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Popular support for the new christian right
Popular Support for the New Christian Right
CLYDE Wl LCOX*
Georgetown University.
The emergence and success of conservative Christians in partisan politics have provoked alternative explanations. These include geography, religious values, social status, party identification, alienation, and symbols. The author divides them into rational and nonrational categories. The latter includes alienation and dislocation. Analysis of the 1984 American National Election Study shows that support for the Christian Right came from religious and political beliefs and responses to political symbols, not from social strain.
The literature on right-wing political groups has generated a number of hypotheses to account for support for the New Christian Right. Many of these theories, advanced during the 1950s with little supporting data, suggest that such support was often the result of irrational social or psychological forces. The theories of nonrational behavior emerged from pluralist writers in the 1950s and 1960s. These writers used as a model then popular exo planations for support of the German Nazis. These theories were widely accepted, probably in part because it was difficult for these researchers to believe that rational individuals could support these organizations. Much of the recent work on support for the Right, however, has posited a socialization approach, which argues that support is the rational result of assessing policy similarity between individuals and groups. The past decade has produced a significant amount of scholarship devoted to the New Christian Right. Scholars have studied the rise of the Christian Right organizations, and the elites of the Christian Right. Others have studied the support for the Moral Majority platform, and national and regional support for the organization. Still other scholars have studied activists of the New Christian Right in Indiana and Ohio. Finally, others have explored the attitudes and behaviors of the evangelicals and fundamentalists who constitute the target constituency of the New Christian Right. 1 Despite this wealth of studies, there *Direct all correspondenceto: Professor Clyde Wilcox, Department of Government,Georgetown University, Washington,D.C. 20057. Telephone:202 687 6130. The Social Science Journal, Volume 26, Number 1, pages 55-63. Copyright © 1989 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0035-7634.
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has been little effort to date to test systematically competing theories of popular support for the New Christian Right with national survey data.2 This is unfortunate, since the literature is rich with sociological and political theories to account for support for rightwing groups. This article tests a number of theories derived from this literature for support for the New Christian Right on 1984 data. These theories can be divided into two categories: rational and nonrational. The former assume that support for the Right results from the inculcation of certain values and beliefs through the processes of political socialization, and the latter asserts that this support stems from nonrational impulses or unusual sociological strains. The nonrational theories suggest that supporters are individuals with high levels of social or psychological strain, and that their support is a result of that strain. These explanations were most commonly offered by writers in the 1950s and 1960s, often in the absence of supporting data. Socialization theories, on the other hand, posit that support for the Right comes from an assessment by individuals that these organizations favor policies or ends that are congruent with their own. These theories are therefore rational theories in a narrow sense. Of course, the socialization process itself is not rational, as Lindblom has eloquently noted.3 There are several theories within each category. Testing each of these theories in multivariate analysis will sort out the independent effects of these rational and irrational explanations for support. The data for this study come from the 1984 American National Election Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. Respondents were asked to evaluate a series of social and political groups on an imaginary feeling thermometer ranging from zero degrees representing extremely negative affect to one hundred degrees representing extreme warmth. Among the list of groups rated was "Evangelical political groups like the Moral Majority." One of the difficulties with feeling thermometers is that many respondents assign warm scores to most groups. Individual differences in response patterns to these items mean that a score of seventy degrees may indicate strong support in one respondent, and may be the coolest score used by another respondent. To correct for individual differences, each individual's mean score across all social groups was subtracted from his or her score for the New Christian Right. Those who assigned to the Moral Majority a score of at least ten degrees above their individual mean were defined as supporters. This procedure has been employed in other studies.4 Although recoding the adjusted feeling thermometer item into a dichotomous measure of support may seem to be discarding potentially useful information, previous studies have suggested that use of unrecoded measures result in coefficients more strongly affected by degree of opposition to the Moral Majority than by support, s This analysis is limited to whites. Blacks respond to feeling thermometer items differently than whites, and display different relationships between religious and political beliefs. Most other studies of the Christian Right have followed this procedure. These operational choices produce a set of 187 supporters of the New Christian Right, approximately 11.5 percent of the white population. This figure is consistent with earlier estimates of support in 1980. This study looks at six types of explanations: (1) geography, (2) religious beliefs, (3) social status, (4) political beliefs, (5) alienation, and (6) symbols. Geography is the
New Christian gight
57
first. One variant within this general set argues that the dominant values of certain regions are consistent with support for the right-wing movements. In particular, Southern conservatism and Western individualism are thought to be consonant with support for these organizations. 6 In addition, the values associated with rural areas are thought to lend support to right-wing groups. Rural birth or rural residence are thought to be good predictors of approval of the Right.7 Both of the explanations listed above are rational ones, positing that geography gives rise to values which leads to support. A third geographic explanation emphasizes the role of social dislocation in such support. In this theory, those individuals who have recently moved into an area are seen as less likely to have established ties to the community, or to have formed friendships. They are therefore more susceptible to appeals from right-wing groups? This final geographic explanation is based on a nonrational model, with lonely, isolated individuals responding to the appeals of right-wing activists. Another variant of this explanation suggests that the Right has some special appeal to those who have moved to urban areas after a rural upbringing, or who have experienced a major move between regions. A second set of explanations examines the role of religious values, identifications and behaviors on support for the Christian Right. A number of scholars have asserted that evangelical Christianity, particularly the fundamentalist wing, has been the source of support for right-wing groups. Although the organizations of the New Christian Right were formed to mobilize evangelical and fundamentalist Christians into political action, Buell and Sigelman found no relationship between membership in evangelical denominations and support. Other scholars, however, have suggested doctrinal tests of evangelicalism and fundamentalism. Such doctrinal evangelicalism has been found to be a significant predictor of support for the New Christian Right? Religiosity has also been associated with support for the Right. Stouffer found that religiosity was associated with anticommunist intolerance, and Himmelstein has argued that the frequency of church attendance is associated with support for antiabortion groups. Religious attendance and salience has also been associated with membership in antifeminist organizations. 1° These religious explanations are rational ones, with support for the Christian Right seen as an expression of the conservative religious values which come from particular religious identities and behaviors. A third set of explanations emphasizes the role of social status. While some scholars have suggested that the Right has appeal to those with low levels of education, occupational prestige, and income, a more frequent thesis is that support comes from those who feel that their social status may be threatened by changes in society. Many of these individuals exhibit objective indicators of status inconsistency: discrepant values on status location variables (education, occupation, and income). Several studies have explored the relationship between objective status inconsistency and support for the Right. Other scholars have suggested that status concerns may be explored by measures of status anxiety. In any event, the Right is thought to appeal to those with status concerns because it attacks the social power structures while legitimating the hoarding of wealth. H In order to test the status inconsistency explanation, two sets of measures of status inconsistency were computed. 12 Bivariate analysis revealed that the supporters are sig-
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nificantly more likely to display one type of status inconsistency: income greater than occupational prestige. In the multivariate analysis, this is the only measure of status inconsistency to be included in the model. Some researchers have operationalized status anxiety bY the propensity of the respondent to overstate his or her social status. Lipset and Raab reported that the supporters of the John Birch Society were more likely than other respondents to overstate their social status, and other researchers have reported a similar tendency among supporters of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. Other scholars have examined the generational mobility of respondents, arguing that those whose status has declined are likely to display status anxiety.13A measure of status anxiety was constructed, combining overreporting of social status, generational mobility, and concern of a decline in future income. Respondents were coded as exhibiting status anxiety if they either overreported their social status, reported a decline in generational social status, or were worded about a future decline in their income. The resulting measure represents a fairly easy test of the status anxiety thesis: Negative results will be definitive while positive results will call for further investigation. A fourth set of explanations posits a connection between political attitudes and identifications and support for the Right. These explanations are rational ones, where support is seen as the result of the perception that the group articulates a political position which is similar to that of the supporter. One of the strongest relationships is between Republican partisanship and support for the Right. Recent studies of supporters of the New Christian Right have also identified partisanship as an important variable. 14 In addition, general ideology has been linked with support for the Right. Specific issue positions have also been linked with support. In particular, support for the New Christian Right has been linked to attitudes toward defense spending, and to attitudes on social issues. ~s Three separate issue scales were computed, based on results of factor analysis. These scales measured social issue attitudes, foreign policy attitudes, and attitudes on domestic policy issues. An additional scale was constructed which tapped support for spending for social programs. A fifth explanation for support for the Right emphasizes the role of alienation produced by mass society. It posits that mass society creates large numbers of individuals who lack ties to organized groups. Individuals without group connections are thought to be mobilized easily by right-wing groups. ~6 One variant of the alienation hypothesis emphasizes alienation from government. In this explanation, support comes from those who feel disenfranchised, who are cynical about government, who feel that they can make little difference in government policy, and who feel that government does not represent their needs. The survey contained a number of items which asked the respondent's preferred policy position, and the position which the respondent believed represented current government policy. A scale was computed which summed the absolute values of the differences between the respondent and government. This measure represented the total distance the respondent perceived between his or her ideal policy package and that of the government. A second measure was constructed to tap cynicism. A final set of explanations of support for the Right is offered by symbolic politics theories. These explanations suggest that when the social status accorded to the life-style of certain groups declines, these groups become involved in symbolic political crusades to
New Christian Right
59
recover this prestige. Conflicts over issues such as the Equal Rights Amendment, gay fights and pornography are seen as symbolic battles over broader life-style issues. Rightwing groups respond to the political symbols. These political symbols are often reified as political opponents. 17 It is possible that Moral Majority supporters perceive the universe of symbolic political and social groups differently than do other whites. To test this hypothesis, separate factor analyses were performed for both groups on all the feeling thermometer items which tap affect towards social and political groups. Different factor rotation methods were explored, with little substantive difference among the solutions. The varimax solution was selected for this analysis. For white nonsupporters, four factors emerged. The first factor, which might be termed Middle America, consisted of women, the middle class, the poor, whites, and older citizens. Weaker, second loadings on this factor included blacks, hispanics and Catholics. The second factor, Minorities, consisted of blacks and hispanics along with gays-lesbians and civil rights leaders. The third factor is labeled the Right, included conservatives, big business, the military, antiabortion activists, and the Supreme Court. The final factor, the Left, consisted of labor unions, liberals, black militants, welfare recipients, and the women's liberation movement. For Moral Majority supporters, the factor structure was somewhat different. The Middle America factor emerged, but without the secondary loadings of blacks and hispanics. Catholics appeared in the Minority factor. The most important difference, however, was in the Left factor. For supporters of the Moral Majority, this factor split, with a Mainstream Liberal factor including labor unions, liberals, and the U.S. Supreme Court, and a factor including groups which constitute the Out-groups of the New Right: black militants, the women's liberation movement, and gays-lesbians. The factor structures for the supporters and other whites suggest important differences in the way that Moral Majority supporters perceive the social and political world. For the supporters of the Moral Majority, then, racial minorities are not part of Middle America, and Catholics are a minority group. The Supreme Court is still perceived as liberal, and the left is composed of moderate and radical elements. Gays and lesbians are part of the radical left, not a minority group. Symbolic group scales were computed based on the factor structure from the analysis of supporters (average alpha for scales was .54). Because of the different perception of the Supreme Court and Catholics between the two groups, they were not included in any scale. Bivariate analysis suggested that affect for middle America was not correlated with support for the Christian Right. The other three scales were included in the multivariate analysis discussed below. To test each of the explanations, multivariate logit analysis was performed. Independent variables include demographic variables to tap the two sets of explanations. Theories of nonrational behavior are presented in the equation by two measures of social dislocation (whether a respondent had recently moved, and whether he or she had moved from a rural area to an urban area or between regions during his or her life), status concerns (objective incongruity, and anxiety), and policy alienation. The symbolic politics explanation is tested by inclusion of four scales representing affect toward social groups. Bivariate analysis suggested that supporters of the Moral Majority differed significantly
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from the rest of the population on each of these scales. Socialization explanations were represented in the equation by measures of religious attachment (denomination, doctrine, and religiosity), of partisanship, and of issue positions on social, foreign policy, and economic issues. Table 1 shows that rational explanations dominate nonrational ones. Evangelical doctrine emerged as the most significant predictor of support, followed by the respondent's position on social issues. Foreign policy issues and affect for right-wing and left-wing groups were also significant at .01. Sex emerged as significant at .05, with men more likely to support the Moral Majority. While these results are not surprising, they do indicate that nonrational explanations based on social dislocation, alienation, and status inconsistency are not significant predictors, while values and attitudes are. Moral Majority supporters are doctrinal evangelicals and fundamentalists with high levels of religiosity who hold conservative positions on social and foreign policy issues and are cool toward the symbols of the Left and warm toward the symbols of the Right. The multivariate analysis suggests that the most important direct predictors of support are religious, political and symbolic variables. This suggests that the socialization explanation provides a stronger account of support for the Right. Those who support the Table/.--Multivariate Explanations Sex Region Rural Birth Recently Moved Regional or Rural/Urban Move Evangelical Doctrine Evangelical Denomination Religiosity Education Income Occupation Income>Occupation Status Anxiety Partisanship Social IssueAttitudes Foreign Policy Attitudes Domestic Political Attitudes Spending, Social Programs Policy Alienation Cynicism Affect--Right Affect---Minorities Affect--Liberals Affect---Out-groups N
-.23* -.07 .10 .19 .13 .62** .04 .06 -.02 -.01 .00 -.11 .07 .03 .14** .12** .08 .04 .05 -.02 .01 ** -.00 -.01 -.01 ** 895
Logit RegressionCoefficients. *Indicates coefficient significant at .05. **Indicates coefficient significant at .01. SeeAppendix for details of scale construction.
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61
Moral Majority are evangelical Christians with conservative views on social and foreign policy issues who are sympathetic with the political fight and unsympathetic with the left. Although these results are not surprising, they do suggest that support comes from rational assessment of the positions of the New Christian Right, not from abnormal social strain. One set of theories emphasizing nonrationality was not tested here. The data provided no items from which to test psychological theories of support, which argue that support is often due to strong-mindedness, authofitarianism, dogmatism, or other psychological strains. Recent research on support for the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, however, has reported that these explanations are of little help in explaining support for the Christian Right in an earlier era.~e This research has suggested that such support is rational-the result of a certain set of political attitudes and predispositions.
Appendix Variables and Scales in Analysis Sex Region Rural Birth Recently Moved Regional/Rural Move Evangelical Doctrine Evangelical Denomination Religiosity Education Income Occupation Income > Occupation
Status Anxiety
Partisanship Social Issues Foreign Policy Domestic Issues Spending - Social Progs. Policy Alienation
Cynicism Affect--Right Affect--Minorities Affect--Liberals Affect--Out-groups
V707 V9 (Receded to 0 = non-south, 1 = south) V699 (Receded to 0 = non-rural, 1 = rural) V702 (Recoded so that 1 = moved in past two years, 0 = not moved in past two years) V699, V18, V701, V9 (0 = not moved, 1 = moved from region or from rural to urban area) 1 if V1080 = 1 and V1081 = 1, 0 if both conditions not satisfied V687 (categories 100-109, 130-149 are coded as evangelical). 1 = evangelical, 0 = not V688 V438 V516 V680 (housewives assigned husbands scores) (Income and Occupation divided into thirds. Item equals 1 if income is higher than occupation, 0 if income is equal to or less than occupation) V683, Income, Occupation, Education, V516, V694, V151 ) 1 if subjective social status is higher than objective mea sures, if social status is lower than that of parents, or if worried about future income) V318 Meafi of V250, V423, and V1038 after recoding. Alpha = .50 Mean of V388, V395, and V408 after receding. Alpha = .51 Mean of V375, V382, V1073, V1074 after recoding. Alpha = .57 Mean of V998, V1000, V1001, V1002, V1005. Alpha = .71 Mean of series of items created by taking absolute value of distance between respondent's issue position and his or her perception of the government position, items included V375, V380, V382, V387, V388,V393, V395, V00, V401, V406, V08, V413, V414, V419. Atpha = .49 Mean of V1063, V1064, V1065, V1066. Alpha = .61 Mean of V764, V773. Alpha = .49 Mean of V763, V765, V779. Alpha = .79 Mean of V767, V770. Alpha = .61 Mean of V775, V778, V782. Alpha = .54
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NOTES
1.
2.
3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
*The author thanks Elizabeth Cook and Corwin Smidt for helpful comments. Leopoldo Oomez assisted in the data analysis. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meethag of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, in April, 1988. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. James Guth, "The Politics of the New Christian Right," in Alan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (ed.) Interest Group Politics, 60-83. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1983); Robert Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority," in Robert Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (eds.) The New Christian Right. (New York: Aldine, 1983); Margaret Latus, "Mobilizing Christians for Political Action: Campaigning with God on Your Side," in David Bromley and Anson Shupe (eds.) New Christian Politics, 251-268. (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984); Guth, "Southern Baptist Clergy: Vanguard of the Christian Right?", in The New Christian Right. Milton Yinger and Stephen Cutler, "The Moral Majority Viewed Sociologically," Sociological Focus 15 (1982): 289-306; Lyman Kellstedt, "The Falwell Issue Agenda: Sources of Support among White Protestant Evangelicals," in M. Lynn and D. Moberg (eds.) An Annual in the Sociology of Religion (Greenwich Conn.: JAI, 1988); John Simpson, "Moral Issues and Status Politics," in The New Christian Right. Anson Shupe and William Stacey, "Public and Clergy Sentiments Toward the Moral Majority: Evidence from the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex," in New Christian Politics, 91-100; Joseph Tanmey and Stephen Johnson, "The Moral Majority in Middletown," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 22 (1983): 145157; Clyde Wilcox, "Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980: A Second Look," Social Science Quarterly 68 (1987): 157-167; Lee Sigelman, Clyde Wilcox and Emmett Buell, "An Unchanged Minority: Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980 and 1984," Social Science Quarterly 68 (1987): 876-884. Richard Pierand and James Wright, "The Moral Majority in Indiana," in New Christian Politics, 195-212; Sharon Georgianna, "The Moral Majority and Fundamentalism: Plausibility and Dissonance." (Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1984); Wilcox, "Religious Orientations and Political Attitudes: Variations within the New Christian Right," American Politics Quarterly 15 (1987): 274-296. Corwin Smidt, "Evangelicals and the 1984 Election: Continuity or Change?", American Politics Quarterly 15 (1987) 419--444; Ted Jelen, "The Effects of Religious Separatism on Partisan Identification, Voting Behavior, and Issue Positions among Evangelicals and Fundamentalists in the 1984 Election," Sociological Analysis 48 (1987); Kathleen Beatty and Oliver Walter, "Fundamentalists, Evangelicals and Politics," American Politics Quarterly 16 (1988): 43-59. But see, James Guth and John Green, "The Moralizing Minority: Christian Right Support among Political Activists," Social Science Quarterly 67 (1987), for a test of competing theories among national political elites. Charles Lindblom, "Another State of Mind," American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 9-21. Wilcox, "Popular Support"; Sigelman, Wilcox and Buell, op. cit. Wilcox, "Popular Support..." There is substantially more variation in the degree of opposition to the Moral Majority than in the degree of support. Moreover, several variables are correlated with the degree of support, but not with the degree of opposition. All analysis was performed using SPSS-X. James McEvoy, Radicals or Conservatfi~es? The Contemporary American Right (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971); Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1978). Lipset and Raab; Raymond Wolfinger, Barbara Wolt'mger, Kenneth Prewitt and Sheilah Rosenhack, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in R. Schoenberger (ed.), The American Right Wing 9-47 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); Fred Grupp,
New Christian Right
8. 9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17. 18.
63
"The Political Perspectives of John Birch Society Members" in The American Right Wing 83118; Scott McNaI1, "Social Disorganization and Availability: Accounting for Radical Rightism," in The American Right Wing 119-140. McNall, op. cit. Lipset and Raab, op. tit.; Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; Grupp, op. tit.; McEvoy, op. tit.; Guth, op. tit.; Emmett Buell and Lee Sigelman, "An Army that Meets Every Sunday? Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980," Social Science Quarterly (1985): 426--434. There is some controversy about the proper classification of Baptists in denominational groupings. Given the high concentration of Bible Baptist Fellowship members among Moral Majority activists reported in Guth, op. cit. and in Wilcox, "Religious Orientations . . . . " Baptists have been included in the evangelical category for this study; Wilcox, "Fundamentalists and Politics: An Analysis of the Impact of Differing Operational Definitions," Journal of Politics 48 (1986): 1041-1051; Wilcox, "Popular Support..." Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and CivilLiberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Jerome Himmelstein, "The Social Basis for Antiferninism," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 25 (1986): 1-15; Kent Tedin, David Brady, Mary Buxton, Barbara Gorman, and Judy Thompson, "Social Background and Political Differences between Pro- and Anti-ERA Activists," American Politics Quarterly 5 (1977): 395-407. Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; Martin Trow, Right Wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance. Doetoral dissertation, Columbia University; Gary Rush, "Status Consistency and Right Wing Extremism," American Sociological Review 32 (1967): 86-92; McEvoy, op. cit.; Ira Rohter, Radical Rightists: An Empirical Study. Doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University; Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; McEvoy, op. tit. For both measures, education, occupation, and income were recoded into three relatively equal categories. One set of measures classified individuals as discrepant only if they were in the top third on one measure and the bottom third on a second; the second set subtracted the value of each indicator from the other. A set of measures were then computed for each possible inconsistent pair. Wilcox, "Popular Backing for the Old Christian Right: Explaining Support for the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade," Journal of Social History 21 (1987): 117-132; Wolf'mger, et al., op. cit. Nelson Polsby, "Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism," Political Studies 8 (1963): 250271; Wolf-roger, et al., op. cit.; Grupp, op. cit.; Rohter, op. tit.; McEvoy, op. tit.; Wilcox, "Popular Support..." Rohter, op. cit.; Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; McEvoy, op. cit.; Guth and Green, op. tit.; Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; Rohter, op. cit.; Buell and Sigelman, op. cit.; Buell and Sigelman, op. cit.; Guth and Green, "The GOP and the Christian Right: The Case of Pat Robertson's Campaign Contributors." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987; Wilcox, "Popular Support..." Rohter, op. cit.; Pamela Conover and Virginia Gray, "Political Activists and the Conflict over Abortion." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincirmati, 1981; Gilbert Abcarian and Sherman Stanage, "Alienation and the Radical Right," Journal of Politics 27 (1965): 776-796; Wolf'mger, et al., op. cit. Conover and Gray, op. cit. Wilcox, "Popular Backing..."
CLYDE Wl LCOX*
Georgetown University.
The emergence and success of conservative Christians in partisan politics have provoked alternative explanations. These include geography, religious values, social status, party identification, alienation, and symbols. The author divides them into rational and nonrational categories. The latter includes alienation and dislocation. Analysis of the 1984 American National Election Study shows that support for the Christian Right came from religious and political beliefs and responses to political symbols, not from social strain.
The literature on right-wing political groups has generated a number of hypotheses to account for support for the New Christian Right. Many of these theories, advanced during the 1950s with little supporting data, suggest that such support was often the result of irrational social or psychological forces. The theories of nonrational behavior emerged from pluralist writers in the 1950s and 1960s. These writers used as a model then popular exo planations for support of the German Nazis. These theories were widely accepted, probably in part because it was difficult for these researchers to believe that rational individuals could support these organizations. Much of the recent work on support for the Right, however, has posited a socialization approach, which argues that support is the rational result of assessing policy similarity between individuals and groups. The past decade has produced a significant amount of scholarship devoted to the New Christian Right. Scholars have studied the rise of the Christian Right organizations, and the elites of the Christian Right. Others have studied the support for the Moral Majority platform, and national and regional support for the organization. Still other scholars have studied activists of the New Christian Right in Indiana and Ohio. Finally, others have explored the attitudes and behaviors of the evangelicals and fundamentalists who constitute the target constituency of the New Christian Right. 1 Despite this wealth of studies, there *Direct all correspondenceto: Professor Clyde Wilcox, Department of Government,Georgetown University, Washington,D.C. 20057. Telephone:202 687 6130. The Social Science Journal, Volume 26, Number 1, pages 55-63. Copyright © 1989 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0035-7634.
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has been little effort to date to test systematically competing theories of popular support for the New Christian Right with national survey data.2 This is unfortunate, since the literature is rich with sociological and political theories to account for support for rightwing groups. This article tests a number of theories derived from this literature for support for the New Christian Right on 1984 data. These theories can be divided into two categories: rational and nonrational. The former assume that support for the Right results from the inculcation of certain values and beliefs through the processes of political socialization, and the latter asserts that this support stems from nonrational impulses or unusual sociological strains. The nonrational theories suggest that supporters are individuals with high levels of social or psychological strain, and that their support is a result of that strain. These explanations were most commonly offered by writers in the 1950s and 1960s, often in the absence of supporting data. Socialization theories, on the other hand, posit that support for the Right comes from an assessment by individuals that these organizations favor policies or ends that are congruent with their own. These theories are therefore rational theories in a narrow sense. Of course, the socialization process itself is not rational, as Lindblom has eloquently noted.3 There are several theories within each category. Testing each of these theories in multivariate analysis will sort out the independent effects of these rational and irrational explanations for support. The data for this study come from the 1984 American National Election Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. Respondents were asked to evaluate a series of social and political groups on an imaginary feeling thermometer ranging from zero degrees representing extremely negative affect to one hundred degrees representing extreme warmth. Among the list of groups rated was "Evangelical political groups like the Moral Majority." One of the difficulties with feeling thermometers is that many respondents assign warm scores to most groups. Individual differences in response patterns to these items mean that a score of seventy degrees may indicate strong support in one respondent, and may be the coolest score used by another respondent. To correct for individual differences, each individual's mean score across all social groups was subtracted from his or her score for the New Christian Right. Those who assigned to the Moral Majority a score of at least ten degrees above their individual mean were defined as supporters. This procedure has been employed in other studies.4 Although recoding the adjusted feeling thermometer item into a dichotomous measure of support may seem to be discarding potentially useful information, previous studies have suggested that use of unrecoded measures result in coefficients more strongly affected by degree of opposition to the Moral Majority than by support, s This analysis is limited to whites. Blacks respond to feeling thermometer items differently than whites, and display different relationships between religious and political beliefs. Most other studies of the Christian Right have followed this procedure. These operational choices produce a set of 187 supporters of the New Christian Right, approximately 11.5 percent of the white population. This figure is consistent with earlier estimates of support in 1980. This study looks at six types of explanations: (1) geography, (2) religious beliefs, (3) social status, (4) political beliefs, (5) alienation, and (6) symbols. Geography is the
New Christian gight
57
first. One variant within this general set argues that the dominant values of certain regions are consistent with support for the right-wing movements. In particular, Southern conservatism and Western individualism are thought to be consonant with support for these organizations. 6 In addition, the values associated with rural areas are thought to lend support to right-wing groups. Rural birth or rural residence are thought to be good predictors of approval of the Right.7 Both of the explanations listed above are rational ones, positing that geography gives rise to values which leads to support. A third geographic explanation emphasizes the role of social dislocation in such support. In this theory, those individuals who have recently moved into an area are seen as less likely to have established ties to the community, or to have formed friendships. They are therefore more susceptible to appeals from right-wing groups? This final geographic explanation is based on a nonrational model, with lonely, isolated individuals responding to the appeals of right-wing activists. Another variant of this explanation suggests that the Right has some special appeal to those who have moved to urban areas after a rural upbringing, or who have experienced a major move between regions. A second set of explanations examines the role of religious values, identifications and behaviors on support for the Christian Right. A number of scholars have asserted that evangelical Christianity, particularly the fundamentalist wing, has been the source of support for right-wing groups. Although the organizations of the New Christian Right were formed to mobilize evangelical and fundamentalist Christians into political action, Buell and Sigelman found no relationship between membership in evangelical denominations and support. Other scholars, however, have suggested doctrinal tests of evangelicalism and fundamentalism. Such doctrinal evangelicalism has been found to be a significant predictor of support for the New Christian Right? Religiosity has also been associated with support for the Right. Stouffer found that religiosity was associated with anticommunist intolerance, and Himmelstein has argued that the frequency of church attendance is associated with support for antiabortion groups. Religious attendance and salience has also been associated with membership in antifeminist organizations. 1° These religious explanations are rational ones, with support for the Christian Right seen as an expression of the conservative religious values which come from particular religious identities and behaviors. A third set of explanations emphasizes the role of social status. While some scholars have suggested that the Right has appeal to those with low levels of education, occupational prestige, and income, a more frequent thesis is that support comes from those who feel that their social status may be threatened by changes in society. Many of these individuals exhibit objective indicators of status inconsistency: discrepant values on status location variables (education, occupation, and income). Several studies have explored the relationship between objective status inconsistency and support for the Right. Other scholars have suggested that status concerns may be explored by measures of status anxiety. In any event, the Right is thought to appeal to those with status concerns because it attacks the social power structures while legitimating the hoarding of wealth. H In order to test the status inconsistency explanation, two sets of measures of status inconsistency were computed. 12 Bivariate analysis revealed that the supporters are sig-
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nificantly more likely to display one type of status inconsistency: income greater than occupational prestige. In the multivariate analysis, this is the only measure of status inconsistency to be included in the model. Some researchers have operationalized status anxiety bY the propensity of the respondent to overstate his or her social status. Lipset and Raab reported that the supporters of the John Birch Society were more likely than other respondents to overstate their social status, and other researchers have reported a similar tendency among supporters of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. Other scholars have examined the generational mobility of respondents, arguing that those whose status has declined are likely to display status anxiety.13A measure of status anxiety was constructed, combining overreporting of social status, generational mobility, and concern of a decline in future income. Respondents were coded as exhibiting status anxiety if they either overreported their social status, reported a decline in generational social status, or were worded about a future decline in their income. The resulting measure represents a fairly easy test of the status anxiety thesis: Negative results will be definitive while positive results will call for further investigation. A fourth set of explanations posits a connection between political attitudes and identifications and support for the Right. These explanations are rational ones, where support is seen as the result of the perception that the group articulates a political position which is similar to that of the supporter. One of the strongest relationships is between Republican partisanship and support for the Right. Recent studies of supporters of the New Christian Right have also identified partisanship as an important variable. 14 In addition, general ideology has been linked with support for the Right. Specific issue positions have also been linked with support. In particular, support for the New Christian Right has been linked to attitudes toward defense spending, and to attitudes on social issues. ~s Three separate issue scales were computed, based on results of factor analysis. These scales measured social issue attitudes, foreign policy attitudes, and attitudes on domestic policy issues. An additional scale was constructed which tapped support for spending for social programs. A fifth explanation for support for the Right emphasizes the role of alienation produced by mass society. It posits that mass society creates large numbers of individuals who lack ties to organized groups. Individuals without group connections are thought to be mobilized easily by right-wing groups. ~6 One variant of the alienation hypothesis emphasizes alienation from government. In this explanation, support comes from those who feel disenfranchised, who are cynical about government, who feel that they can make little difference in government policy, and who feel that government does not represent their needs. The survey contained a number of items which asked the respondent's preferred policy position, and the position which the respondent believed represented current government policy. A scale was computed which summed the absolute values of the differences between the respondent and government. This measure represented the total distance the respondent perceived between his or her ideal policy package and that of the government. A second measure was constructed to tap cynicism. A final set of explanations of support for the Right is offered by symbolic politics theories. These explanations suggest that when the social status accorded to the life-style of certain groups declines, these groups become involved in symbolic political crusades to
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recover this prestige. Conflicts over issues such as the Equal Rights Amendment, gay fights and pornography are seen as symbolic battles over broader life-style issues. Rightwing groups respond to the political symbols. These political symbols are often reified as political opponents. 17 It is possible that Moral Majority supporters perceive the universe of symbolic political and social groups differently than do other whites. To test this hypothesis, separate factor analyses were performed for both groups on all the feeling thermometer items which tap affect towards social and political groups. Different factor rotation methods were explored, with little substantive difference among the solutions. The varimax solution was selected for this analysis. For white nonsupporters, four factors emerged. The first factor, which might be termed Middle America, consisted of women, the middle class, the poor, whites, and older citizens. Weaker, second loadings on this factor included blacks, hispanics and Catholics. The second factor, Minorities, consisted of blacks and hispanics along with gays-lesbians and civil rights leaders. The third factor is labeled the Right, included conservatives, big business, the military, antiabortion activists, and the Supreme Court. The final factor, the Left, consisted of labor unions, liberals, black militants, welfare recipients, and the women's liberation movement. For Moral Majority supporters, the factor structure was somewhat different. The Middle America factor emerged, but without the secondary loadings of blacks and hispanics. Catholics appeared in the Minority factor. The most important difference, however, was in the Left factor. For supporters of the Moral Majority, this factor split, with a Mainstream Liberal factor including labor unions, liberals, and the U.S. Supreme Court, and a factor including groups which constitute the Out-groups of the New Right: black militants, the women's liberation movement, and gays-lesbians. The factor structures for the supporters and other whites suggest important differences in the way that Moral Majority supporters perceive the social and political world. For the supporters of the Moral Majority, then, racial minorities are not part of Middle America, and Catholics are a minority group. The Supreme Court is still perceived as liberal, and the left is composed of moderate and radical elements. Gays and lesbians are part of the radical left, not a minority group. Symbolic group scales were computed based on the factor structure from the analysis of supporters (average alpha for scales was .54). Because of the different perception of the Supreme Court and Catholics between the two groups, they were not included in any scale. Bivariate analysis suggested that affect for middle America was not correlated with support for the Christian Right. The other three scales were included in the multivariate analysis discussed below. To test each of the explanations, multivariate logit analysis was performed. Independent variables include demographic variables to tap the two sets of explanations. Theories of nonrational behavior are presented in the equation by two measures of social dislocation (whether a respondent had recently moved, and whether he or she had moved from a rural area to an urban area or between regions during his or her life), status concerns (objective incongruity, and anxiety), and policy alienation. The symbolic politics explanation is tested by inclusion of four scales representing affect toward social groups. Bivariate analysis suggested that supporters of the Moral Majority differed significantly
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from the rest of the population on each of these scales. Socialization explanations were represented in the equation by measures of religious attachment (denomination, doctrine, and religiosity), of partisanship, and of issue positions on social, foreign policy, and economic issues. Table 1 shows that rational explanations dominate nonrational ones. Evangelical doctrine emerged as the most significant predictor of support, followed by the respondent's position on social issues. Foreign policy issues and affect for right-wing and left-wing groups were also significant at .01. Sex emerged as significant at .05, with men more likely to support the Moral Majority. While these results are not surprising, they do indicate that nonrational explanations based on social dislocation, alienation, and status inconsistency are not significant predictors, while values and attitudes are. Moral Majority supporters are doctrinal evangelicals and fundamentalists with high levels of religiosity who hold conservative positions on social and foreign policy issues and are cool toward the symbols of the Left and warm toward the symbols of the Right. The multivariate analysis suggests that the most important direct predictors of support are religious, political and symbolic variables. This suggests that the socialization explanation provides a stronger account of support for the Right. Those who support the Table/.--Multivariate Explanations Sex Region Rural Birth Recently Moved Regional or Rural/Urban Move Evangelical Doctrine Evangelical Denomination Religiosity Education Income Occupation Income>Occupation Status Anxiety Partisanship Social IssueAttitudes Foreign Policy Attitudes Domestic Political Attitudes Spending, Social Programs Policy Alienation Cynicism Affect--Right Affect---Minorities Affect--Liberals Affect---Out-groups N
-.23* -.07 .10 .19 .13 .62** .04 .06 -.02 -.01 .00 -.11 .07 .03 .14** .12** .08 .04 .05 -.02 .01 ** -.00 -.01 -.01 ** 895
Logit RegressionCoefficients. *Indicates coefficient significant at .05. **Indicates coefficient significant at .01. SeeAppendix for details of scale construction.
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61
Moral Majority are evangelical Christians with conservative views on social and foreign policy issues who are sympathetic with the political fight and unsympathetic with the left. Although these results are not surprising, they do suggest that support comes from rational assessment of the positions of the New Christian Right, not from abnormal social strain. One set of theories emphasizing nonrationality was not tested here. The data provided no items from which to test psychological theories of support, which argue that support is often due to strong-mindedness, authofitarianism, dogmatism, or other psychological strains. Recent research on support for the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, however, has reported that these explanations are of little help in explaining support for the Christian Right in an earlier era.~e This research has suggested that such support is rational-the result of a certain set of political attitudes and predispositions.
Appendix Variables and Scales in Analysis Sex Region Rural Birth Recently Moved Regional/Rural Move Evangelical Doctrine Evangelical Denomination Religiosity Education Income Occupation Income > Occupation
Status Anxiety
Partisanship Social Issues Foreign Policy Domestic Issues Spending - Social Progs. Policy Alienation
Cynicism Affect--Right Affect--Minorities Affect--Liberals Affect--Out-groups
V707 V9 (Receded to 0 = non-south, 1 = south) V699 (Receded to 0 = non-rural, 1 = rural) V702 (Recoded so that 1 = moved in past two years, 0 = not moved in past two years) V699, V18, V701, V9 (0 = not moved, 1 = moved from region or from rural to urban area) 1 if V1080 = 1 and V1081 = 1, 0 if both conditions not satisfied V687 (categories 100-109, 130-149 are coded as evangelical). 1 = evangelical, 0 = not V688 V438 V516 V680 (housewives assigned husbands scores) (Income and Occupation divided into thirds. Item equals 1 if income is higher than occupation, 0 if income is equal to or less than occupation) V683, Income, Occupation, Education, V516, V694, V151 ) 1 if subjective social status is higher than objective mea sures, if social status is lower than that of parents, or if worried about future income) V318 Meafi of V250, V423, and V1038 after recoding. Alpha = .50 Mean of V388, V395, and V408 after receding. Alpha = .51 Mean of V375, V382, V1073, V1074 after recoding. Alpha = .57 Mean of V998, V1000, V1001, V1002, V1005. Alpha = .71 Mean of series of items created by taking absolute value of distance between respondent's issue position and his or her perception of the government position, items included V375, V380, V382, V387, V388,V393, V395, V00, V401, V406, V08, V413, V414, V419. Atpha = .49 Mean of V1063, V1064, V1065, V1066. Alpha = .61 Mean of V764, V773. Alpha = .49 Mean of V763, V765, V779. Alpha = .79 Mean of V767, V770. Alpha = .61 Mean of V775, V778, V782. Alpha = .54
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NOTES
1.
2.
3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
*The author thanks Elizabeth Cook and Corwin Smidt for helpful comments. Leopoldo Oomez assisted in the data analysis. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meethag of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, in April, 1988. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. James Guth, "The Politics of the New Christian Right," in Alan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (ed.) Interest Group Politics, 60-83. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1983); Robert Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority," in Robert Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (eds.) The New Christian Right. (New York: Aldine, 1983); Margaret Latus, "Mobilizing Christians for Political Action: Campaigning with God on Your Side," in David Bromley and Anson Shupe (eds.) New Christian Politics, 251-268. (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984); Guth, "Southern Baptist Clergy: Vanguard of the Christian Right?", in The New Christian Right. Milton Yinger and Stephen Cutler, "The Moral Majority Viewed Sociologically," Sociological Focus 15 (1982): 289-306; Lyman Kellstedt, "The Falwell Issue Agenda: Sources of Support among White Protestant Evangelicals," in M. Lynn and D. Moberg (eds.) An Annual in the Sociology of Religion (Greenwich Conn.: JAI, 1988); John Simpson, "Moral Issues and Status Politics," in The New Christian Right. Anson Shupe and William Stacey, "Public and Clergy Sentiments Toward the Moral Majority: Evidence from the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex," in New Christian Politics, 91-100; Joseph Tanmey and Stephen Johnson, "The Moral Majority in Middletown," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 22 (1983): 145157; Clyde Wilcox, "Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980: A Second Look," Social Science Quarterly 68 (1987): 157-167; Lee Sigelman, Clyde Wilcox and Emmett Buell, "An Unchanged Minority: Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980 and 1984," Social Science Quarterly 68 (1987): 876-884. Richard Pierand and James Wright, "The Moral Majority in Indiana," in New Christian Politics, 195-212; Sharon Georgianna, "The Moral Majority and Fundamentalism: Plausibility and Dissonance." (Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1984); Wilcox, "Religious Orientations and Political Attitudes: Variations within the New Christian Right," American Politics Quarterly 15 (1987): 274-296. Corwin Smidt, "Evangelicals and the 1984 Election: Continuity or Change?", American Politics Quarterly 15 (1987) 419--444; Ted Jelen, "The Effects of Religious Separatism on Partisan Identification, Voting Behavior, and Issue Positions among Evangelicals and Fundamentalists in the 1984 Election," Sociological Analysis 48 (1987); Kathleen Beatty and Oliver Walter, "Fundamentalists, Evangelicals and Politics," American Politics Quarterly 16 (1988): 43-59. But see, James Guth and John Green, "The Moralizing Minority: Christian Right Support among Political Activists," Social Science Quarterly 67 (1987), for a test of competing theories among national political elites. Charles Lindblom, "Another State of Mind," American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 9-21. Wilcox, "Popular Support"; Sigelman, Wilcox and Buell, op. cit. Wilcox, "Popular Support..." There is substantially more variation in the degree of opposition to the Moral Majority than in the degree of support. Moreover, several variables are correlated with the degree of support, but not with the degree of opposition. All analysis was performed using SPSS-X. James McEvoy, Radicals or Conservatfi~es? The Contemporary American Right (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971); Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1978). Lipset and Raab; Raymond Wolfinger, Barbara Wolt'mger, Kenneth Prewitt and Sheilah Rosenhack, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in R. Schoenberger (ed.), The American Right Wing 9-47 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); Fred Grupp,
New Christian Right
8. 9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17. 18.
63
"The Political Perspectives of John Birch Society Members" in The American Right Wing 83118; Scott McNaI1, "Social Disorganization and Availability: Accounting for Radical Rightism," in The American Right Wing 119-140. McNall, op. cit. Lipset and Raab, op. tit.; Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; Grupp, op. tit.; McEvoy, op. tit.; Guth, op. tit.; Emmett Buell and Lee Sigelman, "An Army that Meets Every Sunday? Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980," Social Science Quarterly (1985): 426--434. There is some controversy about the proper classification of Baptists in denominational groupings. Given the high concentration of Bible Baptist Fellowship members among Moral Majority activists reported in Guth, op. cit. and in Wilcox, "Religious Orientations . . . . " Baptists have been included in the evangelical category for this study; Wilcox, "Fundamentalists and Politics: An Analysis of the Impact of Differing Operational Definitions," Journal of Politics 48 (1986): 1041-1051; Wilcox, "Popular Support..." Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and CivilLiberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Jerome Himmelstein, "The Social Basis for Antiferninism," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 25 (1986): 1-15; Kent Tedin, David Brady, Mary Buxton, Barbara Gorman, and Judy Thompson, "Social Background and Political Differences between Pro- and Anti-ERA Activists," American Politics Quarterly 5 (1977): 395-407. Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; Martin Trow, Right Wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance. Doetoral dissertation, Columbia University; Gary Rush, "Status Consistency and Right Wing Extremism," American Sociological Review 32 (1967): 86-92; McEvoy, op. cit.; Ira Rohter, Radical Rightists: An Empirical Study. Doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University; Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; McEvoy, op. tit. For both measures, education, occupation, and income were recoded into three relatively equal categories. One set of measures classified individuals as discrepant only if they were in the top third on one measure and the bottom third on a second; the second set subtracted the value of each indicator from the other. A set of measures were then computed for each possible inconsistent pair. Wilcox, "Popular Backing for the Old Christian Right: Explaining Support for the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade," Journal of Social History 21 (1987): 117-132; Wolf'mger, et al., op. cit. Nelson Polsby, "Toward an Explanation of McCarthyism," Political Studies 8 (1963): 250271; Wolf-roger, et al., op. cit.; Grupp, op. cit.; Rohter, op. tit.; McEvoy, op. tit.; Wilcox, "Popular Support..." Rohter, op. cit.; Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; McEvoy, op. cit.; Guth and Green, op. tit.; Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; Rohter, op. cit.; Buell and Sigelman, op. cit.; Buell and Sigelman, op. cit.; Guth and Green, "The GOP and the Christian Right: The Case of Pat Robertson's Campaign Contributors." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987; Wilcox, "Popular Support..." Rohter, op. cit.; Pamela Conover and Virginia Gray, "Political Activists and the Conflict over Abortion." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincirmati, 1981; Gilbert Abcarian and Sherman Stanage, "Alienation and the Radical Right," Journal of Politics 27 (1965): 776-796; Wolf'mger, et al., op. cit. Conover and Gray, op. cit. Wilcox, "Popular Backing..."