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Priming social affiliation promotes morality – Regardless of religion
Personality and Individual Differences 75 (2015) 195–200
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Priming social affiliation promotes morality – Regardless of religion Nicholas D. Thomson ⇑ University of Durham, UK
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 7 August 2014 Received in revised form 8 November 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Available online 8 December 2014 Keywords: Morality Religion Priming Social group Moral foundations Prosocial
a b s t r a c t Whilst prior studies have shown religious priming spurs prosocial behavior, there is little evidence this is unique to religion. It could be that priming any social affiliation encourages prosocial behavior simply by representing, belonging, and being responsible to a group, as opposed to acting as an individual. The current study aims to test if priming social affiliation is associated with greater moral self-perception. Using a large sample (N = 801), this study included an experimental manipulation to tease out if the previously-demonstrated priming effects that increase morality may be unique to religious affiliation or are general to any meaningful social affiliation. Results showed priming social affiliation had a unique influence on morality. This priming effect was not different for those with a religious affiliation when compared to people with a non-religious affiliation. Religious affiliates may see themselves as more moral, and priming their religious affiliation did indeed induce greater morality, but this was also true for other social affiliations. Therefore, religion is not fundamental to moral priming, and it is likely to be the perceived benefits of being in a group that enhances prosociality. We discussed implications of belonging to a social group on morality and prosociality. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction ‘‘We are all a sort of chameleons that still take a tincture from things near us.’’ [(John Locke, 1693, p. 66)] For centuries religion has been argued as the foundation of human morality. In recent years, scientists have undertaken the ‘‘almighty’’ task to discern if religion is the catalyst for morality. The term morality is widely used with the assumption that morals uniquely deter an individual from behaving in a socially disadvantageous way; morals provide people with an intrinsic law of right and wrong. The Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007) is pillared on five moral virtues. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) includes these five virtues within two foundations of moral judgement; Individualizing and Binding. The Individualizing foundation includes Harm and Fairness subfoundations, and represents moral values that focus on the wellbeing and equality of individuals, and ameliorating injustices (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). The Binding foundation consists of Ingroup, Authority, and Purity sub-foundations, and is representative of moral values that focus on self-control and communitylevel needs above personal desires, which serve to unite and ⇑ Address: Department of Psychology, University of Durham, Science Site, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, County Durham, UK. E-mail address: [email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.11.022 0191-8869/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
strengthen social bonds through group entities (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), such as family, culture, and religious organizations (Cornwell & Higgins, 2014). The Progressivism foundation indexes the sympathetic consideration of others (Garvey & Ford, 2014), with higher scores signifying that the person prioritizes Individualizing over Binding moral values. The ingroup binding sub-foundation is fundamental to the narrative of religious contagion, which thrives on collective communities around a common belief system, focusing its morals on preventative values, such as chastity (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Therefore, it would be expected that people with religious affiliations prioritize binding moral values, which would result in lower progressivism. Religious doctrine has been theorized to be synonymous with moral virtues (Graham & Haidt, 2010). However, on balancing individualizing and binding, ultimate priority lies with the binding moral values for religious affiliates. Whilst it is assumed religious affiliation promotes moral behavior (Graham & Haidt, 2010), this may be restricted to those who are of the same denomination. This has been described as the ‘‘dark side’’ of the binding foundation (Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014, p.1555). As such, religious social affiliations may impact an individual’s moral behavior differently towards people within their group compared to outsiders (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). Priming religious concepts and religion has been shown to increase prejudice (Preston & Ritter, 2013), violent behavior (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009), and covert
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racial prejudice to outgroups, even when controlling for pre-existing religiousness (Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010). These effects of outgroup hostility or prejudices are not confined to Christian denominations, as similar findings have been found for Buddhists (Ramsay, Pang, Shen, & Rowatt, 2014), Muslims (Koopmans, 2014), and Hindus (Hunsberger, 1996). Therefore, it could be expected that people with religious social affiliations would be less progressive than their non-religious counterparts, based on their strong loyalties to their group and animosity towards other groups. However, similar to the religious, non-religious social affiliations have been shown to promote binding moral virtues, such as placing importance of allegiance to one’s social group (Gillespie, Mitchell, Johnson, Dawson, & Beech, 2013). Therefore, any social affiliation may enhance binding moral values or even specific binding sub-foundations (e.g., Ingroup). Binding, however, is comprised of other important factors which may be enhanced by religious affiliations. From a large (N = 34,476) community sample, Graham and colleagues (2011) found that perceptions of social groups predicted foundations on the MFQ. Those who endorsed the binding foundation values held positive views of the U.S. Government, police officers, military personnel, parental corporal punishment, highly religious/spiritual groups, and a negative view of atheists, homosexuals, anarchists, and illegal immigrants (Graham et al., 2011). Consistent with the argument that those with a religious affiliation hold binding values to be more important, one could argue people with religious affiliations also value the beliefs of those who uphold authority, strict rules, and social hierarchical structures. However, religious teachings promote moral concern for others: ‘‘Whoever closes his ear to the cry of the poor will himself call out and not be answered’’ (Proverb 21:13). Thus, religious affiliation may enhance concern for others’ wellbeing, upholding individualizing moral values. This concern for others may also be true for social groups that promote consideration of other people. In a prior study, people who held a positive view of environmentalists, pacifists, vegetarians, nurses, ACLU members, liberals, labor unions, and who held a negative view of CEOs, the rich, and hunters were more likely to score higher on the individualizing foundation values (Graham et al., 2009, 2011). Therefore, religious affiliation may not be as important for upholding individualizing values as social affiliations that foster prosociality. Yet, robust literature finds links between religiosity and prosocial behavior (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Stavrova & Siegers, 2014), suggesting that religion itself is a catalyst for increasing prosociality. For example, priming religion has been shown to increase people’s righteousness to those committing unfair behaviors (McKay, Efferson, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2011). The direct relation between God, religion, spirituality, and prosocial behavior has been extensively studied and resulted in robust support for religious primes increasing prosocial behavior (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pichon, Boccato, Saroglou, 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007, 2011; van Beest & Williams, 2011). However, an important consideration is whether the sense of community that religion fosters may explain the effects of priming on prosocial behavior. Graham and Haidt (2010) suggest prior studies focus on belief specifics, such as the effect of observing deities, whilst neglecting the deeper importance of religion, ‘‘which is the strengthening of a community’’ (p. 140). That is, prior research confounds social affiliation, and the concomitant sense of community, with religious priming. The value of community is supported by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007), who found similar increases in prosocial behavior using secular and religious primes. This suggests priming a sense of belonging to a social group that connects one to a community promotes prosocial behavior, and not simply priming religion.
Because religious primes are commonly compared to non-meaningful and non-religious primes (e.g., weather seasons [Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010]), the mechanisms for the effects religion has on prosocial behavior are unclear. Research has begun to look at mechanisms behind the link between religion and prosocial behavior. Although prior research has included potential mechanisms such as the moral significance of the religious prime to the individual (e.g., secular and religion priming), these have been unsuccessful in teasing apart religion’s effects on prosociality (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). One potential mechanism behind religion’s influence on prosociality is the wider context that religion provides, which is belonging to a community (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Research has yet to equate primes on social connectedness while varying the influence of religion. Careful selection of primes is needed to ensure that the categories chosen (e.g., social religious vs. other social groups) for inclusion in future studies are meaningful to each individual. In order to avoid imposing categories on people, however, we argue that allowing people to self-select a social affiliation provides a more intrinsically motivating prime. This allows for testing the unique contribution of religious affiliations versus other social affiliations that foster similar prosocial attitudes. The aim of the present study was to test if priming a self-generated social affiliation was associated with greater self-perception on progressivism within a sample of undergraduates. Two versions of a questionnaire with self-perceived morality, one with social affiliation identification question asked first (priming condition) and another with the same question last, were distributed to investigate the priming effect. This study is unique in its methodology as it allowed people to freely name a social group that they identified with. Follow-up probes were used to gauge the importance of the chosen affiliation. Social affiliations were then later categorized as religious and non-religious, and as promoting prosociality or not. We expected people who named a religious social affiliation to be less progressive, possibly due to their higher levels of binding values in comparison to those with any other social affiliation. Further, it was explored whether religious affiliation was related to higher levels of individualizing values. We expected that priming would be associated with higher levels of progressivism, individualizing, and binding (particularly the ingroup sub-foundation). It was expected that when primed, people with a religious social affiliation would score lower on progressivism and be held steadfast in traditional binding values. Finally, we expected those who were primed and who endorsed prosocial affiliations to be more progressive. 2. Method 2.1. Participants Students (N = 801; 59% female) enrolled in undergraduate prerequisite classes participated within classrooms. Using G⁄Power 3.1 with .80 power and a medium effect-size (.27, derived from Johnson et al., 2010) showed a target sample size of 132. Participants were enrolled in first-year prerequisite courses at a university in Hawai’i, and received no compensation for participation. Participants (Median = 19.0, Mage = 20.4 years, SD = 4.1, range 18– 71 years) self-identified as Caucasian (24%), Asian-American (50%), Pacific Islander (15%), African-American (4%), HispanicAmerican (4%), or other (3%); these are representative of the university population. 2.2. Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to either the priming or control group. The priming group was administered a questionnaire with social affiliation priming questions prior to the MFQ
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(Graham et al., 2011). The four priming questions were directed to make the participant identify (‘‘What social affiliation do you most identify with?’’), and actively consider the importance and positive elements of his/her significant social group with which he/she identified (‘‘Why is this social affiliation important to you?’’; ‘‘Does this social affiliation make you a better person from day to day?’’; and ‘‘From this social affiliation, what do you wish the world would adopt?’’). The open-ended ‘‘why’’ question was coded as important for prosocial attitudes and behaviors (n = 109; e.g., self-improvement, benefits others, being open-minded and flexible) or other factors (n = 255; e.g., upbringing, not important, supportive, personal identification). Most participants (n = 302) reported that their social affiliation made them a better person than did not (n = 91). The sequential order in which these priming questions were presented allowed us to test the prime of social affiliation separate from the effects of ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘better person’’. The control group reported on the MFQ items first, followed by asking them to identify their social affiliation. Control participants were not asked to consider the positive effects of belonging to a social group because of potential carry-over effects from completion of the MFQ. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Hawai’i. 2.3. Measures The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) consists of 30 items rated on a 6-point scale. Half of the items are rated from ‘‘not at all relevant’’ to ‘‘extremely relevant’’, and the other 15 items rated from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to ‘‘strongly agree’’. Consistent with prior research (Napier & Luguri, 2013), Progressivism was calculated as a difference score by subtracting the mean of Ingroup, Authority, and Purity (Binding scale) from the mean of Harm and Fairness (Individualizing scale). Internal consistency was acceptable (Kline, 1986) for the Binding scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .74) and the Individualizing scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .69). Internal consistency for the sub-foundations was similar to that obtained in prior research (range .53–.67; Graham et al., 2011; Napier & Luguri, 2013; Simpson & Laham, 2015), which was poor. Thus, these were used in follow-up analyses using multivariate analyses. Social affiliation was queried with an open-response question. The open-ended question was coded for being religious or non-religious affiliation. Religious affiliations included Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and religious without denomination. Non-religious affiliations included atheism, political, scientist, environmentalist, feminist, ethnic group, and sports affiliation. Those who did not identify with a social affiliation were omitted from the study (n = 14). Participants who named a religious group (61%) were predominantly Christian (85%). 2.4. Data analytic plan To test significance of both group affiliation and priming effects on moral foundations, a 2 (religious affiliation vs. non-religious affiliation) 2 (priming vs. control condition) between–between Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on progressivism, covarying gender, age, and ethnicity. Subsequently, we examined group affiliation and priming effects on the sub-foundations that made up individualizing and binding. These were tested using 2 2 Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA), one with the two individualizing sub-foundations as the dependent variables, and one with the three binding sub-foundations as dependent variables. MANCOVA can be used to test whether the independent variables exert an effect on the linear combination of the dependent variables (Stevens, 2009), such that we tested effects of priming and social affiliation on the combination
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of individualizing and binding sub-foundations. Between-subjects effects were examined to determine the source of any significant differences based on priming or religious social affiliation. SPSS version 20 was used for data analyses. Partial eta-squared was used as an estimate of effect size. Further testing was used to determine if people who endorsed prosocial principles as being an important reason for their social affiliation were more progressive on the MFQ. An ANCOVA was conducted on progressivism by the coded measure of ‘‘why’’ the social affiliation was important, controlling for covariates. Similar to Shariff and Norenzayan (2007), the ‘‘better person’’ question was used as a suspicion probe to determine if the prime made people explicitly aware of their moral self-worth (1 = prosocial, 0 = other). This awareness could have affected moral self-perception. Therefore, an ANCOVA was conducted on progressivism by the effect of saying yes(1) or no(0) to the ‘‘better person’’ question, whilst controlling for covariates. 3. Results First, to determine if religious affiliates were equally represented across each condition a Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity correction) was conducted. Religious affiliates were not more represented in one condition than the other, x2(1, n = 801) = 3.09, p = .08. 3.1. Do those who are primed on social affiliation report greater progressivism? Table 1 presents correlations for the moral foundation scales, covariates, and the predictor variables. The result of the ANCOVA showed that there was a statistically significant main effect for priming (F(1, 797) = 5.18, p = .02, g2partial = .01) on progressivism. People who were primed reported being more progressive than individuals in the control group. A main effect was also found for affiliation type, with religious affiliates scoring lower on progressivism than those identifying with non-religious social affiliations (F(1, 797) = 73.79, p = .001, g2partial = .09). There was no significant interaction between affiliation type and priming (F(1, 797) = .09, p = .76, g2partial = .00), suggesting that the effect of priming did not differ based on religion. As expected, making people aware of their social affiliation was associated with greater self-perception of progressivism. The effect size for religion was in the moderate range (Miles & Shevlin, 2001) and suggests religious people see themselves as less progressive. 3.2. Does priming social affiliation affect binding moral values? To unpack the difference in progressivism due to priming social affiliation, MANCOVAs were conducted on the binding and individualizing subscales with the expectation that religion would be related to higher endorsement of binding and possibly individualizing values; priming would be related to higher endorsement of binding and individualizing. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and significant effect of the MFQ foundations being predicted by social affiliation and priming condition. There was a significant effect for the priming condition on the binding subscales (Wilks K = .96, F(3, 792) = 11.19, p < .001, g2partial = .04). Examining the between-subjects effects showed differences across the Ingroup and Purity sub-foundations. Those who were primed endorsed more Ingroup and less Purity moral values (F(1, 794) = 4.39, p = .04, g2partial = .01; F(1, 794) = 13.22, p < .001, g2partial = .02, respectively). Social affiliation also had a significant effect on the binding subscales (Wilks’ K = .82, F(3, 792) = 58.50, p < .001, g2partial = .18). The between-subjects effects were significant across all binding
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Table 1 Correlations among main variables. 1 a
1. Framing 2. Ethnicitya 3. Gendera 4. Religiona 5. Age 6. Harm 7. Fairness 8. Ingroup 9. Authority 10. Purity 11. Progressivism M SD a * **
–
2
3 0.04 –
4 **
0.09 0.00 –
5 0.06 0.16** 0.07* –
6 0.01 0.09* 0.2** 0.04 –
20.43 4.10
7
8
9 **
10
11
0.04 0.1** 0.16** 0.16** 0.10** –
0.04 0.13** 0.08* 0.04 0.05 0.56** –
0.10 0.15** 0.12** 0.25** 0.01 0.30** 0.33** –
0.01 0.18** 0.01 0.29** 0.05 0.24** 0.30** 0.57** –
0.06 0.16** 0.04 0.44** 0.08* 0.34** 0.27** 0.52** 0.58** –
3.60 0.68
3.63 0.62
2.9 0.78
3.14 0.71
2.71 0.89
0.01 0.07 0.18** 0.26** 0.02 0.41** 0.39** 0.5** 0.56** 0.54** – 0.70 0.69
Based on Spearman’s correlation. p < .05. p < .01.
Table 2 Means (standard deviation) for between subjects ANCOVAs predicting moral foundations (accounting for covariates). Religious affiliation
Progressivism Harm Fair Ingroup Authority Purity
Non-religious affiliation
Significant effect
Control (n = 234)
Priming (n = 255)
Control (n = 170)
Priming (n = 142)
.51 3.67 3.61 2.97 3.32 3.09
.57 3.70 3.69 3.13 3.29 2.96
.89 3.46 3.59 2.61 2.93 2.35
.99 3.49 3.61 2.73 2.85 2.08
(.61) (.61) (.65) (.72) (.58) (.75)
(.60) (.68) (.61) (.78) (.74) (.82)
(.69) (.71) (.62) (.78) (.70) (.77)
(.78) (.73) (.61) (.73) (.76) (.85)
Rel, Prime Rel Rel, Prime Rel Rel, Prime
Note: Rel = Social affiliation, Prime = Priming condition.
subscales; for Ingroup (F(1, 794) = 44.97, p < .001, g2partial = .05), Authority (F(1, 794) = 59.03, p < .001, g2partial = .07), and Purity (F(1, 794) = 175.19, p < .001, g2partial = .18). As expected, religious affiliates reported higher levels on Binding moral values. No interaction was found between priming and social affiliation (Wilks’ K = 1.00, F(3, 792) = 0.43, p = .73, g2partial = .00). Therefore, priming and social affiliation had significant effects on Binding values, with religious social affiliation having a medium effect size.
To determine if the effect of priming was due to justification of their own moral worth by answering ‘‘yes’’ to the better person question we examined the results of an ANCOVA. There was no significant effect of the better person question (F(1, 388) = .28, p = .60, g2partial = .00). Those who responded that the social affiliation made them a better person were not then more progressive, suggesting that emphasizing a prosocial orientation to one’s social affiliation, not simply being primed as a ‘‘better person,’’ had an effect on moral progressivism.
3.3. Does priming social affiliation affect individualizing moral values? 4. Discussion The effect of priming was non-significant (Wilks’ K = 1.00, F(2, 793) = 0.95, p = .39, g2partial = .00). There was a significant effect of social affiliation (Wilks’ K = .98, F(2, 793) = 8.30, p < .001, g2partial = .02). Examining the between-subjects effects, social affiliation had a significant effect on Harm, with religious affiliates reporting higher concern and compassion for others than non-religious affiliates (F(1, 794) = 13.13, p < .001, g2partial = .02). Again, the interaction between priming and social affiliation was non-significant (Wilks’ K = 1.00, F(2, 793) = .26, p = .77, g2partial = .00). In sum, those with a religious affiliation endorsed higher individualizing values than those without, and priming had no effect. 3.4. Do those who identify prosociality as an important component to their social affiliation endorse more progressive values? To explore a possible mechanism of how priming social affiliation has an effect on progressivism we conducted an ANCOVA. Those who believed their social affiliation encouraged prosocial attitudes reported greater levels of progressivism (M = .90, SD = .80) than those who felt it was important for other reasons (M = .66, SD = .67; F(1, 359) = 7.16, p = .01, g2partial = .02). Therefore, participants who spontaneously considered their social affiliation to foster prosocial behaviors were more progressive.
Priming social affiliation had a unique effect on self-perceived morality. When primed, all individuals regardless of affiliation type reported higher levels of progressivism, even though religious affiliates reported lower levels on this foundation. There were no interactions between social affiliation and priming, which indicates religion did not moderate the effect of priming as previously found (Pichon et al., 2007). Therefore, priming a self-selected social group affiliation of any type increased self-perception of prioritizing moral virtues of justice, fairness, and equality for others over traditional values. A unique part of the present study was the inclusion of whether their social affiliation had prosocial merit and this was a potential mechanism by which priming may operate. Participants who perceived their groups as promoting helpful and selfless behavior and encouraging open-minded ideals also endorsed more progressive values. Religious social affiliation predicted progressivism. People who identified with a religious social affiliation reported less progressive moral virtues than those with any other social affiliation. This is consistent with prior research showing people who prioritize binding over individualizing show greater affiliation to those who uphold strict rules, hierarchical structures, and authoritarian values. Also, those with religious tendencies strongly adhere to
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maintaining collective communities, which would insulate and reinforce their shared moral beliefs. This prioritization of their ingroup and traditional values has led prior researchers to suggest there may be a dark side to holding binding moral virtues (Smith et al., 2014). For example, religious affiliates have been found to be more prejudiced and less concerned towards outsiders (Johnson et al., 2010), to the point of hostility (Ramsay et al., 2014) and violence (Ginges et al., 2009). However, religious doctrine also teaches concern for others. In line with research on religion and prosocial behavior (Preston & Ritter, 2013), we found religious affiliates were higher on the individualizing foundation, suggesting stronger concern for the wellbeing of others. However, this effect size was small. Unlike religion, priming was related to higher progressive moral values. When individuals were primed with their chosen social affiliation, they reported greater sympathetic concern for others’ wellbeing as prioritized over traditional values. Therefore, making people aware of their social group membership instills wider moral concern that extends beyond their own group’s rights and wellbeing. However, our findings suggest this prioritization reflects differences in the binding foundation. That is, people who were primed with belonging to a group reported less concern over purity and general acceptance of less virtuous behaviors in others. Our findings are consistent with prior research that shows people who place less value on concerns for purity were more accepting of homosexuals, atheists, sexually-open people, and prostitutes (Graham et al., 2011). The present study extended earlier findings by showing that priming affected allegiance to one’s social group and communitylevel needs. Consistent with our expectations, those primed for a social affiliation were higher on ingroup moral values, which was similar to the findings for religious affiliation but with a small effect size. Therefore, prioritization of one’s ingroup is not limited to those with a religious affiliation; this finding is consistent with prior research (Gillespie et al., 2013). Together our findings suggest that priming social groups may have an affiliative and prosocial effect similar to earlier religious priming studies. Without a similarly-relevant social comparison that represents an individual’s identification, the suggestion that priming religion has an ability to singularly, and above all other affiliations, increase prosocial behavior stands on tenuous evidence. For example, social-emotional brain regions have been found to be activated in response to religious prime (Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010), but the current study would suggest these effects are explained by the perceived value of one’s social group. Indeed, individuals who recognized their social affiliation as beneficial to self-improvement, promoting helping behaviors, and being more open-minded reported higher progressive values. Therefore, our findings suggest that priming social groups that foster a prosocial orientation leads people to have more progressive attitudes. There were several limitations to the study. Although the MFQ is widely used to measure morality, it is based on self-report which limits these findings to self-perception. However, laboratory studies have shown similar effects to questionnaire studies that priming religiosity increases moral behavior (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Nevertheless, experimental studies using laboratory measures of prosociality would further the discoveries of this paper. The present study included students enrolled in undergraduate prerequisite classes. This limits the generalizability of the findings, as levels of religiosity and spirituality ebb and flow throughout the college years (Bryant, Choi, & Yasuno, 2003; Stoppa & Lefkowitz, 2010). The present findings are robust for a number of reasons. A large sample size was targeted to detect significant priming effects. The fact that strong effects were found for religious social affiliation across most of the moral foundations, independent of priming, sug-
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gests that interaction effects would emerge, should there have been any. We specifically included a question about whether the participants viewed their social affiliation as an enhancement to prosociality. Thus, we tested a possible mechanism as to the importance behind social affiliations. Also, we were able to eliminate alternative explanations, such as whether people felt the need to justify their social affiliation’s prosociality as a result of the priming questions.
4.1. Final conclusion Religious affiliation was related to less progressivism, regardless of priming. Also, explicit priming of social affiliation had a positive influence on progressive moral values, and this effect was not unique to religion. We argue that a possible mechanism for the effect of priming may be the prosocial value a person places on their social affiliation. Consistent with this suggestion, those who felt that the important qualities of their social group included being open-minded and showing concern for others were more favorable to compassion moral virtues than to authoritarian moral virtues. In sum, our findings support the notion that religion is not fundamental to moral priming (Norenzayan, 2014). Instead, it is likely to be the benefits of belonging to a prosocial group, as opposed to acting as an individual, that enhances prosociality.
Acknowledgments Sincerest thanks to Dr. Luna Centifanti and the three anonymous reviewers for the invaluable comments and suggestions.
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Priming social affiliation promotes morality – Regardless of religion Nicholas D. Thomson ⇑ University of Durham, UK
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 7 August 2014 Received in revised form 8 November 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Available online 8 December 2014 Keywords: Morality Religion Priming Social group Moral foundations Prosocial
a b s t r a c t Whilst prior studies have shown religious priming spurs prosocial behavior, there is little evidence this is unique to religion. It could be that priming any social affiliation encourages prosocial behavior simply by representing, belonging, and being responsible to a group, as opposed to acting as an individual. The current study aims to test if priming social affiliation is associated with greater moral self-perception. Using a large sample (N = 801), this study included an experimental manipulation to tease out if the previously-demonstrated priming effects that increase morality may be unique to religious affiliation or are general to any meaningful social affiliation. Results showed priming social affiliation had a unique influence on morality. This priming effect was not different for those with a religious affiliation when compared to people with a non-religious affiliation. Religious affiliates may see themselves as more moral, and priming their religious affiliation did indeed induce greater morality, but this was also true for other social affiliations. Therefore, religion is not fundamental to moral priming, and it is likely to be the perceived benefits of being in a group that enhances prosociality. We discussed implications of belonging to a social group on morality and prosociality. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction ‘‘We are all a sort of chameleons that still take a tincture from things near us.’’ [(John Locke, 1693, p. 66)] For centuries religion has been argued as the foundation of human morality. In recent years, scientists have undertaken the ‘‘almighty’’ task to discern if religion is the catalyst for morality. The term morality is widely used with the assumption that morals uniquely deter an individual from behaving in a socially disadvantageous way; morals provide people with an intrinsic law of right and wrong. The Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007) is pillared on five moral virtues. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) includes these five virtues within two foundations of moral judgement; Individualizing and Binding. The Individualizing foundation includes Harm and Fairness subfoundations, and represents moral values that focus on the wellbeing and equality of individuals, and ameliorating injustices (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). The Binding foundation consists of Ingroup, Authority, and Purity sub-foundations, and is representative of moral values that focus on self-control and communitylevel needs above personal desires, which serve to unite and ⇑ Address: Department of Psychology, University of Durham, Science Site, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, County Durham, UK. E-mail address: [email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.11.022 0191-8869/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
strengthen social bonds through group entities (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), such as family, culture, and religious organizations (Cornwell & Higgins, 2014). The Progressivism foundation indexes the sympathetic consideration of others (Garvey & Ford, 2014), with higher scores signifying that the person prioritizes Individualizing over Binding moral values. The ingroup binding sub-foundation is fundamental to the narrative of religious contagion, which thrives on collective communities around a common belief system, focusing its morals on preventative values, such as chastity (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Therefore, it would be expected that people with religious affiliations prioritize binding moral values, which would result in lower progressivism. Religious doctrine has been theorized to be synonymous with moral virtues (Graham & Haidt, 2010). However, on balancing individualizing and binding, ultimate priority lies with the binding moral values for religious affiliates. Whilst it is assumed religious affiliation promotes moral behavior (Graham & Haidt, 2010), this may be restricted to those who are of the same denomination. This has been described as the ‘‘dark side’’ of the binding foundation (Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014, p.1555). As such, religious social affiliations may impact an individual’s moral behavior differently towards people within their group compared to outsiders (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). Priming religious concepts and religion has been shown to increase prejudice (Preston & Ritter, 2013), violent behavior (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009), and covert
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racial prejudice to outgroups, even when controlling for pre-existing religiousness (Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010). These effects of outgroup hostility or prejudices are not confined to Christian denominations, as similar findings have been found for Buddhists (Ramsay, Pang, Shen, & Rowatt, 2014), Muslims (Koopmans, 2014), and Hindus (Hunsberger, 1996). Therefore, it could be expected that people with religious social affiliations would be less progressive than their non-religious counterparts, based on their strong loyalties to their group and animosity towards other groups. However, similar to the religious, non-religious social affiliations have been shown to promote binding moral virtues, such as placing importance of allegiance to one’s social group (Gillespie, Mitchell, Johnson, Dawson, & Beech, 2013). Therefore, any social affiliation may enhance binding moral values or even specific binding sub-foundations (e.g., Ingroup). Binding, however, is comprised of other important factors which may be enhanced by religious affiliations. From a large (N = 34,476) community sample, Graham and colleagues (2011) found that perceptions of social groups predicted foundations on the MFQ. Those who endorsed the binding foundation values held positive views of the U.S. Government, police officers, military personnel, parental corporal punishment, highly religious/spiritual groups, and a negative view of atheists, homosexuals, anarchists, and illegal immigrants (Graham et al., 2011). Consistent with the argument that those with a religious affiliation hold binding values to be more important, one could argue people with religious affiliations also value the beliefs of those who uphold authority, strict rules, and social hierarchical structures. However, religious teachings promote moral concern for others: ‘‘Whoever closes his ear to the cry of the poor will himself call out and not be answered’’ (Proverb 21:13). Thus, religious affiliation may enhance concern for others’ wellbeing, upholding individualizing moral values. This concern for others may also be true for social groups that promote consideration of other people. In a prior study, people who held a positive view of environmentalists, pacifists, vegetarians, nurses, ACLU members, liberals, labor unions, and who held a negative view of CEOs, the rich, and hunters were more likely to score higher on the individualizing foundation values (Graham et al., 2009, 2011). Therefore, religious affiliation may not be as important for upholding individualizing values as social affiliations that foster prosociality. Yet, robust literature finds links between religiosity and prosocial behavior (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Stavrova & Siegers, 2014), suggesting that religion itself is a catalyst for increasing prosociality. For example, priming religion has been shown to increase people’s righteousness to those committing unfair behaviors (McKay, Efferson, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2011). The direct relation between God, religion, spirituality, and prosocial behavior has been extensively studied and resulted in robust support for religious primes increasing prosocial behavior (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pichon, Boccato, Saroglou, 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007, 2011; van Beest & Williams, 2011). However, an important consideration is whether the sense of community that religion fosters may explain the effects of priming on prosocial behavior. Graham and Haidt (2010) suggest prior studies focus on belief specifics, such as the effect of observing deities, whilst neglecting the deeper importance of religion, ‘‘which is the strengthening of a community’’ (p. 140). That is, prior research confounds social affiliation, and the concomitant sense of community, with religious priming. The value of community is supported by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007), who found similar increases in prosocial behavior using secular and religious primes. This suggests priming a sense of belonging to a social group that connects one to a community promotes prosocial behavior, and not simply priming religion.
Because religious primes are commonly compared to non-meaningful and non-religious primes (e.g., weather seasons [Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010]), the mechanisms for the effects religion has on prosocial behavior are unclear. Research has begun to look at mechanisms behind the link between religion and prosocial behavior. Although prior research has included potential mechanisms such as the moral significance of the religious prime to the individual (e.g., secular and religion priming), these have been unsuccessful in teasing apart religion’s effects on prosociality (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). One potential mechanism behind religion’s influence on prosociality is the wider context that religion provides, which is belonging to a community (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Research has yet to equate primes on social connectedness while varying the influence of religion. Careful selection of primes is needed to ensure that the categories chosen (e.g., social religious vs. other social groups) for inclusion in future studies are meaningful to each individual. In order to avoid imposing categories on people, however, we argue that allowing people to self-select a social affiliation provides a more intrinsically motivating prime. This allows for testing the unique contribution of religious affiliations versus other social affiliations that foster similar prosocial attitudes. The aim of the present study was to test if priming a self-generated social affiliation was associated with greater self-perception on progressivism within a sample of undergraduates. Two versions of a questionnaire with self-perceived morality, one with social affiliation identification question asked first (priming condition) and another with the same question last, were distributed to investigate the priming effect. This study is unique in its methodology as it allowed people to freely name a social group that they identified with. Follow-up probes were used to gauge the importance of the chosen affiliation. Social affiliations were then later categorized as religious and non-religious, and as promoting prosociality or not. We expected people who named a religious social affiliation to be less progressive, possibly due to their higher levels of binding values in comparison to those with any other social affiliation. Further, it was explored whether religious affiliation was related to higher levels of individualizing values. We expected that priming would be associated with higher levels of progressivism, individualizing, and binding (particularly the ingroup sub-foundation). It was expected that when primed, people with a religious social affiliation would score lower on progressivism and be held steadfast in traditional binding values. Finally, we expected those who were primed and who endorsed prosocial affiliations to be more progressive. 2. Method 2.1. Participants Students (N = 801; 59% female) enrolled in undergraduate prerequisite classes participated within classrooms. Using G⁄Power 3.1 with .80 power and a medium effect-size (.27, derived from Johnson et al., 2010) showed a target sample size of 132. Participants were enrolled in first-year prerequisite courses at a university in Hawai’i, and received no compensation for participation. Participants (Median = 19.0, Mage = 20.4 years, SD = 4.1, range 18– 71 years) self-identified as Caucasian (24%), Asian-American (50%), Pacific Islander (15%), African-American (4%), HispanicAmerican (4%), or other (3%); these are representative of the university population. 2.2. Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to either the priming or control group. The priming group was administered a questionnaire with social affiliation priming questions prior to the MFQ
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(Graham et al., 2011). The four priming questions were directed to make the participant identify (‘‘What social affiliation do you most identify with?’’), and actively consider the importance and positive elements of his/her significant social group with which he/she identified (‘‘Why is this social affiliation important to you?’’; ‘‘Does this social affiliation make you a better person from day to day?’’; and ‘‘From this social affiliation, what do you wish the world would adopt?’’). The open-ended ‘‘why’’ question was coded as important for prosocial attitudes and behaviors (n = 109; e.g., self-improvement, benefits others, being open-minded and flexible) or other factors (n = 255; e.g., upbringing, not important, supportive, personal identification). Most participants (n = 302) reported that their social affiliation made them a better person than did not (n = 91). The sequential order in which these priming questions were presented allowed us to test the prime of social affiliation separate from the effects of ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘better person’’. The control group reported on the MFQ items first, followed by asking them to identify their social affiliation. Control participants were not asked to consider the positive effects of belonging to a social group because of potential carry-over effects from completion of the MFQ. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Hawai’i. 2.3. Measures The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) consists of 30 items rated on a 6-point scale. Half of the items are rated from ‘‘not at all relevant’’ to ‘‘extremely relevant’’, and the other 15 items rated from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to ‘‘strongly agree’’. Consistent with prior research (Napier & Luguri, 2013), Progressivism was calculated as a difference score by subtracting the mean of Ingroup, Authority, and Purity (Binding scale) from the mean of Harm and Fairness (Individualizing scale). Internal consistency was acceptable (Kline, 1986) for the Binding scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .74) and the Individualizing scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .69). Internal consistency for the sub-foundations was similar to that obtained in prior research (range .53–.67; Graham et al., 2011; Napier & Luguri, 2013; Simpson & Laham, 2015), which was poor. Thus, these were used in follow-up analyses using multivariate analyses. Social affiliation was queried with an open-response question. The open-ended question was coded for being religious or non-religious affiliation. Religious affiliations included Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and religious without denomination. Non-religious affiliations included atheism, political, scientist, environmentalist, feminist, ethnic group, and sports affiliation. Those who did not identify with a social affiliation were omitted from the study (n = 14). Participants who named a religious group (61%) were predominantly Christian (85%). 2.4. Data analytic plan To test significance of both group affiliation and priming effects on moral foundations, a 2 (religious affiliation vs. non-religious affiliation) 2 (priming vs. control condition) between–between Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on progressivism, covarying gender, age, and ethnicity. Subsequently, we examined group affiliation and priming effects on the sub-foundations that made up individualizing and binding. These were tested using 2 2 Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA), one with the two individualizing sub-foundations as the dependent variables, and one with the three binding sub-foundations as dependent variables. MANCOVA can be used to test whether the independent variables exert an effect on the linear combination of the dependent variables (Stevens, 2009), such that we tested effects of priming and social affiliation on the combination
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of individualizing and binding sub-foundations. Between-subjects effects were examined to determine the source of any significant differences based on priming or religious social affiliation. SPSS version 20 was used for data analyses. Partial eta-squared was used as an estimate of effect size. Further testing was used to determine if people who endorsed prosocial principles as being an important reason for their social affiliation were more progressive on the MFQ. An ANCOVA was conducted on progressivism by the coded measure of ‘‘why’’ the social affiliation was important, controlling for covariates. Similar to Shariff and Norenzayan (2007), the ‘‘better person’’ question was used as a suspicion probe to determine if the prime made people explicitly aware of their moral self-worth (1 = prosocial, 0 = other). This awareness could have affected moral self-perception. Therefore, an ANCOVA was conducted on progressivism by the effect of saying yes(1) or no(0) to the ‘‘better person’’ question, whilst controlling for covariates. 3. Results First, to determine if religious affiliates were equally represented across each condition a Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity correction) was conducted. Religious affiliates were not more represented in one condition than the other, x2(1, n = 801) = 3.09, p = .08. 3.1. Do those who are primed on social affiliation report greater progressivism? Table 1 presents correlations for the moral foundation scales, covariates, and the predictor variables. The result of the ANCOVA showed that there was a statistically significant main effect for priming (F(1, 797) = 5.18, p = .02, g2partial = .01) on progressivism. People who were primed reported being more progressive than individuals in the control group. A main effect was also found for affiliation type, with religious affiliates scoring lower on progressivism than those identifying with non-religious social affiliations (F(1, 797) = 73.79, p = .001, g2partial = .09). There was no significant interaction between affiliation type and priming (F(1, 797) = .09, p = .76, g2partial = .00), suggesting that the effect of priming did not differ based on religion. As expected, making people aware of their social affiliation was associated with greater self-perception of progressivism. The effect size for religion was in the moderate range (Miles & Shevlin, 2001) and suggests religious people see themselves as less progressive. 3.2. Does priming social affiliation affect binding moral values? To unpack the difference in progressivism due to priming social affiliation, MANCOVAs were conducted on the binding and individualizing subscales with the expectation that religion would be related to higher endorsement of binding and possibly individualizing values; priming would be related to higher endorsement of binding and individualizing. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and significant effect of the MFQ foundations being predicted by social affiliation and priming condition. There was a significant effect for the priming condition on the binding subscales (Wilks K = .96, F(3, 792) = 11.19, p < .001, g2partial = .04). Examining the between-subjects effects showed differences across the Ingroup and Purity sub-foundations. Those who were primed endorsed more Ingroup and less Purity moral values (F(1, 794) = 4.39, p = .04, g2partial = .01; F(1, 794) = 13.22, p < .001, g2partial = .02, respectively). Social affiliation also had a significant effect on the binding subscales (Wilks’ K = .82, F(3, 792) = 58.50, p < .001, g2partial = .18). The between-subjects effects were significant across all binding
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Table 1 Correlations among main variables. 1 a
1. Framing 2. Ethnicitya 3. Gendera 4. Religiona 5. Age 6. Harm 7. Fairness 8. Ingroup 9. Authority 10. Purity 11. Progressivism M SD a * **
–
2
3 0.04 –
4 **
0.09 0.00 –
5 0.06 0.16** 0.07* –
6 0.01 0.09* 0.2** 0.04 –
20.43 4.10
7
8
9 **
10
11
0.04 0.1** 0.16** 0.16** 0.10** –
0.04 0.13** 0.08* 0.04 0.05 0.56** –
0.10 0.15** 0.12** 0.25** 0.01 0.30** 0.33** –
0.01 0.18** 0.01 0.29** 0.05 0.24** 0.30** 0.57** –
0.06 0.16** 0.04 0.44** 0.08* 0.34** 0.27** 0.52** 0.58** –
3.60 0.68
3.63 0.62
2.9 0.78
3.14 0.71
2.71 0.89
0.01 0.07 0.18** 0.26** 0.02 0.41** 0.39** 0.5** 0.56** 0.54** – 0.70 0.69
Based on Spearman’s correlation. p < .05. p < .01.
Table 2 Means (standard deviation) for between subjects ANCOVAs predicting moral foundations (accounting for covariates). Religious affiliation
Progressivism Harm Fair Ingroup Authority Purity
Non-religious affiliation
Significant effect
Control (n = 234)
Priming (n = 255)
Control (n = 170)
Priming (n = 142)
.51 3.67 3.61 2.97 3.32 3.09
.57 3.70 3.69 3.13 3.29 2.96
.89 3.46 3.59 2.61 2.93 2.35
.99 3.49 3.61 2.73 2.85 2.08
(.61) (.61) (.65) (.72) (.58) (.75)
(.60) (.68) (.61) (.78) (.74) (.82)
(.69) (.71) (.62) (.78) (.70) (.77)
(.78) (.73) (.61) (.73) (.76) (.85)
Rel, Prime Rel Rel, Prime Rel Rel, Prime
Note: Rel = Social affiliation, Prime = Priming condition.
subscales; for Ingroup (F(1, 794) = 44.97, p < .001, g2partial = .05), Authority (F(1, 794) = 59.03, p < .001, g2partial = .07), and Purity (F(1, 794) = 175.19, p < .001, g2partial = .18). As expected, religious affiliates reported higher levels on Binding moral values. No interaction was found between priming and social affiliation (Wilks’ K = 1.00, F(3, 792) = 0.43, p = .73, g2partial = .00). Therefore, priming and social affiliation had significant effects on Binding values, with religious social affiliation having a medium effect size.
To determine if the effect of priming was due to justification of their own moral worth by answering ‘‘yes’’ to the better person question we examined the results of an ANCOVA. There was no significant effect of the better person question (F(1, 388) = .28, p = .60, g2partial = .00). Those who responded that the social affiliation made them a better person were not then more progressive, suggesting that emphasizing a prosocial orientation to one’s social affiliation, not simply being primed as a ‘‘better person,’’ had an effect on moral progressivism.
3.3. Does priming social affiliation affect individualizing moral values? 4. Discussion The effect of priming was non-significant (Wilks’ K = 1.00, F(2, 793) = 0.95, p = .39, g2partial = .00). There was a significant effect of social affiliation (Wilks’ K = .98, F(2, 793) = 8.30, p < .001, g2partial = .02). Examining the between-subjects effects, social affiliation had a significant effect on Harm, with religious affiliates reporting higher concern and compassion for others than non-religious affiliates (F(1, 794) = 13.13, p < .001, g2partial = .02). Again, the interaction between priming and social affiliation was non-significant (Wilks’ K = 1.00, F(2, 793) = .26, p = .77, g2partial = .00). In sum, those with a religious affiliation endorsed higher individualizing values than those without, and priming had no effect. 3.4. Do those who identify prosociality as an important component to their social affiliation endorse more progressive values? To explore a possible mechanism of how priming social affiliation has an effect on progressivism we conducted an ANCOVA. Those who believed their social affiliation encouraged prosocial attitudes reported greater levels of progressivism (M = .90, SD = .80) than those who felt it was important for other reasons (M = .66, SD = .67; F(1, 359) = 7.16, p = .01, g2partial = .02). Therefore, participants who spontaneously considered their social affiliation to foster prosocial behaviors were more progressive.
Priming social affiliation had a unique effect on self-perceived morality. When primed, all individuals regardless of affiliation type reported higher levels of progressivism, even though religious affiliates reported lower levels on this foundation. There were no interactions between social affiliation and priming, which indicates religion did not moderate the effect of priming as previously found (Pichon et al., 2007). Therefore, priming a self-selected social group affiliation of any type increased self-perception of prioritizing moral virtues of justice, fairness, and equality for others over traditional values. A unique part of the present study was the inclusion of whether their social affiliation had prosocial merit and this was a potential mechanism by which priming may operate. Participants who perceived their groups as promoting helpful and selfless behavior and encouraging open-minded ideals also endorsed more progressive values. Religious social affiliation predicted progressivism. People who identified with a religious social affiliation reported less progressive moral virtues than those with any other social affiliation. This is consistent with prior research showing people who prioritize binding over individualizing show greater affiliation to those who uphold strict rules, hierarchical structures, and authoritarian values. Also, those with religious tendencies strongly adhere to
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maintaining collective communities, which would insulate and reinforce their shared moral beliefs. This prioritization of their ingroup and traditional values has led prior researchers to suggest there may be a dark side to holding binding moral virtues (Smith et al., 2014). For example, religious affiliates have been found to be more prejudiced and less concerned towards outsiders (Johnson et al., 2010), to the point of hostility (Ramsay et al., 2014) and violence (Ginges et al., 2009). However, religious doctrine also teaches concern for others. In line with research on religion and prosocial behavior (Preston & Ritter, 2013), we found religious affiliates were higher on the individualizing foundation, suggesting stronger concern for the wellbeing of others. However, this effect size was small. Unlike religion, priming was related to higher progressive moral values. When individuals were primed with their chosen social affiliation, they reported greater sympathetic concern for others’ wellbeing as prioritized over traditional values. Therefore, making people aware of their social group membership instills wider moral concern that extends beyond their own group’s rights and wellbeing. However, our findings suggest this prioritization reflects differences in the binding foundation. That is, people who were primed with belonging to a group reported less concern over purity and general acceptance of less virtuous behaviors in others. Our findings are consistent with prior research that shows people who place less value on concerns for purity were more accepting of homosexuals, atheists, sexually-open people, and prostitutes (Graham et al., 2011). The present study extended earlier findings by showing that priming affected allegiance to one’s social group and communitylevel needs. Consistent with our expectations, those primed for a social affiliation were higher on ingroup moral values, which was similar to the findings for religious affiliation but with a small effect size. Therefore, prioritization of one’s ingroup is not limited to those with a religious affiliation; this finding is consistent with prior research (Gillespie et al., 2013). Together our findings suggest that priming social groups may have an affiliative and prosocial effect similar to earlier religious priming studies. Without a similarly-relevant social comparison that represents an individual’s identification, the suggestion that priming religion has an ability to singularly, and above all other affiliations, increase prosocial behavior stands on tenuous evidence. For example, social-emotional brain regions have been found to be activated in response to religious prime (Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010), but the current study would suggest these effects are explained by the perceived value of one’s social group. Indeed, individuals who recognized their social affiliation as beneficial to self-improvement, promoting helping behaviors, and being more open-minded reported higher progressive values. Therefore, our findings suggest that priming social groups that foster a prosocial orientation leads people to have more progressive attitudes. There were several limitations to the study. Although the MFQ is widely used to measure morality, it is based on self-report which limits these findings to self-perception. However, laboratory studies have shown similar effects to questionnaire studies that priming religiosity increases moral behavior (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Nevertheless, experimental studies using laboratory measures of prosociality would further the discoveries of this paper. The present study included students enrolled in undergraduate prerequisite classes. This limits the generalizability of the findings, as levels of religiosity and spirituality ebb and flow throughout the college years (Bryant, Choi, & Yasuno, 2003; Stoppa & Lefkowitz, 2010). The present findings are robust for a number of reasons. A large sample size was targeted to detect significant priming effects. The fact that strong effects were found for religious social affiliation across most of the moral foundations, independent of priming, sug-
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gests that interaction effects would emerge, should there have been any. We specifically included a question about whether the participants viewed their social affiliation as an enhancement to prosociality. Thus, we tested a possible mechanism as to the importance behind social affiliations. Also, we were able to eliminate alternative explanations, such as whether people felt the need to justify their social affiliation’s prosociality as a result of the priming questions.
4.1. Final conclusion Religious affiliation was related to less progressivism, regardless of priming. Also, explicit priming of social affiliation had a positive influence on progressive moral values, and this effect was not unique to religion. We argue that a possible mechanism for the effect of priming may be the prosocial value a person places on their social affiliation. Consistent with this suggestion, those who felt that the important qualities of their social group included being open-minded and showing concern for others were more favorable to compassion moral virtues than to authoritarian moral virtues. In sum, our findings support the notion that religion is not fundamental to moral priming (Norenzayan, 2014). Instead, it is likely to be the benefits of belonging to a prosocial group, as opposed to acting as an individual, that enhances prosociality.
Acknowledgments Sincerest thanks to Dr. Luna Centifanti and the three anonymous reviewers for the invaluable comments and suggestions.
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