Post-Fukushima Japan: The continuing nuclear controversy

Energy Policy 68 (2014) 199–205

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Short Communication

Post-Fukushima Japan: The continuing nuclear controversy Shun Deng Fam a,b,n, Jieru Xiong c, Gordon Xiong b, Ding Li Yong b,d, Daniel Ng e a

School of Archaeology and Anthropology, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia South-east Asian Biodiversity Society, Singapore, Singapore Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore d Fenner School of Environment and Society, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia e Department of Biological Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore b c

H I G H L I G H T S








As Europeans urgently phase-out nuclear power, Japan voted out such a government despite high anti-nuclear sentiment. Regulatory climate within the nuclear industry was dysfunctional as a result of being captured by the ‘nuclear village’. New ‘independent’ nuclear authority is made up of previously captured agency. With a pro-nuclear government, and lack of really independent nuclear authority, old problems may yet arise. Japanese government has to choose between lowering emissions, low popular support for nuclear power, and affordable electricity.

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 9 October 2013 Received in revised form 12 January 2014 Accepted 13 January 2014 Available online 14 February 2014

The Fukushima disaster was a wake-up call for the nuclear industry as well as a shocking revelation of the inner workings of the Japanese power sector. The political fallout from the event was far-reaching, pushing governments into abandoning nuclear expansion, turning instead to fossil fuels and renewable energy alternatives. While the move away from nuclear energy was deemed a move critical to political survival in Europe, we find that political candidates running on anti-nuclear platforms did not win elections, while the pro-nuclear Liberal Democratic Party won government in the 2012 elections. Against this backdrop, we analyse the energy conflict in Japan using a framework of values versus interests and consider the regulatory and cultural conditions that contributed to the disaster. A number of considerations lie in the way of an organised phase-out of nuclear power in Japan. We also consider the possible policy paths Japan may take. & 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Fukushima Energy conflict Politics Amakaduri Gakubatsu Nuclear

1. Introduction: Setting the stage for the energy conflict Japan has virtually no natural fossil fuel resources and therefore has to rely almost exclusively on imports (Koike et al., 2008; Shadrina, 2012). Prior to the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011, nuclear energy supplied 31% of Japanese electricity (ANRE, 2011a). Japan had planned to raise the nuclear share in the national energy mix to 53% by 2030 to accomplish its targeted reduction in carbon emissions (METI, 2010; Ferguson, 2011; Meltzer, 2011). The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which managed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and Japan’s nuclear safety regulator, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), are under pressure for administrative, regulatory

n Corresponding author at: School of Archaeology and Anthropology, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Tel.: þ61 468558576.

0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.01.014

and safety failings, which contributed to the disaster (Acton and Hibbs, 2012; The National Diet of Japan, 2012). The effects of the disaster became a global policy concern, and a matter of political survival in Western nuclear-powered nations. The resulting massive scale-back of nuclear power has prompted new worries about upheavals in energy politics and possible impacts on global development policy (Fam et al., 2012). Historically, Japan has had little overt internal opposition to the expansion of nuclear power. Valentine and Sovacool (2010) identified six factors that supported the expansion of the Japanese civilian nuclear industry: (1) the state itself guides economic development; (2) the importance of energy policy means that decision-making in this regard is centralised; (3) campaigns to tie public national esteem to technological prowess; (4) policy decisions are made largely by technocrats or technocratic leaders; (5) political authority is not seriously challenged and (6) there is little civic activism. A combination of the stagnant Japanese

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Table 1 Spike in Japanese fossil fuel imports post-Fukushima is mostly from the expensive fuel and crude oil, and natural gas imports (METI, 2011). Values are in million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe). Fuel

2009

2010

2011

2010–2011% Change

Low-sulphur heavy oil bunker C Low sulphur crude oil Steam coal LNG

1.1 9.4 61.2 83.4

1.2 9.4 67.7 91.7

3.1 12.9 67.5 100.6

þ 158 þ 37  0.29% þ 13.5

economy and the Fukushima disaster may however, have now give grounds for challenging the latter two factors. Indeed, the DPJ have lost the latest elections, news polls have shown public resistance to the restart of reactors and there have also been street protests against further expansion and utility of nuclear power. The previous Japanese government led by Yoshihiko Noda had flip-flopped on major decisions under pressure from nuclear and manufacturing industries (Table 2), while struggling to import substitute fossil fuels. In order to reduce the generating shortfall, utility companies have had to reactivate aged, disused thermal plants. This in spike in Japanese fossil fuel import in 2011 (Table 1) resulted in electricity suppliers suffering huge losses (Sankei, 2012a), which are expected to widen in 2012 as reactors remain offline (Sankei, 2012b). Nuclear power has become unpopular in Japan (Kajimoto and Nakagawa, 2012). In 2007, only 7% of the Japanese public wished for nuclear-free electricity, with 21% preferring to reduce reliance, 53% keeping the status quo and 13% supporting an expansion of nuclear power. Post-Fukushima, a poll saw 70% wishing to cease or reduce nuclear reliance (Penney, 2012). The Noda government ran their election campaign partially on a platform to reduce reliance on nuclear power, but have been voted out of government with the pro-nuclear Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) headed by (now) Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returning to power. In light of this series of events, the phase out of nuclear power in Japan would be delayed or abandoned. In light of this series of events, the phase out of nuclear power in Japan would be delayed or abandoned. This documents the energy conflict going on in Asia’s nuclear powered economic and technological powerhouse. This paper will address the absence of drastic modifications in Japan’s nuclear energy policy on two analytical levels. At the state-societal level, the electoral victory of the pro-nuclear LDP had stifled Japan’s progress in abandoning its nuclear energy policy. On the governmental level, the powerful nuclear village in Japan and the institutionalized practice of Amakaduri had contributed in maintaining the status-quo of Japan’s nuclear energy policy.

2. Materials and methods This is an exploratory case study looking at identifying: (1) the actors involved in this energy conflict, and the role they play and; (2) the institutional barrier to reform in the Japanese nuclear energy sector. By using a broad approach of rational choice theory, we discussed their roles in perpetuating or opposing Japan’s nuclear energy policy. Moreover, we will also discuss the normative values undergirding Japan’s Amakaduri practice, and its role in sustaining the identified institutional barrier through the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). In order to build a case and unravel the dynamics of Japan’s ongoing energy conflict, an extensive literature review was carried out as the political aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster unfolded.

3. Results 3.1. The actors Political actors can be value or interest actors (Abbott and Snidal, 2002). Value actors are characterised by uncompromising beliefs in a normative set of criteria for determining the appropriateness of actions. Interest actors are ends-oriented, and can make trade-offs in order to optimise the paths to their targets. Value actors differ from interest actors in that their stand is not a goal that can be traded off against other competing interests. The different actors are classified in Table 3. The government is a value actor with regards to energy affordability as it deeply affects Japanese economic and energy security as this cannot be compromised. Pro-nuclear large corporations and their employees can be regarded as interest actors as their interest in cheap energy can be traded off to some extent, for example with higher profits or reliable supply or employment (Adelman and Okada, 2012; Kubota, 2012). 3.2. The institutional barrier The ‘nuclear village’ consists of pro-nuclear advocates from Japan’s Diet, prefectural governors, bureaucracy such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and other regulatory agencies, nuclear vendors, the financial sector and large corporations represented by Keidanren (Kingston, 2012). The village has promoted and built the nuclear industry in Japan, despite decades of opposition (McCormack, 2011). The main reason for the proliferation of the Japanese nuclear industry is due to the occurrence of ‘regulatory capture’ (The National Diet of Japan, 2012), a form of government failure where a state regulatory agency advances the interests of the industry it was created to regulate (Dal Bò, 2006). The mechanism for regulatory capture in the Japanese nuclear industry is an institutionalised practice called ‘amakudari’, where university graduates join a regulatory agency or ministry such as the METI and retire into powerful executive posts in the corporations they once regulated (Kingston, 2012; Aldrich, 2011). The source of structural power for amakudari as an institutionalised practice stems from its control of strategic positions within the bureaucracies and the corporate realms (Colignon and Usui, 2003). High-ranking retiring bureaucrats moved into TEPCO, while lowerranking ones moved onto smaller utilities (Onishi and Belson, 2011), and this maintains TEPCO’s influence. For instance, Toru Ishida, a former agency head in METI had shifted into TEPCO and was appointed as TEPCO’s senior advisor upon retiring from METI in 2011 (The Japan Times, 2011). The main nuclear regulatory authority in Japan was the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). However as a regulatory body, it lacked independence. This was because NISA was operating under the METI, which promotes nuclear energy as an export industry and as an energy security solution (Iwata, 2012; The National Diet of Japan, 2012; Turner, 2003). This is a clear institutional conflict of interest. In theory, the elected members of government represent the interest of the people. However because legislation and regulation is a public good, the voting public tends not to actively campaign for regulation. On the other hand, the regulation is a private good to the industry because it directly affects their business. Hence corporations will actively campaign to shape regulations in their favour (Ramseyer, 2012). When the politicians and the top of the bureaucracy start promoting the interests of the regulated industry, the regulatory regimes they are in charge of inevitably serves their vision. Hence NISA became only a nominal regulator. In practice, 11 out of 19 members of the panel rewriting safety rules come from a lobby

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group for power companies (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011). As NISA was staffed by career bureaucrats and lacked technical expertise, advice is typically sought from engineers from industry-related corporations. In the compliant Japanese society, these engineers are unlikely to undermine their employers in what the National Diet’s report called ‘reflexive obedience’ (The National Diet of Japan, 2012; Onishi and Belson, 2011). Inspections were also predictably regular (Wang and Chen, 2012). After a pipe explosion in 2004, NISA admitted that the component had not been inspected in 28 years (Clenfield and Sato, 2007). TEPCO has also admitted falsifying its safety records, even colluding with NISA to identify inspectors who reported safety breaches to the agency to shut them out of the industry (Onishi and Belson, 2011).

4. Discussion 4.1. Governance challenges: Conflicts, contestations and barriers The actors involved conflict on two levels (Table 3). The first is an interest conflict (competing interests), pitting popular concern of nuclear risk against the economic interests in low-cost nuclear energy. The second is a value conflict of energy and economic security versus environmental and safety risks. The embedded contestation is over the safety risk in seismically-active Japan. Central to these is an institutional barrier, known as the ‘nuclear village’. 4.2. Interest conflict: Popular concern vs cheap energy Japanese industrial consumption requirement is consistent throughout the day and therefore draws baseload electricity, as do households (The Economist, 2011). When the nuclear power plants were shut down, the low-cost baseload shortfall was largely made up by expensive fuel oil and LNG (Table 1; METI, 2011). The use of less efficient and more expensive oil-based thermal generation plants have affected industries and households (Oi, 2012;

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Warnock and Ito, 2012). The major industries of Japan, represented by the influential Keidanran group criticised nuclear phase-out plans and have urged the restart of reactors to prevent ‘the hollowing-out of industry and employment’ (Sieg, 2012). Popular concern over the safety risk of nuclear power plants have mostly been over the siting of nuclear power plants near or over seismically active zones (Sheldrick, 2012; Tsukimori, 2012). Nobel laureate Kenzaburō Ōe led a 75,000-strong anti-nuclear rally in central Tokyo, claiming to have the signatures of over 7.5 million in support (The Economist, 2012). The decision to backflip on the earlier decision to impose a nuclear freeze despite mounting public opposition may have caused electorates to lose trust in their then leader. Political manoeuvring commenced to try to take advantage of the prevailing sentiments. A leader within the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) left and took 49 legislators with him to form a new party campaigning on the anti-nuclear platform (Brinsley and Hirokawa, 2012; The Economist, 2012). However anti-nuclear politicians have thus far failed to translate vociferous demonstrations into votes, losing both post-Fukushima elections. Tetsunari Iida, one of Japan’s most prominent renewable energy proponents lost to the incumbent in a four-way gubernatorial election for the Yamaguchi Prefecture in July 2012 (Inajima, 2012; Tabuchi, 2012a). In another gubernatorial election in Kagoshima Prefecture earlier in the month, the anti-nuclear prospect heavily lost his election battle, garnering only 34% of votes (Dawson, 2012). Even more significantly, the pro-nuclear LDP has been voted back to form government. The rational choice theory makes the assumption that actors are utilitarian maximizers. Actors have a set of preferences and will choose the preference which accrues them the most utility— or in other words optimal benefit and minimal costs (Jonge, 2012). Three hundred twenty-one Japanese citizens were surveyed in 2010 prior to the Fukushima disaster to assess their perspectives on energy security (Valentine et al., 2011). The authors found a consensus among survey participants that they expect Japan to play a role in reducing greenhouse gas emission, but on the condition that energy remains as affordable. In the post-

Table 2 Timeline of relevant post-Fukushima events under the Noda administration. Date

Event

11 March 2011

Earthquake and tsunami hits Fukushima prefecture and destroys cooling mechanisms at Fukushima Daiichi (Takenaka and Saoshiro, 2011) TEPCO asked to decommission all 10 reactors in the Fukushima prefecture (The National Diet of Japan, 2012) Japanese Prime Minister Noda announces that all reactors of Fukushima Daiichi are in stable, cold shutdown state (Takenaka and Saoshiro, 2011) Shutdown of the all in Japan nuclear reactors for safety checks completed (AFP, 2012) Two reactors in Oi plant restarted under pressure from manufacturers amid public protests (Koh, 2012; McCurry, 2012) The Japanese National Diet releases official report criticising the government, nuclear regulators and the nuclear industry (The National Diet of Japan, 2012) Japan announces plans to phase out nuclear power (Mochizuki et al., 2012; Tabuchi, 2012b) Government retracts 40-year phase out timescale under industrial pressure (Tabuchi, 2012c) NISA scrapped and NRA inaugurated under the environment ministry (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012a)

2 December 2011 16 December 2011 5 May 2012 1 July 2012 5 July 2012 14 September 2012 15 September 2012 19 September 2012

Table 3 Table classifying the actors and their priorities in this case study. Stand/priority

Value actors

Interest actors

Environment and Safety Risks (generally anti-nuclear) Energy affordability (generally pro-nuclear) Maintaining political power

Anti-nuclear activist; Renewable energy activist Japanese Government

Voting Japanese public: alarmed at nuclear disaster and regulatory failings; lost of trust in government and regulatory regimes Large industrial corporations; Sections of Japanese society dependent on nuclear industry for development and employment; members of the Nuclear Village Japanese Government

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Fukushima milieu and based on national opinion polls conducted, voting for an anti-nuclear political party could be counted as the optimal choice of the electorate. Nevertheless, there are other factors which had affected the cost-benefit calculus of the electorate. During the election campaign Shinzo Abe who led the LDP promised aggressive monetary stimulus to revitalize the Japanese economy (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2012). The “Abenomics” card played by the LDP proved particularly enticing for the electorate, especially so as the Japanese economy had been sluggish for years (The Diplomat, 2012). Due to the economic factor, the pro-nuclear LDP was seen as the more utilitarian choice than the anti-nuclear DPJ. Therefore, a political party which supports the continued usage of nuclear power was voted into power and therefore explaining the intriguing election outcome. It also implies that Japan’s nuclear energy policy would not be drastically revised. 4.3. Value conflict: Energy and economic security vs environmental and safety concerns Energy security has always been central to Japanese national security debates (Soeya, 1998). Japan's entry into World War II was an energy security decision (Manning, 2000; Boudreau, 1997). The current Japanese government is finding difficulty achieving energy security, best defined as: “The provision of affordable, reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, judiciously governed and socially acceptable energy services” (Sovacool, 2012). Producing electricity from fossil fuel means that energy now comes from less reliable and environmentally benign sources, is less affordable, but appears more socially acceptable. However nowand arguably more than at any time in Japan’s history, energy security is extremely tightly linked to its increasingly fragile economy. A spike in manufacturing costs from energy imports and reduced industrial output from electricity shortage means that Japanese manufacturers become uncompetitive, especially in comparison to its Korean and Chinese competitors. Achieving further industrial energy efficiency is a formidable challenge, because as pointed out by various authors, Japan is an ‘unusually energy-efficient’ economy (Manning, 2000; Ikenberry, 1986). Japan’s attempts at geopolitical leveraging for resource fields have also been inferior to that of China. Chinese national oil companies are strategically advantaged by being able to establish in areas isolated by the Western democracies, to which Japan is aligned (Rotberg, 2008). China has surpassed Japan in African aid provision and has moved faster into African energy politics (Campbell, 2008; Townsend and King, 2007). Japanese influence in Central Asian resource states is being eroded by the Chinese strategy of vertical integration and geographic location, such that China can control oil and gas supply lines and routes (Gorst and Dyer, 2009; Townsend and King, 2007; Downs, 2000). China also claims over 80% of the South China Sea, through which at least 70% of Japan’s oil supply is shipped (Calder, 1997). With their first ever trade deficit since the 1980s oil shock and burdened by a debt level over 230% of GDP (Vivoda, 2012; White, 2012), it is increasingly difficult for Japan to maintain economic competitiveness for the resource scramble. The decades of striving for energy independence and insulation from energy geopolitics has become a strategic weakness. Indeed, the success of the Abe electoral campaign could at least be partially put down to the nationalist attitude displayed regarding the legal ownership of the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea (Graham, 2013). The earliest anti-nuclear value actors rose from the atomic bomb detonations at the end of World War II and the 1954 “Lucky Dragon Incident”, when an American hydrogen bomb test contaminated the crew of a nearby fishing boat and killed its chief radio officer (Dusinberre and Aldrich, 2011). Therefore the

movement draws support from fishing communities that have had their livelihoods disrupted by the coastal sitings of the nuclear plants, as well as the anti-war activists, who link nuclear energy to nuclear weapons. Anti-war activists refer to nuclear power as the maintenance of a belligerent war potential (The Japan Times, 2011). They cite the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which defines pacifist postwar Japan and reads: "(2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized". (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 1947). The third component of anti-nuclear activists is women who have left the workforce to raise their children. Their goal of ‘protecting children, women’s lives/rights and peace’ emanates from their maternal instincts and is therefore a value (Alexander, 2012). From the experiences of the mothers who suffered through Hiroshima, and the fear of another nuclear war or a nuclear holocaust, these women are vehemently objected to nuclear power. The clash of values stems from the fact that previous governments believed in the economic and environmental value of nuclear power while anti-nuclear groups view nuclear power from anti-war and nuclear safety risks perspective, that the potential prospect of being able to produce nuclear weapons or the risk to the lives of people in a nuclear accident, however minute the possibility, cannot be compromised (Tabuchi, 2012d). 4.4. The nuclear village as an institutional barrier and governance challenges The combined effect of regulatory failures of the nuclear village, the devastating consequences of these failures during the earthquake and tsunami, and TEPCO’s continued opacity throughout the crisis has led to an extraordinary level of public distrust in the government’s oversight of the nuclear industry (Kingston, 2012; Tabuchi, 2012c; Shirouzu and Tudor, 2011; Yilmaz, 2011). Nuclear power cannot be completely replaced overnight, and therefore an overhaul of the regulatory system is urgently needed. It is expected that the METI and members of the nuclear village will put up stiff resistance against upsetting the status quo that has made the village “an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society” (The National Diet of Japan, 2012). According to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, public policy outcomes can be explained by the dynamics of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Within the domain of Japan’s nuclear energy policymaking, the nuclear village which was upheld by the institutionalized practice of amakudari can be regarded as a pro-nuclear advocacy coalition. Importantly, these advocacy coalitions are held together by sets of normative values – or core beliefs using the language of the Advocacy Coalition Framework – which are resistant to changes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Indeed, amakudari is embedded within the Japanese culture. The blurring of boundary between the public and private sectors which had enabled the amakudari practice can be traced to Japan’s ‘gakubatsu’ culture. Gakubatsu refers to schoolbased ties which have developed among Japanese university students (Colignon and Usui, 2003). The gakubatsu ties developed are so strong that graduates do not regard classmates employed in other sectors to be outsiders. The hopping of civil servants from the public to the private sector is therefore regarded as appropriate and normal (Colignon and Usui, 2003). Hence, members of the nuclear village can be seen as value actors. Even in the aftermath of the Fukushima fallout, the normative values of the nuclear village remained resilient. Former Japanese Prime Minister

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Junichiro Koizumi who had supported the dismantling of Japan’s nuclear power plants was criticised by the nuclear village as “optimistic and irresponsible”. The nuclear village is the key governance challenge because first, it affects public trust in the government and the authority of government regulatory systems; second, as the disaster shows, it deeply impacts the economy and energy security of the nation. Both the interest (large corporation interests) and value conflicts (pro-nuclear politicians’ conviction that nuclear energy is the panacea to energy security) have elements from the nuclear village. Interest actors such as the voting Japanese public can be engaged through transparency and trading off against other lessintensive interests (Abbott and Snidal, 2002). In seismically-active Japan, the Japanese government faces a major challenge to regain the trust of the people in nuclear power. The obvious solution to the nuclear village is to not have a domestic nuclear industry. However accomplishing this takes time. There are three main factors to consider when considering governance options: 1. Political factors and public opinion: Despite the high disapproval ratings for nuclear power public opinion polls, the ruling DPJ was voted out of office. The LDP, who had remained silent on the issue during campaigning but was instrumental in the establishment of the nuclear village, won a landslide victory in the December 2012 elections. The discordance between the public opinion on nuclear power and the results of elections signal that two years after the Fukushima disaster, the Japanese public have decided put more weight on non-nuclear issues. Indeed, the new Prime Minister pledged immediately after the elections to review the safety standards of currently suspended nuclear plants so that those certified safe can restart within three years (The Japan Times, 2013). It seems that the nuclear industry may yet regain its political clout again. 2. Financial and infrastructural factors (Lock-in): The immense sunk costs associated with nuclear power means that it will be impossible to eliminate nuclear power overnight, especially with utility companies also burdened with drastically increased fuel costs (Tabuchi, 2012b). The economic burden of the rising energy costs post-Fukushima was one of sources of the public discontent with the DPJ. 3. Carbon emission targets: The immediate reliance on the fossil fuels to make up for the shortfall in energy supply will inevitably increase Japan’s national carbon footprint. Japan’s commitment to slash emissions target by 25% by 2020 from 1990, already seen to be over-ambitious at that time, will be reviewed, presumably to a more achievable target (Japan Daily Press, 2012). Emissions target reflect the Japanese commitment to environmental issues, and while seemingly at odds with nuclear safety currently, it will continue to play a role in shaping Japan’s nuclear policy.

5. Conclusions and policy implications The DPJ came to power in 2009 on an anti-bureaucracy ticket (Aldrich, 2011) and tried to seize the opportunity to make good on that promise by disbanding NISA, and setting up a new agency called the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) under the Ministry of Environment. They also prevented the construction of new reactors (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012b). Under a new pro-nuclear Prime Minister, the new NRA, but still largely staffed by NISA employees (Fitzpatrick, 2013) and originally set up to review safety regulations during the DPJ era, may yet pave the way for the revitalisation of the industry instead. Furthermore, the Abe Cabinet is populated with individuals with considerable clout in the energy industry (The Japan Times, 2013). The intricate balance

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between Japan’s immediate energy meets, carbon emission targets and public anti-nuclear sentiments is also what the current government has to handle delicately. Although Japan is currently locked-in to nuclear power to a significant extent, the problem can be resolved over time, by enforcing the 40-year operational period proposed by the Noda administration. The government should enforce and fund the decommissioning of reactors that independent experts deem to be unsafe for operation. With fewer reactors, the nuclear village will lose its influence. By also funding renewable energy, Japan will also be able to resume its isolation from energy geopolitics, avoid resource scrambles and meet its emissions targets. Japan will be forced to further modify its energy policy, and its planned energy mix. It might after all, be useful that Japan’s energy policy planning and implementation be centralised so changes may be swiftly implemented. As mentioned earlier, it is economically and politically impossible to cease all nuclear energy use in the short term. Even in the longer term, nuclear energy may still have a role to play in Japan’s energy mix. Indeed, it has been calculated that to meet greenhouse gas emissions targets, it will be difficult to lower the use of nuclear energy (Hong et al., 2013). The Abe government, and future governments face a difficult task in balancing popular opposition to nuclear power, lowering of greenhouse gas emission and still maintain affordable electricity prices. There are three policy directions that Japan can take. One is a technocratic route, where the policy is directed at energy production itself. The most obvious and straightforward option, if Japan wants to reduce reliance on nuclear power in the short to medium term is to decommission the oldest reactors and replace them with fossil fuel options, such as LNG. This will clearly force Japan to play the energy geopolitics game with China, as well as send the signal that Japan will not meet its ambitious emissions targets. At the same time the technological giants that are manufacturing and retailing nuclear power plants can be encouraged with incentives to join the renewable energy technology race, to reduce dependence on LNG generation as soon as possible. Therefore this policy direction may result in Japan exchanging its emissions targets and affordable energy prices in the shorter term for more acceptable forms of energy production. The second policy direction is a domestic policy route, where active steps are taken to identify and disrupt entrenched amakaduri and gakubatsu practices. This arguably is the best way to get to the root of the cultural problems that have plagued the Japanese nuclear industry, but is also the most difficult policy route as even the Japanese Cabinet is made up of individuals with considerable influence within the nuclear village. The nuclear energy industry is one where transparency should be of the highest order, due to the high economic and human costs associated with their failures. Therefore we argue that if Japan wishes to carry on dominating Asia in nuclear energy production, they must first tackle and resolve their entrenched cultural issues first. They can then supplement nuclear power production with increased levels of renewable energy from solar, wind and tidal generation. This can be seen as a long-run solution, as it will take a while to accomplish, and therefore take just as long for the industry to regain the trust of the voting public but it helps maintain energy prices and meet greenhouse gas emissions targets and allows Japan to continue its isolation from global energy geopolitics.

Acknowledgements SDF is grateful to Carolyn Hendriks at The Australian National University for the very helpful comments and discussions on an early version of the manuscript. The authors also thank two anonymous reviewers for immense help in revising and improving the manuscript.

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