Psychological studies of religion head for derailment

Religion (1983) 13, 127-136

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF RELIGION HEAD FOR DERAILMENT

L . J. Francis

Richard Hutch's recent survey article' poses the question `Are psychological studies of religion on the right track?' In the course of his survey he draws upon the debate between Ian Vine and myself which we began at the Second Lancaster Colloquium on the Pschology of Religion in 1977 and subsequently continued through the pages of the Bulletin of the British Psychological Society .' I am pleased to have been invited to reply to Hutch's review article for three reasons . First, I had allowed Vine's second paper to go unchallenged because I suspected that his misrepresentation of my case was so transparent that those who subsequently followed our debate would recognize the mistake for themselves . 3 However, Hutch has clearly failed to distinguish between the case I was making and the case Vine misrepresents me as making . I can at least offer to clarify this debate for future reviewers . Second, Hutch fails to offer a satisfactory answer to the question posed by the title of his paper . His failure is due not to an inadequate search of the literature, but to the absence of a serious discussion of what would be involved in assessing the `right track' in the first place . I suspect that Hutch would have appreciated the nature of this problem more clearly had he come to terms with the argument of my original paper . By developing my case I can at least offer some criteria against which psychological studies of religion can be assessed . Even if the notion of identifying a `right track' should appear illusory, it ought to be possible to identify the major causes of derailment . Third, in contrasting my original paper in the Bulletin of the British Psychological Society with my two subsequent articles in that journal, 4 Hutch accuses me of having "'thrown in the towel" as far as the theoretical advancement of the discipline of the psychology of religion is concerned' and of having limited myself `mainly to issues in religious education' . At a personal level I may well want to argue that the criticism is unjust, but, more importantly, at a pro0048-721X/83/020127 + 09$02 .00/0

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fessional level I want to argue that the implications of the criticism are dangerous for the healthy development both of the psychology of religion and psychological research in the area of religious education . Historically, research in religious education has been impoverished by a failure to recognize the wider debates conducted within the psychology of religion, while the psychology of religion itself has been impoverished by a failure to take seriously the theoretical and empirical advances being made within the specific field of research in religious education . I can at least emphasize the important practical benefits of co-operation between these two areas . THE DEBATE WITH VINE

The debate with Vine goes back to the paper he presented to the Second Lancaster Colloquium on the Psychology of Religion in 1977 under the title `Psychological theory and religious belief-an unholy divide?' The nub of Vine's case is summed up in his own abstract where he argues that 'psychological considerations . . . lead to a justification for rejecting at least some theological perspectives on the grounds that they are rationally indefensible' . His key notion is that `theological doctrines make claims about objective reality' and that these claims must be `seen in the light of a rational approach which relates truth to what is publicly knowable through the use of empirical procedures' . He argues that religious beliefs cannot be justified in these ways and that therefore `orthodox believers must be committed to beliefs which fall short of standards of rationality that we should be reluctant to relax' . He concludes that theological viewpoints which devalue rationality may consequently `threaten our material survival, happiness or self-actualization' . While listening to Vine's presentation and the subsequent discussion at the colloquium I became increasingly confused regarding the nature of the debate that was taking place . I found myself wanting to seek clarification as to whether the speakers were in fact doing psychology or whether they were doing theology . I suspected that the disciplines of psychology and theology were disparate academic activities, each characterized by their own concepts, syntax and modes of validation, and each drawing on a vast and sophisticated specialist literature . Unless I could be sure in which of these two activities Vine and his discussants were engaging I could not be sure what criteria were appropriate against which to evaluate their claims . As I listened more attentively to the debate, I saw it move backwards and forwards between the two disciplines of psychology and theology . Psychologists were trying to assess his claims against the perspectives of their own discipline, while theologians were attempting to accomplish the same end against the perspectives of their very different discipline . Both groups were, of course, right in doing what they were doing . The problems come, however, when the divide between the two disciplines is such that the psychologist fails

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to appreciate the weight of the theologian's contribution and the theologian fails to appreciate the weight of the psychologist's contribution . It is difficult for those standing in one discipline to hear precisely what those within another discipline are actually saying, since the methodological assumptions and the presupposed literature differ between the two groups . I concluded that it would have facilitated communication in the inter-disciplinary debate if the participants had paused to reflect on the nature of the grounds on which their distinctive contributions were based . The problem focused so clearly for me by Vine's paper reappeared from time to time and in different guises throughout the rest of the colloquium . Because this problem is likely to continue to be the main hindrance to the development of the psychology of religion as a succesful branch of study in its own right, I decided to highlight it in my evaluation of the colloquium in the Bulletin of the British Psychological Society . In this paper, I argue that the colloquium drew attention to a divide between two kinds of proponents of the psychology of religion, `psychologists who study religion and theologians who employ the tools of psychology' . I argue that there is still a tendency `for the theologian to misuse the tools of psychology and for the psychologist to misrepresent the theologian's position' . These tendencies are not the result of wilful misrepresentation, but rather the result of an all too understandable failure to stand comfortably within two disciplines . The psychology of religion is, by its very nature, an inter-disciplinary activity . The interface between two discliplines is an exceedingly complex area in which to work . To work successfully at such an interface presupposes competence in both disciplines and familiarity with a wide range of literature and issues . The point of my critique of the Lancaster Colloquium was to argue that the psychology of religion will flourish most successfully when it is undertaken by those who can hold their own both in psychological debate and theological debate . This seemed to meet not a stringent criterion, but a self evident necessity if good sense is to be talked across disciplinary boundaries and if an inter-disciplinary study is to be advanced . I am not, as Hutch seems to think, attempting `to cast the psychology of religion in terms of either psychology or theology', but to insist that the psychology of religion must hold its own within both disciplines . When Vine replies to my paper he writes, `I suspect that to take Francis's perspective to its apparent conclusion would actually rule out a psychology of religion and leave us with only a religious psychology' . Without actually attributing the following views to me, Vine then proceeds to argue against three propositions, namely `the assumption that only the religious psychologist can understand religion well enough to study it fairly' ; `the claim that no-one but a Christian or a mystic can study Christian belief systems or mystical practices', and the assertion `that the religious "language game" can

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be understood only by those inside that "form of life"' . These three statements are not the kind of points I have ever made or with which I would ever wish to agree . On the basis of reading Vine's paper and of failing to notice that Vine does not directly attribute those three views to me, Hutch concludes that I have `suggested . . . with . . . zeal . . . that the psychologist might do well to become more personally receptive to those with firm religious beliefs' . Again, this is plainly not my position . My position has been much better understood by Timothy Miles . 5 Miles examines what is involved in psychology attempting to assess the truth claims of religious statements and the extent to which psychological truth and religious truth are compatible . He argues that, while it is not necessary for the psychologist to accept or to believe the truth claims made by the religious person, he needs to understand how the theologian himself evaluates these truth claims . In Miles's own words, he is `not suggesting that to understand a particular religious truth you have to believe it, but only that you need to know the rules of a particular language game being played' . My point is that the psychologist of religion does not need to be religious but he does need to be theologically competent . Vine's error is to confuse having theological competence with holding religious beliefs . The unbeliever can, if he will but take the discipline seriously, understand and engage in the subtleties of the theological debates involved in the psychology of religion as an equal alongside the believer . POINTS OF DERAILMENT Hutch opens his paper by posing an important question : `Are psychological studies of religion on the right track? Can direction be found by which not only the `right track' might be discovered, but also by which an academic discipline, with clearly stated assumptions of its own, might be said to exist in the first place?' Hutch fails to provide a satisfactory answer to this question . Ultimately, he rests content with `a personal review of current trends in the psychology of religion in America and Britain' . The nearest Hutch gets to proposing criteria for assessing the `right track' is in his opening analysis of what is meant by religion itself, `and how to know it when you see it' . The flaw, he argues, with both American and British psychology of religion is the tendency to be `generally blind to, or selectively inattentive to eastern religious experience, belief and practice' . As a consequence of this perceived tendency Hutch argues that `adequate theoretical renaissance in the discipline will not be wholly possible' . What Hutch seems to be demanding in order for a psychological study of religion to be deemed to be wholly on the `right track' is for the theoretical implications of that study to be relevant to the whole range and variety of

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phenomena which come within the scope of the world `religion' . This criterion rests on a highly dubious assumption and leads to an implication which is empirically impracticable . The assumption is the notion that there is an essence in common shared by all phenomena that rightly claim the name `religion' . The implication is that empirical work in the psychology of religion is without theoretical validity unless it samples the infinite range of religious phenomena . Both problems stem from Hutch's decision to begin with the question `what is religion?' as if a satisfactory answer can be given to such a question and as if the answer could serve as a litmus test of what could count as a worthwhile psychological study of religion . This is a question which has been tackled in a range of ways, not only by theologians but by social scientists of religion and which has led to a wide variety of answers . 6 Hutch would have arrived at an equally unhelpful conclusion had he decided to start with the question `what is mind?' . From this starting point he could have argued that no single school of psychology does justice to the whole range of connotations given to this concept. For example, he might have argued that the behaviourist psychologist is `generally blind to, or selectively inattentive to' the collective unconscious posited by the Jungian psychologist as an essential component of the concept of mind . If Hutch's criterion will not do, what can be put in its place? My suggestion is that attention should be turned from questions of content to questions of method . Instead of asking `what is religion?' or `what is mind?' it might well be more helpful to ask `what is theology?' or `what is psychology?' in the sense of probing what it is that theologians and psychologists do when they set about their respective disciplines . The accent now is on discerning what it is that makes these distinctive pursuits the characteristic activities that they are . Neither of these questions has a simple or single answer . 7 Within the discipline of psychology, thei _~ are a variety of different schools or approaches . Among psychologists themselves there is little agreement concerning either what phenomena are worth scrutiny or what methods are most appropriate for undertaking such scrutiny . When a psychologist turns to undertake the psychology of religion, it is right that he should employ the psychological tradition in which he has developed his skills and in which he had confidence . His choice of method will necessarily selectively limit the scope of his work and the generalizability of the implications of his conclusions . In assessing his study from the perspective of a psychologist, what I demand first of all is that his work will do professional justice to the school of psychology on which it builds, and that his conclusions do, not go beyond the legitimate scope of his methodological standpoint . Similarly, within the discipline of theology there are a variety of different schools or approaches . The range of phenomena which come legitimately

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within the theologian's view is vast . I do not expect any one theologian to have mastery over the many fields of the theological enterprise . When a theologian turns to undertake the psychology of religion, it is right that he should continue to work within the theological tradition in which he has developed his skills and in which he has confidence . Again, his choice will necessarily selectively limit the scope of his work and the generalizability of the implications of his conclusions . In assessing his study from the perspective of a theologian, what I demand first of all is that his work will do professional justice to the area of theology on which it builds, and that his conclusions do not go beyond the legitimate scope of his methodological standpoint . It is here that the added complexity of an inter-disciplinary activity needs to be taken into account . The psychologist doing the psychology of religion needs to be assessed not just as a psychologist but as a theologian as well : the theologian doing the psychology of religion needs to be assessed not just as a theologian but as a psychologist as well . Psychological studies of religion can be judged to be on the `right track' only when they have satisfied the stringency of the theological and psychological critique . In practice, this test has two implications . First, it means that derailment can occur whenever a study fails to meet one or both of these criteria . Second, it means that there will be a wide variety of academically acceptable psychologies of religion moving to and fro over a complex network of tracks, just as there is a wide variety within the parent disciplines of theology and psychology themselves . FRANCIS'S TOWEL

In response to my second and third papers in the Bulletin of the British Psychological Society Hutch accuses me of having "'thrown in the towel" as far as the theoretical advancement of the discipline of the psychology of religion is concerned' and having limited myself `mainly to issues in religious education' . I consider this an unfortunate judgement for two reasons . First, it fails to take seriously the criteria implied in my first paper in that series for assessing theoretical advancement of the psychology of religion . Second, in basing his judgement solely on a comparison of these three papers, Hutch chooses to be selectively inattentive to the main body of my published work . I propose, therefore, to look more closely at this reputedly discarded towel . The purpose of my second and third papers in the Bulletin of the British Psychological Society is to review the first and second meetings of the International Seminar on Religious Education and Values . The point that I wanted to make is that I met here a small international group of people who were setting out to do the psychology of religion in such a way as to expose themselves to the stringent critique of both psychologists and theologians . The point is made even more clearly in the review of the third meeting ." In this

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context, theologians and psychologists were listening very attentively to what each other was saying in the attempt to refine their theoretical understanding and their empirical research techniques . They were able to do this, I argue, because they shared a common purpose, namely to generate greater insight into religious development and into the part played by education in this process . In one sense, Hutch is right to temper my enthusiasm regarding the achievement of the three international seminars on religious education and values . Viewed against the perspective of the vast inadequately chartered interface between psychology and theology, the achievement is infinitesimal . After all, my reviews can point to only a handful of studies and none of these would escape without some criticism . On the other hand, Hutch may be over hasty in his rejection of the significance of the work to which I draw attention . What I am intending to point to is simply a context in which theologians and psychologists can begin to understand each other's perspectives when they set about a matter of shared concern . Particularly in Britain there are very few opportunities available for the refinement of studies in the psychology of religion . I would be disappointed if British scholars concerned with this interdisciplinary area should fail to give due consideration to one of the few matrices in which the study is likely to be nurtured . Finally, how is my own work, conducted as it is firmly within the field of religious education, likely to contribute to the wider concerns of the psychology of religion? I hope that it does so by taking seriously the criteria which I have proposed for assessing whether or not psychological studies of religion are on the right track . Briefly, and in crude outline, I have attempted to work at three small but specific issues, in which I have tried to take seriously both the discipline of psychology and the discipline of theology First, I have worked within the branch of social psychology concerned with psychometrics in order to discover as much as possible about the development of the school child's attitude towards Christianity . So far, this has been an eight year project with cross sectional studies conducted in 1974, 1978 and 1982 . Gradually a body of interrelated material is emerging which is able to examine the influence on the child's attitude towards Christianity of such factors as age, sex, generation, intelligence, social background, parental behaviour, type of school, type of religion taught in school, and so on . 9 At the same time I provided an instrument of clearly stated theoretical and empirical qualities which has been and is currently being used by a number of other researchers in various contexts . 10 Second, I have tried to think clearly about the problems involved in assessing research in the development of religious thinking ." My aim has been to analyse what is meant by religious thinking in such a way that the analysis is acceptable to the theologically aware and at the same time amenable to

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psychological investigation . This has involved both making a distinction between `thinking about religion', `thinking religiously' and `thinking in religious language', and suggests ways in which these `areas can be researched' . 12 Third, in association with three colleagues, I have tried to take seriously a school of personality research and locate religion within the theoretical postulates of that school . This has involved a great deal of careful empirical work and the careful sifting of a vast theoretical literature . The detailed results of this work are gradually becoming available . 13 Even if the total expanse of my towel may be small, I hope that I shall still be found to be both clearly in possession of it and busily engaged in extending its area . END PIECE

Enough has been said, I hope, to correct the review which Hutch presents of my own position . Now, what can be said more generally about psychological studies of religion in Britain? Are they, in Hutch's terms, on the right track, or are they, 'in my terms, heading for derailment? Being closer to the British context, I am less sanguine than Hutch from his greater distance of the possibility of providing an authorative answer to such a question . At the present time, I shall be content to wait until Laurence Brown and Michael Argyle's collection of papers from the Oxford Symposium on the Psychology of Religion, held in May 1982, is published . Meanwhile, it would perhaps be wise to disclaim . a t least for my own part, Hutch's assertion that 'Scobie and Francis are representative of the "state of the art" of psychology of religion in Britain', since the only sense in which this could be true has nothing to do with either the method or focus of my work, but solely with the fact that psychologists of religion in Britain tend to find that they are working in comparative isolation and that they need to make a hobby of their specialised interest rather than a career .

NOTES

I

A . Hutch, `Are psychological studies of religion on the right track?' Religion, 12

2

(1982) 277-299 . I . Vine, `Psychological theory and religious belief-an unholy divide?'

unpublished paper presented to the second Lancaster Colloquium on the Psychology of Religion, 1977 ; Leslie Francis, `The psychology of religion : Revived, not yet reborn', Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, (1978) 31, 44-45 I . Vine, `Facts and values in the psychology of religion', Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, (1978) 31,414-417 .

3

Seethe correspondence by M . R . Fielding and Pauline Fielding, `United we stand : divided we fall?', Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, (1979) 32, 83 .

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5 6 7

8 9

10

11

12 13

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L . Francis, `The psychology of religion : beyond revival', Bulletin of the British Psychological Society (1979) 32, 141-142 ; `Developments in the psychology of religion, Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, (1981) 34,387-388 T . R . Miles, `Psychological research and religious truth', unpublished paper presented to the British Psychological Society's Annual Conference, April 1979 . See for example, S . H . Alatas, `Problems of defining religion', International Social Science Journal (1977) 29, 213-234 . For introductory examinations of these questions, see M . Wiles What is Theology?, London, Oxford University Press, 1976; A . Colman, What is Psychology?, London, Kogan Page, 1981 . W . K . Kay and L . Francis, `Further developments in the psychology of religion', (awaiting publication) . See for example, L . Francis, `Attitude and longitude : A study in measurement', Character Potential: a record of research (1978) 8, 119-130 ; `Measurement reapplied : research into the child's attitude towards religion', British Journal of Religious Education (1978) 1, 45-51 ; `School influence and pupil attitude towards religion', British Journal of Educational Psychology (1979) 49, 107-123 ; `Christianity and the child today', Occasional papers; Farmington Institute for Christian Studies (1980) 6 . See for example, M . Carter, `The development of aspects of self in adolescence with reference to religious and moral education', unpublished M .Phil dissertation, University of Nottingham, 1979 ; W. K . Kay, `Religious thinking, attitudes and personality amongst secondary pupils in England and Ireland', published PhD dissertation, University of Reading, 1981 ; J. Greer, `Religious attitudes and thinking in Belfast pupils', Educational Research (1981) 23, 177-189 . Especially the work of R. Goldman, Religious thinking from Childhood to Adolesence, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964; and J. Peatling, The incidence of concrete and abstract religious thinking in the interpretation of three bible stories by pupils enrolled in grades four through twelve in selected schools in the Episcopal Church in the United States of America, unpublished PHD dissertation, University of New York . L . Francis `Research and the development of religious thinking', Educational Studies (1979) 5, 109-115 . See for example, L . J. Francis, P . R . Pearson, M . Carter and W . K . Kay, `Are introverts more religious?', British Journal of Social Psychology (1981) 20, 101-104 ; `The relationship between neuroticism and religiosity among English 15/16 year olds', Journal of Social Psychology (1981) 114,99-102 L . J . Francis, P . R . Pearson and W . K . Kay, 'Eysenck's personality quadrants and religiosity', British Journal of Social Psychology (1982) 21, 262-264 ; `Are introverts still more religious?' Personaliy and Individual Differences (in press) ; 'Neuroticism and Religiosity: a replication', Journal of Social Psychology (in press) ; L . J. Francis and P . R . Pearson `When introverts cease to be more religious (awaiting publication) .

LESLIE J . FRANCIS is Research Officer at Culham College Institute . Culham College Institute, The Malthouse, 60 East Saint Helen Street, Abingdon, Oxon .