Out of America: A black man confronts Africa

Review

Essays

Humanitarian Intervention by Christopher M. Gray

Humanitarian Int-tion: i%e United Nations in an Evolving World Order. By Sean D. Murphy. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996. 427 pp. $59.95.) Children First. 7he Story of UniceA Past and Present. By Maggie Black. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.365 pp. $72.00.) The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Eflectsof Fore&p Aid and International Charity. By Michael Maren. (New York: The Free Press, 1997. 302 pp. $25.00.) Out of America: A B&k Man ConfrontsAftica. By Keith Richburg. (New York: Basic Books, 1997. 256 pp. $24.00.) In 1951,while the United States conducted the Korean War under the aegis of the United Nations, George Santayana expressed deep skepticism about the American-sponsored Parliament of Man: The desire to improvethe world is militancy in excelsis. It involves not only the exercise of power but the miracle of creation: to see mankind adopt one’s thoughts, obey one’s precepts, and draw forever the line between good and evil exactly where we have drawn it. What enterprise could be more ambitious and show a more extraordinary self-confidence than the assumed mission to judge and convert all the rest of the worlcP1

Alas, Santayana’s well-founded doubts about improving the world have not been shared by subsequent U.S. foreign policy elites. American opponents of the Vietnam War often demanded that it be settled by the United Nations, which, thanks to its largely Third World membership, was absolved of sin in the eyes of the New Left. Jimmy Carter’s administration vocally rededicated U.S. foreign policy to the promotion of human rights and foreign aid. And President Bill Clinton and most of his foreign policy advisers shared from their youth this deep faith in the effectiveness and high moral purpose of the United Nations. Although the United Nations indulged anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments during the 1970s and 1980s the future president and his cronies evidently did not despair of the Parliament of Man. Indeed, the end of the Cold War only magnified hopes that our sinful world can be redeemed by means of the United Nations. The Soviet Union, which blocked action by the Security Council for forty-five years, ceased to 1 George Santayana,L@minutions and POUWT(New York: Scrihner’s, 1951), pp. 246-47.

Christopher M. Gmy works as a public policy consultantin the Washington, DC., area. He played a minor role in Operation Provide Relief while working for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in 1992.

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eliist, whereupon Third World countries could no longer exploit the superpower rivalry by “selling” their allegiance (including votes in the United Nations) to the highest bidder. In the new environment the United States found it easy to create a LT.N.-sanctioned coalition to make war on Iraq in 1990-91. and George Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker were careful to win sanction from the United Nations before wooing Congress. United Nations authorization, they judged, would embarrass Congress into supporting the war, but even if Congress rehised, the administration was prepared to proceed on the basis of the authorization. Like Hany Truman and Dean Acheson at the onset of the Korean conflict, Bush and Baker failed to consider the precedent they were setting. The Gulf War’s success persuaded many U.S. and U.N. policy elites that the Parliament of Man might well form the basis for a New World order. If the United Nations could now muster the consensus and force needed to right wrongs involving security, oil, and spheres of influence, so too could it use force on behalf of the humanitarian causes promoted by U.N. agencies such as the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Health Organization (WHO). To be sure. the I_TniteciNations Charter prohibits members from forcehlly interfering within a state’s borders, thus violating their sovereignty. But if the Charter were revised, or interpreted differently, it would become possible to avert massacres, enforce peace and human rights, and uphold democracy inside miscreant or “failed” states. After all, it was far easier to mobilize support for overseas interventions in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly than in the United States Congress.

Making the United Nations Charter a “Living Document” We currently call such good works “humanitarian intervention.” Sean Murphy, a State Department attorney, seeks in his book of that name to sketch the emerging legal doctrine justifying the use of force for humanitarian ends. He studies the conduct of recent U.N. military interventions in Liberia, Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, RWandd, and Haiti, and recognizes that these interventions are almost unprecedented. Hence his effort to generate case law creating criteria and norms for hihIre humanitarian involvements. Murphy traces the intellechlal history of humanitarian intervention back to ancient times. Apparently Aristotle vaguely argued for states to execute justice in other states so that more citizens could share in “the good life.” But Murphy admits Aristotle believed only other Greek states deserved to be treated with justice (pp. 38-39). Barbarians deserved nothing better than enslavement. Christian concern about the conditions of just war constihlted the biggest intellecnial breakthrough for humanitarian intervention and justified war only for self-defense and the punishment of large-scale cruelty. The founder of international law) Hugo Grotius, defended forceful intervention lby outsiders only in order to punish rulers for excessive crimes against their own people (pp. 45%). Immanuel Kant strongly condemned any outside intervention into 144 I Orhis

Review Essays a state’s internal affairs. John Stuart Mill argued that if a people were too cowardly to protect their own liberty, then an outside intervention would not be sustainable. Mill did make an exception: “a protracted civil war” with no prospect of a speedy conclusion justified an outside power’s intervention to force a peace. Mill made this exception after observing analogous civil wars settled by outside interventions in his own time. These various thinkers influenced the writing of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which provides vague authority for forceful humanitarian intervention: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41 empowers the Security Council to use nonmilitary measures such as economic sanctions and interference with communications. Only when these are exhausted can Article 42’s provisions for forceful means be invoked. However, Chapter VII would appear to conflict with the more familiar Article 2 (4) by which AllMembers shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state

Murphy admits that Charter provisions justifying humanitarian intervention “are at tension” with other provisions protecting state autonomy (p. 82). He also grants that Article 2 (4) usually takes precedence over Chapter VII in practice. The United Nations now emphasizes the latter provision because of political pressure, especially American political pressure. But Murphy adheres to the legal fiction that the United States is just a vote in the Security Council, not its main driver. Murphy’s six case studies of humanitarian intervention fail to get beneath the surface of events. They are lucid but bland summaries of newspaper articles and U.N. directives. He observes of U.N. Resolution 814 on Somalia that it “marked the first time that the United Nations itself deployed an armed force with specific orders to use all the force necessary to accomplish its mission” (pp. 238-39). But he fails to discuss the crucial roles played by prestige media, President Clinton, Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, General Colin Powell, and Admiral Jonathan T. Howe in expanding the mission. His case studies on Somalia and Rwanda rely overwhelmingly on reporting by Keith Richburg. Richburg’s and Michael Maren’s books, which do get beneath the surface, will be discussed later in this essay. In his conclusion, Murphy chides nations that begin with unilateral humanitarian interventions (read “United States”), encounter obstacles, and then make the multilateral United Nations the fall guy. “There is too much resistance to the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention,” he scolds, “and too much variance in the conditions under which such interventions occur” (p. 386). The Cold War is over, so realists cannot plead deadlock in the Security Council. But Winter

1998 I 145

Review Essays Murphy fails to confront why the Clinton administration likes to run for the tall grass of the United Nations whenever its lack of strategy and resolution become apparent.

The Guilt Industry Professional altruists in nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) fuel the rage for humanitarian intervention. Some famous NGOs are Save the Children, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, and the biggest of all, UNICEF. Maggie Black’s history of UNICEF may seem out of place in this essay, but in fact illuminates the “development” mentality at work. Humanitarian intervention cannot be understood without understanding the “development” creed and the NGOs, government agencies, and universities that constitute its church. UNICEF proclaims sentimentally that children are the only sacred objects in our secular world. Maggie Black, an English globalist, fUlly subscribes to that dogma. Her book is a distillation of world nannyism. Children First crisply nanates and analyzes the activities of UNICEF during James Grant’s executive directorship from 1980 to 1995. Grant ( 1922-95) was the American son of a medical missionary who became a dynamic missionary for “development>” or foreign aid. Unlike most visionary do-gooders, he actually accomplished some genuine improvements in public health and immunization during his tenure. Grant, an official of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the 196Os, was one of the many technocrats inspired by JFK’s vision of a Third World saved by First World idealists, ideas, and tools. Black informs us that Grant clung to his New Frontier hopes until he died (p. 15). After grasping LJhKEF’s helm, Grdnt set out to reduce Third World child mortality. His planning criterion was “doability.” LJnlike his fellow devc+ opment bureaucrats, Grant sought some concrete accomplishments. Cheap. available technologies and procedures to ameliorate child mortzzlity already existed: child growth monitoring, sanitary water supplies, oral rehydration for childhood diarrhea, breastfeeding for children, and immunization. Grant set achievable worldwide goals based on these practices. Then he pressured national rulers, fellow U.N. bureaucrats, NGOs, religious leaders, civic groups, and celebrities (Liv Ullmann and Audrey Hepburn, e.g.) to enact them. Grant drummed up publicity relentlessly. He used UNICEF’s clecentralized field stmcture to mobilize civil society in such countries as India, Bangladesh. Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil, and Mexico. He convinced the communist rulers of China and Vietnam that reducing child mortality was in their interest. Grant wisely refused to allow UNICEF to become involved in artificial contraception and abortion policy. He knew how loathsome such measures were in much of the Third World. He also recognized that reducing child mortality usually motivated parents to lower their reproduction rate (pp. 191-92). By 146 I Orbis

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dint of his efforts and tact, Grant accomplished over 60 percent of his child mortality reduction targets. Yet Grant also did much damage to the Third World poor by clinging to his New Frontier understanding of foreign aid. Before 1980 UNICEF confined itself to immediate disaster relief rather than long-term development. Under Grant “UNICEF transformed itself into an activist agency of an international development agenda.“2 Many Third World countries played prodigally with loans and aid during the overseas development assistance aid (ODA) boom years of the 1960s and 1970s. The World Bank’s president at the time, Robert McNamara, bears much responsibility for dispensing this easy credit. The prodigal countries soon found themselves suffering from heavy debt service, market distortion, and economic stag- Many Third nation during the 1980s. Western banks then put them on a world strict diet of market-oriented reforms, fEca1 austerity, and interest countries repayment to nurse back their economies. Bankers call this “structural adjustment” (SA), but UNICEF has railed against SA played since 1980 and accuses it of endangering the lives of children. prodigally Black echoes the party line on SA. She calls the 1980s with foreign a time “in which ‘development’ as both a concept and a crusade was at a nadir,” and bemoans “the anti-internationalism of the aid during the Reagan-Thatcher years” (p. 154). She neglects to discuss how “boom years.” Lord P.T. Bauer intellectually discredited the conventional wisdom of development economics during the 1970s. Bauer demonstrated with irrefutable evidence how development assistance harmed poor countries much more than it helped them.3 Margaret Thatcher listened to Bauer’s message and sacked Richard Jolly, the Labour government’s adviser on development, when she became prime minister in 1979. Grant at UNICEF then immediately rehired Jolly to lead the UNICEF attack on SA and demand “adjustment with a human face” in order to spare budget cutbacks in children’s services. In practice, “adjustment with a human face” meant suspending debt repayment schedules. ~011~refused to see that SA was the best chance for mismanaged Third World and former communist economies to achieve prosperity. Children Fin-t nowhere mentions Bauer and his American student, Nicholas Eberstadt.” Although they are now the foremost critics of development economics, Black spends no time discussing their ample scholarship and increasing political influence. Instead she repeats the buzzword of “sustainable development” which appears to mean continuing the same failed dirigisme. As Eberstadt has dryly observed:

1 Nicholas Ekrstadt, “U.N. Development Disasters,” Washington li:mes, Sept. 4, 1997, sec. A, p. 21. 3 P.T. Bauer, LXwnt on Lkwlopment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Bauer, Equali& the 7bird World, and Economic LMusion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Bauer, Reali(s and Rhetoric (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). 4 See Nicholas Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American Purpose (Washington, D.C.: Al3 Press, 1988).

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In UNICEF‘s

view. market-oriented refomls, privatization of state-owned enterprises, liherdlizecl tratlc arrangements and smaller, more limitetl govemment are, on the whole, hdZd&LlS to chilclrren. By contrast, reciLlced defense spending, augmented social welfare hudget5, enhanced Sdte control over local economic activity, greater state-to-state aicl flows, and a more overarching restructuring of international trade ancl finance for

low-income areas are generally ciescribed as children-friendly.i

A more detached historian than Black might observe how structural adjustment has in fact improved the lot of Third World children by restricting the ability of incompetent governments to harm them through ill-conceived and con-upt “socialist” policies dependent on bureaucrats and First World handouts. But Black reveals her anachronistic outlook when she describes communist Vietnam and China as states that truly care about their citizens. She mentions without irony how “Vietnamese women were having to weather the profound social changes accompanying the process of economic transition” (p. 225), and gushes that .‘China-the cradle of so many public health innovations-had made spectacular progress in reducing matemal mortality” (p. 204). Black never questions whether China’s rulers may lie about health statistics just as they lie about coerced infanticide, torture, religious persecution, and slave labor. James Bumham observed that Eleanor Roosevelt regarded the entire world as her personal slum project.” The same observation holds for Black. She devotes chapters to utopian UNICEF efforts to export feminism, environmentalism, and education to half the world’s population. She also adopts a hectoring tone when writing about the chauvinism of U.N. executives and Third World tribalist5 (pp. 212-14) and bemoans how resistant to change much of the world is. So humorless and insensitive to human imperfection is her account that the reader almost experiences relief when war-induced disasters in subSaharan Afric.a, eastern Europe, and Latin America demonstrate the irrelevance of UNICEF’s utopian missions and force it to return to its original mission of disaster relief.

Country Ruined by Charity Michael Maren loathes the mind-set represented by Black as his subtitle, i%e Ravaging Effects of Fore&n Aid and International Charity, indicates. An eyewitness to the Somalian intervention, Maren is even more critical of ODA than Hauer or Eberstadt (pp. 11-12): I.ikr mOst people ~1 the linitetl States ancl Western Europe, I’ve hearcl the pk?dS of aicl organizations ancl boasts of their accomplishments in the Third World, hut the Africa 1 know

today

is in much

worse

addetl a whole new dimension

shape

than it was

when

I first arrived

to my view of the aid business.

My experience

So~xalia there

Review Essays has made me see that aid could be worse than incompetent and inadvertently destructive. It could be positively evil.

Maren is an old Africa hand who began as a Peace Corps worker in 1977, then did stints with Catholic Relief Services and USAID. Unlike New Frontiersman and fellow AID official, James Grant, Maren lost his faith in good intentions early on when he saw two-thirds of USAID’s 1979-81 food aid to Somalia fail to reach its destination. The food was stolen by Somalia’s various clan warlords and sold to supply them with soldiers and weapons. This Conradian experience led him to a career writing terse angry prose about the West’s relations with Africa. Maren sees Somalia as a parable of Western exploitation of the Dark Continent. To some extent, his New Left outlook is true. The U.S. government and the U.N. agencies and NGOs it fimds probably would not have poured so much money into the country if neighboring Ethiopia had not become a Soviet satellite. Mohammed Siyaad Barre, the thuggish warlord who ruled Somalia from 1969 to 1991, aligned the country with the USSR between 1970 and 1977. He lost Soviet sponsorship in 1977 after his clients secured strategically more vital Ethiopia. In a typical Cold War game of double blackmail, Barre then secured U.S. aid in 1980. America held its nose and dealt with Somalia because the Horn of Africa was an important choke point. Barre and his lackeys were satiated with American riches. They stole and exploited Western aid with impunity. Clan leaders like Mohammed Farah-Aidid who led gangs against Barre also exploited the aid. As Maren acidly observes: For ten years before the famine of 1992, Somalia was the largest recipient of aid in sub-Saharan Africa, and in some years the third largest in the world behind perennial leaders Egypt and Israel. But most of Somalia’s six million people never saw a penny. Much of what wasn’t filtered out to pay the expenses of the relief agency was lost in the corrupt maze of the Somali government’s nepotistic bureaucracy. Only the wiliest and most entrepreneurial of Somalia’s people ever saw any tangible benefits from the aid. That money went to Somali bureaucrats whose primary skill was in earning money dealing with foreign charities. And when money did drip down to the people it was used in ways designed by a government desperately trying to cling to its diminishing power. As Somalia stood on the brink of chaos in 1990, it was utterly dependent on foreign aid (p. 24).

Fieldworkers for the relief agencies knew that aid was corrupting the country. Maren and some colleagues begged their superiors at AID in 1980-81 to consider the consequences of the stolen assistance; they were silenced. NGO officials who testified about aid fraud met the same fate. He satirizes the notion of “sustainable development” (pp. 4648) solemnly intoned by Black. The phrase was just a means of prolonging ODA. In 1994, Maren managed to gain access to the confidential files of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva. UNHCR, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and UNICEF were the primary agencies operating in Somalia. Maren discovered that UNHCR officials Winter

1998 I 149

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knew the money they were shelling out for CARE in Somalia was disappearing into the pockets of Somali clan leaders: Every clocument

ancl confidential

of the relief operation, politically

showing

ckiven fiasco pushing

of this, the L1.N. agencies, the

contrdcfs.

They

during the 1980s

memo over a nine-year

period concernecl

that everyone

at every level knew it W:U,;I

Somalia

involved

to the eclge of anarchy.

Yet through all

CARE, and other NGOs stayed in Somalia.

stayed

for the money.

They

were.

the politics

in every

They stayed for

sense

of the worcl,

(p. 135).

mercenaries

This reviewer once worked for UiVTHCRand can testify to Maren’s accuracy about how politically driven the agency is. But, as Eberstadt notes, Maren’s conspiratorial mind-set leads him to misunderstand why humanitarian aid usually fails. Maren blames the greed of NGOs and American grain merchants for aid failures, and proposes more federal regulation. But as Eberstadt observes. “the real flaws of the humanitarian aid programs Maren describes do not derive from a shortage of government oversight; in large part, they can be traced to a surfeit of government influence.“’ Bounteous U.S. government grants subsidize the waste and market distortions created by AID, U.N. agencies, and NGOs. Maren criticizes Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) for not understanding the foreign aid system, but Helms does understand why aid abuse occurs. His proposed reorganization of AID and the United Nations addresses the “surfeit of government influence.” Remove the subsidies and incentives for waste and most aid abuses will end. Maren understands the politics of the media, Pentagon, and United Nations better than the politics of the market. He reminds us how the forgotten U.S. Marine airlift, Operation Provide Relief, began delivering food to starving Somalis during the late summer of 1992. Available statistics demonstrate that the worst of the famine ended by October 1992 (pp. 204-13)> yet indignant Western journalists, listening to U.N. agency and NGO officials, insisted a humanitarian military invasion was necessary to end the suffering. Keith Richburg, the Wa&irgton Post’s Africa correspondent and a friend of Maren’s. frankly admits that he clamored for a full-scale intervention without reflecting on the consequences (p. 59): HereI’llhaveto a&nit in

that I was among those early believers

just a lunch

of teenage

kicls with ourdated.

in terror at the first sight of ;I well-annecl landing

that a military

inWl~wItiOn

coulcl work ant1 that the Unitecl States should lead ir. Afier all. these were

Somalia

at Mogaclishu’s

hacl matTeled

airport.

at the pinpoint

rusty weapons paratrooper

Like rvelyone accuracy

no American

inrerest

desire to relieve

7 Nicholas Ekentadt.

150 I Orbis

interventionism,

at stake

human

other

mdking a helicopter

else, I hdd watched

of America’s

high-technology

what better place than Africa, in the midst of a devastating a new kind of American

who we~-e likely to scdtter

or marine

a benevolent,

than the collective

the Gulf war

ancl

weaponly.

Ancl

famine. to raise the flag for selfless

interventionism.

revulsion

at violence

suffering?

“Aid Harms the

Hungry."

Weeklv Standaxi,

Mar. 17, 1997, p. 37.

with and :I

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The journalists beat the drums for an intervention and the politicians and generals decided to respond in November 1992, though for different reasons. President Bush was a lame duck who sought to leave office with a noble gesture. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Powell wanted to avoid a costly quagmire in Bosnia. They also wanted to limit post-Cold War defense budget cutbacks by demonstrating how usefiA the Pentagon could be in humanitarian emergencies. They both believed the mission to Somalia was “doable” (Maren, p, 251). U.N. secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in turn, wanted to enhance the profile and power of the United Nations by rebuilding a collapsed nation. So these officials authorized Operation Restore Hope, the American-led U.N. military intervention in Somalia. None of these offkials understood the actual situation in Somalia and neither did the new Clinton foreign policy team. They all saw the country as a prime opportunity to demonstrate how “assertive multilateralism” could improve the world. They would pioneer the new concept of peace enforcement and burnish their own images. As Smith Hempstone, American ambassador to Kenya, publicly warned in a lonely dissent, “If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu” (Richburg, p. 59). The initial food-delivery mission conducted by the marines was uneventful. But General Charles Wilhelm, the marine commander and a Beirut veteran, took care not to get involved with local clan rivalries. The army troops who replaced the marines did not follow their example. They began shooting up the city in vain attempts to impose order. Hempstone’s prophecy came true in October 1993 in the streets of Mogadishu when eighteen American Rangers were killed in a futile effort to kidnap Mohammad Farah-Aidid, regarded by Clinton’s advisers as the primary “threat to peace.” Contrary to myth, those American troops were under the direct control of President Clinton and were acting under the American-sponsored U.N. Resolution 814, an ambitious, nation-building, peace-enforcing order drafted by Powell’s staff at the Pentagon. The resolution reflected an utter misunderstanding of Somalian conditions and circumstances. Maren shows that almost nothing it ordered was “doable,” since the resolution did not reflect the surreal circumstances of Mogadishu so vividly conveyed by Maren and Richburg. When the Somalia peace intervention turned sour, the Clinton administration blamed the United Nations for Resolution 814, and got away with it because the Rwanda and Haiti humanitarian interventions distracted attention from the Somalian fiasco. Clinton pulled out American troops in March 1994. Third World peacekeeping troops guarded U.N. agencies in Somalia for another year until the Parliament of Man called it quits. Richburg admits: “Somalia dashed the world’s hopes-and mine-that Africa might somehow become the testing ground for the New World Order and the idea of benign military intervention” (p. 85). Richburg and Maren both admit that the media abused its enormous power when it compelled the Somalia intervention. Tne former excoriates himself “for having been so wrong, for setting myself up for the betrayal” (Richburg, p. 89). The night before American troops pulled out of Mogadishu, Winter 1998 I 151

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Maren heard the few reporters left there admit that they were to blame for the Somalian intervention. They had succumbed to emotion instead of carefully thinking through the situation (Maren, pp. 203-4).

Conclusion

Except for Rwanda, where the mission was confined to disaster relief, U.S. and U.N. officials failed to think through their successive humanitarian interventions. The Haitian and Bosnian peace enforcement missions have likewise been analyzed by Mark Falcoff, Charles Lane, and A.J. Bacevich and found wanting in strategic sense and accomplishment.” It appears that as soon as the troops withdraw, Haiti and Bosnia will revert to their troubled conditions just as Somalia did. Unlike Richburg, the Clinton foreign policy team refuses to recognize that improving the world is simply beyond the abilities of America and the United Nations, and that the American public, which puts up the money and soldiers for the failed crusades, will not stand for the consequent humiliations and failures. But the Clinton team, as Bacevich put it, has yet to learn that “Absent clearly stated objectives and a persuasive rationale pointing to substantial American interests at stake, the first sign of trouble will provoke a public backlash.“” How long will it take before Americans imbibe Santayana’s wisdom, and understand the wrong-headed and even malevolent purposes to which good intentions are put?

Restore Democracy‘ Restored.” Commmtaq2 May 1996. pp ‘ti-4: lane, “Island of Disenchantment: Haiti’s Deteriorating Democracy,” NW Kepztbhc, Sept. 29. 199’, pp. 17-21; AJ. Bncevich, “Hunked Down in Bosnia,” Wee/z&Sta:tandard,July 22, 1006. pp. 12-l-t. ‘I A:l. Hacevich, “Learning from Aidid.” Commentan: Dec. 1993. p. 33.

8 Mark Falcotf “What ‘Operation

~;harles

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