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Participation and power equalization
0RGANIZATIONAL BEttAVIOR A:ND I3[U~CIA~2~ " PERFORI~ANGE 5~ 4 3 0 4 4 8
1970)
Participation and Power Equalization !VIAuK MULDER AND
I~ENK
WILKE ~
Institute o] Social Psychology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands The widely held belief that participation in decision making will result in power equalization between "haves" and "have-nots" is criticized. I t is hypothesized, on the contrary, that when great differences exist in the expert power of group members, the participation process will provide the more powerful persons with greater opportunities for using their expert power, with the result that their effective influence on the less powerful will increase. An experiment was designed in which two variations of Other's expert power and two variations of Subject's extent of participation with Other (Other being a paper stooge) were ananipulated. Measures included pre- and post-measures of Subject's preference for a certain solution of a complex problem. As a result, the Experimenter could determine whether or not Subject had changed from his initial point of view to one in line with the opposite opinion advanced by Other and was able to find out Subject's reactions to Other and to the influence process. Two hypotheses were put to test: l=[ypothesis One: a higher degree of expert power (availability of relevant information) of Other will result in more effective influence by Other on Subject than lower expert power. Hypothesis Two: the more expert power possessed by Other, and the greater the extent of Subject's participation with Other in the decisionmaking processes, the greater Other's effective influence on Subject. Both hypotheses were strongly supported by the experimental findings. The relevance of the tested theory and of other empirical data for "democrat/zation processes" is discussed. TtIEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS F o r s o m e t i m e now, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e l a s t h a l f decade, t h e r e h~a,s b e e n a n o t i c e a b l e t r e n d in s e c i a l science l i t e r a t u r e in f a v o r of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d p o w e r e q u a l i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , in t h e o r i z i n g on t h e alIoc'ation of p o w e r , e q u a l i t y , etc., social s c i e n t i s t s h a v e o f t e n s e e m e d t o l e a v e t h e f i r m g r o u n d of e m p i r i c a l f a c t s a n d h a v e i n s t e a d l e t t h e m s e l v e s be c a r r i e d away by personal prejudices and wishful thinking. T o give a n e x a m p l e : When group p r o d u c t i v i t y in 'a c o n d i t i o n of inc r e a s e d h i e r a r c h i z a t i o n w a s c o m p a r e d w i t h p e r f o r m a n c e in a d e h i e r a r c h ~During this study, both authors were connected with the Institute of Social Psychology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands. ]Dr. Wilke is now at Groningen University. 430
I:'ARTIOIPATION AND 1JOWER EQUALIZATION
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ized condition (power equalization), and the result showed group produ,ctivity to be higher in the hierarchi.cal set-up, researchers still did not concede to the dat,a. They suggested, instead, that this difference could at best be a temporary phenomenon. On the other hand, when reporting an increase in satisfaction in the dehierarchized treatments, they ,did not stipulate that this increase might also be a short-run effeCt (Morse & Reimer, 1956, p. 128). A further example: a replication of the famous Co ch and French participation experiment was carried out in Scandinavia, and when the favorable effects of power equalization .on productivity did not show up, this was explained by the different expectations and ideology prevailing in the Norwegian factory under consideration (French, Israel, & As, 1960). It is clear, however, that the effects found in the original study were also preconditioned by certain expectations and ideology (such as, the assumptions of subjects about the expectations of the ~esear.chers). If such preconditions could be used .as a reason for repudiating the results in the Norwegian factory, then, by the same token, the interpretation based on the earlier findings in the United States could not be considered more valid. This tendency among social s.cientists to favor certain theoretical interpretations is concomitant to ,a world-wide movement aimed at demoli~shing the long existent barriers .constructed and maintained by people with power against the h'ave-nots of power. Social science has a function with regard to this ideological movement: to deliver valid theory and accurate data which can be applied in promoting good social developments designed for the benefit of all people, rather than favoring special subgroups. However, social science cannot adequately perform this function by providing society with theories that seem to support the idea of equality, equal opportunity, etc., but which are not corroborated by .the empirical data. In this study, a certain t;heory and data on partMpation ,and power differentiation .are reported which are~ relevant for this process of democratization in society but which are also crucial for fundamental theory on the 'allocation of power. The main characteristic of the participation concept is its relatedness to power (although participation is, ,of .course, also feinted to other concepts), and the following discussion is kept within the limit,s of this chara~cteristi.e. "Participation emphasizes equality, and means two-way discussion," and"participation, however defined, is well accepted as ra form of powerequalization" (Strauss 1963, pp. 43, 57, 60). Power equ~alization refers to a process of reduction in the power
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:~¢IULDER AND W I L X E
differential between people, generally between people on two levels in the form'al power hierarchy, such as superiors and subordinates (Strauss, 1963, p. 43). Particip,ation, therefore, is a process in which subordinates are allowed to contribute to decision making; the degree of involvement varying from consultation by the leader of the unit with his subordinates to real group decision making. This crucial feature .of participation, communication between equals, is explicitly mentioned in every 'application of participation procedures, such ,as in the Scanlon plan (Krulee, 1955), the appraisal interview in management development systems of large organizations (Unilever, 1967), the Workers' Councils, and comparable institutions in European industrial organizations, as well as in theoretically oriented research (Kolaja, 1965; "l~horsrud & Emery, 1965; Golembiewski, 1965). The question arises: what is the meaning of "equals" in this context? Sometimes, "equ~als" ~are as different with regard to formal positions as the director of an ~ndustri~l organization and a worker of the s'ame organization. In this regard, it i~s necessary tha.t more ,attention be paid to the differences which exist in the amount of expert power possessed by the concerned individuals. For example, "superiors" tend to have more relevant information ,available th'an "subordinates." Managers of organiza~ions (industrial enterprises, unions, health institutes, etc.) tend to have more information about the administrative, economic, technological, and ~ocial data relevant to that specific type of organization primarily because day after day, week after week, they are working with these data, and they are trained to handle them. These data are of a theoretical and practical nature, and may include, for instance, information about the relationship between technology ,and production, ,and between production and the market; or they may deal with the organization's relations with outside institutions on matters con,eerning financial funds or political influence, etc. This knowledge has u bearing on connections between the 'subsystems of the total system (the .organization), on the connections between the organization ,and the external environment~ and is of ,cr~.cial importance for the viability of the o~ganization as a whole. Equally as important as having relevant information is having exper~ hess in communications ~and human relations with equ.als, superiors, ,and subordinates (el. Blau & Scott, 1962, p. 172). Again superiors tend to have more varied and extensive experience in this area than subordinates. A case in point: in evaluation procedures (el. Unilever, 1967), superiors or evaluators h,ave many interviews with lots of different evaluees, while the individuai who is evaluated participates in only a few interviews, his own. It is not a coincidence that precisely in preparation for participation ~programs," the superiors often receive extra training, sometimes amounting to periods of h,alf a year (see, e.g., Morse & Reimer, 1956) o
PARTICIPATION A N D P O W E R EQUALIZATION
433
What, then, is the effect of these expert power differences, or of expert power differences in general, on the relationship between "equals"? How is the participation mechanism assumed to work? "Participation, however defined, is well accepted .as a form of power equaliz'ation," stated Strauss (1963, p. 60). We do not ,agree with this statement, because its content is vague and .does not specify any preconditions or effects. We must ask for the theory behind it, and we believe that ~here lies no specific theory behind it at all. We do, however, agree with Strauss (1963, p. 60) th'a~ "considering the major role which the participation concept plays in ,contemporary organizational theory, there has been surprisingly little research or even critical analysis in the area." In the following, we sh,all try to sketch a line of theoretical .analysis which will run counter to the loose formulation that "participation is a form of power equa.lization." Expert power, like all power, is conceived of as potential influence. The strength of Other's expert power for Subi eet, in any area, is the maximum potential ability of Other to influence Subiect in this area. From the definition of power, it follows that in order to transfer this potential influence of Other into ef]ective influence, Other and Subject must necessarily involve themselves in some form of interaction, in communication, with each other. This has been substantiated in a variety of experiments, e.g., Riecken (1958); Bavelas et al. (1965); Levinger (1969), ttovland and Weiss (1951), Talland (1954), and Showell (1960). Effective influence is defined as a change in Subject's behavior or attitudes, with the source of this change being Other's acts directed at influencing Subject. Effective influence on the basis of expert power ~can be realized when Subject perceives that Other has certain knowledge or skills which Subiect himself does not have (in the same degree), and when Subject trusts Other to use this knowledge correctly. As far back as the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon formulated that "knowledge is power," and 'in experimental social psychology, this was demonstrated immediately after the first W.orld War (Moore, 1921). In the experiment we are about to report, two hypotheses were tested, and the first concerns this relationship between expert power and effective influence:
Hypothesis One: higher expert power (of Other) will result in more effective influence (on Subject) than lower expert power. The relationship expressed in the first hypothesis was only a starling point for us; of crucial importance was the testing of the relationship expressed in our second hypothesis. It is clear that participation of Subject in the decision-making of .his group means that he communicates with other (equal or superior) group members, thus acquiring the opportunity,
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I~ULDER AND W I L K E
to the extent of his resources, to influence effectively the final decisions of the group. From the above ~conceptualizati, on .and our earlier introductory remarks, it is possible to conclude that greater participation (that is, more communication between the persons with limited exper~ power and those with more expert power) does not in itself result in power equalization. On the eontrary, greater participation enables the ones with more expert power to in.crease their effective influence over the "participants." When Other is more expert-powerful than Subject, the more Subieot part,elpates in the decision-making pro.cesses, the greater will be Other's effective influence on him.
Hypothesis Two: the more expert power possessed by Other, and the greater the extent of participation of Subject (with Other) in dec~ision making, the greater is Other's effective influence on Subieet (of. Figure I: a2 b2 minus a~ bl is greater than al b2 minus al b0. l~o predictions were formulated for the participation variable in this design: a priori we expected that greater part'i.eipation of Subiect could result in larger, equal, or smaller effective influen:ce of Other on Subiec t. For instance, it did seem possible that in a combined Low Expert PowerHigh Participation treatment a .boomerang effect could manifest itself which would keep Other's effective influence at a minimum; this might result from .his running short ,of ,a~guments, or repeating himself, and thus exposing h'imself as being weak. We do not adhere to French and Snyder's hypothesis that "the total amount of influence effected by a leader (or member) over a member increases with increases in the .amount of influen.ce attempted." (In French & Snyder's correlational analysis, their hypothesis did n,ot find clear empirical support; French & Snyder, 1959.) It is~ in our opinion, important to note how pro-arguments and contra-arguments are related in ,a "systematic" way; for instance, Other's far greater expert power in our experiments indicates one such system. Two other variables were not manipulated in our experiment, but it did seem to be necessary to control them. These two variables were Subject's task involvement and 'his self-confidence. In earlier experiments (e.g., Shaw & Benrod, 1962), it was demonstrated that (under certain conditions) Subjects with a low degree of self-confidence were more susceptible to social influence. In our experiment, in the High Expert Power treatment, Other has apparently more relevant information available than Subject, and the explanation .could be advanced that Subject in his treatment would perceive this difference, feel less self-confident for that reas.on, and thus would be more influenced by Other.
PARTICIPATION A N D POWER EQUALIZATION
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Earlier empirical data on involvement are ambiguous, but it is often theorized that high participation leads to high involvement, and that involvement in the group'.s task results in greater openness to influences from the group (or group members). According to these two ,considerations, the strongest effective influence of Other on Subject would be predicted to occur 'in the combined High Participation-High Expert Power treatment. This, of course, would be exactly in line with our predictions. However, our predictions stem directly from expert power theory, and we did not include mediating variables like self-confiden.ce and involvement in our theoref/cal scheme. These two variables were measured in ,order to check the theoretical interpretations. RESEARCH DESIGN Our subjects were pupils from High School for Teachers' Training and were between 15 and 18 years of age. They were invited to volunteer for a study on "how people make use of information." Upon 'arrival at the experimental session, Subject was told that he was going to work (together with a colleague) on a town planning problem. He was placed in a room by himself, and was provided with: (a) the lay-out of a town, containing blocks of houses, big buildings, railroad and canal systems, etc., and two large open sp'sces, one in the center of the town a~d one in an open area outside the town and; (b) relevant reformation, formulated in a number of separate items which constituted the units of information (see below). Subject was given to understand that his colleague, Other, was seated in another room and had also been given the town plan ,and relevant information. They were to collaborate as members of a town-planning agency and give advice on the best solution to a problem, the location of a newly to be built town hospital, choosing from the open site in the middle of the town, or the site outside the town. Subject w.as first to study his town plan ~and ~nformation by himself and thereafter give the Experimenter his opinion on the most favorable solution to the problem. Next, Subject would be asked to work together with Other on the problem, communicating with him by means of written messages. The messages would be carried back and forth by the Experimenter. In reality, Other did not exist but was played by the Experimenter; the Experimenter brought messages from Other in accordance with a prearranged scheme. After the Experimenter had received Subject's preferred problem solution, he returned with the first message from Other which contained the opposing point of view. In the pilot study for this experiment, 'it appeared that without any influence or information f~om us, our subjects were in favor of locating the hospital outside the city center. Taking this as our cue, the informa-
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tion given to our Subjects (b above) was also largely in favor of locating the hosp,ital outside the city. The Subject could thus be ,assumed to start the experimental session with a firm opinion in favor of this solution. It was necessary to make Other a paper stooge of the Experimenter, otherwise Other'.s motivation in the different experimental ,conditions was expected to vary, and our intention was to keep this variable in the experiment ,a ,const~ant. In this experiment, then, there were two vari.ables which were experimentally manipulated, to wit, expert power (,of Other on Subject) and participation (the time for communication about the problem solution). Other's relative expert power was manipulated by varying the amount of relevant ~information available to Subject and Other at the beginning of the decision period. In the experimental condition of Low Expert Power (of Other), Subject was provided with 4 critical information units (items supporting his point of view that the best location was outside the ~own's center), and 2 information units somewhat more in favor of the other location. Other, on the other hand, had 5 units, all of them supporting the opposite point of view (location in the center of the town). In an earlier procedure, "judges" (that is, members of the team of Experimenters) had reached complete agreement on what information could be considered to be "in favor of" or "somewhat in favor of" one or the other of the two possible locations for the hospital. The group of information units were homogeneous in the sence that each unit appeared to have, according to the two judges, approximately equal weight wit'h regard to the issue at .stake: For example:
In favor o] location within center: sufficient opportunities existed for nurses to rent rooms in tShe ,center of the town; In favor 'of location outside town: outside the town, apartment buildings could be constru~cted; Some~zhat in favor 'el location in center: some of the medical doctors who would be connected with the hospital had their private practices in the town's center; In favor of location outside town: the roads towards the open area inside the town's center are extremely narrow. In the experimental condition of High Expert Power (of Other), Subject aga~in had his 4 plus 2 information units, and Other had 10 items supp.or~ing his point of view. Thus in Low Expert Power, Other had potentially a slight overweight; in High Power, a s~rong one. At the beginning of the session, Subject was told that Other perhaps had more information than he did. This was
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PARTICIPATION AND POWER EQUALIZATION
done to prevent Subject's feelings of resistance against Other, observed in an experiment by Shaw and Penrod (1962) in which Other appeared to have more information than Subject without Subject having a plausible explanation for this. Participation was operationally defined in this experiment as the time available for eommunicati, on about the decision problem, so that everyone could use his information only to u certain extent. In Low Participation, 5 time units were available; in High Participation, 10 time units could be used. (The amount of available time was not made known to Subject in .order to avoid his possible compensation mechanisms, like speeding up the arguing, or the reverse, etc.) The two expert power variations and the two participation variations combined into a 2 )K 2 .design (in principle an .analysis of variance design) with four treatments (F~ig. 1). The dependent variable in the experiment was effective influence, defined earlier in the paper (see above). It was measured in two different ways: 1. Objective measures o] change in Subject's opinion: The crucial data concerned the factual change in Subiect's preference for the problem solution, the location of the new hospital outside or inside the town center. Subject was given a possibility at the end of the session to give his final opinion by making an alternative choice for the most preferable solution. The Experimenter was thus able to ,check if Subieet h.ad, after all, mainrained his initial opinion, or had changed in ~avor of the opinion advocated by O?~her (of. da~a in Table 1). With the same objective in mind (of checking whether Subject had changed his opinion or not) the content of Subiect's communication was analyzed ,and his .opinion changes scored (cf. Table 2). 2. Other's effective influence on Subject: Subject's attitudes. In the above mentioned measures of effective influence, Other's effective influence on subieet was directly measured by Experimenter's .comparis,on of the initial and final opinions of Subject. In a second group of measures, Subject was explicitly asked ~o ~express ~his reactions towards Other ,and towards the influence process .on a 6-point rating scale, represented by a line on which only the two extremes were verbalized. Questi,ons: How strong did you feel the arguments of the Other were? (from "strong" to "weak") (~cf. Table 3). Lo. part. (bi) Lo. exp. (al) Hi. exp. (a2)
aibi a2bl
FIG. 1. The four experimental treatments.
Hi. part. (b~) alb2 a~b2
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How strong did you feel your own arguments were? (from "strong" to "weak") (cf. Table 5). Did you feel that the arguments ,of the Other were stronger or weaker? (cf. Table 4). Did the Other have ~nore information than you? (more-less) (el. Table 6). To what extent are you in agreement with Other? (agree-disagree) (cf. Table 7). Foil.owing the theoreti.cal considerations, some other measures were taken to eontro.1 for the effect of intervening v,ariables. The intention was to assess if, in this experimental situation, "involvement" and "selfconfidence" were determinants of effective influence. Measures, on 6-point ratings scales: a. For involvement: how involved do you feel in the task y,ou have done here? (very strong-fairly weak). b. For self-confidence: how much self-confidence did you have during this investigation? (mu.ch-little). In one series of the experiment being reported, Other was a formal positi.on. Subject was then asked: a. In your opinion, could one say that in your team a head (leader) was functioning? (yes or no). b. To what extenb did you think that this Other w~as a strong or weak head (of the agency)? (strong-weak). The first question was intended to be a check upon the introduction, in that series of the experiment, of a formal leadership. With the second question, researchers had an exploratory intention in mind with regard to the two hypotheses. The research design described .above was applied in three "replications" or series: in the first experiment, 60 subjects, aged 15 to 18 years, pupils fr.om High School for Teachers' Training, were equally, and at random, divided into four experimental treatments. In each of these treatments, the Subieet presumed that he was collaborating with a colleague from a "town planning agency." In the second experiment, 64 subjects, with the same background as in the first experiment, were split over treatments; the only difference with the first experiment being that here Subiect presumed that he was working together with the boss of the "town planning agency." Experiment three, with 108 subjects, was an exact replieati,on of the second, with one ,additional sentence in the introduction stressing Subject's own responsibility for his opinion ch,anges. In the second and third experiment, therefore, Other had legitimate power or position power (on the basis of Experimenter's introduction of the situation to Subiect) in ad-
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dillon to expert power. In the first experiment, such "formal power" did not exist. The data from the three experiments were pooled in this paper. After separate analyses they revealed that, in agreement with a priori theory, the data of all three experiments were only slightly different from each other. RESULTS
The data will be presented in four section.s. In Section 1, the data of the .crucial measures are summarized; in Section 2, reactions of :Subjects to the influence process are reported. Section 3 gives data on the measures of the ,control variables, and some special data are summarized in Section 4. : Section 1: Other's effective influence Vn Subject; objectively measured changes. The final opinion of Subject was measured by an alterI~ative choice question administered at the end of the session. It was then determined, by Experimenter, whether or not Subj oct had maintained his initial opinion .concerning the location of the new hospital or had changed in favor of the opinion .advocated by Other. In Table 1, the number of Subiects who changed, that is to say, the effective influence by Other on Subject, is reported. Another measure, comparable with the one reported above, was performed by analyzing the content of Subieet's messages and scoring the opinion changes which manifested themselves. These data are reported in Table 2. The data in Tables 1 and 2 concerning the effective influences of Other on Subject gave strong support to Hypotheses One and Two. Higher Expert Power of Other results in more effective influence of Other on Subieet than Low Expert Power; this holds also within the Low Participation treatment (in Table 1, p < .05; in Table 2, p < .01). Even then, the intera,ction effect is manifesting itself strongly (,and signifi,cantly). Although Participation shows a main effect, this must be completely TABLE 1 SUBJECTS WHO CHANGED OPINION ( N = 232, nl = n2 = n3 = n~ = 5S ~,
NUMBER
OF
Frequencies =
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
16 26
16 50
T h e analyses r e p o r t e d in this one a n d t h e following t a b l e are X square a n d a special t h i r d order interaction analysis (Nass 1968). p v~.lu.`es; ,expert power, p < ,001; participation, p < .01; interaction, p < .05.
440
MULDER AND WILKE TABLE 2 NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO CHANGED (COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS) ( N = 2 3 2 , nl = n 2 = n 3 = n 4 = 58) Frequencies
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
9 24~
15 48
p values: expert power, p < .001; partieipation, p < .001; interaction, p < .05.
attributed to the very strong effect in the High Participation-High Expert Power eell; differences in Low Expert Power are negligible (and nonsignificant). Section 2: Other's effective influence on Subject: Subject attitudes. In Table 3, the interaction effect is most prominent; the strength of Other's argument is greatest in ttigh Participation-High Expert Power and very TABLE 3 STRENGTH OF OTHER'S ARGUMENTS (N = 232, nl = n 2 = n3 = n4 = 58)
Means
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
4.3 4.1
zt. 7 3.1
Lo. expert Hi. expert
T h e lower t h e score, t h e stronger O's arglnnent. Analysis of variance has been applied on these a n d t h e following Tables. p values: expert power, p < .001; participation, n.s.; interaction, p < .001.
slight in High Participation-Low Expert Power, where something of a boomerang effect showed up (see Theoretical Considerations). Expert differences in Low Participation are negligible. In Table 4, expert power appears to be effective; again the Participation effect is restricted to High Expert Power treatment. In Table 5, the interaction effect is not significant, although the trend is clearly discernible. Again, in Table 6, TABLE
4
STRENGTH OF 0TIIER~S ARGUMENTS, EXPLICITLY COMPARED BY SUBJECT WITH HIS OWN ARGUMENTS (N = 232, nl = n~ = n~ = n~ = 58)
Means
Lo. Part.
tti. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
5.0 4.2
5.0 3.1
The lower the score, the stronger O's arguments. p values: expert power, p < .001; participation, p < .01~ interaction, p < 21,
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TABLE 5 STRENGTII OF SUBJECT'S OWN ARGUMENTS (N=232, nl =n~=n~ =ra= 58)
IV[eans ~
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert I-Ii.expert
3.7 3.9
3.8 4.5
The lower the score, the stronger Subject's arguments. p values: expert power, p < .01; participation, p < .05; interaction, n.s.
Expert Power has clear effects, while the Participation effect is located in High Expert Power treatments; the interaction effect is not significant. It strikes us that in those measures explicitly referring to Subject himself, the effects are weaker than in the ones not doing so. This is in agreement with some of our earlier experimental data. In Table 7, the interaction effect is again strong; participation has only effects when .combined with High Expert Power. TABLE 6 OTHER 1V~oRE INFORMATION THAN SUBJECT? ( N = 2 3 2 , nl = n 2 = n 3 = n 4 = 58)
Means ~
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
3.5 3.0
3.4 2.4
The lower the score, the more information Other has, compared with Subject himself. p values: expert power, p < .001; participation, p < .05; interaction, n.s.
Tables 1-7 enable us to draw the following conclusion. The High Expert Power of Other tends to result in greater effective influence of Other on Subject than Low Expert Power in Tables 4 and 6 this holds true even within the low participation treatments. Thus, Hypothesis One has found strong support in our data. TABLE 7 SUBJECT'S AGREEMENT WITIK OTHER
(N = 232, ni = n~ = n3 = n~ = 58)
Means ~
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
4.6 4.4
4.6 3.4
The lower the score, the more Subject agrees with Other. p values; expert power, p < .001; participation, p < .01; interaction, p < ,0!.
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MULDER AND W I L K E
The most prominent finding, however, is the consistent interaction effect: Hypothesis Two is also strongly supported by these data. When Other has rel,atively low expert power, participation does not have any effect, that is, Other's overweight does not become effective. When, however, Other has greater expert power, the more Subject participates in the decision making, the more effective influence Other has on him. It i.s interesting to ,compare data from Tables 1 and 2 with the data from other tables. For instance, while it .appears tha~ in High Parti.cip ation-High Expert Power the effective influence ,of Other .on Subiect is, in actual fact, very great (more than 85% of the Subject changed their initial firm opinion under Other's influence !), they express in ,a subiective attitude measure only moderate agreement with Other (see Table 7). It seems t~ be difficult for a person to acknowledge to himself and others (Experimenter) that he is influenced b y Other(s). S e c t i o n 3. Two variables were measured to assess if they ~might, in this experimental situati.on, be determinants of effective influence: task involvement and self-confidence. The four treatments did not differ in the analysis of variance with regard to any of these, two variables and .are therefore not reported here. Thus, no basis exists for an interpretation in which these variables might be theoretically connected with the already reported differences between the experimental treatments found for effective influence. S e c t i o n 4. In the second and third replications of the experiment, Subiect was presumably working with the head of the town planning agency. Subjects were questioned about whether in ~heir opinion Other had been functioning as a real head, and if Other was a strong or a weak head. (N = 172, nl = n 2 ~- n 3 = n 4 = 43). On the first question, less ~han 45% of Subiects gave an affirmative answer; thus the measure does not reflect the presence of the experimentally introduced formal head. The number of affirmative answers tends to be larger in High Expert Power than in Low Expert Power (p ~ .]0). The second measure logically linked to the first question gives identical results: in High Expert Power, Subiects feel that Other was a strong head. Our intention to use the first question as an "independent check" of the introduced formal head had clearly failed, and for that reason t:he linking of the second question with the first one undermined the findings of the seeond. DISCUSSION
In this experimental situation, Subiect star~ed with a firm point of view in favor of a certain problem solution. This point of view was u result of his general foreknowledge 'of this problem and his introduction
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to certain information supporting his previous knowledge. The firmness of this initial point of view is apparent in the data; in the .condition of Low Expert Power of 0ther~ in which Other had a slight ove~weight ~in relevant information, only 28% of Subjects changed their opinion after the communication between Subject and Other (see Table 1). This experimental situtation, then, is very appropriate for testing the relationships between expert power, participation, and effective influence, as formulated in our hypotheses. Two classes of measures were taken: of primary importance was the check on Subject's opinion .change, obtained by eemparing :his final opinion with his preparticipation point .of view, and by a~alyzing the :content of his written communications with Other. In these measures, Other's effective influence on Subject is defined by the number of Subjects who changed their initial opinion in favor of Other's p.oint of view. The second ,class consisted of subjective attitude measures, in which Subject expressed his opinions about the strength of his own ar.guments, about the ,strength of Other's arguments, the difference in strength between Other's arguments and his own, ,and his agreement with Other, etc. High Expert Power (power ----potential influence) results in greater effective influence than Lower Expert P.ower. Knowledge is, indeed, power--as Bacon stated .many centuries ago, and Moore demonstrated experimentally half a century ago. In our experiment, as in Moore's first experimental demonstration (Moore, 1921), this relationship is demonstrated to hold true for an area in which the knowledge is relevant. However, this experiment had been designed to test a hypothesis on the relationship between participation and power equalization. Contrary to rough formulations in the literature, to the effect that participation leads to power equalization between less ,and more powerful group members, we stated that under certain conditions, the opposite must be expected: the greater the difference in expert power between Subiect and Other, the greater will be Other's effective influence on Subject under conditions of greater participation by Subject in decision-making processes with Other. Greater participation by Subject will enable Other to bring all his greater expert power to realization and will expose Subject to stronger influence. From the experimental data, the ,conclusive evidence is that more participation by Subject in the decision-making process, combined with more expert power of Other, results in a larger difference in Other's effective influence on Subject. From the data, it is also clear that the above reported differences cannot be attributed to differences in task involvement or self-~confidence, .as could be expected on the basis of earlier experiments and theorizing (see Theoretical Considerations). In this experiment, we .do no4 have to
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bother about the way self-confidence might have been caused by information nor about self-confidence or task involvement as an intervening variable in the relationship between power, participation, and effective infiuence. A remark about a technical point must be made: in our experiment, the effective influence of Subject on Other is excluded as Other is a paper stooge of Experimenter. However, this is not a serious objection against our theoretical 'interpretation: Subject's expert power is kept constant in the two expert .conditions, so that it may be assumed that if Subject's influence could have been effective, his effective influence on Other would not have been any different in one treatment than in another. The only difference between the reported experiment and an experiment without a paper stooge (at present being planned by us) would again be the effective influence of 0t,her on Subject, demonstrated already in this experiment. We thus predict the same result in the future experiment as rep.orted here in this .one. Of fundamental importance is the following remark, intended to prevent incorrect generalizations from our study: in our experiment, it was demonstrated that "under ,certain ,conditions" participation does not promote power equalization, but on the contrary, participation leads to a widening of the power gap. One of these "certain conditions" is specified in the reported experiment, to wit~ the greater expert power of Other in relation to Subject. It would follow that if Subject, while working with his legitimate boss (Other) as in experiments two and three, were to acquire more expert power than Other (conceptually and in fact quite possible!), more participation would lead to more effective influence of Subject on his superior. Returning to the world-wide democratization processes, referred to in the introduction, this means that persons who aspire to participate with people from higher levels in the decision-making processes of their .organizaZions and groups must be capable, qua motivational and ability level, to attain and maintain to some extent an equality in expertness with these "superiors." Otherwise, the power gap between superiors and participants will even be likely to increase as a direct consequence of the participa?~ion pro'eedure, and it would be preferable to avoid participation, so ,as to keep one's opinion .safe from persons possessing greater power. The requirements necessary for this "intended" parti.cipation lie in two main areas, as .can be seen from the results of several field studies. In a study carried out in Dutch Councils of the Enterprise (0ndernemingsraad), it appeared that half of the voluntary membership of these Councils bad no desire for participation in decision-making; the other
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half complained about the lack of expertness (Quint, 1967; V a n der Velden, 1968). In Kolaja's report (Kolaja, 1965, p. 21) about studies of the Yugoslav Workers' 'Councils, it is demonstrated with survey and *observation data that "management personnel and better-educated persons (in the reported study, these are persons in research positions) accounted for a large proportion of accepted suggestions" (although they formed, a small minority in the Councils). K olaja (19'65) stated that "management, and especially the director, formulated many proposals wh'ieh t'he Court.ell readily approved" (pp. 21-23). The main problem of the labor unions and other institutes was how to stimulate the "motivation of workers to participate in factory affairs" (Kolaia, 1965, p. 57). The empirical findings in research done by Broekmeyer in the Natron factory in Bosnia give further evidence in this direction (Broekmeyer, 1958, p. 269). It can be derived from such data that even when participation procedures are realized in good faith, so much expert power is still concentrated in a small ,group of people that the power gap is .a,ctually not decreasing. If people hope,, through participation, to real'ize their aim of contributing to the decision making of their groups or organizations on important issues, certain requirements must be fulfilled with regard to their level .of motivation .and expertness (for motivational requirements see, e.g., Vroom, 1960, who demonstrated a certain personality variable as a determinant on the effecks of participation). It may be assumed, therefore, that in many instances, learning processes are necessary to make it possible for people to fulfill these requirements. One possibility ~is learning during and through the participati.on process itself. Thibaut and Kelley refer to two opposing possibilities for a person to use his greater expertness: either by Other giving expert advice to the extent th,at Subie.et .also becomes an expert, or by Other not learning the relevant knowledge and skills (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959, p. 109; of. also in this .context Rosen, 1966). An.other possibility 'is learning before the critical p.artieipation phase. In laboratory and field experiments, it has been demonstrated that the exertion o.f power results in a strong .aspiration for more power (Mulder, 1959; and Mulder et al. 1970). In an experimental study by French et al. (1966), it appeared t'bat preconditions, existing long before the experimental participation (such as the level of parti.eipation normally functioning in the organization to which Subject belonged), were determinants of ihe effects of the experimental participation. It also seems realistic to .a.ccept the fa.ct tha~ effective participation requires certain skills and types .of knowledge which are unevenly dis-
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tributed in the various strata of our society as a result of prevailing conditions from the first years of li.fe, through adolescence, and later (Inkeles, 1966). This means that the learning must extend over longer periods of time and be intensive if the participation goals of people are ever to be attained. As a result, the preceding costs for people from the deprived strata of the population will be extremely high. Thus, .people must be "ready,' for participation in order to get its rewards (such as the possibility of contributing to the steering of their group in a good direction). Also, in this case, costs precede rewards. This cannot be emphasized enough because earlier social psychological studies have shown that the members' perception of more participation in the decision-making process suffices for their satisfaction, involvement, etc. (Hoffman & M.aier, 1961; March & Simon, 1958, p. 54). Power equalization between "haves" and "have-nots" .cannot be realized through and after participation as such. When equality in relevant knowledge, in abilities, in motivation strength, etc., is not realized before the participation process, the power differential will not decrease but, on the contrary, will increase still further. REFERENCES BAVELAS, A., HASTORF, A. ]~., GROSS, A. E., • KITE, W. 1:~,., Experiments on the alteration of group structure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 55-70. BLAU, ~. M., & SCOTT, W. l~., Formal organizations. San Francisco: Chandler, 1962. BROEK~EYER, M. J. De arbeidersaad in Zuidslabi@. Meppel. Boom: 1962. Coe~, L., ,& FRENCH, J. R. P. Overcoming resistance to change. In D. Cartwright and A. Zsmder (Eds.), Group dyna,mics. London: Tavistock, DILL, W. l~. Desegregation or integration? In W. W. Cooper, ~ . J. Lea vitt, and M. W. Shelly (Eds.~, New perspectives in organization research. New York: Wiley. FRENCH, J. I~. P., ISRAEL,J., & AS, D. An experiment on participation in a Nm~vegian factory. Human Relations, 1960, 13~ 3-19. FRENel~, J. 1%. P., KAY, E., & MEYER, I-I. Participation and the appraisM system. Human Relations, 1966, 19, 3-20. FREI~CH, J. 1%. P., & SlCrDSR, R. (1959) Leadership and interpersonal power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, p. 118-149. GOLE~BIEWSKI,l%. T. Small groups and large organizations. In 3. March (Ed.), Handbook o] organizations, 1965. HOFF~A~, L. 1%., & MAIER, N. 1%. F. Quality and acceptance of problem solutions by members of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 401-407. HOVLAND, C. I., & WEISS, W. The influence of source credibility on communication effectiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1951, 1~, 635~650. IZ~ELES, A. Social structure and the socialization of competence. Harvard Educational Review, 1966, 36, 265-283.
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I~0LAZA, I. Workers' Councils. The Yugoslav experience, London: Tavistock, 1965. KnV~E~., G. K. The Scanlon Plan: cooperation through participation. The Journal o] Business, Univ. o] Chicago, 1955, 2, 100-113. LEVlNGER, G. The development of perceptions and behaviour in newly formed social power relationships. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1969, 83-98. MAEe~, J, G., & SIMOn, H. A.; WITH G•ETZXOW, It. Organizations. New York: Wiley, 1958. MOORE~ H. T. The comparative influence of majority and expert opinion. The American Journal o] Psychology, 1921, 32, 16-20. MORSE, Ik!. C., • I:~EI1V~ER,]~. W~e experimental change of a major organization variable. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1956, 52, 120-129. MULDER, M. Power and satisfaction in task-oriented groups. Acta Psychologica, 1959, 16, 178-225. MULDER, M., •EE:N', P., et El. Power distance between subject and more-powerful Other as a determinant of SubjecVs power behavior on a level of reality. Submitted for publication. MOLDER, M., VEEI~, P., et El. Cognitive processes in power equalisation. To be published in: The European Journal o] Social Psychology, 1970. NASS, CH. Interaction of third order in a three-time binary-frequency block (with fixed second order margin frequencies). Dept. of Statistics, Netherlands Institute for Preventive Medicine at Leyden. To be published. QT:I~, ft. G. H. De ondernemingsraad in enn viertal bedrijven. Doctoral dissertation, Instituut voor Sociale Psychologic, l~ijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1967. RIRC~=E~, tI. W. The effect of talkativeness on ability to influence group solutions of problems. Sociometry, 1958, 21, 309-321. ROSEN, S. The comparative roles of informational and material commodities in interpersonal transactions. The Journal o] Experimental an~ Social Psychology, 1966, 2, 211-226. SHAW, M. E., (~ PEI~EOD,W. W., Does more information available to a group improve group performance? Sociometry, 1962, 25, 377-390. SHOWELL, M. Interpersonal knowledge and rated leader potential. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 87-92. SMIT~, G. G., & TANNENBAUIV~,A. S. Organizational control structure--a comparative analysis. Human Relations, 1963, 16, 299-316. STRAUSS, G. Some notes on power-equalization. In I-I. J. Leavitt (Ed.), The social science o] organizations. New York: Prentice Hall, 1963. Pp. 39-84. TALLAND,G. A. The assessment of group opinion by leaders, and their influence on its formation. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1954, 49, 431-434. TANNENBAUM, A. S. Social psychology o] the work organization. London: Tavistock, 1966. T/tIBAUT, J. W., (~ KELLEY, ]~. I~. The social psychology o] groups. New York: Wiley, 1959. TttORSRUD, E., (~ EMERY, 1~. E. Industrial conflict and industrial democracy. In J. R. Lawrence (Ed.), Operational research in the social sciences, 1965. Pp. 439-447. UI~mEVER GROIJP MAI~AGEMENT PERSOI~NEL. Manual on evaluation o/ managers, specialists and scientists in Unilever N. V. Rotterdam, February 1967. VAN DEE VELDE1N-,~t. A. Mede~eggenschap ennoverleg. Doctoral dissertation Instimut voor Sociale PSychologie, Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1968.
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VR00M, V. Some personality determinants o] the effects o] participation. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. ZIT,LER, R. C , & BEHRI~GEa, R. D. Assimilation of the knowledgeable newcomer under conditions o f group success and failure. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 60~ 228-291. RECEIVED: M a r c h 5, 1969
1970)
Participation and Power Equalization !VIAuK MULDER AND
I~ENK
WILKE ~
Institute o] Social Psychology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands The widely held belief that participation in decision making will result in power equalization between "haves" and "have-nots" is criticized. I t is hypothesized, on the contrary, that when great differences exist in the expert power of group members, the participation process will provide the more powerful persons with greater opportunities for using their expert power, with the result that their effective influence on the less powerful will increase. An experiment was designed in which two variations of Other's expert power and two variations of Subject's extent of participation with Other (Other being a paper stooge) were ananipulated. Measures included pre- and post-measures of Subject's preference for a certain solution of a complex problem. As a result, the Experimenter could determine whether or not Subject had changed from his initial point of view to one in line with the opposite opinion advanced by Other and was able to find out Subject's reactions to Other and to the influence process. Two hypotheses were put to test: l=[ypothesis One: a higher degree of expert power (availability of relevant information) of Other will result in more effective influence by Other on Subject than lower expert power. Hypothesis Two: the more expert power possessed by Other, and the greater the extent of Subject's participation with Other in the decisionmaking processes, the greater Other's effective influence on Subject. Both hypotheses were strongly supported by the experimental findings. The relevance of the tested theory and of other empirical data for "democrat/zation processes" is discussed. TtIEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS F o r s o m e t i m e now, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e l a s t h a l f decade, t h e r e h~a,s b e e n a n o t i c e a b l e t r e n d in s e c i a l science l i t e r a t u r e in f a v o r of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d p o w e r e q u a l i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , in t h e o r i z i n g on t h e alIoc'ation of p o w e r , e q u a l i t y , etc., social s c i e n t i s t s h a v e o f t e n s e e m e d t o l e a v e t h e f i r m g r o u n d of e m p i r i c a l f a c t s a n d h a v e i n s t e a d l e t t h e m s e l v e s be c a r r i e d away by personal prejudices and wishful thinking. T o give a n e x a m p l e : When group p r o d u c t i v i t y in 'a c o n d i t i o n of inc r e a s e d h i e r a r c h i z a t i o n w a s c o m p a r e d w i t h p e r f o r m a n c e in a d e h i e r a r c h ~During this study, both authors were connected with the Institute of Social Psychology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands. ]Dr. Wilke is now at Groningen University. 430
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ized condition (power equalization), and the result showed group produ,ctivity to be higher in the hierarchi.cal set-up, researchers still did not concede to the dat,a. They suggested, instead, that this difference could at best be a temporary phenomenon. On the other hand, when reporting an increase in satisfaction in the dehierarchized treatments, they ,did not stipulate that this increase might also be a short-run effeCt (Morse & Reimer, 1956, p. 128). A further example: a replication of the famous Co ch and French participation experiment was carried out in Scandinavia, and when the favorable effects of power equalization .on productivity did not show up, this was explained by the different expectations and ideology prevailing in the Norwegian factory under consideration (French, Israel, & As, 1960). It is clear, however, that the effects found in the original study were also preconditioned by certain expectations and ideology (such as, the assumptions of subjects about the expectations of the ~esear.chers). If such preconditions could be used .as a reason for repudiating the results in the Norwegian factory, then, by the same token, the interpretation based on the earlier findings in the United States could not be considered more valid. This tendency among social s.cientists to favor certain theoretical interpretations is concomitant to ,a world-wide movement aimed at demoli~shing the long existent barriers .constructed and maintained by people with power against the h'ave-nots of power. Social science has a function with regard to this ideological movement: to deliver valid theory and accurate data which can be applied in promoting good social developments designed for the benefit of all people, rather than favoring special subgroups. However, social science cannot adequately perform this function by providing society with theories that seem to support the idea of equality, equal opportunity, etc., but which are not corroborated by .the empirical data. In this study, a certain t;heory and data on partMpation ,and power differentiation .are reported which are~ relevant for this process of democratization in society but which are also crucial for fundamental theory on the 'allocation of power. The main characteristic of the participation concept is its relatedness to power (although participation is, ,of .course, also feinted to other concepts), and the following discussion is kept within the limit,s of this chara~cteristi.e. "Participation emphasizes equality, and means two-way discussion," and"participation, however defined, is well accepted as ra form of powerequalization" (Strauss 1963, pp. 43, 57, 60). Power equ~alization refers to a process of reduction in the power
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differential between people, generally between people on two levels in the form'al power hierarchy, such as superiors and subordinates (Strauss, 1963, p. 43). Particip,ation, therefore, is a process in which subordinates are allowed to contribute to decision making; the degree of involvement varying from consultation by the leader of the unit with his subordinates to real group decision making. This crucial feature .of participation, communication between equals, is explicitly mentioned in every 'application of participation procedures, such ,as in the Scanlon plan (Krulee, 1955), the appraisal interview in management development systems of large organizations (Unilever, 1967), the Workers' Councils, and comparable institutions in European industrial organizations, as well as in theoretically oriented research (Kolaja, 1965; "l~horsrud & Emery, 1965; Golembiewski, 1965). The question arises: what is the meaning of "equals" in this context? Sometimes, "equ~als" ~are as different with regard to formal positions as the director of an ~ndustri~l organization and a worker of the s'ame organization. In this regard, it i~s necessary tha.t more ,attention be paid to the differences which exist in the amount of expert power possessed by the concerned individuals. For example, "superiors" tend to have more relevant information ,available th'an "subordinates." Managers of organiza~ions (industrial enterprises, unions, health institutes, etc.) tend to have more information about the administrative, economic, technological, and ~ocial data relevant to that specific type of organization primarily because day after day, week after week, they are working with these data, and they are trained to handle them. These data are of a theoretical and practical nature, and may include, for instance, information about the relationship between technology ,and production, ,and between production and the market; or they may deal with the organization's relations with outside institutions on matters con,eerning financial funds or political influence, etc. This knowledge has u bearing on connections between the 'subsystems of the total system (the .organization), on the connections between the organization ,and the external environment~ and is of ,cr~.cial importance for the viability of the o~ganization as a whole. Equally as important as having relevant information is having exper~ hess in communications ~and human relations with equ.als, superiors, ,and subordinates (el. Blau & Scott, 1962, p. 172). Again superiors tend to have more varied and extensive experience in this area than subordinates. A case in point: in evaluation procedures (el. Unilever, 1967), superiors or evaluators h,ave many interviews with lots of different evaluees, while the individuai who is evaluated participates in only a few interviews, his own. It is not a coincidence that precisely in preparation for participation ~programs," the superiors often receive extra training, sometimes amounting to periods of h,alf a year (see, e.g., Morse & Reimer, 1956) o
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What, then, is the effect of these expert power differences, or of expert power differences in general, on the relationship between "equals"? How is the participation mechanism assumed to work? "Participation, however defined, is well accepted .as a form of power equaliz'ation," stated Strauss (1963, p. 60). We do not ,agree with this statement, because its content is vague and .does not specify any preconditions or effects. We must ask for the theory behind it, and we believe that ~here lies no specific theory behind it at all. We do, however, agree with Strauss (1963, p. 60) th'a~ "considering the major role which the participation concept plays in ,contemporary organizational theory, there has been surprisingly little research or even critical analysis in the area." In the following, we sh,all try to sketch a line of theoretical .analysis which will run counter to the loose formulation that "participation is a form of power equa.lization." Expert power, like all power, is conceived of as potential influence. The strength of Other's expert power for Subi eet, in any area, is the maximum potential ability of Other to influence Subiect in this area. From the definition of power, it follows that in order to transfer this potential influence of Other into ef]ective influence, Other and Subject must necessarily involve themselves in some form of interaction, in communication, with each other. This has been substantiated in a variety of experiments, e.g., Riecken (1958); Bavelas et al. (1965); Levinger (1969), ttovland and Weiss (1951), Talland (1954), and Showell (1960). Effective influence is defined as a change in Subject's behavior or attitudes, with the source of this change being Other's acts directed at influencing Subject. Effective influence on the basis of expert power ~can be realized when Subject perceives that Other has certain knowledge or skills which Subiect himself does not have (in the same degree), and when Subject trusts Other to use this knowledge correctly. As far back as the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon formulated that "knowledge is power," and 'in experimental social psychology, this was demonstrated immediately after the first W.orld War (Moore, 1921). In the experiment we are about to report, two hypotheses were tested, and the first concerns this relationship between expert power and effective influence:
Hypothesis One: higher expert power (of Other) will result in more effective influence (on Subject) than lower expert power. The relationship expressed in the first hypothesis was only a starling point for us; of crucial importance was the testing of the relationship expressed in our second hypothesis. It is clear that participation of Subject in the decision-making of .his group means that he communicates with other (equal or superior) group members, thus acquiring the opportunity,
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to the extent of his resources, to influence effectively the final decisions of the group. From the above ~conceptualizati, on .and our earlier introductory remarks, it is possible to conclude that greater participation (that is, more communication between the persons with limited exper~ power and those with more expert power) does not in itself result in power equalization. On the eontrary, greater participation enables the ones with more expert power to in.crease their effective influence over the "participants." When Other is more expert-powerful than Subject, the more Subieot part,elpates in the decision-making pro.cesses, the greater will be Other's effective influence on him.
Hypothesis Two: the more expert power possessed by Other, and the greater the extent of participation of Subject (with Other) in dec~ision making, the greater is Other's effective influence on Subieet (of. Figure I: a2 b2 minus a~ bl is greater than al b2 minus al b0. l~o predictions were formulated for the participation variable in this design: a priori we expected that greater part'i.eipation of Subiect could result in larger, equal, or smaller effective influen:ce of Other on Subiec t. For instance, it did seem possible that in a combined Low Expert PowerHigh Participation treatment a .boomerang effect could manifest itself which would keep Other's effective influence at a minimum; this might result from .his running short ,of ,a~guments, or repeating himself, and thus exposing h'imself as being weak. We do not adhere to French and Snyder's hypothesis that "the total amount of influence effected by a leader (or member) over a member increases with increases in the .amount of influen.ce attempted." (In French & Snyder's correlational analysis, their hypothesis did n,ot find clear empirical support; French & Snyder, 1959.) It is~ in our opinion, important to note how pro-arguments and contra-arguments are related in ,a "systematic" way; for instance, Other's far greater expert power in our experiments indicates one such system. Two other variables were not manipulated in our experiment, but it did seem to be necessary to control them. These two variables were Subject's task involvement and 'his self-confidence. In earlier experiments (e.g., Shaw & Benrod, 1962), it was demonstrated that (under certain conditions) Subjects with a low degree of self-confidence were more susceptible to social influence. In our experiment, in the High Expert Power treatment, Other has apparently more relevant information available than Subject, and the explanation .could be advanced that Subject in his treatment would perceive this difference, feel less self-confident for that reas.on, and thus would be more influenced by Other.
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Earlier empirical data on involvement are ambiguous, but it is often theorized that high participation leads to high involvement, and that involvement in the group'.s task results in greater openness to influences from the group (or group members). According to these two ,considerations, the strongest effective influence of Other on Subject would be predicted to occur 'in the combined High Participation-High Expert Power treatment. This, of course, would be exactly in line with our predictions. However, our predictions stem directly from expert power theory, and we did not include mediating variables like self-confiden.ce and involvement in our theoref/cal scheme. These two variables were measured in ,order to check the theoretical interpretations. RESEARCH DESIGN Our subjects were pupils from High School for Teachers' Training and were between 15 and 18 years of age. They were invited to volunteer for a study on "how people make use of information." Upon 'arrival at the experimental session, Subject was told that he was going to work (together with a colleague) on a town planning problem. He was placed in a room by himself, and was provided with: (a) the lay-out of a town, containing blocks of houses, big buildings, railroad and canal systems, etc., and two large open sp'sces, one in the center of the town a~d one in an open area outside the town and; (b) relevant reformation, formulated in a number of separate items which constituted the units of information (see below). Subject was given to understand that his colleague, Other, was seated in another room and had also been given the town plan ,and relevant information. They were to collaborate as members of a town-planning agency and give advice on the best solution to a problem, the location of a newly to be built town hospital, choosing from the open site in the middle of the town, or the site outside the town. Subject w.as first to study his town plan ~and ~nformation by himself and thereafter give the Experimenter his opinion on the most favorable solution to the problem. Next, Subject would be asked to work together with Other on the problem, communicating with him by means of written messages. The messages would be carried back and forth by the Experimenter. In reality, Other did not exist but was played by the Experimenter; the Experimenter brought messages from Other in accordance with a prearranged scheme. After the Experimenter had received Subject's preferred problem solution, he returned with the first message from Other which contained the opposing point of view. In the pilot study for this experiment, 'it appeared that without any influence or information f~om us, our subjects were in favor of locating the hospital outside the city center. Taking this as our cue, the informa-
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tion given to our Subjects (b above) was also largely in favor of locating the hosp,ital outside the city. The Subject could thus be ,assumed to start the experimental session with a firm opinion in favor of this solution. It was necessary to make Other a paper stooge of the Experimenter, otherwise Other'.s motivation in the different experimental ,conditions was expected to vary, and our intention was to keep this variable in the experiment ,a ,const~ant. In this experiment, then, there were two vari.ables which were experimentally manipulated, to wit, expert power (,of Other on Subject) and participation (the time for communication about the problem solution). Other's relative expert power was manipulated by varying the amount of relevant ~information available to Subject and Other at the beginning of the decision period. In the experimental condition of Low Expert Power (of Other), Subject was provided with 4 critical information units (items supporting his point of view that the best location was outside the ~own's center), and 2 information units somewhat more in favor of the other location. Other, on the other hand, had 5 units, all of them supporting the opposite point of view (location in the center of the town). In an earlier procedure, "judges" (that is, members of the team of Experimenters) had reached complete agreement on what information could be considered to be "in favor of" or "somewhat in favor of" one or the other of the two possible locations for the hospital. The group of information units were homogeneous in the sence that each unit appeared to have, according to the two judges, approximately equal weight wit'h regard to the issue at .stake: For example:
In favor o] location within center: sufficient opportunities existed for nurses to rent rooms in tShe ,center of the town; In favor 'of location outside town: outside the town, apartment buildings could be constru~cted; Some~zhat in favor 'el location in center: some of the medical doctors who would be connected with the hospital had their private practices in the town's center; In favor of location outside town: the roads towards the open area inside the town's center are extremely narrow. In the experimental condition of High Expert Power (of Other), Subject aga~in had his 4 plus 2 information units, and Other had 10 items supp.or~ing his point of view. Thus in Low Expert Power, Other had potentially a slight overweight; in High Power, a s~rong one. At the beginning of the session, Subject was told that Other perhaps had more information than he did. This was
437
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done to prevent Subject's feelings of resistance against Other, observed in an experiment by Shaw and Penrod (1962) in which Other appeared to have more information than Subject without Subject having a plausible explanation for this. Participation was operationally defined in this experiment as the time available for eommunicati, on about the decision problem, so that everyone could use his information only to u certain extent. In Low Participation, 5 time units were available; in High Participation, 10 time units could be used. (The amount of available time was not made known to Subject in .order to avoid his possible compensation mechanisms, like speeding up the arguing, or the reverse, etc.) The two expert power variations and the two participation variations combined into a 2 )K 2 .design (in principle an .analysis of variance design) with four treatments (F~ig. 1). The dependent variable in the experiment was effective influence, defined earlier in the paper (see above). It was measured in two different ways: 1. Objective measures o] change in Subject's opinion: The crucial data concerned the factual change in Subiect's preference for the problem solution, the location of the new hospital outside or inside the town center. Subject was given a possibility at the end of the session to give his final opinion by making an alternative choice for the most preferable solution. The Experimenter was thus able to ,check if Subieet h.ad, after all, mainrained his initial opinion, or had changed in ~avor of the opinion advocated by O?~her (of. da~a in Table 1). With the same objective in mind (of checking whether Subject had changed his opinion or not) the content of Subiect's communication was analyzed ,and his .opinion changes scored (cf. Table 2). 2. Other's effective influence on Subject: Subject's attitudes. In the above mentioned measures of effective influence, Other's effective influence on subieet was directly measured by Experimenter's .comparis,on of the initial and final opinions of Subject. In a second group of measures, Subject was explicitly asked ~o ~express ~his reactions towards Other ,and towards the influence process .on a 6-point rating scale, represented by a line on which only the two extremes were verbalized. Questi,ons: How strong did you feel the arguments of the Other were? (from "strong" to "weak") (~cf. Table 3). Lo. part. (bi) Lo. exp. (al) Hi. exp. (a2)
aibi a2bl
FIG. 1. The four experimental treatments.
Hi. part. (b~) alb2 a~b2
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MULDER AND WILKE
How strong did you feel your own arguments were? (from "strong" to "weak") (cf. Table 5). Did you feel that the arguments ,of the Other were stronger or weaker? (cf. Table 4). Did the Other have ~nore information than you? (more-less) (el. Table 6). To what extent are you in agreement with Other? (agree-disagree) (cf. Table 7). Foil.owing the theoreti.cal considerations, some other measures were taken to eontro.1 for the effect of intervening v,ariables. The intention was to assess if, in this experimental situation, "involvement" and "selfconfidence" were determinants of effective influence. Measures, on 6-point ratings scales: a. For involvement: how involved do you feel in the task y,ou have done here? (very strong-fairly weak). b. For self-confidence: how much self-confidence did you have during this investigation? (mu.ch-little). In one series of the experiment being reported, Other was a formal positi.on. Subject was then asked: a. In your opinion, could one say that in your team a head (leader) was functioning? (yes or no). b. To what extenb did you think that this Other w~as a strong or weak head (of the agency)? (strong-weak). The first question was intended to be a check upon the introduction, in that series of the experiment, of a formal leadership. With the second question, researchers had an exploratory intention in mind with regard to the two hypotheses. The research design described .above was applied in three "replications" or series: in the first experiment, 60 subjects, aged 15 to 18 years, pupils fr.om High School for Teachers' Training, were equally, and at random, divided into four experimental treatments. In each of these treatments, the Subieet presumed that he was collaborating with a colleague from a "town planning agency." In the second experiment, 64 subjects, with the same background as in the first experiment, were split over treatments; the only difference with the first experiment being that here Subiect presumed that he was working together with the boss of the "town planning agency." Experiment three, with 108 subjects, was an exact replieati,on of the second, with one ,additional sentence in the introduction stressing Subject's own responsibility for his opinion ch,anges. In the second and third experiment, therefore, Other had legitimate power or position power (on the basis of Experimenter's introduction of the situation to Subiect) in ad-
439
PARTICIPATIOI~ A N D P O W E R EQTJALIZATIOI~
dillon to expert power. In the first experiment, such "formal power" did not exist. The data from the three experiments were pooled in this paper. After separate analyses they revealed that, in agreement with a priori theory, the data of all three experiments were only slightly different from each other. RESULTS
The data will be presented in four section.s. In Section 1, the data of the .crucial measures are summarized; in Section 2, reactions of :Subjects to the influence process are reported. Section 3 gives data on the measures of the ,control variables, and some special data are summarized in Section 4. : Section 1: Other's effective influence Vn Subject; objectively measured changes. The final opinion of Subject was measured by an alterI~ative choice question administered at the end of the session. It was then determined, by Experimenter, whether or not Subj oct had maintained his initial opinion .concerning the location of the new hospital or had changed in favor of the opinion .advocated by Other. In Table 1, the number of Subiects who changed, that is to say, the effective influence by Other on Subject, is reported. Another measure, comparable with the one reported above, was performed by analyzing the content of Subieet's messages and scoring the opinion changes which manifested themselves. These data are reported in Table 2. The data in Tables 1 and 2 concerning the effective influences of Other on Subject gave strong support to Hypotheses One and Two. Higher Expert Power of Other results in more effective influence of Other on Subieet than Low Expert Power; this holds also within the Low Participation treatment (in Table 1, p < .05; in Table 2, p < .01). Even then, the intera,ction effect is manifesting itself strongly (,and signifi,cantly). Although Participation shows a main effect, this must be completely TABLE 1 SUBJECTS WHO CHANGED OPINION ( N = 232, nl = n2 = n3 = n~ = 5S ~,
NUMBER
OF
Frequencies =
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
16 26
16 50
T h e analyses r e p o r t e d in this one a n d t h e following t a b l e are X square a n d a special t h i r d order interaction analysis (Nass 1968). p v~.lu.`es; ,expert power, p < ,001; participation, p < .01; interaction, p < .05.
440
MULDER AND WILKE TABLE 2 NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO CHANGED (COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS) ( N = 2 3 2 , nl = n 2 = n 3 = n 4 = 58) Frequencies
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
9 24~
15 48
p values: expert power, p < .001; partieipation, p < .001; interaction, p < .05.
attributed to the very strong effect in the High Participation-High Expert Power eell; differences in Low Expert Power are negligible (and nonsignificant). Section 2: Other's effective influence on Subject: Subject attitudes. In Table 3, the interaction effect is most prominent; the strength of Other's argument is greatest in ttigh Participation-High Expert Power and very TABLE 3 STRENGTH OF OTHER'S ARGUMENTS (N = 232, nl = n 2 = n3 = n4 = 58)
Means
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
4.3 4.1
zt. 7 3.1
Lo. expert Hi. expert
T h e lower t h e score, t h e stronger O's arglnnent. Analysis of variance has been applied on these a n d t h e following Tables. p values: expert power, p < .001; participation, n.s.; interaction, p < .001.
slight in High Participation-Low Expert Power, where something of a boomerang effect showed up (see Theoretical Considerations). Expert differences in Low Participation are negligible. In Table 4, expert power appears to be effective; again the Participation effect is restricted to High Expert Power treatment. In Table 5, the interaction effect is not significant, although the trend is clearly discernible. Again, in Table 6, TABLE
4
STRENGTH OF 0TIIER~S ARGUMENTS, EXPLICITLY COMPARED BY SUBJECT WITH HIS OWN ARGUMENTS (N = 232, nl = n~ = n~ = n~ = 58)
Means
Lo. Part.
tti. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
5.0 4.2
5.0 3.1
The lower the score, the stronger O's arguments. p values: expert power, p < .001; participation, p < .01~ interaction, p < 21,
441
PARTICIPATION A N D P O W E R EQUALIZATION
TABLE 5 STRENGTII OF SUBJECT'S OWN ARGUMENTS (N=232, nl =n~=n~ =ra= 58)
IV[eans ~
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert I-Ii.expert
3.7 3.9
3.8 4.5
The lower the score, the stronger Subject's arguments. p values: expert power, p < .01; participation, p < .05; interaction, n.s.
Expert Power has clear effects, while the Participation effect is located in High Expert Power treatments; the interaction effect is not significant. It strikes us that in those measures explicitly referring to Subject himself, the effects are weaker than in the ones not doing so. This is in agreement with some of our earlier experimental data. In Table 7, the interaction effect is again strong; participation has only effects when .combined with High Expert Power. TABLE 6 OTHER 1V~oRE INFORMATION THAN SUBJECT? ( N = 2 3 2 , nl = n 2 = n 3 = n 4 = 58)
Means ~
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
3.5 3.0
3.4 2.4
The lower the score, the more information Other has, compared with Subject himself. p values: expert power, p < .001; participation, p < .05; interaction, n.s.
Tables 1-7 enable us to draw the following conclusion. The High Expert Power of Other tends to result in greater effective influence of Other on Subject than Low Expert Power in Tables 4 and 6 this holds true even within the low participation treatments. Thus, Hypothesis One has found strong support in our data. TABLE 7 SUBJECT'S AGREEMENT WITIK OTHER
(N = 232, ni = n~ = n3 = n~ = 58)
Means ~
Lo. part.
Hi. part.
Lo. expert Hi. expert
4.6 4.4
4.6 3.4
The lower the score, the more Subject agrees with Other. p values; expert power, p < .001; participation, p < .01; interaction, p < ,0!.
442
MULDER AND W I L K E
The most prominent finding, however, is the consistent interaction effect: Hypothesis Two is also strongly supported by these data. When Other has rel,atively low expert power, participation does not have any effect, that is, Other's overweight does not become effective. When, however, Other has greater expert power, the more Subject participates in the decision making, the more effective influence Other has on him. It i.s interesting to ,compare data from Tables 1 and 2 with the data from other tables. For instance, while it .appears tha~ in High Parti.cip ation-High Expert Power the effective influence ,of Other .on Subiect is, in actual fact, very great (more than 85% of the Subject changed their initial firm opinion under Other's influence !), they express in ,a subiective attitude measure only moderate agreement with Other (see Table 7). It seems t~ be difficult for a person to acknowledge to himself and others (Experimenter) that he is influenced b y Other(s). S e c t i o n 3. Two variables were measured to assess if they ~might, in this experimental situati.on, be determinants of effective influence: task involvement and self-confidence. The four treatments did not differ in the analysis of variance with regard to any of these, two variables and .are therefore not reported here. Thus, no basis exists for an interpretation in which these variables might be theoretically connected with the already reported differences between the experimental treatments found for effective influence. S e c t i o n 4. In the second and third replications of the experiment, Subiect was presumably working with the head of the town planning agency. Subjects were questioned about whether in ~heir opinion Other had been functioning as a real head, and if Other was a strong or a weak head. (N = 172, nl = n 2 ~- n 3 = n 4 = 43). On the first question, less ~han 45% of Subiects gave an affirmative answer; thus the measure does not reflect the presence of the experimentally introduced formal head. The number of affirmative answers tends to be larger in High Expert Power than in Low Expert Power (p ~ .]0). The second measure logically linked to the first question gives identical results: in High Expert Power, Subiects feel that Other was a strong head. Our intention to use the first question as an "independent check" of the introduced formal head had clearly failed, and for that reason t:he linking of the second question with the first one undermined the findings of the seeond. DISCUSSION
In this experimental situation, Subiect star~ed with a firm point of view in favor of a certain problem solution. This point of view was u result of his general foreknowledge 'of this problem and his introduction
PARTICIPATION A N D P O W E R EQUALIZATION
443
to certain information supporting his previous knowledge. The firmness of this initial point of view is apparent in the data; in the .condition of Low Expert Power of 0ther~ in which Other had a slight ove~weight ~in relevant information, only 28% of Subjects changed their opinion after the communication between Subject and Other (see Table 1). This experimental situtation, then, is very appropriate for testing the relationships between expert power, participation, and effective influence, as formulated in our hypotheses. Two classes of measures were taken: of primary importance was the check on Subject's opinion .change, obtained by eemparing :his final opinion with his preparticipation point .of view, and by a~alyzing the :content of his written communications with Other. In these measures, Other's effective influence on Subject is defined by the number of Subjects who changed their initial opinion in favor of Other's p.oint of view. The second ,class consisted of subjective attitude measures, in which Subject expressed his opinions about the strength of his own ar.guments, about the ,strength of Other's arguments, the difference in strength between Other's arguments and his own, ,and his agreement with Other, etc. High Expert Power (power ----potential influence) results in greater effective influence than Lower Expert P.ower. Knowledge is, indeed, power--as Bacon stated .many centuries ago, and Moore demonstrated experimentally half a century ago. In our experiment, as in Moore's first experimental demonstration (Moore, 1921), this relationship is demonstrated to hold true for an area in which the knowledge is relevant. However, this experiment had been designed to test a hypothesis on the relationship between participation and power equalization. Contrary to rough formulations in the literature, to the effect that participation leads to power equalization between less ,and more powerful group members, we stated that under certain conditions, the opposite must be expected: the greater the difference in expert power between Subiect and Other, the greater will be Other's effective influence on Subject under conditions of greater participation by Subject in decision-making processes with Other. Greater participation by Subject will enable Other to bring all his greater expert power to realization and will expose Subject to stronger influence. From the experimental data, the ,conclusive evidence is that more participation by Subject in the decision-making process, combined with more expert power of Other, results in a larger difference in Other's effective influence on Subject. From the data, it is also clear that the above reported differences cannot be attributed to differences in task involvement or self-~confidence, .as could be expected on the basis of earlier experiments and theorizing (see Theoretical Considerations). In this experiment, we .do no4 have to
444
1VIULDER A N D W I L K E
bother about the way self-confidence might have been caused by information nor about self-confidence or task involvement as an intervening variable in the relationship between power, participation, and effective infiuence. A remark about a technical point must be made: in our experiment, the effective influence of Subject on Other is excluded as Other is a paper stooge of Experimenter. However, this is not a serious objection against our theoretical 'interpretation: Subject's expert power is kept constant in the two expert .conditions, so that it may be assumed that if Subject's influence could have been effective, his effective influence on Other would not have been any different in one treatment than in another. The only difference between the reported experiment and an experiment without a paper stooge (at present being planned by us) would again be the effective influence of 0t,her on Subject, demonstrated already in this experiment. We thus predict the same result in the future experiment as rep.orted here in this .one. Of fundamental importance is the following remark, intended to prevent incorrect generalizations from our study: in our experiment, it was demonstrated that "under ,certain ,conditions" participation does not promote power equalization, but on the contrary, participation leads to a widening of the power gap. One of these "certain conditions" is specified in the reported experiment, to wit~ the greater expert power of Other in relation to Subject. It would follow that if Subject, while working with his legitimate boss (Other) as in experiments two and three, were to acquire more expert power than Other (conceptually and in fact quite possible!), more participation would lead to more effective influence of Subject on his superior. Returning to the world-wide democratization processes, referred to in the introduction, this means that persons who aspire to participate with people from higher levels in the decision-making processes of their .organizaZions and groups must be capable, qua motivational and ability level, to attain and maintain to some extent an equality in expertness with these "superiors." Otherwise, the power gap between superiors and participants will even be likely to increase as a direct consequence of the participa?~ion pro'eedure, and it would be preferable to avoid participation, so ,as to keep one's opinion .safe from persons possessing greater power. The requirements necessary for this "intended" parti.cipation lie in two main areas, as .can be seen from the results of several field studies. In a study carried out in Dutch Councils of the Enterprise (0ndernemingsraad), it appeared that half of the voluntary membership of these Councils bad no desire for participation in decision-making; the other
PARTICIPATION AND POWER EQUALIZATION
445
half complained about the lack of expertness (Quint, 1967; V a n der Velden, 1968). In Kolaja's report (Kolaja, 1965, p. 21) about studies of the Yugoslav Workers' 'Councils, it is demonstrated with survey and *observation data that "management personnel and better-educated persons (in the reported study, these are persons in research positions) accounted for a large proportion of accepted suggestions" (although they formed, a small minority in the Councils). K olaja (19'65) stated that "management, and especially the director, formulated many proposals wh'ieh t'he Court.ell readily approved" (pp. 21-23). The main problem of the labor unions and other institutes was how to stimulate the "motivation of workers to participate in factory affairs" (Kolaia, 1965, p. 57). The empirical findings in research done by Broekmeyer in the Natron factory in Bosnia give further evidence in this direction (Broekmeyer, 1958, p. 269). It can be derived from such data that even when participation procedures are realized in good faith, so much expert power is still concentrated in a small ,group of people that the power gap is .a,ctually not decreasing. If people hope,, through participation, to real'ize their aim of contributing to the decision making of their groups or organizations on important issues, certain requirements must be fulfilled with regard to their level .of motivation .and expertness (for motivational requirements see, e.g., Vroom, 1960, who demonstrated a certain personality variable as a determinant on the effecks of participation). It may be assumed, therefore, that in many instances, learning processes are necessary to make it possible for people to fulfill these requirements. One possibility ~is learning during and through the participati.on process itself. Thibaut and Kelley refer to two opposing possibilities for a person to use his greater expertness: either by Other giving expert advice to the extent th,at Subie.et .also becomes an expert, or by Other not learning the relevant knowledge and skills (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959, p. 109; of. also in this .context Rosen, 1966). An.other possibility 'is learning before the critical p.artieipation phase. In laboratory and field experiments, it has been demonstrated that the exertion o.f power results in a strong .aspiration for more power (Mulder, 1959; and Mulder et al. 1970). In an experimental study by French et al. (1966), it appeared t'bat preconditions, existing long before the experimental participation (such as the level of parti.eipation normally functioning in the organization to which Subject belonged), were determinants of ihe effects of the experimental participation. It also seems realistic to .a.ccept the fa.ct tha~ effective participation requires certain skills and types .of knowledge which are unevenly dis-
446
1VIULDER AND WILKE
tributed in the various strata of our society as a result of prevailing conditions from the first years of li.fe, through adolescence, and later (Inkeles, 1966). This means that the learning must extend over longer periods of time and be intensive if the participation goals of people are ever to be attained. As a result, the preceding costs for people from the deprived strata of the population will be extremely high. Thus, .people must be "ready,' for participation in order to get its rewards (such as the possibility of contributing to the steering of their group in a good direction). Also, in this case, costs precede rewards. This cannot be emphasized enough because earlier social psychological studies have shown that the members' perception of more participation in the decision-making process suffices for their satisfaction, involvement, etc. (Hoffman & M.aier, 1961; March & Simon, 1958, p. 54). Power equalization between "haves" and "have-nots" .cannot be realized through and after participation as such. When equality in relevant knowledge, in abilities, in motivation strength, etc., is not realized before the participation process, the power differential will not decrease but, on the contrary, will increase still further. REFERENCES BAVELAS, A., HASTORF, A. ]~., GROSS, A. E., • KITE, W. 1:~,., Experiments on the alteration of group structure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 55-70. BLAU, ~. M., & SCOTT, W. l~., Formal organizations. San Francisco: Chandler, 1962. BROEK~EYER, M. J. De arbeidersaad in Zuidslabi@. Meppel. Boom: 1962. Coe~, L., ,& FRENCH, J. R. P. Overcoming resistance to change. In D. Cartwright and A. Zsmder (Eds.), Group dyna,mics. London: Tavistock, DILL, W. l~. Desegregation or integration? In W. W. Cooper, ~ . J. Lea vitt, and M. W. Shelly (Eds.~, New perspectives in organization research. New York: Wiley. FRENCH, J. I~. P., ISRAEL,J., & AS, D. An experiment on participation in a Nm~vegian factory. Human Relations, 1960, 13~ 3-19. FRENel~, J. 1%. P., KAY, E., & MEYER, I-I. Participation and the appraisM system. Human Relations, 1966, 19, 3-20. FREI~CH, J. 1%. P., & SlCrDSR, R. (1959) Leadership and interpersonal power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, p. 118-149. GOLE~BIEWSKI,l%. T. Small groups and large organizations. In 3. March (Ed.), Handbook o] organizations, 1965. HOFF~A~, L. 1%., & MAIER, N. 1%. F. Quality and acceptance of problem solutions by members of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 401-407. HOVLAND, C. I., & WEISS, W. The influence of source credibility on communication effectiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1951, 1~, 635~650. IZ~ELES, A. Social structure and the socialization of competence. Harvard Educational Review, 1966, 36, 265-283.
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I~0LAZA, I. Workers' Councils. The Yugoslav experience, London: Tavistock, 1965. KnV~E~., G. K. The Scanlon Plan: cooperation through participation. The Journal o] Business, Univ. o] Chicago, 1955, 2, 100-113. LEVlNGER, G. The development of perceptions and behaviour in newly formed social power relationships. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1969, 83-98. MAEe~, J, G., & SIMOn, H. A.; WITH G•ETZXOW, It. Organizations. New York: Wiley, 1958. MOORE~ H. T. The comparative influence of majority and expert opinion. The American Journal o] Psychology, 1921, 32, 16-20. MORSE, Ik!. C., • I:~EI1V~ER,]~. W~e experimental change of a major organization variable. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1956, 52, 120-129. MULDER, M. Power and satisfaction in task-oriented groups. Acta Psychologica, 1959, 16, 178-225. MULDER, M., •EE:N', P., et El. Power distance between subject and more-powerful Other as a determinant of SubjecVs power behavior on a level of reality. Submitted for publication. MOLDER, M., VEEI~, P., et El. Cognitive processes in power equalisation. To be published in: The European Journal o] Social Psychology, 1970. NASS, CH. Interaction of third order in a three-time binary-frequency block (with fixed second order margin frequencies). Dept. of Statistics, Netherlands Institute for Preventive Medicine at Leyden. To be published. QT:I~, ft. G. H. De ondernemingsraad in enn viertal bedrijven. Doctoral dissertation, Instituut voor Sociale Psychologic, l~ijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1967. RIRC~=E~, tI. W. The effect of talkativeness on ability to influence group solutions of problems. Sociometry, 1958, 21, 309-321. ROSEN, S. The comparative roles of informational and material commodities in interpersonal transactions. The Journal o] Experimental an~ Social Psychology, 1966, 2, 211-226. SHAW, M. E., (~ PEI~EOD,W. W., Does more information available to a group improve group performance? Sociometry, 1962, 25, 377-390. SHOWELL, M. Interpersonal knowledge and rated leader potential. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 87-92. SMIT~, G. G., & TANNENBAUIV~,A. S. Organizational control structure--a comparative analysis. Human Relations, 1963, 16, 299-316. STRAUSS, G. Some notes on power-equalization. In I-I. J. Leavitt (Ed.), The social science o] organizations. New York: Prentice Hall, 1963. Pp. 39-84. TALLAND,G. A. The assessment of group opinion by leaders, and their influence on its formation. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1954, 49, 431-434. TANNENBAUM, A. S. Social psychology o] the work organization. London: Tavistock, 1966. T/tIBAUT, J. W., (~ KELLEY, ]~. I~. The social psychology o] groups. New York: Wiley, 1959. TttORSRUD, E., (~ EMERY, 1~. E. Industrial conflict and industrial democracy. In J. R. Lawrence (Ed.), Operational research in the social sciences, 1965. Pp. 439-447. UI~mEVER GROIJP MAI~AGEMENT PERSOI~NEL. Manual on evaluation o/ managers, specialists and scientists in Unilever N. V. Rotterdam, February 1967. VAN DEE VELDE1N-,~t. A. Mede~eggenschap ennoverleg. Doctoral dissertation Instimut voor Sociale PSychologie, Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1968.
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VR00M, V. Some personality determinants o] the effects o] participation. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. ZIT,LER, R. C , & BEHRI~GEa, R. D. Assimilation of the knowledgeable newcomer under conditions o f group success and failure. The Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 60~ 228-291. RECEIVED: M a r c h 5, 1969