Parliamentary and presidential elections in Mauritania, 2006 and 2007

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President’s party and no representation from the opposition. Consequently, the constitutional changes introduced with the intention of advancing democracy in Kazakhstan are now of little value. With a compliant parliament dominated by his own party, President Nazarbayev has consolidated his authority over all branches of the political system. The election had little impact on the government formed, as most of the same ministers remained in post. The opposition in any form is now completely marginalised from the political process. It is likely that all their attempts at contesting the results through the courts will amount to little, as judicial procedures in Kazakhstan are sympathetic to the authorities. With no elections to contest until the 2011 local elections, the opposition and the other political parties face a considerable time outside the political process. Possibly, in this intervening period, the parties e loyal opposition and outright opposition alike e may turn their attention to working more closely with the people and strengthening their party organisations. Despite criticising the electoral process, the OSCE designated Kazakhstan as Chair of the organisation for 2010 at a meeting held at the end of November 2007 in Madrid. Overall, however, the result could prove damaging to Kazakhstan’s international reputation. Despite the apparent air of stability that the election result gives President Nazarbayev, the long-term effect could be de-stabilising. By again having a fraudulent electoral process that disenfranchises voters, the President has

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failed to let out any steam in the system. Over time, pressure may grow, not just among opposition elites but also among the electorate at large. Most authoritarian regimes eventually fall to political and popular pressure for greater pluralism. President Nazarbayev is potentially storing up this problem for a later date. Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust who funded the field research during the 2006e2007 academic year which made it possible to be present in Kazakhstan during the election. References AK Zhol, 2007. Ty dostoin svoei mechty! (Pre-election programme.) ANSDP, 2007. Za Novyi Kazakhstana! (Pre-election programme.) Buluktaev, Y., et al., 1998. Politicheskie Partii kazakhstana: Spravochnik. IPK, Almaty. Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2002. About Political Parties (with 2005, 2006, and 2007 amendments). Nur Otan, 2007. Za protsvetanie Kazakhstana I blagopoluchie Kazakhstantsev. (Pre-election programme.) Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 2007. Novyi Kazakhstan v novom mire. (Presidential Annual Address, February.) Available from: www.akorda.kz. OSCE/ODIHR, 2004. Election Observation Mission Report, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections. 19 September, 3 October, and 15 December, Warsaw. OSCE/ODIHR, 2007. Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, International Election Observer Mission, Parliamentary Election of Kazakhstan. 18 August.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.12.001

Parliamentary and presidential elections in Mauritania, 2006 and 2007 Ahmed Aghrout  European Studies Research Institute, University of Salford, Salford, Manchester M5 4WT, UK

1. Background  Tel.: þ44 (0)161 295 5614; fax: þ44 (0)161 295 2818. E-mail address: [email protected]

In August 2005 a bloodless military coup ended the 21 years of President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya’s

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Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

authoritarian regime in Mauritania.1 With military coups having occurred in 1978, 1979, and 1984, the 2005 coup was the most recent of a series marking the country’s postindependence history. Ould Taya had seized power in 1984 and became head of the Comite´ Militaire de Salut National (Military Committee for National Salvation). From 1991, Ould Taya initiated constitutional reforms legalising multiparty politics in Mauritania, which paved the way for the country’s first multiparty elections.2 In reality, the reforms, called le tournant de´mocratique de 1991e1992, were intended merely to legitimise a discredited political regime (International Crisis Group, 2006). Successive elections, presidential and legislative, enabled Ould Taya to tighten his grip on power and saw Mauritania become, de facto, a one-party state. Thus, the 2005 coup signified both a rupture in the autocratic rule of Ould Taya and the Parti Re´publicain De´mocratique et Social (Democratic and Social Republican Party, PRDS) and renewed hope for democratic development.3 After the coup, leaders of the 17-member Conseil Militaire pour la Justice et la De´mocratie (Military Council for Justice and Democracy, CMJD) pledged they would remain in power for no more than two years, during which they would ‘‘create favourable conditions for an open and transparent democratic game in which civil society and political actors can freely take part’’ (Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 3 August 2005; translation). A number of important measures were taken by the CMJD during this transitional military phase (August 2005eMarch 2007) prior to the holding of elections (Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2005). In September 2005, a general amnesty for political prisoners, particularly coup plotters and alleged Islamic extremists,4 and the CMJD organised ‘national consultation’ days in October to discuss ways for a speedy return to constitutional rule.5 Setting up the Commission Electorale Nationale Inde´pendante (National Independent Electoral Commission, CENI) and an election timetable were the key issues discussed during this national consultation (Ordonnance, 2005). Another milestone was the June 1

The coup was initially condemned by the United Nations, the African Union, and the European Commission. 2 A new constitution, replacing the 1964 constitution, was adopted in a referendum in July 1991. 3 See Pazzanita (1996) for further details. 4 Amongst those released was Colonel Salah Ould Henena, a leading figure in the failed coup attempt against President Ould Taya in June 2003. 5 The CMJD adopted a decree confirming the ineligibility of members of the Council and the transitional government to take part in the scheduled elections.

2006 referendum that approved major constitutional changes (Middle East Online, 2006), which included limiting the presidential term to five years for a maximum of two consecutive terms and a clause making the two-term restriction unalterable (Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2006).6 It was against this backdrop that Mauritania returned to democratic practices. The elections were intended to return the country to civilian rule and constitutional normality (Le Monde, 2007), the final stage of a political transition under military rule. The parliamentary elections were held on 19 November and 3 December 2006 for the National Assembly (al-Jamiya al-Wataniya) and on 21 January and 4 February for the Senate (Majlis al-Shuyukh). These were followed by the presidential election on 11 and 25 March 2007. 2. Electoral system The three elections were conducted under different electoral rules. The 95 members of the National Assembly were elected by universal suffrage to serve a 5-year term.7 Deputies were elected using a mixed voting system: 64 members were elected from a mix of 20 single-member and 22 two-member constituencies using a two-round majority system to represent 42 of the country’s 45 constituencies (Moughatas); 17 deputies are elected from the three large cities (Nouakchott 11, Nouadhibou 3, and Selibaby 3) in multi-seat constituencies with party-list proportional representation; and 14 deputies were elected by proportional representation on a nationwide basis. The 56-member Senate is indirectly elected and senators serve 6-year terms; one-third of Senate seats are renewed every two years. Municipal councillors elect 53 senators by simple majority in single-member constituencies and three senators are chosen by the elected senators to represent the Mauritanian community living abroad. The president is elected by direct universal suffrage using a two-round system to ensure an absolute majority; the president serves a 5-year term.8 3. Parties and presidential candidates Mauritania has undergone notable political change since the overthrow of Ould Taya. The legalisation of 6 Under the 1991 constitution, the president served six-year terms for an indefinite number of terms. 7 The previous assembly (2001e2005) consisted of 81 members. 8 From 2007, the presidential mandate is renewable only once (Ordonnance, 2007).

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

multipartism in the 1990s benefited mainly the PRDS which dominated Mauritanian politics until the 2005 military coup, and renamed as the Parti Re´publicain pour la De´mocratie et le Renouveau (Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal, PRDR) afterwards. Of the 35 officially registered political parties, 28 contested the parliamentary electiondthe largest number everdalong with several independent candidates. In all, independents represented 30% of all candidates; various major political forces, especially the former opposition, criticised the ruling junta for being behind the proliferation of independent candidates. Prior to the parliamentary election, two major coalitions were formed between several different political parties. These coalitions included the 11-party Coalition des Forces du Changement De´mocratique (Coalition of Forces for Democratic Change, CFCD) established in May 2006 (Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2006). The CFCD brought together former major opposition parties, such as the Rassemblement des Forces De´mocratiques (Rally of Democratic Forces, RFD), Union des Forces du Progre`s (Union of Forces of Progress, UFP), Alliance Populaire Progressiste (People’s Progressive Alliance, APP), and Parti Mauritanien pour l’Unite´ et le Changement (Mauritanian Party for Unity and Change, PMUC).9 The other major coalition, alMithaq (Convention), was formed in January 2007 and consisted of independents and parties formerly associated with Ould Taya’s regime (Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2007). Among other parties, al-Mithaq included the PRDR, the former ruling party; Union pour la De´mocratie et le Progre`s (Union for Democracy and Progress, UDP); Rassemblement pour la De´mocratie et l’Unite´ (Rally for Democracy and Unity, RDU); Union du Centre De´mocratique (Union of the Democratic Centre, UCD); El-Badil (Alternative); and independent moderate Islamists.10 There were 20 contenders in the presidential election, 8 from political parties and 12 independents. The principal contestants were the long-time opposition figure and RFD leader, Ahmed Ould Daddah, formerly governor of Mauritania’s central bank; Zeine Ould Zeidane, a technocrat who had served as chief of Mauritania’s central bank during the CMJD’s government; Saleh Ould Hanena, leader of the failed 2003 coup attempt against Ould Taya; and Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, an economist who 9 The CFCD also included six other small parties; three of these subsequently left the CFCD coalition to set up El-Watan, a new coalition. 10 Al-Mithaq included 12 other small political parties.

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had served several times as a minister. Abdallahi benefited from the support of the al-Mithaq coalition and many viewed him as the candidate representing the ruling junta. Note, too, that three black candidates (descendants of freed black slaves) took part in the presidential contest.11 This indicates significant progress for the black community in a society divided along ethnic and regional lines and long dominated by the white Moors group. 4. Electoral campaigns By and large, the campaigns for parliamentary and presidential elections were conducted in a peaceful environment with no serious incidents reported (Mission d’observation e´lectorale de l’Union europe´enne (MOE/ UE), 2007). The campaigns were marked by a ‘‘great deal of folklore and a few programmes’’ (Arab Election Watch, 2006; Nouakchott Info, 2006). Tents were erected in almost all electoral districts and in Nouakchott, the capital. These attracted large crowds of people, where they ‘‘spent pleasant nights in the tents, drinking peppermint-flavoured tea with poets reciting poetry praising the candidates and singers singing for this or that candidate’’ (Arab Election Watch, 2006). The campaigns proved the poorer for the lack of real political debate. The commitments of the parties and the independents about economic, social, and political reforms were fairly vague. Even so, the promise to break off relations with Israel was received with satisfaction by a large proportion of voters (Arab Election Watch, 2006).12 In many instances, the information for voters gave more emphasis to explaining how to tick a ballot paper than presenting clear political programmes (Mission d’observation e´lectorale de l’Union europe´enne (MOE/UE), 2007). Throughout the presidential campaign, candidates held public meetings in various cities in their efforts to attract votes. Three presidential candidatesdAbdallahi, Ould Daddah, and Ould Zeidanedhad more resources than the other contenders.13 From early on in the campaign, the state-controlled electronic and print media showed bias in favour of these three candidates; even, in certain instances, in favour of Abdallahi, viewed as the regime’s favoured candidate. During the second 11 The candidates were Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Ibrahima Moctar Sarr, and Ba Mamadou Alassane; between them, they won some 18% of the vote in the first round. 12 Mauritania established full diplomatic relations with Israel in October 1999, the third Arab state after Egypt and Jordan. 13 Their resources came from private sources; institutional support was mainly confined to media access.

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Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

week of the campaign, however, the media attempted to rectify this imbalance by reducing the coverage of the leading candidates (Reporters sans Frontie`res, 2007).

Table 1 Results of the National Assembly election, 19 November and 3 December 2006 Party/Coalition

1st Round (seats)

2nd Round (seats)

Total seats

Independents Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) Union of Forces of Progress (UFP) Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal (PRDR) Popular Progressive Alliance (APP) Union for Democracy and Progress (UDP) Rally for Democracy and Unity (RDU) Mauritanian Party for Union and Change (PMUC) PMUCeAPP RFDeUFP Democratic Renewal (RD) Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) Alternative Popular Front (FP) Social Democratic Unionist Party (PUDS) National Rally for Liberty, Democracy and Equality (RNLDE)

10 12

31 3

41 15

3

5

8

4

3

7

4

1

5

1

2

3

2

1

3

2

0

2

0 0 2

2 2 0

2 2 2

0

1

1

0 1 1

1 0 0

1 1 1

1

0

1

Total

43

52

95

5. Election results The parliamentary and presidential elections were monitored by foreign observers. The European Union, in particular, deployed an election observation mission (EOM) and contributed V6 million to the organisation and supervision of the elections.14 Even though the EOM underlined in its final report a number of deficiencies in the electoral process, it raised no major concerns about them and expressed its satisfaction for their ‘‘orderly and transparent conduct’’ (Mission d’observation e´lectorale de l’Union europe´enne (MOE/UE), 2007, pp. 5e7). With something more than a million registered electors, turnout for the National Assembly election was 72.4% in the first round and 69.5% in the second. The relatively high participation rate underscored voters’ enthusiasm for an elected civilian government and their high expectations of the post-Ould Taya’s era.15 The published results for the parliamentary election do not give the distribution of the vote for each party but only seat distributions by parties, blocs, and independent candidates. These are reported in Table 1. The CFCDdthe former oppositiondwon a remarkable 38 seats in the National Assembly. The RFD, the main party in the coalition, won 15 seats; the UFP won 8 seats and APP won 5. The former governing party (PRDR) won only 7 seats.16 Overall, the al-Mithaq bloc, which included independent candidates, managed to secure 57 seats in the new National Assembly. The other major winners in the election were the independent candidates with 41 seats, many of whom are regarded as Islamists.17 The al-Mithaq bloc also gained 38 seats in the Senate. Although the CFCD did not do as well as hoped for, winning only 15 seats, the result should give the CFCD much greater influence and involvement in the law-making process than its marginal representation in previous legislatures (Africa Research Bulletin, 2006). Again, the independents performed well, securing 34 seats, so constituting two-thirds of Senate seats. 14 There were also observers from the Arab League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the African Union. 15 Turnout was 55% in the 2001 parliamentary election. 16 The PRDR (standing as the PRDS) had won 70 out of 79 seats in 1996 and 67 seats out of 79 in 1992. In the 2001 election, it won 64 out of 81 seats. 17 Islamic parties were banned, so their candidates could only stand as independent candidates or under the banner of other political parties.

First round: registered electors 1,073,287; total votes 788,029; invalid votes 122,716. Turnout 73.4%. Second round: registered voters 632,956; total votes 439,835; invalid votes 27,289. Turnout 69.5%. The second round electorate consists of registered electors for the 33 constituencies where a second round took place. Source: Agence Mauritanienne d’Information: first round: http:// www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2006/novembre/22/17.html; second round: http://www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2006/decembre/4/18.html.

Equally noteworthy in a conservative society were the gains made by women in these elections, particularly significant given their traditionally low level of participation. In line with the 20% gender quota set up by the transitional authorities for the first time in Mauritania’s history, women won 18 seats in the National Assembly and 9 seats in the Senate. This led Mauritania to have ‘‘the second-highest proportion of women representatives in the entire Middle East and North Africa region’’ (National Democratic Institute, 2007). The presidential election was the last stage in the process of handing over power to democratic

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

institutions. Turnout in the first round was 70.1%. No candidate won an overall majority but Abdallahi and Ould Daddah emerged as the top two candidates, so entered the second round. Both advocated rather similar policies, especially on issues related to social inequality, slavery, national unity, and the like. The key to the outcome in the second round, however, had much more to do with the new alliances concluded in the interim than the candidates’ respective platforms (Makrane Ait Ouarabi, 2007). Abdallahi enjoyed not only the backing of the al-Mithaq alliance (and presumably the military junta) but also the support of several candidates from the first round, such as Ould Zeidane (14.3%) and Ould Boulkheir (9.8%).18 Although Ould Daddah, the veteran opposition leader of the CFCD, had the backing of other candidates, he managed to win only in Nouakchott, and in the Inchiri and Trarza regions. Abdallahi triumphed in Mauritania’s remaining 11 regions. Certainly, the desertion of Ould Boulkheirda member of the CFCD with whom Ould Daddah shared a long history of fighting against nepotism and political tyrannydworked against Ould Daddah’s bid for the presidency (African Press Agency, 2007). Ultimately, Abdallahi was proclaimed the winner of the presidential contest after garnering some 53% of the vote to Ould Daddah’s 47%. See Table 2. 6. Implications Conducted in a reasonably free and fair way, the parliamentary and presidential elections in Mauritania mark the conclusion of the political transition under military rule and the restoration of democratically elected institutions. The return to civilian government may herald hopes of a new era of pro-democracy reforms in the country. The process will take time to bear fruit. Meanwhile, the new leadership is faced with immediate challenges which, if not addressed, might erode the prospects for democratisation. The elections reported here will not have any marked effect on the balance of power, traditionally tilted towards the executive. This means that the presidency will have the upper hand over the parliament in initiating reforms. Thus, critical to the success of the presidency is the ability to keep the military out of politics and to deal with the most pressing social problems such as racial tensions, vestiges of slavery, the return of 18 Ould Zeidane and Ould Boulkheir were well rewarded for their support: the former was appointed prime minister, and the second elected president of the National Assembly.

389

Table 2 Results of the presidential election in Mauritania, 11 and 25 March 2007 Candidate (Party)

1st Round Votes

Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi Ahmed Ould Daddah (RFD) Zeine Ould Zeidane Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (APP) Ibrahima Moctar Sarr Saleh Ould Hanena (PMUC) Mohamed Ould Maouloud (UFP) Dahane Ould Ahmed Mahmoud Mohamed Ould Cheikhna Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla Ethmane Ould Cheikh Ebi El Maali Ba Mamadou Alassane (PLEJ) Mohamed Ahmed Ould Baba Ahmed Ould Salihi Moulaye El Hacen Ould Jeid (PMRC) Chbih Ould Cheikh Malainine Rajel dit Rachid Moustapha (PMR) Sidi Ould Isselmou Ould Mohamed Ahid Isselmou Ould El Moustapha (PCD) Mohamed Ould Mohamed El Moctar Ould Tomi Mohamed Ould Ghoulam Ould Sidaty

2nd Round

Votes Votes (%)

Votes (%)

183,743 24.8 373,519 52.9 153,242 113,194 72,611 58,818 56,718 30,265 15,316 14,265 12,807 10,874 4078 2789

20.7 15.3 9.8 7.9 7.7 4.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 0.6 0.4

333,184 e e e e e e e e e e e

47.1 e e e e e e e e e e e

2536 0.3 e

e

2117 0.3 e 1976 0.3 e 1804 0.2 e

e e e

1790 0.2 e 1470 0.2 e

e e

653 0.1

First round: registered voters 1,134,774; total votes 795,083; invalid votes 54,017. Turnout 70.1%. Second round: registered voters 1,132,176; total votes 764,045; invalid votes 57,342. Turnout 67.5%. Source: Agence Mauritanienne d’Information: first round: http:// www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2007/mars/12/78.html; second round: http:// www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2007/mars/26/50.html.

refugees, and the living standards of the population. In particular, the recent exploitation of oil could give the authorities more resources to improve social conditions in a country where about one person out of two lives in poverty. The recently adopted law criminalising slavery for the first time is a positive sign, but Mauritania has a long way to go to achieve national unity among people of multi-ethnic groups and establish genuine democratic government. References African Press Agency, 2007. How Sidi Ould Abdallahi won the Mauritanian presidential election. 27 March. At: http://apanews. net/spip.php?page¼show_article&;id_article¼24342. Africa Research Bulletin, 2006. Mauritania: Opposition Leads. 1e31 December. Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2005. Le Conseil Militaire pour la Justice et la De´mocratie publie un communique´. 3 August.

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Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2006. Un groupe de partis politiques annonce la cre´ation d’une coalition des forces du changement. 26 May. Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2007. De´claration annonc¸ant le regroupement au sein d’une charte de 18 partis politiques. 8 January. Arab Election Watch, 2006. Legislative elections in Mauritania. 13 December. At: http://www.intekhabat.org. International Crisis Group, 2006. La transition politique en Mauritanie: Bilan et perspectives. Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord 53, pp. 2e6. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2006. April, p. 47189. Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2005. September, p. 46812. Le Monde, 2007. 26 March. At: http://www.lemonde.fr/. Middle East Online, 2006. Mauritania’s constitution gets 96.96% yes vote. 28 June. At: http://www.middle-east-online.com. Mission d’observation e´lectorale de l’Union europe´enne (MOE/UE), 2007. Rapport Final. Mission d’observation e´lectorale de l’Union europe´enne en Mauritanie. March. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.12.006

Mokrane Ait Ouarabi, 2007. Election pre´sidentielle en MauritaniedLa course pour le second tour a commence´. El-Watan, 14 March, p. 15. National Democratic Institute, 2007. Women are transforming Mauritanian politics. At: http://winwithwomen.ndi.org. Nouakchott Info, 2006. Campagne e´lectoraledSilence, on dance. 13 November. At: http://www.akhbarnouakchott.com/imagesprg/zeit_ 411_1.pdf. Ordonnance, 2005. Cre´ation de la Commission Electorale Nationale Inde´pendante. 14 November. Ordonnance, 2007. Modifiant et comple´tant certaines dispositions de l’ordonnance du 7 octobre 1991 portant loi organique relative a` l’e´lection du pre´sident de la re´publique. 3 January. Pazzanita, A., 1996. The origins and evolution of Mauritania’s second republic. The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (4), 575e596. Reporters sans Frontie`res, 2007. Public media rise to challenge of providing balanced, neutral coverage of historic election. 27 March. At: http://www.rsf.org.