- Email: [email protected]
Power production: What are the risks?
Book
reviews
state, and several chapters describe different aspects of conflict between local and central government, there is no systematic analysis of what ‘the nuclear state’ means in the broader context of the centralization of power and restriction of local democracy in the UK. A more historical perspective than the predominantly 1980s focus could have offered an opportunity for analysis of the interactions between early modes of legitimation of nuclear power, the effective exclusion of local authorities from the decision-making process even on reactor siting, the alienation thus set up, and the consequent deep mistrust of local authorities by the nuclear establishment. This has now developed its own dynamics of institutional conflict and confrontation, and an aggression born of insecurity in the nuclear establishment. Thus the chapter on France as a possible ‘foretaste of the future’ is
especially pertinent for the UK, where the broad strategic options in energy policy lie between primary dependence on large, centralized supply-side investments, or real commitment to energy end-use efficiency, with diverse smaller scale supply options. This technical policy conflict is discernible as a broader political conflict over what kind of institutional structure our ‘democracy’ should take. Decentralist energy strategies are not conceivable without greater political acceptance of decentralized responsible democratic institutions, and this is a battle which incorporates far more than energy. A thoroughgoing analysis of this broader way in which our technologies encapsulate deep social commitments - nuclear more so than most - would have rounded off nicely what is still a valuable collection. Brian Wynne University of Lancaster, UK
The real risks of nuclear power POWER PRODUCTION: THE RISKS?
WHAT ARE
by J.H. Fremlin Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1987,326pp, f6.95 During the nuclear power debates of the past decade, John Fremlin has made frequent media appearances to allay the fears of the public by explaining the ‘real’ risks of nuclear power rather than the perceived risks, exaggerated by the media and environmental pressure groups. One of the main objectives of this book is ‘to reduce the exaggerated fear of nuclear power which is hindering its development’ (p 3).
Insignificant
risks
To achieve this objective, together with the aim of improving management of our fossil fuels, Fremlin divides the book into four parts. Part 1 introduces the reader to the concept of risk, outlining the general risks of death in the UK prior to more specific
154
chapters on risks of cancer and radiation-related cancer deaths. Part 2 deals with the various methods of power production with chapters on renewable resources, conventional forms of power (coal, oil, gas, nuclear) and conservation. This is linked to Part 3 where a quantitative assessment of the risks of these forms of power is made. Part 4 is devoted to the opposition to such schemes, with the emphasis on anti-nuclear campaigns. The main thrust of Fremlin’s thesis is that all forms of power production offer fairly insignificant risks to the public compared to other risks in everyday life. In comparing the relative risks of power-producing industries, however, he concludes that nuclear power is safer than power from fossil fuels, which are responsible for more cancers than all radiationinduced cancers combined. In turn, these cancer deaths are only a fraction of the total in the UK at the present time. His postscript on Chernobyl, an addendum to the first edition, does not alter his conclusions. He does make sensible suggestions to the UK
authorities in the aftermath of the accident to reduce risks, such as improving evacuation procedures and following a remote-siting strategy - an approach advocated by myself and Stan Openshaw for many years.
Unnecessary
padding
Overall, this is a very readable book. It could be improved, however, if it was condensed and played to the strengths of the author, ie radiation risks and nuclear power. Parts 1 and 3 are much better than 2 and 4 which tend to pad out the book unnecessarily and dilute Fremlin’s main line of argument. Even then, Fremlin’s treatment of risk is rather narrowly defined; he focuses on risk of life. There is no discussion on investment risk, which is particularly relevant in the view of the government’s intention to privatize the electricity industry. Moreover, his treatment of socioeconomic factors and their relevance to public policy initiatives is poor. For example, his short section on perception of risks is thin considering the amount of research carried out in this area in the 1980s. While it may be true that the cancer deaths attributed to Chernobyl will amount to 7000-4OOOO in a population of 75 million over 50 years, Fremlin’s obsession with mortality statistics means that he ignores the economic significance of the accident (pp 283-284). It is correct to assume that lamb-eating Scats are unlikely to die any younger, but sheep farmers still have restrictions on their flocks 17 months after the accident and await further compensation from the government. The economic consequences of a ‘big’ accident could therefore be more wide-ranging than to the plant itself; thus his comparison with a Siberian coal mine disaster is misleading. Fremlin concedes ‘that most readers of this book will have felt that I am prejudiced in favour of nuclear power’ (p 276). This is indeed the case not so much for the sound, logical presentation of the low health risks of nuclear power but the rather arrogant, dismissive approach to opponents of his views. This technocratic self-assurance, often associated with propo-
LAND USE POLICY January
1988
Book reviews
nents of the nuclear industry, has probably done more harm to the marketing of nuclear power than any other cause. For example, in a discussion of nuclear waste repositories in the UK, he claims that in early 1984 ‘two deep burial sites in worked out mines are under consideration, against a lot of doubtless well-intentioned but ill-informed opposition’ (p 200). For someone who castigates a selective sample of anti-nuclear campaigners for their bias and factual inaccuracies, this statement offers both these elements! No doubt he considers the MPs on the Environment Committee as ill-informed in the light of their damaging criticisms of the current management of radioactive wastes. It
is surprising that no mention is made of this report considering that it is featured on the front cover of the book. This is an important contribution to the debate on the future of power production in the UK. It is highly readable, written in a free-flowing style with neat touches of humour in parts. If only some of the more vitriolic sections had been toned down, it would have been more palatable to a wider audience. John Fernie of Geographical Sciences Huddersfield Polytechnic Huddersfield, UK
Depaflment
Resolving the problems of nuclear residues NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: EXPERIENCE OPTIONS
AND
DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: FEASIBILITY, NEEDS AND COSTS by Expert Groups of the Nuclear Energy Agency OECD, Paris, France, 1986, 1 IOpp, F150 The birth of civil nuclear power generation, like that of most infants, was an occasion for rejoicing and optimism. As the child matured, however, general reservations about its character and future became more widespread. Public perceptions of limitless cheap power muted and a growing concern about the leftovers - spent fuel and senescent plant - took their place. The industry, however, necessarily concerned itself with the whole hfespan of nuclear energy from its inception; and the two Expert Group reports now published by OECD are devoted more to state-of-the-art reports on this steady, long and intensive international work than to answering the public’s more belated
LAND USE POLICY January 1988
recognition of the problems which nuclear residues pose - relevant though the reports may also be to that concern. The report on spent fuel management considers disposal options, current practice and future plans before reviewing technical aspects and the impact and probable impact of social, economic and political views and constraints. The different problems inherent in disposing of spent fuel which has, and has not been, reprocessed are considered in detail. Some attempt is made to draw a balance between the cost and technical difficulties of permanent storage of spent fuel which is not reprocessed, and of the residuals of that fuel when it is. The report clearly does not find it easy to come down positively in favour of either option: unreprocessed fuel elements have less-demanding safety requirements but are substantially more demanding of space. Reprocessing radically reduces the volume of waste demanding particular safety care, but equally radically increases the care required for that reduced volume. Moreover at national levels options may in any event be determined by the physical resources available: a country with very substantial and stable geological strata suitable to the long-term
storage of a large volume of unreprocessed fuel may be free to eschew reprocessing and its costs, while a country without may not. But many nations with both options are nevertheless choosing the former when subsequent retrieval and reprocessing remains possible. The picture may become far clearer if it becomes economically desirable to re-burn plutonium and uranium residues - far and away the largest part of spent thermal reactor fuel - in fast breeder reactors; if experiments in the use of uranium/ plutonium fuel in thermal reactors show greater promise; and if vitrification and other techniques under development for the safe disposal of high and intermediate level reprocessing wastes become well established and politically acceptable. For the moment however, as the report indicates, less than 27% of the total of spent oxide fuel arising in OECD countries up to the turn of the century is likely to be reprocessed, and any one or more of the factors identified may have a bearing on this low proportion. The review of technical aspects is particularly informative and should be standard reading for any possessed of anxieties about the long-tern prospects of safe spent fuel disposal. The fact that it is already possible to design containment canisters with a life expectancy in excess of one million years in suitable geological environments certainly deserves to be more widely known. The report concludes with a country-by-country survey of the existing position in all the OECD countries. The members of the expert group are identified.
Decommissioning The report on decommissioning is more prosaic, perhaps because the answer to the question ‘How do you decommission nuclear plant?’ is essentially the same as the humourous answer to questions as to how hedgehogs reproduce - ‘very carefully’. In fact technologies for decommissioning, decontamination and containment or demolition of nuclear plant are already well established. Part of
155
reviews
state, and several chapters describe different aspects of conflict between local and central government, there is no systematic analysis of what ‘the nuclear state’ means in the broader context of the centralization of power and restriction of local democracy in the UK. A more historical perspective than the predominantly 1980s focus could have offered an opportunity for analysis of the interactions between early modes of legitimation of nuclear power, the effective exclusion of local authorities from the decision-making process even on reactor siting, the alienation thus set up, and the consequent deep mistrust of local authorities by the nuclear establishment. This has now developed its own dynamics of institutional conflict and confrontation, and an aggression born of insecurity in the nuclear establishment. Thus the chapter on France as a possible ‘foretaste of the future’ is
especially pertinent for the UK, where the broad strategic options in energy policy lie between primary dependence on large, centralized supply-side investments, or real commitment to energy end-use efficiency, with diverse smaller scale supply options. This technical policy conflict is discernible as a broader political conflict over what kind of institutional structure our ‘democracy’ should take. Decentralist energy strategies are not conceivable without greater political acceptance of decentralized responsible democratic institutions, and this is a battle which incorporates far more than energy. A thoroughgoing analysis of this broader way in which our technologies encapsulate deep social commitments - nuclear more so than most - would have rounded off nicely what is still a valuable collection. Brian Wynne University of Lancaster, UK
The real risks of nuclear power POWER PRODUCTION: THE RISKS?
WHAT ARE
by J.H. Fremlin Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1987,326pp, f6.95 During the nuclear power debates of the past decade, John Fremlin has made frequent media appearances to allay the fears of the public by explaining the ‘real’ risks of nuclear power rather than the perceived risks, exaggerated by the media and environmental pressure groups. One of the main objectives of this book is ‘to reduce the exaggerated fear of nuclear power which is hindering its development’ (p 3).
Insignificant
risks
To achieve this objective, together with the aim of improving management of our fossil fuels, Fremlin divides the book into four parts. Part 1 introduces the reader to the concept of risk, outlining the general risks of death in the UK prior to more specific
154
chapters on risks of cancer and radiation-related cancer deaths. Part 2 deals with the various methods of power production with chapters on renewable resources, conventional forms of power (coal, oil, gas, nuclear) and conservation. This is linked to Part 3 where a quantitative assessment of the risks of these forms of power is made. Part 4 is devoted to the opposition to such schemes, with the emphasis on anti-nuclear campaigns. The main thrust of Fremlin’s thesis is that all forms of power production offer fairly insignificant risks to the public compared to other risks in everyday life. In comparing the relative risks of power-producing industries, however, he concludes that nuclear power is safer than power from fossil fuels, which are responsible for more cancers than all radiationinduced cancers combined. In turn, these cancer deaths are only a fraction of the total in the UK at the present time. His postscript on Chernobyl, an addendum to the first edition, does not alter his conclusions. He does make sensible suggestions to the UK
authorities in the aftermath of the accident to reduce risks, such as improving evacuation procedures and following a remote-siting strategy - an approach advocated by myself and Stan Openshaw for many years.
Unnecessary
padding
Overall, this is a very readable book. It could be improved, however, if it was condensed and played to the strengths of the author, ie radiation risks and nuclear power. Parts 1 and 3 are much better than 2 and 4 which tend to pad out the book unnecessarily and dilute Fremlin’s main line of argument. Even then, Fremlin’s treatment of risk is rather narrowly defined; he focuses on risk of life. There is no discussion on investment risk, which is particularly relevant in the view of the government’s intention to privatize the electricity industry. Moreover, his treatment of socioeconomic factors and their relevance to public policy initiatives is poor. For example, his short section on perception of risks is thin considering the amount of research carried out in this area in the 1980s. While it may be true that the cancer deaths attributed to Chernobyl will amount to 7000-4OOOO in a population of 75 million over 50 years, Fremlin’s obsession with mortality statistics means that he ignores the economic significance of the accident (pp 283-284). It is correct to assume that lamb-eating Scats are unlikely to die any younger, but sheep farmers still have restrictions on their flocks 17 months after the accident and await further compensation from the government. The economic consequences of a ‘big’ accident could therefore be more wide-ranging than to the plant itself; thus his comparison with a Siberian coal mine disaster is misleading. Fremlin concedes ‘that most readers of this book will have felt that I am prejudiced in favour of nuclear power’ (p 276). This is indeed the case not so much for the sound, logical presentation of the low health risks of nuclear power but the rather arrogant, dismissive approach to opponents of his views. This technocratic self-assurance, often associated with propo-
LAND USE POLICY January
1988
Book reviews
nents of the nuclear industry, has probably done more harm to the marketing of nuclear power than any other cause. For example, in a discussion of nuclear waste repositories in the UK, he claims that in early 1984 ‘two deep burial sites in worked out mines are under consideration, against a lot of doubtless well-intentioned but ill-informed opposition’ (p 200). For someone who castigates a selective sample of anti-nuclear campaigners for their bias and factual inaccuracies, this statement offers both these elements! No doubt he considers the MPs on the Environment Committee as ill-informed in the light of their damaging criticisms of the current management of radioactive wastes. It
is surprising that no mention is made of this report considering that it is featured on the front cover of the book. This is an important contribution to the debate on the future of power production in the UK. It is highly readable, written in a free-flowing style with neat touches of humour in parts. If only some of the more vitriolic sections had been toned down, it would have been more palatable to a wider audience. John Fernie of Geographical Sciences Huddersfield Polytechnic Huddersfield, UK
Depaflment
Resolving the problems of nuclear residues NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: EXPERIENCE OPTIONS
AND
DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: FEASIBILITY, NEEDS AND COSTS by Expert Groups of the Nuclear Energy Agency OECD, Paris, France, 1986, 1 IOpp, F150 The birth of civil nuclear power generation, like that of most infants, was an occasion for rejoicing and optimism. As the child matured, however, general reservations about its character and future became more widespread. Public perceptions of limitless cheap power muted and a growing concern about the leftovers - spent fuel and senescent plant - took their place. The industry, however, necessarily concerned itself with the whole hfespan of nuclear energy from its inception; and the two Expert Group reports now published by OECD are devoted more to state-of-the-art reports on this steady, long and intensive international work than to answering the public’s more belated
LAND USE POLICY January 1988
recognition of the problems which nuclear residues pose - relevant though the reports may also be to that concern. The report on spent fuel management considers disposal options, current practice and future plans before reviewing technical aspects and the impact and probable impact of social, economic and political views and constraints. The different problems inherent in disposing of spent fuel which has, and has not been, reprocessed are considered in detail. Some attempt is made to draw a balance between the cost and technical difficulties of permanent storage of spent fuel which is not reprocessed, and of the residuals of that fuel when it is. The report clearly does not find it easy to come down positively in favour of either option: unreprocessed fuel elements have less-demanding safety requirements but are substantially more demanding of space. Reprocessing radically reduces the volume of waste demanding particular safety care, but equally radically increases the care required for that reduced volume. Moreover at national levels options may in any event be determined by the physical resources available: a country with very substantial and stable geological strata suitable to the long-term
storage of a large volume of unreprocessed fuel may be free to eschew reprocessing and its costs, while a country without may not. But many nations with both options are nevertheless choosing the former when subsequent retrieval and reprocessing remains possible. The picture may become far clearer if it becomes economically desirable to re-burn plutonium and uranium residues - far and away the largest part of spent thermal reactor fuel - in fast breeder reactors; if experiments in the use of uranium/ plutonium fuel in thermal reactors show greater promise; and if vitrification and other techniques under development for the safe disposal of high and intermediate level reprocessing wastes become well established and politically acceptable. For the moment however, as the report indicates, less than 27% of the total of spent oxide fuel arising in OECD countries up to the turn of the century is likely to be reprocessed, and any one or more of the factors identified may have a bearing on this low proportion. The review of technical aspects is particularly informative and should be standard reading for any possessed of anxieties about the long-tern prospects of safe spent fuel disposal. The fact that it is already possible to design containment canisters with a life expectancy in excess of one million years in suitable geological environments certainly deserves to be more widely known. The report concludes with a country-by-country survey of the existing position in all the OECD countries. The members of the expert group are identified.
Decommissioning The report on decommissioning is more prosaic, perhaps because the answer to the question ‘How do you decommission nuclear plant?’ is essentially the same as the humourous answer to questions as to how hedgehogs reproduce - ‘very carefully’. In fact technologies for decommissioning, decontamination and containment or demolition of nuclear plant are already well established. Part of
155