j0umull~ Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 227-255
ELSEVIER
Politeness in conflict management: A conversation analysis of dispreferred message from a cognitive perspective * Takuo Hayashi* Ryukoku University, 67 Tsukamotocho, Fukakusa, Kyoto 612, Japan Received December 1993; revised version August 1994
Abstract The present study discusses strategies of conflict management from a cognitive perspective and attempts to explicate redressive mechanisms involved in conversation. On the basis of the premise that the speaker's intention may be conveyed by sequences of acts as outputs of plans, a conversation analysis of preference organization was conducted on natural data from a counseling session between a pre-service teacher and a supervisor. The supervisor's redressive strategies were examined both globally and locally in the light of Brown and Levinson's (1978) politeness theory, by following how a dispreferred message of refusal is presented through a series of exchanges. It is demonstrated that the speaker's politeness strategies in a goal-oriented discourse can be described as a plan-directed collaborative venture of top-down operations, which involve the use of global knowledge on the interactional and organizational structure of discourse, on the one hand, and of bottom-up operations, which involve the use of local knowledge in sequential turn-by-turn actions, on the other.
1. Introduction
Previous studies of politeness have predominantly dealt with the analysis and characterization of utterances in fairly limited and isolated contexts. This can be attributed to the fact that the early politeness theories (Lakoff, 1973; Brown and Levinson, 1978; Leech, 1983) were proposed on the basis of speech act theory
~ This is a revised and extended version of the paper presented at the 4th International Pragmatics Conference in Kobe, Japan (1993). The research was supported by the Humanity, Religion and Science Fund of Ryukoku University. I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Robert Hopper for his comments on the earlier version of this paper and Prof. Jack Bilmes for his suggestions. I am also grateful to Prof. Jacob Mey for his encouragement and support. Finally, I must express my gratitude to the anonymous readers for their constructive criticisms and suggestions for the earlier version of this paper. * Fax: +81-75-643-8510; E-mail:
[email protected] 0378-2166/96/$15.00 © 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved SSDI 0 3 7 8 - 2 1 6 6 ( 9 4 ) 0 0 0 8 0 - 8
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(Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), which is characterized by a philosophical analysis of sentences in isolation. In Brown and L e v i n s o n ' s (1978) politeness theory, which is the most comprehensive one to date, the preoccupation with the analysis o f sentences in isolation is most clearly reflected in the assumption that threats to the positive and negative face of the speaker arise from individual acts, and hence facethreatening acts are understood by analyzing them in isolation. ~ However, as Brown and Levinson themselves point out (1989: 232), this sentence-based speech act theory was ably criticized by researchers in conversation analysis, who argue that the meaning of an utterance is often determined by the overall conversational structure (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) and local turn-by-turn organization (Sacks et al., 1974). For a more comprehensive and convincing description of politeness phenomena, therefore, we need to analyze utterances within a larger linguistic context as strategic products of speaker's discourse plans. The need to amend the neglect of such larger structural dimension is expressed by Brown and Levinson in a later version of their work as follows: "FTAs do not necessarily inhere in single acts (and hence the concept might be better labeled "facethreatening intention') ... a higher-level intention to issue a criticism may be conveyed by a series of acts (and responses) that are not themselves FTAs or are not the particular FTA in question .... Consequently, some strategies for FFA-handling are describable only in terms of sequences of acts or utterances, strung together as outputs of hierarchical plans.'2 The present study analyzes politeness strategies expressed in a series of acts within one episode, and discusses from a cognitive perspective how redressive actions can be accounted for in terms of both the global organization and local sequences. The basic assumption of the study is that o n e ' s utterances are the realization of a plan: a sequence o f actions which are designed to implement a goal (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Furthermore, following the discourse model which was suggested by researchers in artificial intelligence (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979) and cognitive science (Hobbs and Agar, 1985), we assume that discourse production involves both top-down and bottom-up operations, requiring knowledge of global context and of local context respectively (see section 3.1 below for more discussion of the model). In the present paper, the contextual constraints o f both kinds are discussed to account for the preference structure which is involved in achieving two conflicting goals of different nature, viz., to be polite (interactional) and to refuse (ideational). 3 First, I will present a macro-analysis of how the two types of global knowledge, i.e., interactional knowledge and organizational knowledge, are involved in the top-down operations of politeness strategies for refusal. Then, I will
For a review of criticisms of the universality of Brown and Levinson' notion of face and politeness theory, see Kasper (1990). For a discussion on how their analysis of face is interpreted by the speakers of different languages, see Ervin-Tripp and others (in preparation). Also, for an alternative model of politeness theory based on a culture-general conceptualization of face, refer to Arundale (1993). 2 This same reservation about sentence-based speech act theory is also expressed in their introduction (1989: 9-10). 3 Terms due to Barbara Grosz (see e.g., 1977). See also below, section 3.2.
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present a micro-analysis o f how local turn-by-turn sequential knowledge of discourse determines preference structure in the process of the bottom-up face-saving operations. The local analysis will be conducted in two parts, first in terms of local structure and second with respect to the reflexive nature o f aligning actions. While the macro-analysis reveals the relevance o f actions to the roles o f the participants and the institutionally-defined social norm (Moerman, 1988), the micro-analysis gives insight into how the two participants resolve the conflict through coherent sequences of actions in progress (Schegloff, 1987). Before going into the analysis, I will first present a conceptual overview o f the notion o f preference (in particular, that of dispreferred message), the nature o f the face-threats involved in the message of refusal, and the discourse structure o f dispreferred message.
2. Dispreferred message and politeness 2.1. Concept of preference The notion o f preference has been broadly applied in conversation analysis (Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Sacks and Schegloff, 1979; Levinson, 1983; Drew, 1984; Pomerantz, 1984). It refers to linguistic p h e n o m e n a of a wide range and at various levels, such as lexical selection, speech act (message), utterance design, and sequences of acts (Atkinson and Heritage, 1989: 53). The concept of preference, however, is a controversial one, involving at least three kinds o f views. One, the most prevalent, is to define it from a structural perspective, as in the morphological concept o f markedness. The basic claim o f this view is that while preferred seconds are produced immediately after the first parts, dispreferred seconds are accompanied by marked features such as delays, accounts, prefaces, or mitigations (Levinson, 1983; Heritage, 1984; Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Hayashi, 1992; Pomerantz, 1984). 4 In terms o f conversational rules and structures, this view is explained by Taylor and Cameron (1987) as follows: "The production of a first pair part of a particular adjacency pair makes the subsequent production, by the next speaker, of the most appropriate second pair 'accountably due'. If the appropriate (i.e. 'preferred') response is not forthcoming, distinctive marking of the actual response produced can serve, at least, to indicate its speaker's acknowledgement of the absence of the preferred response and, thus also, of the dispreferred status of the actual response." (p. 112)5
4 Levinson (1983: 333), who discusses the notion of preference with regard to the morphological concept of markedness, argues: "The parallel is therefore quite apt, because in a similar way preferred (and thus unmarked) seconds to different and unrelated adjacency first pair parts have less material than dispreferreds (marked seconds), but beyond that have little in common (cf. 'irregular'). In contrast, dispreferred seconds of quite different and unrelated first parts (e.g. questions, offers, requests, summonses, etc.) have much in common, notably components of delay and parallel kinds of complexity". 5 Taylor and Cameron (1987), who are critical of the structural approach, say that it is inappropriate to "maintain the early ethnomethodological claim that those differences are purely formal, with no basis in the truly psychological or functional sense of 'preference' " (p. 114).
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Others a d o p t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h and see p r e f e r e n c e as a r e f l e c t i o n o f w h a t the s p e a k e r w a n t s to do. O w e n ( 1 9 8 3 : 1 5 1 ) o b s e r v e s that " o n c e we b e g i n to talk o f p r e f e r e n c e s as ' o n the part o f ' either participant, w e are surely close to d e a l i n g with m o t i v a t i o n s , or wants, or s o m e s i m i l a r n o t i o n " (cited in B i l m e s , 1988: 171). I n c l u d e d in this v i e w o f p r e f e r e n c e are n o t i o n s such as s o c i a b i l i t y , support, and s o l i d a r i t y ( P o m e r a n t z , 1984: 77). 6 In y e t a n o t h e r view, w h i c h I will call the ' c o n t e x t u a l a p p r o a c h ' , p r e f e r e n c e is c o n c e i v e d o f as i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r a n k e d c o n v e n t i o n a l action w h e r e a v a i l a b l e c h o i c e s are n o n e q u i v a l e n t ( B i l m e s , 1988). In this view, w h i c h I will a d o p t in the present study, there is no o n e - t o - o n e c o r r e l a tion b e t w e e n a l t e r n a t i v e actions and t y p e o f p r e f e r e n c e . F o r e x a m p l e , while a g r e e m e n t m a y g e n e r a l l y constitute a p r e f e r r e d r e s p o n s e to a s s e s s m e n t , it d o e s not in a case like an a r g u m e n t , where the a b s e n c e o f d i s a g r e e m e n t is interpreted as the failure to d e f e n d o n e ' s position. 7 L i k e w i s e , it does not constitute a p r e f e r r e d r e s p o n s e in situations w h e r e the first statement is a s e l f - d e p r e c i a t i o n b y the s p e a k e r ( P o m e r antz, 1984: 5 7 - 1 0 1 ) . In such cases, it is a g r e e m e n t s rather than d i s a g r e e m e n t s that m a y be p r e f a c e d by m a r k e d features. A s B r o w n and L e v i n s o n p o i n t out, the prefe r e n c e c h o i c e s are in m a n y cases m o t i v a t e d and d e t e r m i n e d b y face c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (1989: 3 8 - 4 0 ) . Thus, m e s s a g e s such as rejections, d i s a g r e e m e n t , and n o n - a n s w e r s constitute d i s p r e f e r r e d m e s s a g e s w h e n e v e r p r e s e r v a t i o n o f face is an i m p o r t a n t consideration.
2.2. Refusal and face The dispreferred m e s s a g e we are c o n c e r n e d with here is refusal. Within the f l a m e work o f S e a r l e ' s (1976) speech act theory, the refusal in our e x a m p l e m a y be p l a c e d under the category o f directives, which refer to acts intended to get the hearer to do something. In the t a x o n o m y o f Bach and Harnish (1979), directives are defined as acts which express not only "the s p e a k e r ' s attitude t o w a r d s o m e p r o s p e c t i v e action by the h e a r e r " , but also "the s p e a k e r ' s intention (desire, wish) that his utterance or the attitude it expresses be taken as (a) reason for the hearer to act" (1979: 47). In this m o d e l the refusal in our data m a y be put in their s u b c a t e g o r y o f either 'require-
Bilmes (1988) argues that the properties of extended concepts of preference in much of the conversation analysis literature are psychological, and rather loosely related to the original concept of Sacks (lecture in 1971), which was concerned with "how actions, such as invitations to dinner can be accomplished" (p. 165). He points out, for example, that while Atkins and Drew (1979) specifically reject the idea of preference as referring to the speaker's psychological predispositions, they go on to claim that "for the recipient of an accusation (or complaint), some of the alternative conditionally relevant actions are preferred, whilst others are dispreferred" (p. 59, cited in Bilmes, 1988: 171). Bilmes comments that the original notion of preference by Sacks (1971) is the "principle of ordering": do X unless you have reasons not to, in which case, do Y unless you have reasons not to, in which case do Z and so on (ibid.: 163). 7 Bilmes (1988: 167) explains the latter situation with the following example: "When A attributes some action or thought or attitude to B, in B's presence, there is a preference for B to contradict A interruptively or immediately following the turn in which the attribution was produced".
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ments' or 'prohibitives' within directives. 8 The type of refusal we are concerned with m a y also be considered as one o f expressives, acts which are defined by Searle (1976: 12) as the expression o f the psychological state o f the speaker. In Bach and Harnish's (1979) model, it may be one of the constatives (the counterparts of Searle's expressives), which are defined as expression o f a belief or an intention, and in particular it belongs to one o f their subcategories o f 'assertives', 'retractives', or 'dissentives'. B r o w n and L e v i n s o n assume that certain kinds o f speech acts are intrinsically face-threatening (1989: 65-66). Directives are listed a m o n g the group o f acts which threaten the addressee's negative face-want, 9 while expressives are listed a m o n g those which threaten the addressee's positive face-want. With our data, their theory predicts that the supervisor's refusal as directive threatens the teacher's negative face, the desire that his/her future choice o f actions be uninhibited, in the sense that it prohibits him/her to teach what he/she wants to teach and requires him to take alternative actions. On the other hand, refusal as expressive should threaten the teacher's positive face, the desire that his/her want be also desirable to others, in the sense that it expresses the supervisor's intention not to appreciate or recognize the teacher's belief that his proposition is a legitimate one. This suggests that during the extended sequences o f turns, we expect the supervisor to generate redressive actions which satisfy both positive and negative face threats.
2.3. Dispreferred message and discourse structure W h e n the speaker tries to refuse, he m a y be heard as providing background information to give the impression that the refusal is due not simply to his/her choice, but to inevitable circumstances b e y o n d his/her control (Mey, 1993: 230). A dispreferred second to invitation may, for example, be produced by such an account combined with other redressive markers as shown in (1-1) (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 58, also cited in Levinson, 1983: 333):
Formally these acts are described as follows (Bach and Hamish, 1979: 47): "Requirements: (bid, charge, command, demand, dictate, direct, enjoin, instruct, order, prescribe, require) In uttering e, S requires H to A if S expresses: i. the belief that his utterance, in virtue of his authority over H, constitutes sufficient reason for H to A, and ii. the intention that H do A because of S's utterance. Prohibitives: (enjoin, forbid, prohibit, proscribe, restrict) In uttering e, S prohibits H from A-ing if S expresses: i. the belief that his utterance, in virtue of his authority over H, constitutes sufficient reason for H not to A, and ii. the intention that because of S's utterance H not do A." 9 Another interpretation is to consider refusal as a directive which threatens both negative and positive face-wants. See Wilson et al. (1992) on this interpretation.
232 (1-1) 01 A: 02 03 B: 04 05 06 07
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Uh if you'd care to come and visit a little while this morning I'll give you a cup of coffee. hehh Well that's awfully sweet of you, I don't think I ((delay)) ((marker)) ((appreciation)) ((refusal can make it this morning, hh em I'm running an ad in the or declination)) ((account)) paper and -and ah I have to stay near the phone.
Dispreferred messages may also be softened over a series of turns as in (1-2). Speaker A first responds with a tentative or token agreement after delay and preface (04-05). Following B's confirmation question (06), A responds with a similar but even weaker agreement token (07-O8), which is followed by a long pause (09) and a mitigated incomplete dispreferred response (10). (1-2) (Pomerantz, 1984: 73) 01 B: I think I'll call her and ask her if she's interested 02 because she's a good nurse, and I think they would 03 like her don't you? 04 A: Well, I'll tell you, I haven't seen Mary for years. 05 I should- As I remember, yes. 06 B: Well do you think she would fit in? 07 A: Uhm, ah, I don't know, what I'm ah hesitating about 08 is ah - em maybe she would. 09 (1.0) 10 A: ah but I would hesitate to em The exchanges which involve a dispreferred message may last several minutes and include more complex interactional features. Such is the case of our data, which is taken from a discussion between a pre-service teacher and a supervisor at a post-teaching conference. Here, the supervisor's second pair part of a request/refusal exchange is extended into long sequences of exchanges. This is because the supervisor is expected to elicit from the teacher an alternative in a non face-threatening manner, and a blatant refusal of the teacher's proposal would constitute a dispreferred message. For the supervisor to obtain the alternative decision, it is important that he withhold the speech actions which are of immediate relevance to the prior talk and instead take alternative actions in accordance with the global discourse plan. A long sequence of such exchanges often involve hierarchically organized global structures as well as those features which are illustrated in the two excerpts above. In the present study, I will discuss how politeness strategies of both a local and a global nature are used to achieve speaker's goals.
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3. Discussion 3.1. Model of analysis
Utterances can be viewed as linguistic actions which are used to achieve the speaker's goals. When such actions or sequences of actions are consciously organized and predetermined by the speaker, they constitute a conceptualized course of actions called plan. A plan is a cognitive representation of programmed actions which enable the speaker to steer the current state toward some desired goal state (Abelson, 1975; Schank and Abelson, 1977). A plan can be characterized in terms of multiple levels of cognitive representation. Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979: 288-289) assume four levels of such abstraction, consisting of "outcomes" (task goal) (which is the highest), "designs" (behavioral approach), "procedures" (sequences of gross actions), and "operations" (sequences of more minute actions). A plan may also be conceptualized in terms of hierarchical structure of goals. According to Hobbs and Agar (1981: 4), "it is in general a tree-like structure whose non-terminal nodes are goals and subgoals, i.e., a logical representations of states to be brought about, and whose terminal nodes are actions" (cited in McLaughlin, 1984: 43). The process of plan construction is multi-directional in the sense that it consists of interactional operations of not only top-down but also bottom-up operations (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979; Hobbs and Agar, 1985). That is, while the speaker may set up general goals and sub-goals and accordingly generate action plans which specify elementary actions top-down, it is unlikely that the planner can lay out in advance all of the hierarchically organized plans and actions and execute them on the basis of abstract knowledge alone. In everyday conversation, much of plan construction involves the kind of operations which are bottom-up or "opportunistic" (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979: 279). Once actions are initiated and tested, the speaker may have to add sub-plans at lower levels to work out the details in response to subsequent developments or to modify the original plan when, for example, he/she is faced with plan-blocking incidents (Hobbs and Agar, 1985: 216). The two types of planning process involve discourse knowledge of a different kind. ~° For topdown planning, the knowledge base would be more general and static, as this planning is primarily concerned with higher levels of plan-abstraction. For bottom-up planning, the speaker would depend more on the specific and local information of interactional context, as this planning is concerned with the knowledge base of lower levels. The distinction may be comparable, in its directionality, to 'extrinsic context' and 'intrinsic context' in an analytical framework. The former refers to conventional knowledge about cultural, social, and relational variables, whereas the latter refers to idiosyncratic information or message features dealing with particular events and occasions, which are observed and renewed in discourse
~o Hayes-Rothand Hayes-Roth(1979: 289) list four levels of the knowledgebase which are used to suggest decisionsat the correspondinglevel of plan-abstraction.
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(Heritage, 1984; Mandelbaum, 1991 ; Hopper, 1992).~ 1 The speaker incorporates the discourse knowledge of both kinds in constructing his/her plan. The global knowledge constitutes a guideline for the speaker to carry out his/her global plan, while the local knowledge provides a signal to adjust that plan or to induce sub-plans. The two types of knowledge are used interactively as the speaker tries to accomplish his/her goals. In the present study, the data will be analyzed in two parts: global analysis and local analysis. In both o f the analyses, the speaker's actions in a conflict situation are discussed interpretively: they are reflectively characterized and evaluated in reference to the discourse goal and plan. In the global analysis, I will reveal how the supervisor's redressive actions for refusal are interactionally produced and structurally organized by the global knowledge of a normative type; in the local analysis, I will show how subsequent actions are relevantly produced, situationally managed and sequentially aligned to achieve his sub-goals and over-all goal. (For discussion of the interpretive approach of analysis, see Craig and Tracy, forthcoming, and Tracy, 1994.)
3.2. Scope of analysis Conversational goals can be characterized from three perspectives (Grosz, 1979, cited in Hobbs and Evans, 1980: 354): ideational or domain goals (e.g. task, event), textual or discourse goals (e.g. coherence, felicity), and interpersonal or social goals (e.g. image). T h o u g h polite refusal in the present study m a y involve all o f these, I will be primarily dealing with goals o f the last kind. I will discuss how a speaker c o n v e y s the refusal message (ideational goal) in a structured m a n ner (discourse goal), but the focus will be on h o w the speaker m a n a g e s to maintain the favorable image o f the interlocutor's face (interpersonal goal). The discussion will look into h o w the supervisor achieves these goals; it will do this by analyzing both the t o p - d o w n and bottom-up redressive operations involved in clinical supervision.
t~ Schegioff (1992: 196) questions this distinction in favor of the latter, using the term "the paradox of proximateness" and insisting that "if some 'external' context can be shown to be proximately (or intrainteractionally) relevant to the participants, then its external status is rendered beside the point; and if it cannot be so shown, then its external status is rendered equivocal" (ibid.: 197). This comes from his basic position that "If one is concerned with understanding what something in interaction was for its participants, then we must establish what sense of context was relevant to those participants, and at the moment at which what we are trying to understand occurred .... So, even if one can show that, of the descriptions of the settings and persons which could be invoked, some particular ones are relevant to the participants in their interaction, it remains to be shown that they are procedurally consequential for the particular aspect of the talk or conduct which is the focus of analysis - that is, that there is a consequential tie (again for the participants) between the setting and interactional identities so understood and a particular facet of their conduct" (ibid.: 196; emphasis in original). In the present study, the external context concerns the discourse knowledge of the supervisor on the role and prescribed actions which he is expected to take, and which were clearly demonstrated in the data. Here, the two labels are used to characterize the types of contextual knowledge source involved in the two-way planning processes on the basis of an assumption that they are used interactively by the speaker for production of redressive actions.
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The conversational segment which is reproduced here took place during the last stage of the post-conference session where the participants discuss solutions to the problems (see the excerpt). 12 The main issues discussed in the previous stages include the importance on the part of the teacher of preparing materials, the need for assessing the students' prior knowledge, and the importance o f appropriately phrasing structuring devices. The supervisor's first (ideational) goal is to induce the teacher to share the belief that it is not a good idea to repeat the same topic. His next goal is to help him find a differenl topic which the students might be interested in. In the present paper, I will deal with the first part of the discussion, where the supervisor manages to resolve this conflict o f opinions.
3.3. Global analysis of discourse and politeness in clinical supervision 13 As pointed out above, the speaker's discourse actions are often directed top-down by goals and subgoals which are set up in advance. In clinical supervision, such topdown operations involve two types of global knowledge: interactional knowledge and organizational knowledge. In lhe next two sections, I will show h o w politeness strategies are planned on the basis o f this global knowledge.
3.3.1. Interactional knowledge and politeness strategies In a goal-oriented discourse, the speaker's action plans are constructed by the global knowledge called script, or the stabilized prototypical knowledge of the world which prescribes the roles and actions of the participants (Schank and Abelson, 1977). One type of such knowledge is what I call 'interactional k n o w l e d g e ' , which instructs the speaker how he/she should take an initiative in turn-by-turn sequential interactions. In the terminology o f Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979), this is the kind o f knowledge which is required at the level o f the ' d e s i g n ' plane in planning. In conversation, this global knowledge concerns interactional macro-structures called floor and turn. T h o u g h the technical distinction between floor and turn is not always clear, I will follow Edelsky (1981: 45), who distinguishes them by defining
12 The data was taken from a post-conference session of a clinical supervision between a supervisor (a male graduate student) and a preservice teacher (a male undergraduate student) at a university in North America. A large part of this data was also discussed in a metacognitive study of discourse by Hayashi and Hayashi (1992). For a discussion on gender-related differences on politeness strategies in clinical supervision, see Hayashi and Hayashi (1994). 13 The label 'clinical supervision' was first used by the researchers at Harvard University in the 1960's (e.g. Morris Cogan, Robert Goldhammer). 'Clinical' is meant to suggest a face-to-face relationship between teacher and supervisor with the fi~cus on teacher's actual behavior in the classroom. It usually means a setting where a person does not figllow a prescriptive path, but rather has sense of 'ownership' in the process being studied. Clinical supervision is conceived of as a professional model where the individual has equal input into the events which lead to a final product. It is a 'descriptive' term that continues the tradition of the group at Harvard who originated the model. The term 'clinical' may be contrasted with other terms such as 'training', which suggest an 'apprenticeship' model where someone follows a 'prescriptive' path to complete a series of events leading to a final product (I thank Dr. Kenneth F. Jerich, Director of Curriculum and Instruction at Illinois State University for providing me with this information.)
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floor as "the acknowledged what's-going-on within a psychological time/space" in contrast to turn as "an on-record 'speaking' (which includes nonverbal activities) behind which lies an intention to convey a message that is both referential and functional". 14 Clinical supervision is a special type of discourse, in which the participants take part in a "jointly-built one idea" (Edelsky, 1981: 384). It is similar to what Edelsky (1981) calls a "collaborative venture". That is, whereas in an ordinary discourse with a singly developed floor, the 'territory of information' (Kamio, 1994) under discussion is clear and the contribution of information is unequivocal, the discussion in collaborative discourse revolves around a topic which belongs to the territory of both interactants, such as in our case the teacher and the supervisor. In this segment of the data (see Excerpt 1), the teacher brings to the discussion his knowledge of the material, his assessment of the students' prior knowledge, and his judgment of how the lesson should proceed after the failure. The supervisor, on the other hand, contributes expert knowledge of teaching techniques, his assessment of the cause of the teacher's failure in the last lesson, and his judgment of what should be the primary concern of the teacher in the next lesson. Interactions in a collaborative floor are inherently less face-threatening than in a singly-developed floor. They involve less overt directive actions, share more similar meaning units, and the length and frequency of utterances are more neutralized among the participants (Edelsky, 1981 ). In clinical supervision, the supervisor discusses the problem in a collaborative manner, encourages the teacher to contribute his viewpoint, and attempts to obtain a jointly-built consensus. Floor management normally depends in large part on how turn-taking is conducted. In Hayashi and Hayashi's (1990, 1991, 1992) model, utterances which are used to claim and maintain the floor are considered as main-channel turn utterances, while those which are produced to yield and support the floor are defined as backchannel turn utterances. That is, whether utterances are back-channel or main channel depends on their functional relationship with the floor. In this model, back-channel utterances include not only short comments or acknowledgments of the sorts described by Yngve (1970) or Edelsky (1981), but any intention-based utterances (Hayashi and Hayashi, ibid.). They are 'symbolic claims' to the turn, with an elocutionary force of some kind (McLaughlin, 1984). The discourse functions of backchannel utterances include not only encouraging the floor holder to continue to talk (e.g. prompting the flow of the talk, reinforcing what the interlocutor has said), but also requiring some kind of repair from the floor holder (e.g. clarifying vague ideas, making claims on what the interlocutor has said).ls In clinical supervision, the supervisor takes the role of 'a pseudo floor-supporter' who provides back-channel utterances, while the teacher takes the role of 'a pseudo floor-holder' who provides mainchannel utterances. The term 'pseudo' is used here to indicate that while the ownership of the discussion topic is supposed to be of a collaborative nature, as J4 Also see R. Hayashi (1991, forthcoming) for a discussion of these concepts. 15 In this model, back-channel utterances are classified into two groups and four sub-groups by the features [response] and [judgmental] depending on whether they produce perlocutionary reactions and whether they are judgmental or not, respectively (Hayashi and Hayashi, 1992: 124-125).
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mentioned above, the interaction unfolds within the kind of format where the floor is singly maintained and developed. That is, since the supervisor is expected to work with the teacher in a cooperative manner, he seemingly takes the role of a floor supporter as he listens to, responds to, and clarifies what the teacher says, through a variety of back-channel devices of a non face-threatening nature. Throughout our excerpt, the supervisor uses these back-channel utterances both to avoid imposition (i.e., negative politeness) and to show respect (i.e., positive politeness). In discourse, they take the form of either elicitation (e.g. "Have most of these things already been discussed before up to this time in one way or another?" (21-22)), acknowledgment (e.g. "All right" (16), "I understand what you are saying" (52)), or a combination of the two (e.g. "Confusion." "What else?" (45)).
3.3.2. Organizational knowledge and politeness strategies The speaker's over-all action plans may also be constructed by the kind of script which I call 'organizational knowledge', particularly when the speaker's goal requires rather elaborate planning. It specifies the sequence of goals and gross actions in a hierarchical manner, and instructs the speaker rather explicitly how he/she should organize the discussion. It is the kind of global knowledge which in Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth's (1979) model of planning would be required for the planning plane of 'procedure'. In clinical supervision, the supervisor is expected to help the teacher improve his/her teaching skills by employing the so-called "low-direct high-indirect" approach (Blumberg, 1980: 63), which include strategies such as praise, acceptance, and avoidance of criticism. According to Egan (1980), this helping process consists of three stages: (i) the supervisor LISTENS TO the teacher by responding to him with sympathy, (ii) the supervisor CLARIFIES the issues to help the teacher see an objective picture of himself, and (iii) the supervisor ELICITS desired actions by helping the teacher find solutions himself. This organizational knowledge of discourse provides the basic guideline in constructing the supervisor's over-all plan. As for the interpersonal goal of showing politeness, the activities in the first and last stages have a strong bearing on the maximization of positive face. Namely, the instructor's concern is to respect the teacher's beliefs and Values by listening to and confirming what the teacher has to say. The second stage, on the other hand, may involve actions addressed to satisfy both the negative and positive face-wants of the teacher. The clarification attempts may require redressive actions to minimize the threat to the negative face-want ot' the teacher to be left alone. At the same time, they may involve redressive actions to maximize the positive face-want of the teacher that his/her thinking be recognized as capable, sufficient, and correct. As the data show, the supervisor relies on this organizational knowledge as he tries to achieve his conflicting goals of being polite and refusing the proposal of the teacher (see Fig. 1). At the highest level of organization, the discussion is conducted in three parts, following the basic procedure of supervision. In Part 1, the supervisor just LISTENS TO the teacher exploring how he feels in general about repeating the same topic (09-27). At this stage, the supervisor only tries to find out and understand what the teacher has to say. It turns out that the teacher indeed was preoccupied with
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Fig. 1. Global analysis of organizational structure of the excerpt. SI: Section 1, $2: Section 2, $3: Section 3. (1), (2), (3): Procedural stages of clinical supervision (see the discussion in 3.3.2). the content of the material; the supervisor ends this part by just c o n f i r m i n g the teacher's view (26). In Part 2, the supervisor C L A R I F I E S the possible consequences of repeating the topic (28-81). Here, the supervisor is more critical and sometimes provocative, as compared to Part 1. His (ideational) subgoal is to elicit the ramifications of teaching the same topic in terms of what will happen if the teacher tries to do the same lesson again which had " b o m b e d " . This part ends when the supervisor confirms that the teacher analyzes objectively the general consequences of repeating the same topic (80). In Part III, the supervisor E L I C I T S a decision of what to teach in the next lesson ( 8 1 - 9 2 ) . This part is rather short, and ends when the teacher makes a proposal to take another topic.
Excerpt 1 01 T: Ah-h .... Can I start over on this next week? Just when ... Just 02 start all over? 03 S: On this subjeCt? And do this subject over? 04 T: To a TE (Teacher Exposition)? 05 S: Well, the answer to that is "yes". I'd like to discuss with you, if you 06 really think that's a good idea. I ... I, No, you can do that if that's 07 what you'd like to do, but before you do it, I'd like for you to ... ah 08 discuss with me some ramifications, ah, whether it's a good idea. O9 I'm not saying it isn't, ah .... what, what do you think about that in general? 10 T: Well, I can go into specifics with TE. I can talk about the 11 immigration .. ah .. restriction .. ah .. I can talk about the Red Scare. Two 12 topics that weren't brought up until today were lightly gone over ... and I can go 13 in depth of the supporters ... why they supported these things. I can go into 14 depth in the Ku Klux Klan ... what it is made of, what it represented ... why? 15 things like that. 16 S: All right. So you're telling me you feel it would be a good idea to do it, 17 because there are important things that were not discussed ... 18 T: These were all movements in the 20's that died after the 20's, and since we are -
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discussing this decade, there are points that should be brought up and they weren't sufficiently today. Have most of these things already been discussed before up to this time in one way or another? Only fundamentalism, prohibition, and ah, was one other thing that they brought up that we may have touched. But the Ku Klux Klan, Red Scare, immigration restrictions haven't been. So you feel that would be a new material. Oh, yea .... All right. If you had a lesson in class that bombed, and you're apparently telling me that's what happened today. Do ah, it's .... do I read that correctly? Yea. Yea. What would be one of your prime considerations to do the next day in class if a certain lesson bombed? What might be the main consideration for the next day's lesson? T- To take the same topic. To take the same topic. You think that would be the most important consideration. Yea! To go, to cover up. Now, now think of what you just said. The lesson just bombed. Yea. But the material still has to be covered. I'm asking you what's the most important thing for the next lesson. What's the association? You start over. What's the association the students have with the material you just covered today? Confusion. Confusion. What else? Dislike of. You got it! This has not fostered their ability to like what's happening, has it? All right. If that's the case, what might happen if you turn around tomorrow and go again if you were in a high school classroom? ... Welt, they're going to be forced to listen, because I'm going to be lecturing. I ... I understand what you're saying, but I'm trying to get you to realize something here that ... Yea, I know, but I just can't let that ... I just wouldn't let this information go by. They've got to know it. Well but wait a minute. Does it have to be done tomorrow? Well, if we're going ... in a sequential pattern in a history class, it's usually going to take it decade by decade, so I can't go do it when they're doing the 1950's. I understand, but are we definitely through with the 1920's tomorrow? No. No. So it doesn't have to be done tomorrow. It doesn't have to be done next time. Ah, I would think that in the end of any section like this, there's probably going to be at least, maybe, a day for review. Maybe, maybe two days. So you just told me that if you try to do it tomorrow there's probably going to be a dislike for the material. What does that almost preclude might happen in tomorrow's lesson if you try this again?
240 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
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T: S: T: S: T: S: T: S: T: S: T: S:
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... No student discussion. No student discussion? What ... what do you think their reaction is going to be? "Oh! no!" "Oh! no!" and whenever they start out "Oh no!", what's likely to happen for the day? They're ... they are tuned out for the day. Yea ... which means you're likely to have two "bombs" in a row. And, would that mean you still wouldn't have accomplished what you set out to accomplish? No. No! you mean no? I mean, yeah you're right. O.K. No, I wouldn't accomplish it. All right. So let's discuss the possibility if you're not going to accomplish it anyway. You're taking a chance on getting blown out of the saddle two days in a row. You tell me next week not to take this topic. I haven't said a thing about that yet. I already told them I was. Just because I told them I was, doesn't mean I have to, right? Oh... I'll gladly take another topic next week. I see. And with what reason would you gladly take another topic next week? Hum. Because I don't want the same, the same thing to happen. Fine.
The data also show that the same procedural script is mapped onto the plans for smaller discourse sections within each part. The supervisor appears to rely on this organizational knowledge to achieve the subgoals for each part and plans his actions hierarchically by cyclically applying this global knowledge (though not all of the actions are organized in terms of the full three-stage process)) 6 In Part I, the supervisor first L I S T E N S T O the teacher's view on the ramifications o f teaching the same topic (01-20) and then C L A R I F I E S if it will not be the repetition of the same topic (21-27). In Part II, the supervisor attempts to elicit a more objective view on the ramifications o f repeating the same topic, which he failed to do in the first part. With the framing move "All right." (28), he sets out to L I S T E N TO the teacher by repeating the same question in Part 1 but this time using the word " b o m b e d " to remind the teacher that the lesson had failed (28-37). Having confirmed the teacher's response (35-37), he tries to C L A R I F Y the problem once again, using the prompter " b o m b e d " (38) in an attempt to get a more objective picture o f the situation. This exchange is repeated several times with other cue words such as "the most important thing" (40), "association" (41), until finally the teacher comes up with a relevant answer " c o n f u s i o n " (44). After a confirming c o m m e n t "All right. This has not fos-
~6 For internal evidence of the division into parts and sections, see the discussion in section 3.4.1 below.
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tered their ability to like what's happening, has it?" (47), the supervisor proceeds to ELICIT a possible consequence of repeating the same topic that bombed (48-49). The supervisor's original plan to induce the association of students' attitude (i.e., dislike) with student participation (i.e., no student discussion) is interrupted when the teacher insists that the material has to be taught next time for the lessons to be sequential (50-51). Here again, the supervisor applies the same conventional scheme to deal with this plan-blocking incident. That is, the supervisor LISTENS TO what the teacher has to say about why he wants to teach the material (56-59), and CLARIFIES whether it really has to be taught next time (60-64). After these temporary plan-blocking interactions (54-64), they return to the earlier discussion on the psychological effects upon student participation. In the following exchanges, the supervisor is able to ELICIT responses which are close to the expected response, i.e., "no student discussion" (68), "tuned out for the day" (73). Part 2 ends when the supervisor confirms the teacher's response (77-80). Part 3 begins as the supervisoi- LISTENS TO the teacher tell him whether he still wants to repeat the same topic when it is clear it will end up not accomplishing the goal (81-89). The supervisor then CLARIFIES the reason why the teacher has decided not to take the same topic, before he concludes this segment (90-92). 3.4. Local analysis of politeness As discussed above, the speaker's plans for goals and sub-goals can rarely lay out all of the hierarchically organized actions in advance; rather, many discourse actions would be bottom-up operations in which the speaker works out the details in response to subsequent developments (Hobbs and Agar, 1985). The knowledge which is involved in these operations derives from the local context, in particular from the preceding actions of the interlocutor. In this section, I will look into the local sequences of actions and show, in two parts, how politeness is expressed bottom-up. First, I will analyze the sequence of actions by discussing how actions are locally organized and structured to achieve the speaker's sub-goals. Next, I will analyze the adjacent actions in more detail by discussing how 'aligning' actions (e.g. disclaimers; for a discussion of the notion of 'aligning', see below, section 3.4.2) are used for the management of interactional meanings and communicative roles. 3.4.1. Structure of sequences and politeness The discussion of the excerpt can be considered a kind of discourse called 'argument', where the participants negotiate an agreement over the contents or competitive demands of proposals (Jackson and Jacobs, 1981). In the terminology of Schiffrin (1985), it is an 'oppositional argument', where speakers openly dispute positions of polarity, rather than a 'rhetorical argument', where a speaker presents a monologue to justify his/her position. An argument of this kind often evolves from an adjacency pair (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) which then is expanded by a series of exchanges such as insertion sequences, pre-sequences, or post-sequences (Jackson and Jacobs, 1980, 1981). The excerpt in this study may be regarded as an argument where an adjacency pair of request grant/refusal is delayed and expanded by long
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sequences of turns. 17 The teacher's request is approved but on condition that its ramifications be discussed first; the grant is only provisional and the final decision is delayed, with an implication that the supervisor disagrees with the teacher. When participants dispute their positions in an oppositional argument, the speaker's talk is directed to challenge the interlocutor's points, but often with a display of cooperation of some kind (Schiffrin, 1985: 45). In clinical supervision, the supervisor's challenge is always indirect and non-imposing. The basic format of argument is a series of questions (by the supervisor), followed by answers (by the teacher). The supervisor's questions, in combination with other acts, constitute exchanges, which in turn become the basis of higher-level organizational units of Sections and Parts. Here, I will analyze individual actions from a structural perspective in order to reveal how the supervisor locally achieves his goal and subgoals bottom-up. The contextual analysis of the individual act according to its illocutionary force in conversation has several difficulties and problems (Kreckel, 1981; Taylor and Cameron, 1987). The main problems include the question of the specific set of illocutionary acts and the conventions for performing and interpreting them, the difficulties in formulating exhaustive and satisfactory categories, and the skepticism regarding the criteria for identifying the categories (see Taylor and Cameron, 1987, for further discussion). Of these, perhaps the most serious problem for data analysis is the last one: how can an analyst reliably classify an utterance into a specific category of act? This is the inherent problem for empirical analysis of this kind, for the speaker's intentions are not always clear and there is no guarantee that an analyst can recover those intentions and interpret the utterances correctly. In the following analysis, I will use, with some modifications, the exchange structure model of the so called Birmingham school (Coulthard, 1977; Coulthard and Montgomery, 1981; Stubbs, 1983), where speech acts are analyzed functionally with respect to hierarchical structure. In this model, the notion of speech act is defined by its function in the discourse rather than by the speaker's intention or the felicity conditions as proposed in the original speech act theory of Searle and Austin. 18 The notion of function in this model is also different from the functionalism of Hallidayan grammar in that it does not refer to the kind of message which an utterance transmits, but rather to its sequential, interactional, distributional or positional character of the utterance (e.g. to evoke a response, to mark a boundary; Taylor and Cameron, 1987: 69). In particular, I am incorporating the system of analysis developed by Francis and Hunston (1992), which is claimed to be flexible enough to cope with a wide variety of situations other than classroom discourse.19 They follow Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) in ~7 This observation may be supported by the fact that the discussion ends with the teacher's proposal that he do not repeat the topic; thus, an answer was finally given to the original question "Can I start over on this next week?" (01). As Levinson (1983: 306) argues, we need to replace the strict criterion of adjacency pair with the notion of 'conditional relevance', where the first pair part sets up certain expectations around which the discussion revolves. ts See Chapter 4 of Taylor and Cameron (1987) for criticism of the exchange structure model. t9 For a discussion on the dispute over the unit of organization (e.g. three-part exchange vs. adjacency pair), see Tsui (1989), who argues that the follow-up move has several functions, such as showing understanding or showing acceptance, as well as making an evaluation.
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postulating a structural rank scale which consists of interaction, transaction, exchange, move and act. In this system, exchange consists of four structural elements, Initiation (I), Response (R), Follow-up (F), and Response/Initiation (R/I). 2° Their system is adopted here, because it provides us with a structural framework for analyzing how each utterance is related to the speaker's plan. Part 1. Judging from the preceding exchanges (not reproduced here), the teacher seems to have made a hasty proposal rather abruptly when he and the supervisor were still talking about what should have been done to prevent the problems which arose during the lesson. However, the supervisor takes up this new topic willingly and discusses it patiently over several moves. As mentioned above, his first sub-goal is to LISTEN TO the teacher and find out what he has to say, instead of giving critical comments or hastily eliciting a right course of action. This part consists of four exchanges of sequences, of which one is embedded within another (03-04). In the first exchange, where the teacher makes an eliciting move, the supervisor first responds by initiating a clarifying exchange. The eliciting move in the inserted exchange (03) is an indication of the supervisor's respect for the teacher's positive face; with an eliciting move consisting of two questions "On this subject?", "And do this subject over?" ([return], ]return]), the supervisor returns his response not only relevantly, but in a non-judgmental manner in order to simply clarify the proposal. The teacher's initial eliciting move is then responded to by an informing move consisting of multiple units of statements, organized in a non face-threatening manner. Following a tentative approval of the proposal, "Well, the answer to that is 'yes'." (05), the supervisor responds with the statements, " I ' d like to discuss with you, if you really think that's a good idea, I ... I, No, you can do that if that's what you'd like to do, but before you do it, I'd like for you to ... ah discuss with me some ramifications, ah, whether it's a good idea, I'm not saying it isn't " ([qualify], [comment], [qualify], [comment]) (07-09). The first act indicates that the approval just given is conditional, but the second act modifies it, indicating that the teacher's proposal is nevertheless viable (see Fig. 2). The supervisor alternately gives a positive and negative evaluation of the proposal, with the second act reducing the negative face threat evoked by the preceding one. The third and fourth acts are also used in combination to give the same effects. 2] The supervisor's plan to LISTEN TO the teacher's opinion is then realized by an exchange consisting of the four structural elements I, R, F, and F. The eliciting move that follows the informing move initiates this exchange with a question, "What, what do you think about that in general?" ([inquire]) (09). It indicates to the teacher that the supervisor is willing and ready to discuss the issue with the teacher, Though the supervisor may have a different view,
20 The last element, which is not applicable in our data, is an adaptation from Coulthard and Montgomery (1981). Under this system various types of structure are proposed, which can be generally expressed as I(R/I)R(Fn). 2~ The use of two conflicting propositions within a turn, which are addressed to the positive face and negative face of the interlocutor, has been reported as a strategy to soften the face threat of a dispreferred message (Pomerantz, 1984; Hayashi, 1992).
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(09) S: I (eliciting [inquire]) - {elicit }--~ (10-15) T: R (16-17) S: F (acknowledging [marker], [reformulate]) (18-20) T: F (21-22) S: I (eliciting [neutral proposal]) [elicit}~ (23-25) T: R (26) S: F (acknowledging [reformulate]) (27) T: F
Fig. 2. Exchange structure of Part 1. T: Teacher, S: Supervisor; I: Initiation, R: response, F: Follow-up, F/I: Follow-up/Initiation. { l: type of exchange, ( ): type of move, [ ]: type of act. (The structural description of exchanges for each part is an adaptation of the model proposed by Francis and Hunston (1992). See their work for definitions of the structural units and their functions.) he is trying to "at least sincerely indicate 'I want your positive face to be s a t i s f i e d ' " (Brown and Levinson, 1989: 101), or "S (the speaker) wants at least some of H ' s (the addressee's) wants" (Brown and Levinson, 1989: 70). The teacher's response to his supervisor's inquiry (09) consists more of similar statements of what he wants to do in the next lesson than of general statements on the consequences of repeating the same topic (10-15). Though the supervisor is not satisfied with this response, he acknowledges it by saying, "All right. So y o u ' r e telling me you feel it would be a good idea to do it because there are important things that were not discussed." ([marker], [reformulate]) (16-17). This acknowledging m o v e is a follow-up by which the supervisor simply shows understanding (i.e., respect of the teacher's positive face) of what the teacher has just said; this ends Section 1. The supervisor's plan in Section 2 is to C L A R I F Y the teacher's belief by letting him realize that much of the content of the proposed material has already been discussed. As mentioned above, the second stage is potentially threatening to both the positive face and negative face of the teacher. 22 The supervisor attempts to minimize these face threats, adopting an organizational structure which is exactly the same as that of the first section (21-27). In the eliciting move, he simply clarifies the previ-
22 The clarification attempts may carry the connotations that "the speaker does not care about the addressee's feelings, wants, etc." and that "'the speaker does not intend to avoid impeding the addressee's freedom of action" (Brown and Levinson, 1989: 66).
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ous statement of the teacher with a question, "Have most of these things already been discussed before up to this time in one way or another?" ([neutral proposal]) (21). When the teacher refutes this comment in the following move (23), the supervisor responds to it with a statement, "So, you feel that would be a new material." ([reformulate]) (26). The last two moves (26, 27) of follow-up indicate that this exchange is complete; the supervisor's plan for Part 1 ends here. Part 2. The exchanges of Part 2 are the longest, consisting of 15 exchanges including one embedded within the first one (see Fig. 3). This may suggest that the face-threatening effects of the second stage are the greatest. In this part, the supervisor patiently prompts the teacher to engage in reflective thinking and helps him to achieve a deeper understanding o1' self and to CLARIFY his thinking. Section 1 begins as the supervisor, who now realizes that the teacher is only concerned with the material, continues to LISTEN TO what the teacher has to say about repeating the same topic. Section 1 (28-37) has the structure of I, (I, R), R, and F, where the second and third elements constitute an inserted sequence. The first move begins with a short remark, "All right." ([marker]) (28). It is "a token of ritualized agreement" (Schiffrin, 1985: 43), with which the supervisor displays a cooperative attitude prior to proposing a question and statement of a challenging nature, "If you had a lesson in class that bombed, and you're apparently telling me that's what happened today." ([inquire], [comment]) (28-29). This cooperative approach is further displayed by a clarifying exchange embedded within the move (see Fig. 3). The word "bombed" being threatening to the teacher's positive face, the supervisor tries to mitigate its effect by a question, "Do ah, it's .... do I read that correctly?" ([neutral proposal]) (29). It allows the supervisor to indicate to the teacher that he wants to be sure of the teacher's understanding of the situation before he continues with the question (31-33). Following the teacher's response, the supervisor returns to the original eliciting move with two questions (31-33). Since the teacher's reply is still basically the same as before, the supervisor does not further try to elicit a response at this point, but simply responds with an acknowledging move, "To take the same topic. You think that would be the most important consideration?" ([receive], [reformulate]) (35-36). This move is a gesture of respect for the teacher's positive face. As we saw above, the supervisor always uses this type of follow-up to end the exchange of each section. In Section 2 of Part 2, the supervisor once again attempts to elicit a more objective analysis of the lesson, i.e. the need to consider the psychological impact of the topic upon the students (38-47). Compared to the corresponding section in Part 1, this attempt is carried out rather intensively and consists of four long exchanges (see Fig. 3). The supervisor's strategy here is to begin this section with an informing move, "Now, think of what you said. The lesson just bombed." ([starter] and [informative]) (38). This reminds the teacher of what had happened in the last lesson. The first act is used to make him reconsider the problem more deeply, and to draw his attention to the message to follow. The informing act indicates that the supervisor respects the teacher's ability to come up with a different interpretation of the situation (i.e., respect for his positive face) and also that he avoids imposing his idea (i.e., respect for the teacher's negative face). Not being able to elicit a relevant answer, the
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(28-33) S: I[(eliciting [marker], [inquire], [comment], [inquire], [inquire]) (insertion sequence) (29) S: I (eliciting [neutral proposal]) {clarify ] (30) T: R (34) T: R (35-36) S: F (acknowledging [receive], [reformulate]) (37) T: F
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(57-59) T: R (60) S: l (eliciting [receive], {neutral proposal]) (61) T: R (62-64) S: F (acknowledging {receive], {reformulate], [reformulate], {comment]) (64-67) S: I (eliciting [starter], {inquire])
{elicit (68) T: R (69) S: I (eliciting [receive], [inquire]) {elicit} (70) T: R (71) S: I (eliciting [receive], [inquire])
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{elicit}
{ (73) T: R (74-75) S: I (eliciting [receive], [reformulate], [neutral proposal])
- ]elicit]
{ (76) T: R (77) S: I (eliciting [receive], [return])
- {clarify } ~ (78) T: R (79) S: F (acknowledging [receive]) (80) T: F
Fig. 3. Exchange structure of Part 2. T: Teacher, S: Supervisor; I: Initiation, R: Response, F: Followup, F/I: Follow-up/Initiation. { }: type of exchange, ( ); type of move, [ ]: type of act.
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- [direct] - - (81-83) S: I (directing [marker], [directive], [comment]) ~ - (84) T: I {inform] (85) S: R (informing[protest]) (Transaction 3)
~-- (86-87} T: I {inform} q_ (88) S: R (acknowledging[marker]) - {inform} - - (89) T: 1 [elicit] ~ (90) S: I (eliciting [receive], [inquire]) -
T: R L (91) (92) S: F (acknowledging[endorse]) Fig. 4. Exchange structure of Part 3. T: Teacher, S: Supervisor; I: Initiation,R: Response, F: Followup, F/I: Follow-up/Initiation. { }: type of exchange, ( ): type of move, [ ]: type of act. supervisor patiently repeats this type of redressive move three more times (with almost the same propositional content) (40, 43, 45). In the second eliciting exchange, the eliciting move is expanded by an additional hint, "the association the students have with the material you just covered today" (43). The expansion facilitates introspection and induces a response "Confusion" (44), which is close to what the supervisor anticipated. In the last eliciting exchange (45-47), he finally gets the anticipated answer and responds with the acknowledging move, "You got it! This has not fostered their ability to like what's happening, has it." ([react], [reformulate]) (47). It is a follow-up to the preceding move to indicate a positive endorsement; the supervisor's planned actions for Section 2 end here. Section 3 of Part 2 is even longer than the previous section and consists of nine exchanges (48-80) (see Fig. 3). This is partly due to the fact that the supervisor took time to solve a rather serious plan-blocking issue by applying the first and second stages of the procedural script (56-64). This mapping process was briefly mentioned above in the global analysis, but I will describe its local strategies in more detail here. The first exchange starts as the supervisor proceeds to elicit the consequence of how the students' negative feeling affects their participation (48-50). Right after this first eliciting move (47-49), however, his plan is blocked by the teacher, who is still concerned with the importance of teaching the material (50-51). Instead of eliciting the anticipated response forcibly, the supervisor responds with an informing move, "I ... I understand what you're saying, but I'm trying to get you to realize something here that ..." ([receive], [informative]) (52-53). This move was, however, responded to with an even stronger objection from the teacher, "I just wouldn't let this information go by." (54). The objection is very strong and at this point the supervisor tries to re-invoke the view that it can wait, by resorting to the basic procedure. In the next eliciting exchange (56-59), he initiates an eliciting move, "Well, but wait a minute. Does it have to be done tomorrow?" ([starter], [neutral proposal]) (56); he simply LISTENS TO the teacher. Following the response of the teacher (which is the same as before), the supervisor repeats the same question, adding the word "deft-
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nitely" to clarify the teacher's belief: "I understand, but are we definitely through with the 1920's tomorrow? ;' ([receive], [neutral proposal]) (60). The change of the teacher's mind then prompts the supervisor to close the exchange with an acknowledging move (62-64). This move constitutes the follow-up element, and as we saw above, reinforces the face-saving effects (i.e., positive politeness). Now that the problem of the serious plan-blocking issue is solved, the supervisor initiates an elicit exchange to return to the previous point, by asking what might happen if a topic the students dislike is repeated (64-67). First, before he repeats the question he reminds the teacher of the situation, "So, you just told me that if you try to do it tomorrow there's probably going to be a dislike for the material." ([starter]) (65-66). In the subsequent three exchanges, the supervisor repeatedly elicits the anticipated response through questions. Though the teacher's responses ("No student discussion" (68), "Oh! n o ! " (70)) are relevant, the supervisor continues to elicit an anticipated answer by adding cue words. The face-threatening effects of these moves are reduced as the supervisor initiates the eliciting moves with short statements, "No student discussion " ([receive]) (69), "Oh n o ! " ([receive]) (71). (See Fig. 3.) The last two moves of the last exchange constitute the follow-up elements; at this point, the supervisor's plan for Part 2 is over. Part 3. The goal of the supervisor in Part 3 is to ELICIT a solution as to how the teacher should go about the next lesson. Of the five exchanges, two (the second and third exchanges) are initiated by the teacher. In these exchanges, the supervisor LISTENS TO the teacher by just responding to these moves. In the first exchange (81-83), the supervisor suggests discussing the ramifications. The last statement reminds the teacher of what had happed in the previous lesson; this is done in a way to soften the face-threatening effect invoked by the preceding statement, "You are taking a chance on getting blown out of the saddle two days in a row." ([comment]) (82-83). Though the supervisor may have been prepared to initiate an eliciting move, this was then followed by the teacher's move "you tell me next week not to take this topic" (84). To remain neutral, the supervisor then responds with a statement, "I haven't said a thing about that yet." ([protest]) (85), assuring the teacher that the decision is up to him (i.e., respect for the teacher's positive face). Then the supervisor initiates an eliciting move to CLARIFY the teacher's proposal, " I see. And with what reason would you gladly take another topic next week?" ([receive], [inquire]) (90). The first act displays understanding, and the second act checks whether the teacher's change of mind is based on a rationale consistent with the preceding discussion. The teacher's response being satisfactory, the supervisor simply responds with a short acknowledging move, " Fine" ([endorse]) (92). It is a followup element of the exchange and the last move to the end of the whole discussion. 3.4.2. Aligning actions and politeness The discussion above revealed how redressive actions are sequentially organized to build up interactional structure bottom-up under the global constraint of a topdown script. Many of these local actions are "aligning actions" (Stokes and Hewitt, 1976, cited in Nofsinger, 1991 : 111), which are produced in direct relevance to the adjacent utterances of the interlocutor or the speaker in order to line up, straighten
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out, or modify the message. They are used to "frame messages for purposes of clarifying, interpreting and managing conversational meaning and communicator role" (Ragan, 1983: 159, cited in Nofsinger, 1991:112 ). Many of the aligning actions in clinical supervision are redressive in that they are non-critical and non-coercing. In clinical supervision, aligning actions also constitute 'metadiscourse actions', or discourse devices which are used to monitor and adjust the speaker's discourse plan (Hayashi and Hayashi, 1992). That is, they are concerned not just with monitoring and management of preceding utterances, but are related to the discourse goal at multiple levels of organization. Though a broad range of actions may be considered as forms of alignment (Nofsinger, 1991), I will discuss only three types of such aligning actions whose redressive effects are relatively salient: disclaimers, repetitions, and reformulations. 23 Disclaimers. The speaker may use speech actions to prevent the interlocutor from arriving at an interpretation of the message which is unfavorable or facethreatening. Such aligning actions are referred to as as "disclaimers" (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975, cited in Nofsinger, 1991: 133). In my data, disclaimers are often used by the supervisor to display understanding (i.e., positive politeness) before producing utterances which are threatening to the teacher's face. One such example is "I ... I understand what you're saying", in Section 3 of Part 2 before the challenging remark "but I'm trying to get you to realize something before that ..." (52-53). This disclaimer is used in response to the teacher's strong resistance to the suggestion, in order to show willingness to understand the teacher's belief and to reduce the face-threatening effect of the utterance to follow. Another such example is "I understand", before a clarification question "but are we definitely through with the 1920's tomorrow?" (60). Both of them are used in Section 2, where the supervisor's sub-goal is to CLARIFY the issue. Though disclaimers are usually considered as pre-positioned preventatives for the utterances to follow, our data show that they can be used to refer to an adjacent utterance both prospectively and retrospectively. In Section 1 of Part 1, the supervisor, who is against the teacher's proposal, first informs him that he wants to discuss whether that is a good idea. But then, immediately after, he tries to prevent a possible interpretation that he rejected that proposal by saying "No, you can do that if that's what you want to do " (06-07). This straightens out the intent of the previous message retrospectively, perhaps at the same time framing the following message in a positive manner. Likewise, the following qualifying message " I ' m not saying it isn't" (09) is a disclaimer used to prevent a negative interpretation retrospectively. In both of these, the supervisor tries to save the positive face of the teacher by minimizing the face-threatening effects of the negative response, because his sub-goal here is just to LISTEN to what the teacher has to say. Disclaimers may also be used to indicate that an interpretation or proposition is not the speaker's own, but the interlocutor's. In the first exchange of Part 2, the
23 For more discussionon these categories, see Nofsinger(1991:111-144).
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supervisor tries to 'align' the phrase "If you had a lesson in class that bombed" (28) by saying "and you're apparently telling me that's what's happened today". The disclaimer is used to reduce the face-threatening effect of the word "bombed" by reminding the teacher that the supervisor is not expressing his personal view. The aligning action not only reveals understanding and concern for the teacher's want (i.e., respect for his positive face), but also prevents the teacher from asserting that the supervisor is being presumptuous (i.e., disrespect for his negative face). The same kind of disclaimer, whereby the speaker simply reproduces what the interlocutor has said earlier, is found in other places. In the first exchange of Section 2 of Part 2, the supervisor tries to elicit an objective view in a more direct manner. He initiates the informing move with a starter "Now, think of what you just said" (38) before he informs the teacher that "The lesson just bombed" (38). This is a disclaimer which is used to prevent an interpretation that the supervisor is being judgmental in a face-threatening manner. In both cases, disclaimers are used to help the teacher ANALYZE the problem in a non face-threatening manner. Also in the first exchange of the last section of Part 2, the supervisor initiates the eliciting move by saying, "So you just told me that if you try to do it tomorrow there's probably going to be a dislike for the material" (64-66). The metalinguistic phrase "So you just told me" reminds the teacher that the observation that the students will have a negative reaction toward the material is not his own. Repetition. The speaker often repeats exactly what the interlocutor has said in the prior turn to indicate that he/she has understood the message. This is a common aligning device, by which the speaker can show not only participatory listenership of the message, but also positive politeness such as acceptance, sharing of a belief, involvement, intimacy, and rapport (Tannen, 1989). 24 Repetition can convey positive politeness more strongly than short back-channels of the continuer type such as "mm hum", or "yeah" (Schegloff, 1982, Nofsinger, 1991:117). Repetition serves not just to indicate that "one has heard correctly what was said", but "to stress emotional agreement with the utterance" (Brown and Levinson, 1989: 112-113). Aligning actions in the form of repetition are often used in my data (particularly in Part 2), either in an acknowledging move (35, 62) or in an eliciting move (45, 69, 71) (see Fig. 3). Repetition in an acknowledging move is used when the supervisor ends each section with positive reinforcement, before moving into the next phase. In Section 1 of Part 2, for example, the supervisor repeats the teacher's response in the pre-head position ("To take the same topic?' (35)). It is a pseudo-agreement, by which the supervisor indicates acceptance and rapport before he moves to the next phase of action (i.e., Section 2). Repetition in an eliciting move is also used to reduce the face-threatening effects which may arise by asking the same question. It is used in exchanges where the teacher's answers are relevant to the supervisor's questions, but are not exactly what the supervisor had in mind. An example of this is the repetition "Confusion" (45), used toward the end of the second section of Part 2 to elicit a different word. 24 For an extensivediscussionon the theoreticalimplications,functions,and variationof repetition,see Tannen (1989: 36-58).
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Formulation. The speaker may express the gist of what the interlocutor has said, for example, when trying to confirm his/her understanding of the interlocutor's prior utterance. This should be distinguished from simple repetition and is referred to as "formulation" (Heritage, 1985). Like repetition, formulation is used as a face-saving device. It indicates to the interlocutor that the speaker is not only attentive, but accepts what the teacher has just said. In the excerpt, formulation is found exclusively in the exchanges toward the end of each section, as the supervisor moves on to advance his plan (16, 26, 35, 47, 62-63) (see Fig. 3). Formulations are not necessarily comprehensive or neutral summaries of the prior turn; rather, they offer a "representation" of a narrow selection, or a proposed "upshot" of prior talk (Heritage, 1985: 101, cited in Nofsinger, 1991: 121). In clinical supervision, the upshot is often used to indirectly control the flow of discussion. One example of formulation is found in the second exchange of Part 1, where the supervisor responds with a statement, "So you're telling me you feel it would be a good idea to do it because there are important things that were not discussed." (16). We see that the supervisor paraphrases the teacher's response in such a way as to change the teacher's answer (a statement of specific details of the next lesson) into one which is more relevant to his own plan. Another example occurs in the last exchange of Part 1, where the supervisor acknowledges the teacher's answer by saying "So you feel that would be a new material." (26). Here, the supervisor takes up the second statement only because it is more relevant to his present question and his local sub-goal.
4. Conclusion The present study was carried out based on the earlier observation that a single message can be expressed through a series of utterances. The main concem of the study was to describe how face-saving strategies for dispreferred messages are produced through sequences of acts as the outputs of plan and sub-plans. It was argued that the redressive strategies for refusal can be explained as two-way interactive, goal-oriented operations based on global and local knowledge of discourse. Two types of global discourse knowledge which constrain speech actions top-down were proposed for the global analysis. One type of knowledge concerns the interactional structures of floor and turn, while the other concerns the organizational structure of script. In clinical supervision, the interactional knowledge is used to conduct the discussion in a collaborative manner. It prescribed the role of the supervisor as a pseudo floor-supporter who provided back-channel actions to advance his/her goals. The data also showed that this organizational knowledge directed the supervisor to conduct the discussion according to the three-stage procedure eharacteristic Of clinical supervision. This procedure was applied cyclically to lower levels of organizational units and constrained local redressive actions. The other type of knowledge concerns sequential information: this constitutes the basis of bottom-up operations and is derived from local interaction. The analysis of local speech actions was conducted from two perspectives, the structural analysis of sequences and the alignment analysis of actions. The first perspective of analysis aimed at finding out how the super-
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visor manages current bottom-up decisions in each section, while keeping in mind a more global organization and goal. Here, the data showed that a combination of multiple acts were used to produce moves with redressive effects. Such moves in turn were used recurrently to constitute a systematic set of exchanges for each section, and provided internal evidence for the organizational units proposed in the global analysis. The second perspective of analysis looked into what type of speech actions were directed to adjacent utterances to manage conversational meanings and communicator role. Here, it was found that disclaimers, repetitions, and formulations were among the most salient forms of aligning actions used to monitor and advance the supervisor's plan. The present study confirmed earlier observations that the speaker's redressive strategies cannot be explained in terms of individual, or some combination of individual, speech actions alone. Many of these actions are not routine expressions with redressive features of the sorts described by Brown and Levinson (1989) and may not be considered as politeness strategies in isolated contexts; they are interpreted as politeness acts when analyzed in terms of goals and scripts. Though the use of structured sequences has been observed in previous studies of pre-sequences, such as preinvitations, pre-requests, and pre-arrangements (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 253, Levinson, 1983: 345-349, Hopper, 1992: 156-161), the present study suggests that preference organization of structured sequences is not confined to such routinized interactions. Secondly, the two-directional analysis of politeness strategies suggests that the collaborative use of both global and local analysis of interaction provides an adequate and comprehensive account of social phenomena. A global analysis of the clinical supervision accounted for the reasons 'why' the supervisor conducts the session in the way he does, whereas the local analysis of interactions accounted for the process of 'how' he deals with conflicts to accomplish his goals in non face-threatening manners. The present study has clearly demonstrated that both macro- and micro-methods, when used in a complementary manner, can enrich talk analysis of this kind. 25 The present study also suggests that what appear to be primarily social and affective operations, such as politeness techniques, in large part overlap and coincide with cognitive operations. It may well be that there are similar crossovers in other related social phenomena, and future studies using this kind of approach may provide more profound insights into the pragmatics of human interaction.
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