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Personnel security policies
PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICIES PART 1: THE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE PROBLEM (c) The trusted staff remain trustworthy, and that any who become risks to security are identified and removed at once from the 'danger areas'. This requires constant and close supervision by supervisors and other staff. User malpractice and error, caused by a lack of knowledge, skill and understanding, can be as devastating to a system as any well-planned, deliberate attack. Many instances of data loss/corruption or computer service unavailability can be avoided if personnel are properly trained in their normal duties, and additionally are aware of the threats to an installation and the correct day to day countermeasures that should be employed. A comprehensive training and computer security awareness programme is therefore a vital element of any personnel security policy for computer staffs. These, then, are the elements of personnel security: • Screening. • Security clearances. • Supervision. • Training and security awareness. Computer staffs--especially those entrusted with the most sensitive and responsible key appointments but ultimately all those who have any contact with system assets (including security guards, contract (external) staff, and cleaning/ancillary staff) -- must be of the highest integrity. Management should pay constant attention to their conduct, reliability and personal behaviour.
- A SECOND PAPER IN CLSR'S CONTINUING SERIES ON THE SUBJECT OF COMPUTER SECURITY, THE PEOPLE FACTOR Computer security has become the subject of much dis~ssion and a whole industry of books, seminars, confmances and courses has emerged, But still precious Iltl~ has been done about Introducing it practically. Most believe they have no need for it, or Insist that disasters and security breaches only happen to others; some learn the hard way that this is not so. We can no longer claim, as most do, that computer sacudty is in its infancy: this is not true and is just an excus~ It need not be, as many claim it is, either complicated or expensive, nor is it an impossible task. The solutions are straightforward, and need not be highly technical. Low-tech insider crimes and operator errors are the greatest threats, not highly sophisticated attacks; the ¢ou~res need to be similarly uncomplicated. Computer sacurity is essentially a people problem, not a machine one, and should be dealt with accordingly, in this article Martin Smith: (a) Outlifles the elements of personnel security and its fundamental principles, within the Information Technology environment. (b) D~Jtbes the threats from staff members and outsiders, and their motivation for crime. Part II w4H ~ the several stages Involved in the achievement of a sound and comprehensive personnel security policy.
FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY
PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL
There are fundamental principles that should govern the personnel security measures at any computer installation:
The greatest threat to any computer system lies with the people operating or using the system. Whatever the nature of the safety measures enforced, eventually the people involved must be trusted; it is this trust that they can betray. They will be responsible for the computer system's programming, maintenance, operation, use and security, but they may be dishonest disaffected, incompetent or careless. And no matter what care is taken, unless personnel security is sound then all the other measures will be of little worth. Any computer security policy needs to concentrate on personnel security as much, perhaps even more, as all other elements of a rounded 'defence in depth'.
THE NEED-TO-KNOW PRINCIPLE Possession or knowledge of information, whatever its classification, must be limited strictly to those who have both the authority for access (clearance) and a clear need to know that information for the efficient performance of their duties. Status or appointment does not on its own imply entitlement to knowledge or possession of that information. The more sensitive or valuable that information, the more important becomes this principle. Sales managers should not automatically be allowed, by virtue of their position within the company and despite the fact that they carry a high level of clearance, to have access to, say, research data held by other perhaps more junior staff. Human nature dictates that the 'brass', with their confidence and authority, will attempt to brow-beat more lowly staff in order simply to know what is going on. Management and security staffs must make it clear, and show it to be true, that when those receiving such browbeats refuse to disclose information they are supported and that there are no adverse, only positive, consequences of their compliance with this principle.
THE ELEMENTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY As systems become smaller, more powerful and more widely dispersed, a greater number of staff gain an increasingly comprehensive access to the growing database, and often at more and more isolated and unsupervised remote sites. Add to this the fact that the computer's abilities to store, process and produce vast amounts of valuable and sensitive data make them very attractive targets, it is therefore vitally important that: (a) Only trusted staff are allowed access to a computer system, and then only: • to those parts they require access to in order to carry out their duties efficiently; • to a level of sensitivity for which they have been cleared. (b) Untrusted staff and strangers are denied access to the system, and thus the opportunity to do damage.
THE NEED-TO-GO PRINCIPLE. Staff, again of whatever rank and appointment, should be allowed physical access within the computer installation and any associated areas only as far as is necessary for them to perform their jobs. They should also be denied unnecessary access to data areas and functions within the computer itself, even though they may be legitimate users of other parts of the system for other reasons.
37
THE TWO-PERSON PRINCIPLE.
the absence of the perpetrator may cause the offence to emerge). 'Old Harry', who has been in charge of the data preparation room for years, who has never given cause for concern, who works every weekend and who never takes a holiday may not be the faithful retainer everyone supposes: he may be milking the computer system dry. As a rule, always avoid predictable routine as much as possible, though remember at the same time that we are all creatures of habit and your staff will always prefer their routine to be preserved.
In order to reduce the opportunities for any person to breach system security, those responsibilities and duties which would afford particularly useful access to the system or its security feature should not be carried out by one person alone. This individual should be accompanied at all times during the performance of such duties by an authorised person, where 'authorised' infers an equal knowledge and the ability to detect any unauthorised or dangerous practises; it is of no use for a security guard to accompany the installation manager (IM) during very technical operations, since the security guard will not understand what the IM is doing and will not therefore, recognise an illegal or incorrect action;
THE THREATS FROM STAFF MEMBERS An individual's role and status within an organisation will dictate the nature and amount of damage--inadvertent or deliberate--that he or she can cause to the computing service and data.
(a) This principle is particularly relevant to security-related tasks such as: • Control of access-control procedures (issues of passwords, etc).
USERS The majority of staff who have access to a computer system will comprise low-level users -- those with terminals on their desks and with limited access to, and use of, that system. Yet the effects of their actions can be considerable, since there is often little control or supervision over them. Their level of training and often the mundane nature of their duties result in high error rates:
• Systems start-up and shut down. • Periods of classified processing. • Modification or maintenance of software/hardware (This list is not exhaustive). (b) However, when a certain procedure or operation is subject to the two-person rule, this then raises the possibility of collusion between the two staff members. To avoid this, as much as possible and practical should be done to vary shift rosters and working practises so that the same people are not always working together, and vital functions should be well dispersed among staff members.
(a) Failure to Apply Checks. In the interests of expediency, or as a result of ignorance or laziness, users will often ignore or deliberately bypass the in-built security and validation checks designed to protect the system and its data. (b) Operator Error. 'Finger trouble' is inevitable and costly.
(c) There are certain computer functions that should not be carried out by the same person:
(c) Dishonesty False entries; deliberate omissions and transcription errors; misuse of resources; unauthorised disclosures of company trade secrets; the clogging up of the system with unauthorised processes (football pool permutations, stamp club membership lists, etc): these are all potentially extremely damaging to the company.
• A programmer should never be allowed to operate the computer system, and operators should not act as programmers. Certainly this rule should apply for particularly sensitive computer operations though the constraints of live operations and on-line computing may make this difficult.
SYSTEM SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT STAFFS The small number of system support and development staff have immense responsibilities towards the system's well-being, efficiency and security. They will have a deep understanding of the system software and security features, and almost endless opportunity to commit dishonest or damaging acts either by manipulation of the software code or as a result of the inefficient performance of their duties. Apart from programming errors, deliberate acts such as the insertion of software bugs or the avoidance of in-built software security features are easily committed.
• The introduction of any system security features must be carried out by staff entirely independent of programming or operational staffs (security staff, perhaps). • The data preparation and data processing functions should be entirely divorced from each other, not only organisationally but physically too. • Data custodians/librarians should not be directly responsible to, or connected with, any operations or programming staffs.
COMPUTER OPERATIONS STAFFS
• The custodian of any classified/sensitive material should not be allowed to authorise its reproduction, issue or destruction, and independent checks of this person's work must be carried out at regular but random times.
At the heart of the system are the well-trained, confident and influential computer operations staff. These personnel can fall prey to human temptation like all others, but their actions can have profound effects on the installation. Simple errors can have catastrophic results. Manipulation of data and the subsequent suppression of audit and security features (in order to hide such unauthorised or dishonest acts), unauthorised disclosure of data, and theft of computer resources are all easily achieved. Furthermore, these staff will tend to be blind to their computer's faults and weaknesses. They will have great faith in the infallibility of their system and its own security and safety features. They will be a closely knit group and be blind, too, to any suspicious activity of a close colleague. They may indeed cover for any incompetence of a colleague. There is, therefore, an even greater need for personnel security measures and supervision over these staff
THE ROTATION OF DUTIES.
No one person should be kept in one particular post for too long, especially if that appointment carries with it any specific security responsibilities or opportunities for dishonesty. This will help to avoid the errors that emerge from boredom or over-familiarity with duties, and it will prevent an individual from continuing any crooked activities indefinitely. This replacement process often reveals dishonesty or inefficiency that would otherwise have remained concealed. Predictable working routines should be interrupted without notice. Enforced holiday periods should be introduced (during which
38
;~i "
II
llil (IOMPI~Fi I.:. I A\~ ANI) :',I ( I.~RIIY RI I~ORI
People will commit a computer crime for a number of fundamentally different reasons:
members, and it is more important than ever that they are trustworthy and conscientious.
(a) Because it is T h e r e . . . Hackers seem to lack any real malice towards the owners of the computer systems they love to try to break into. Time and again they admit merely to wanting to crack any security measures simply as an intellectual challenge or to satisfy their curiosity, with no real thoughts of personal gain.
SECURITY STAFFS Who checks the checker? Security staffs are only human too, and the dishonest guard or subverted security manager will have ample unsupervised opportunity to commit acts against the interests of the installation. The security manager will, of course, have an intimate knowledge of the system, but for the guards their activities would be limited in the main to the less technical attacks--theft of computer resources, vandalism, sabotage. Coercion with dishonest computer staff members could, however, lead to other dishonest acts which require both knowledge and opportunity. Security staffs must be cleared for access to the highest level of information held, processed or produced within the computer centre they are protecting. (Do not forget cleaners, who also have unescortecl access to the heart of the installation, building/equipment maintenance staffs and computer maintenance engineers.)
(b)To Gain Personal Advantage. The step from the challenge to the crime is a small one. Personnel, especially those with access, will given the opportunity and often whatever the prize no matter how small, use any security weaknesses within the computer system to their own advantage--personal, financial or competitive. Extra motivation occurs when an individual encounters a pressing need for extra cash--blackmail, during sticky divorce proceedings, gambling, over-extension of borrowing, etc. (c) Retaliation. Individuals may retaliate against the computer to damage it deliberately or the parent organisation--relieving a real or imagined grudge, displacing their animosity of management and/or work practises, or simply as a result of fear of the computer installation and its effect on future job security. Indeed, computers are often thought of as fair game, and public support will tend to be against the computer. Tales of oldage pensioners receiving bills for £50 million are oftrelated. Computers have also been attacked as part of a wider campaign against an organisation, such as during industrial disputes.
OUTSIDERS An organisation will have no control over outsiders who, deliberately or inadvertently, damage or attack the system. Although the greatest dangers to any system came from those who work within it, criminals may attempt fraud or theft, 'hackers' may attack the system for fun, and terrorists or vandals may attack and damage vital equipment, especially those remote and therefore more easily accessible components such as communications links or power supplies.
THE MOTIVATION FOR CRIME Why do not only strangers, but also those within an organisation's computer department who should hold allegiance to, and have an interest in, that organisation's wellbeing, efficiency and profitability, commit dishonest acts against the security and safety of the computer? If we can recognise these motivating factors, then we can adapt and improve still further the personnel security features. People will be tempted into committing a crime if:
(d) The Modern Criminal. Computers can be used simply as tools to carry out a crime. The present generation is the last to have grown up without computers; my son could punch his name into my PC before he could write it for himself. Martin Smith, Editorial Panelist © M.R. Smith 1990
(a) They are unhappy or disgruntled. Good morale is an important aspect of not only an organisation's performance but also its safety and security.
This paper is extracted from 'Commonsense Computer Security- Your Practical Guide to Preventing Accidental and Deliberate Electronic Data Loss' by Martin R Smith (McGraw Hill 1989). The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of any organisation within which he is associated.
(b) The crime is easy to commit and there is a reasonable chance of getting away with it. (c) There is the opportunity and the reward is sufficient-'every person has a price'. I
I
BOOK REVIEW
EC S O C I A L D I M E N S I O N 1992: the European Social Dimension by PatrickVenturini 1988 of the internal market. The aim of this report therefore is to present (Official Publicationsof the EuropeanCommunities) 119pp. ECU9,75 the variousfacets of this social dimension and the dynamicsof their ISBN 92 825 87037 interaction: freedom of movement for persons and occupational mobility, economic and social cohesion,the working environment, This publication borrows extensivelyfrom the work and discussions company law, social measures in support of technological change, carried on in the EuropeanCommission during 1987 when an interand industrial relationssystems.The report notes that development departmental working party examined the social dimension of the of a European social dimension is not the sole responsibilityof the internal market. As the foreword states - at a time when the 1992 Community, but rather a matter for all social and economic interest goal of a Europewithout frontiers has gained credibility,some people groups at Community, national, regional and local levels. It is, says are alarmed becausethey feel 'the social dimension' of the internal the report, a fact that Europe - and not just the social Europe market has been forgotten. This should not be, since the Treatyof 'will be built from the bottom up involvingall the partiesconcerned'. Rome resolvesto ensure the economic and social progress of the member statesand the elimination of barrierswhich divide Europe. Availablefrom HMSO Books(PC 16) 51 Nine ElmsLane,London The social dimension is in fact one of the key factors for the success SW8 5DR
39
- A SECOND PAPER IN CLSR'S CONTINUING SERIES ON THE SUBJECT OF COMPUTER SECURITY, THE PEOPLE FACTOR Computer security has become the subject of much dis~ssion and a whole industry of books, seminars, confmances and courses has emerged, But still precious Iltl~ has been done about Introducing it practically. Most believe they have no need for it, or Insist that disasters and security breaches only happen to others; some learn the hard way that this is not so. We can no longer claim, as most do, that computer sacudty is in its infancy: this is not true and is just an excus~ It need not be, as many claim it is, either complicated or expensive, nor is it an impossible task. The solutions are straightforward, and need not be highly technical. Low-tech insider crimes and operator errors are the greatest threats, not highly sophisticated attacks; the ¢ou~res need to be similarly uncomplicated. Computer sacurity is essentially a people problem, not a machine one, and should be dealt with accordingly, in this article Martin Smith: (a) Outlifles the elements of personnel security and its fundamental principles, within the Information Technology environment. (b) D~Jtbes the threats from staff members and outsiders, and their motivation for crime. Part II w4H ~ the several stages Involved in the achievement of a sound and comprehensive personnel security policy.
FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY
PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL
There are fundamental principles that should govern the personnel security measures at any computer installation:
The greatest threat to any computer system lies with the people operating or using the system. Whatever the nature of the safety measures enforced, eventually the people involved must be trusted; it is this trust that they can betray. They will be responsible for the computer system's programming, maintenance, operation, use and security, but they may be dishonest disaffected, incompetent or careless. And no matter what care is taken, unless personnel security is sound then all the other measures will be of little worth. Any computer security policy needs to concentrate on personnel security as much, perhaps even more, as all other elements of a rounded 'defence in depth'.
THE NEED-TO-KNOW PRINCIPLE Possession or knowledge of information, whatever its classification, must be limited strictly to those who have both the authority for access (clearance) and a clear need to know that information for the efficient performance of their duties. Status or appointment does not on its own imply entitlement to knowledge or possession of that information. The more sensitive or valuable that information, the more important becomes this principle. Sales managers should not automatically be allowed, by virtue of their position within the company and despite the fact that they carry a high level of clearance, to have access to, say, research data held by other perhaps more junior staff. Human nature dictates that the 'brass', with their confidence and authority, will attempt to brow-beat more lowly staff in order simply to know what is going on. Management and security staffs must make it clear, and show it to be true, that when those receiving such browbeats refuse to disclose information they are supported and that there are no adverse, only positive, consequences of their compliance with this principle.
THE ELEMENTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY As systems become smaller, more powerful and more widely dispersed, a greater number of staff gain an increasingly comprehensive access to the growing database, and often at more and more isolated and unsupervised remote sites. Add to this the fact that the computer's abilities to store, process and produce vast amounts of valuable and sensitive data make them very attractive targets, it is therefore vitally important that: (a) Only trusted staff are allowed access to a computer system, and then only: • to those parts they require access to in order to carry out their duties efficiently; • to a level of sensitivity for which they have been cleared. (b) Untrusted staff and strangers are denied access to the system, and thus the opportunity to do damage.
THE NEED-TO-GO PRINCIPLE. Staff, again of whatever rank and appointment, should be allowed physical access within the computer installation and any associated areas only as far as is necessary for them to perform their jobs. They should also be denied unnecessary access to data areas and functions within the computer itself, even though they may be legitimate users of other parts of the system for other reasons.
37
THE TWO-PERSON PRINCIPLE.
the absence of the perpetrator may cause the offence to emerge). 'Old Harry', who has been in charge of the data preparation room for years, who has never given cause for concern, who works every weekend and who never takes a holiday may not be the faithful retainer everyone supposes: he may be milking the computer system dry. As a rule, always avoid predictable routine as much as possible, though remember at the same time that we are all creatures of habit and your staff will always prefer their routine to be preserved.
In order to reduce the opportunities for any person to breach system security, those responsibilities and duties which would afford particularly useful access to the system or its security feature should not be carried out by one person alone. This individual should be accompanied at all times during the performance of such duties by an authorised person, where 'authorised' infers an equal knowledge and the ability to detect any unauthorised or dangerous practises; it is of no use for a security guard to accompany the installation manager (IM) during very technical operations, since the security guard will not understand what the IM is doing and will not therefore, recognise an illegal or incorrect action;
THE THREATS FROM STAFF MEMBERS An individual's role and status within an organisation will dictate the nature and amount of damage--inadvertent or deliberate--that he or she can cause to the computing service and data.
(a) This principle is particularly relevant to security-related tasks such as: • Control of access-control procedures (issues of passwords, etc).
USERS The majority of staff who have access to a computer system will comprise low-level users -- those with terminals on their desks and with limited access to, and use of, that system. Yet the effects of their actions can be considerable, since there is often little control or supervision over them. Their level of training and often the mundane nature of their duties result in high error rates:
• Systems start-up and shut down. • Periods of classified processing. • Modification or maintenance of software/hardware (This list is not exhaustive). (b) However, when a certain procedure or operation is subject to the two-person rule, this then raises the possibility of collusion between the two staff members. To avoid this, as much as possible and practical should be done to vary shift rosters and working practises so that the same people are not always working together, and vital functions should be well dispersed among staff members.
(a) Failure to Apply Checks. In the interests of expediency, or as a result of ignorance or laziness, users will often ignore or deliberately bypass the in-built security and validation checks designed to protect the system and its data. (b) Operator Error. 'Finger trouble' is inevitable and costly.
(c) There are certain computer functions that should not be carried out by the same person:
(c) Dishonesty False entries; deliberate omissions and transcription errors; misuse of resources; unauthorised disclosures of company trade secrets; the clogging up of the system with unauthorised processes (football pool permutations, stamp club membership lists, etc): these are all potentially extremely damaging to the company.
• A programmer should never be allowed to operate the computer system, and operators should not act as programmers. Certainly this rule should apply for particularly sensitive computer operations though the constraints of live operations and on-line computing may make this difficult.
SYSTEM SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT STAFFS The small number of system support and development staff have immense responsibilities towards the system's well-being, efficiency and security. They will have a deep understanding of the system software and security features, and almost endless opportunity to commit dishonest or damaging acts either by manipulation of the software code or as a result of the inefficient performance of their duties. Apart from programming errors, deliberate acts such as the insertion of software bugs or the avoidance of in-built software security features are easily committed.
• The introduction of any system security features must be carried out by staff entirely independent of programming or operational staffs (security staff, perhaps). • The data preparation and data processing functions should be entirely divorced from each other, not only organisationally but physically too. • Data custodians/librarians should not be directly responsible to, or connected with, any operations or programming staffs.
COMPUTER OPERATIONS STAFFS
• The custodian of any classified/sensitive material should not be allowed to authorise its reproduction, issue or destruction, and independent checks of this person's work must be carried out at regular but random times.
At the heart of the system are the well-trained, confident and influential computer operations staff. These personnel can fall prey to human temptation like all others, but their actions can have profound effects on the installation. Simple errors can have catastrophic results. Manipulation of data and the subsequent suppression of audit and security features (in order to hide such unauthorised or dishonest acts), unauthorised disclosure of data, and theft of computer resources are all easily achieved. Furthermore, these staff will tend to be blind to their computer's faults and weaknesses. They will have great faith in the infallibility of their system and its own security and safety features. They will be a closely knit group and be blind, too, to any suspicious activity of a close colleague. They may indeed cover for any incompetence of a colleague. There is, therefore, an even greater need for personnel security measures and supervision over these staff
THE ROTATION OF DUTIES.
No one person should be kept in one particular post for too long, especially if that appointment carries with it any specific security responsibilities or opportunities for dishonesty. This will help to avoid the errors that emerge from boredom or over-familiarity with duties, and it will prevent an individual from continuing any crooked activities indefinitely. This replacement process often reveals dishonesty or inefficiency that would otherwise have remained concealed. Predictable working routines should be interrupted without notice. Enforced holiday periods should be introduced (during which
38
;~i "
II
llil (IOMPI~Fi I.:. I A\~ ANI) :',I ( I.~RIIY RI I~ORI
People will commit a computer crime for a number of fundamentally different reasons:
members, and it is more important than ever that they are trustworthy and conscientious.
(a) Because it is T h e r e . . . Hackers seem to lack any real malice towards the owners of the computer systems they love to try to break into. Time and again they admit merely to wanting to crack any security measures simply as an intellectual challenge or to satisfy their curiosity, with no real thoughts of personal gain.
SECURITY STAFFS Who checks the checker? Security staffs are only human too, and the dishonest guard or subverted security manager will have ample unsupervised opportunity to commit acts against the interests of the installation. The security manager will, of course, have an intimate knowledge of the system, but for the guards their activities would be limited in the main to the less technical attacks--theft of computer resources, vandalism, sabotage. Coercion with dishonest computer staff members could, however, lead to other dishonest acts which require both knowledge and opportunity. Security staffs must be cleared for access to the highest level of information held, processed or produced within the computer centre they are protecting. (Do not forget cleaners, who also have unescortecl access to the heart of the installation, building/equipment maintenance staffs and computer maintenance engineers.)
(b)To Gain Personal Advantage. The step from the challenge to the crime is a small one. Personnel, especially those with access, will given the opportunity and often whatever the prize no matter how small, use any security weaknesses within the computer system to their own advantage--personal, financial or competitive. Extra motivation occurs when an individual encounters a pressing need for extra cash--blackmail, during sticky divorce proceedings, gambling, over-extension of borrowing, etc. (c) Retaliation. Individuals may retaliate against the computer to damage it deliberately or the parent organisation--relieving a real or imagined grudge, displacing their animosity of management and/or work practises, or simply as a result of fear of the computer installation and its effect on future job security. Indeed, computers are often thought of as fair game, and public support will tend to be against the computer. Tales of oldage pensioners receiving bills for £50 million are oftrelated. Computers have also been attacked as part of a wider campaign against an organisation, such as during industrial disputes.
OUTSIDERS An organisation will have no control over outsiders who, deliberately or inadvertently, damage or attack the system. Although the greatest dangers to any system came from those who work within it, criminals may attempt fraud or theft, 'hackers' may attack the system for fun, and terrorists or vandals may attack and damage vital equipment, especially those remote and therefore more easily accessible components such as communications links or power supplies.
THE MOTIVATION FOR CRIME Why do not only strangers, but also those within an organisation's computer department who should hold allegiance to, and have an interest in, that organisation's wellbeing, efficiency and profitability, commit dishonest acts against the security and safety of the computer? If we can recognise these motivating factors, then we can adapt and improve still further the personnel security features. People will be tempted into committing a crime if:
(d) The Modern Criminal. Computers can be used simply as tools to carry out a crime. The present generation is the last to have grown up without computers; my son could punch his name into my PC before he could write it for himself. Martin Smith, Editorial Panelist © M.R. Smith 1990
(a) They are unhappy or disgruntled. Good morale is an important aspect of not only an organisation's performance but also its safety and security.
This paper is extracted from 'Commonsense Computer Security- Your Practical Guide to Preventing Accidental and Deliberate Electronic Data Loss' by Martin R Smith (McGraw Hill 1989). The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of any organisation within which he is associated.
(b) The crime is easy to commit and there is a reasonable chance of getting away with it. (c) There is the opportunity and the reward is sufficient-'every person has a price'. I
I
BOOK REVIEW
EC S O C I A L D I M E N S I O N 1992: the European Social Dimension by PatrickVenturini 1988 of the internal market. The aim of this report therefore is to present (Official Publicationsof the EuropeanCommunities) 119pp. ECU9,75 the variousfacets of this social dimension and the dynamicsof their ISBN 92 825 87037 interaction: freedom of movement for persons and occupational mobility, economic and social cohesion,the working environment, This publication borrows extensivelyfrom the work and discussions company law, social measures in support of technological change, carried on in the EuropeanCommission during 1987 when an interand industrial relationssystems.The report notes that development departmental working party examined the social dimension of the of a European social dimension is not the sole responsibilityof the internal market. As the foreword states - at a time when the 1992 Community, but rather a matter for all social and economic interest goal of a Europewithout frontiers has gained credibility,some people groups at Community, national, regional and local levels. It is, says are alarmed becausethey feel 'the social dimension' of the internal the report, a fact that Europe - and not just the social Europe market has been forgotten. This should not be, since the Treatyof 'will be built from the bottom up involvingall the partiesconcerned'. Rome resolvesto ensure the economic and social progress of the member statesand the elimination of barrierswhich divide Europe. Availablefrom HMSO Books(PC 16) 51 Nine ElmsLane,London The social dimension is in fact one of the key factors for the success SW8 5DR
39