Party identification in the Czech Republic: inter-party hostility and party preference1

Party identification in the Czech Republic: inter-party hostility and party preference1

Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 479–499 www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud Party identification in the Czech Republic: inter-party ho...

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Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 479–499 www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud

Party identification in the Czech Republic: inter-party hostility and party preference1 Kla´ra Vlachova´ Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilska´ 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Praha, Czech Republic

Abstract This study introduces basic models of voting behavior and describes in greater detail the findings and starting points of the model of party identification. It recapitulates findings related to the voting behavior in the Czech Republic throughout the nineties, as well as the reasons leading to the application of the party identification model to the analyses of voting behavior. The influence of positive feelings toward the elected party and negative feelings toward the other parties are tested here. The study explores in particular the influence of inter-party hostility on the voting behavior, and tests it both separately and in combination with the subjective social class and subjective political orientation.  2001 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Party identification; Inter-party hostility; Positive and negative affective feelings; Voting; Tactical voting; The Czech Republic

Models of voting behavior Which factors influence voting behavior in modern democracies? Is voting behavior a matter of habit or of a newly considered decision? This is the central issue of voting behavior research. There are three voting behavior models (e.g., Franklin and Jackson, 1983; Harrop and Miller, 1987).2 E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Vlachova´). This study was created as part of grant No. 403/99/1129 of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic. The author would like to thank Blanka Reha´kova´ for her analysis of the relationship between partisan hostility and the choice of a party. 2 It is, however, necessary to take into consideration that voting behavior, like party systems, is based on social factors which can be influenced by: national revolution (center vs periphery, national and langu1

0967-067X/01/$20  2001 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 7 - 0 6 7 X ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 1 5 - 0

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The sociological (radical, structural) model focuses on group voting behavior— especially those grouped according to social class, religion and age. A relationship is created between social groups and political parties because parties promote the interests of social groups (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985, in the Czech Republic, for example, Mateju and Reha´ kova´ , 2000; Reha´ kova´ and Mateju, 2000). This model focuses on the voting behavior of secondary social groups, and underestimates the role of attitudes, opinions and values in voting behavior. It is appropriate for the study of realignment processes. The party identification (social-psychological) model considers voting as a clear expression of loyalty to a political party. Party identification is the long-term relationship of a voter to a party. It is of a similar nature to, for example, religious identification or nationality. Behind this identification is an affiliation to a certain group and the influence of the family. This model addresses the question of why so many voters change their choice (Campbell et al., 1960; Budge et al., 1976). Party identification is primarily seen as an affective matter. This model is appropriate for the study of voter–party alignment, and helps explain the stability of voting behavior rather than its changes (Heath and McDonald, 1988). The rational choice (economic) model always approaches an electoral choice as a newly considered decision that a voter makes based on information the voter has obtained. According to this model, voters first choose a party within the entire spectrum of political parties—that party which is closest to their interests, values and priorities. They evaluate what individual parties offer them according to politically salient issues. This model is based on the economic theory of voting behavior. Its modifications focus on how the choice of a party is influenced by the voters’ evaluation of the parties’ performance history, modeling voters as consumers in a political supermarket. It asks why so few voters change their choice (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Fiorina, 1981; Himmelweit et al. 1981, 1985). Acquiring information and making decision based on this information is expensive for the voter. Therefore, a rational voter takes the simpler route of making decisions based on the ideology to which a particular party subscribes, rather than according to detailed policy proposals. Voters often base their decisions on the opinions of others and on information obtained from conversations with other people and from the media, especially television. The final party identification is based on this simplified cognitive process. The rational selection model is appropriate especially for the study of voter–party dealignment, that is, class–party dealignment (weakening of class voting) and the growth in importance of issue voting.3 Although it is also based on other

age differences, religion), industrial revolution (class, organization in unions, social mobility), the growing impact of the state (private vs public sector employees, service users—especially housing, recipients of benefits vs non-users), post-industrial influences (education, wealth, materialism vs post-materialism) and other influences (age/generation, gender, social environment). Moreover, short-term influences, such as the economic development, mass media (especially television), politics, campaigns, canvassing and opinion polls, may influence voting. 3 The increase of the importance of issue voting is ascribed to the growth of education and the information explosion through mass media, which has made the acquisition of information less costly.

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points of departure, it enhances the two previous approaches and its understanding of party identification even leads back to the party identification model. Analyses from many countries—Great Britain, Canada, western Germany, Denmark and Norway—show that despite the increase of the importance of issue voting and the decrease in importance of class voting, a majority of people have a stable relationship to parties and a stable electoral history. A minority of people diverge in each new election from their previous electoral choice. This is why some authors (e.g., Harrop and Miller, 1987) prefer the party identification model when studying voting behavior. Data from electoral as well as other surveys in the Czech Republic also shows that the electoral choices of most voters remain consistent. Can we talk about party identification? In order to answer this question, we shall concentrate upon testing party identification in the Czech Republic and take as our points of departure the presuppositions of this model. Notwithstanding the above, we deem the other models just as helpful for voting behavior research.

Party identification model The phenomenon of party identification was already noticed by Hume (affections), Washington and Madison (spirit of Party), and Calhoun (party attachments) (Campbell and Valen, 1961). It is clear from their insights that party identification develops when mass parties are formed. Party identification is defined as a personal relationship which an individual develops to a political party, or a feeling of solidarity with a political party. It is a psychological construct. The party identification model is based on social psychology and is also known as ‘the Michigan model’. It was first used for surveys of US presidential elections between 1952 and 1956 (Campbell et al., 1960). This model sees party identification as a deep-seated relationship which develops during childhood, is passed down from generation to generation, becomes stronger as time passes (that is, as the voter gets older) and influences voters by helping them to comprehend politics, politicians, relationships between parties and social groups, party strategies, political issues and the performance of the government. If any changes of party identification occur, they are usually a consequence of personal changes, such as changes in affiliation to a social group or geographic and social mobility. Nevertheless, short-term voting against party identification is not ruled out either, under one of the short-term influences (see 1). The voter, however, returns to the original party identification in the next election—‘homing tendency’ (Harrop and Miller, 1987: 134; Heath and McDonald, 1988). The party identification model makes a distinction between a party as a psychological group and a party as an object of an electoral choice (Borre and Katz, 1973). The party identification model was originally based on the realities of the situation in the US and its specific electoral and party systems. For a very long time there have been two main electoral parties without fixed membership, and party identification was considered to be equivalent to party membership (Harrop and Miller, 1987: 138). Gradually, however, it was discovered that the Michigan model was also

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applicable to countries with different electoral and party systems and to parties with fixed membership which can be found, for example, in Denmark, Norway, Germany, France, Canada, Australia (e.g., Campbell and Valen, 1961; Richardson, 1991).4 Research started to distinguish between actual and psychological party membership—party identification. Moreover, party identification has perhaps a much greater effect on the choice of a party in continental systems than the original Michigan model presupposed (Richardson, 1991). If, however, the analyses have cast into doubt anything of the party identification model in continental countries, it was the element of party identification being passed down in the family (Converse and Dupeux, 1962; Cameron, 1972–73). In the beginning of party identification research in the US, positive attachments to political parties were in the center of attention. They were considered to be a uniform voting behavior factor (Campbell et al., 1960). Subsequent research of party identification in Europe has contributed to the realization that party identification is a much wider construct and shapes not only the vote but also the tactical, that is strategic, vote5 (Bowler and Lanoue, 1991; Lanoue and Bowler, 1992). Research in the US focused more on the affective component of party identification, European research revealed its cognition component (Richardson, 1991; Bowler et al., 1994). The party identification model is related to Duverger (1954) and his electoral laws of the impact of the electoral system on the party system. Party identification does not exist as such but is formed by the electoral and party systems. It is the result of a set of political impulses and alternatives, which is true of all political attitudes (Bowler et al., 1994). Voters react to alternatives offered to them in elections in a particular manner. They react more strongly to an ideologically ‘extreme’ competitor, less so to a less dangerous moderate party. The presence of a relatively extreme competing party may result in the formation of a closer psychological link with the preferred party which is seen as being threatened. Ideological distance is a major factor leading to voters feeling they are being threatened. The greater the distance between a voter and a competing party on the political spectrum, the more the voter feels threatened. The distance alone, however, is not enough to produce such a reaction in the voter. It is important that the voter considers the threat an ‘extreme’ party represents is real. The extent of the threat posed by the competing party is determined by the impulses and outlooks generated by the electoral system. While, for example, in proportional representation electoral systems voters of large parties do not tend to be disturbed by small parties, in majority electoral systems even a small competing party can be seen as a serious threat.6 Any party that has a chance to win elections on the national level can cause

4

The sociological model prevailed in Europe in the past—voting behavior was determined more by class and religion. 5 A choice not of the preferred party but of a ‘third’ party, with the goal of preventing the victory of a competing party. 6 For example, a small party may defeat stronger parties in a two-round electoral system because it is elected in the second round as lesser evil by voters of mutually competing strong parties that did not progress to the second round.

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the voter to feel jeopardized, and this feeling is not necessarily based on an actual success of such a party. According to the traditional party identification theory (Campbell et al., 1960), positive affective relationships are one of the dominant motivations contributing to conforming behavior. Other authors (Crewe, 1976; Goot, 1972; Maggioto and Piereson, 1977), however, believe that party identification may best be understood in the context of the alternatives existing in the party system at a given time. Negative relationships to rival parties may be just as influential on voting behavior as affective relationships to preferred parties. Inter-party hostility, along with affective feelings for favored parties, is a common component of a typical party membership in European party systems. There is also a close link between party loyalty and political ideas on the one hand, and the hostility towards competing parties on the other. Party identification is usually stronger when political parties reflect traditional deepseated social oppositions and mutually competing value systems and ideologies. Party identification tends to be most developed among voters of traditional ‘cleavage’ parties—parties that are built around politically salient social differences. On the other hand, voters supporting ‘non-cleavage’ parties are less likely to establish a strong attachment to any party. Although it is sometimes proposed that the influence of traditional social divisions is weakening in democratic countries and that we are seeing voter–party dealignment, it is clear that there is still inter-party hostility and ideological competition based on political divisions and that voting psychology plays a part. Although we presume that party identification is a long-term relationship between a voter and a party, it does not have to be a relationship for life. New events, value changes or new prominent political issues may weaken party identification.7 The weakening of party identification may cause voter volatility and changes in the party system: the strengthening of new parties and weakening of the old ones.8 Party identification research and knowledge about the creation and disintegration of voter–party alignment, especially at a time of growing ‘issue voting’, have contributed to the fact that identification ceased to be perceived exclusively as an affective issue and started to be seen as an integrated array of affective and cognitive components. The existing party identification is not one-dimensional; it represents an array consisting of (Richardson, 1991): (1) positive affective feelings to preferred parties: feelings of attachment, loyalty and lesser evil; (2) negative affective feelings to rival 7

The most prominent cause of weakening party identification is a massive strengthening of the role of ‘independent’ television news which have replaced the traditional party medium—newspapers—and thus contributed to the weakening importance of parties as mediators of political communication (Harrop and Miller, 1987: 140). Another obvious important cause lies in political crises—weakening of partisanship has been registered in periods of anti-parliamentarism and the promotion of individualities over parties, strengthening of partisanship at times of political polarization (Cameron, 1972–73). 8 DeGaulle’s RPF in France between 1947 and 1951, Poujadistic UFF in 1956 and Gaulle’s UNR in 1958 are usually considered to be a product of weakening party identification (Cameron, 1972–73). Also the Czech US, although it is considered to be a party that was established as a ‘revolt’ of elites in ODS, exists thanks to the changes in party identification of ODS voters following the party’s financial scandals revealed in 1997.

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parties: feelings of hostility, disloyalty, greatest evil; (3) evaluative images favoring the supported party and rejecting other parties; (4) political values and issue positions corresponding to the preferred political party: social economic values (left—right), values concerning political procedures (liberalism—authoritarianism), anomie, trust in politics, etc. More so than in the past, party identification is derived from an individual processing political information and is less dependent on an affiliation with a secondary social group. It involves a set of mutually interrelated information, ideas and affective orientations stored in an individual’s memory, which is recalled in response to a relevant stimulus—most frequently during elections. Identification becomes an intermediary variable between a voter’s social experience and political behavior. It is a predictor of voting behavior, its stability and changes (Borre and Katz, 1973). Nevertheless, it is not a perfect predictor (Harrop and Miller, 1987). With regard to party identification, both an orientation (to a concrete party) and its strength play a crucial role.9 As the level of identification decreases, it becomes less likely that a voter will repeat the vote. It is also a fact that identified voters generally play a much more active role in politics (they are more interested in politics, participate more frequently in political discussions, obtain political information from the media etc.) than those who are not identified. And finally, it is necessary to realize that party identification, or orientation, has various psychological meanings for various voters and that their relationship to a party may be based on a wide variety of reasons. Borre and Katz (1973) distinguish a pragmatic, symbolic and ideological identification.10 The symbolically oriented tend to be rural in background, to be relatively high in religiosity and limited in education. Borre and Katz (1973) also expect the symbolically oriented to be overrepresented among the self-employed. The ideological, on the other hand, should be relatively high in education, high in organizational membership and activity (not only in political parties). Pragmatic identification is typical for urban people, employees and managers (especially in larger enterprises) and low in church attendance. The most stable patterns of voting behavior over time will come from those of symbolic identification. The ideologically oriented will be the next most stable, and the pragmatically oriented the least stable in voting behavior. The data available for the Czech Republic does not yet make it possible for us to identify voters with symbolic, ideological and pragmatic party identifications and the role of evaluative ideas pertaining to parties and politicians. Nevertheless, based on the data available, it is possible to describe the positive affective relationships of voters to parties and the strength of those relationships, the negative affective relationships and their role during the choice of a party, and to speak about the role of party identification in a tactical choice. We shall analyze data from surveys ISSP 9

It has been studied subjectively—by asking to what extent a voter feels identified with his/her party. To put it simply, symbolic identification is an identification whereby a voter identifies emotionally with the symbols and traditions of a party, ideological identification occurs when a voter identifies with the party’s program and pragmatic when a voter identifies with a party because the party supports his/her economic interests (vote for one’s pocketbook) (Borre and Katz, 1973). 10

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1996 and 1999, conducted in the Czech Republic.11 The role of political values and thematic attitudes in electoral choices has been previously studied in the Czech Republic, see for example, Mateju and Vlachova´ (1998a,b, 2000).

Party identification in the Czech Republic Positive attachment to parties—party loyalty Since 1992 voting behavior has become more stable in the Czech Republic, which has been externally reflected in the stabilization of the party system (Vlachova´ , 1997). Voting behavior analyses conducted with exit-poll data surveys from 1996 and 1998 by IFES and SC&C for Czech Television show that a majority of voters voted for the same party in two consecutive elections. The percentage of voters who voted for the same party as in the previous elections varied according to party. In 1996, 75% of CSSD voters selected the same party (Czech Social Democratic Party), 73% of KDU-CSL (Christian Democratic Union—Czechoslovak People’s Party) voters, 67% of KSCM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) voters, 63% of ODS (Civic Democratic Party) voters, 50% of SPR-RSC (Association for the Republic— Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) voters and 34% of ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance) voters. In 1998, ODS (80%) had the most stable voters, followed by KSCM (74%), KDU-CSL (58%) and CSSD (53%) (Kreidl, 1998).12 More than one half of voters voted for the same party in two subsequent elections. Why do so many (or so few) voters choose the same party? Is it a consequence of party identification? Or can we even talk about party identification in a country where parties can be freely created and free elections have been held only for the past 11 years? The results of analyses of electoral choices (Mateju and Vlachova´ , 1998a,b) have shown that a self-declared a political orientation along the right–left axis (subjective political orientation discovered using the visual method on a ten-point scale leading from left to right) has a much greater influence on electoral choices between pairs of parties than the left–right orientation following from a voter’s social-economic values. The declared political orientation plays an important role, especially when deciding between parties that are ideologically cohesive, that belong to neighboring ‘party families’—KSCM and CSSD, CSSD and KDU-CSL, ODS and ODA. Electoral choices between ideologically distant parties (typically, for example, CSSD and ODS) depends greatly on the socio-economic values of the individual voter and the declared political orientation takes a back seat in an electoral choice. The declared political orientation—i.e., self-classification along the left–right axis—derives most likely from a party choice and is employed retroactively when forming voting 11

More detailed information about the data files from the ISSP surveys may be found in the Sociological Data Archive (http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/). 12 KSCM—communists, far left, CSSD—social democrats, left, SPR-RSC—populists, center extremist, KDU-SCL—Christian democrats, center, US—liberal conservatives, right, ODA—liberal conservatives, right, ODS—liberal conservatives, right, DEU—‘conservative’, ‘right’.

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behavior—the choice influences party identification and party identification influences the choice (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976). A majority of voters in the Czech Republic, then, vote ‘as before’ and do not change radically their electoral choices between elections. Is it because they have strong relations to the chosen parties? And how do these relationships affect their vote? Table 1 shows the strength of voters’ relationships to the parties they voted for in the Chamber of deputies elections. In 1996 approximately one-fifth of respondents did not state what relationship they had to the chosen party, more than onefourth of respondents stated a strong attachment and two-fifths stated a moderate attachment. In 1998 the number of those who did not characterize their relationship to the chosen party increased to one-third. Approximately one-fifth of respondents described their relationship as strong and more than one-third characterized it as moderate. The weakening of a subjective relationship to parties may be caused by many factors. The most important factor, however, may be a wave of anti-partisan attitudes and the stress that influential intellectuals in the media place on the importance of individuals independent of party politics, including Va´ clav Have1 in the presidential position in the nineties in the Czech Republic.13 As Cameron mentions (1972–73), an era of anti-partisanship and a greater importance put on the role of independent individuals lead to a fall of the value of partisanship (not only actual but also psychological). The product of such anti-partisanship was, for example, the institution of the Senate as it was originally intended to be ‘a council of wise independent individuals’, the formation of the semi-expert/semi-political government of Josef Tosˇovsky´ in 1998, and the defamation of parties prior to and especially after the party financing scandals (Maresˇ, 2000). With regard to individual political parties, the power of a positive attachment to Table 1 Voter-party alignment-total populationa Attachment to a chosen party

1996 1998 a

13

Very strong

Strong

Moderate

Weak

Very weak

No response

4.8 2.8

22.5 16.2

41.5 37.7

6.7 6.8

3.0 3.0

21.5 33.4

n96=863, n99=1221. Source: ISSP 1996, 1999.

There exists an elitist anti-partyism, which is supported by the activities of President Havel in the Czech Republic. Havel (1989) has always been an opponent of political parties. He conceives of parties as political clubs not participating in electoral competition. He has always wished for ‘independent’ individuals participating in an electoral struggle. Throughout the nineties this anti-partyism has been widely mediated by independent public Czech Television. The position of parties and their struggle ‘for a place in the sun’ in the political system of the Czech Republic in the Nineties has been described, for example, by Kunc (1999).

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Table 2 Voter attachment to individual parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies, 1996 (row%)a Attachment to a chosen party

KSCM CSSD SPR-RSC KDU-CSL ODS ODA a

Very strong

Strong

Moderate

Weak

Very weak

7.7 5.0 11.4 2.5 9.5 1.9

47.7 19.8 22.7 34.6 35.1 13.0

41.5 60.3 52.3 50.6 47.5 64.8

3.1 11.6 4.5 9.9 4.5 11.1

0.0 3.3 9.1 2.5 3.3 9.3

n=728. Source: ISSP 1996.

the chosen parties differed in both years monitored (Tables 2 and 3). In 1996, higher than expected frequencies were discovered with regard to KSCM in the categories of ‘very strong’ and ‘strong’ attachment, with regard to CSSD in the categories ‘moderate’ and ‘weak’ attachment, with regard to SPR-RSC in the categories ‘very strong’ and ‘very weak’ attachment, and with regard to KDU-CSL in the categories ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ attachment. With regard to ODS, higher than expected frequencies were discovered in the categories ‘very strong’ and ‘strong’ attachment, whereas with regard to ODA, it was especially in the categories ‘strong’ and ‘very weak’ attachment. In 1998, substantially higher frequencies were discovered again in the categories ‘very strong’ and ‘strong’ attachment with regard to KSCM, and what is more, the number of voters in the category ‘very strong’ also increased. With regard to CSSD, higher frequencies were discovered in the categories ‘moderate’ and ‘weak’ attachment. With regard to KDU-CSL, electoral loyalty has strengthened: substantially higher frequencies were discovered in the categories ‘very strong’ and ‘moderate’ attachment. With regard to ODS, higher than expected frequencies were discovered in the same categories as two years before; the number of voters with a strong attachment, however, decreased slightly. Voters for the new US (Freedom Union) Table 3 Voter attachment to individual parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies, 1998 (row%)a Attachment to a chosen party

KSCM CSSD KDU-CSL ODS US a

Very Strong

Strong

Moderate

Weak

Very weak

11.9 2.0 7.1 5.3 1.1

31.7 21.3 23.4 30.5 17.0

47.5 61.3 58.9 52.2 61.4

5.9 11.5 8.5 7.3 13.6

3.0 4.0 2.1 4.7 6.8

n=1095. Source: ISSP 1999.

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demonstrated weak loyalty. Figs. 1 and 2 show the correspondence analysis results pertaining to the relationship between the power of party attachment and the party, and illustrate the described relationships. The question is whether at the time the research was carried out the strength of the attachment had any bearing on the willingness of voters to vote for the party they stated they had chosen in the previous elections. This question, however, is almost impossible to answer. Both surveys (ISSP 1996 and ISSP 1999) were conducted approximately half a year after the elections, and these periods were far too short for any greater changes in voter preferences to occur. The inertia of vote was high, between 93 (ODS) and 73% (US) in both years, even with regard to those political parties that had relatively the smallest cores of identified voters (CSSD, ODA and US). Such a great inertia of voting behavior prevented any reliable testing of the relationship between the strength of party attachment and the willingness to vote for that party again in potential elections. Nevertheless, it is clear that the willingness to vote for the same party decreased with a weakening attachment. Those who declared they had very strong and strong attachments in 1996 were willing to give their vote to the same party in 98.1% (ODS)—87.5% (ODA) of cases. People with a moderate attachment would vote for the same party in 92.3% (KDU-CSL)—66.7% (SPR-RSC) of cases and people declaring weak and very weak attachment in 90.0% (KDU-CSL)—66.7% (SPR-RSC) of cases. In 1998, it was 100.0% (KDU-CSL and SPR-RSC)—68.8%(US) in the case of very strong and strong attachment, in the case

Fig. 1.

Voter–party alignment in 1996.

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Fig. 2.

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Voter–party alignment in 1998.

of moderate attachment 93.2–78.9% (and 44.4% with regard to SPR-RSC) and 84.6% (ODS)— 66.7%(US) in the case of weak and very weak attachment. Even more so than the collected data, the political crises, or rather the crises of the credibility of political parties caused by the revelation of party financing scandals at the end of 1997 and in the first half of 1998 confirmed the importance of the strength of a positive attachment to a chosen party. Parties to which voters had relatively cool attachment, such as SPR-RSC and ODA, did not manage to retain electoral support in the long run and disappeared from upper-level politics. On the other hand, parties such as KDU-CSL and ODS, which had relatively strong cores of identified voters, overcame the crisis. ODS survived even though its support dropped by two-thirds and ODA, KDU-CSL and the new US attempted to attract its voters. Party identification, then, is likely to play a role in forming voting behavior during elections to the Chamber of Deputies (the Chamber of Deputies have been thus far elected in eight electoral districts using the proportional representation system). In addition to this, however, party identification also functions in each rotating Senate election. Senate elections occur in single-mandate electoral districts using the absolute majority system (two-round electoral system). While in the first round, the dominant strategy of voters is to vote for a specific party, just like in the case of Chamber of Deputies elections, and after the first round candidates of those parties that have the greatest electoral support in the Chamber of Deputies elections rank at the top in a majority of districts, in the second round, voters sometimes opt for a tactical

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vote—a ‘third’ vote for a relatively uncontroversial party ideologically. Bowler and Lanoue (1991) observe that tactical voting occurs if more than two parties compete with each other in a majority voting system, which is the case in the Czech Republic. If a certain parties does not have a chance of succeeding in such an arrangement, voters of such parties cast their vote for ‘the lesser’ of the remaining ‘evils’. Tactical voting may lead to inversely proportional effects of the absolute majority electoral system in the Czech Republic. In the Senate, it enforces the representation of parties that belong to the least ideologically controversial alternatives, unlike the preferences of the general population—KDU-CSL and ODA.14 After the rotating elections in 1998, KDU-CSL had 15 Senators (i.e., 18% of seats) with an electoral support of 9–12% among the entire population and ODA 7 Senators (i.e., 9% of seats) with an electoral support of 0.5% among the entire population. After elections in 2000 KDU-CSL 18 Senators (i.e., 22% of seats), ODA 7 Senators (i.e., 9% of seats) and Four-coalition (KDU-CSL, US, ODA, DEU) 8 Senators (i.e., 10% of seats) (Table 4). That these parties are acceptable alternatives of a strategic vote can be gleaned from the data pertaining to the question of which party, in addition to their own, voters would vote for. In 1996, ODA (25.1%) and KDU-CSL (16.3%) Table 4 Electoral results and mandates of parties after elections to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the parliament of the Czech Republic, 1996-2000

KSCM CSSD SPR-RSC KDU-CSL US ODA DEU Four-coalitiona ODS Independents a b c d e

Chamber of deputies 1996

Senate 1996 Chamber of deputies 1998

Senate 1998 Senate 2000

% of votes

Seats

Seats

% of votes

Seats

Seats

Seats

10.33 26.44 8.01 8.08 – 6.36 – – 29.62 –

18 61b 18 18 – 13 – – 68 –

2 25 – 13 – 7 1 – 32c 1

11.3 32.32 – 9.00 8.60 –

24 74 – 20 19d –

– 27.74 –

– 63 –

4 24 – 15 4 7 1 – 26e –

3 15 – 18 6 7 – 8 22 2

Coalition of KDU-CSL, US, ODA and DEU. One deputy converted to ODS before the end of electoral term. Two senators converted to US before the end of electoral term. One deputy converted to CSNS before the end of electoral term. One senator died → by-elections in one district in 1999. Source: Czech Statistical Office.

14 Classification of ODA as a moderate party may seem problematic as this party defined itself more right-wing than ODS. Its voters, however, were relatively more moderate in their values compared to the voters of ODS and perceived themselves as such (Mateju and Vlachova´ 1998a,b, 2000), and this influenced the perception of the position of this party along the political axis.

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Table 5 For which party would voters of individual parties vote, in addition to the chosen party in 1996 (row%)a Would vote except for their party Would vote

KSCM

CSSD

SPR-RSC

KDU-CSL

ODS

ODA

KSCM CSSD SPR-RSC KDU-CSL ODS ODA

3.3 19.7 13.8 0.0 0.0 0.0

65.0 2.8 27.6 16.2 6.4 13.7

5.0 9.6 0.0 1.5 1.5 2.2

5.0 21.9 10.3 4.4 21.6 21.6

0.0 10.1 13.8 33.8 2.5 37.3

0.0 11.2 10.3 32.4 56.9 5.9

a n=590. The remainder up to 100% in each line is attributed to the category ‘another party’. Source: ISSP 1999.

ranked first and second among second-choice parties; in 1998, US (19.3%) followed by KDU-CSL (18.6%).15 US and CSSD, although they are also often stated as second-choice parties, are not likely to profit from the tactical vote. Unlike KDU-CSL and ODA, US and CSSD are not ideologically uncontroversial ‘third’ parties acceptable for a tactical vote. While voters of both left-wing and right-wing parties are willing to vote for KDUCSL and were willing to vote for ODA on a greater scale, CSSD is acceptable primarily to left-wing voters of KSCM, and US primarily to right-wing voters of ODS (see Tables 5 and 6). In the case of these parties, a great ideological distance felt by a portion of voters, and sometimes even inter-party hostility formed in the Table 6 For which party would voters of individual parties vote, in addition to the chosen party in 1999 (row%)a Would vote except for their party Would vote

KSCM

CSSD

KDU-CSL

ODS

ODA

US

KSCM CSSD KDU-CSL ODS US

0.9 21.9 2.1 0.0 1.3

67.3 2.3 29.2 8.3 5.2

9.3 34.6 2.1 15.7 20.8

0.0 10.0 15.6 0.4 41.6

0.0 1.2 1.0 10.5 13.0

2.8 5.8 33.3 45.9 0.0

a

n=769. The remainder up to 100% in each line is attributed to the category ‘another party’. Source: ISSP 1999.

15 Besides the chosen party, in 1996 15.9% of voters would vote for CSSD, 12.0% of voters for ODS, 7.0% of voters for KSCM and 4.0% of voters for SPR-RSC, 19.7% of voters would vote for another party. In 1998, 16.4% would vote for SSD, 10.3% for ODS, 7.7% for KSCM, 4.6% for ODA and 0.8 for SPR-RSC 22.3% of voters would vote for another party besides their own party.

492

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multi-party system (negative attachment of voters to parties, Tables 7 and 8), act as barriers to them benefiting from a tactical vote.16 Inter-party hostility effect The choice of a party for which a voter will vote in elections is affected not only by positive psychological attachments but also negative attachments, such as hostility, fear of victory of an unacceptable party, etc. Negative attachments play a role in multi-party systems both with regard to the regular and tactical vote. In 1996 KSCM, with 35.6% of respondents voicing antagonistic attitudes, ranked first among Czech parties that voters would never vote for, followed by SPR-RSC with 32.1%, ODS with 21.5%, and CSSD with 2.9%. In 1999 KSCM ranked first among these Table 7 For which party would voters of individual parties never vote in 1996 (row%)a Would never vote for Would vote for at the time of the research

KSCM

CSSD

SPRRSC

ODS

Another party

KSCM CSSD SPR-RSC KDU-CSL ODS ODA

0.0 22.2 27.8 46.8 55.6 40.4

0.0 0.5 0.0 5.1 7.0 1.8

16.7 33.8 5.6b 36.7 33.3 50.9

75.8 33.8 55.6 6.3 0.0 5.3

7.6 9.7 11.1 5.1 4.1 1.8

a

n=697. Source: ISSP 1999. This relative frequency is high compared to voters of other parties. It may be an error of the research but just as well it may be an exact reflection of what was happening with voters of SPR-RSC between 1996-1998. SPR-RSC was a party into where voters placed their hope that it would bring order to the politics and economy. Soon, however, it become obvious that the party has deep problems and voters turned away from it (Kreidl and Vlachova´ , 1999). b

16

In this respect, US has not replaced ODA on the political scene as an ideologically uncontroversial party of a tactical vote, although it has defined itself similarly. Furthermore, it positioned itself on the side of KDU-CSL against ODS in the political competition in 1998. Perhaps, this is also due to the fact that CSSD chairman Zeman derided it at the beginning of its existence as a party of dishonest renegades from ODS. Similar statements and their success in politics not only in the Czech Republic suggest a question who teaches voters vote tactically. Let’s mention another example: the historical gesture by KDU-CSL chairman Lux, who after the first round of Senate elections in 1996 when ODS was winning, crossed out the number 79—the maximum possible number of seats of ODS—in a television broadcast press conference, saying that this was not the goal of the Senate elections. This gesture reinforced the open call of the KDU-CSL leadership directed toward regional organizations of KDU-CSL and ODA not to support ODS candidates in the second round—that is its coalition partner in the government. This electoral alliance of moderate parties formed in the first Senate elections and repeated in the subsequent ones, is likely to make it impossible for some time to make the Senate elections a competition between left-of-center and right-of-center party alliances such as in France. Events which may lead voters to vote tactically described for example Lanoue and Bowler (1992).

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Table 8 For which party would voters of individual parties never vote in 1999 (row%)a Would never vote for Would vote for at the time of the research

KSCM

CSSD

SPRRSC

ODS

US

Another party

KSCM CSSD KDU-CSL ODS US

0.0 17.6 59.4 49.1 65.9

0.0 0.3 4.5 58.6 1.1

7.4 26.7 15.8 24.1 28.4

60.3 33.5 14.3 0.0 0.0

17.4 14.5 1.5 7.1 0.0

14.9 7.4 4.5 27.4 4.5

a

n=1028. Source: ISSP 1999.

parties with 40.1%, followed by SPR-RSC with 21.9%, ODS with 20.3%, US with 6.8 and CSSD with 2.3%. While the relationship between the positive attachment to a party (that is, strong party identification) and the vote cannot be tested in view of the data available, the relationship between the absolute unwillingness to vote for certain parties (negative attachment) and the vote of another party has turned out to be testable. The analysis of tables was conducted in SPSS 9.0 using the Log-Linear method, which made it possible to block the diagonal cells.17 The analysis contains the variable to be explained (explained variable), i.e., ‘the intended vote’, and the explanatory variables: ‘party a voter would never vote for’, ‘subjective political orientation’ and ‘subjective class’. A detailed description of questions, the results of which were the basis according to which the variables were constructed, are contained in Appendix A. The 1996 results are given in Table 9. Negative statistically significant adjusted residuals suggest that the unwillingness to vote for a particular party rarely translates into a vote of another party (i.e., where the frequencies are lower than expected). Positive statistically significant adjusted residuals show that the absolute unwillingness to vote for a particular party significantly more often translates into a vote for another party (i.e., where the frequencies are higher than expected). People who would never vote for ODS showed a greater tendency to vote for KSCM, and likewise, those who would never vote for KSCM would more frequently vote for ODS. People who would never vote for SPR-RSC or ODS would often choose CSSD. There was a significant correlation between an electoral choice of KDU-CSL and an unwillingness to cast a ballot for KSCM and SPR-RSC, and the decision to vote for ODA was also related to the rejection of SPR-RSC. In 1999 (Table 10), the vote for KSCM more frequently correlated not only with the rejection of ODS, but also US. Those who intended to cast their ballot for CSSD 17

I.e., we blocked those cells in which the unwillingness to vote for KSCM correlated with the intention to vote for the same party—KSCM, the unwillingness to vote for ODS with the intention to vote for ODS etc.

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494

Table 9 The influence of negative attachment to some parties on the vote in 1996a Preference 10.1996 Would KSCM not vote for

CSSD

KSCM

48

KDU-CSL

37

11

ODS

50

73 ⴚ5.50

2.58 29

5.50

23* 2.77

81

2.63 73

ODA

135

ⴚ4.95 SPRRSC

ODS

0.57* 29

ⴚ2.77

2.03 5

3.76 3

ⴚ4.87

2.70

ⴚ4.46

a Absolute frequencies and adjusted residuals. The empty boxes are blocked. * Not statistically significant (Negative statistically significant adjusted residuals suggest where the unwillingness to vote for a specific party occurs rarely along with the vote of another party (i.e., where the frequencies are lower than expected). Positive statistically significant adjusted residuals suggest where absolute unwillingness to vote for a specific party is significantly related to the vote of another party (i.e., where the frequencies are higher than expected). The Log-Linear (SPSS) method, adjusted residuals in the model of independence. Source: ISSP 1996.

Table 10 The influence of negative attachment to some parties on the vote in 1999a Preference 1.1999 Would KSCM not vote for

CSSD

KSCM

KDU-CSL

62

79 ⴚ12.53

SPRRSC

9

ODS

73

US

21

94 ⴚ5.87

56 ⴚ3.12

2 6.60

2.53 0

ⴚ3.58

4.09

4.05 25

19

51 2.08

58 6.96

ⴚ0.22*

6.11

US

229 4.83

21*

118 4.15

ODS

ⴚ6.62 6

ⴚ2.65

ⴚ6.21

a Absolute frequencies and adjusted residuals. The empty boxes are blocked. *Not statistically significant. The Log-Linear (SPSS) method, adjusted residuals in the model of independence. Source: ISSP 1999.

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were more likely to refuse to vote for US, SPR-RS and ODS. People who decided to vote for KDU-CSL were not significantly more willing to vote for KSCM. And finally, an intended vote for ODS correlated with a rejection of KSCM, while a vote for US correlated with a rejection of KSCM and SPR-RSC. While in 1996 it was not possible to test the relationship between the absolute unwillingness to vote for a particular party in combination with a subjective political orientation and with subjective social class (Tables 11 and 12) due to the size of the sample, in 1999 this was possible. When people who would never vote for ODS declared their political orientation as left, they more often intended to vote for KSCM. Those who would never vote for KSCM or SPR-RSC and positioned themselves on the left were more likely to vote for CSSD. Those who would never vote for SPR-RSC or ODS and declared their political orientation as moderate would also more frequently vote for CSSD. People who would never vote for KSCM and felt to be politically moderate intended significantly more often to vote for KDU-CSL. And finally, those who refused to vote for KSCM or SPR-RSC and declared rightwing orientation decided significantly more frequently to vote for ODS. As can be seen, a negative attachment to a certain party in combination with a subjective political orientation leads to a certain electoral choice. Table 11 The influence of a negative attachment to some parties in interaction with the political orientation, on the election in 1999a Preference 1.1999 Would not vote for, KSCM political orientation

CSSD

KSCM, left

13

KDUCSL 3* 3.48

KSCM, center

39*

KSCM, right

10

34

36 0.46*

SPR-RSC, center

1

SPR-RSC, right

0 58

ODS, center

13

ODS, right

1*

ⴚ5.25

0.59* 41 0.55*

4.05

0 ⴚ0.25*

53 ⴚ2.66

ⴚ6.50 13

8* ⴚ2.32

7.02

ⴚ6.52 16* ⴚ0.59*

2.77 4*

ⴚ0.77*

ⴚ1.21*

7.88

58*

10.49 1

10*

8 ⴚ3.27

ODS, left

192 1.57*

7.67

ⴚ3.42

ⴚ5.51

5.98

3*

48

ⴚ3.45 32

40* ⴚ11.72

8*

3 0.26*

1.29*

SPR-RSC, left

ODS

2* 0.33*

0.42*

a Absolute frequencies and adjusted residuals. The empty boxes are blocked. *Not statistically significant. The Log-Linear (SPSS) method, adjusted residuals in the model of independence. Source: ISSP 1999.

496

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Table 12 The influence of a negative attachment to some parties in interaction with the social class, on the elections in 1999a Preference 1.1999 Would not vote for, KSCM social class

CSSD

KDU-CSL

ODS

KSCM, lower and working

19

31

47*

KSCM, lower middle

18

KSCM, middle+

25

ⴚ2.89 ⴚ2.74

4*

SPR-RSC, lower and middle

1

PRS-RSC, middle+

3

32 ⴚ1.78*

1.76*

46

ODS, middle +

ⴚ0.81*

ⴚ4.18 9

ⴚ0.38* 31

ⴚ0.03*

ⴚ1.16*

0.46*

0.94*

ⴚ2.72 28*

10

23*

11*

16 0.64*

3.56

3.80 ODS, lower middle 15*

ⴚ4.16

0.64*

5*

64*

4.94 11

8* 4.62

ⴚ2.44 ODS, lower and working

1.03*

5.24

31

1.36* 120

8*

30 ⴚ2.78

55*

28* ⴚ5.86

SPR-RSC, lower and working

ⴚ1.21*

5.55 18*

ⴚ0.52* 0

3.02

ⴚ3.58

a Absolute frequencies and adjusted residuals. The empty boxes are blocked. *Not statistically significant. The Log-Linear (SPSS) method, adjusted residuals in the model of independence. Source: ISSP 1999.

The analysis has shown that there is an interesting relationship between the electoral choice and the absolute unwillingness to vote for a certain party in combination with both a subjective political orientation and a subjective classification by social class. If people who would never vote for ODS felt themselves to be members of the lower and working class, they would more frequently intend to vote for KSCM, but if they felt themselves to be members of the middle and upper class, they would more frequently intend to vote for CSSD. Those who would never vote for SPRRSC would more often cast their ballot for CSSD, and this relationship is visible among all social classes. If people who would never vote for KSCM identify with lower and working classes, they more frequently intend to vote for KDU-CSL. If, however, they identify with middle and upper classes, they more frequently intend to vote for ODS. A negative attachment to a certain party in combination with a subjective class also leads to various electoral choices. The affect that inter-party hostility may have on the tactical vote in the second

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round of Senate elections should also be mentioned. As has been said, KDU-CSL is typical of a party that would be affected by a tactical vote. Not only is it the party that a substantial portion of left and right-wing voters would most frequently vote for in addition to/instead of their preferred party, but it is also not among the parties that voters would never vote for (Tables 8 and 9). US and CSSD are also often mentioned as parties voters would vote for in addition to/instead of their party. In their case, however, this primarily concerns voters from the same segment of the political spectrum and therefore US and CSSD are not widely acceptable ‘third’ parties. Data pertaining to what type of voters would never vote for these two parties only underlies this fact—voters of KSCM and CSSD in particular refuse US; voters of ODS, on the other hand, completely reject the vote of CSSD. “It is the presence of a meaningful third party that makes tactical voting not just possible but also sensible” (Lanoue and Bowler, 1992: 141).

Conclusion Party identification testing was not an easy task with the data available. First of all, both surveys were conducted relatively shortly after the elections and therefore electoral preference changes were not frequent enough to allow testing of either the influence of the previous vote or the influence of a relationship to the chosen party on the intended vote. Testing of party identification and its effect on the next vote is a task that requires data sets from panel surveys of a sufficient number of respondents, with one wave of surveys executed well ahead of the elections and the second after the elections. The same applies to the study of the above-mentioned tactical vote. Despite these facts, however, the application of certain points of departure related to the party identification model may be useful for the Czech Republic. The analysis has revealed that there are voters who have relatively strong positive attachments to the chosen parties. Voters of three parties in particular—KSCM, KDU-CSL and ODS—demonstrate stronger party identification than voters of the remaining parties. In the long run, we can expect more stable voting behavior from these voters than from voters who do not have such strong attachment to the chosen parties. In view of the fact that KSCM and KDU-CSL each have a large membership18 base and their voters are older, of lower education, come from lower classes, and moreover, in the case of KDU-CSL they are of Catholic denomination and from rural areas, we can expect that their identification will be not only ideological but often also symbolic. On the other hand, ODS is a party with relatively few members19 and its voters are, compared to the two above-mentioned parties, younger, of higher education, come from middle classes, are from cities and are not of any particular religious orientation. In view of this characterization, we may expect more frequently

18 19

KSCM has about 160,000, KDU-CSL 62,000 members. ODS has 19,000 members, CSSD 18,000 members and US 3000 members.

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pragmatic identification from these voters. Nevertheless, ideological identification cannot be ruled out either; it may be related more to an interest in politics which is not related to formal membership in a party or other political activity. In view of the data available, however, these theses should not be understood as more than hypotheses. The results of the analyses of the relationship between a party for which voters would never vote (negative affective relationship to a certain party) and the choice of a party, and the choice of a party in combination with a subjective political orientation and subjective social class, were important and interesting. It has been revealed that inter-party hostility and the perception of an individual’s ideological and social position contribute greatly to the formation of voting behavior, not only with regard to a regular vote but also to a tactical vote.

Appendix A. Questions pertaining to voting behavior and party identification: Vote: If you voted, which political party did you vote for? The power of a positive attachment to the chosen party: How strong was your relationship to the political party you voted for? Intended vote: Can you tell us which political party you would vote for if the parliamentary elections were to take place next week? Second-choice party: If you were to vote for two parties in elections, which other party would you vote for? Negative attachment, never voted for party: Which political party would you never vote for? Declared (subjective) political orientation: In politics, the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ are often used. Where would you position yourself politically? Definitely left=1, somewhat left=2, center=3, somewhat right=4, definitely right=5. Declared (subjective) social class: In which social group, class, would you classify yourself? Lower class=1, working class=2, lower middle class=3, middle class=4, upper middle class=5, upper class=6.

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