Public participation and poverty alleviation: The experience of reform communists in India's West Bengal

World Development, Vol. 20, No. 10. pp. 1401-1422. Printed in Great Britain.

0305-750X/92 $5.00 + 0.00 Pergamon Press Ltd

1992.

Public Participation and Poverty Alleviation: The Experience of Reform Communists in India’s West Bengal JOHN ECHEVERRI-GENT* University of Virginia, Charlottesville

Summary. - Public participation is essential to making poverty alleviation programs responsive to the needs of the poor, but it requires a political process that adequately represents their interests. Yet as long as the poor remain poor. they are disadvantaged in securing equitable representation. This article highlights the problems stemming from this paradox of participation. It shows how implementing poverty alleviation programs through elected governing councils has simultaneously made policy more responsive to the poor while permitting the organizational interests of the ruling communist party to distort implementation. The article highlights the importance of political competition among parties and nongovernment organizations for maximizing responsiveness to the poor.

1. INTRODUCTION Does public participation in policy implementation enhance or reduce the effectiveness of programs to help the rural poor? Contentions concerning this issue can be grouped into three hypotheses. The greater responsiveness hypothesis maintains that public participation enhances the prospects of effective implementation by making it more responsive to the needs of the poor. Participation is also said to have an educational impact. It transforms the poor from objects of development into knowledgeable subjects of progress.’ The elite domination hypothesis asserts that public participation renders implementation more susceptible to the influence of local elites who distort implementation to benefit their own interests.’ Advocates of the political patronage hypothesis argue that public participation is mediated by political organizations. These attempt to shape public participation in ways that advance their own interests even when this conflicts with the requisites of effective implementation.’ To assess the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments it is necessary to examine two components of public participation: the opportuniry structure for participation and the process of interest representation. The opportunity structure for participation refers to the matrix of 1401

incentives and disincentives that condition the decisions of individuals to participate in policy decisions (Tarrow, lY91, pp. 32-39). Reforming state institutions is the most common approach to enhancing the opportunities for public participation. The manner in which they are altered is important because it affects decision makers’ incentives to respond to the interests expressed through public participation. It also shapes the process of interest representation by providing various social groups with different incentives to mobilize and differential access to decisionmaking authority. The process of interest representation IS broadly conceived. It includes both efforts to influence policy decisions and electoral mobilization to affect the selection of representatives with authority over public policy. The nature of interest

*I would like to gratefully acknowledge the U.S. Department of Education’s Fullbright Scholar program, the University of Chicago and the University of Virginia for supporting the research and writing of this article. I would like to thank the following for their help: N. C. Adak, Suraj Bandyopadhyay, Rakhari Chatterji, Uma Das Gupta, Elisavinda EcheverriGent, Samuel Lieberman. Ashok Maiti. Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne H. Rudolph. P. K. Sen. and the two anonymous reviewers for World Developmenr. Final revision accepted: January 28, 1992.

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representation is important because in virtually all cases there is no obvious public interest, but rather a discourse among competing actors, each striving to take advantage of opportunities to advance their interests. Disproportionate control over economic, political, and information resources privileges some actors in this discourse, but its nature is also shaped by the opportunity structure for participation and the strategies that different actors employ. Examining the opportunity structure for participation and the process of interest representation is essential to evaluating the three hypotheses concerning public participation. For instance, the greater responsiveness hypothesis assumes that altering state institutions to create opportunities for public participation will make anti-poverty programs more effective. Advocates of this hypothesis, however, rarely give adequate consideration to the nature of interest representation and the limits it places upon the ability of the poor to advocate their interests. The elite domination hypothesis is more cognizant of these limits. In pointing out that elites are privileged in the process of interest representation by their control over a preponderant share of economic and political resources. it offers a much less sanguine view of the benefits of public participation for the poor. Its tendency to equate control over economic resources with control over politics. however, underestimates the potential autonomy of the political process. The political patronage hypothesis provides more scope for the independent impact of politics. Its implications do not necessarily contradict the elite domination hypothesis since political patronage often occurs within the parameters of elite domination. Together, the elite domination and political patronage hypotheses suggest a “paradox of participation.” Using public participation to make policy responsive to the needs of the poor requires a political process that represents their interests. But as long as the poor remain poor, they are disadvantaged in securing equitable representation. This article examines factors that might assist in overcoming this paradox. While taking the constraints presented by social structure seriously, the article demonstrates that the political process need not mechanically reflect social structure. It advances Kohli’s (1987) contention that disciplined political parties are important elements in securing equitable representation for the poor by emphasizing the importance of political competition. Kohli’s argument does not facilitate policy prescriptions because disciplined parties are rare and difficult for policy makers to create. Even where

they exist, political competition is essential to maintaining a party’s responsiveness to the needs of the poor. There are many forms of political competition, however. The article concludes with some observations concerning the types of competition that are most likely to make public policy more responsive to popular needs.

2. THE SETTING In order to explore these issues, this article examines the implementation of the National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) in the Indian state of West Bengal. Implementation of the NREP in West Bengal is distinguished by the fact that the government has delegated full authority over the program to a system of elected local governing councils called panchayclr.s. Because implementation through pmchuyccts provides an extensive role for public participation, examination of NREP implementation in West Bengal constitutes an excellent laboratory for testing the above hypotheses. The NREP has two basic objectives. First, it is designed to provide work to unemployed laborers residing in rural areas. Wages are paid in cash and food grains. They are intended to improve the standard of living and nutrition of the rural poor. The program’s second objective is to construct durable assets that will improve the infrastructure of rural areas. The assets created by the program are supposed to promote economic growth that will eventually curtail unemployment and poverty. In a country with large amounts of surplus labor and extensive underdeveloped rural areas, the NREP relies on public works to utilize surplus labor to promote economic development. The NREP has been an important component of the Indian government’s campaign to eliminate poverty. It provided a Rs. 24.X7 billion outlay for the program during the Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-X6 to 1989-90). The NREP was targeted to create 290 million person-days of employment annually during the Seventh Plan. During the first four years of the plan, it created 1,476 million person-days of employment, exceeding its target by 27% (Government of India, hereafter GOI, 1990a, p. 31). In 198687, NREP projects built 39,000 kilometers of rural roads. They created minor irrigation works covering 55,000 hectares. NREP projects afforested 215,000 hectares, and they constructed 159,000 community buildings. (GOI, 1988, p. 39). In 1989. the program was given new impetus when the government combined it with the Rural Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP) into

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

AND

the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY). This program was designed to concentrate employment generation in 120 backward districts with acute poverty and unemployment. Funding was almost double the combined previous levels of the NREP and RLEGP in 1989-90, and it is budgeted to remain at approximately this level 199&Y 1 (GOI, 1990b, p. 12). This reorganization of India’s public works programs makes the experience of the NREP in West Bengal particularly relevant. The Indian government has authorized gram panchuyat.~ (village councils) to be the primary implementing agency of the JRY. Since grum panchayats have exercised authority over the NREP and its predecessor programs in West Bengal since 1978, examination of the experience in West Bengal is likely to hold valuable lessons for the new national program. West Bengal provides a distinctive context for our study. It spans territory greater than that of Austria and encompasses a population the size of France. Although metropolitan Calcutta dominates the state’s commercial. political and cultural life, 74% of the state’s population lives in its rural hinterland. Situated on the western edge of one of the world’s largest river deltas, much of West Bengal is low-lying alluvial soil used largely for paddy cultivation. As one proceeds westward away from the delta, the terrain becomes undulating and the soil turns into less fertile laterite. Northern West Bengal ascends to the Himalayan foothills where commercial crops such as jute and tea become important. High population density and scarce land combine to make poverty pervasive in rural West Bengal, even by Indian standards. Its rural population density of 466 persons per square

Table

Marginal (less than 2.5) Small (2.5-5) Semi-Medium (S-IO) Medium (w-20) Large Total

1403

ALLEVIATION

kilometer is more than 2.5 times greater than the all-India rural average and more than 17 times greater than the overall average for the United States (GOI, 1985a, pp. 54, 192; World Bank, 1991, p. 205). More than 30% of all households are without land in rural West Bengal (GOI. lY78a; Bandyopadhyay and Associates, 1985, p. 13). Of the landed households, 89.3% had marginal or small holdings less than five acres. These cover 60.4% of the area operated (see Table 1). This figure is considerably above the all-India averages of 74.6% and 26.3% respectively. The average size of land holdings in West Bengal at 0.94 hectares is just half the all-India average of 1.82 hectares and second lowest of all Indian states (GOI, 1985b, p. 412). More than 44% of the agricultural work force makes its livelihood as agricultural laborers (Boyce, 1987, p. 225). According to an excellent study by Kakwani and Subbarao (1990. p. A-6), 68% of West Bengal’s rural population lived beneath the poverty line in 1983. This placed the state far above the all Indian average of 48.4%. and ranked West Bengal second only to Bihar in the incidence of rural poverty. It is important to remember the specificity of the opportunity structure created for implementing the NREP. Channeling public participation through the panchayats encourages political parties to play a prominent role in mediating public participation. Panchuyut members are chosen through partisan elections, and the punchayuts authority over substantial funds makes them an important resource for building partisan support. This form of decentralization differs from those that encourage nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and other community-based organiza-

1. Distribution of landownership in WeAt Bengal 198~81

Size of operational land holdings (in acres)

POVERTY

West

Percentage holdings Bengal

of India

West

Percentage of area operated Bengal India

69.7

56.6

29.2

12.1

19.6

18.0

31.2

14.2

8.8

14.0

25.2

21.2

1.9

9.0

10.7

29.7

0.0

2.4

3.1

22.8

100.0

loo.0

100.0

100.0

Source: GO1 (August 1985b), pp. 41U-411

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tions to play an active role. It was selected in part because it was more congenial to the political project of the Communist Party of India (Marocist) (CPI(M)). With more than 70% of the population of West Bengal residing in rural areas, political success in Bengali politics requires building a rural constituency. The CPI(M) was largely an urban based party through the 1960s. Its efforts to cultivate rural support began in earnest in the late 1960s when it organized militant agitations for agrarian reform. The extension of the CPI(M)‘s organization into rural areas, however, was limited by a wave of repression unleashed by the central and state governments under the ruling Congress party during the 1970s. In 1977, the CPI(M) won I78 of West Bengal’s 294 seats in the state legislative assembly (see Table 2). Together with a coalition of smaller leftish parties it formed the Left Front Government. Despite the CPI(M)‘s electoral success, the party’s grasp on power remained insecure. First, many of the votes it garnered reflected popular protest against Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian rule during the Emergency period (19755 77) rather than solid support for its programs. Another reason was that its success in lY77 was in part a consequence of the way in which the newly organized Janata Party cut into the constituency of the CPI(M)‘s traditional rival, the Congress (I) Party (Kohli, 1987, p. 107). In short, the CPI(M)‘s victory presented it with the opportunity to consolidate its position as the state’s leading party by augmenting its rural support. In this context, implementation of rural poverty alleviation programs such as the National Rural Employment Programme provided the CPI(M) with a chance to demonstrate its commitment to

ameliorating rural poverty and expand its electoral support. West Bengal has been ruled by the CPI(M) and allies since 1977. This state of 60 million is the world’s most populous political unit to be ruled by a democratically elected communist party. The CPI(M) has also established what may well be a record for the duration of a democratically elected communist government. The longevity of the CPI(M)‘s rule coupled with its cadres’ historic commitment ‘to the rural poor create extraordinarily favorable conditions for alleviating poverty through public participation. It is especially difficult to criticize the CPI(M)‘s leadership for lack of political will that proverbial problem associated with most failures of anti-poverty programs. This study is therefore of particular interest since it highlights the problems that arise when political will is not initially in question.J

3. THE GREATER RESPONSIVENESS HYPOTHESIS The greater responsiveness hypothesis is based on the premise that a substantial gap exists between government bureaucracy and the poor. This gap has detrimental consequences for poverty alleviation programs. Policy makers are often poorly informed about the circumstances in which implementation takes place. Program dcsign is frequently inappropriate. The poor not only are often unable to communicate their needs to government officials. They are also incapable of compelling them to respond. Public participation. according to this hypothesis, helps to

1969

CPl(M) Forward Block Revolutionary Socialist Party cPI* Congress (I) Janata Party Others Total seats won by the Left Front Total assembly seats

43 13 6 16 127

Government

7s 280

80

21 12 30 s5 x2 280

1071

I072

1977

19x2

Ill

14 0 3 35 216

178 2.5 20 2 20 2s 20 2.30 2Y3

174 2s 19 7 49 17 2.78 2Y1

5 3 13 105 40 277t

12 280

IWI

1x7 26 IX

1x7 2x lY

II 40 II

2.51 33

Commission of India (lY7Yc). p. 6-1; Election (1981), pp. X9, 145, 167; Election (1984), p. 29; Bancrjie (19X7), p. X0; T/w Td~g~uph (June 19. 1YYl). p. I. *The CPI has been a member of the Left Front since the 19X2 clcctions. iElections were countermanded in three constituencies. Sources:

Ghosh

Commission of India

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AND POVERTY

surmount these problems by creating opportunities for the poor to communicate their needs to officials. By involving the poor in policy problems, it makes them more effective participants in the policy process. Perhaps most importantly, public participation transfers authority to the public and enhances the ability of the poor to oblige government officials to respond to their needs. In creating an extensive role for public participation in the NREP, officials of the West Bengal government endeavored to improve its implementation by decentralizing authority and providing greater control to those better informed about local circumstances. Eighty percent of NREP funding is allocated to grant panchayu~s who are responsible for the planning and implementation of projects within their jurisdiction. The other 20% is given to zilla purishuds (district councils) to use for projects of larger scale which may transcend the boundaries of ~~UNI panchuyats. The delegation of authority to the gram yunchayuts has extended the government’s administrative network below the block, the lowest previous level of administration. The decentralization of administrative authority enables projects to be planned in a way that better accounts for local needs.’ The inclusion of local politicians and representatives of the public into the administrative network has transformed their relations with government officials. The literature on relations between bureaucrats and politicians in India usually stresses the tensions that arise (Taub, 1969). In contrast, bureaucrats repeatedly told me that inclusion of punchuyats facilitated implementation for those who were able to make the necessary adjustments. According to these officials, block development officers had to adjust from having the final word to being more like a captain of a team. The preeminent district official. the district magistrate, was also obliged to adjust. He told me, “Decisions are less individual and more collective. I now have a symphony to work with. I have to conduct it.“’ Not all bureaucrats have made the transition, but those that have find that working with punchyat institutions provides an array of advantages. At the block level, they often act as a buffer between the public and the block development officer. They seem to have reduced the number of disruptions of the administration. A survey by the Home Department of the Government of West Bengal found that since the rejuvenation of the purzchuyuts in 1978, the number of gharuo’s (demonstrations) against block development officers has declined throughout the state (Ganguly, 19X3, p. 5). One block

ALLEVIATION

1405

development officer told me that gram punchayat members are helpful because they can use social pressure to dissuade recalcitrant individuals from interfering with NREP implementation. A district planning officer observed that panchayats improve the performance of block development officers by providing them with “detailed knowledge of the needs of their block.“’ Similarly, the punchuyut system facilitates the work of district level administrators. A former district magistrate, and director of the Department of Panchayats, stated that the district magistrate “can use zilla parishad politicians to control ‘their people’ and prevent law and order Another district magistrate related problems.“” that he prefers to work through the punchuyut system because of the way it structures his relations with politicians. Previously, members of the legislative assembly and parliament would unexpectedly appear and make demands. The existence of the zilfu purishud regularizes interaction with politicians. The district magistrate often finds the zillu parish& a useful organizational buffer because he can refer other politicians to it.’ The punchayut system even provides a means for the district magistrate to keep other district officials in line. Conflicts between the magistrate and departmental engineers can arise just as they do between any generalist and technocrat. District magistrates can make use of their influence over the zillu purishud to curb the opposition of technocrats. “’ The incorporation of punchayuts into the implementation process increases government officials’ administrative capacity. By serving as a focus for interest representation. they simultaneously increase the flow of information to officials and serve as buffers insulating them from disturbances. They also enhance the government’s capacity for social control. This has positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, government officials have used the punchuyuts to collect unpaid irrigation taxes and help detect power theft.” At the same time, collusion between government officials and punchayut officials can insulate decision making from popular demands and render authorities less accountable to the public. The repressive aspect of the new institutional arrangements is illustrated by the comments of a Block Development Officer who observed that with the incorporation of the punchuyuts into the policy process, government personnel or panchuyut officials could get away with actions that previously would have caused a riot (Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen, 1988, p. 28). There is little doubt that implementing the NREP through punchayuts has increased public

1406

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interest although the scope of change is difficult to measure. I conducted a survey of 36 gram panchayat pradhans (chairmen) in four blocks in Midnapur district. Of the pradhans interviewed 96% responded that they had frequent contact with members of the public while planning NREP projects and 89% reported frequent contact durmg implementation. The rates of contact for different segments of the poor were roughly similar. Ninety one percent of the pradhans reported that they had frequent contact with cultivators during the course of planning NREP projects. Eighty nine percent had frequent contact with political workers, 81% with agricultural laborers and 74% with social workers. Of course, one must treat these data with some skepticism given the interest that the pru&mns have in exaggerating their consultation with the public. At the minimum, it reflects the widespread legitimacy of public participation among the prudhuns. My informal discussions with the public have convinced me that it is also a product of their increased interest in programs implemented by the punchuyurs. Decentralizing authority to the punchuyuts has also brought parties into closer contact with the people. For example, the secretary of a local Krishak Samiti (Peasants Association) told me that he thought implementing the NREP through grmrn purdmyuts strengthened his party, the CPI(M), because it makes it necessary for the party to keep in close contact with villagers in order to plan and implement the program.” Decentralized authority over development has made it necessary for higher party officials and MLAs to keep in closer contact with their constituencies. Prior to the revival of punchuyuts in 1978, MLAs often stayed in Calcutta and visited their constituencies infrequently. If they wanted to get something done for their constituency, they approached the minister or the secretary of the appropriate department in the capitol. With the devolution of authority over development to the panchuyut.s, an MLA often must go to the zillu parishud or even the gram punchuyut to initiate a project. This provides considerable disincentive for MLAs to behave in the stereotypical fashion of returning to their district only at election time.‘” There is significant evidence to support the contention that expanding the role of public participation has made implementation of the NREP more responsive to local needs. One of the most important criticisms of planning in India is that it has an institutional bias favoring the creation of new assets to the neglect of maintenance and improving old ones. As a result. the country suffers from increasing capital-output

ratios. Experience of this in the everyday life of rural inhabitants usually takes the form of irrigation canals, roads. buildings, embankments and tubewells in a state of inefficient disrepair. NREP planning through punchuyati ruj institutions overrides this bias by making planning more accessible to the everyday experience of rural inhabitants. This is reflected in their plans. Examination of the plan for 453 projects in 37 of 44 grum panchuyuts in four blocks in Midnapore district shows that 55% of all projects and 45% of allocated expenditures were for the maintenance and repair of existing assets. In addition, 6% of the projects and 6% of allocations were for improvement of assets (see Table 3). Despite the advantages, implementing the NREP through the pmchayuts creates substantial problems. Although public participation at the local level is supposed to improve coordination between the NREP and other programs. most authorities had difficulty conceptualizing ways of achieving this. Punchuyut officers did not see the connection between the programs. This attitude is reflected in a remark by Midnapore’s sahhudhipati (chair of the zillu purislzad). When asked about coordination between the NREP and the Integrated Rural Development Scheme (IRDP), he replied, “Ilow can there be‘? The NREP creates collective assets while the IRDP distributes loans to scattered individuals.” In addition to the lack of coordination between the NREP and other anti-poverty programs, the suhhudhip&i told me that there had been little coordination between the NREP and the work of the state government departments. The district planning officer stated that there had been no linkage between the NREP and the district plan.” Even Benoy Chowdhury, Minister for Rural Development, Land Reforms and Panchayats, admitted that there was a lack of coordination.‘i It was precisely this problem that the initiative for decentralized planning was intended to change. Early indications are that one of the main advantages of the new system has been its placing the NREP within the framework of a district plan (Ghosh. 1988. p. 659). G‘ram punchayuts tend to implement very small projects. This is in part a consequence of their proclivity to wait until funds are locally available before they plan their projects. Funds for the NREP usually arrive in small increments of approximately Rs. 15,000. The eagerness of each gram punchuyut member to secure projects for his or her constituency creates pressures to divide the funds further. If a gram punchuyat decides to take up a large project, it faces bureaucratic disincentives. It must secure governmental sanction for any project costing more than Rs. 5.000.

PUBLIC

Table

PARTICIPATION

3. Distribution of NREP

expendirures

AND

Roads Schools

and community

buildings

ALLEVIATION

Maintenance assets

45,582 (8.8)

520.226 (100)

60,165 (41.7)

75.255 (52.1)

8,900 (6.2)

134,320 ( 100)

5100 (6.9) -

46.446 (63.1)

22.008 (29.9)

Drinking

water

32.131 (26.X)

87,622 (73.2)

Scheduled caste development Total

and

scheduled

Tribe

73.5.54 (99.9) 119,753

( 100) 47.591 (100)

47.591 ( 100)

Forestry

Total

23X.441 (45.8)

and drainage tubewells

Improvement of existing

blocks”

236,203 (45.4)

Irrigation

and

1407

in 1984-85 for 37 grurn punchuyars in four Midnapore New projects

category

POVERTY

40,684 (63.1)

3350 (29.9)

-

119.753 (100)

463.220

426.676

59.582

949.478-i

Source: Annexure A forms collected from the block olfices of Jamboni, Binpur I Tamluk II and Dashpur II. Midnapore district, West Bengal. *These figures do not include all expenditures made by the grutn pmchqais as Anncxure A forms for all allotments were unavailable. tThis total excludes Rs. 44,865 in miscellaneous expenditures.

Gram greater

panchayats deciding to take up projects than this amount often divide them into

phases to circumvent this requirement (GOI. 1981, p. 11). As a result, the average cost of one project in the plans of the 36 gram panchayats that I examined was less than Rs. 2,000. This small sum points to the conclusion that the size of projects is suboptimal relative to the requisites of efficient rural development. The lack of technical expertise available to gram punchuyars also encourages them to take up small NREP projects. It has other unfortunate consequences. Grum panchuyut members usually lack the training to design NREP projects. The Government of West Bengal anticipated this by creating the position of job assistant for each grum panchuyat. The people assuming this position, despite government training programs, usually lack the expertise necessary to plan sophisticated projects. Subassistant engineers at the block office have the expertise, but they are often preoccupied with other responsibilities.‘” The result is that gram punchuyats tend to avoid technically complex projects, and they sometimes make mistakes in project construction.” Implementing the NREP through the panchayats has attenuated administrative accountability. Gram panchayae often do not maintain adequate records. A survey conducted by the Government of West Bengal found that at least

25% did not maintain proper records concerning public works programs (Government of West Bengal, c.1980, p. 36). Another study of yanchuyari ruj institutions in Midnapore found that official supervision of gram panchayat finances was inadequate because extension officers (panchayats) were overworked and unable to carry out necessary audits (Adak, 1983, p. 127). Delays in the collection of utilization certificates are another manifestation of the erosion of the pnnchuyats’ accountability. Upon spending NREP funds, gram panchayats are required to submit utilization certificates to the block development officer. He collects them for the entire block and sends them to the district. The same process occurs at the district and state levels until the utilization certificates are sent to the central government. States must certify utilization of 50% of their installments before the central government will provide another. Delays at different levels of the administrative hierarchy can accumulate and prevent the state from acquiring the funds authorized to it by the central government. Such delays have contributed to West Bengal’s relatively low rate of NREP fund utilization. As Table 4 reveals, West Bengal’s rate of utilizing available NREP resources has been among the lowest for all Indian states with a population greater than five million. Its 74.2% average rate of utilization

Aveixge

10x1-x2

19X2-X3 19X3-84 198546

1986X7

IYXFXX IYXX-XYXI-X? to XX-X0

Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar CTujarat

72.0 50.1 52.1 3Y.X

73.3 63.6 70.2 76.1

70. I 47.4 65.1 Yh.0

101.2 67.3 Y7.3 73.9

Y1.h 102.6 83.7 X5.4

77.1 67.2 106.2 112.6

10x.0

X3.0

67.3 106.0 x5.2

6h.S x2.9 x1.3

Haryana Jammu and Kashmir Karnataka

7‘l.Y x3.1 57.1 Y6.7

72.X 65.7 73.2 72.2

77.2 x0.3 75.1 76.7

102.0 67.5 YO.5 x1.7

Y7.6 X7.4 65.1 1Oh.O

xx.‘) 100.8 00.x 74.6

103.5 Y3.1 117.x I IY.0

XX.3 X3.0

100.0 100.0 61.1 100.0

Y3.0 52.7 4X.4 Y4.0

X4.Y 60.8 16.6 9X.3

71.6 100.3 106.X IOO.0

101.3 104.‘) 103.5 100.0

Y-1.2 Y4.X Y3.1 x1.7

112.X 7X.X 127.X Y4.Y

Y4.0 X4.6

74.3 71.6 67.X 42.X

72.2 84.‘) 73.3 62.X

71.6 YO.3 7x.1 66.1

83.6 xx.7 YX.6 72.3

103.6 Il2.0 X5.3 114.0

I I I.2 213.9 73.3 x7.0

Y2.1 130.5 173.Y 74.J

X0.‘)

71.5

71.x

73.0

x7.7

96.5

Y0.i

102.3

X1.Y

provided

by GO1

Kcreia Madhya Pradesh Maharxhtra Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Tamil Nadu

Uttar Pradesh West

Bengal

Average

for states

81.4 x0 h

x3.‘) OS.6

Y4.7 X5.0 71.2

~IbOVC

Sources:

XIII-XVI. *Data for

Computations IYXGXS

from

data

II-IV;

C;Ol ( IYSY). Anncxure\

are not available.

the 1980s is the second lowest of all states. Government officials provided four reasons for the delays. First, an extension officer @anckuyats) told me that some gvarn pccnchuyyars have trouble keeping records according to government guidelines.” Second, responsibility for NREP projects is often divided up among different members of the grcrrn pancha_vn~. This causes logistical complications because information must be collected from different members.” Also the larger the number of members involved in project supervision, the greater the likelihood that irresponsible members will gain authority. A third reason is that delays in submitting utilization certificates are increased because grurn punchuyut.s create a lot of paperwork by taking up so many small projects.“’ Finally, some say that the delays are caused because the grurrz yunchnyuts are understaffed. Pradhans fulfill their responsibilities on a part-time basih only. And despite the fact that gram punchuyuts maintain two full-time employees, I was told, “If a grrm punchayut office was a government office spending the equivalent money, it would have at least five staff to fulfill its responsibilities.“” Given the scope of poverty in West Bengal, the inability of the pc~z~huy~r.r to absorb more NREP during

(IYX?id), Anncxurca

funding is a blemish on their poverty alleviation record. The annual average of employment generated in West Bengal during the period from 1985-86 to 1988-3-89was 16.6 million person-days. This means that each year, some 664,0(10 people 17% of the state’s agricultural laborers received 25 extra days of employment through the NREP.“’ According to Kakwani and Subbarao’s (lYY0, p. A-12) study of India’s 14 largest states. West Bengal had by far the greatest disparity between its share of NREP employment and its share of the “ultrapoor” - i.e. those whose incomes are at most 80% of the poverty line. It generated only 3.1% of NREP employment while it included 12.7% of the ultrapoor. Mv fieldwork uncovered another troublesome gap *in the mechanisms of accountability. The government lacks the means to verify whether expenditures made on paper have materialized in the field. Overreporting of physical achievement has been an important form of corruption in other public works programs. Projects either do not meet specifications, or at times. they do not exixt at all. The absence of mechanisms to monitor the construction of NREP projects encourages corruption. In sum. this investigation of the greater re-

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

AND

sponsiveness hypothesis has shown that the consequences of implementing the NREP through panchuya~~ are a mixed bag. Devolving administrative responsibilities onto the democractically elected panchayat members has promoted a cooperative relationship between bureaucrats and politicians. By decentralizing authority over implementation, it has made decision making more accessible to the public at large. There is considerably greater public involvement in NREP planning and implementation than in other programs although the difference is difficult to measure. In addition, the delegation of authority over developmental expenditures to the punchuyuts has encouraged a parallel decentralization of the activities of political parties and related organizations. As a result of these changes. NREP projects appear to better conform with local needs. The consequences of public participation also have a down side. The development of cooperative relations between local politicians and bureaucrats can degenerate into collusion that insulates these authorities from popular accountability. Grum punchuyuts plan projects that are too small. They lack the technical expertise to implement sophisticated projects. Their ability to absorb available funds was disappointing. Many grum panchuyuts failed to keep adequate records. This was especially troublesome given the absence of systematic bureaucratic checks on their performance. The performance of the punchuyuts, however, was better than what one might expect given the paucity of bureaucratic controls. This is because of the constraints placed upon them by the process of interest representation. In order to better understand these constraints we must explore the elite domination and political patronage hypotheses.

4. THE ELITE DOMINATION HYPOTHESIS Many argue that increasing the opportunities for public participation reinforces the power of social elites rather than undermines it. Establishing formal political equality does not eliminate other bases of social power. For instance, unless political equality is accompanied by measures to establish a more egalitarian economic order, control over economic resources will remain an important means of social domination. While agricultural laborers may have the same constitutional rights as large landowners. they frequently remain dependent upon them for employment and loans. In addition, elite control over important economic resources often makes

POVERTY

ALLEVIATION

1409

securing their cooperation a priority for government officials responsible for promoting economic development. Elites can translate their power and prestige into privileged access to government officials. In contrast, the social distance between government officials and the poor is often great, and the poor frequently depend on social elites to function as intermediaries in their dealings with the government. In a dialectical fashion, social elites employ their various sources of social power to gain control over the political space opened by opportunities for public participation. They then use their political power to reinforce their other modes of social domination. In West Bengal, as in most of agrarian societies, the most important economic resource is land; however, the impact of agrarian structure on rural politics is more complex than most observers presume. Given the scarcity of land relative to the state’s population and the dependence of 44% of the rural work force on agricultural labor for their livelihoods, it seems plausible that control over land might serve as a basis for substantial political power. Some of the most astute observers of Bengali politics have taken this position. For instance, writing in the 1960s, Franda (1968. p. 268) observed, The existing man/land ratio and the short supply of land in relationship to demand reinforce an economy of high rents and a high rate of tenancy, and encourage attitudes of acquiescence on the part of landless and tenant farmers. This accounts for the fact that conflicts bctwecn landholders and peasant cultivators have not devcloped to any significant degree in the countryside. [and] for the failure of the Communist Party to promote a “class struggle”

in the rural areas. Rural politics in West Bengal in the lY50s and 1960s was dominated by “key men” whose political power was largely derived from the control over land and the consequent dependence of those lacking land and viable independent livelihoods (Franda, 1968; Ghosh. 1981, pp. 17-18; Bhattacharya, 1077, pp. 295-296). Yet it would be myopic to argue that this is the exclusive outcome of such an agrarian structure. The large numbers of smallholders and agricultural laborers constitute a potential constituency for a politics that empowers the poor rather than reinforces their dependence. Advocates for the rural poor have long searched for the means to bring about such a transition. The transformation of rural politics in West Bengal from one dominated by local economic elites and the Congress Party to one dominated by the CPI(M) provides some clues as to how such a transition might be achieved.

1410

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The CPl(M)‘s rejuvenation of the state’s pornchuyurs played an important role in curbing the elites’ political domination. India’s punchayats, however, reinforce elite domination more often than undermining it. The early experience of panchuyuts in West Bengal is typical. One study found, In West Bengal, about two-thirds of anchal (village) pradhans were either jotedars (big landowners) or businessmen; only in a small number of cases, a teacher or a service holder was iound to have been elected a Pradhan. In the rural economy. the moneylcnding activities of a jotcdar and/or businessman. when coupled with powcrs of a Pradhan, usually helped him to cxercisc effective leadership and play a domineering role in the locality (Mukhopadhyay. 1080, p. 75).

How did the CPl(M) end the rural elites’ control over the punchuyuts‘? After coming to power in 1977, it enacted several institutional reforms have made the punchayuts more autonomous. First, political parties have been allowed to play an active role in punchuyar elections. Prior to 1978, parties were proscribed from participating in elections. All too frequently, these nonpartisan elections were perfunctory. and local elites actually selected punchayut members prior to the elections (Davis, 1983, p. 184). Inclusion of parties has promoted public interest and more competitive elections. It increased competition for control over the punchuyuts as manifested by the large number of candidates that campaigned for office in the elections. In 1983, 134,583 candidates contested for 45,237 gmn panchayut seats; 25,058 candidates competed for 8,660punchuyut sumiti seats; and 2,160 candidates campaigned for 678 seats in West Bengal’s 15 zillu parishads (Ganguly, 1985a. p. 9). Another indication of the competitiveness is the violence that accompanies the elections.‘” An important cause of this competition is that control over panchayuts means control over development funds, patronage and strategic positions that enhance chances for success in elections for the state assembly and the national Lok Sabha (Banerjie, 1983, p. 9; Sengupta, 1983, p. 4). Since 1978, the Government of West Bengal has allocated enough funding to punchayuts to make them sites of power. It was estimated that for 1983-84, Rs. four billion were given to the panchuyut system with between Rs. 500,000 and Rs. 800,000 going to each gram punchuyut (Ganguly, 1983, p. 9). The revival of panchayats in West Bengal began with the 1978 elections - the first in 15 years. The partisan electoral contests provided the CPl(M) with an opportunity to dislodge the Congress (I) and its large landowning allies from

their domination of the rural sector. A good indication of the change brought about can be gathered by the social backgrounds of the pradhnns who chair the grurn punchuyuts and exercise predominant control over programs like the NREP (see Table 5). In contrast to earlier gram punchuyuts, my survey in Midnapore district found that most of the prudhans were not members of the traditional elite. Sixty-five percent (23 of 35 respondents) were white-collar employees. Fifty-seven percent (20 of 35) were school teachers. The overrepresentation of school teachers is apparently characteristic of the district and the entire state. Midnapore’s district punchuyut officer conducted a survey of the district’s pradhans and found that 42% (217 of 51S)pradhnn.r were school teachers (Kohli. 19X3, p. 792). According to a survey of 100 grrrm panchuyuts throughout the state, 29% of all prudhuns were teachers (Government of West Bengal, c. 1980, p. 2Y). The pradhans in my survey were remarkably young. Ilalf were younger than 40. Their mean age was 39.1 years of age. Most came from the middle castes. The largest share belongs to the Mahishya’s a cultivating group that is the largest caste in Midnapore. The backgrounds of the fathers of the pradhuns was relatively modest. Eighty-three percent (29 of 36) were cultivators. Information concerning the amount of land their father owned was collected from 17prudhun.s. Sixty-five percent (11 of 17) owned less than one hectare. The median amount of land owned was 2.6 acres. Most of the pradhuns had availed themselves of education to achieve occupational mobility. Their mean level of education was 12.4 years with 47.6% (17 of 36) having obtained at least a bachelor of arts (14 years of education). In short, the social backgrounds of prudhuns differed from that of the traditional rural elite. Most of the prudhuns were members of a new rural middle class.*” CPl(M) party documents (Communist Party of India (Marxist), 1986, p. 159) stress the importance of building an alliance with “middle peasants” since “they are an effective weapon in building up public opinion.” The CPl(M)‘s efforts to extend its organization into the countryside has created opportunities for this emerging class. For instance, the Left Front Government has expanded West Bengal’s educational system. According to Kanti Biswas, the Left Front’s Minister of Education, it has opened 12,000 schools and appointed 46,000 new teachers since 1977 (Basu, 1989, p. 220). The new teachers are CPI(M) party members or sympathizers. Indeed, one the CPI(M)‘s tactics for expanding rural base has been to recruit rural youth who attended institutions of higher educa-

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

Table Occupations Pradhans

Occupations Fathers

of all

Cultivators Businessmen Teachers Social Workers Service Tenant Farmers Unemployed Not available Total

8 1 20 2 1

1 f 36

Cultivators Businessmen Teachers Doctor Service Agricultural Total

POVERTY

5. Social backgrounds

Pradhans’

laborer

AND

36

Superior castes Brahmin Middle castes Jaishal banik Mahato Sadgop Mahishya Goala Karmakar Khatriya Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Minorities Rajbanshi Bhogta Santa1 Muslim Not available Total

in rural areas before their return to their rural homes - often as school teachers (Kohli, 1987, p. 10.5; Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen, 1988, p. P2). There is strong evidence that the CPI(M) is using the position of school teacher as a patronage sinecure for party workers.2s The sympathies and affiliations of many teachers with the CPI(M) coupled with the large numbers of teachers elected as pradhans26 supports the hypothesis that the CPI(M) has accommodated the new middle class and institutionalized its in the panchayats (see also Banpower dyopadhyay and Von Eschen, 1988, pp. PlO, P22). The political ascendance of this group has parallels throughout rural India. Social and political change has increased the power and assertiveness of a middle social stratum usually identified as the “backward classes.” The political systems of different Indian states have incorporated them in different fashions (Frankel and Rao, 1989, 1990). In West Bengal, the collective political power of this group has been relatively weak. This in large measure because West Bengal’s middle castes are much more fragmented than the middle castes of other states (Kohli, 1990; Attwood and Baviskar, 1991, pp. 6-7). No middle caste is able to assert political power on a statewide level. There is no dominant middle caste group comparable to the Marathas in Maharashtra, the Jats in Haryana, the Reddy’s in Andhra Pradesh etc. The consequence has tion

of pradhans Years education attained by Pradhans

Age of all Pradhans

Years

No. of Pradhans

7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 1.5 16 17

1 1 1 10 6 0 0 6 8 0 3

< 30 3&39 4@49 5&59 60 >

2 16 15 3 0

Total

36

Mean

39.1

1

Total

36

4 I 2

Mean

12.4 years

Castes of all Pradhans 29 1 1 1 2 2

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ALLEVIATION

4 1 2 2 1s 1 1 1

36

been a lower salience of caste-based politics, and the middle castes’ greater dependence on the CPI(M) to organize their political power. Why did the CPI(M), a party which claims to be dedicated to improving the plight of the poor, come to depend on the rural middle strata to manage the panchayats? The middle classes possessed social status and influence which facilitated their role as an alternative political elite. Their social status enhances their ability to garner support from middle social strata as well as from the bottom echelons of West Bengal’s social hierarchy. It also allows them to relate more comfortably with government officials whose caste and social status is usually comparable if not higher. There is even a more pragmatic reason. Implementing a program such as the NREP requires a minimum level of educational training. The middle strata are better educated than the poor. Ninety-eight percent of West Bengal’s agricultural laborers have no more than a primary school education and 80% are illiterate (GOI, 1987, p. 367). In sum, the CPI(M) appears to have dislodged large landowners and social elites from control over the panchayats. This contradicts the elite domination hypothesis. The CPI(M) implemented a series of institutional reforms to bring about this change. It made the panchayats into an important loci for promoting economic development by providing them with control over substantial development funds. It simultaneously

1412

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increased

competition for control over the panby introducing partisan elections. These changes, however, do not necessarily make the panchuyats more responsive to the rural poor. The CPI(M) and its middle strata allies have interests of their own. In order to understand the role that these play, we must explore the political patronage hypothesis. chuyats

5. THE POLITICAL PATRONAGE HYPOTHESIS Public participation usually involves a process of interest representation that is mediated by political organizations such as parties, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), etc. The interests of these organizations do not necessarily coincide with those of the public. Political parties, for instance, may be more concerned with enhancing their campaign funds and building electoral support than with advancing the interests of the poor. The leaders of parties and NGOs alike can become more interested in advancing their careers and increasing their personal incomes than representing the public interest. Proponents of the political patronage hypothesis contend that enhancing the role of public participation usually increases the opportunities for various forms of political patronage. These lead to corruption of the implementation process and ineffective public policy. Political parties exert considerable influence over how the NREP is implemented. This is especially true of the CPI(M). The party’s organization parallels that of the punchayuts. For every gram punchuyut, there are branch committees. Punchuyut sumitis (block councils) and local committees function at the block level. Zillc purishuds and district committees operate at the district level. Though the specific nature of relations between party and NREP implementation varies with the people involved, I have gathered sufficient information to provide a general overview. The CPI(M) provides guidance to the planning and implementation of the NREP. When the availability of NREP funds is announced, local committees convene meetings that include CPI(M) prudhuns and members of the party’s branch committees. Everyone is instructed to hold meetings with villagers to discuss local needs. The local committee secretary convenes another meeting to discuss the information gathered and set priorities. The pradhuns and other party members then present the decisions reached at the meetings for approval by their respective gram punchayuts.” Party officials fre-

quently visit NREP projects to investigate their progress. They are sometimes called upon to help resolve disputes among workers or with local residents. Eighty one percent (65 of 80) of the prudhuns and secretaries surveyed in Midnapore district said that those responsible for supervising implementation included either party members or panchuyut members, most of whom have a party affiliation. One party official informed me that the CPI(M) local committee in his block even performs an internal audit of the grum panchuyats.”

The CPI(M) serves as an important means of curtailing corruption. In the five blocks studied, 10 CPI(M) prudhans were compelled to leave office on charges of corruption during 1978-85. Six of the 10 were forced to do so because the party had expelled them. I was also told that the district committee of the CPI(M) has expelled five of the party’s zillu purishud members for corruption during 1978-85.“” Kohli (19X7, pp. 95-143) has argued that the contribution of the various political parties to the effectiveness of NREP implementation was to a considerable extent a function of its organization and internal discipline. There is much evidence to support this position. Nevertheless, this study leads to a less sanguine conclusion concerning the virtues of the CPI(M). The CPI(M) has grown considerably since it came to power in West Bengal. Party membership stood at 33,720 in February 1978. By the end of lY85, its membership had increased to 136.980 (Communist Party of India (Marxist), 1982, p. 169; 1986. p. 158). Party organization has been extended into new areas. With the Left Front coming into power the responsibility of the party has been extended to include overseeing both the state government and party affairs. The resuscitation of the punchayuts has been especially demanding. In 1978, the CPI(M) took it upon itself to come up with 47,000 reliable candidates at a time when its party membership was just over 30,000. Between elections, it must oversee the work of 3,305 gram punchuycrts. The tremendous growth of the CPI(M)‘s membership and responsibilities has strained the capacity of the party’s organization. New members frequently lack adequate political training. They often strive to advance their personal ambition instead of the public welfare or even party interests. The influx of opportunists into the party and the rapid extension of its organization has caused gaps in the party’s network of control and communication. CPI(M) members heading the punchuyats are not always controlled by party discipline. Many party members in branch and local committees lack dedication and

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

AND

lose sight of public needs.“” Furthermore. those who control popular support can often secure CPI(M) backing even if they have been tainted by corruption (Ganguly, 1985b, p. 1). Since the CPI(M) has gained control over the state government, party membership has become a valuable commodity, and branch and local committee secretaries have become susceptible to bribes for facilitating entrance into the party from those who are denied membership on other grounds (Sarkar, 1985b, p. 7; Sarkar, 1985c, p. 6; Ghosh. 1985, p. 7). Finally, gaps in the party’s communication network make it difficult for cadres at the district and state levels to keep in touch with public sentiment and monitor the activity of party members.” As a result, senior officials become less effective in assessing public sentiment and maintaining party discipline. Even if the ranks of the panchuyats were filled with ideologically committed cadre, the disparity between the limited economic opportunities offered by the NREP and the vast employment and infrastructural needs of rural West Bengal would make the temptation to favor supporters virtually irresistible. I came across charges that employment was given to supporters of the party in power while others were excluded.“2 Project sites were selected to benefit party sup orters while the land of others went neglected:- ,r: Party workers agitated for payment of wages higher than those sanctioned by official wage rates.‘” They attempted to secure payment of mate (wages for supervision of pr$ects) even though such work was superfluous.-Allegations were made that pro ram funds were siphoned off into party coffers.- g, In short, the NREP presents parties with the opportunity to secure resources to strengthen their organization and build support. There is a general consensus that all parties avail themselves of the opportunities for patronage to some extent, though the degree to which implementation is distorted is difficult to measure. While public participation provides opportunities for corruption, the democratic process creates mechanisms to constrain its scope. Voters in Midnapore used electoral sanctions against panchayat members with a reputation for corruption to a remarkable extent. In Moyna block, the CPI(M) has dominated local politics ever since 1977. It won the punchayat elections in 1978. It defeated the Congress (I) in the 1982 legislative assembly elections for the Moyna constituency by 10.000 votes. It stemmed the tide in favor of Rajiv Gandhi by winning 2,000 votes more than the Congress (I) Lok Sabha elections in 1984. Yet it lost the punchuyut elections in 1983 when the Congress (I) won control over seven of the

POVERTY

ALLEVIATION

1413

block’s eleven gram punchayuts. What is the cause of this anomaly? The most persuasive explanation is that three CPI(M) pradhuns became mired in charges of corruption. This created a popular backlash against the party at the local level and caused its defeat.” A similar situation occurred in Binpur I. The CPI(M) had won control over all 10 of the gram punchuyats in the block in the 1978 elections. Corruption became an issue in the 1983 campaign. Binpur I is divided by the Kasai River. Four gram punchayuts are located east of the Kasai and six to the west. The CPI(M) was criticized for channeling funds and benefits to the four eastern gram punchuyuts and neglecting the six in the west. This tendency was encouraged by the fact that there are two CPI(M) local committees for the block - one for the east and one for the west. The sabhupati (chair) of the block’s panchuyat samiti was also secretary of the local committee for the east. By channeling disproportionate benefits to his home base, he alienated the six gram panchuyut constituencies to the west. In the 1983 elections, the opposition defeated the CPI(M) in all six, while the CPI(M) retained control over three of the four gram punchuyuts in the east.jx Corruption was a less potent issue against the CPI(M) in Jamboni block even though it was more pervasive among CPI(M) pradhans. In the 1978 elections, the party won seven of 10 gram punchayats. Four of its seven pradhans and the upa-sabhuputi (vice chairman) of the punchuyat sumiti were implicated in corruption. The CPI(M) voted to remove them from office and expel them from the party. This caused the party to lose control over two gram punchayuts. The CPI(M)‘s discipline paid off. It won control over all 10 of Jamboni’s gram punchayuts in the 1983 elections.3y In conclusion, shifting authority over NREP implementation to panchayats has greatly increased the power of political parties, especially the CPI(M), which controls a vast majority of panchuyut seats and maintains a parallel organization that closely monitors and frequently intervenes in implementation. The importance of political parties in NREP implementation means that conflict between implementation objectives and party interests has the potential for serious distortion of implementation. The rapid expansion of the CPI(M) since 1977 has meant that its membership has experienced an influx of individuals who may be more attracted to the power and opportunities that accompany party membership rather than the ideological commitments professed by the party. Even if internal party discipline were to succeed in cleansing pun-

1414

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DEVELOPMENT

chuyats of individual corruption, the parties maintain institutional interests that may distort implementation. The role of electoral sanctions in limiting patronage and corruption has been remarkable. Its efficacy, however, is contingent upon the availability of political alternatives to the party in power. Our examination of the political patronage hypothesis shows that while public participation creates considerable opportunities for patronage and corruption, it also presents mechanisms to curb these problems. Political competition is essential to the effective operation of these mechanisms.

6. CONCLUDING

REMARKS

This evaluation of the three hypotheses has produced mixed findings. The examination of the greater responsiveness hypothesis shows that expanding the role of public participation through the panchuyats has resulted in the devolution of implementation authority to those better acquainted with local needs. It has also made decision makers more accessible to the public. The enhanced role of public participation has facilitated the planning of projects more appropriate to local circumstances. At the same time, however, the usefulness of the projects has been limited by their small size and the shortage of technical expertise available to panchayat authorities. Punchuyut officials have also contributed to West Bengal’s low utilization rate of NREP funds. Although implementing the NREP through panchayats has reduced accountability through bureaucratic channels, it has heightened accountability through electoral sanctions. The net outcome of this change in modes of accountability is difficult to measure. In fact, it is likely to depend on the process of interest representation that characterizes local politics. This study does not provide much evidence to support the elite domination hypothesis. Our findings differ with those who find the CPI(M) regime to be a captive of “its landlord base” and the “dominant elite” (Mallick, 1990, p. 157; 1991). They also diverge from those who stress the CPI(M)‘s dedication to uplifting the plight of the rural poor (Kohli, 1987; Nossiter, 1988, pp. 137-143). By allocating substantial resources to the punchuyars and subjecting them to partisan elections, the CPI(M) has made success in democratic competition decisive for controlling NREP implementation. In its effort to build its rural support and dislodge the Congress (I) and its elite supporters, the CPI(M) has established a

base of support among the emerging rural middle classes. In spite of the party’s ideological commitments, the rural poor are for the most part junior partners in the CPI(M)‘s coalition. Rather than giving direction to the CPI(M), the rural poor become dependent upon its largesse in the form of the patronage that is made available through programs like the NREP. It is important to keep in mind the distinctiveness of the setting in West Bengal. Few parties can claim the dedicated leadership and ideological commitment to the poor possessed by the CPI(M). Few parties show as much concern for maintaining party discipline as the CPI(M), even with its recent problems. The party’s relative success in dislodging traditional landed elites is unlikely to be replicated in less favorable circumstances. And even the CPI(M) was obliged to align with the emerging middle classes as well as the poor in order to maintain political power. Social structure leaves its imprint on public participation even though altering the opportunity structure for participation can change the parameters under which social groups represent their interests. The extent to which public participation distorts policy implementation by providing political organizations with opportunities to follow their own interests is the subject of the political patronage hypothesis. Our study has shown that elevating the role of the punchayuts has given political parties, especially the CPI(M), a prominent role in guiding development. They provide local authorities with information about local circumstances. They also monitor the performance of panchayat members and weed out those engaged in corruption. The important role played by the parties in NREP implementation means that their potential for distorting it is considerable. Even the ideologically committed CPI(M) is guilty of patronage and corruption. In the short term, this limits the impact of the program and may discredit it. Over the longer term, use of programs such as the NREP for patronage creates political dependence which limits the public’s capacity for independent collective action (Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen, 1988, pp. P32, S3-S4, SS). Implementing poverty alleviation programs through public participation has both positive and negative consequences. Altering state institutions to make opportunities for public participation improved the efficacy of implementation by transferring authority to those with more knowledge about local problems and encouraging the poor to participation in implementation decisions. True, problems have arisen due to lack of technical expertise and inattentive record

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

AND POVERTY

keeping, but these do not seem insuperable if the proper administrative resources and training are made available. More intractable problems arise as a consequence of the process of interest representation. These problems are summarized by the paradox of participation. Using public participation to make policy responsive to the needs of the poor requires a process of interest representation that represents their interests, but as long as the poor remain poor, they are disadvantaged in securing equitable representation. How can the paradox be resolved? Kohli’s (1987) stress on party discipline provides one alternative. The findings of this study suggest, however, that he overestimates the CPI(M)‘s discipline and understates the need for democratic competition. The point here is not that the CPI(M)‘s commitment and organizational discipline were unimportant in the effectiveness of its poverty alleviation efforts. They were. Nor is it that Kohli completely ignores the impact of democratic politics on the CPI(M). In fact, he perceptively observes that it caused some dissipation of power among the various wings of the CPI(M)‘s leadership and reduced likelihood for authoritarian commandism (Kohli, 1987, p. 95). Instead, the argument here is that democratic competition is essential to maintaining party commitment and discipline over the long run. The declining competitiveness of politics in West Bengal suggests that there may be a reduction in responsiveness to the rural poor. The Congress (I) Party is in an unprecedented state of disarray. Its disorganization enabled 4,939 Left Front candidates to run unopposed in the 1988 panchuyar elections (The Telegraph. 1988). The decline of the Congress (I) is even more clearly manifested in the deterioration of its electoral performance. The share of seats in the 1988 panchuyat elections won by the Congress (I) declined from 33% in 1983 to just 23% in 1988. The performance of the Congress in the West Bengal Assembly elections has also been disappointing (see Table 2). At the same time, the CPI(M) has steadily increased its dominance visri-vis its partners within the Left Front and the Congress (I). It now holds 66% of all elected panchuyut positions (up from 55% in 1983) and 64% of all members of the state legislative assembly. Analogy with communist societies is tempting. In both China and the Soviet Union, the membership of the communist party, in many cases, was initially inspired by an ideological commitment to alleviate poverty and promote economic development. In each case, however, in the absence of democratic competition, there was no

ALLEVIATION

1415

means of checking the influence of the party’s institutional interests. Moreover, since the party monopolized the avenues of social mobility, it increasingly attracted careerists with less commitment to social equity and greater vulnerability to corruption. Comparison with single party dominant democratic systems is more appropriate. The CPI(M), like other parties that have dominated democratic systems, has embarked on a “virtuous cycle” where it uses its electoral victories to refashion public policy, political institutions and political symbols to strengthen its political support (Pempel, 1990, p. 16). The dominance the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) in Mexico is a possible analogue. The era of Mexico’s most progressive reform came at a time when Lazaro Cardenas built an alliance with peasants and workers in order to break with the conservative Callista faction that has previously dominated the ruling party (Hamilton, 1982, pp. 104-141; Cornelius, 1973). The history of the PRI from the Cardenas era to the 1980s is characterized by the decline of the party’s social responsiveness and the spread of corruption. The PRI’s monopoly over political power, the absence of an autonomous civil service, and the party’s growing control of economic resources through the expansion of the public sector all contributed to these outcomes. In fact, the linkages between the party’s organization and the bureaucracy have become such a barrier to effective implementation that President Carlos Salinas has placed the Programa National de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) his main program for funding housing, electricity, and other types of infrastructure - directly under the control of the President’s office in order to insulate it from political pressures while maximizing his personal control (Valdez, 1990). On the other hand, greater degrees of political competition in one party dominant systems such as Sweden and Japan is an important factor in limiting the spread of corruption and encouraging responsiveness to social needs.“’ Political competition can assume many modes. Huntington (1968, pp. 397-432) has observed that as their number increases, political parties tend to compete by fashioning and refashioning alliances with one another rather than by expanding their constituencies to include those previously excluded from power. Pressures to outflank the opposition by mobilizing new groups, according to Huntington, is stronger in a two-party system. Furthermore, he argues that competition in a two-party system strengthens their internal organization. Enhancing popular responsiveness, also requires that members of the public be given

1416

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the opportunity to formulate and signify their own preferences (Dahl, lY71. pp. l-2). This is best achieved if competition takes place between programmatic parties competing for support by offering the public a coherent set of policies. Competition can also, of course, take place within political parties. Some measure of intraparty competition may help to stymie the Michelsian “iron law of oligarchy” and maintain the party’s popular responsiveness. For instance, intraparty competition within the “congress system” helped to maintain the Congress Party’s responsiveness, if not to the poor, at least to different factions of social elites (Kothari, 1964; Morris-Jones, 1978). Yet, as the decline of the Congress Party in West Bengal illustrates, excessive competition based upon the personal factions can undermine a party’s efficacy (Kohli, 1YYOb). Geddes’s (1991) game theoretical model of administrative reform offers a good starting point for understanding which forms of partisan competition are likely to enhance the representation of the poor. According to this model, reform is most likely to occur when there is a limited number (usually two) of evenly matched parties, and where party leaders exercise close control over the selection of party candidates. Evenly matched parties in search of electoral advantage have greater incentive to reform than dominant parties. As the party system becomes more fragmented, partisan concerns are diverted from appeals to new constituencies to the construction and maintenance of coalitions. Open access to partisan candidacies reduces the incentives for reform since it gives incumbent legislators greater incentives to bolster their position by maintaining their access to patronage. Legislators will be more willing to sacrifice their patronage prerogatives when their career prospects are dependent on party leaders. This observation parallels Kohli’s (1987) advocacy of disciplined parties as an important means for poverty alleviation. The parallel however, seems stronger when legislators have little control over policy and therefore compete primarily in terms of patronage. Our study suggests that decentralizing authority over policy to local officials may elevate its importance in local political competition.

Partisan competition ensure responsiveness

may be insufficient to the poor. Efforts

garner assume

often

maj,ority support mtddle-of-the-road

motivate positions

parties

to to to

on policy issues. Parties assume cautious postures in order to avoid offending powerful groups. Their aggregation of interests impedes them from responding to all social groups. As we have seen, decentralizing state authority can encourage parties to be more responsive to local needs. Still. partisan interests create tensions between the requisites for local responsiveness and the requirements of political success at the provincial and national levels. When parties suppress conflict within their ranks, they reduce their receptiveness to societal pressures. Instead of responding to popular interests. party leaderships may represent them in ways that advance their personal and partisan interests. By establishing patronage networks, parties often create dependence rather than the capacity for independent collective action. NGOs and social movements are often viewed as alternatives to political parties (Kothari. 1988, pp. X7-54; Melucci, 19X8, pp. 165-179). Free of the requisites of majoritarian politics and partisan interests, they create political spaces that empower individuals and communities to define their interests and articulate their politics in ways that are more reflective of local needs. Yet the strengths of NGOs and social movements can also be their weakness. Their local focus and political independence may result in broader political insignificance (Annis, 1987, p. 129). Political parties, NGOs and social movements stand in a complementary if often antagonistic relationship (Keane, 1988, pp. 101-151). While parties are indispensable for aggregating diverse social interests in electoral systems, NGOs and social movements can play an important role in enabling the poor to articulate and act upon their interests. They can empower the poor to curb political parties’ tendency to allow partisan interests to reduce their popular responsiveness. Promoting political competition among programmatic political parties and a vibrant NGO and social movement sector may be the best way to surmount the paradox of participation.

NOTES 1. Early advocates of the educational impact of public participation include Mill (1958). and Laski (1960). Freire (1973, 1970) has dealt at length with the transformative impact of participation in development. See also Pateman 1970) and Barber (1984). Goulet (1989) wisely stresses the tensions that arise when the

transformative impact of participation is taken as an end in itself rather than a means for effective policy. The hypothesis has been supported by an array of experts on development in the developing world (Montgomery. 198X; Esman and Uphoff. 1984; Gran, 1083; Korten, 1981; Uphoff and Esman, 1974). It has

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

AND

been an explicit justification for the establishment of panchayaf institutions in India (Government of India, 19X%, p. 51; 1978a. p. 8; 1955. Vol. I, Section 2. p, 23). For a study of panchayati raj institutions in West Bengal that finds strong support for the hypothesis. see Shiviah, Srivastava and Jena (19X0). especially pp. l-6. 2. The hypothesis has a long history in American political analysis (Lowi, 1969; McConnell, 1966; Selznick, lY4Y). One of the better known applications of this hypothesis in analyzing India’s political economy during the postindependence period is Frankel (197X). For analyses of panchayats based on this argument see Hiraway (19X6); and Mathews (1085). A sophisticated version of the argument has been applied to an analysis of the Community Development Program in Birbhum district of West Bengal in Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen (1981). 3. This hypothesis originated in Michels’ (1062) assertion that party organizations develop institutional interests that shape their pursuit of their stated objectives. For an updated treatment see Panebianco (1988, especially pp. 49-68). It has been developed in the literature on political machines in the United States. A number of scholars have applied the machine model in their analysis of the Congress Party in India (Scott. 1972, pp. 132-143; Weiner. 1967; and Brass, 1965). 4. Much of the analysis of this article is based upon intensive fieldwork in five blocks in Midnapore district during the spring of 19X5. Midhaporc is an overwhelmingly rural district with Y2% of its population residing in rural areas. Its implementation of the NREP ranked slightly above the average for West Bengal as a whole on two basic indicators. The blocks were selected in order to account for different levels of agricultural development and the dominance of different parties. For a more detailed discussion of the methodology of this study see Echcverri-Gent (forthcoming). chapter 5. 3Interview with Dileep Bhattacharya, Secretary Panchayat Department, Government of West Bengal, Calcutta, March 3, 1985.

6. Interview with S. K. Guha, Midnapore, February 22. lYX5.

District

Magistrate.

7. Interview with S. Bhowmick, District Officer, Midnapore, February 29, 19X5.

Panchayat

X. Interview with R. S. Bandhopadhyay, Director. Department of Panchayats, Calcutta, February 8, 1985. Y. Interview 22, 19X5.

with S. K. Guha,

Midnapore.

10. Interview with R. S. Bandhopadhyay, February 8, 19X5. 11.

For instance,

the state government

February

Calcutta.

has used the

POVERTY

ALLEVIATION

1417

panchayafs to collect unpaid irrigation taxes (The Sraresman (Calcutta) February 2. 1985, p. 9). It has also called upon panchayuts to help detect power theft in rural areas (The Telegraph (Calcutta) March 5, 1985. p. 3). 12. Interview with Paritosh Maiti, Secretary of the Krishak Samiti and member of the CPI(M) local committee. Tamluk II, Mecheda, April 1. 1985. 13. This point was made to me during an interview with P. C. Banerji. Secretary Department of Planning and Development. Government of West Bengal, Calcutta, June 16. 19X4. See also interview with Keshab Chakraborti. Chief Demographer. Town and Planning Department, Government of West Bengal, Calcutta. June 21, 19X4. and interview with S. Sarkar, District Planning Officer. Midnaporc, February 22, 1985. 14. Interview with S. Sarkar, District ficer. Midnapore. February 22, 1985. 15. Interview with April 11, 1985.

Benoy

Chowdhury,

Planning

Of-

Calcutta.

16. Additional subassistant engineers were to be provided at the block level, but their deployment has been delayed by the resistance of departmental interests in the capitol (Ghosh. 1988, p. 662). 17. Westergaard (1986, p. 41) also notes this problem in her study of gram panchayuts. 18. Interview Moyna, March

with extension 27, 1985.

officer

(panchuyurs).

19. Interviews with block development officer Jamboni; interview with block development officer Binpur 1. Lalgarh, March 15, 1985; interview with punchayar clerk Tamluk II, Mecheda. April 1, 19X5. 20. pur

Interview with block development II, Sonakhali, April 3, 19X5.

officer

Dash-

21. Interview with block development officer Dashpur 11, Sonakhali. April 3, 1985. My findings are corroborated by a 1087 newspaper article and another survey in Midnapore cited in Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen (198X), p. P36). 22. The data on employment generated by the NREP were provided by the Department of Rural Developmcnt, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Government of India. West Bengal has a total of 3.891531 main workers classified as agricultural laborers according to the Census of Zndia 1981 (Government of India, 1986. p. 181). The number of NREP work days per laborer generated by the NREP varies considerably from village to village. The figure of 25 days per worker was selected on the basis of surveys by Kohli (1987. p. 137). who found that the NREP provided 2X days of supplementary employment per worker in his area and Westergaard (1986, pp. X2-83)

1418

who found the households of landless 15-79 extra days of work per year.

WORLD families

DEVELOPMENT

secured

23. During the 1988 panchuyut election campaign police reports indicate that there were 67 violent clashes in which 148 were seriously injured and seven killed. This is a decline in the level of violence since the 1983 campaign when 173 violent incidents were reported in which 372 were seriously injured and nine were killed (The Telegraph, February 28, 1988; and Ganguly, 1985a, p. 9). 24. An array of studies corroborate this finding (Bandhopadhyay and Von Eschen, 1988, pp. P9-PlO, P27; Kohli, 1987, p. 111; Westergaard, 1986, pp. 4047, 53-54, 62-65, and 69-72; Government of West Bengal, c. 1980, p. 29). The only study that appears to contradict it is Lieten’s (1988) survey in Mahammad Bazar block in Birbhum district. Lietin found that 74 of the 127 (CPI(M)‘s candidates for seats in the block’s grum panchayars were small peasants, sharecroppers. or agricultural laborers. He also found that the CPI(M) candidates included a large share (51%) of members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Only 10 were school teachers. The inconsistency with other findings at least in part is explained by the disparity between the backgrounds of candidates for gram panchayats studied by Lieten and the backgrounds of prudhans. 25 In 1989, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the West Bengal legislative assembly compiled a highly critical report on the functioning of the Govcrnment of West Bengal’s Department of Education. Among the irregularities it criticized was the appointment of 1,313 teachers without requisite sanction from the government. For a discussion of the PAC report see Abdi (1989, pp. 32-33): Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen (1988. p. P20); and Rattan (1987. p. 47). 26. The Government of West Bengal’s statewide survey of 100 grain punchuyarr found that 24 of the 29 pradhans that were school teachers were members of the CPI(M). These accounted for 33% of the 73 prudhuns affiliated with the CPl(M) in the sample. School teachers accounted for only 3 of the 21 prudhuns (14%) who affiliated with opposition parties or were independents. The other two school teachers serving as pradhuns were members of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, another partner of the Left Front (Government of West Bengal, c. 1980. p. 29). 27. Interviews with Buddhadev Bhakat, CPI(M) local committee secretary, Jamboni, Gidhni, March 13, 1985: Sudhir Pandey. former local committee secretary and sabhapali. Binpur 1 punchuyut sumiti. Lalgarh, March 19, 1985; subhuputi, Tamluk II panchuyutsumiti, April 2. 1985; and sabhapuli, Dashpur II punchuyu~ sumiti, April 4, 1985. This account is also supported by Westergaard (1986, pp. 71, 88, 91). 28. Interview with Paritosh Maiti, CPI(M) local committee member and secretary Krishak Samiti, Tamluk II. Mecheda, April I, 1985.

29. Interview with Dr S. K. Mishra. Midnapore, April 9, 1985. Sukumar Sen Gupta, CPI(M) secretary for Midnapore district has stated to Amrita Basu that his party expelled 167 elected punchuyuf members on grounds of corruption in 1983 (Basu, 1990, p. 496). In his study of Mahammad Bazar block in Birbhum district, Lieten (1988, p. 2070) also observed a relatively high turnover in gram punchuyur representatives due in part to the CPI(M)‘s expelling of those considered to be corrupt. 30. In a party letter “for members only,” the state committee attributed the growth of support for the Congress (I) to the fact that the party was losing contact with the public largely because lower level units have not been keeping track of the problems of people in their locality (Sarkar. 1985. p. 6). Published party documents also note these problems (Communist Party of India (Marxist), 1985. pp. 163: and 1982, p. 96). 31. Sarkar p. 7.

(1985b).

p. I; (1985c),

p. 6: Ghosh

(1985).

32. See interview with Dashpur I Congress (I) Panchayat Samiti member, Jotegobardhan. April 4, 1985. Benoy Chowdhary in a posfmortem to the 1984 Lok Sabha elections observed, “Sectarianism and partisanship while providing relief jobs or recording the names of sharecroppers also led to the alienation of natural allies of the Left” (Nossiter, 1988, p. 141). Westergaard’s (1986. pp. 45, 60, 63, 74, 76) study of grum punchuyuts also encountered similar charges. Also set Banerjee (1985, p. 29). 33. Survey Dashpur II, observation dyopadhyay

response of grum punchuyul secretary, Sonakhali, April 3. 1985. For a similar concerning Birbhum district see Banand Von Eschen (1988, pp. P24, P31).

34. Interview with subassistant Lalgarh, March 22, 1985.

engineer,

35. Interview with block development I, Lalgarh, March 22, 1985.

Binpur

officer,

1,

Binpur

36. Interview with Sukumar Das. former General Secretary, West Bengal Pradesh Congress Committee, Tamluk, April 3. 1985. 37. This explanation was provided to me in an interview with Bhushan Dolai, General Secretary, Congress (I) Moyna Block Committee, Moyna, April 6. 1985. CPI(M) party leaders attributed their defeat to the fact that one Congress leader had been responsible for an influx of relief funds following the floods in 1978. I found their contention unconvincing because it fails to explain why the funds should have an impact on the punchuyat elections in 1983 and not on the elections that preceded or followed it. (Interview with CPI(M) member of the state legislative assembly, Moyna constituency, Moyna, April 6, 1985.) 38. The fourth gram punchuyat in the East was won by the Communist Party of India - a partner with the

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

AND

CPI(M) in the Left Front though often an electoral rival. Interview with block development officer, Binpur I, Lalgarh, March 14, 1985. Interview with Sabhapati (Jarkhand Party), Binpur I, Panchayat Samiti, Lalgarh, March 19, 1985. CPI(M) leaders attributed their losses to the fact that they failed to make the public aware that they were not given sufficient resources to meet everyone’s needs (interview with Amiya Sen Gupta, Secretary, CPI(M) local committee for Binpur I (West), Dahijuri, March 18, 1985). Sudhir Pandey, the former sabhapati and secretary of the CPI(M) local committee for Binpur I (East) denied being involved in any corruption. He attributed the CPI(M)‘s defeat to a loss of “the spirit of sacrifice” among party cadre (interview, Lalgarh, March 19, 1985). 39. Interview with Buddhadev CPI(M) local committee, Jamboni, 1985.

Bhakat, Gidhni,

Secretary March 13,

40. For an argument that the Liberal Democratic Party’s domination of the Japanese political system is best described as “patterned pluralism” in which political competition has served an important function in maintaining the LDP’s responsiveness to social needs

POVERTY

ALLEVIATION

1419

see: Muramatsu and Krauss (1990 and 1987). Calder (1988, pp. 20-26) has emphasized the insecurity of LDP politicians despite the long-standing rule of the LDP as the reason for the party’s responsiveness. The Swedish experience is a bit more complicated. During 1932-76 the Social Democratic Party’s share of the vote hovered around 46%. It garnered a majority of Swedish votes only twice (1940 and 1968), each time under exceptional conditions. The defeat of the Social Democrats in 1976 after the party failed to respond to new issues concerning environmental protection and nuclear power as well as its clumsy handling of collective wage earner funds illustrates the paloable threat of political competition confronting the ‘party (EspingAndersen. 1990. no. 33-57). The Social Democrat’s strategy for defusing this threat was first to ally with the Agrarian Party and later to formulate policies that appealed to the country’s middle and professional classes. The broad coverage of trade union membership and the Social Democrats’ receptiveness to their political initiatives along with the corporatist system of bargaining between centralized organizations of business and labor functioned to maintain the Social Democrat’s responsiveness to a broad array of social needs (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Pontusson, 1990). .L

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