Power from Perspective: Potential future United States energy portfolios

ARTICLE IN PRESS Energy Policy 37 (2009) 1432–1443

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Power from Perspective: Potential future United States energy portfolios Bruce Tonn a,, K.C. Healy b, Amy Gibson a, Ashutosh Ashish c, Preston Cody b, Drew Beres b, Sam Lulla c, Jim Mazur c, A.J. Ritter b a b c

University of Tennessee, Knoxville 37831-6038, USA Deloitte Touche, USA Independent Consultant, USA

a r t i c l e in f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 7 October 2008 Accepted 1 December 2008 Available online 3 February 2009

This paper presents United States energy portfolios for the year 2030, developed from seven different Perspectives. The Perspectives are characterized by different weights placed on fourteen defining values (e.g., cost, social acceptance). The portfolios were constructed to achieve three primary goals, energy independence, energy security, and greenhouse gas reductions. The portfolios are also evaluated over a comprehensive set of secondary criteria (e.g., economic growth, technical feasibility). It is found that very different portfolios based on very different defining values can achieve the three primary goals. Commonalities among the portfolios include reliance upon cellulosic ethanol, nuclear power, and energy efficiency to meet year 2030 energy demands. It is concluded that the US energy portfolio must be diverse and to achieve national energy goals will require an explicit statement of goals, a strong role for government, and coordinated action across society. & 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Energy portfolios Energy independence GHG emissions

1. Introduction The United States is facing a number of significant challenges to its energy supply. Rising and highly volatile energy costs, energy supply uncertainties, and increasing concerns about the environmental impacts of energy production (Gilman, 2006; IPCC, 2007) and use have created the growing realization that cheap, plentiful energy is something that can no longer be taken for granted. International relations concerning energy are strained, as worldwide demand for energy in countries like China and India is surging, and distress about the Middle East continues to be serious. Controversies plague many energy options open to the United States (Pew Research Center, 2008). For example, nuclear energy policy and use has been shaped by negative public perceptions and attitudes about safety and reliability that are a result of the events at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and in Japan (MIT, 2003; Rosa and Rice, 2004). Public awareness of global warming issues has brought unfavorable attention to carbon-based energy sources such as coal—long regarded as safe and politically acceptable. In a relatively short period of time, the biofuels industry has gone from basking in wide public acceptance to public excoriation in the food versus fuel debate. Similarly, the rise and fall of energy supply and demand since the oil crisis during the 1970s has contributed to public perception that energy supply may not be a

 Corresponding author.

E-mail address: [email protected] (B. Tonn). 0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.12.019

‘‘real’’ issue, making it difficult to gain public acceptance of certain policies regarding the management of supply or reduction of demand. Building new transmission lines (Gerlach, 2004) and drilling for oil offshore (Freudenburg and Gramling, 2004) have also proven to be controversial. Even relatively benign sources of energy such as wind face negative public scrutiny in the form of NIMBYism and concerns over aesthetics and bird strike (Johansso and Laike, 2007). In general, surveys indicate that the public is not satisfied with the current national energy policy (Coburn and Farhar, 2004; Ansolabehere and Morison, 2007; Teixeira, 2007; Smith, 2004; Beck and Martinot, 2004). Yet, surveys also indicate a gap in knowledge about energy issues as a whole (Farhar and Coburn, 2005; Cooper et al., 2006). Therefore, finding support for one energy policy over another is difficult as there are multitudes of perceptions reflecting several overlapping and conflicting concerns about the current US energy portfolio. Given the influence of public attitudes and perceptions on energy policy and production, it is advisable to study possible future US energy portfolios from the Perspectives of groups and individuals that will drive US energy policy. This paper acknowledges the pluralistic nature of US society and the multitude of Perspectives contained therein. These perceptions and attitudes have been categorized into seven ‘‘Perspectives’’ or mindsets (Section 2.1). These Perspectives were applied to develop seven energy portfolios that achieve primary and secondary energy policy goals (Section 2.2) and identify the actions and policy levers needed to implement them. A tool was developed to facilitate construction of the seven national energy portfolios (Section 2.3).

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Section 3 compares the seven national energy portfolios and assesses them over the primary and secondary criteria. The paper concludes with several observations and recommendations.

2. Methodology 2.1. Perspectives This project uses a Perspective-based variant of the wellknown scenario-based methodology. Scenarios are descriptions of plausible future worlds that can be used to support strategic decision-making (Schwartz, 1991). Scenarios are widely used in business (Wright et al., 2008) and military strategic planning, and recently have made inroads into other areas, such as urban planning (Hopkins and Zapata, 2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change used a scenario approach to drive regional GHG emissions, which were then input into the global climate models (IPCC, 2000). These scenarios postulated different levels of economic growth, technological change, and population changes around the world. Scenarios have frequently been used in energy contexts (Devezas et al., 2008). For example, scenarios have been used to envision energy futures for Colombia (Smith et al., 2005). Scenario work done for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change by the Global Business Network (Mintzer et al., 2003) resulted in these three scenarios:

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the world energy system and two variant scenarios, a carbon constraint case and a hydrogen case (EC, 2006). The scenario methodology used in this project has its roots in the classical scenario development methodology presented by Peter Schwartz in his book, The Art of the Long View (Schwartz, 1991). Schwartz’s methodology calls for intensive trend assessment and the creation of multiple but disparate scenarios that posit different directions and combinations for the most important driving forces. As described below, the methodology implemented in this project is a variant of the general scenario development methodology. This project created multiple Perspectives that could lead to different national energy portfolios by the year 2030 or shortly thereafter. This time period was chosen, because it is consistent with the timeframe used by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) for its energy production and demand forecasts. The foundations for the seven Perspectives were developed during a structured brainstorming session using classroom-proven techniques, involving project team members. Specifically, ten policy experts were provided an ample supply of sticky notes and instructed to write down as many types of Perspectives that appear to be engaged in and actually could impact energy policy in the United States as they could imagine. Through manipulation of the notes and an extended discussion, ideas were shaped into seven distinct Perspectives and given appropriate names. The seven Perspectives that emerged from the brainstorming exercise are these:

 America-Firsters—the primary goal of this Perspective is  Awash in Oil and Gas—assumes that these energy resources 



are available and cheap; Technology Triumphs—commercialization of climate friendly energy technologies is accelerated through a combination of state policy, technological breakthroughs, public and private investment, and consumer interest; and Turbulent World—supply disruptions and energy security concerns lead to aggressive federal energy policy promoting domestic, low-risk resources.

United Nations University’s Millennium Project (2008) has been quite active in developing a comprehensive set of world scenarios. Their latest 2020 Global Energy Scenarios have these titles:

 Business as usual—the Skeptic–no surprises or much change in

energy independence;

 Bottom-Liners—this Perspective is composed of industrialists     

who prefer a secure and low-cost national energy portfolio, regardless of its GHG emissions or energy import profile; Entrepreneurs—this Perspective represents American marketplace ingenuity in solving our energy problems; Environmentalists—the primary goal of this Perspective is to reduce GHG emissions; Individualists—the primary goal of this Perspective is to maintain the high quality of life in the United States; Politicians—the dominant theme of this Perspective is to be as accommodating to as many interests as possible in the implementation of national energy policies; and Technophiles—this Perspective advocates a ‘big engineering’ approach to achieving energy independence and GHG emissions.

energy sources and consumption patterns;

 Environmental Backlash—International environmental move-

 

ment becomes much more organized; some groups lobby for legal actions and new regulations and sue for action in the courts, while others become violent and attack fossil energy industries; High-Tech Economy—Technological innovations accelerate beyond current expectations; and Political Turmoil—Increasing conflicts and wars, with several countries collapsing into failed states, leading to increasing migrations and political instabilities around the world.

Several other energy-related scenario projects should be noted. The International Energy Agency developed two versions of the energy future: one that is underinvested, vulnerable, and dirty and another that is clean, clever, and competitive (IEA, 2006). The World Energy Council developed four scenarios at the ends of two axes: high or low engagement by governments; and high or low cooperation and integration among nations and regions, and among the public and private sectors (WEC, 2007). Finally, the European Commission has developed a reference projection for

An initial project task was to write one-page narratives for each Perspective.1 A second task entailed describing each Perspective’s weights over fourteen defining values, which were also generated during the brainstorming session described above. It is common to conduct strategic decision-making within a values framework (e.g., see Keeney, 1992) and we found that a values-based approach added definition and transparency to the Perspectives. The fourteen defining values used in this research are: Cost of Investment, Deployment/Implementation Time, Technology Feasibility, National Security, Foreign Relations, Environmental Friendliness, Sustainability, Social Acceptance, Maximize Efficiency (Minimize), Portfolio of Choice/Flexibility, Independence (Self-Sufficiency), Economic Growth, Reliability, and Convenience. How each Perspective weighted these criteria is shown in Table 1. The emphasis that the project placed on defining values ensured that a wide

1 The narratives as well as extensive documentation of the quantitative analyses can be found in the project report available at http://bakercenter.utk.edu/ main/event.php?key=142

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Table 1 Perspectives’ weights over defining values. Defining values

America-Firsters

Bottom-Liners

Entrepreneurs

Environmentalists

Individualists

Politicians

Technophiles

Cost of investment Deployment/implementation time Technology feasibility National security Foreign relations Environmental friendliness Sustainability Social acceptance Maximize efficiency Portfolio of choice/flexibility Independence (self-sufficiency) Economic growth Reliability Convenience

I H I H I L M H L M H M M M

H H M L L L I M H M L H M L

M H H M M H H H H H M H H M

I H I L M H H I I L I I L L

M M H H L M L M L L M H H H

H H H H L M L H L L M M M H

M H H I M M M I H I I M M M

H—high weight, M—medium weight, L—low weight, I—indifferent to the value.

range of portfolios with a wide range of energy sources, not only those biased towards fossil fuels (Sovacool, 2008b), would be created. The Perspectives’ narratives, weights on defining values, and names were extensively debated, discussed and revised during the course of the project as analyses challenged the internal validity of each Perspective. The Perspectives were also the focus of this projects’ internal and external review. Lastly, an extensive literature review was conducted in an attempt to support the existence of the Perspectives in American society. The literature review did not reveal any previous studies that categorized the American public vis-a`-vis their Perspectives on energy policy in the manner presented above. However, we believe that the seven Perspectives are representative of many aspects of the dominant social paradigms in the United States (Kilbourne et al., 2002; Tonelson, 1992; Greene, 2008; Alario and Freudenburg, 2006). Also, these Perspectives have some but limited overlap with other types of categorizations of energy users.2 For example, Lutzenhiser (1993) identified through surveys conducted for the Electric Power Research Institute these six different conceptions of energy held by individuals:

     

comfort/pleasure seeker; appearance conscious/conformists; lifestyle simplifiers/hassle avoiders/indifferent consumers; control seekers; nonconformists; and conservers.

Also, Stern and Aronson (1984) identified at least five different types of energy users. The investor regards energy as a cost that is carefully considered in making purchases such as equipment and capital, and views energy technologies as durable ways to recover costs over their useful life. The consumer thinks of their homes and automobiles as consumer goods that provide pleasures and necessities. The conformer sees energy technologies as a way to belong to a particular social group or attain status. The crusader sees energy use as an ethical issue and conserves energy as an expression of self-reliance and environmental stewardship. The problem avoider treats energy as no more than a potential source of annoyance or inconvenience, doing nothing about it until technologies breakdown and services cease.

2 We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for these three references and accompanying materials.

Finally, Sovacool (2008a) identifies five different conceptions of ‘‘energy’’ in the United States:

 The scientific view of physicists and engineers frames energy









as a property of heat, motion, and electrical potential, measurable in joules and BTUs. According to this view, energy can neither be produced nor consumed, quantity is always conserved, quality is always declining, and correct policy is a matter of understanding thermodynamics and physics; The economic view sees energy as a commodity, or collection of commodities such as electricity, coal, oil, and natural gas, traded on the market. This view emphasizes the value of choice for consumers and producers and assumes that the marketplace allocates choices efficiently. According to this view, when prices rise, fuel substitutes will be found, and inequities arise only through irrational behavior. Correct policy is a matter of analyzing transactions between buyers and sellers and minimizing the external costs of these transactions; The ecological view rejects framing energy as scientific or economic, and instead classifies energy resources as renewable/non-renewable, clean/polluting, and inexhaustible/depletable to emphasize their environmental context. This view prioritizes the values of sustainability, frugality, and future choice. Correct policy is a matter of recognizing that energy resources are finite and interdependent and that present use engenders significant costs to future generations; The social welfare view sees energy services as a social necessity. This view suggests that people have a fundamental right to energy for home heating, cooling, lighting, cooking, transportation, and essential purposes. The central value here is one of equity, and correct policy becomes a matter of distributing energy services to all social classes; and The energy security view focuses on the geographical location of energy resources, political stability of producing and consuming countries, and availability of fuel substitutes. This view sees energy supply as a key component of national security, and correct policy becomes a matter of maintaining economic vitality and military strength.

Parts of all three categorizations overlap with our seven Perspectives. For example, aspects of the Bottom-Liners Perspective can be found in Sovacool’s economic view and Stern and Aronson’s investor. Also, aspects of the Environmentalists Perspective can be found in Sovacool’s ecological view, Lutzenhiser’s conservers, and Stern and Aronson’s crusader. Sovacool’s scientific and energy security views do not quite capture the enthusiasm of

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the Technophile Perspective or the adamancy of the AmericaFirsters Perspective, respectfully. Individualists, Politicians, and Entrepreneurs do not seem to overlap with these other categorizations. It needs to be emphasized that a Perspective should be understood to be a particular worldview exemplified by a set of specific defining personal values mentioned above that guides how an individual holding the Perspective would go about developing a preferred future national energy portfolio. The Perspectives and resulting national energy portfolios should not be considered as being scenarios, however. This is because the Perspectives were constructed to be ideals or even caricatures of existing worldviews. As such, it is not assumed that any one Perspective will dominate the energy policy debate in the United States to the extent that Perspective’s national energy portfolio will largely become true in the future (nor does this research attribute any degree of political influence to any Perspective). Thus, this research is not asserting that any of the seven national energy portfolios discussed below could become true, as might be the case with a set of traditional scenarios. Instead, the Perspectives should be viewed as a tool, such as scenarios that can be used to inform strategic decision-making. Additionally, we do not assert that these are the only Perspectives that exist and influence US energy policy. Also, we make no claims as to what fraction of the US population may hold each of the Perspectives. Given that no previous work has approached categorization of energy viewpoints in the manner described above, a logical follow-up project would be to implement a national survey to ascertain what percentage of the population holds each of the seven Perspectives and to possibly identify other Perspectives that influence energy policy in the United States.

2.2. Framework for national energy portfolio development Once the Perspectives were identified and defined, the next step was to create a framework for having each Perspective build its own national energy portfolio. This framework has three components: portfolio components, policy levers, and portfolio evaluation criteria. The energy components that could be included in any Perspective’s national energy portfolio are shown in Table 2. The set of components includes a comprehensive range of conventional and unconventional energy sources, including some emerging technologies. For a practical and implementable energy portfolio, only energy components with projected commercial viability/feasibility by 2030 were considered as potential energy sources in the final analysis. Examples of the commercially unviable/unfeasible technologies that were left out include: nuclear fusion, space-based solar, nanotechnology-based photo-

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voltaic cells, bacterial enzymes, and hydrogen. The tool described in the next sub-section assisted the project team members build their Perspective-based portfolios using these components. Each Perspective also had to identify appropriate policy levers, what would need to be implemented to achieve their preferred portfolios. An initial set of policy levers was created during the brainstorming exercise mentioned above. This set was revised several times during the course of the project. It should be noted that the set is comprehensive but not exhaustive (e.g., state-level policy levers have been omitted as have numerous policies that would fall under various federal regulatory bodies). A total of fiftyfive policy levers were available to choose from. Examples of policy levers include: R&D grants, production tax credits, low carbon fuel standards, cap and trade, national renewable portfolio standards, and increases in drilling offshore and in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The last piece of the framework is the portfolio evaluation criteria. We have divided these criteria into two groups, primary and secondary criteria (see Table 3). The former group is composed of these three criteria: energy independence, energy security and greenhouse gas emissions. These three were chosen because they seem to dominate policy discussions in the United States. To support the analyses reported below, we define each fairly simply. Energy independence is defined as the difference between oil and natural gas imported into the United States and oil and natural gas consumed in the United States. Each energy component of a portfolio was given an energy security rating, with imported oil and natural gas receiving the lowest ratings, biofuels, wind and hydropower the next lowest, and sources like coal, solar, and nuclear the highest. While these two definitions both capture concerns over Middle East oil imports and the realization that oil is traded in a world market (i.e., making it difficult for the US restrict imports from any particular country), the former is designed to capture the distaste many have (such as the hypothetical America-Firsters) in sending US money overseas to buy energy and the corresponding loss of wealth (Greene and Ahmad, 2005). The latter is designed to capture the threat of another oil embargo as well as near-term threats to large fractions of our base energy supplies (e.g., loss of biomass resources due to drought and inclement weather). Greenhouse gas reductions are measured in CO2e, and are tightly related to changes in fossil fuel use, which may or may not flow from changes in energy independence and energy security. We realize that there are many definitions of energy independence and energy security, many of which much more complicated than those provided above (e.g., Yergin, 2006). For example, some may argue that nuclear is not a very secure energy component because of the sustainability of uranium supplies in the mid- to long-term (Mudd and Disendorf, 2008). Also, volatility in markets for one energy component may impact prices and supplies of other energy components serving the United States. We do not dismiss these and other points. Indeed, many of these

Table 2 Energy components used in this study. Conventional energy sources

Alternative energy sources

Oil (including sand tar and shale oil) Natural gas (including shale gas, CBM, and methane hydrates) Coal Conventional hydroelectric (including microdams) Nuclear

Biomass Biofuels (ethanol, biodiesel) Wind Geothermal Waste Solar Unconventional hydroelectric (e.g., wave energy) Energy efficiency

Table 3 Primary and secondary evaluation criteria. Primary criteria

Secondary criteria

Energy independence Energy security Greenhouse gas reduction

Economic impacts (national) Economic impacts (individual) Economic impacts (commercial/Industrial) Technical feasibility Other environmental impacts (e.g., air and water pollution) Political feasibility International relations Demographic considerations

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arguments are included in our analyses, through the defining values (e.g., sustainability, reliability, independence, and national security) and the secondary criteria. However, by keeping our definitions of energy independence and energy security straightforward helped make the analyses reported below tractable. To conclude our discussion of the framework, the secondary criteria listed in Table 3 are dominated by economic concerns. Specifically, each portfolio is assessed over its potential impact upon the national economy and upon the pocket books of consumers and the bottom lines of businesses. The portfolios are also assessed for their technical feasibility, other environmental impacts (e.g., water and air pollution), political feasibility, impacts upon international relations, and demographic considerations (i.e., social equity concerns).

2.3. Portfolio construction tool A significant amount of effort was devoted to building a spreadsheet tool to facilitate the construction of national energy portfolios out to the year 2030. This effort was divided between acquiring inputs for the tool and building the tool itself. Thus, concurrent with Perspective development, a broader set of team members engaged in exhaustive research and review of existing literature on the various sources of energy, their supply versus demand, their relative importance to the overall US portfolio, their potential for future development and commercialization, and their relative present and future costs. An inherent challenge in analyzing a topic as large as the US energy portfolio is in building a model that is both sophisticated enough to capture the most important variables, yet not so complicated that its construction is intractable. Rather than build a comprehensive model from the bottom up, this project team assembled a ‘‘meta-model,’’ a tool that allowed us to aggregate the results from a range of models. The results from the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook (Revised Early Release) for 2008 serve as the base case for analysis, because it is the most robust and widely used energy model. It is also used as the reference case for Congressional analysis done by the EIA and other agencies. While the EIA projections for energy production and demand for each portfolio component provided a baseline for developing Perspective-based portfolios, additional research provided data and assumptions used to modify the EIA baselines as per each Perspective’s values. Indeed, this is quite appropriate because EIA’s baseline case does not incorporate new policy initiatives nor does it incorporate energy efficiency as an energy source. The results reported in Section 3 clearly show how incorporating new policies and energy efficiency initiatives can lead to major gains vis-a`-vis the three primary criteria discussed above when compared to the EIA base case. Conceptually, our model separates consumption, production, and the electric power system. Following EIA’s framework, consumption was broken down into the four demand sectors: residential, industrial, commercial, and transportation. Each sector was further broken down based on the types of energy it consumed directly (i.e., natural gas for home heating) and its demand for electricity. Production specifically included the domestic production of the following energy components: liquids (petroleum), natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydropower (including some expansion of existing facilities and other river hydrokinetic potential), biomass, biofuels (further subdivided by ethanol sources, biodiesel, and industrial biofuels), wind, geothermal, waste, solar, and unconventional hydropower (e.g., ocean energy). The electric power system is separate because it is an intermediate mechanism, converting multiple types of energy into a form that is transmitted and consumed. As such, it is both

consumed by the demand sectors and represents a consumer of energy components for the generation of electricity. Lastly, the model allows for changes in energy efficiency in the four demand sectors and in the transmission of electricity. Given a set of forecasts and assumptions that balance the portfolio, the model automatically calculates the key outcomes at issue in this paper. A summary worksheet presents the portfolio, both for consumption and production, the difference of which is calculated as the ‘‘independence gap.’’ The values for other key criteria are also calculated based on the portfolio. CO2 equivalent emissions are calculated using the ratios implied by EIA data for coal, natural gas, and liquids consumption. Energy security is calculated as the percentage of energy coming from highly secure sources (domestic production, sans biofuels/biomass/hydropower), medium secure sources (biofuels/biomass/hydropower), and low secure sources (imports). Cost and benefit data were gathered during our research and incorporated into the model. The model calculates the incremental cost of a portfolio above and beyond the EIA base case. As such, it provides an estimate of what additional costs/benefits will be incurred to achieve a portfolio as opposed to the ‘‘business as usual’’ baseline. The following types of costs were estimated: capital investment in production capacity, cost to achieve demand efficiency gains, and costs of public policies. Social benefits associated with reduction in emissions were also estimated. Capital investment costs are calculated using the current cost of adding generating capacity for electric plants and facility costs for ethanol production. Additional capacity required was calculated by converting the amount QBTU over and above the EIA base case into required MW of additional capacity (using EIA’s implied utilization rate for each type of plant). Ethanol was converted into million gallons per year of incremental capacity. The cost to achieve demand efficiency gains was estimated based on the reduction in energy demand over the EIA base case and the levelized technology costs ($/kWh) to achieve these efficiency costs across the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors (see Eldridge et al., 2008). Public policy costs were estimated from a wide variety of sources, and then the costs of those policies included in a portfolio were added together depending on the policies chosen in the respective Perspective portfolio. Social benefits factored the reduction in level of CO2, CO, SOx, NOx, and PM10 emissions resulting from the use of different components in each portfolio. The social benefits include both environmental, safety, and health benefits ($/ton of emissions) as related to reductions in emissions. These were analyzed in prior work (see Das et al., 2002), which found a wide range of possible estimates due to different methods used by different researchers. That work settled on a middle ground, which incorporated both the market price of tradable emissions permits and human health benefits of reduced pollution. There are several important shortcomings of the model to note. One is that this is a ‘‘first order’’ model—it does not factor in the second-order effects of changes in prices. For instance, if the production of domestic liquids is dramatically increased, the price of oil would fall. Just as we have seen a bias towards low MPG vehicles and reduced gasoline consumption as a response to the current high price of oil, a lower price of oil would likely induce the opposite effect. This would mean that the demand for liquids would increase, though this type of interaction is not modeled. Another drawback is that the model relies on the current costs of capacity and does not incorporate economies of scale and learning that will surely result from increased production of emerging energy sources. The model also does not incorporate the ongoing operational costs, such as maintenance and fuel. Despite these shortcomings, the model still provides order of magnitude estimates that allow for a relative comparison and evaluation of costs.

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It should also be noted that the tool does not directly model relationships between policy levers and energy portfolio outcomes. Each champion chose a set of policy levers consistent with the assumptions underlying the forecasts of their created energy portfolio. The model is not sophisticated enough to simulate the national economy to determine whether the policy levers are insufficient, overly sufficient or approximately what would be required. Lastly, the model does not assume behavior changes that could change levels of energy demand from those forecasted by the EIA. Reductions in demand were gained solely through gains in efficiency, not through behavioral changes (e.g., changes in driving habits or thermostat settings). Our first-order model is also not able to estimate changes in energy consuming behavior that could result from the implementation of the policy levers, called for in each of the Perspectives. Including behavioral changes could make achieving primary goals (e.g., energy independence) harder or easier for each Perspective. However, any changes in forecast demand would probably not significantly impact the Perspectives or the differences observed between the Perspectives.

3. Results Seven different national energy scenarios for the year 2030 based on different Perspectives are summarized in Fig. 1. The first column presents the base case forecast produced by the US EIA which includes a large amount of imported energy and domestic coal. The remaining columns include radically different portfolios based on different assumptions and goals. At one end of the spectrum, the Environmentalists’ portfolio is characterized by a large amount of demand reduction through efficiency increases, a

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much higher amount of renewables, and almost no domestic coal production. In contrast, the Bottom-Liners place even more reliance on low-cost coal. The Technophiles push nuclear power more heavily than the other Perspectives. The Individualists and America-Firsters advocate policies to increase US production of liquids, in order to reduce the cost of driving and to achieve energy independence, respectively. As would be expected given the conditions of the study, all portfolios realize some progress towards closing the independence gap—or the difference between US domestic energy supply and total demand—by 2030 (see Fig. 2). The more goal-oriented, cost-unconstrained Perspectives (Technophiles, Environmentalists, America-Firsters) either achieve or come close to eliminating foreign energy imports. The Perspectives vary widely in their approach to achieving independence. The Technophiles portfolio relies on growth in all energy portfolio components with emphasis placed on expanding nuclear, alternative and renewable energies. Although coal-based energy production declines as nuclear and alternative energies grow, there is no particular bias against coal itself. In fact, the abundant availability of coal suggests it as a fall-back option, because if alternative energies should not grow at the assumed rate, it could become a national strategic energy reserve and/or a source to be converted into liquid transportation fuels. The America-Firsters portfolio is similar to the Technophiles portfolio in that all energy components are represented, but with less aggressive growth targets for nuclear and renewable energies. The Bottom-Liner portfolio is closest to the current status quo (and the EIA base case) and is the least successful in reducing imports. All portfolios offer significantly improved energy security over the EIA base case. Based on this rating scheme, the AmericaFirsters and Technophiles portfolios are the most secure given

Fig. 1. Summary of the seven Perspectives’ energy portfolios (year 2030).

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30

Q BTU

20 10 0 2007

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

-10 -20 EIA Base Case Environmentalists

Technophiles America Firsters

Individualists Politicians

Bottom-Liners Entrepreneurs

Fig. 2. Summary of the seven Perspectives’ impact on energy independence gap.

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% EIA Base Case America Firsters Bottom-Liners

Entrepreneurs Environmentalists Individualists High

Politicians Medium

Technophiles Low

Fig. 3. Summary of seven Perspectives’ impacts on energy security.

their elimination of energy imports and diversity of domestic energy sources (see Fig. 3). The Environmentalists portfolio is somewhat less secure, given its reliance on biofuels and wind. The third primary goal in constructing the energy portfolios was GHG reductions. This goal was the main motivating force in the Environmentalists Perspective, for example. Fig. 4 shows the impact of each Perspectives’ model portfolio on GHG emissions. The Environmentalists’ portfolio reduces GHG emissions to over 50% below the Kyoto Protocol goal for US energy-related emissions, which is approximately 4746 mmt CO2 equivalent. (Energy-related emissions account for approximately 83% of the total US GHG emissions and the total Kyoto Protocol goal of 5718 mmt by 2012.) In fact, even while pursuing other goals, the Technophiles and Entrepreneurs portfolios meet the GHG reduction goals (in 2023) and the Politicians come close. A key factor in understanding the impact and feasibility of each portfolio is an analysis of costs. In this study, costs are defined as capital investments, costs of achieving demand reduction, costs of government policies and programs, and some social costs. The Technophiles and Environmentalists portfolios carry the largest

accumulated capital costs at $3.1 and $2.8 trillion, respectively (2008–2020, see Fig. 5). This is primarily due to the aggressive programs needed to build nuclear, solar, and other generating plants at a pace that would achieve their primary goals, energy independence, and GHG reductions, respectively, by 2030. Although these numbers are large and would undoubtedly impact capital availability for non-energy projects, they represent only a fraction of the likely capital investment for the country over the next 22 years. According to the US Census Bureau, total capital expenditures for the United States between 2000 and 2005 alone were approximately $6 trillion. These costs also compare favorably with five-year national infrastructure investments of $1.6 trillion recommended by the American Society of Civil Engineers. Investments to reduce demand were highest in the Environmentalists and Entrepreneurs Perspectives, but low compared to the capital costs. Not surprisingly, the Environmentalists portfolio incurs the largest policy costs and Bottom-Liners incur the least. In analyzing the policy levers and actions necessary to develop each portfolio, we found a fair amount of commonality across the

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7000 6500 6000

CO2 Emissions

5500 5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 2007 2010 EIA Base Case Environmentalists

2015 America Firsters Individualists

2020

2025 Bottom-Liners Politicians

2030 Entrepreneurs Technophiles

Fig. 4. Summary of the seven Perspectives’ impacts on GHG emission reductions.

$3 $2 $1 0 $(1) $(2) $(3) $(4) $(5) America-Firsters

Bottom-Liners

Capital Costs

Entrepreneurs Environmentalists Demand Efficiency Costs

Individualists Policy Costs

Politicians

Technophiles

Social Benefits

Fig. 5. Perspectives portfolio costs and benefits (incremental over the EIA base case, 2008–2030).

portfolios in the types of actions required to spur growth beyond the EIA base case. Therefore, the range of policy costs is less than for capital or demand reduction. We also made an attempt to illustrate some social benefits associated with the portfolios. Specifically, the benefits captured in Fig. 6 are those associated with reducing emissions ($ per ton of carbon, NOx, SOx, and PM10 emissions reduced). These benefit estimates generally encompass health and environmental benefits attributable to emission reductions. As expected, those portfolios with the most GHG emission reductions (e.g., Environmentalists, Technophiles) exhibited the highest social benefits. It should be noted, however, that the benefit estimates in Fig. 6 are understated. For example, it was beyond the capability of this study to include the health and environmental benefits associated with reductions in mercury emission reductions evident in most portfolios. National security benefits associated with reducing oil imports are not monetized, either. Lastly, a whole range of non-energy benefits associated with energy efficiency improvements, from improved comfort in homes, safer workplaces, and job creation, are also not included.

The seven energy portfolios were also assessed over several secondary criteria. The secondary criteria used to assess each portfolio fall into these broad categories: Economic Impacts (National, Individual, and Commercial/ Industrial); Feasibility (Technical, Political); Other Environmental Impacts; Impacts on International Relations; and Demographic Considerations. Our assessments over the secondary criteria are predominantly qualitative in nature. Upon review of the secondary criteria, the three portfolios that seemed to stand out for their ability to best address the primary criteria of energy independence/security and GHG reduction loose some of their luster. The Environmentalists portfolio has questionable political feasibility and cost and economic concerns. The Technophiles portfolio is costly and aggressive and relies on the commercialization of technologies that are in varying stages of development, while the AmericaFirsters portfolio has significant negative environmental impacts as well as economic concerns. Portfolios such as Entrepreneurs or Politicians begin to look more attractive for being ‘‘middle of the road,’’ offering a

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Perspectives Primary Criteria Matrix (2030) (Bubble Size = CO2 emissions) AmericaFirsters

Energy Security

Individualists

Bottom-Liners

Politicians

Technophiles Environmentalists Entrepreneurs

EIA Base Case

0 Imports Energy Independence

Fig. 6. Summary of seven Perspectives over the three primary criteria.

reasonable balance of energy security and GHG reductions, less alarming cost impacts and plausible political and social feasibility. Even these portfolios are not without flaws. As is often the case, the appropriate course of action for the United States is one that likely combines aspects of all seven portfolios, and will require more detailed study of the various technology and economic factors involved. Qualitative analyses were conducted for each portfolio with respect to the major global and technological events. This analysis revealed how dynamic and sensitive the portfolios can be to world events. Our analyses across these criteria suggest that timing is a major consideration with respect to these events. For example, a global economic downturn resulting in a corresponding US economic downturn, such as is happening at the time this piece is being written, could jeopardize many of the Perspectives’ initiatives, including the capital cost intensive Environmentalists, Entrepreneurs, and Technophiles Perspectives. On the other hand, if a global economic downturn occurred later rather than sooner, then the impacts on the United States could be mitigated if its energy sources were already more domestic (e.g., as would be the case with the three previously mentioned Perspectives and the America-Firsters as well). A terrorist attack would call into question the advisability of the Bottom-Liners Perspective and the others that rely on large, site-based or infrastructure-based energy systems (e.g., Technophiles). The Perspectives with decentralized energy components, like the Environmentalists, would be more favored. A significant acceleration of climate change would deal a blow to portfolios still heavy into fossil fuels (e.g., Bottom-Liners, Individualists). Also, the continued skyrocketing of liquid fuel prices may cause the Perspectives to naturally shift toward other fuel sources that require a heretofore prohibitive investment. The emergence of a major disruptive technology could prove quite interesting with respect to the seven portfolios. An order of magnitude or more increase in battery technology could put electric vehicles in the forefront, lessening the need for oil and even biofuels. New nuclear fusion technology, especially when combined with advances in electricity transmission technology, could lead to more emphasis on large-scale, centralized electrical generation systems over decentralized renewable generation. These types of technologies seem to threaten investments made in coal, biofuels, and renewable energy more than in other areas.

4. Observations Our analysis led to three important insights. First, achieving energy independence, energy security, and GHG reductions can

indeed be accomplished in radically different manners. Second, achieving any or all of these goals may be logically achievable within some Perspectives and not logically achievable within other Perspectives. This second insight leads to a third insight: the Perspectives differed between those that emphasized energy portfolio outcomes versus those that emphasized values and means that, in turn, result in energy portfolios of some sort. For example, Bottom-Liners, as envisioned in this research, do not have strong preferences for any particular component(s) of a national energy portfolio. Instead, any portfolio that satisfies their main values, of which the low cost is most important, is probably acceptable. The Politicians did not achieve either total energy independence or completely meet the Kyoto GHG emission targets, because they are more focused on satisfying a wide range of values that, ultimately, required trading off the achievement of these two end-goals. In this sense, the Environmentalists Perspective is the only one that could be said to have strong preferences for particular energy portfolio components (e.g., renewables like wind and solar) and a strong focus on an outcome (i.e., reductions of GHG emissions). It is interesting that sometimes a focus on one goal led to the achievement of another (see Fig. 6). For example, the Environmentalists’ focus on GHG reductions actually leads to an energy portfolio that almost results in energy independence. In the case of the Entrepreneurs, a focus on taking advantage of opportunities, their core value, created in large part from the implementation of a plethora of government policies, leads to both a substantial reduction in the energy independence gap and a substantial reduction in GHG emissions. In general, it could be argued that increasing energy independence also increases US energy security. This is because energy independence reduces risks associated with disruptions in the supply of foreign energy sources, such as oil. However, if energy security is defined mainly with respect to the absence of risk to energy supplies, then domestic energy also needs to be evaluated against these standards. In this regard, some energy sources, such as coal, pose little risk of supply disruptions, whereas biofuels may actually pose more risk due to annual weather fluctuations and changing demand for food-based agricultural products. So, for example, the Environmentalists portfolio, while substantially reducing dependence on foreign oil, may not be seen as being as secure a portfolio as the America-Firsters, which relies heavily on domestic sources of fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Different Perspectives do have very different energy portfolios. The range of coal production and consumption across the scenarios is quite large, as is the range in the reliance on renewables. However, there are also interesting commonalities among the Perspectives. For example, almost all the scenarios rely

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upon cellulosic ethanol sooner or later. Since this technology is still in its infancy, making this component a successful part of our national energy strategy should be the focus of even more attention from the R&D and policy communities. Most of the Perspectives opted to support national renewable portfolio standards. Many states already have such standards (Wiser et al., 2007; Sovacool and Cooper, 2007), but not at the 25  25 level envisioned by the national Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) proposal. Given the potential interest in this policy lever from many different Perspectives and given that there are many concerns about how the state-level RPS programs have been implemented, this particular federal policy also deserves significant attention and analysis. Energy efficiency needs to have a central role in US energy policy. It is important to note that the focus sometimes lies in the transportation sector (see the Individualists) and sometimes in the electricity consumption sector (see the Bottom-Liners). Of course, energy efficiency in both areas is important for the Environmentalists, Technophiles, and Entrepreneurs. An important consideration for our national energy strategy is how electricity will be used in the future to meet our transportation needs. Electrification of the transportation system has enormous implications for technology developers, as well as for electric system managers. Another common element in all the Perspectives is technology. Technological advances are required to support cellulosic ethanol production, favored by most Perspectives. The Entrepreneurs and Technophiles Perspectives are based on technological solutions, small and big. The other Perspectives also support an array of national investments in energy R&D. While energy R&D is quite active in the United States, one question that should be posed is whether these investments are adequate to meet the needs of any of the portfolios envisioned by this research. Additionally, it should be asked whether the investments are well balanced between big, national laboratory-type projects, and small Entrepreneur-based projects. Also, it should be asked whether research funds are appropriately allocated between basic and applied energy-related research. It is interesting that R&D programs were so prominent in the Perspectives, given that public support for increasing or even just maintaining current federal energy-related (broadly interpreted) research budgets is uncertain. The public should be willing to support speculative research into the types of breakthrough technologies discussed in the previous section that could significantly alter the energy portfolio paths envisioned within the seven Perspectives. However, it is unclear whether the public is willing to support programs that necessarily will lead to some successes and some failures and may take more rather than less time to yield commercially viable results. A renewed emphasis on engaging the public in discussions about the value, scale, and scope of energy-related science and technology research should be considered. A strong economy is needed to support the paths of many of the Perspectives. A strong economy is needed to support the investment in new infrastructure. A strong economy is also needed to produce government revenues to support R&D programs and the tax incentives supported by most of the Perspectives. One could argue that there is some urgency to move forward with such investments and programs before energy problems lead to domestic and global economic downturns that could make such investments potentially unaffordable. Urgency for progress in dealing with national energy issues is also a natural characteristic of several Perspectives. The Environmentalists Perspective is especially sensitive to any delays in reductions in GHG emissions. The America-Firsters could be said to be anxious to attain energy independence and the Entrepre-

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neurs and Technophiles are anxious just to get started! The Bottom-Liners could be anxious to lock in an energy portfolio that lowers uncertainties with respect to energy costs and supplies. The Politicians support change, too, but maybe not a large change in the short term. Change will not happen without strong government support. Most of the Perspectives expressed some support for some type of government action, from financial support for key R&D programs to tax incentives to broader policies. Absent government action, most Perspectives will have a hard time reaching their goals and/ or satisfying their values. With this said, a last observation is the relative minor role a US cap and trade program played in our analyses. Only one Perspective adopted cap and trade, the Environmentalists, and this Perspective’s portfolio results in significant GHG reductions. However, through a diverse and comprehensive set of policies and programs, the Entrepreneurs, Technophiles, and, for all intents and purposes, the Politicians Perspectives also meet GHG emission reduction goals. This leads us to reason that there are other mechanisms or approaches, for example ‘cap and invest’, that could be as effective and maybe more politically acceptable than a ‘cap and trade’ program.

5. Recommendations Applying a diverse set of Perspectives to achieve a set of very demanding potential national energy goals resulted in seven different energy portfolios. Although the strategies and outcomes were different, it is possible to derive a common set of recommendations for action. (1) We must change how we define energy independence and security. In reality, the vast majority of imported US energy is petroleum. Creating petroleum independence or security through hardlinking of domestic production to domestic consumption is costly, time consuming and does not leverage the efficiencies of global energy infrastructure. A more practical definition of energy independence or security would define them as creation of ‘‘options’’ for the United States in terms of the level to which we voluntarily choose to obtain our petroleum requirements from the global marketplace versus domestic sources. This optionality is created by reducing our overall petroleum demand and by developing domestic sources. Additionally, a reliability factor must be applied to assessing security. The impact of weather on the availability of some energy sources influences the overall security of the US energy portfolio. At this point, energy independence and energy security become similar strategies, with similar actions, differing only in the degree of optionality and reliability that is to be achieved. For either strategy to be effective, three things must occur: (a) US energy infrastructure and petroleum sources must be developed to a level that makes them credible and viable alternatives to foreign sources. (b) Demand reduction programs must continue to be supported by the public and private sectors. (c) A comprehensive approach or formula(s) to calculating the economic cost to the United States of imported oil (e.g., purchase price, infrastructure maintenance, and regulation) must be developed and used as the basis for energy infrastructure investment decisions, as well as by the private sector when making energy purchase decisions. (2) A goal-oriented approach to changing the long-term outlook for US energy supply and demand must be adopted. Of the

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Perspectives developed and analyzed as part of this study, those which were goal-oriented enabled the most significant and substantive improvements to the US energy supply and demand picture. Those Perspectives that focused more on the means or approach by which the goals of energy independence or security, or significant reductions in GHG would be achieved, were generally much less successful in achieving those goals, at least within the timelines of this study. This suggests that the United States will need to challenge and break from traditional approaches to developing and implementing energy policy and that: (a) A national energy goal and strategy for the United States must be established. (b) This goal and strategy must be supported by the national leadership. (c) A national ‘‘scorecard’’ of metrics to measure our progress toward energy goals and to provide a common frame of reference for public discussion should be established. (3) Effecting real change to the US energy portfolio will require long-term coordinated action. Regardless of Perspective or portfolio, achieving any energy goal will require a consistent and coordinated approach over time. An incremental approach or one that changes direction and priority from year to year will not enable the long-term public sector programs or private sector investments necessary to develop many energy solutions. This suggests that: (a) A national energy policy be established that is long-term in its horizons, comprehensive in its scope, and that transcends political time horizons and partisanship. (b) Changes to energy policy must be predictable and measured and recognize the long-term nature and stability requirements of private and public sector investments. (c) A long-term national energy policy will require a steward to provide oversight and maintain the ‘‘health’’ of the policy. (4) The US energy portfolio must be diverse. Regardless of the Perspective, meeting the US demand for energy will require us to leverage all sources of energy available to us. With only one exception, all portfolios developed in this study relied on inputs from all energy components to meet the goals of energy independence or energy security, with the major differences being in the relative level of contribution of some components to the overall energy supply. Diversity in the US energy portfolio also improves overall security through reduced dependence on any one energy source. Additionally, demand reductions must be considered to be as important as supply increases. There are no silver bullet solutions to meeting US energy needs on the horizon, nor can any single or selected group of energy sources meet our wide range of energy requirements. However, one can strongly argue that diversity may be more politically acceptable than would be a portfolio that served only the interests of a limited number of Perspectives. This need for diversity has several implications for US energy policy: (a) US energy policy should not intentionally exclude any potential sources of energy and should support research, development, and commercialization of a broad range of energy sources and technologies. (b) An energy policy which promotes supply should also promote demand reductions. Additionally, a sound energy policy and reduction of GHG emissions are not mutually exclusive; however, the need for a diverse energy portfolio suggests that investment in GHG reduction technologies and other offsetting techniques will be required.

(5) Government must play a strong role in addressing long-term US energy issues: although government involvement is sometimes viewed with suspicion or as counter to capitalist principles, the energy and climate issues facing the United States are large, complex, and beyond the ability of any one group, be it private enterprise, community or public sector, to solve. The national scope of the US energy challenges suggests that the federal government play a unifying role, supporting the states and private sector. This role of the government in addressing US energy issues should focus on: (a) Establishing clear national goals, strategy, and policy that provide focus, stability, and support long-term investments in energy infrastructure, sources, and demand reduction. (b) Developing the standards and mechanisms, which facilitate private sector and public involvement in supporting national energy goals and strategies, including reducing barriers to entry for new innovation and investment.

This research suggests numerous next steps. To enhance the portfolio-based Perspectives methodology described above, additional research is needed to confirm the hypothetical Perspectives within the US population. A national survey could be conducted to identify the seven Perspectives within the general population and even identify additional, distinctly different Perspectives. Such a survey could also provide insights into the energy attitudes of the major demographic groups, such as Generation Years (do they represent a distinct Perspective?) and the growing elderly population in the United States. The portfolio construction tool developed to support this project could also be improved and made available for general public use. Future research could explore many issues only touched on in this report. These issues include estimating total social and other costs attributable to the Perspectives and exploring regional implications of the portfolios and policies. Evaluating more in depth the quality of life implications of the Perspectives as well as how lifestyle changes (e.g., through changes in land use patterns or simply through changes in how people use energy) could be incorporated into the Perspectives are two other topics worthy of consideration.

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