Political disagreement and ambivalence in new information environment: Exploring conditional indirect effects of partisan news use and heterogeneous discussion networks on SNSs on political participation

Accepted Manuscript Political Disagreement and Ambivalence in New Information Environment: Exploring Conditional Indirect Effects of Partisan News Use and Heterogeneous Discussion Networks on SNSs on Political Participation Jinhee Kim, Ki Deuk Hyun PII: DOI: Reference:

S0736-5853(17)30044-8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2017.07.005 TELE 979

To appear in:

Telematics and Informatics

Received Date: Revised Date: Accepted Date:

18 January 2017 10 July 2017 11 July 2017

Please cite this article as: Kim, J., Hyun, K.D., Political Disagreement and Ambivalence in New Information Environment: Exploring Conditional Indirect Effects of Partisan News Use and Heterogeneous Discussion Networks on SNSs on Political Participation, Telematics and Informatics (2017), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tele. 2017.07.005

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

Running Head: Political Disagreement and Ambivalence

Political Disagreement and Ambivalence in New Information Environment: Exploring Conditional Indirect Effects of Partisan News Use and Heterogeneous Discussion Networks on SNSs on Political Participation

Jinhee Kim* (Ph.D., Associate Professor) 77 Cheongam-Ro, Nam-Gu Division of Humanities and Social Sciences Pohang University of Science and Technology, Pohang South Korea 37673

Ki Deuk Hyun (Ph.D., Associate Professor) Global Studies Program Akita International University, Akita, Japan

1

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

2

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

3

Abstract This study investigates the (de)mobilizing influences of political (dis)agreement in the news and in political discussion on political attitudes and participation in new information environments. Results demonstrate the mediating functions of political ambivalence in that exposure to proattitudinal news reduces ambivalence and thereby promotes political participation, whereas exposure to counter-attitudinal news increases ambivalence and thereby discourages participation. Importantly, the effect of exposure to counter-attitudinal news on ambivalence was moderated by heterogeneous discussion networks on social network sites, such that the combination of exposure to counter-attitudinal news and to heterogeneous discussion networks amplifies ambivalence additively, and thereby augments the tendency toward demobilization. These results are interpreted as suggesting that changing media contexts may lead to complex roles of news and political discussion.

Keyword: Political Disagreement, Political Ambivalence, Partisan News, Heterogeneous Political Discussion Network, Political Participation

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

4

Political Disagreement and Ambivalence in New Information Environment: Exploring Moderated Mediation Effects of Partisan News Use and Heterogeneous Discussion Networks on SNSs on Political Participation 1. Introduction Political disagreement and ambivalence have been noted as major factors that can function to depress political participation (e.g., Dilliplane, 2011). Mostly focusing on the heterogeneous discussion networks, prior literature suggests that political disagreement that people encounter during interpersonal communication can discourage them from engaging in politics. In this demobilizing process induced by the disagreement, political ambivalence has been considered to play a key role in mediating/moderating the effects of heterogeneous communication on political participation (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn 2004; Nir, 2005). Although previous research reveals that the characteristics of discussion networks have important influences on political engagement, recent rapid changes in the information environment due to the emergence of new media technologies require that researchers reexamine the relationships among heterogeneous discussion networks, political ambivalence, and participation. Specifically, first, digital technologies create various venues in which people can express and exchange political opinion and viewpoints. For example, political discussion aided by online discussion forums and social network sites (SNSs) places an additional dimension to face-to-face political conversation. Second, emerging media technologies can enhance user control over the selection of political news and discussion partners based on the user’s political dispositions, which can affect political attitudes and participation accordingly. These seemingly increasing trends in ability to select news and discussion partners by political similarity may reinforce pre-existing political beliefs and opinion, raising concerns about fragmentation and

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

5

polarization of public opinion (Sunstein, 2001). However, some scholars have asserted that the current information environment does not necessarily diminish people’s exposure to political difference and disagreement. For example, individuals do not actively avoid exposure to online information that challenges their attitudes (Garrett, 2009) and emerging media technologies can even facilitate inadvertent exposure to politically-dissimilar views (Brundidge, 2010; Kim, 2011; Yang, Barnidge, & Rojas, 2017). These studies indicated that considerable exposure to news and opinion that disagree with an individual’s attitudes can happen in communication mediated by emerging media. At the same time, the studies also imply that reliance on online news sources and discussion may not exert uniform effects on political attitudes and behaviors. Rather, the influences of emerging mediamediated political communication may depend upon the extent to which individuals expose themselves to similar or dissimilar information by consuming news and engaging in political discussion. To illuminate the complex roles of agreement and disagreement in political communication induced by emerging media environments, this study examines theoretical links among two politically different types of news site use, namely proattitudinal and counterattitudinal news, heterogeneous discussion networks, political ambivalence and participation. To account for the effect of the rapidly changing political information environments, we focus on partisan news websites that are accessible from PC and mobile devices, and the network heterogeneity of discussion on SNSs, which are increasingly popular and prominent. Theoretically, the current research draws upon the differential gains model which hypothesizes that both news use and political discussion would contribute to participation interactively because frequent discussion amplifies the mobilizing effects of news consumption (Hardy &

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

6

Scheufele, 2005; Scheufele, 2002). However, we argue that in partisan selective contexts facilitated by new information environments, the interactive relationship may take different turns. Specifically, political agreement or disagreement with news sites that an individual relies on may increase or decrease political participation mainly through the level of political ambivalence, and these indirect effects may be moderated by the level of heterogeneous political discussion networks in which the individual engages. To test this proposition, we propose moderated mediation models of partisan news site use on participation, and examine the mediating function of political ambivalence conditioned by discussion heterogeneity on SNSs. 2. Literature review 2.1. Partisan news use, political ambivalence, and participation Diverse news sources tailored to users’ preferred ideological and political orientations have been prevalent since the emergence of the Internet and cable TV news channels. Unlike traditional mainstream news media that present relatively objective, moderate, and two opposing as well as equally convincing views of political life, partisan news outlets may provide biased views that favor one political view over the other (Levendusky, 2013a; 2013b). This kind of news tends to deliver simplified one-sided messages that may help audience make sense of complicated political world by filtering out information that contradicts a predisposition (Rosenstiel, 2006). Particularly, emerging media technologies equipped with increased user control are often believed to enhance the selection of politically likeminded news (Sunstein, 2001). Political blogs and online opinionated news sites are examples of these new forms of slanted news source. In addition, because partisan news reaches the public through news websites and SNSs, individuals can easily and readily seek and obtain proattitudinal news. As partisan news outlets gain popularity and influence, scholars’ attention has been

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

7

shifted away from exploring the level of news exposure or attention and toward examining the degree of selection of news that is consonant with users’ political views (e.g., Dilliplane, 2011; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Levendusky 2013a; 2013b; Stroud, 2010). One of the crucial consequences of likeminded news use is the reinforcement of political attitudes, which results in the formation of clear and certain evaluations of in-group political party and leaders. This strengthening of attitudes may yield extreme, skewed, and polarized attitudes. The reinforcement of political orientations induced by online partisan news outlets can promote political participation. Partisan news outlets tend to endorse the in-group party, criticize the out-group party, and induce anger and disgust at the out-group party (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Therefore, exposure to news aligned with individuals’ political dispositions enhances in-group identity—i.e., partisanship (Levendusky, 2013b), strengthens partisan beliefs (Stroud, 2011), increases accessibility to partisan attitude (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2011), and creates biased perceptions of public opinion climate that are supportive of one’s political opinion (DvirGvirsman, Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015). This strong attitude toward the in-group political party as well as prominent leaders can encourage political participation. Indeed, increased exposure to politically likeminded information may be enjoyable, cultivate enthusiasm, and further energize citizens’ political activities (Dilliplane, 2011; Stroud, 2010). Besides the use of proattitudinal news, the current media context also provides ample opportunities to come across news stories that challenge one’s political positions. Users do not necessarily avoid dissimilar news actively, revealing some degree of tolerance for political differences and disagreements (Garrett, 2009). In addition, new media can facilitate inadvertent exposure to political disagreement and differences, because physical and discursive boundaries that used to set apart politically different groups and their ideas become more porous in online

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

8

spheres (Brundidge, 2010). Furthermore, even highly-engaged users who express their political views and read news stories posted do not filter out dissonant information from their information feeds (e.g., unfriending), but maintain online friendships (Yang et al., 2017). As a result, online news use can increase exposure to social and political differences. Paradoxically, the use of counter-attitudinal news that appears to be desirable in achieving deliberation and tolerance in democratic society tends to increase political ambivalence (Dilliplane, 2011; Keele & Wolak, 2008) as a result of simultaneous consideration of competing arguments (Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2002). Ambivalence has been defined as “feelings of conflict that a person experiences when an attitude object is considered” (Priester & Petty, 1996, p. 432), or as “the co-existence of positive and negative dispositions toward an attitude object” (Ajzen, 2001, p. 39). The main difference between these two conceptualizations (Priester & Petty, 1996 for details) is that the former refers to actually-felt mixed or opposing feelings (i.e., subjective experience), whereas the latter refers to the simultaneous presence of two opposing thoughts and feelings (i.e., objective structural property). Ambivalence is different from indifference that shows no response either positively or negatively (Yoo, 2010) and from the uncertainty that results from a lack of information (Alvarez & Brehm, 1997). The current research focuses on the latter conceptualization— positive and negative evaluations to a political object. Political ambivalence has been measured by estimating the degree to which respondents have both positive feelings and negative feelings, mostly about two political candidates or parties (i.e., rival candidates and ruling vs. opposition party). For example, Nir (2005) measured ambivalence using “average intensity of the two ratings and disparity between them” (p. 428) suggested by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995). This measure that reflects objective

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

9

ambivalence has been used extensively in prior relevant literature (Mutz, 2002, Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Lee & Chan, 2009), and the current research also uses this measure (Section 3.2.3). Subjective ambivalence has been measured by assessing the extent to which participants’ reactions are conflicted, mixed, and indecisive to an attitude object (Priester & Petty, 1996). For example, Lee and Chan (2009) measured subjective ambivalence by asking respondents the degree to which they experience difficulty when judging who is right and who is wrong on the topic of political reform. Once individuals feel ambivalent due to the exposure to contradictory information, they may seek additional information and further process it carefully and systematically (Rudolph & Popp, 2007). This procedure may facilitate internalization of any two competing arguments and thus weaken subsequent behavioral intentions and behaviors (Levendusky, 2013b). Thus, ambivalent individuals may remain indecisive or may vacillate under conflicting situations. These individuals may take a long time to make a decision during an election, may show decreased interest in politics with perceived confusion, and may lose motivation to become involved in political activities (Hmielowski, 2012; Lavine, 2001; Matthes, 2012; Nir & Druckman, 2008). Although prior literature does not reach a consensus regarding the direct relationship between the use of counter-attitudinal news and political participation, the inclusion of possible mediator (i.e., political ambivalence) may allow us to predict indirect effect of counter-attitudinal news on diminished participation through the mediator. In sum, proattitudinal news site use may reinforce existing political attitudes, reduce political ambivalence, and thus form strong and certain political views, resulting in mobilizing political action. In contrast, counter-attitudinal news site use may lead users to endorse opposing information to evaluate political parties or leaders, which induces political ambivalence and

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

10

indecisiveness, resulting in demobilizing political action. Although political ambivalence has been proposed as a main underlying mechanism to explain the association between exposure to congenial versus opposing news sites and participation, the mechanism has not been tested directly (cf. Hmielowski, 2012). With this reasoning, the following two hypotheses were drawn: H1: Counter-attitudinal news site use will demobilize political participation through heightened political ambivalence. H2: Proattitudinal news site use will mobilize political participation through diminished political ambivalence. 2.2. Moderating role of heterogeneous discussion networks on SNS In addition to exploring each of the two types of indirect effects explained, this study also examines a possible moderating role of political discussion network. News use and political discussion have been identified as two major communication elements that contribute to political participation both independently and jointly. Literature on the basis of differential gains model (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Scheufele, 2002) explored joint effects of news use and political conversation on participation. Specifically, positive association between news use and participation tends to be augmented particularly when political conversation is frequently made. Relevant findings were interpreted as suggesting that those who engage in political conversation have a chance to distill main issues from news consumption, to discuss the issues’ relevance to their own political life, and to understand complicated political processes effectively through reflective thinking—all of these activities promote informed, active, and meaningful political participation (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Leighley, 1990; McLeod et al., 1999; Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000). However, the aforementioned picture of the interactive effect of news consumption and

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

11

political conversation on participation can be somewhat different with the rapid changes in the political information environment, thus providing opportunities to advance the differential gains model. Specifically, the model has not considered the popularization of partisan news and political discussion on emerging media platforms. The prevalence of online partisan news sites provides individuals with great control over their selection of politically preferred news. Political conversation in online environments allows individuals to become involved easily in geographically-unconstrained conversations with people who have heterogeneous beliefs (Kim, Hsu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013). Particularly, SNSs such as Facebook and Twitter, connect people from diverse social and political backgrounds (Papacharissi, 2002). Due to these characteristics, SNS use tends to be more strongly associated with bridging than bonding social capital (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007), which implies that conversation through SNSs may help users to reach out to diverse and heterogeneous groups of people and their ideas. Furthermore, key formal interactive SNS features such as hyperlinks and discussion threads enable easy movement among sites and thereby allow users to be exposed to ideologically divergent, cross-cutting perspectives (Kim, 2011). Similarly, the current SNS environment helps users to encounter dissimilar opinions inadvertently (Brundidge, 2010). Because the boundary between political and apolitical domains tend to be blurry (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), when visiting entertainment sites, people may encounter the same sex marriage controversy portrayed on TV dramas that include diverse and challenging perspectives. With this changing political communication environment in mind, the current study explores the role of heterogeneous conversation networks made in SNSs that may moderate each of the two indirect effects explained. Specifically, H1 states that when people use counter-

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

12

attitudinal news frequently, they may develop political ambivalence that may, in turn, depress political activities. What would be the role of SNSs-mediated heterogeneous conversation networks in this relationship? Assuming that counter-attitudinal news users may not avoid conflicting information actively (Brundidge, 2010; Garrett, 2009; Mutz, 2006) and that their exposure to heterogeneous conversation networks is also expected to enhance political ambivalence, the combined exposure to counter-attitudinal news use and heterogeneous discussion networks may amplify political ambivalence additively, which may reflect differential losses model (Brundidge, Garrett, Rojas, & Gil de Zuniga, 2014). That is, the indirect path proposed in H1 may be augmented, particularly when users are exposed to a high (vs. low) heterogeneity of opinion encountered during conversation on SNSs. Similar to the logic explained above paragraph, we predict that the negative association between proattitudinal news use and political ambivalence may be weakened when users are exposed to a high (vs. low) heterogeneity of opinion encountered during conversation on SNSs. This may be the case because diverse opinions encountered accidentally or intentionally may allow individuals to moderate or change their pre-existing attitudes by reconciling divergent political evaluations (Papacharissi, 2002). For example, proattitudinal news users who engage in heterogeneous political discussion may experience the clash of opposing views. Given that heterogeneous discussion networks tend to increase political ambivalence (Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Mutz, 2006), the indirect effect from proattitudinal news use to enhanced political participation through diminished political ambivalence may be alleviated particularly when level of heterogeneous discussion networks is high compared to low. In sum, the current study examines whether the influence of heterogeneous conversation networks on SNSs can moderate the indirect effects postulated in H1 and H2. Because these two

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

13

interactive effects imply that each of the two strength of associations between independent variable (i.e., pro- and counter-attitudinal news use respectively) and mediator (i.e., ambivalence) will vary depending on the level of the moderator (i.e., heterogeneous conversation on SNSs), the significant interactive effects would result in moderated mediation effects. Therefore, the following hypotheses were drawn. H3: The demobilizing effect of counter-attitudinal news site use on political participation through heightened political ambivalence will be stronger when the level of heterogeneous political conversation networks on SNSs is high compared to low. H4: The mobilizing effect of pro-attitudinal news site use on political participation through diminished political ambivalence will be weaker when the level of heterogeneous political conversation networks on SNSs is high compared to low. 2.3. The context of South Korea The current political communication situation in South Korea consists of a multitude of partisan media operations and a growing ideological division of the news media and politics. Since the transition to democracy beginning in the late 1980s, Korean politics has continued its ideological differentiation and split. Two major political camps representing conservative and progressive politics have alternated administrative and congressional power in post-authoritarian Korean society. This ideological differentiation and contestation process has facilitated ideological polarization among political elites (Lee, N. Y., 2011), followed by sharp partisan division among the public over important policy issues (Lee, S.-W., 2011). News media have been regarded to assist this political change toward progressiveconservative separation by actively advocating particular partisan and ideological orientations. News media, especially newspapers, tend to clearly take partisan positions, and often to set

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

14

policy agendas, over ideologically-divisive policy issues (Rhee, Cho, Song, & Jung, 2011). At the time of data collection, for example, South Korea had a group of strong partisan news outlets which broadly support one of the two major political parties. Conservative media outlets (e.g., Chosun Ilbo) generally align their editorial stances with the party that is currently ruling (Saenuri) which represents conservative politics, whereas progressive media (e.g., Hankyoreh Sinmun) tend to support progressive politics of the party that is currently the main opposition (New Politics Alliance). The widespread use of emerging media technologies such as SNSs has further polarized and fragmented the public along partisan and ideological lines. SNSs are very popular in Korea, and the number of SNS users tends to increase each year. One survey showed that as of 2015, 4,250 out of 9,873 respondents (43.1% vs. 39.9% in 2014) use at least one SNS, mostly on their smartphone, and that their average use time per day was 65 minutes (vs. 60 minutes in 2014) (Analysis of SNS use trend and use behavior, 2016). Although Korean citizens’ active use of SNSs is assumed to promote their political engagement, interactions on SNSs are reported to replicate the polarized tendency of mainstream media. Studies found that Korean Twitter users tended to follow news sites that agreed with their partisan orientations than with sites that opposed it (Hahn, Ryu, & Park, 2015), and that political bloggers were more likely to exchange hyperlinks with correspondents who had similar political views than with those whose view differed (Park & Thelwall, 2008). This highly-polarized and highly-fragmented media environment in Korea raises an important question regarding how democratic citizenship is affected by this diversity of political information and discussion via new media. 3. Methods 3.1. Sample and procedure

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

15

Data from various regions across South Korea were collected from SNSs users. They were recruited from an online panel sample. One survey company in Seoul that had about 1 million online users was commissioned to administer an online survey in 2014. For the current study, the survey company sent an email invitation with an online survey link (URL) to its panel members by using a system-generated randomization tool, subject to constraints that age and gender were proportionate to the SNS user population approximately. The survey included one screener question that asks respondents to check all SNSs that they are currently using at the time of data collection. All participants used both Facebook and Twitter (N = 542). Of the 542 participants, 269 (49.6%) were female. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 68 (M = 30.58, SD = 9.89). Compared to a survey that used a representative sample (N = 10,172) conducted in Korea that reflects 2014 SNS users’ profiles (Kim, 2015), our sample overrepresented groups aged in the 20s (45.6% vs. 27.5%) and 30s (31.5% vs. 22.7%) and underrepresented groups aged in the 40s (10.7% vs. 16.4%) and 50s (4.2% vs. 8.2%). This disproportion was inevitable, partly because the current study did not recruit participants under age of 18 who constitute about 17% of SNS users in Korea. However, the large-scale survey showed that 47.6% of SNS users in Korea are female, so our sample represented gender proportions overall. The median level of education was a four-year college degree, and the average monthly income was 3,500,000 – 3,990,000 won, which is higher than that of the general population. With regard current occupation, 37.3% of respondent were employed as administrative support workers, 28.6% were students, 8.3% were professionals, 7% were unemployed, 6.6% were homemakers, 4.1% were self-employed, 3.3% were freelancers, 1.1% were public officers, 0.7% were teaching profession, and 3% had other occupations. 3.2. Measures

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

16

3.2.1. Pro and counter-attitudinal news site use. Partisan news site use was measured by asking how many days per week respondents accessed partisan news sites through computers and mobile devices to obtain political news. Use of each of three representative conservative news sites (i.e., Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, and JoongAng Ilbo) and three progressive news sites (i.e., Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang Shinmun, and OhmyNews) in South Korea were probed. Based on the averaged frequencies of use of news sites that were either consistent with or opposed to respondent’s political ideology, an index was created for proattitudinal news site use (M = 2.84 days, SD = 1.87) and for counter-attitudinal news site use (M = 2.33 days, SD = 1.60) respectively. For example, when respondents identified themselves as conservatives, their use of conservative news sites was considered as proattitudinal news use, whereas their use of progressive news sites was counted as counterattitudinal news site use. When respondents had no ideological leanings, their use of either conservative or progressive news sites was treated as mixed news use, and the two averaged usage frequencies combined were multiplied by 0.5 and the same frequency numbers were assigned to both proattitudinal and counter-attitudinal news site use, following the method of Mutz and Martin (2001). For example, if a respondent with no particular political leaning indicated 4 days and 6 days of his/her averaged usage frequencies of conservative and progressive news site respectively, his/her score for proattitudinal and counter-attitudinal news site use were 5 and 5. 3.2.2. Heterogeneous discussion networks on SNSs. The heterogeneous discussion networks were measured for SNS-mediated political conversation. Based on previous studies (Eveland & Hively, 2009; Mutz, 2002), an individual’s SNS-based conversation with people having opposed political orientations and viewpoints was

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

17

regarded as heterogeneous discussion on SNS. To assess each respondent’s individual network heterogeneity, respondents were asked to use a 10-point scale to rate how often they talked about politics and government affairs through SNSs with (a) people who are conservative, (b) people who are progressive, (c) people supportive of the ruling party, (d) people supportive of the opposition party, and (e) people who disagree with their political views. Subsequently, following Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Waismel-Manor, and Nisbet’s (2006) operationalization, each individual’s responses to each question were recoded based on that individual’s self-reported political ideology. For example, if a respondent identified herself/himself as a conservative, discussions with (b), (d), and (e) were judged to be heterogeneous discussion. Each respondent’s discussion frequencies with politically dissimilar people were averaged to create each respondent’s discussion network heterogeneity on SNS (M = 3.36, SD = 1.90). Similar to the measurement of news site use, for those having no particular ideological leanings, discussion with either conservative or progressive discussants was considered as mixed discussion, and the two discussion frequencies combined were multiplied by 0.5. Of note, the offline heterogeneous discussion networks were also measured using the same scale and items and an index was also created using the same procedure explained (M = 4.14, SD = 1.79). 3.2.3. Political ambivalence. Political ambivalence was constructed by computing respondents’ combined ratings of the two main political parties, ruling (R) and opposition (O) ones, and of the two main political leaders, the current president Gunhye Park (P) and the leader of the opposition party Jaein Moon (M). The rating score for each of the four measures above (i.e., R, O, P, and M) ranged from 1 (Strongly Dislike) to 11 (Strongly Like). Each individual’s ambivalent attitude toward the main

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

18

political parties and political leaders respectively was computed by using two equations below (Nir, 2005). Ambivalent attitude toward political parties = (R+O)/2 -│R-O│ Ambivalent attitude toward political leaders = (P+M)/2 -│P-M│ Each of the two ambivalence scores ranged from -4 (Least Ambivalent) to 11 (Most Ambivalent). For example, if one respondent rated 1 (Strongly Dislike) for ruling party and 11 (Strongly Like) for the opposition party (or the reverse), the score was -4 (Least Ambivalent). In contrast, if a respondent rated 11 (Strongly Like) for president Gunhye Park and 11 (Strongly Like) for Mr. Jain Moon, the score was 11 (Most Ambivalent). The two types of ambivalence scores were averaged for the purpose of analysis (r = .73) and labeled as political ambivalence (M = 3.62, SD = 2.04) 3.2.4. Political participation Political participation was measured by asking whether respondents had engaged in each of the following six political activities: attending political meetings, participating in protests, joining political parties, donating money to a specific party or organization, persuading others to vote for or against a specific party or candidate, and signing petitions (1 = Yes, 0 = No). An additive participation index was created by summing all responses (M = 1.16, SD = 1.65, α = .77). Because this variable was substantially skewed in a positive direction (skewness = 1.54) and included zeros, it was transformed using the LG 10 (original score of political participation + 1) recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). After the transformation (M = .23, SD = .28), the skewness of the variable was .70, which is acceptable. 3.2.5. Control variables Demographic (age, gender, education, income), political, and news media attention

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

19

variables were included as controls. Five political variables that may influence political participation were measured. Political interest was measured using a single 7-point scale (M = 4.49, SD = 1.51). Political knowledge was measured by asking four questions regarding political figures and institutions in South Korea. An index was created by adding the number of correct answers to the questions (M = 2.48, SD = 1.26, α = .61). The strength of political ideology was measured initially on a 7-point scale (1 = Strong Conservative, 7 = Strong Progressive); however, the folded measure ranging from 0 (Independent) to 3 (Strong Conservative or Strong Progressive) was used (M = 1.82, SD = .88) for the current analysis purpose. Similarly, the strength of partisanship was measured initially on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Supportive for Ruling Party, 7 = Strongly Supportive for Oppositional Party); however, the folded measure ranging from 0 (Independent) to 3 (Strongly Supportive for Ruling or Oppositional Party) was used (M = 1.85, SD = .96) for the current analysis. For news media variables, level of attention to news was measured using a 5-point scale (1 = Very Little Attention, 5 = Very Close Attention) by assessing attention to newspapers (M = 2.73, SD = 1.28), TV news (M = 3.50, SD = .92), and online news (M = 3.67, SD = 1.01). Correlations among focal and control variables are shown in Table 1. 4. Results 4.1. Testing the hypothesized indirect effects H1 and H2 were tested using SPSS macro program developed by Hayes (2013; 2015). Each of the two mediations models was set up and the control variables aforementioned were taken into account respectively. Bootstrapping procedures (N = 5,000 bootstrap samples) and 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals were used to examine each of the two hypothesized indirect effects (Figure 1). Results showed that counter-attitudinal news use discouraged political

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

20

participation through heightened political ambivalence, indirect effect b = -.004, CI [-.0091, .0001]. In contrast, proattitudinal news use encouraged political participation through diminished political ambivalence, indirect effect b = .003, CI [.003, .006]. Although these indirect effects are close to zero, both H1 and H2 were supported. Notably, the overlap of the variances of counterattitudinal news and political participation with the variance of political ambivalence (R2) was .002. Likewise, the overlap of the variances of proattitudinal news and political participation with the variance of political ambivalence (R2) was .006. These results indicate that the effects were small (see MacKinnon, 2008; Preacher & Kelly, 2011 for r-squared measures). [Figure 1 about Here] 4.2. Testing the hypothesized Moderated Mediation Effects H3 and H4 were also tested using the same macro program and procedure. Given that significant interactions for each of the two types of new exposure (i.e., pro and counterattitudinal news site use) and heterogeneous discussion networks of SNS-based conversation on political ambivalence were predicted, Model 7 in the same macro program was used. H3 predicted that the negative effect of counter-attitudinal news site use on political participation through heightened political ambivalence would be augmented more when the degree of heterogeneous SNS-based discussion network is high than when it is low (i.e., differential losses model). To test this idea, a moderated mediation effect was tested by treating the degree of heterogeneous SNS-based discussion network as a moderator. Proattitudinal news site use and offline heterogeneous discussion networks were controlled along with the control variables mentioned. Results revealed that the predicted interaction for counter-attitudinal news site use and heterogeneous network of SNS-based discussion on political ambivalence was significant, b

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

21

= .06, t = 2.22, p < .05. This interaction suggests that the positive association between counterattitudinal news site use and political ambivalence tends to be stronger when the level of heterogeneous network of SNS-mediated conversation is high than when it is low. With this significant and positive interaction in mind, directly relevant to H3, the index of moderated mediation from the macro output showed that the indirect effect of counter-attitudinal news site use on participation through ambivalence was significantly moderated by heterogeneous network of SNS-mediated conversation (Figure 2): index of moderated mediation (ω) = -.0010, CI [.0027, -.0001]. Specifically, the negative indirect effect (i.e., counter-attitudinal news site use tend to depress political participation through heightened ambivalence) was significant when heterogeneous network of SNS-based conversation was high (Mean+1SD, Mean): indirect effect b = -.0050, CI [-.0107, -.0015], indirect effect b = -.0031, CI [-.0072, -.0008] respectively. However, the negative indirect effect was no longer significant when the heterogeneous network of SNS-based conversation was low (Mean–1SD): indirect effect b = -.0013, CI [-.0057, .0014]. These results can be interpreted as suggesting that counter-attitudinal news site use tends to depress participation by heightening ambivalence and that this negative indirect effect is exacerbated when heterogeneous network of SNS conversation is encountered frequently. [Figure 2 about Here] Using the same procedure, H4 was also tested. Counter-attitudinal news site use and offline heterogeneous discussion networks were controlled along with the covariates mentioned. H4 predicted that the indirect effect of proattitudinal news site use on political participation as a consequence of diminished political ambivalence would be alleviated when level of heterogeneous network of SNS-based conversation is high compared to when it is low. Results showed that the interaction between proattitudinal news site use and heterogeneous network of

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

22

SNS conversation on political ambivalence was not significant, b = .009 t = .41, p > .05. Furthermore, the index of moderated mediation from the macro output showed that the indirect effect of proattitudinal news site use on participation through ambivalence was not significantly moderated by heterogeneous network of SNS conversation: index of moderated mediation (ω) = -.0002, CI [-.0012, .0007]. Thus, H4 was not supported. 5. Discussion The purpose of this study was to explore how the rapidly-changing political communication environments, particularly focusing on the emergence of partisan news and heterogeneous discussion networks on SNS, may influence levels of political ambivalence that results in (de)mobilizing political participation. Results show that proattitudinal news site use reduced political ambivalence and that this reduction promoted active political participation. In contrast, counter-attitudinal news site use increased political ambivalence, and this increase discouraged political engagement. Two theoretical implications are noteworthy from these findings (H1 and H2). First, although prior research suggested political ambivalence as a possible mechanism that explains the negative relationship between exposure to heterogeneous news information and political participation (e.g., Brundidge et al., 2014; Dilliplane, 2011), the current research measured and tested its mediating role directly. Second, the findings suggest that political ambivalence can be influenced by contextual information, such as complicated political information environment, showing its malleable characteristic, not just a static trait formed by an individual’s enduring dispositions (Keele & Wolak, 2008; Rudolph, 2011). Furthermore, when the frequent use of counter-attitudinal news sites is combined with the involvement of heterogeneous political discussion networks on SNSs, these two communication elements further exacerbated the demobilizing effects additively (H3) as

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

23

predicted by differential losses model (Brundidge et al., 2014). However, contrary to the similar prediction of this model (to a lesser degree compared to H3), H4 was not supported. Specifically, although H4 predicted that proattitudinal news sites use combined with heterogeneous discussion networks on SNS would increase political ambivalence, the results do not support the hypothesis. Perhaps, exposure to likeminded news may trigger an uncompromising mindset along with strong internal efficacy because the news may provide readers with useful resources that can be used to counter opposing arguments and defend the readers’ existing viewpoints. Namely, proattitudinal news users may discount the incongruent information during interpersonal contacts through SNSs by focusing on reinforcing their pre-existing attitudes (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Because of this biased reasoning process, proattitudinal news users may just maintain low levels of political ambivalence when encountering political disagreement. Alternatively, the initial defensive mindset may lead people to seek proattitudinal news outlet actively because they may be motivated to confirm their existing views. In contrast, those who are motivated to seek various issues may expose themselves readily to counter-attitudinal news outlets. The finding pertaining to H3 that supports differential losses model is particularly noteworthy. Contrary to the differential gains model, the losses model paints a disturbing picture of the current political communication environment. Although exposure to disagreement in the news and discussion may increase opportunities to consider competing perspectives and to reason out political difference, it can also dampen political participation by increasing political ambivalence and indecisiveness (Mutz, 2006). The present research confirms that this concern should be further examined in the new media environment. Prior studies have noted that new media technologies do not necessarily diminish, but can even increase exposure to opposing and diverse viewpoints. However, relatively little is known regarding the tangible benefits of

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

24

exposure to differences in new media for deliberation. Future research needs to investigate whether assumed deliberative benefits from exposure to political difference are gained in new media settings and how these benefits are related to participatory behaviors. Findings of the current study have important implications for political engagement in a polarized media environment like South Korea. News media in Korea have undergone substantial ideological and partisan differentiation. These processes have been accelerated by emerging media technologies as existing partisan media outlets expand online, and new partisan online sources (e.g., OhmyNews) proliferate. At first glance, political consequences of the proliferation of partisan online sources seem benign, because people who use proattitudinal news sources were more likely to participate in politics. However, participatory contribution of proattitudinal news use recalls the traditional dilemma of a trade-off between deliberative and participatory democracy (Mutz, 2006). Our evidence confirms this concern by showing that exposure to counter-attitudinal sources, which is a necessary condition for deliberation, discouraged people’s political participation by heightening ambivalence. When people who consume proattitudinal news sources are more likely to participate than those who use counter-attitudinal news outlets, the ongoing political polarization in Korea can further intensify. Political elites and parties may attempt to accommodate the demands of people who vote and participate more actively than others. These likely voters and participants may form clear ideological preferences espoused by partisan media. Given the strong political alignment currently existing between Korean news media and political elites, the whole process may constitute and reinforce a feedback loop of polarization, consisting of partisan elites, partisan media, and their audiences. This polarization cycle can increase political conflict and can harm consensus building. In fact, recent data show that public perception of social conflict in

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

25

Korea reached the highest point in the most recent 2014 survey since the inception of annual surveys in 2008 (Dankook Center for Dispute Resolution, 2015). Although we should wait for detailed empirical evidence, the growing polarization may be at least partially responsible for the rising perception of conflict. Another important implication of the current research regards the participants of the online survey of this research. Our respondents do not represent all online or SNS users in Korea precisely; instead, the respondents tend to be online-savvy and young SNS users. We acknowledge our sampling as a limitation of this research. At the same time, we argue that the findings from this particular group still have an important implication for political participation process in Korea. These SNS users are often equipped with new technologies and compared with earlier Korean Internet users, SNS users more actively engage in politics both online and offline (Song, 2011). Because SNS users may tend to be very vocal about political issues, politicians and news media closely monitor opinion atmosphere in SNSs. Granting the political SNS users’ high level of participation and visibility in Korean politics, our findings raise concerns in which users’ participation is negatively associated with the exposure to political disagreement from online news media and SNSs. Even among potentially techno-savvy group of SNS users, participatory benefits of online news sources and SNSs are uneven, and this unevenness may yield significant political consequence. Users who expose themselves to similar political views by Facebook may engage in political participation actively. For example, college students in Hong Kong who use Facebook for the purpose of political protest (e.g., receiving/posting protest information, expressing views) participated in street political protests actively. Importantly, these students avoided counter-attitudinal political information, such as by unfriending during times of political turmoil in which public opinion was

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

26

polarized (Zhu, Skoric, & Shen, 2017). If so, those who have balanced positions may be underrepresented in real politics. The absence of this group of people in voting booths, political rallies, and streets may strengthen ideologically-extreme positions by political elites and partisan media. In the long run, those who have balanced and moderate voices and demands may be increasingly alienated from the media and politics, which may further discourage their political participation. Along with recent criticism on self-reported measures of political conversation and ambiguities about the concept of “political” discussion (Eveland, Morey, & Hutchens, 2011), future research would benefit from designing an experimental study to explore effects of distinct types of conversation on political participation through different mechanisms. Specifically, three different types of discussion network that include safe, dangerous, and diverse conversation (Eveland & Hively, 2009) may be manipulated using a computer interface with several representative political topics (e.g., same-sex marriage). Subsequently, participants’ opinions made before and after the exposure to each of the three discussion conditions can be compared. The findings may show whether respondents’ prior attitude toward a certain political controversy has been weakened, strengthened, compromised, or even unchanged depending on the types of discussion network. Results of such analysis of attitude change might allow precise prediction of subsequent political actions. These discussions indicate the importance of identifying specific elements that constitute tangible pro-civic consequences as a result of exposure to political differences and disagreements. Since Mutz’s (2006) claims, studies have grappled with the dilemma that in democracy, political disagreement may foster deliberative democracy but demobilizes participatory democracy. Perhaps, political disagreement works best among moderates or weak ideologues by increasing

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

27

their enthusiasm and may thereby lead them to political engagement (Wojcieszak, Baek, & Carpini, 2010). However, beyond the discussion of simple trade-off between deliberation and participation, scholars need to explore conditions in which disagreement can entail both deliberation and participation. This beneficial outcome may happen when messages and communication that express political disagreement inform the opponent’s counterarguments and alternatives, and when individuals are open to interacting with individuals who hold views that are dissimilar to their own. A beneficial outcome may also happen when the political disagreement prompts a discussant to make political decisions with heightened internal efficacy based on reevaluation of competing opinions, either through reinforcement of original positions or conversion to opposing perspectives. Future research needs to further elaborate particular characteristics of discussants, messages and discussion networks that may affect the relationship between deliberation and participation. Finally, the magnitudes of indirect effects indicated by rsquared measures are small in the current research, so the results should be interpreted cautiously. A replication of the study during a time of political turmoil rather than the current relatively stable situation might obtain high or medium effect sizes. Despite several limitations regarding self-reported and cross-sectional nature of the data collected from online-savvy, young, and educated SNSs users, the current research emphasizes the importance of assessing the rapidly-changing political communication environment, particularly focusing on the use of partisan news sites and the involvement of heterogeneous discussion networks on SNS. Given the findings indicating that disagreement induced by information from partisan news sites and interpersonal channels through SNS depresses political engagement by heightening political ambivalence, scholars of political communication should explore how these new types of political information environments can be used to reach a

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

desirable compromise that realizes democratic society. Future research may examine diverse mechanisms underlying these democratic processes that go beyond (increased or diminished) political ambivalence identified in the current study.

28

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

29

References Analysis of SNS use trend and use behavior. (2016, April 15). Korean Information Society Development Institute. Retrieved from https://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/common/premium?file=1%7C13868 Ajzen, I. (2001). Nature and operation of attitudes. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 27-58. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.27 Alvarez, R. M., & Brehm, J. (1997). Are Americans ambivalent towards racial policies? American Journal of Political Science, 41, 345-374. doi:10.2307/2111768 Brundidge, J. (2010). Encountering “difference” in the contemporary public sphere: The contribution of the Internet to the heterogeneity of political discussion networks. Journal of Communication, 60, 680-700. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01509.x Brundidge, J., Garrett, R. K., Rojas, H., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2014). Political participation and ideological news online: “Differential gains” and “differential losses” in a presidential election cycle. Mass Communication and Society, 17, 464-486. doi:10.1080/15205436.2013.821492 Dankook Center for Dispute Resolution (2015). Annual index of conflict perception. Retrieved from http://www.ducdr.org/dispute_01/cognition.php?ptype=view&idx=17472&page=1&code=dis_05 Dilliplane, S. (2011). All the news you want to hear: The impact of partisan news exposure on political participation. Public Opinion Quarterly, 75, 287-316. doi:10.1093/poq/nfr006 Dvir-Gvirsman, S., Garrett, R. K., & Tsfati, Y. (2015). Why do partisan audience participate? Perceived public opinion as the mediating mechanism. Communication Research. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0093650215593145. Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The benefits of Facebook “friends”: Social

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

30

capital and college students’ use of online social network sites. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, 12, 1143-1168. doi:10.1111/j.10836101.2007.00367.x Eveland, W. P., & Hively, M. H. (2009). Political discussion frequency, network size, and “heterogeneity” of discussion as predictors of political knowledge and participation. Journal of Communication, 59, 205-224. doi:10.1111/j.14602466.2009.01412.x Eveland, W. P., Morey, A. C., & Hutchens, M. J. (2011). Beyond deliberation: New directions for the study of informal political conversation from a communication perspective. Journal of Communication, 61, 1082-1103. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01598.x Garrett, R. K. (2009). Politically motivated reinforcement seeking: Reframing the selective exposure debate. Journal of Communication, 59, 676-699. doi:10.1111/j.14602466.2009.01452.x Hahn, K. S., Ryu, S., & Park, S. (2015). Fragmentation in the Twitter following of news outlets: The representation of South Korean users’ ideological and generational cleavage. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 92, 56-76. doi:10.1177/1077699014559499 Hardy, B. W., & Scheufele, D. A. (2005). Examining differential gains from Internet use. Journal of Communication, 55, 71-84. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2005.tb02659.x Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis. New York: Guilford. Hayes, A. F. (2015). An index and test of linear moderated mediation. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 50, 1-22. doi:10.1080/00273171.2014.962683

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

31

Hmielowski, J. D. (2012). Intramedia moderation, electoral ambivalence, and electoral decision making. Mass Communication and Society, 15, 454-477. doi:10.1080/15205436.2011.616640 Huckfeldt, R., Mendez, J. M., & Osborn, T. (2004). Disagreement, ambivalence, and engagement: The political consequences of heterogeneous networks. Political Psychology, 65-95. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00357.x Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. Journal of Communication, 59, 19-39. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x Keele, L., & Wolak, J. (2008). Contextual sources of ambivalence. Political Psychology, 29, 653-673. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00659.x Kim, Y. (2011). The contribution of social network sites to exposure to political difference: The relationships among SNSs, online political messaging, and exposure to cross-cutting perspectives. Computers in Human Behavior, 27, 971-977. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2010.12.001 Kim, Y. (2015). Social network service use trend and use behavior analysis. KISDI STAT Report, 15-03-02. Kim, Y., Hsu, S. H., & de Zúñiga, H. G. (2013). Influence of social media use on discussion network heterogeneity and civic engagement: The moderating role of personality traits. Journal of Communication, 63, 498-516. doi:10.1111/jcom.12034 Knobloch‐Westerwick, S., & Meng, J. (2011). Reinforcement of the political self through selective exposure to political messages. Journal of Communication, 61, 349-368. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01543.x Lake, R. L. D., & Huckfeldt, R. (1998). Social capital, social networks, and political participation. Political Psychology, 19, 567-584. doi:10.2307/3792178

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

32

Lavine, H. (2001). The electoral consequences of ambivalence toward presidential candidates. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 915-929. doi:10.2307/2669332 Lee, F. L., & Chan, J. M. (2009). The political consequences of ambivalence: The case of democratic reform in Hong Kong. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 21, 47-64. doi:10.1093/ijpor/end053 Lee, N. Y. (2011). Main source of ideological conflict in Korea: Public polarization or elite polarization?” Korean Party Studies Review, 10, 251-287. Lee, S.-W. (2011). The political polarization and the partisan sorting in Korean politics. Democracy and Human Rights, 11, 109-138. Leighley, J. E. (1990). Social interaction and contextual influences on political participation. American Politics Research, 18, 459-475. doi:10.1177/1532673X9001800404 Levendusky, M. (2013a). Partisan media exposure and attitudes toward the opposition. Political Communication, 30, 565-581. doi:10.1080/10584609.2012.737435 Levendusky, M. (2013b). Why do partisan media polarize viewers? American Journal of Political Science, 57, 611-623. doi:10.1111/ajps.12008 MacKinnon, D. P. (2008). Introduction to statistical mediation analysis. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Matthes, J. (2012). Exposure to counterattitudinal news coverage and the timing of voting decisions. Communication Research, 39,147-169. doi:10.1177/0093650211402322 McLeod, J. M., Scheufele, D. A., Moy, P., Horowitz, E. M., Holbert, R. L., Zhang, W., ... & Zubric, J. (1999). Understanding deliberation the effects of discussion networks on participation in a public forum. Communication Research, 26, 743-774. doi:10.1177/009365099026006005

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

33

Mutz, D. C. (2002). Cross-cutting social networks: Testing democratic theory in practice. American Political Science Review, 96, 111-126. doi:10.1017/S0003055402004264 Mutz, D. C. (2006). Hearing the other side: Deliberative versus participatory democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mutz, D. C., & Martin, P. S. (2001). Facilitating communication across lines of political difference: The role of the mass media. American Political Science Review, 95, 97-114. Nir, L. (2005). Ambivalent social networks and their consequences for participation. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 17, 422-442. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edh069 Nir, L., & Druckman, J. N. (2008). Campaign mixed-message flows and timing of vote decision. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20, 326-346. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edn035 Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere. New Media and Society, 4, 9-27. doi:10.1177/14614440222226244 Park, H. W., & Thelwall, M. (2008). Developing network indicators for ideological landscapes from the political blogosphere in South Korea. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13, 856-879. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.00422.x Rhee, J. W., Cho, H. J., Song, H. J., & Jung, J. H. (2011). South Korean media system: Toward a democratization model. Korean Social Sciences Review, 1, 303-337. Preacher, K. J., & Kelley, K. (2011). Effect size measures for mediation models: Quantitative strategies for communicating indirect effects. Psychological Methods, 16, 93-115. doi:10.1037/a0022658.

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

34

Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (1996). The gradual threshold model of ambivalence: relating the positive and negative bases of attitudes to subjective ambivalence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 431-449. Doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.431 Rosenstiel, T. (2006). How the mass media divides us: Two alternative perspectives. In P. Novola & D. Brady (Eds), Red and blue nation? Characteristics and causes of America’s polarized politics (Vol. 1, pp. 249-254), Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Rudolph, T. J. (2011). The dynamics of ambivalence. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 561-573. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00505.x Rudolph, T. J., & Popp, E. (2007). An information processing theory of ambivalence. Political Psychology, 28, 563-585. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00590.x Scheufele, D. A. (2002). Examining differential gains from mass media and their implication for participatory behavior. Communication Research, 29, 46-65. doi:10.1177/009365020202900103 Scheufele, D. A., Hardy, B. W., Brossard, D., Waismel-Manor, I. S., & Nisbet, E. (2006). Democracy based on difference: Examining the links between structural heterogeneity, heterogeneity of discussion networks, and democratic citizenship. Journal of Communication, 56, 728-753. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00317.x Sobieraj, S., & Berry, J. (2011). From incivility to outrage: Political discourse in blogs, talk radio, and cable news. Political Communication, 28, 19–41. doi:10.1080/10584609.2010.542360 Song, K. J. (2011). A study on political participation of the social media generation. Korean and World Politics, 27, 57-88. Stroud, N. J. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of Communication, 60,

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

35

556-576. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x Stroud, N. J. (2011). Niche news: The politics of news choice. New York: Oxford University Press. Sunstein, C. (2001). The daily we: Is the internet really a blessing for democracy. Boston Review, 26(3). Retrieved from http://bostonreview.net/cass-sunstein-internet-democracydaily-we Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 755-769. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). Computer-assisted research design and analysis. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Thompson, M. M., Zanna, M. P., & Griffin, D. W. (1995). Let’s not be indifferent about (attitudinal) ambivalence. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 361-386). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Wojcieszak, M. E., & Mutz, D. C. (2009). Online groups and political discourse: Do online discussion spaces facilitate exposure to political disagreement? Journal of Communication, 59, 40-56. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01403.x Wojcieszak, M. E., Baek, Y. M., & Carpini, M. X. D. (2010). Deliberative and participatory democracy? Ideological strength and the processes leading from deliberation to political engagement. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22, 154-180. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edp050 Wyatt, R. O., Katz, E., & Kim, J. (2000). Bridging the spheres: Political and personal conversation in public and private spaces. Journal of Communication, 50, 71-92

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

36

doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02834.x Yang, J., Barnidge, M., & Rojas, H. (2017). The politics of “Unfriending”: User filtration in response to political disagreement on social media. Computers in Human Behavior, 70, 22-29. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2016.12.079 Yoo, S. J. (2010). Two types of neutrality: Ambivalence versus indifference and political participation. Journal of Politics, 72, 163-177. doi:10.1017/S0022381609990545 Zhu, Q., Skoric, M., & Shen, F. (2017). I shield myself from thee: Selective avoidance on social media during political protests. Political Communication, 34, 112-131. doi:10.1080/10584609.2016.1222471

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

37

Figure 1. Indirect Effects of Partisan News Use on Participation through Political Ambivalence

Note. Entries are unstandardized b. Numbers inside parentheses are total effect of an independent variable on an outcome variable, without including the mediator. Also, the intercepts before/after including the mediator for each of the two models above were -.23/-.09 and -.15/-.09 respectively. + p < .10, *p < .05, ***p < .001

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

38

Figure 2. Indirect Effects of Counter-Attitudinal News Site Use on Political Participation through Political Ambivalence as a Function of Heterogeneous Political Discussion Networks on SNS

Note. Entries are unstandardized b. * p < .05, ** p < .01

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

Table 1 Correlation matrix of variables used

1

2

1. Political interest

.

2. Political ideology

.31***

3

4

3. Partisanship strength

.33

.58***

.

4. Political knowledge

.36***

.17***

.20***

5. Attention to newspaper

.33***

.08

.05

6. Attention to TV news

.39

***

6

7

8

9

10

11

**

.14

.24*** ***

.18

.30***

***

***

.22

.

.18

.56**

.

-.02

-.03

.11*

.26***

.27***

.20***

.

.37***

.21***

.25***

.26***

.31***

.29***

.28***

.55***

10. SNS heterogeneous DN

.24***

-.05

-.14**

.07

.20***

.19***

.15***

.33***

.18***

11. Offline heterogeneous DN

.26***

-.04

-.10*

.13**

.22***

.19***

.16***

.32***

.13**

.67***

**

***

.28***

***

**

.15

8. Counter-attitudinal news use

.20***

9. Proattitudinal news use

12. Political ambivalence 13. Political participation

-.21 .36

***

-.29

***

.24

***

***

.

***

.20

.42

**

.

.18

7. Attention to Internet news

**

12

.

***

***

5

-.40 .26

***

***

-.19

***

.22

***

Notes: DN = Discussion Network. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

.08

-.01 **

.13

*

.11

*

-.11

***

.18

***

.18

.09

*

.

-.12

***

.26

.

.34 .20

.

.12

. .-22**

39

POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND AMBIVALENCE

40

Highlights • • •

Proattitudinal news site use mobilized political participation through a low level of political ambivalence. Counter-attitudinal news site use demobilized political participation through a high level of political ambivalence. The demobilizing effect of counter-attitudinal news site use on political participation through a high level of political ambivalence was stronger when the level of heterogeneous political discussion networks on SNSs was high compared to low