Participatory rural development without participation: Insights from Ukraine

Journal of Rural Studies 69 (2019) 76–86

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Journal of Rural Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jrurstud

Participatory rural development without participation: Insights from Ukraine

T

Vasyl Kvartiuka,∗, Jarmila Curtissa,b a b

Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), Theodor-Lieser-Str. 2, 06120, Halle (Saale), Germany Thünen Institute, Institute of Farm Economics, Bundesallee 63, 38116, Braunschweig, Germany

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Community-based organizations Participatory governance Decentralization Local government Ukraine

As participatory approaches to rural development are adopted in post-communist countries, there is a growing need to evaluate their success. Centralized and hierarchical governance systems pertinent to these countries may introduce serious challenges for community-driven development (CDD) and newly established community-based organizations (CBOs). We address these concerns by critically assessing whether CBOs in rural Ukraine engage in meaningful partnerships with local governments. In doing so, we examine the link between participation and CBO establishment and clarify how lack of local governments' fiscal autonomy may undermine CBOs' sustainability. We use unique primary data and employ both qualitative and quantitative methods to test hypotheses about how these organizations were established. We find that newly-established organizations are disconnected from local inhabitants and are aligned with the fundraising incentives of local governments. The context of incomplete decentralization reforms common to post-Soviet countries distorts local governments’ incentives and, as a result, jeopardizes the sustainability of the CDD efforts.

1. Introduction In the last three to four decades, both governments and international development agencies have adopted the principles of decentralization, participatory governance and community-based development as a foundation of their rural development strategies (Speer, 2012). These approaches are embedded in broader trends of outsourcing service delivery to private for-profit and nonprofit organizations (Bennett and Iossa, 2010; Evans, 1996; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Considering the fact that active and engaged communities are an important prerequisite of a successful decentralization reform (Bergh, 2004; Wong and Guggenheim, 2005), community-based and –driven development (CDD) aims to involve community members in the development process by “emphasizing community control over planning decisions and investment resources” (Wong, 2012). Community-based organizations (CBOs), representing local communities, are considered to be the focal points in CDD development initiatives (Wong, 2012; World Bank, 2005) and effective partners in public service provision in rural areas (World Bank, 2004). Remarkably, development partnerships between local governments and CBOs (or local communities more generally) are now part of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite broad acceptance of these approaches to local development, little systematic research has ∗

been carried out to determine how they perform in different contexts. Since participatory governance was introduced only in early 2000s in the post-Soviet countries (Babajanian, 2005; World Bank, 2000, 2008b), studies on this region are particularly scarce. This article addresses this gap. A major aspiration of development agencies has been to incentivize rural communities to establish CBOs that would facilitate local civic activism on a sustainable basis (Speer, 2012) and partner with local governments for public services provision (Brinkerhoff, 2002). For instance, the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) launched a CDD project in Ukraine in 2007 with a vision to use CBOs as platforms for rural leaders to independently drive local development agenda in partnership with local governments (Sah, 2015). In five years, a majority of Ukrainian villages had a CBO dealing with a particular issue or promoting a general local development strategy. For instance, solely UNDP's Program “Community-Based Approach to Local Development” (CBA) has worked with the CBOs located in approximately 20% of all rural administrative units since its inception in 2007 (UNDP, 2017). Despite the fact that CBOs have become a common phenomenon in Ukrainian rural areas in just the span of a decade, we still know very little about effectiveness and sustainability of the governance arrangements involving CBOs. Scholars are increasingly concerned about the potential pitfalls of

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (V. Kvartiuk), [email protected] (J. Curtiss).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2019.04.002 Received 4 June 2017; Received in revised form 7 April 2019; Accepted 18 April 2019 Available online 06 May 2019 0743-0167/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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CDD and effectiveness of partnerships between the communities and local governments especially in the contexts of incomplete decentralization reforms (Banerjee et al., 2010; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Speer, 2012). So far, the literature on decentralization and CDD have been commonly separated from each other and, as a result, participation was examined outside the context of decentralization (Krishna, 2003). In Ukraine (like in many other post-Soviet countries), vertical and centralized governance structures inherited from the Soviet past reduced local governments' technical and fiscal capacity (World Bank, 2008a). This may have affected CDD in two major ways. First, local scarce resources may lead to over-dependence on donors' aid and facilitation, which is widely criticized because this dependence may drive local leaders' incentives away from meaningfully engaging community members in local public policy processes (Bano, 2008; Bräutigam, 2000; Knack, 2001). CBOs that emerged endogenously with minimal outside facilitation are believed to be more sustainable in their activities because they represent community's preferences better and enjoy greater levels of social capital (Bano, 2008; Froelich, 1999; Khieng and Dahles, 2015; Krishna, 2003). In addition, external facilitation may adversely incentivize CBO leaders to exclude community members from their activities. Second, limited autonomy of local governments in centralized governance systems may incentivize local bureaucrats or politicians to instrumentalize CBOs for fundraising or clientelistic purposes. A meaningful partnership requires a CBO to be “embedded” in local communities with inhabitants actively participating in local politics (Evans, 1996; Teamey, 2007). However, with low participation rates local governments and other powerful elites may want to misuse relatively flexible CBOs and even shield them from citizens' engagement retaining full control over them (Howard, 2017; Platteau and Abraham, 2002). For instance, Bergh (2010) shows that Moroccan local political leaders instrumentalize CBOs for clientelistic purposes in the light of low community participation and constraining administrative and fiscal environment. This paper critically assesses whether Ukrainian CBOs engage in meaningful partnerships with local governments. In doing so, we examine the link between participation and establishment of the CBOs and study the incentives of local politicians to use CBOs as vehicles for their fundraising efforts in the Ukrainian context with limited administrative and fiscal autonomy. Results should inform us whether Ukrainian rural CBOs could be considered a product of the “bottom-up” processes of civic activeness within communities, or merely a bureaucratic construct of the local governments motivated to use them for their reelection or for clientelistic purposes. Understanding the “embeddedness” of CBOs in local communities and the nature of relationships with local governments will help identifying the determinants of CBOs’ sustainability and developing recommendations for improving the design of the CDD initiatives and participatory governance institutional design in the post-Soviet context. This knowledge will be particularly useful for the design of the comprehensive decentralization reforms that were launched by the Ukrainian government in 2014. We tackle these research questions by drawing upon the literature on collective action, local governance and decentralization. Furthermore, we utilize unique data from a 2012 survey in Ukraine with mayors and residents, along with qualitative interviews with development experts and practitioners. Evidence suggests that most of the CBOs in Ukraine are disconnected from the community members with only very few exceptions where CBO leaders manage to mobilize community members and to establish effective partnership with local governments. The problem appears to be in local politicians’ incentives to retain control of CBOs to use them as vehicles for fundraising going around their limited administrative and fiscal autonomy. As a result, meaningful partnerships between the CBOs and local governments appear to be unlikely without further deeper decentralization reforms.

2. Institutional context Centralized governance structure among the post-Soviet countries leaves rural municipalities in a very disadvantaged situation. Local governments are typically highly dependent on the higher governmental tiers and have little decision-making autonomy in comparison to the higher tiers (Babajanian, 2008; Bhuiyan, 2010; Ross, 2010; World Bank, 2008a). Most rural municipalities have insufficient tax bases and, thus, heavily rely on redistribution schemes that even out fiscal inequalities among municipalities called ‘equalization transfers’ (World Bank, 2008a). In addition, they can apply for ‘capital subsidies’ representing opt-in transfers stipulated for local investments in public infrastructure. However, neither of these income sources provide adequate funding for municipalities' sustainable development (World Bank, 2008a). The result is that local inhabitants were left with basic public services of extremely poor quality (OECD & World Bank, 2004). World Bank (2008a) estimated a fiscal need of 29 billion USD to be invested over a decade to avoid further deterioration of Ukrainian rural public goods. Unsystematic attempts to implement decentralization reforms over the past two decades have not improved local governments’ fiscal autonomy. Quite the opposite, the changes of the Ukrainian Budgetary Codex in 2010 centralized public budgets even further, leaving municipalities with very few fundraising instruments. In addition, the system of intergovernmental transfers is rife with clientelism, which results in informal bargaining over the transfers guaranteed by law (World Bank, 2008a). Often, tax revenue-generating efforts of local governments bring virtually no benefit to municipalities because the transfers they receive from higher governmental tiers only weakly depend on fiscal effort (World Bank, 2008a). Similar findings are reported in the contexts of other post-Soviet countries (e.g. Zhuravskaya, 2000). These circumstances may motivate municipalities to turn to private donors who may be willing to contribute towards local needs, but legislation restricts fundraising from private sources. Because of the long tradition of collective farms financing local public goods (Dudwick et al., 2007), local communities still often expect rural enterprises to at least co-fund these needs. Most of these enterprises do so on an ad hoc, informal basis. Despite the apparent availability of private funding, local bureaucrats are severely restricted in fundraising from extrabudgetary sources due to anti-corruption legislation.1 Some local governments would not initiate local development initiatives even though private funding might be available. The media-reinforced fear of corruption charges among the mayors stems from several publicly resonant court cases. Consequently, not only are the municipalities limited in the mobilization of public resources, but private fundraising is also severely hindered. Ukraine, along with other post-Soviet countries, started experimenting with the adoption of participatory approaches to local development only in the beginning of the 2000s. A pioneering project was launched by the World Bank in 2001 and stipulated the creation of a Ukrainian Social Investment Fund (USIF) providing communities with grants for social infrastructure renovation under the condition of community involvement (World Bank, 2008b). Later on, other major development initiatives adopted the principles of CDD as well. A wellknown example is the UNDP's CBA project “Community-Based Approach to Local Development” (launched in 2007 and still in operation) that provided funding for local infrastructure improvements (e.g. water, education, healthcare) and promoted community mobilization by establishing CBOs. By 2012, the vast majority of the development agencies in Ukraine that funded social infrastructure had adopted some form of CDD approach. This represents a large chunk of overall development assistance as social infrastructure was accountable for 36% of total 1 “Law on the Principles of Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption” (2009; 2013).

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receipts in 2013 (OECD, 2016). As a result of these and other donor initiatives being coupled with entrepreneurial readiness to participate in local development, substantial private funding opportunities were generated. Until the mid-2000s, the Ukrainian CBO landscape has been rather desolate (Kvartiuk, 2015). Formal civil society organizations are typically scarcely represented in Ukrainian rural areas. One can often find veterans', youth, and professional associations that represent a legacy of Soviet times, though many of these organizations are inactive and exist only on paper. With a gradual economic recovery and improvements in fundraising opportunities in the 2000s, other types of NGOs began to emerge. Still, most of these organizations are young and lack capacity. Participation rates among the Ukrainian rural population are low (Kvartiuk, 2016). Eastern Europe in general is known for low levels of social capital and civic activism (Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Sissenich, 2010). Collective farms’ central role in local public goods provision during Soviet times contributed to a widespread consumerist mentality among rural population (Kvartiuk, 2015). Thus, local inhabitants may have little motivation to get engaged and deal with local needs.

trust has been found to be generally low (Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Sissenich, 2010). Thus, Paldam & Svendsen (2001) argue that the Soviet legacy destroyed social trust and replaced it with dysfunctional institutions. Third, collective action may be further hindered by beliefs and mental models associated with the Soviet past. In particular, Denzau and North (1994) argue that a common perception of the surrounding world may determine the degree of cooperation. Consequently, we hypothesize that CBOs are more likely to be established in those communities with larger needs in public goods, higher levels of social trust, and with inhabitants having more progressive mental models. CBOs that were established with donors' facilitation are typically referred to as “externally induced” and they are widely criticized for lack of members and unsustainable financial performance (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010; Bergh, 2010; Narayan, 1999). Fowler and Biekart (1996) argue that an ability to fundraise locally (e.g. membership fees), coupled with the availability of volunteers, signal organizational legitimacy within a community and give it a mandate to act on its own behalf. Scholars are increasingly concerned that the availability of aid may give rise to organizations without a membership base (Bano, 2008) or transform “bottom-up” organizations into technocratic CBOs highly responsive to donors' agenda (Banks et al., 2015; O'Toole and Burdess, 2004). Accordingly, in the villages where donors have induced CBOs' establishment, local patterns of civic activism may be disconnected from the institutional framework of a newly-established CBO (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010). Donors' facilitation may shift accountability directions from “downward” (membership base) to “upward” (donor community) and create incentives to focus on short-term projects rather than long-term strategic development (Banks et al., 2015). For instance, Chapple and Montero (2016) show that development initiatives that “are imposed from outside” may be unsustainable if they are not backed up by new leadership that endogenously emerge within local networks. Inactive local residents may generate and reinforce local governments’ incentives to shield local CBO from active participation and retain control over its activities. In particular, local politicians seeking reelection and fearing electoral competition may have incentives to counteract CBOs that could engage in lobbying and civic movements aiming to affect governmental decision-making (Bishop and Davis, 2002; Blair, 2000; Wampler, 2007). Guided by the incentives to stay in power, mayors may be motivated to have full control of local CBOs and their activities (Fritzen, 2007) and avoid a “messy” decision-making process that involves civil society (Bräutigam, 2000). As a result, impediments from the side of local officials may undermine local collective action and, as a result, sustainability of a CBO, making it highly dependent on local government.

3. Theoretical framework Involving CBOs as partners within local development was a result of a gradual paradigm shift within the public administration and development agencies. Neoliberal ideas of state failure in central public goods provision that were promoted by the World Bank have paved the way for rethinking governance systems in the 1980s and 1990s with involvement of the private sector (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). Evans (1996) concept of “embeddedness” linked the discussion on decentralization and CDD. “Embeddedness” is positioned as a central element of public-private cooperation. Evans (1996) defines “complementarity” in a broad sense as “mutually supportive relations between public and private actors” and relates it to public goods provision where both actors may have complimentary competitive advantages. International development agencies saw nonprofit organizations in a broad sense as mechanisms allowing the voice of consumers and service recipients to be heard by the decision-makers (Ackerman, 2004). In the rural context, CBOs were a natural candidate to become local participation platforms and over time, these organizations became a central aspect of development agendas (Barr et al., 2005; Murray and Overton, 2011). In the rural or local context, CBOs can represent communities and “provide a basis for collective action” (Barr et al., 2015). Because active and engaged local residents are a prerequisite for a successful CDD (Bergh, 2004; Wong and Guggenheim, 2005), we examine factors contributing to a degree to which a CBO is embedded in a local community.

3.2. “Benevolent capture” by local governments

3.1. “Bottom-up” vs. “externally induced” CBOs

Apart from the donors' facilitation, availability of funding may be a major factor that stimulates establishment and growth of CBOs. Resource dependency theory (Froelich, 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggests that available resources are not only decisive for organizations' establishment, but to a large extent they also dictate organizations' missions. The dependency on resources is an organizational characteristic that causes a loss of autonomy (Gronbjerg, 1993; Provan, 1984). An emerging body of literature documents this phenomenon empirically in the context of rural CBOs (e.g. Adhikari and Goldey, 2010; Bano, 2008; Datta, 2005). The main problem with dependence on one funding source is that CBOs' leaders may pursue donor agencies’ objectives without embedding organizational decision-making in the local community. Availability of donor funding may generate adverse incentives of fiscally constrained local governments to establish and retain control of CBOs. Local bureaucrats, when fundraising via the newly-established CBOs, may benefit by capturing rents either directly by misappropriating funds (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Platteau and

One of the main challenges of CDD is to meaningfully engage local inhabitants in local public policy processes and development initiatives (Banerjee et al., 2010). The vision of the donor community was to use CBOs' institutional structure as focal points or platforms for local participation (EU, 2006; Sah, 2015; UNDP, 2017). The degree of CBOs’ embeddedness in rural communities represents its legitimacy and sustainability (Datta, 2005; Molden et al., 2017). The post-Soviet context may be associated with certain obstacles of participation making “bottom-up” establishment of CBOs less likely. First, Olson's (1965) cost-benefit framework of collective action suggests that community members act collectively (establishing a CBO or becoming its members) when the marginal benefit from the collective action is at least as high as the marginal cost. Second, social trust reduces the transaction costs of collective action by mitigating the need for costly sanctioning mechanisms (Andreoni and Gee, 2012; Francois and Zabojnik, 2005). In post-communist societies, the level of social 78

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Donor Agencies

Public/State Funding

Local Government

setting. Accordingly, we may observe a substitution effect between the state and private funding. Those local governments with higher fiscal autonomy may be more successful in bargaining over transfers from higher tiers of the government (Bates, 2008; Bratton, 2012; Timmons, 2005). Whereas those that are more fiscally constrained may have adverse incentives to establish CBOs hoping for additional fundraising opportunities from private sources.

Private Funding

CBO

4. Empirical strategy Higher Tier Governments

Entrepreneurs (Local Donors)

4.1. Data

Municipality Inhabitants

This study draws on qualitative and quantitative data that we collected from 2011 to 2012 in Ukraine. During the first data collection round, we conducted a total of 18 semi-structured face-to-face interviews with experts on local governance, CDD, and local development, along with selected mayors and CBO chairs.2 The aim was to extract information on challenges of local public policy regarding public goods provision and experience with CDD on the ground from the perspective of various stakeholders, and to map existing civil society representatives. Fig. 2 demonstrates the study regions. We carried out most of the expert interviews in Kyiv and stakeholder interviews in two selected regions: Kyiv oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.3 The choice of the former was motivated by relative resource abundance and reasonable access to information for local CBOs. The latter, on the other hand, is known for its relatively low level of public goods provision, which may potentially give rise to vigorous civic activity. Another data source used in the study is the survey conducted with all local stakeholders, including mayors, CBO chairs and residents, in 54 randomly-selected municipalities from two representative regions: Ternopil’ and Dnipropetrovs'k. We selected the regions to control for economic and cultural differences between the western and eastern parts of the country. As it is difficult to gain access to official residents' registries in Ukraine, and they may not even contain reliable information, we utilized systematic sampling based on a “random walk” method. We selected residents in randomly determined geographical locations within a given municipality forming stratified samples according to gender, age, and employment. The sample size within each of the municipalities ranged from 7 to 16 respondents, proportionately depending on the population size. We determined subsamples within municipalities' villages based on their shares in the total municipality's population. This approach ensured that relatively small villages within the municipalities were also represented in the sample. As a result, we obtained two random samples: a sample of 54 mayors and 588 residents from the two study regions. Major limitations of the study are associated with difficulties in data collection. First, we conducted qualitative interviews in Kyiv oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, both of which have certain pertinent specificities that may challenge generalization. Second, although the regions selected for the quantitative data collection are more representative, the sample size of the survey with mayors is relatively small, which may require triangulation of methods to ensure reliability of the results.

Fig. 1. Local government's fundraising incentives. Source: Author's elaboration.

Gaspart, 2003) or indirectly by benefiting from potential gains in political support and local popularity (Fritzen, 2007). Mansuri and Rao (2004) suggest that CBOs may be in a situation of a “benevolent capture” when local elites use them to address public issues but retain full control of the CBO management. A growing body of literature reports empirical evidence for “benevolent capture” in different contexts (Babajanian, 2005; Fritzen, 2007; Prokopy, 2005). Because centralized governance systems (pertinent to many post-Soviet countries) may restrict local governments in terms of fiscal and administrative autonomy (World Bank, 2005, 2008a), local bureaucrats may seek ways to expand their possibilities. If local governments retain control over a CBO, these flexible organizations may substantially improve their fundraising and managerial opportunities. Fig. 1 depicts local government's adverse incentives to control local CBO explicitly considering fiscal incentives. For a given municipality, the only source of funding is the higher tier government (depicted within the left-hand dashed rectangle) because it is legally restricted in fundraising from private sources (donor agencies, private entrepreneurs and residents). A CBO has a flexible legal form and can accept contributions from private donors (depicted within the right-hand dashed rectangle) and, as a result, may be of a high interest for the local government as it provides additional fiscal and administrative autonomy. As a result, we hypothesize that local governments are more likely to establish CBOs in fiscally constrained municipalities. In such cases, local governments and CBOs could be considered one integrated governance unit (double-dashed line). Local governments' adverse incentives to establish CBOs may be governed by the severity of the municipality's fiscal constraints. Andreoni and Payne (2003) suggest that nonprofits may face a tradeoff between private funding and state grants with one source of funding crowding out the other. We extend their argument to the fundraising calculus of local governments in the Ukrainian fiscally constrained rural

4.2. Methodology The empirical strategy aims to test “bottom-up” hypothesis of CBOs establishment and to examine local governments' incentives in a fiscally constrained context. First, we analyze qualitative interviews that were carried out during the first wave of data collection following the approach suggested by Ritchie and Spencer (1994). These authors’ 2

For a list of conducted interviews, please consult Appendix A. In 2014, three years after the data collection, the international community recognized the illegal annexation of the region by Russia. 3

Fig. 2. Overview of the study regions. 79

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framework stipulates the following distinct stages of data analysis: becoming familiar with the data; identifying a thematic framework; indexing transcribed data; charting the concepts occurring within the data; and finally, mapping and interpretation. This methodology allows researchers to dig deep into the data and reveal aspects that may potentially be beyond simple hypothesis testing (it includes some conceptual elements of a grounded theory). With the help of this framework, we explore all the aspects of CBO establishment that this study is concerned with. We also provide selected quotes from the interviewees in order to illustrate the arguments. Next, we use an econometric model to test our hypotheses about “bottom-up” CBO establishment and the “benevolent capture” of local CBOs by local governments in response to the lack of fiscal autonomy. The choice of the model specification is dictated by the binary nature of the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2002) and, accordingly, we use a binary discrete choice model of the following general specification:

Pr (CBOi = 1|x ) = +

(

0

+

1 FisConsti

+

2 Participation i

+

to address this problem with advanced model specification, for example, using instrumental variable techniques. Third, the proxies used for financial constraints and the availability of entrepreneurial funding are based on the perceptions of the mayors. In particular, we generated the proxies based on the respective questions utilizing a Likert scale, and not using direct measures of local public finance figures. Thus, these perceptions may not represent the actual situation in the field. However, we are interested in the incentives that these perceptions generate, and thus, these variables may be all the more relevant for the given context. 5. Results Interviews with local stakeholders reveal that CBO presence in rural areas is a widespread phenomenon, as nearly half of the sampled municipalities (26 out of 54) hosted a CBO. The geographic distribution of municipalities with CBOs is, however, greatly uneven. Between the two selected regions, we found established CBOs in 76% of the sampled municipalities in Dnipropetrovs'k, while this is the case in only 30% of the sampled municipalities in the Ternopil’ region in the western part of Ukraine. A higher degree of urbanization and larger municipalities of the Dnipropetrovs'k region may partially explain these observations.

3 PrFundingi

4 Zi + i )

where the dependent variable is a dummy reflecting whether a municipality has a registered CBO. FiscConsti is a vector of proxy variables for municipality i ’s fiscal constraints. Following the logic of the “benevolent capture” hypothesis, we expect higher fiscal constraints to be positively related to the likelihood of a CBO establishment. PrFundingi is a vector of proxies for the availability of local private funding. Following the resource dependence theory, availability of local funding should increase the likelihood of a CBO establishment. Furthermore, interacting these variables should give us a clue about a tradeoff between public and private funding that local governments may face. To test whether a CBO establishment is aligned with the “bottom-up” hypothesis, we include a vector of variables representing inhabitants' proclivity to collective action in municipality Participationi . Finally, Zi is a vector of controls. We use three proxies to control for a municipality's fiscal constraints: mayors' valuations of predictability of subsidies, SUBSIDIES ; equalization transfers, EQTRANS ; and local tax base, AUTONOMY . The latter represents the degree to which locally-collected taxes (although they are transferred to higher tier governments) can cover local needs. As a result, they could be seen as a leverage for a municipality to negotiate higher equalization transfers, and as a result, attain higher fiscal autonomy (World Bank, 2008a). This variable reflects a municipality's fiscal power. The availability of private funding for local development is reflected in the mayors' perceptions of the degree of local entrepreneurs' proclivity to contribute financially (FUNDBUSINESS ) and inhabitants' willingness to make regular monetary contributions towards local public needs (FUNDPOP ). We further use municipalitywide average residents' responses to a question about their involvement in local affairs (INVOLVE ), proclivity to convince neighbors to participate in local collective action, i.e., peer pressure (PEER) , and social trust (TRUST ) as proxies for local collective action potential. These variables should account for the extent to which local communities can develop a grass-roots “bottom-up” CBO. In addition, we control for local government's capacity (LGCAPACITY ), level of inhabitants' satisfaction with local public goods (PGINDEX ) and other municipality's characteristics. Before proceeding with the presentation of the results, it is important we outline the limitation of the Probit models. First, according to Babyak (2004) and Bergtold et al. (2011), small sample Probit estimations may suffer from overfitting and therefore bias the results. We deal with this problem by demonstrating specifications with different degrees of freedom that exhibit identical significant relationships. Second, our specifications may suffer from a simultaneity problem between the dependent variable and proxies for private funding. Private donors may change their behavior after establishing a CBO in a given municipality. Because of the sample size, we are restricted in our ability

5.1. “Bottom-up” vs. “externally induced” CBOs Local inhabitants’ involvement in the activities of CBOs appears to be exceptionally low. First, CBO leaders are modest in estimating community support of their organizations. Only 46% of CBOs report having members, and 41% report no members at all.4 The average membership base was 130 persons. Second, residents report low participation themselves. Only 3.57% of the residents within the sample reported being members of Soviet-stemming CBOs called street committees,5 and even fewer (3.06%) said they were members of newly established CBOs.6 Considering that CBOs were established in nearly half of the sampled municipalities, these numbers are surprisingly low. On the other hand, community members appear to be somewhat active in the more traditional types of local activism that had developed within pre-existing institutional frameworks (before CDD promotion in the 2000s). At least half of the respondents “sometimes” attend local town hall meetings, have made monetary contributions to local public goods, and had volunteered, on average, 3–4 times in the previous year. Interestingly, informal forms of participation (e.g. monetary contributions for a certain public good) appear to be significantly higher for members of a CBO than non-members. On the other hand, more formal participation (e.g. town hall meetings) is highest for the members of street committees. Because street committees take root in the Soviet tradition of vertical state governance, they may represent a more formal vehicle for participation. The “bottom-up” CBO establishment hypothesis implies that we should observe differences in interpersonal trust7 between the municipalities with and without CBOs. Contrary to our expectation, Table 1 shows no significant differences across the means of different trust proxies between the municipalities with and without CBOs. In addition, we find either no significant differences in participation rates, or, contrary to our expectations, their levels to be higher in municipalities without CBOs. Interestingly, on average, inhabitants trust mayors more 4

It was not possible to obtain a meaningful answer from the rest. The Soviet Constitution defined street committees as the smallest units of local governance. Currently, they are defined by the LAW ON LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE OF UKRAINE (2001), but the law is not clear about their activities. 6 This figure is slightly higher (4.4%) in municipalities with established CBOs. 7 Respondents answered the question “Can you trust the others (highest score) or you never can be too careful (lowest score)”, which was formulated following the World Values Survey. 5

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Table 1 Participation-related municipality characteristics depending on the presence of a CBO. Participation

Municipalities with a CBO (N = 290)

Municipalities without a CBO (N = 298)

Participation in town hall meetings (1–5 scale), percentage of those responding at least “sometimes” (3) or more often Involvement in local affairs (1–10 scale) Peer pressure (1–10 scale) Percentage of those who volunteered in 2011 Volunteering (number of times in 2011) Share of respondents that have made a monetary contribution Share of respondents that had been making regular monetary contributions Street committees

47.66%

50.55%

3.95 4.74 50.00% 3.66 61.07%∗ 16.78%∗∗∗ 0.23

4.58∗∗∗ 5.03 58.97% 3.50 67.59%∗ 27.24%∗∗∗ 0.25

6.90 2.75 1.70 3.21 3.25

6.93 2.69 1.78 3.22 3.22

∗∗∗

Trust Trust Trust Trust Trust Trust

towards towards towards towards towards

others (1–10 scale)a NGOs (1–4 scale) the central government (1–4 scale) the mayor (1–4 scale) local government in general (1–4 scale)

Note: Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate differences at a minimum of 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. aThe question was formulated in the spirit of the World Values Survey in the following fashion: “Can you trust the others (highest score) or you never can be too careful (lowest score)”.

than the CBO leaders, which implies a relative cautious attitude towards CBOs among local residents. Mental models rooted in the Soviet past appear to hinder residents' proclivity towards collective action and, as a result, to reduce the likelihood of endogenous establishment of a CBO. Our qualitative interviews with development practitioners suggest that they see inhabitants’ participation as insufficient for effective CDD initiatives. In particular, communist rule may have created a mental model of the state regulating public life that minimized the need for individual activism. Along these lines, a development agency representative summarizes the situation in the following fashion:

for the project and will be forgotten about after the project's implementation. If the community doesn't get engaged, the organization will just fade away,” (August 1, 2011). As a result, donors’ agendas and available funding appear to play a central role in the incentives for CBO establishment stimulating the establishment of “externally induced” CBOs. 5.2. “Benevolent capture” by local governments We find that mayors play a dominant role in rural CBOs establishment in Ukraine. In roughly 30% of the cases, mayors identified themselves as CBO chairs. In the remaining 70% of the cases, the mayors either had been directly involved in the organization's establishment or it had been someone else from the village council. Mayors may have incentives to directly retain control of the CBOs due to reelection pressures: we find that mayors who are CBO chairs had been in the office for significantly shorter periods of time (3.6 years) in comparison to the ones that were involved to a lesser extent. Interestingly, all the CBO leaders interviewed reported that their organizations did not receive financial support from local governments, which left fundraising from private sources as a potential objective. Local governments appear to be fiscally constrained within a centralized system of inter-governmental relations and thus seek alternative sources of funding. First, most of the rural municipalities rely on equalization transfers from the rayon government that they have very little discretion over. In this regard, an interviewed mayor points out the following:

“It is difficult to get people involved. Mentality is important. The Soviet Union has taught people to live today and not think rationally about the future. People still don't have the understanding that they need to plan. We try to change the mentality of the people within our projects,” (July 25, 2011). External facilitation appears to play a central role in the establishment of rural CBOs in Ukraine. According to the CBO chairs' responses, a majority (all but five) of the CBOs were established in response to a call of a donor organization, or in order to be able to obtain external donor funding. Among the donor organizations, UNDP's CBA Program was one of the most recurrent funding sources – at least 40% of the sampled CBOs were established through the direct facilitation of this program. Furthermore, local CBO leaders seem to be guided by shortterm funding incentives rather than by a long-term vision of community development. Thus, only 42% of the interviewed CBO chairs could recall and formulate the long-term missions of their organizations during the interview. The rest either could not do that at the time of the interview, or they would directly indicate that the CBO was established for a specific grant program. The frequent lack of strategic vision with regard to a CBO can be demonstrated by a quote from a deputy-mayor of one of the municipalities who is also chairing a CBO:

“There is just no money in the budget. During the Soviet times there were leftovers in the budgets. […] So, if those taxes [PIT, traffic fines, etc.] were retained by the village, the picture would be totally different. […] So, we don't have the motivation to work since the funds that we collect on the local level will be distributed among the budgets [of the higher tier governments],” (July 22, 2011).

“Well, I can tell you that this civic organization is needed only from time to time. If there is an issue, we resolve it,” (July 20, 2011). Furthermore, our results point into the direction of the resource dependence theory as the lack of long-term planning horizon with respect to the CBOs among local elites may undermine the sustainability of newly-established organizations. For instance, a senior development agency official stated the following:

In addition, expert interviews indicate that municipalities with weak tax bases tend to have less leverage in negotiations with the rayon government over equalization transfers.8 As a result, many local 8 Although distribution of equalization transfers should be governed by a distribution formula, in practice informal negotiations between the municipalities and the higher government tiers determine the transfer sizes (World Bank, 2008a).

“There are many organizations that keep being active but there are also some “one-time” organizations which were created specifically 81

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V. Kvartiuk and J. Curtiss

governments find themselves in a complicated fiscal situation where local needs are left unaddressed. Second, local governments attempt to fundraise from private sources. Contributions from local entrepreneurs represent a natural starting point for many mayors. One of the interviewed mayors elaborates along these lines:

Table 2 Probit regression results. Independent variables

“… we don't have our own revenues. We even calculated the shares of each tax that would be needed locally in order for the village council to operate properly. There is an entrepreneur with a lot of land in the village and whenever I address him about the potential to help with social issues in the village he replies, ‘But I pay all the taxes. What else do you want from me?’” (July 22, 2011).

SUBSIDIES AUTONOMY EQTRANS PGINDEX

Our qualitative and quantitative data, however, also indicate that rural entrepreneurs’ co-funding some of local public goods, which goes far beyond their legal tax obligations, is a relatively widespread practice. For instance, ca. 49% of the mayors “fully agree” or “agree” that local entrepreneurs have significantly helped with local development by making monetary or in-kind contributions during the previous two years. Furthermore, some municipalities have experience with levying informal user-fees for some public goods among local inhabitants. Since there is no legal way to collect private funding within existing institutional frameworks, rural bureaucrats may have incentives to establish CBOs, in the process retaining close control of their fundraising activities. Expert interviews indicate that the development community has even coined a term “Pocket CBOs”, which refers to organizations closely controlled by mayors and used as fundraising vehicles. In this regard, one of the mayors stated:

LGCAPACITY TRUST PEER INVOLVE FUNDBUSINESS FUNDPOP POP EQTRANS*FUNDBUSINESS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Probit

Probit

Probit

Probit

0.453 (0.169) −0.438∗ (0.086) −0.376 (0.143) −1.240 (0.187) 0.388∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.299 (0.320) −0.212 (0.351) −0.199 (0.509) 0.667∗∗ (0.024) 2.464∗∗ (0.014) 0.001 (0.123)

0.606 (0.138) −0.470∗ (0.073) −0.514∗ (0.052) −1.777∗ (0.083) 0.412∗∗ (0.044) −0.429 (0.209) −0.153 (0.571) −0.237 (0.453) 0.849∗∗ (0.012) 2.655∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.001 (0.118)

0.696 (0.115) −0.529∗∗ (0.043) −0.645∗∗ (0.040) −1.767∗ (0.075) 0.442∗ (0.067) −0.323 (0.321) −0.077 (0.761) −0.461 (0.186) 0.811∗∗ (0.020) 2.061∗ (0.053) 0.001 (0.240) −0.172 (0.390) −1.949∗ (0.055)

0.533 (0.253) −0.906∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.479∗ (0.098) −1.547∗ (0.088) 0.447∗ (0.064) −0.831∗ (0.057) 0.078 (0.726) −0.087 (0.775) 1.282∗∗∗ (0.003) 4.214∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.002∗∗ (0.026)

−0.166 (0.963) Yes 0.444 53

−7.032∗ (0.069) Yes 0.627 53

EQTRANS*FUNDPOP AUTONOMY*FUNDBUSINESS

“Why do I need them [CBO members]? We use the CBO only when needed. Who will take care of it [CBO] if the whole village becomes a member?” (July 27, 2011).

AUTONOMY*FUNDPOP

Mayors appear to have no incentives to involve local inhabitants in the CBO management. Following the logic of the resource dependence theory, Table 2 shows that greater fundraising potential from local private sources is important for the decision of CBO establishment. Community members' proclivity to make regular financial contributions to public goods (FUNDPOP ), as well as the experience of local businesses’ past contributions to local public goods (FUNDBUSINESS) positively and statistically significantly affect the probability of CBO establishment. Estimation results suggest that fiscal constraints provide local governments with incentives to solicit private donors for development funding, with CBOs playing a role of fundraising platforms. Since local tax base ( AUTONOMY ) has a negative and significant coefficient across specifications, municipalities with greater fiscal autonomy may have lesser incentives to establish a CBO because they can better bargain over equalization transfers with higher-tier governments. Furthermore, the predictability of receiving equalization transfers (EQTRANS) in the follow-up fiscal year also appears to be negatively related with the dependent variable. In particular, municipalities with less stable state funding streams appear to be more likely to establish CBOs. This evidence is in line with our “benevolent capture” hypothesis and supports the conjecture about local governments facing a tradeoff between fundraising from public and private sources. The interaction term EQTRANS FUNDPOP has a negative significant coefficient, which implies that in fiscally distressed communities, a population's proclivity to donate has a greater effect on CBO establishment than in more fiscally stable communities. We do not find an analogical effect of the interaction term EQTRANS FUNDBUSINESS to be significantly different from zero. This finding suggests that the costs of fundraising from local inhabitants are greater than the costs of fundraising from local entrepreneurs. The availability of local private funding in interactions with the second variable for fiscal constraint AUTONOMY (local tax base) shows an opposite effect. Only the parameter with respect to the interaction term AUTONOMY FUNDBUSINESS appears to be statistically significant

Constant Regional controls R2/Pseudo R2 N

−2.630 (0.317) No 0.380 53

−2.049 (0.541) Yes 0.413 53

0.704∗∗∗ (0.008) 1.222 (0.129)

Note: Asterisks indicate the following: * = significant at 0.1; ** = significant at 0.05; *** = significant at 0.01. The p-values are reported in parentheses. Regional controls were implemented with the help of regional dummy variables and are not reported due to space limitations.

and positive. Higher fiscal autonomy implies a broader tax base, which could be the result of a more active entrepreneurial sector in the location. Finally, our Probit estimations suggest that communities' collective action potential is too low for CBO establishment speaking against the “bottom-up” hypothesis. Neither the participation proxies: PEER (peer pressure) or INVOLVE (involvement in local affairs), nor the social trust variable TRUST are significantly associated with CBO establishment. The results suggest that CBOs are established independently of the communities’ participation and the level of social capital, both of which are important for community-based collective action. Community size POP that is discussed in a vast body of literature as being important conditions for collective action (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990) is found to be statistically insignificant. 6. Discussion We do not find support for our hypothesis about “bottom-up” establishment of rural CBOs in Ukraine whereas external facilitation appears to play a decisive role. The vast majority of CBOs in rural Ukraine appears to be disconnected from local community members and was established with external facilitation. CBOs that emerged in the communities endogenously due to inhabitants’ participation represent a rare exception in rural Ukraine. We find that donor funding and facilitation largely motivate establishment of the CBOs, giving rise to moral 82

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hazard undermining long-term sustainability of newly created organizations. As a result, we cannot describe the relationships between local governments and CBOs as “embedded” partnerships in the sense of Evans (1996). Local inhabitants seem to prefer engagement in more traditional types of activism. They distrust newly-established CBOs that should represent partners “embedded” in local communities. These circumstances, obviously, undermine the initial vision of the development agencies that intended to promote CDD. Why then do we observe a substantial growth in the number of newly-established CBOs in rural Ukraine? Centralized approach to local governance, pertinent to the postSoviet context, motivates local governments to establish CBOs and facilitates their “benevolent capture” as suggested by Mansuri and Rao (2004). Fiscal constraints and an inability to fundraise from private sources may motivate local governments to use CBOs as fundraising tools. The Probit model results imply that CBO establishment is strongly aligned with local governments' incentives to expand their fundraising possibilities. In particular, we observe a tradeoff between public and private funding: those mayors who feel more fiscally constrained are more likely to facilitate establishment of a CBO and instrumentalize it for fundraising purposes. Thus, mayors in relatively fiscally constrained municipalities may have more incentives to retain control over local CBOs by shielding them from community participation. These adverse incentives increase a risk of creating “pocket CBOs” that exist only on paper. Mayors' adverse incentives may discourage development of Evans (1996) “embedded” partnerships between CBOs and local governments. Moreover, mayors may actively shield the CBOs from active membership further strengthening the “benevolent capture” and pushing local governance arrangements further away from “embedded partnerships”. This study provides evidence that the post-Soviet context may undermine the effectiveness of the CDD approach contributing to small but growing body of literature (Babajanian, 2008, 2005; Kvartiuk, 2016). However, negative effect of vertical and hierarchical governance systems on CDD success was also found in other contexts as well. For instance, Bergh (2010) found that CBOs in Morocco's hierarchical governance system suffered from "benevolent capture" as well. In order not to confuse local governments' efforts of expanding administrative and fiscal autonomy with local community participation, it is important to closely analyze local politics explicitly considering the incentives of the key stakeholders. Because many donor agencies condition funding on community's involvement, local governments may be creating facades for donors by imitating active involvement of local inhabitants. Similarly, Allina-Pisano (2010) argued that Ukrainian civic activism during the Orange Revolution was often a façade for deeper political economy processes within the society. She argues that major political forces staged many of the protests by paying people to participate. To avoid the “facades” of participation and “embeddedness” within the CDD, it is important to consider CDD in a broader context of decentralization. Rural development partnerships based on “complementarity” and “embeddedness” are only possible if both communities and local governments have sufficient capacity to drive local development forward (Ackerman, 2004; Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996).

“bottom-up” hypothesis and study the incentives of fiscally and administratively constrained local governments to instrumentalize CBOs. The article fills an important gap in the literature by contextualizing CDD in the post-Soviet rural setting. Our evidence suggests that incomplete decentralization reforms and hierarchical governance systems inherited from the Soviet past represent additional challenges for CDD in these countries. Our first important finding is that local CBOs are disconnected from the communities and are mostly induced by donors' facilitation. Residents' survey suggests that although rural inhabitants appear to be involved in more traditional types of activism (e.g. town hall meetings), involvement in newly-established CBOs is marginal and is still a very rare phenomenon. Respondents trust local governments more than the CBOs reflecting a cautious attitude towards the CBOs. Moreover, our econometric model does not grant any support to the “bottom-up” hypothesis and, thus, we cannot report Evans (1996) “embeddedness” in the relationship between CBOs and local government. On the contrary, we find that most of the CBOs are established in response to technical facilitation of the major development agencies like UNDP or World Bank. Such facilitation in the context of low participation rates within communities may enable capture of these organizations by local elites and, in particular, by local government. These findings are in line with a growing body of literature highlighting the negative effect of external facilitation on CBOs sustainability (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010; Banks et al., 2015; Bano, 2008; Chapple and Montero, 2016). So how exactly does post-Soviet context affect the success of CDD? Answering this question, we address the scarce literature examining the link between CDD and decentralization (Bergh, 2010; Krishna, 2003). In an attempt to fill this gap, the distinctive contribution of this article is in examining the incentives of local governments to establish and retain control of CBOs in a context of failed decentralization reform in a post-Soviet country. Our results indicate that fiscally constrained local governments may seek ways to expand their autonomy and have incentives to instrumentalize flexible CBOs to expand their fundraising opportunities. As a result, CBOs may be used as fundraising vehicles without a long-term vision laid out in the CDD. Moreover, rural mayors may also be motivated to keep their membership base low in order to avoid higher costs of CBO management. On the other hand, availability of donor funding may incentivize them to create a façade of community's engagement to be able to obtain funding that is often conditioned on participation. Because mayors pursue communities' interests in their effort to stay in power, this close tandem could be categorized as the “benevolent capture” as suggested by Mansuri and Rao (2004). These adverse incentives may hinder community involvement undermining Evans (1996) vision of “embedded” partnerships between the communities and local governments. As a result, CBOs may exist only on paper lacking local legitimacy (Datta, 2005; Molden et al., 2017). Our findings in the Ukrainian context with severely constrained local governments may be applicable more widely. First, the experience with the CDD should be considered by the decentralization reform launched in 2014, which foresees establishing a number of participatory institutions in reformed administrative units. The success of “embedded” partnerships within newly reformed communities may depend on whether local governments have adverse incentives to instrumentalize local community organizations. Second, we observe the centralization of public revenues in numerous post-Soviet countries where rural municipalities are left with minimal resources and are highly dependent on higher governmental tiers (Babajanian, 2008; Bhuiyan, 2010; Franke et al., 2009; Ross, 2010; World Bank, 2008a). Thus, the results may be relevant for other countries with similar local governance situations (e.g. Bergh (2010) study of the Moroccan case). What are the implications of these findings for the CDD design in the hierarchical governance systems? A major problem is that the incentive structure within existing rural governance arrangements, along with the development of intervention design, do not facilitate inhabitants' involvement in public policy processes. So far, the focus of development

7. Conclusion The purpose of this study is to critically evaluate whether the CDD in rural Ukraine follows the principles of “complimentary” and “embedded” partnerships put forward by Evans (1996). A major aspiration of the development agencies has been to establish sustainable CBOs that would serve as platforms for local participation and engage in partnerships with local governments to improve local public goods provision. In the light of a growing global concern over pitfalls of CDD, centralized governance setup and disengaged rural population may jeopardize Ukrainian CDD. We thus examine whether local community participation laid the foundation for CBOs establishment testing the 83

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efforts has been on institution-building primarily focusing on stimulating establishment of CBOs (EU, 2006; Sah, 2015; World Bank, 2008b). However, educational and awareness-raising activities may be equally important for fostering participation within a municipality. One major “takeaway” is that CDD approaches should ensure that there are clear mechanisms for involving community members in the organization's decision-making process. Second, although it is inevitable that local government plays an important role in CDD programs, it may be useful to shift the focus away from them. In particular, restrictions should apply (to a certain extent) to mayors and bureaucrats working in local governments when it comes to controlling a CBO. Finally, our

results clearly underline the need for more autonomy for local governments. This would reduce their incentives to capture and instrumentalize local CBOs. Acknowledgements The authors cordially acknowledge the financial support provided by the Volkswagen Foundation. We thank Jim Curtiss for proofreading as well as Martin Petrick for valuable comments on the initial stage of work.

Appendix A. Variable description and main descriptive statistics Table 3

Variable description and main descriptive statistics Variable

Data Source

Dependent variable CBO Mayors' survey Independent variables Fiscal Constraints SUBSIDIES Mayors' survey EQTRANS Mayors' survey AUTONOMY Mayors' survey Participation PEER Residents' survey INVOLVE Residents' survey PrFunding FUNDBUSINESS Mayors' survey FUNDPOP Residents' survey Controls PGINDEX Residents' survey LGCAPACITY Mayors' survey TRUST Residents' survey POP UkrStat #VIL UkrStat DIST UkrStat

Description

Mean

Min.

Max.

1st quart.

3rd quart.

Existence of a CBO within a municipality (1-yes; 0-no)

0.48

-

-

-

-

Predictability of receiving capital subsidies for next fiscal year if applied for (1 – not predictable at 1.74 all; 4 – very predictable) Predictability of an equalization transfer for the next fiscal year (1 – not predictable at all; 4 – very 2.74 predictable) Share of locally-collected taxes in municipal budget (fiscal autonomy) 2.3

1

4

1

2

1

4

2

3

1

4

1

4

Municipality-wide average proclivity to exert peer pressure (1–10 scale)

4.94

2.64

8.25

4.13

5.6

Municipality-wide level of involvement in local affairs (1–10 scale)

4.33

2.00

6.25

3.7

5.17

1

4

2

3

1.67

3.13

2.08

2.5

The degree to which local business has contributed financially to local development during last two 2.5 years (1–4 scale) Municipality-wide average perceptions about the community's proclivity to make regular monetary 2.27 contributions for community development (1–4 scale) Residents' average satisfaction with six local public goods (1–4 scale)

2.65

2.14

3.4

2.43

2.85

Index accounting for amount of full- and part-time employees, plus amount of PCs

7.52

4

16

5.13

9.5

Composite index of residents' trust (1–10 scale)

6.61

4.55

9.06

6.09

7.22

Municipality's population Number of villages within a municipality Distance to the nearest town (at least rayon center)

1,238 2.59 19.76

198 1 5

5,006 10 70

745 1 12

1,437 3 25

Appendix B. List of conducted qualitative interviews Table 4

List of conducted qualitative interviews. No.

Date

Organization

Place

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

26.07.11 18.07.11 18.07.11 19.07.11 19.07.11 20.07.11 20.07.11 20.07.11 21.07.11 21.07.11 21.07.11 22.07.11 22.07.11 25.07.11 25.07.11

UNDP Program “Community-Based Approach to Local Development” Think-tank on rural development Ukrainian Social Investment Fund Swiss development agency USAID Ukraine Head of a CBO Mayor of Rozvazhshiv Representative of Ivankiv Rayon Administration Head of a CBO Mayor of Rzhshyshchiv Head of a CBO Head of a CBO Mayor of Vysoke, Kyiv region USAID Crimea UNDP Program “Community-Based Approach to Local Development”

Kyiv Kyiv Kyiv Kyiv Kyiv Rozvazhshiv, Kyiv region Rozvazhshiv, Kyiv region Ivankiv, Kyiv oblast Rzhshyshchiv, Kyiv region Rzhshyshchiv, Kyiv region Poliove, Kyiv region Vysoke, Kyiv region Vysoke, Kyiv region Symferopol, Crimea Symferopol, Crimea

84

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Table 4 (continued) No.

Date

Organization

Place

16. 17. 18.

26.07.11 26.07.11 27.07.11

Head of Crimean Tatar umbrella organization Independent expert on community-based water governance Mayor and a head of a CBO

Symferopol, Crimea Symferopol, Crimea Krasna Poliana, Crimea

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