Playing with Supertankers: Centralization in Land Use Planning in Israel — A National Experiment Underway

Land Use Policy 75 (2018) 269–283

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Land Use Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol

Playing with Supertankers: Centralization in Land Use Planning in Israel — A National Experiment Underway

T

Nir Mualam Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Israel

A B S T R A C T

Compared with decentralization of planning powers, centralization has not been popular in planning policy in the past few decades. Centralization has become associated with dysfunctional governance, obsolete planning, and unconstitutional and unaccountable policies. Nevertheless there are cases in which countries have experimented with centralization in order to solve crises and improve the supply of goods and services. This paper focuses on centralization reforms in Israel that were designed to deal with a chronic shortage in housing. Through interviews with experts, and analysis of laws, and related documents, we address several questions. First, what kinds of steps have been taken recently to centralize planning in the Israeli planning system? Second, what were the motivations behind these steps? And last, in what way have these steps reformed planning in Israel, and what were their consequences? We investigate these issues by looking at a newly established national planning committee:the National Committee for Preferred Housing Plansalso known as “the Supertanker”. The paper examines the aims and objectives of the legislature in forming theSupertanker, and whether these objectives were fulfilled. The findings show that the new policy arrangement has revamped the planning system, reduced the roles of regional planners, and created a fast track that circumvents older, and slower, planning processes, in an attempt to increase the production of housing units, including affordable apartments. The findings also suggest that despite public scrutiny, the Supertanker’s performance cannot be judged solely on the grounds of it being undemocratic and environmentally destructive, as there is conflicting evidence about its ability to speed-up plan approval processes, and enlarge the future housing stock.

1. Introduction This paper reviews land-use planning policies in Israel in the face of the centralization of planning powers. The paper addresses three questions. First, what kind of steps have been taken recently to centralize planning in the Israeli planning system? Second, what were the motivations behind these steps? And last, in what way have these steps reformed planning in Israel? We investigate this issue by looking at a newly established national planning committee:the National Committee for Preferred Housing Plans (NCPHP, also referred to by its Hebrew acronym “Vatmal” or by its nickname- “The Supertanker”). Specifically the paper examines the aims and objectives of the legislature in forming the Supertanker, and whether these objectives were fulfilled. The Supertanker was established as a planning committee controlled by government ministries with a high level of power and

authority, hence its nickname “Supertanker”. In fact, a Supertanker is an airplane designed to extinguish wildfires.1 In the Israeli case, the wildfire has been a dramatic increase in housing prices and a shortage of housing. The main purpose of the Supertanker was to create a fast-track for the production of housing units. This was to be achieved through cutting red-tape, streamlining planning procedure in various ways, and through ancillary measures such as endowing the Supertanker with the capacity to take back government land held by farmers, as well as the capacity to override all former national, district, and local-level plans. The Israeli case-example is particularly interesting in the context of international research for two reasons. First, it is an example of efforts to centralize planning which were extreme in their scope. This case illustrates a national government takeover of planning and a move towards ‘hands-on’ planning by national-level officials. Looking at the

E-mail address: [email protected]. The nickname for the NCPHP - ‘Supertanker’ - was coined by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The inspiration for this name was a wildfire that spread in Northern Israel in 2010. The Israeli government hired an American 747 Supertanker airplane to assist in extinguishing the fire. In the initial stages of the formation of the ‘Supertanker,’ the government established the National Housing Committee (NHC - referred to by its Hebrew acronym “Vadal”) in 2011. The NHC, nicknamed the ‘Supertanker for Battling Bureaucracy,’ was established following the massive 2011 social protests over high costs of living. Owing to matters of scope this paper does not relate to the NHC, but focuses on its successor- the 2014 ‘Supertanker,’ the NCPHP. 1

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.03.019 Received 5 September 2017; Received in revised form 31 December 2017; Accepted 7 March 2018 0264-8377/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Fig. 1. Key informants, sorted by group.

2. Methods

Israeli experience, other countries that consider centralization could gain much insight. Second, the Israeli case should be interesting to wider readership because it involves an urgent reform designed to deal with the housing crisis and specifically, the housing shortage. The Israeli experience is highly relevant because of conditions that underlie recent policy changes including a lingering housing crisis, high population growth, land scarcity, and environmental challenges (OECD, 2011; Rachewsky, 2010). For these reasons, an analysis of Israel’s urban planning reform may provide useful information for other countries struggling with the reallocation of planning authority in the face of multiple socio-economic challenges. Specifically the Israeli case unravels an attempt by the government to deal with the housing crisis by way of centralization. We address this reform first by exploring the context of crisis in which it occurred. We then introduce the Supertanker, and finally evaluate the consequences of the planning reform. The Supertanker reform should be understood as an example of centralization in land use planning. Decision-makers across the globe have attempted to assemble planning policies that reduce bureaucracy while facilitating national stewardship and oversight over resources, goods, and spatial activities. These efforts can materialize as two seemingly opposing trends,; both centralization and decentralization of planning powers have emerged as strategies to achieve those goals on both national and local levels. Globally, centralization is utilized by governments in order to control the production of goods and services (De Vries, 2000; Klosterman, 1985). With housing in mind, centralization of planning powers is often tied to attempts to increase output and minimize the time needed to plan and build new housing projects. The paper introduces these goals of centralization and then investigates whether the Supertanker has achieved them. Israel, with a historically ridged urban planning hierarchy, contends with housing issues with heightened urgency. In dealing with an entrenched housing crisis, Israeli politicians have spurred numerous initiatives to resolve the housing shortage through a variety of means, including increasing the production of housing units all across Israel, building new neighborhoods, and supplying public amenities to serve those neighborhoods.

In this exploratory paper we analyze recent structural and legislative reforms at the national level. The exploratory design is intended to provide insight and familiarity with a topic that has not been fully researched. The analysis of the history and goals of the government in creating the Supertanker relies on evidence concerning the Israeli landuse system and the newly established Supertanker committee. At first, we analyzed newspaper clippings from the years 20102017, TV broadcasts, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data, government reports, State-Comptroller reports, conference proceedings, circulars and guidelines issued by ministerial authorities, transcripts of parliamentary discussions, draft bills, court decisions, and legislation. From the above sources it was possible to elicit the key goals of the government in establishing the Supertanker Committee, to map the measures utilized in this reform, and to review its intended and unintended consequences in the first years of its operation. Following this, we studied the content of plans approved by the Supertanker in 2015-2017. This was carried out using the Planning Administration’s website which archives statutory plans. We identified 32 statutory plans that were passed by the government, and analyzed each of these carefully in line with the short-listed goals and measures identified earlier. The analysis also provides additional statistical data on some of the consequences associated with the Supertanker’s operation. The inspection of Supertanker plans and other documents, in the previous stages, enabled us to shortlist key types of stakeholders that influence, or are influenced by the Supertanker. In order to complement the analysis, we conducted 21 semi-structured interviews (for a full list, see Annex 1). The interviews add rich data on the functioning of the Supertanker, and on the aims of the new reform and its consequences. We interviewed planners, architects, lawyers, environmental activists, and other practitioners who work in, with or against the Supertanker. We interviewed members of the Supertanker, employees of related government ministries, regional planners, local planners dealing with Supertanker initiatives, advisors to the Supertanker, and other informants who filed objections against proposed development (Fig. 1). These interviews were designed to shed light on the Supertanker and the effects of its operation.

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benevolent policy guided by principles of fairness, transparency, just distribution of resources, and democratization in planning (Lloyd and Purves, 2009, p. 80; Larson et al., 2007; Liepa-Zemesa and Hess, 2016; Needham, 2016; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). Decentralization is also frequently justified in the existing scholarship by referring to the failures of centralization in land use planning. In recent decades, centralization policies have been less popular than efforts to decentralize. Centralization’s fame has faded, as states have decreased in their ability to effectively manage development and provide top-down guidance (Rondinelli and Cheema et al., 1983, pp. 10–11). Attention has turned to the local level, which trendy ideas in policy and management suggested would be better able to provide goods and services. Rubbing salt into an institutional wound, central governments are increasingly publicly scrutinized for not sharing their powers (e.g. Tewdwr-Jones 2002, pp.235–236) and for preparing illconceived plans that fail to improve living conditions for their citizens (O’Toole, 2007; Scott, 1998). Given the growing support for local and urban-scale decision-making (Barber, 2013), centralization has become associated with dysfunctional governance, obsolete planning (PintoCorriera et al. 2006; Baker 2013), unconstitutional expropriation of property (Steelman 2000, 581), and even tyranny. Decentrists also suggest that centralization reforms in planning are in fact one step in a greater restructuring process motivated by neoliberal fixation with swifter provision of goods, faster accumulation of wealth, the concentration of power in the hands of the few (Charney 2017) and the reinforcing of existing power relations (Allmedinger and Haughton 2009; Jessop 1997). All of the above putatively support decentralization, not centralization of planning powers.

Each interview lasted 20-60 minutes. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face and taped. Interviewees were identified in three ways: first, we skimmed through meeting summaries of the Supertanker in order to identify planners and other stakeholders that were involved in the plan-making process; second, we browsed government websites to identify possible interviewees; third, we analyzed other documents (e.g. newspapers, and reports), where it was possible to identify additional informants, including local activists, NGO representatives and planners in municipal government wherein Supertanker plans are proposed; fourth, we used snowball technique which led to additional informants. The interviews were semi-structured. Informants were asked about their position with respect to the Supertanker, its goals, the measures used by the government, and the possible consequences of the Supertanker’s activities. Some of the informants were further contacted via email to obtain additional information. Following, I thematically analyzed the interviews and other source of information, according to the Supertanker’s perceived impacts (see Table 1). The institutional changes discussed here occurred in the Israeli planning system in 2014. Since then the Supertanker has produced dozens of plans inclusive of thousands of housing units. The Supertanker’s activity has influenced every strand of local and national government and this is why it can be evaluated. The evaluation is not conducted ex-ante, but reflects an evaluation of an ongoing process. Overall, the triangulation of methods; namely, analysis of policy documents, inspection of ongoing media discussions, legislation, interviews, and statutory plans seeks to generate an overarching view on this policy issue. This method contributes towards a quantifiable and non-quantifiable evaluation of the new reform. The ensuing analysis integrates these data-sources in order to examine the consequences of the Supertanker reform. First, however, we begin by contextualizing the analysis in light of the literature on centralization.

2.1.2. Why centralize? Efforts to centralize decision-making in planning In the past few decades, however, a more critical take on decentralization has appeared in planning scholarship (De Vries, 2000). Critics argue that decentralization itself is primarily motivated by neoliberal ideals which foster privatization and the ‘hollowing out’ of state functions (Allmedinger and Haughton 2009). Others suggest that decentralization leads to fragmented decisions in planning (Firman, 2009; Lubell, 2017). Consequently, several commentators highlight the importance of centralization in certain situations, such as in times of housing crises (Burgess et al., 2010) or when faced with fragmented and unwieldy local governments (Abrams, 1964, p. 73). While aware of the critiques, several attempts to centralize planning powers were made in the past few decades in democratic (Schipper, 2016) and non-democratic countries alike (Tajbakhsh, 2005). Centralized planning in the beginning of the 20th century was primarily influenced by postcolonial adaptations of government institutions (Kingsley, 1996; Rondinelli and Cheema et al., 1983), and by modernist approaches to policy-making, which saw planning as top-down, rational, and comprehensive (Huggins, 2013; Scott, 1998). In the late 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, the shift towards centralization was also influenced by context-specific crises (Needham 2016), broken-down state mechanisms, inner-city malfunction, rapid urbanization, heightening environmental concerns, and the embrace of the agenda of economic growth (Eser and Konstadakopulos, 2000; Sorensen, 2005). Abrams (1964, 73) notes that a centripetal trend is supported “by a belief that centralization saves money, speeds decision making, makes friends, influences votes, streamlines tax collection…” Burgess et al. (2010), in support of centralization, note that top-down intervention by a central government, especially in times of chronic housing shortage, may be a feasible policy option not to be abandoned in light of the failure of local, incremental measures. Attempts to centralize planning are also influenced by central governments' desire to supervise local or regional decisions (Bollens, 1993) and to coordinate development (Tinbergen, 1964). For example, in the year 2000 the Irish government sought to strengthen its role in overseeing local decision-making by introducing a new planning act that reduced the discretionary powers of local planning authorities (Baker

2.1. Centralization in Land-use Planning: Is it in vogue? Public administration and urban governance scholarship provide the basic point of departure for analyzing centralization trends in land use planning. While the literature identifies a global shift towards decentralization in land use planning (Madanipour, 2017), in the past few decades state governments have also embraced centralization policies (Tosics et al., 2010). This includes the decentralization of urban planning powers, responsibilities, and jurisdiction to local players on the one hand, and the centralization of powers, responsibilities, and jurisdiction to national oversight and “fast-track” committees on the other. These seemingly contradictory trends have been the result of many factors discussed in the literature (Parker, 2004, p. 130) some of which relate to the need to effectively produce public goods such as housing. The following literature review begins by describing the powerful trend towards decentralization and then moves on to describe several studies that depict the obverse side- that of centralization in planning. While not intended to be an exhaustive account, the following review points out broad trends in order to better contextualize the Israeli experience. 2.1.1. The dominance of decentralization attempts around the globe Looking at planning scholarship, one can easily discern a tendency to praise decentralization as the epitome of good planning practice. In public administration literature, decentralization is often associated with flexible, adaptive, effective, and innovative decision-making (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, pp. 252–253; Power, 1998, p. 634). Decentralization is also associated with finding local solutions in tune with local needs (United Nations, 2015, p. 75). In the realm of land-use planning, scholars have identified a tremendous global shift over the past few decades towards decentralization of planning powers (Goetz, 1993; Hananel, 2014; Remøy and Street, 2016). Often, decentralization in planning is framed as a 271

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Like the UK, other jurisdictions have put in place centralized landuse planning agencies in order to increase output and expedite planning processes. Alas, there are few global examples, and even fewer studies that investigate the function and apparatus of these highly central, or ‘supertanker’, agencies. In the Israeli context, the first of these Supertanker institutions was the Housing Construction Commission (HCC), which was created to expedite the planning of new neighborhoods in the face of mass immigration from the former USSR to Israel in the 1990s (Feitelson and Shlayn, 1995). Scholarly investigations into these structural changes suggest that centralization in the form of Supertanker-like institutions can cut red tape in times of crises and can shorten the process of planning, therefore reducing the time needed for the compilation of land use plans (Alterman, 2000; Prengler-Rosmarin, 1994; Zilker, 1992). These studies also indicate that centralization through special national planning committees can increase output in the form of added housing units. On the other hand, some evidence suggests that centralized planning agencies have come at a high price, as they tend to reduce avenues for public participation, harm the environment and open spaces, and encourage short-term policies which do not deal strategically with the future (Charney, 2017). Furthermore, in the Israeli context, centralization in land use planning goes hand in hand with government ownership over land and the centralization of land management (Spiegel, 2014). Because the Israeli government is the most prominent landowner in the country (Werczberger and Borukhov, 1999)- and owns at least 93% of landcentralization enables to leverage this invaluable resource to achieve its goals. Thus, centralization in Israel has a multiplier effect because the deciding agency- the government- also manages and controls the major resource for planning- land. Overall, the literature review on centralization in land use planning in Israel and abroad, points to several goals that guide centrists. In the context of housing policy and housing crises these aims include increasing the supply of different types of housing, making homes more affordable, increasing the supply of land for making housing, expediting planning processes, and reducing prices. These issues will be further examined using the Israeli case-example. How do these goals play out in the case of a Supertanker policy? To answer this, we begin by mapping the context of the Israeli reform, its objectives and motivations, and then evaluate it given specific goals set by the government.

2013, 127). Similarly in England, before the Localism Act of 2011, a powerful Thatcherite government sought to centralize planning through the introduction of national guidance and circulars, and the minimization of local decision-making (Allmendinger and Tewdwrjones, 1997, p. 101; Lawless, 1996; Parkinson, 1989). Some of these attempts resulted in the elimination or reduction of regional-tier decision-making. This trend was a mark of a solutionist approach, which gave preference to non-strategic decision making and which launched a massive attack on regional planning as well as on planning as a profession (Hall, 2002, pp. 379–380). One possible outcome of these policy shifts is the decline of spatial planning and the promotion in its place of a business-driven model of planning, which gives preference to quicker decision-making and abandons long-term and coordinated planning approaches. 2.1.3. Can centralization help in time of housing crisis? Centralization, crises, and new Supertanker-like planning agencies Despite the criticism of centralization in planning, several countries have centralized their framework of governance in order to address a variety of planning challenges, including housing and environmental crises. In these cases, centralization was seen as a plausible avenue for dealing with emergencies. Why has centralization been employed in times of housing crisis? This question calls attention to the very nature of crises: in planning theory a crisis is characterized by conflict and uncertainty (Wilkinson, 2011). Uncertainty means that probabilities of certain occurrences are unknown, and thus uncertainty creates unexpected phenomena, behaviors, and unintended consequences such as limited supply or increased demand for public goods (Christensen, 1985; Scott, 2012). Studies in the field of management depict crises as highly precarious situations which cannot be anticipated in advance (Paraskevas, 2006). Risk management, and resilience-based policies cannot always prevent crisis and damage (Desouza and Flanery, 2013), although they may aid in creating new organizational structures (Christensen et al., 2016), processes, and resources that help before or after crises erupt (Malhotra and Venkatesh, 2009). Crises bring havoc to governments and other organizations (Fujita, 2013). In order to address crisis situations, there are governments that focus on short-term steps which fail to address strategic needs (Campbell et al., 2017; Memery, 2001). Other governments fail to see the underlying roots of the crisis and their own missteps (Marcuse, 2010). On the other hand, governments that adapt quickly in order to solve crisis situations can implement long term changes in the planning system (Wilkinson, 2011) that are designed to deliver goods in a manner which mitigates the crisis and reassesses values, goals, and objectives (Alterman, 2002). Management studies relate to crisis as opportunity by noting that crisis situations open up expanded ‘opportunity space’ which involves ‘a relaxation of the normal constraints around decision-making in governmental systems’(Bryson, 1981, p. 181). In the field of housing and planning, anti-crisis measures can spur the establishment of new processes and centralized planning agencies to tackle existing challenges (Sharkansky, 2000). These reforms may be packaged by their creators as saviors of the day and as highly effective and efficient. This is because centralization is supposed to come with increased output, reduction of the time needed for planning, and strengthening of top-down control over resources and decision-making processes (Alterman, 2002). Such efforts to centralize planning can also result in new subjectspecific committees, government departments (Bache et al., 2015, p. 172) and fast-track procedures, such as the now canceled Infrastructure Planning Commission in the UK (Infrastructure Planning Commission, 2009), created in 2008 to ensure the provision of national infrastructure amenities. This state-level commission faced public scrutiny owing to claims that it lacked accountability and was undemocratic (Shipman, 2010).

2.2. Context: A Brief Structural Analysis of the Israeli Land-Use Planning System To better understand the recent processes occurring in the Israeli planning system, we begin by contextualizing its main attributes. Despite having an already highly centralized system, in the past three decades the Israeli government has introduced several national planning agencies to answer emerging housing crises. Although other fiscal and political steps have been taken to battle the crisis, the institutional aspect is of special interest because it presents an overarching attempt to rethink the planning system anew. Home to a population of approximately 8.2 million (The World Bank, 2016), Israel is situated within about 20,000 square kilometers (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). While most OECD countries have decentralized planning systems, Israel is still regarded as having a topdown, hierarchical, and highly centralized system (Silva and Acheampong, 2015). The central government has traditionally been involved in overseeing local-level planning decisions through the creation of binding national and regional land-use plans (Alterman, 2001). In fact, from the founding of the state in 1948, Israeli decisionmakers have stressed top-down planning (Feitelson, 2012; Rachewsky, 2010), and limited autonomy was granted to localities to plan for themselves. Literal “nation building” set the course for Israel’s strict 272

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spread among government officials, who were desperate to solve the problem (Fig. 3). Notably, there have been several measures employed to tackle the emerging housing crisis, including tax subsidies, national strategic plans for housing, a newly created Housing Cabinet and ‘umbrella agreements’ (Heskemey Gag) signed by both central and local governments which were intended to direct government coffers towards localities in order to finance infrastructure projects. These measures suggest that crisis in the 21st century does not confine itself to one dimension (Boin, 2004) and must therefore be tackled on all fronts. For the purposes of this paper, however, we focus on one of the most controversial (and perhaps influential) reforms adopted by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s right-wing government to address the housing crisis- the Supertanker. The new structural reform was not designed per se to lower housing prices, as this was not one of the goals set by the government. Having witnessed a 10-year increase in housing prices, politicians seemed cautious and unwilling to make promises the new reform would not be able to deliver. Instead, an integrative review of the law which formed the Supertanker, government reports, protocols and media coverage, and the interviews we conducted suggest that the Supertanker reform had two primary goals (Table 1): first, to increase the supply of housing units at market rate, and second – to secure a share of affordable housing (small apartments and rental apartments). Section 1 of the NCPHP law states that these goals are of primary concern and that they are to be obtained by expediting planning processes. In addition, parliamentary discussions preceding the reform, frequently referred to the Supertanker as a supply-side policy tool (The Government of Israel, 2014; The Parliament of Israel, 2015). This implies that in the Israeli context, centralization was seen as a vehicle to increase the supply of goods in order to tackle an emerging crisis. This motivation is well-documented in other centripetal government reforms recognized by previous studies (Alterman 2002; Goetz, 1993). The goals of the Supertanker reform (Table 1) were advanced in several ways: first by setting mandatory quotas for affordable housing in each plan; second, by considerably strengthening the power of central government ministries to make decisions pertaining to housing; third, by creating avenues to shorten the time needed for the production of housing units; and fourth, by increasing the supply of land for diverse types of housing. An integrative examination of the discussions that followed the Supertanker reform, and the analysis of Supertanker-approved plans, point to several consequences of the reform (Table 1). The discussion part of this paper examines these consequences in more detail.

urban planning hierarchy, a mindset that strengthened a national approach to planning and delimited local discretion (Razin, 2015). Israeli planning adopted a “command and control” approach, including binding rules, regulations, and maps based primarily on statutory measures (Alfasi, 2009, p. 86; Alterman, 2001, p. 32). The 1965 Planning and Building Law created a statutory system of land-use plans (Razin, 2010) with three tiers of government (Hershcowitz, 2009, pp. 33–34): national, regional, and local decision making. At the national level, the law created a National Planning Board, charged with national structural planning. In 2005, the National Planning Board compiled a new plan; the ‘National Outline Plan Number 35,’ (NOP 35) which defined areas for rural development, urban consolidation, and protected open spaces such as agricultural land, forests, and nature reserves. Since its approval, National Plan No. 35 has been the principle cornerstone of national planning, setting the course for the development of Israel in the 21st century. Lower-level plans cannot trump national-level plans (in particular NOP 35), nor can they overwrite parts thereof. At the regional level, the planning system is comprised of six District Planning Commissions (DPCs) entrusted with significant powers to make regional and local plans. DPCs can plan new neighborhoods and rejuvenate existing ones. They also guide and scrutinize lower-tier local planning authorities. Gradually however, DPCs have become overburdened with local plans (Ben-Alia, 1995, p. 14), some of which include oversight of minor changes to existing buildings (such as minor exterior alterations or changes in setbacks). DPCs were also considered as overly bureaucratic, slow, and inefficient in producing a significant mass of housing units (Israeli Channel 10, 2016a; Meyrovsky, 2016). This backlog in local plan-making, has led to a massive shortage in housing, and was considered to be the primary symptom of a dysfunctional planning system. The failure of DPCs to rapidly compile new plan, rising housing prices, and the perceived failure to tackle the emerging crisis have resulted in the formation of fast-track committees to replace existing spatial planning. The creation of centralized planning agencies was framed as an attempt to cut red tape through force by housing key decision makers and stakeholders under one roof in order to push through top-priority goals. Projects that would otherwise wallow in the cobwebs of local or regional agencies were given priority. Dissatisfaction eventually led to the establishment of the Supertanker planning agency. Fig. 1 depicts the hierarchical Israeli planning system and notes how the new Supertanker reform relates to this existing system. The interaction between the new Supertanker and the old planning system will be analyzed further in the ensuing sections.

4. Discussion: Analysis of Consequences 3. The Housing Crisis and its Impact on Centralization in Israel: The Emerging Supertanker Model, its Main Goals and Effects

The analysis of the Supertanker reform is structured around the consequences identified by our informants as well as those elicited from secondary sources of data. We chose to divide these into two main groups: positive and negative effects. At the outset it should be stressed that the categorization is not meant to imply a dichotomous set of ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ consequence, but rather to indicate major consequences that are often perceived as such, given the goals of the government in setting up the NCPHP law. Where appropriate we indicated that there are different perspectives on certain ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ consequences. We begin first by discussing the positive consequences of the Supertanker reform.

The latest version of the Israeli Supertanker committees, the NCPHP, was created with the intention of battling the emerging housing crisis. High demand and low supply, in addition to decreasing interest rates, have been major driving forces behind jacked up housing prices (International Monetary Fund, 2014). This has resulted in a significant shortage of housing units in general and affordable housing in particular (Hananel, 2013; Schipper, 2016, 2015). As of 2007, housing prices have soared dramatically, causing widespread frustration (Schipper, 2016). Low levels of housing completions (Fig. 2) and a growing population (the highest growth rate in the OECD) led to a sharp increase in housing and rental prices (Fig. 2). In fact, from 2002-2012 average salary payments rose by 25%, while the average price of a three bedroom apartment rose by 69%. At the same time, from 2000-2014 the government cut the budget of its Ministry of Housing by almost 70%. These factors, among others, led to a chronic under-supply of housing. In 2011 citizens took the streets in one of the largest episodes of social unrest known in Israel in the past few decades (Marom, 2013). It was not long before a sense of urgency

4.1. Creating a central ‘one-stop-shop’ for planning by ministerial representatives When creating the Supertanker, politicians intended to forge a more aggressive solution for the lingering housing crisis (Chudy and Weissman, 2013). The draft bill and the transcripts of parliamentary meetings leading to the enactment of the 2014 NCPHP law also make clear the underlying intentions of the legislature: to pave an avenue for 273

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Fig. 2. Illustrative schematic of planning hierarchy in Israel.

Fig. 3. Housing Crisis data, noting housing units completed (left) and nominal home prices in Israel (right). Source: Adapted from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 1 An overview of primary goals, measures and consequences of the Supertanker reform. Key Goals and Measures of the Supertanker reforms

Major Consequences

Goals of centralization

Positive

To increase the supply of housing. To secure a share of affordable housing.

Measures for centralization

quotas for the provision of affordable a ‘one-stop-shop’ for • Setting • Creating housing in each plan. planning by ministerial representatives. the power of central government • Increasing ministries to make plans. Replacing the older plan-making • process with a more focused red-tape: shortening the time needed to • Cutting procedure controlled by central plan new housing units, by: (1) circumventing

•

regional and national planning; and by (2) creating fast-lane routes for plan-approval. Increasing the supply of land for diverse types of housing.

government.

planning processes • Streamlining thereby shortening the time needed to approve statutory plans.

production of new • Increased housing units including affordable housing.

de-freezing, and marketing • Selling, government land. local planning agencies to • Helping ‘get things done’ despite the ‘shackles’ of regional planning.

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Negative a bypass over strategic goals and • Creating policies while overlooking long-term impacts.

• • • • •

Circumventing local, regional, and national planning agencies. Leapfrogging over formerly approved municipal, regional and national plans and policies. Quality issues: Creating new neighborhoods without sufficient infrastructure or the ability to sustain new urban extension. Neglecting urban centers- not encouraging urban renewal. Building on agricultural land, forests, and in other environmentally sensitive areas. Approving plans in Israel’s peripheral areas, where demand is lower. Approving housing ‘on-paper’ without issuing planning permits.

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Table 2 Membership in the Supertanker and the National Planning Board; Author’s Comparison Representatives

Members of the Supertanker

Members of the National Planning Board

Representatives (rep.) of Central Government ministries.

1. Head: rep. of the Minister of Finance.

15. Representatives of different government ministries (the law does not specify which ministries).

Local Government NGOs, civic society and other reps.

2. Another rep. of the Ministry of Finance. 3. Rep. of the Prime Minister’s Office. 4. Ministry of Housing rep. 5. Ministry of the Environment rep. 6. Ministry of Transportation rep. 7. Ministry of Agriculture rep. 8. Ministry of Justice rep. 9. Ministry of Defense rep. 10. Ministry of the Interior rep. 11. Israel’s Land Authority rep. 12. A planner appointed by the Minister of Finance. 13-16. Four representatives of local governments (one of which is the mayor of the township being planned). 17. Environmental NGOs rep. 18. Professional rep. of welfare organizations.

16-27 11 additional Representatives of different municipalities and other local governments from across the country. 28. Environmental NGOs rep. 29. Professional rep. of welfare organizations. 30. Academic institutions rep. 31. Young generation rep. 32. Women’s NGOs rep. 33. A sociologist. 34. Expert Architect. 35. Expert Housing and Construction specialist. 35. Head of Public Parks and Natural Reserves Authority. 36. Rep. of the agricultural sector (Kibbutzim and Moshavim).

Share of Central Government members

efficient plan-making, cut red tape, expedite development, and create a powerful planning entity that would save time, and answer directly to the government and its Housing Cabinet (Government of Israel, 2014; Israeli Parliament, 2014). In order to achieve these goals, the new law defined the planning powers and composition of the Supertanker. A closer look at the law suggests that it was built to sustain local or regional opposition by becoming the long arm of the government (Table 2). The Supertanker is made up of 12 members appointed by different government ministries, four local government representatives, and two additional public representatives (civil society groups and NGOs) (Table 1). Each of these representatives has one vote, thus ensuring that central government always has the upper hand and the majority of votes. A comparison with the older (and still active) National Planning Board demonstrates the vast differences in terms of membership: while both planning agencies are highly centralized the Supertanker is less democratic, and has less representation for NGOs, localities, experts, and wider public interests (Zur, 2014). One of our interviewees, a fierce critic of the Supertanker, explained: “By far, the Supertanker is the worst planning agency I have encountered; vested with powers to circumvent other planning agencies; it bypasses planning itself…and it is not headed by a planner but rather by someone from the Ministry of Finance.” (Interview 8.1.2017). In other words, the composition of the Supertanker was designed to ensure that civil society groups or localities do not stand in the way of the approval of new neighborhoods. This model of hyper-centralization concentrates new powers in the hands of central government and reshapes the delicate balance between local, regional, and national planning agents (Table 3).

Table 3 A detailed analysis of the Supertanker: its powers, plan-approval processes, and committee organization. Key Characteristics of the Supertanker Committee for Housing Preferred Plans (NCPHP-Vatmal) Majority of central government representatives. Size of plans Type of plans Can plan on agricultural land? Can trump regional plans? Can trump national plans? Is there a statutory provision enabling the Committee to trump the general National Outline Plan No. 35? (NOP 35) Procedures: Is there a special mechanism for compensating farmers for the taking of agricultural land? Procedures: Is there a legally binding time frame for the approval of a housing plan? Procedures: Is there a deadline for beginning implementation (issuing building permits)? Is it possible to issue planning permits based on the plan?

need to increase output while fast-tracking development (Planning Administration, 2016; State Comptroller, 2015). The Supertanker is a non-exclusive track, which means that the government created a parallel rout for expedited planning; in addition to the older and slower procedures, planning powers are also vested in the hands of the Supertanker. The highly centralized composition of the Supertanker was coupled with immense planning powers (see Table 2); the Supertanker can now approve plans that circumvent other plans. It has the ability to rezone areas previously zoned by regional spatial plans or even national plans. Previously approved National plans can be ignored, and spatial planning can be undone easily, as long as the Housing Cabinet or the government decides there exists a need for a new neighborhood. The new Supertanker was designed to review large-scale planning projects that included at least 750 housing units (or 200 units in Arab towns). In addition, the legislation set a groundbreaking section

4.2. Replacing the older plan-making process with a more focused planning procedure controlled by central government The Supertanker’s powers include quicker and faster approval procedures for large projects, and the power to circumvent former national and regional plans. All of these features were incorporated due to the 275

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creation of 25,316 housing units. Except supertanker-approved housing units, most of the remaining stock was approved by regional planning committees. Additional 30,835 units were produced in the following year (equaling about 42% of the overall production of units by statutory plans in 2016). In 2017, this number grew to 40,874 apartments approved by the Supertanker (Fig. 6) These figures suggest that within its first three years of operation the Supertanker significantly affected housing production in Israel and superseded the ‘older’ routes of plan-preparation (namely regional planning). As one interviewee told us: “if the target was to approve new housing, this goal was certainly obtained…” (interview 29.8.2017). Moreover, even the fiercest of critics find some merit in the Supertanker’s planning capacity for housing units in Israeli-Arab townships. Several of our interviewees noted that in Arab townships, where planning was delayed for decades owing to politics and understaffed planning committees, the Supertanker has brought change. The harshest of critics we interviewed noted that ‘[t]he Supertanker is the main planning agency that plans a large amount of housing units in Arab townships and this is why minority groups are not against it. This is perhaps the only positive aspect in its operation.’ (interview 8.1.2017). Having said that, a close examination of the data shows that a relatively low number- 8% of housing units – were produced by the Supertanker in predominantly minority townships, which is less than the share of minorities in the entire population (about 21%).

delineating a specific percentage (30%) of affordable housing units that were to be included in new projects. In addition, the new Supertanker was equipped with ancillary tools, such as the ability to plan on agricultural land and other open spaces (Dromy and Gilboa, 2016). In fact, the law includes a mechanism that allows for fast compensation for the taking of farmland by the Supertanker. These mechanisms therefore enable fast urbanization on agricultural land, as well as handing down state-owned agricultural land to private developers. Furthermore, and as an exception to the generally hierarchical Israeli planning system, the Supertanker was empowered to make detailed plans that are ready-made for development on the ground. In other words, the Supertanker itself can now issue planning permits pertaining to plans approved by it. This also meant that the approval of new developments did not have to go through local authorities, nor did it have to gain the approval of mayors (Levi, 2015). 4.3. Streamlining planning processes thereby shortening the time needed to approve statutory plans The process of planning by the Supertanker was also sped-up; the legislature defined shorter time-frames for plan preparation and approval in an attempt to increase output and housing production (BenDavid and Zanzouri, 2015). In addition, the NCPHP law determined fixed periods to begin implementation of the new plans (48 months). Indeed, using Israel’s Planning Administration webpage we examined plan-approval processes, and found that on average Supertanker plans were approved three times faster than those produced by Regional Planning Commissions (Fig. 4).

4.5. Supply of affordable housing on government-owned land In addition, and in line with statutory provisions in the NCPHP law, in 2015-2017 the Supertanker authorized 18,740 affordable housing units, which were mostly smaller apartments (equivalent to the size of 2 bedroom apartments). Overall, 29% of housing units approved in 20152017 were defined as ‘small’ apartments, whereas 68% of housing units were much bigger, and – as a consequence- less affordable. An additional number of 3625 housing units (3%) were intended for special needs populations such as the elderly and people with disabilities. Overall, the data suggests that the total number of affordable units approved by the Supertanker resembles the government’s target, which is 30% of the pool of Supertanker-approved units. Critics, however, argue that this share is not entirely affordable because smaller housing units do not necessarily ensure that they will be rented out or sold at an affordable price to low and middle income families. In this regards, while the government had excused itself with ‘marketing’ considerations, critics argued that unaffordability was the result of government’s aspirations to maximize profit gained from government-owned land (Israeli Channel 10, 2016b; Schipper, 2016). Despite said critiques about affordable housing targets, some experts consider the introduction of mandatory affordable housing measures to be a considerable achievement of the Supertanker (interview 29.12.2016).

4.4. Increased production of new housing units including affordable housing Our analysis of Supertanker plans, compared with the “normal” (old) track for housing plans (those approved by regional planning commissions) illustrates that overall, the Supertanker approved 97,025 housing units in 2015-2017 compared with approximately 180,581 units which were approved by regional planning agencies (Fig. 5). Thus about 53% of housing were planned in the new Supertanker track. By the end of 2015, this expedited route gave birth to detailed plans for the

4.6. Selling, de-freezing, and marketing government land In addition to increasing the amount of available housing units (including affordable housing) the evidence points to another possible advantage of the Supertanker reform; namely, the fact that it is coupled with changing government attitudes with respect to the vast amount of land it owns. Instead of holding on to that land, and keeping it out of the hands of the market, Supertanker plans are based on a ‘de-freezing’ of government-held land, which is later marketed to private developers. In turn, the government tosses these large tracts of land back to the market. These new parcels of government-owned land enables the Supertanker to achieve distributional goals for those who are landless (interview 29.12.2016). In fact, the analysis of statutory plans approved by the Supertanker indicates that it prepared 35 plans for new residential neighborhoods in over 20 townships (Fig. 7). These plans cover land area of about 33

Fig. 4. Time needed for the approval of statutory plans (months, average).

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Fig. 5. Summary of approved housing units, by year (source: author’s analysis of Statutory Plans and data from Israel’s Planning Administration webpage).

Fig. 6. A breakdown of housing types, as approved by the Supertanker in 2015-2017 (source: author).

excellent solution for local planners whose plans cannot be approved at the regional level (interview 10.1.2017). Another city planner considered the Supertanker a savior against rigid district-level planning (interview 28.12.2016). This is attributed to the fact that while regional planners are bound by National Outline Plans, the Supertanker is not, and while regional planners have their own vision of the region based on district plans, the Supertanker is not bound by these plans. Likewise, even those criticizing the Supertanker realize that it employs “young urban planners with a different and fresh perspective” (interview 11.1.2017) who help in getting things done and empower local planning authorities. Obviously, the local embrace of the Supertanker is not shared by every city administration. There are localities appalled by their inability to prevent planning in their jurisdiction by the Supertanker. Several mayors criticize the Supertanker’s imposition of new development contrary to local master plans (Sasson, 2015). Other local planners warned that the Supertanker has the power to “trample planning” altogether (Bosso, 2017a). Overall, the data shows that the NCPHP paved the road for the creation of new neighborhoods of thousands of new apartments. Court challenges were often unsuccessful, as the Administrative and Supreme Courts backed most of the plans created by the Supertanker, even when it was argued that the Committee did not fulfill the requirement for new

square kilometers- equal in size to a medium size city. Some experts argue that these distributional benefits are meant to enrich the government by selling land to developers, who then build high-density neighborhoods (interview 28.6.2017). This is a form of expedited privatization of government-owned land (Charney, 2017). Thus, to use a metaphor, the government controls the machinery (the Supertanker), the factory (the planning system), and the ‘raw materials’ (land) for production. In turn, it sells raw materials to outside contractors, enriching them in an attempt to increase production. Given that the Israeli government owns about 93% of land in Israel, it seems that the Supertanker mechanism amplifies the government powers and its influence on the market. Although increased allocation of government land for new neighborhoods may be perceived as harmful and in the service of developers, it can nevertheless be regarded as an attempt to unsaddle a planning system which has been overburdened with conditional permits and slow-paced development. 4.7. Helping local planning agencies to ‘get things done’ despite the ‘shackles’ of regional planning Several city planners stress the importance of the Supertanker and its good cooperation with planners at the local level (interview 27.2.2017). One of these planners noted that the Supertanker is an 277

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Fig. 7. Map of key cities included in Supertanker plans (source: author & Amir Dominitz).

perspective (Bosso, 2017b). Accordingly, stakeholders suggest that the Supertanker neglects long-term infrastructure and amenity provision (interview 27.7.2017). Indeed, a senior government official told the press: “as far as I’m concerned, those who buy new apartments should bring sleeping bags to work. I don’t care. I will not wait for roads in order to build flats” (Bosso, 2016a). This idea marks the government’s approach to city planning following the housing crisis: planning is the problem, not the solution. The rapid creation of apartments, and not the quality of neighborhoods appears to be the primary concern of decisionmakers. Regional planning, which coordinates the supply of apartments with the planning of infrastructure, is increasingly perceived as an obstacle. The experts we interviewed shed light on this approach. One interviewee noted that “the Supertanker does not relate to ‘the day after

developments to be comprised of 30% affordable housing units. However, three years into its operation, the cracks in the Supertanker were already showing. Critics began launching a massive attack against the Supertanker (Houdi, 2014), arguing that it does not plan well, especially for needs besides housing.

4.8. Creating a bypass over strategic goals and policies while overlooking long-term impacts With respect to long-term planning, some who lambast the nonstrategic planning approach adopted by the Supertanker maintain that the Supertanker sacrifices grander strategic goals in order to achieve an increase in housing supply. It is argued that the Supertanker carries out spot planning of neighborhoods but fails to obtain a long-term 278

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4.10. Quality issues: creating massive new neighborhoods without sufficient infrastructure or the ability to sustain new urban extensions

planning’…it considers primarily the excel sheet; in other words how many apartments are approved in its plans, but I fear that it does not look at what envelops these apartments; the public infrastructure, such as schools, open spaces and the type of buildings” (interview 10.1.2017). According to this criticism, central planning by the Supertanker imposes thousands of housing units (and prospective residents) on municipalities that can neither manage them, nor afford to provide decent services. Although this view comes up again and again, a more nuanced analysis shows that the picture is not black and white. One planner working for the Supertanker, argues that the committee does think strategically by monitoring these plans: ‘We do not forget that the plans need to be implemented and thus we continue to monitor plans after they are passed” (interview 23.7.2017).

Critics did not focus on the Supertanker’s efficiency alone, but also but on its ability to produce thousands of units in one stroke without looking at the actual functioning and quality of these new neighborhoods (Moran, 2017). In particular, some of the informant stressed the ‘quantity vs. quality’ conundrum: while increasing output, the new stock of housing was considered as low-quality and disconnected from the older parts of the city (interview 9.8.2017). One interviewee told us that “it’s not only about ‘flooding’ the market with new flats, but what kind of planning we would like to pursue” (interview 11.1.2017). According to the experts we interviewed, this type of ‘grand planning’ by a single planning agency, downplays or delays planning for needs other than housing, such as transportation connectivity, or employment. Expressing these concerns, one interviewee stated that: “The Supertanker approves big plans, including thousands of apartments. It approves very detailed plans for a specific neighborhood, but while doing so the Supertanker does not see the whole picture….for example in the city of Ashkelon the Supertanker plans to double the size of the city, without a long term vision, without understanding how the city will function; where will its center be? How will its transportation infrastructure be organized? How will people get in and out of town? And even if there is a designated train station, no one is enforcing it as a preliminary condition for building these neighborhoods…the main conditions in these plans relate to roads, but no one is planning for public transportation…they plan ‘housing containers’ for people to live in, but without thinking about space, the natural environment, or urban regeneration in the city.” (8.1.2017). As a result, it is possible to identify civic unrest in the form of both local protests, and anti-Supertanker initiatives promoted by city administrations and city dwellers (Danielly, 2017). Our interviewees explained this unrest by arguing that the newly proposed neighborhoods have been planned too fast, without meaningful public participation, while downplaying the needs and aspirations of some local stakeholders (interview 9.8.2017). Notably, this view was not shared by all informants, as some indicated that the Supertanker managed to solve long-term undersupply of housing units in localities which had traditionally faced insurmountable development challenges and lack of cooperation by government ministries and DPCs (interview 28.12.2016). Moreover, some argued that new neighborhoods planned under the aegis of the Supertanker had some characteristics of well-planned neighborhoods including mixed-use development and walkable streets (Planners Association, 2017).

4.9. Circumventing municipal, regional, and national planning Other commentators focus on the structural changes to the existing Israeli planning system. The new planning committee remodeled the entire planning hierarchy in Israel (Ben-David and Zanzouri, 2015). In creating the Supertanker the Netanyahu government circumvented the hierarchical planning system that had been built up since 1965. The main motivation behind the reform was the view that traditional spatial mechanisms of planning had distorted and inhibited economic forces, created market failures, and did not allow the provision of strategic goods and services. Like in other countries around the globe, the Israeli government targeted spatial planning. The pre-existing planning hierarchy was especially objectionable, and thus came under a direct attack. The consequences of these expedited processes have been the weakening of planning and regional planning in particular. Some argued that the Supertanker disenfranchised national and regional planners and especially regional planning committees (DPCs). The latter were perceived as old-fashioned institutions, incapable of rapid planning. A regional planner we interviewed frankly lamented the loss of power when she explained that “The government sought to empty the middle-tier of planning, the regional. We have had a planning hierarchy, but now everything is top-down, and the planning decisions are directly taken by the government” (interview 24.5.2017). Defending the professionalism of the regional planning committees, the same interviewee noted that the vision of regional planners is much more holistic: ‘we look at the carrying capacity of a planned area, at the infrastructure- things that the NCPHP does not care about.’ Notably, the new Supertanker could simply write off national outline plans and ignore previously approved regional and municipal plans. In line with these new abilities of the Supertanker, certain experts voiced their concerns about planning as a process, and the Supertanker as a marker of a much larger problem- a disbelief in planning and planners. These experts were concerned that the Supertanker attempts to address the symptoms of the housing crisis without taking into account that housing is complex. Talking about the view of planners, one interviewee notes: We prefer planning agencies that work in tune with the rhythm of planning. We are a ‘slow’ profession, there is nothing to be done here, and this is how decisions should be made. But then comes public pressure and this is the abysmal result. If the Supertanker is gone, we will get another super-committee…. [Instead] planning begins and ends in thinking comprehensively about matters, and from there it is possible to plan in small doses. We should not try to fend off problems by sticking our finger in the floodgate, because the gate is much more complex than the finger. (interview 1.1.2017). Planning experts, however, also made some frank confessions. One interviewee, a regional planner, criticized the Supertanker, yet also pointed out that the existing regional planning agencies were too slow, and thus sealed their own fate (interview 24.5.2017). The same interviewee noted that ‘many of the critiques are personal, because planners are angry that the government took their power, but the NCPHP makes an effort to hire good planners and they offer some good solutions.’

4.11. Neglecting urban centers- not encouraging urban renewal In line with the abovementioned critiques, some planners also argued that the Supertanker gave preference to ‘tabula-rasa’ planning, rather than urban renewal and the socio-economic strengthening of existing townships (Bosso, 2016a; interview 9.8.2017; interview 24.5.2017). In fact, a breakdown of plans approved by the Supertanker shows that all of them were approved as extensions to existing townships. Thus, Supertanker plans have not sought to rejuvenate existing neighborhoods, but rather to expand cities and towns outwards. On average, supertanker plans cover 7.9% of municipal land area, compared with the total area included within the municipal boundary of the respective townships. Some supertanker plans cover up to 18%-28% of land area, compared with the existing size of the township (Fig. 8). These figures suggest that although the Supertanker is able to produce plans in existing built fabric, and in city centers, it does not do so. Our informants suggest that this is no coincidence since urban renewal plans are usually more complex and time consuming (interview 28.6.2017) (Figs. 9 and 10). 279

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Fig. 8. Total area coverage of select Supertanker plans (%), compared with land-area of the respective township (source: author).

4.12. Building on agricultural land, forests, and in other environmentally sensitive areas

4.13. Supertanker plans were approved in Israel’s peripheral areas, where demand is lower

From an environmental perspective, the new Supertanker is perceived as even more destructive than its predecessors (Gazit, 2016; Israeli Parliament, 2014). The prevalent argument is that the committee is inclined to plan on green-fields, sacrificing natural resources on the altar of efficiency. Existing reports suggest that 60% of land area, included in Supertanker plans, is designated as agricultural land (Amoyal and Tirosh, 2017). This was confirmed by several interviewees (interview 8.8.2017; interview 29.8.2017) who argue that the loss of agricultural land, especially in fertile areas in Israel’s north and center, might result in increased dependency on food imports, and eventually lead to costly food production in Israel’s arid desert (interview 8.8.2017). Another interviewee, a member of an environmental NGO, notes cases where the Supertanker planned on existing forests and open spaces, and also on areas subject to contamination and pollution. The critique runs even deeper as the environmental consultants who work for the Supertanker are lampooned as ‘biased’ (interview 8.1.2017).

While the supertanker was designed to increase the supply of housing, critics argue that newly approved housing were situated mostly in areas where demand is lower, such as the Negev desert in the South of Israel (Levy, 2017). According to this critique, the Supertanker’s focus on vacant land, not only led to under-supply of housing in urban city-centers, but also resulted in fewer housing units approved in high demand areas such as the Tel Aviv’s metropolitan area. An analysis of Supertanker plans illustrates this further (figures 9 and 10); most Supertanker plans were approved in the Northern or Southern districts of Israel and most units were created in the Southern district. Nevertheless, the data also suggests that the critique is misguided in part, because the Supertanker managed to approve a relatively large share (21%) of housing units in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, where demand for apartments is high. 4.14. Housing units were approved ‘on-paper’; no planning permits issued Although experts we interviewed agreed on one hand that the Supertanker managed to expedite the production of housing units while

Fig. 9. A breakdown of Supertanker housing plans, arranged by year and location (source: author).

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Fig. 10. A breakdown of approved housing units (2015-2017), arranged by district (source: author).

reform. Indeed, three years after the enactment of the NCPHP law in 2014, housing prices did not fall and the government was not able to stop a ten-year increase in housing prices. Instead, the Supertanker’s major concern was to extend supply in an attempt to address the crisis. However, the Supertanker’s alleged success was only partial because the large’ pool’ of dwellings it created remained on paper 3 years after the reform. Moreover, the analysis points to some significant side-effects, which are frequently scrutinized by local and regional planners as well as activists, and civil society groups. The criticisms by these groups suggest that centralization came with the steep price-tag of environmental degradation, the rise of social unrest, and the reorientation and destabilization of the pre-existing planning system. More broadly, the evidence illustrates that critiques voiced in the literature against centralization in land-use planning are also apt in the case of the Supertanker model: specifically, the undemocratic modus operandi of centralization, its top-down approach irrespective of local wishes and needs, and its failure to provide effective instruments for development (Rondinelli and Cheema et al., 1983; Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). The data on the extent of urban expansion, included in Supertanker plans, also corroborate the previous critique which views centralization as an attempt to transfer government-owned land to developers in order to gain political capital (Charney, 2017). Nevertheless, the abovementioned issues do not necessarily lead to an outright conclusion that decentralization could have faired better in answering the growing need for housing. Moreover, the perceived negative consequences of the Supertanker reform, do not lead to the conclusion that centralization is illegitimate in times of crisis. Instead, it is possible to acknowledge its potential alongside its pitfalls. In line with this nuanced approach, the analysis reveals that the bad publicity for centralization may be exaggerated. Experts point to several advantages in the operation of the Supertanker. The evidence suggests that the centralization reform in Israel follows much of what is known in the literature, in that it shortens the time needed to plan. In addition, the Supertanker’s ability to avoid rigid planning procedures, and its ability to present a viable alternative to planning by regional planning bodies mesh well with previous studies that show how centralization in land-use planning may revamp planning hierarchies, increase the supply of goods, and create new opportunities to rethink existing policies and processes (Bache et al. 2015; Alterman 2002). Interestingly, while previous studies look at centralization as an instrument which enables central agencies to supervise and coordinate local and regional policies, the Israeli experience demonstrates an interesting model in which centralization was used to circumvent national, regional and local decision-making altogether. Overall, the analysis of both positive and negative consequences of centralization suggests that a more nuanced understanding of the reform is needed -one which recognizes

shaking up the system, they argued, on the other hand, that most of these units are produced only on paper, and remain unbuilt (interview 29.8.2017; Houdi, 2014). Correspondence with the NCPHP verified that as of November 2017, not a single housing unit in Supertanker-approved plans, has been completed. The government, however, has begun marketing those units for developers in several government tenders (NCPHP Office, 2017). In line with this process, economists have argued that the mere existence of a potential stock of new apartments (albeit on paper) signals that the government means business, therefore sending a clear message to the market, that prices cannot go up as they did before (Bosso, 2017b). However, given the absence of any brick and mortar results, the evidence suggests that the Supertanker’s efficiency is somewhat limited because it would take years to issue planning permits and secure sufficient infrastructure in line with the new plans being approved. Some of our interviewees estimate that the Supertanker will face many hurdles before its plans are actualized (interview 4.7.2017; interview 28.6.2017). These hurdles are due to administrative and environmental barriers such as land contamination, court challenges, and other financial constraints that would render some of the plans obsolete before their implementation. The presence of these obstacles therefore suggests that the time-frame envisioned by the legislature to begin implementation (48 months) might prove to be unrealistic.

5. Conclusion: Has the Supertanker fulfilled its role? The analysis of recent policy changes in Israel demonstrates a special moment where central government has experimented with centralization. Countries that are dealing with lingering housing crises, and jurisdictions that consider centralization of planning powers, may gain interesting insights while the Israeli experiment unfolds. This experiment marks massive changes in the planning process, where faster, more streamlined planning apparatuses replace process-driven planning. Specifically, the Liberal-Right government, in line with its hostile attitude towards the older hierarchical land-use system, has carved out a new national planning arrangement motivated by the housing crisis, and by the government’s urge to quash the rage of renters unable to afford a home (Ben Zaken, 2014). The analysis of the Supertanker reform points out to a set of positive and negative consequences. However, looking back at the two major goals set by the government, it is possible to assert that the centralization reform was somewhat successful in achieving its primary goals: first, it was able to increase the future supply of housing and second, to create the foundations for the supply of a large share of more affordable apartments in the future. Notably, lowering housing prices was not a primary goal of the new 281

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the merits of centralization in the context of crisis, and the need to think out of the planning toolbox. In this new experiment, the entire planning system is being remodeled to include faster, although less democratic planning initiatives which circumvent plans that have been formerly enacted. With the old rules being junked, the Supertanker can also be perceived as a novel initiative to correct past failure. As with most planning policies, it remains in question whether advantages outweigh the disadvantages. As the Supertanker-experiment is still underway, it is possible that it will prove to be a solution to the housing crisis. On the other hand, the experiment may well prove to be disastrous, unsustainable, and destructive to the cities Israelis live in and their environs. The production of ‘apartments on paper’ may prove to be a false attempt to quiet the masses. Either way, the stakes are high and the long-term impacts are yet to be revealed. Despite these uncertainties, the evaluation of the Supertanker opens the hatch for researchers around the world to inform others of similar efforts and their consequences. These studies, in turn, can contribute immensely to the understanding of centralization and its impact on the supply of public goods and services.

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List of Interviews 1. Interview with a senior city planner, working in the City of Ashdod (28.12.2016). 2. Interview with an advisor to the Supertanker (28.12.2016). 3. Interview with a regional planner in the North District Planning Committee (29.12.2016). 4. Interview with an expert planner, a managing partner in a planning consultancy company (1.1.2017). 5. Interview with a member of the Supertanker, representing environmental NGOs (8.1.2017). 6. Interview with a planner working for a local planning authority in Northern Israel (10.1.2017). 7. Interview with a planner, working in Sikkuy NGO -The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality (10.1.2017). 8. Interview with a planner working in the City of Nahariya (27.2.2017). 9. Interview with a senior (retired) regional planner in Tel Aviv’s District Planning Committee (24.5.2017). 10. Interview with a senior regional planner in Tel Aviv’s District Planning Committee (24.5.2017). 11. Interview with a planner, expert in strategic planning, and partner in a planning consultancy (5.6.2017). 12. Interview with a member of The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (28.6.2017). 13. Interview with a senior city planner, working in the City of Hadera (4.7.2017). 14. Interview with a senior planner working in the Supertanker (23.7.2017). 15. Interview with a legal advisor of the Kibbutzim Movement (27.7.2017). 16. Interview with a planner working for the Center of the Regional (Rural) Municipalities (27.7.2017). 17. Interview with environmental activist who filed several objections to the Supertanker (30.7.2017). 18. Interview with a senior regional planner in Central District Planning Committee (8.8.2017). 19. Interview with a lawyer, representing owners objecting to the Supertanker’s plans (6.8.2017). 20. Interview with a lawyer, working with local activists in Jerusalem (9.8.2017). 21. Interview with an environmental activist from Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (29.8.2017). Nir Mualam is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Architecture & Town Planning at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. His main research interests include historic preservation, urban policy, regulatory aspects of planning, and planning processes.

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