Public Perception of Technological Risk
MARC PILISUK* SUSAN HILLIER PARKS GLENN HAWKES University of California, Davis
A public opinion survey of three California cities assessed the extent of public concern over risks associated with modem technologies. A substantial majority of respondents were concerned with each of ten areas, with concern being more widespread among women and less widespread among the more educated. Respondents relied heavily on television news and newspapers for information and varied in rating the reliability of different information sources, with university scientists being the most highly regarded. Decisions on public safety regarding these risks were influenced mainly by federal and state officials, the news media, and business. People believed that they were largely ignored in the process. Despite this feeling, political participation rates were not associated with the extent of concern over the dangers of technological risk. Low participation and high regard for authority raise the issue of the role of the expert in society.
Opportunity for public participation in decision making on hazardous wastes, nuclear energy, and toxic substances is now an article of faith. National laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, and the Atomic Energy Act require it, as do laws in most states. Yet the actual attitudes of the public are seldom known. Moreover, balancing their perceptions with those of experts remains enigmatic. This study surveys 429 citizens in three California cities on their perceptions of risk. On one hand their attitudes may be contrasted with formal “risk assessment,” which may be defined as a “science” practiced by experts.’ On the other hand their attitudes may be considered as input into the decision-making process-grist for the democratic mill. *Direct all correspondence to: Marc Pilisuk, Department California, Davis, CA 95616.
of Applied Behavioral
The Socii Science Journal, Volume 24, Number 4, pages 403-413. Copyright @ 1987 by JAI Press, Inc. All rights of reproduchon in any form reserved. ISSN: 00357634.
Sciences, University of
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Public opinion regarding the risk of potential hazards is, of course, influenced by many factors. The effects of media presentation are varied. Johnson and Tversky present evidence to show that media exposure of a situation of potential risk has its most salient effect through the stimulation of an affective mood.2 Such a mood may increase estimations of the risk of such a situation, but the effect may extend further. First, it may generalize to increase the estimation of similar risks (the generalization effect), and second, it may produce a global effect increasing the perceived risk of even dissimilar occurrences. Tyler and Cook offer further evidence to assist in the distinction between media effects on two different levels in the judgment of risk.3 The distinction between personal and societal level judgments is offered to clarify divergent findings regarding the effect of the media on judgments that one is personally at risk.4 Societal level judgments are opinions or beliefs about the community at large and about the relation of its residents, in general, to a certain social phenomena; e.g., is crime or pollution, increasing-or even increasing in one’s own neighborhood? Personal level judgments refer to a belief or estimation of the likelihood that the individual will be personally victimized by the occurrence. Both concepts have relevance to the public perception of the risk of technological dangers. Tyler and Cook present evidence to show that the societal level judgment is more commonly affected by the media.5 Others have shown that the impersonal (or societal) judgments are clearly distinct and typically independent from the personal.6 The importance of the distinction is highlighted by studies of the translation of risk perceptions into political level views. Typically one finds little translation of the personal into the political.7 Moreover, the media impact appears mostly on the societal level judgments8 and even here the ability to effect a change in individual attitudes or behaviors is frequently overstated.9
METHODS A random sample was drawn from three selected northern California communities chosen as typical of the greater area. Stockton, a city of substantial size, is agricultural. Concord, including the elite Clayton area, is suburban, but with a definite spread of socioeconomic status. Milpitas is an area of recent high technology development in the Santa Clara Valley; it is also one of the urban areas that was a target of malathion spraying from the air in 1980 in response to the infestation of the Mediterranean fruit fly.i’J Sample selection in this study was done through use of inverse telephone directories. Respondents were interviewed briefly by telephone and then mailed a self-administered questionnaire.1 1Of the 9 18 people contacted by telephone, 72% agreed to participate. Of those participating, 65% returned the questionnaire as requested, leaving a sample of 429 adults divided among the sites as follows: Milpitas, 172; Stockton, 153; Concord, 104.
RESULTS A total of 205 males and 2 17 females responded (7 declined to specify gender). The median age was 42, and 83.1% of the subjects were white. Income levels were typically high, with 75.5% reporting incomes above $20,000 and 28.7% above $45,000. The median educational level was two years of college or technical school, with 36.6%
Public Perception of Technological
Risk
405
having completed four years of college and 19.9% reporting some postgraduate education. Respondents were asked about politics and religion. The majority were political moderates (54.1%), with conservatives outnumbering liberals and radicals three to two (27.5% to 18.1 %).I2 Fifty percent of the sample belonged to a church or synagogue and 68.4% considered religion to be important or very important in their lives. Nearly 30% of the sample belonged to a PTA, Rotary, or some other community group, a question included to indicate integration into the community. No significant differences were found on either key demographic variables or key perception variables for the three communities. The sample is skewed toward upper socioeconomic status and is underrepresented of minorities when compared to statewide statistics. Adult nonwhite and Hispanic origin population for California is 42% and median income levels were $21,537. Concord in particular has 9 1% white population with high income and education levels. Milpitas is also distinguished by similarly high average income levels, and the effects were not counterbalanced by the inclusion of Stockton, which is above the state average in all minority groups and lower in income and in education. Concerns Over Risksof Technology
Concerns over technological risks were determined by listing ten items and stating, “We would like to know how concerned you are about each of the following.” A substantial majority of all respondents expressed concern over every technological risk cited. The percentage describing themselves as either “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” ranged from 95.7% for the risk category of storage of toxic chemicals to 76.8% for transportation of explosives. The percentages of concern with each risk category are reproduced in Table 1. More women were concerned about risks than were men. The percentages expressing concern over specific risks were greater for women than for men in all of the 10 items. The difference was statistically significant in 7 items:
Table 1.
Percentage Showing Different Levels of Concern for Potential Hazards. Very
Potential Hazard
Contaminated drinking water Pesticide residue in food Automobile accident Nuclear war Storage of toxic chemicals Nuclear power plant accident Transportation of explosives Preservatives in food products Air pollution Cancer-causing chemicals
Somewhat
Not
Completely
Concerned
Concerned
Concerned
Unconcerned
N
79.1 62.6 39.9 54.9 66.5 56.7 41.4 38.0 58.5 66.9
15.1 29.0 43.3 29.8 29.2 26.7 35.5 41.1 36.8 27.6
5.4 7.8 14.3 11.4 3.8 13.1 19.6 17.4 4.2 4.3
0.00
423 423 418 422 418 420 423 420 424 423
0.00 2.4 3.8 0.5 3.6 3.5 3.3 0.00 1.2
406
l l l l l l
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Contaminated drinking water: x2 = 7.055, d.f. 1, p < .007 Pesticide residue in food: x2 = 6.405, d.f. 1, p < .Ol Nuclear war: x2 = 6.405, d.f. 1, p < .Ol Nuclear power plant accident: x2 = 13.470, d.f. 1, p < .0002 Transportation of explosives: x2 = 32.950, d.f. 1, p < .OOO 1 Preservatives in food products: x2 = 25.9 10, d.f. 1, p < .OOO 1
We will return to the implication of gender differences in the conclusion. Only one factor other than gender showed as consistent an effect on presence of concern. The number of years of education was significantly associated with lz~nconcern on six of the 10 items: a Purity of drinking water: t = 2.94, p < .007 Pesticide residue in food: t = 3.76, p < .OOl a Nuclear war: t = 2.75,~ < .007 l Nuclear power plant accidents: t = 4.40, p < .OO 1 l Transportation of explosives: t = 2.56, p < .02 l Cancer-causing chemicals: t = 2.23, p < .04 l
Those reporting themselves as more religious were, on the average, more concerned in four areas: purity of drinking water (t = 2.01,~ < .055>, car accidents (t = 3.04,~ < .003), transportation of explosives (t = 3.15, p < .002), and food preservatives (t = 2.37, p < .02), and were more likely to be women. Higher income levels distinguished the unconcerned group statistically in three areas of concern: pesticide residue in food (t = 2.28, p < .03), nuclear power plant accidents (t = 3.90, p < .OOl>, and transportation of explosives (t = 2.95, p < .004). In contrast to gender differences, age of respondents was not significantly associated with expression of concern on any item. However, those with larger households were more likely to be concerned about food preservatives (t = 2.54, p < .02). The most striking finding was the extent of concern (at least three out of four people on every item) and the fact that such concerns were not simply a reflection of political beliefs. While men and people with higher levels of income and education were less concerned than lower status women, concerns were nonetheless expressed by major percentages among every category of respondents. Sources of Information and Trust in Information
Subjects were questioned concerning their use of various media as sources of information. Television (53.6%) and newspapers (53.8%) were closely rated as prime choices in the most used source of news; 82.6% listened to television news “almost every day.” Radio was checked as the prime source of news for 24.2%‘3 of the sample and radio news was listened to “almost every day” by 64.7%; 29.8% of the sample said that they tuned into public (listener-supported) television or radio stations for news on a daily basis. Television news viewers were more likely to be concerned than others in three areas of technological risk, i.e., nuclear war (~2 = 4.12, d.f. 1, p < .02), toxic chemicals (~2 = 5.95, d.f. 1,p < .02), and nuclear power plant accidents (~2 = 6.24, d.f. 1,p < .02).
Public Perception of Techno/ogical Risk
Table 2.
Source
407
Percentage Showing Different Levels of Trust for Reliable Information, by Source.* Completely
Somewhat
Not
Completely
Trustworthy
Trustworthy
Trustworthy
Untrustworthy
N
47.1 1.9 .4 418 University scientist 50.4 .__.__...__.........._.___._........__._.._...........__._.__.__.........._..__._..........._.__.............__._.._..__.........__.__._..........__._.__. 66.6 9.3 2.1 417 State agency official 21.8 58.2 11.7 6.8 410 Public interest group 23.1 Federal agency official Knowledgeable acquaintance Media information Elected community leader Industry official
14.4 5.2 3.4 3.4 8.9
59.8 58.3 54.9 50.8 41.0
21.1 26.0 29.4 37.1 34.4
4.5 10.4 12.1 8.5 15.5
416 403 411 409 412
Note: *Sourcesof information are ordered and grouped according to their perceived reliability. Sources within groups do not differ significantly in perceived reliability.
Subjects were provided a list of eight sources of information concerning technological risk and asked to rate each on a four-point scale ranging from “completely trustworthy” to “completely untrustworthy.” Table 2 summarizes the results. The eight sources are ordered and grouped according to their perceived reliability, and sources within groups do not differ significantly in their perceived reliability (Wilcoxon test). A majority of respondents found all but one source of information to be at least “somewhat trustworthy.” The one exception, an official representative of the industry concerned with the problem, was considered an untrustworthy source by 50% of those responding. Industry officials were the least trusted. Slightly more than 50% of both political conservatives and moderates rated representatives of the industry concerned “somewhat trustworthy,” but 68.1% of the liberals considered industry representatives untrustworthy (x2 = 11.89, d.f. 2, p < .003). A majority (6 1.4%) of those who watch television news daily likewise considered the industry representatives as untrustworthy (x2 = 4.71, d.f. 1, p < .03). Those doubting the trustworthiness of the industry representatives also tended to be more highly educated (t = 3.35,~ < .OO1) and to rate religion as more important in their lives (t = 3.65, p < .OOl). Clearly, university scientists were considered the most reliable source, with 97.6% considering them to be either “completely” or “somewhat” trustworthy. Next in order of trustworthiness were state agency officials, public interest groups like the Sierra Club and Common Cause, and federal agency officials. A substantial number of people expressed doubt about what they heard in the media, with only 3.4% considering it to be a “completely trustworthy” source and 4 1.6% considering it as either “not trustworthy” or “completely untrustworthy.” Men tended to be less trusting of media than women (x2 = 6.52, d.f. 1,~ < .Ol); whites were less trusting than nonwhites (~2 = 9.47, d.f. 1,~ < .002); and the more liberal the respondent, the less likely was trust in media (~2 = 11.55, d.f. 2, p < .003). In summary, the mass media, particularly television, were the key information sources, although they were not completely trusted by a substantial minority of the sample and by a majority of the liberals. The university scientist was, by far, considered
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Table 3.
Percentage
Showing Attributed
Source
Source of Influence
on Decision
Great
Some
Slight
Influence
Influence
Influence
Making.*
No influence
N
Politics
68.9
20.3
6.0
4.6
412
Government officials
49.8
40.0
8.8
1.2
407
The media Executives from business University experts
35.2 33.0 21.5
39.6 36.0 53.9
20.0 24.3 21.8
5.1 6.4 2.6
409 402 408
Public interest organizations
12.9
49.7
34.3
2.8
416
People living in affected communities
13.5
32.5
42.2
11.6
412
Note:
*Agents
are ordered
perceived
and grouped
according
to perceived
influence.
Agents within
groups do not differ significantly
in
influence.
the most reliable source for information about technological danger, and industry representatives the least reliable. Responsibility for Decisions Involving Technological Risks
Providing a source of reliable information on matters of technological risk was not synonymous with the amount of perceived influence in decision making for that source. The survey asked people to rate on a four-point scale the influence of seven agents on the outcomes of governmental decisions involving the risk of technologies. Table 3 summarizes these results. The same alternatives were offered in a question asking how great the influence of each of these agents should be. The results are summarized in Table 4. The Wilcoxon test was used to compare ratings of perceived and preferred influence. All tests were highly significant @ < .OOl), indicating that people disliked the degree to which various agents played a role in guiding decisions concerning technological risks. Table 4.
Percentage
Showing
Preferred Source of Influence
on Decision
Making.*
No Influence
Great
Some
Slight
Influence
Influence
Influence
University experts People living in affected communities
60.6 64.8
35.4 29.8
3.5 3.3
0.00 1.9
389 412
Government officials Public interest organizations
36.2 36.3
47.4 44.3
10.7 11.6
5.5 7.7
411 413
The media
10.3
32.0
21.9
29.6
405
3.6
24.6
30.0
41.6
406
12.1
19.2
66.3
Preferred Source
of /nf/uence
Executives from business Politics Note:
2.1
*Agents
are ordered
in preferred
and grouped
influence.
according
to preferred
influence.Agents within groups do not differ
N
410 significantly
Public Perception
of
Technological
409
Risk
Table 5. Comparison of Preferred Sources of Influence, with Attributed Sources, on Decision Making.
Preferred Source of Influence
University experts People living in affected communities Government experts Public interest organizations The media Executives from business Politics
Attributed
Influence*
Order
Influence
Order
3.843 3.575 3.141 3.092 2.232 2.150 1.502
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2.943 2.058 3.388 2.728 3.048 2.950 3.536
5 7 2 6 3 4 1
Note; *Basedon a four-point scale: 1 = no influence,4 = great influence.
Clearly, the respondents perceived politicians to be critical agents affecting decisions regarding health and safety risks of technology, and they did not agree that this should be the case. While there was some support for the high level of perceived influence on the part of government officials, the sample preferred that their influence be reduced. Business executives and the media were both considered major influential groups in the decision outcomes, and both were considered to be substantially more influential than they should be (see Table 5). At the lower end of the list in perceived influence were university experts, public interest organizations, and, last, people living in affected communities. University experts were seen to warrant a greater role in decisions than they were perceived to have. The same was true for public interest organizations. The greatest reversal came in the category “people living in affected communities.” Over half (53.9%) of the respondents felt that people living in the affected communities had little or no influence on risk decision outcomes, while 92.4% indicated that such people should have “some” or “great” influence. A majority (63.3%) responded in the “great influence” category. Finally, respondents were asked to check one entity or group they felt should have the final word in decisions regarding public safety. In order of the most frequent choices, these were Citizens (48.7%), Scientific Experts (24.5%), Local Government (10.2%), State Government (6.4%), Federal Government (6.4%), and Public Interest Groups (3.8%) (see Table 6).14
Table 6.
Percentages of Preferred Source of Final Authority in Public Safety by Political Ideology (N = 430).
Citizens*
State or Federal
Scientific
Government*
Experts*
Liberals
54.8
8.0
Moderates Conservatives
50.2 42.9
13.3 15.2
No.@*Percentages do not total to data reported.
100%
21.0 23.2 28.0
because less representative categories arc not included in the
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Political conservatism in this sample tended to increase the likelihood of assigning the final word to state or federal government and to university experts. The differences, however, did not reach statistical significance. The preferences as to where final authority should like do not necessarily reflect differences in the perceived reliability of sources. While liberals tended to be slightly more distrustful of state and federal government agencies for reliable information, the political groups were identical in high regard for university scientists’ information. It is possible that the conservative group is indicating a greater respect and desire for authority. The findings suggest a latent populism. A large percentage of people felt that persons living in an affected area hold little influence on decisions about technological dangers that might directly affect their own health and safety, while believing that persons so affected should have a great deal of influence in such outcomes. They perceived the decision-making process, perhaps correctly, as a political one with little or no opportunity for input by ordinary citizens or communities. To determine a relationship between the level of citizen concern and citizen political participation we asked (1) whether people had voted in the 1984 election, (2) whether they had joined or contributed money to an organization with a special cause (other than unions of religious organizations, and (3) whether they had ever written, phoned, or sent a telegram to a public official or a newspaper. Political participation in any form was not related to the extent of concern with the issue of risks of technology, and it has not resulted in making people feel that their influence is felt in such matters.
CONCLUSION The findings of this study indicate a high level of public concern over the risks of technology that cuts across every area of risk and all the important demographic characteristics of the sample. The leading concerns were contaminated drinking water and cancer-causing chemicals, but more than 75% were also clearly concerned about pesticide residues in foods, nuclear war, storage of toxic chemical, nuclear power plant accidents, and air pollution. Those who professed nonconcern on one or more items tended to be men, with more years of education, less religious, and with higher incomes. The sex difference is striking. It is consistent with conceptions of the gender gap in which women express more concern with health, welfare, and avoidance of nuclear war than do men.‘5 Willingness to accept risk is part of a masculine image that is sometimes portrayed in the media. Such an image could result in a denial of concern among some men. Conversely, some of the effects of the two most widely indicated concerns, cancercausing chemicals and toxic water, are matters disproportionately affecting the health of the fetus and of the infant, matters likely to be of greater concern among women. The finding that lower income and less education were associated with greater levels of concern can be explained in relation to the selective underrepresentation in the sample of low income, less educated groups. This explanation would suggest that the reported levels of concern may actually be understated. Conversely, the levels of political participation are probably overstated. Yet it is clear that even a sample weighted in favor of greater participation still shows that there is minimal opportunity for influence by local citizens. Primary sources of information were television news and newspapers, although a substantial portion of the sample had some doubts about the overall reliability of the
Public
Perception
of
Technological Risk
411
media. This surely could be a factor reducing potential of the media to influence political behavior.16 The sample also indicated that decisions about risks of technology to public health and safety were largely determined by politics, with the media and large businesses having substantial and undeservedly strong influence. The affected citizens, on the other hand, were perceived as largely without influence but deserving of great influence in the decisions. In general, the results showed moderate support for state and federal agencies and experts, both as sources of trustworthy information and as groups deserving of influence in risk-decision outcomes. Information was also deemed truthful from public interest groups such as Common Cause and the Sierra Club. The most respected source, by a wide margin, however, was the university expert. The sample felt that the influence on decision making of scientific experts should be increased. Decisions regarding the risks of technology create problems for democratic societies. Such decisions are perceived, perhaps correctly, as the outcome of larger political forces with the media and big business exerting selective and sometimes prejudicial influences. Moreover, there is a dilemma between the knowledge that decision making is dependent on technical information that is not widely dispersed, and the democratic view that people affected ought to be most important in determining the outcomes of decision making in matters of public safety. This dilemma contributes to the high status afforded the opinions of the university scientist. i7 Whether or not this trust is warranted, given the influence of industry and government in funding and in defining areas of supportable research, is a matter that can be debated. It is likely, however, that the reputation of the independent expert is one that will prove useful to the political process and that university scientists will be called on more often to help allay public fears. The danger in this comes from the tendency among experts to view public concern as an outgrowth of technical ignorance and as a matter to be managed so that it does not add emotional counterweights to rational calculations. It is important to note again the warnings of Jacques Ellul and others that no source of judgment with regard to technological risk is wholly without prejudice,18 and that the concerns of the public are in response to risks of truly enormous magnitude. The measure of concern over technological risk was not reflected in the extent of political participation. Only education level was associated with higher rates of all three forms of political action. While daily use of either a newspaper or television news was associated with voting, the viewers were less likely to contact a public official or an editor. Less than 30% of the sample claimed membership in a community group, yet this factor was a key to predicting who would contact a public official or an editor. While joining or contributing money to a special interest group was more common, it is clear that the level of participation, in all forms, did not create a high sense of citizen influence. If the present study suggests that a greater value is likely to be placed on the role of the expert not tied to business or to government, it also suggests the need to improve the mechanisms for public participation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Work on this project was supported by grants from the California Department of Food and Agriculture and by the University of California Agricultural Experiment Station at
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the University of California, Davis. Appreciation is acknowledged to Curt Acredolo, Cheryl Bellrose, Rachael Dixon Cross, Nancy Miller, Ellen Morris, and Martha Stiles for their participation in the research, and Paula Heady, Carole Hinkle, and Jean Seay for their assistance in production of this article.
NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. S.C. Morris, K.M. Novak, and L.D. Hamilton, Health Effects of Coal in the National Energy Plan BNL-51043 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of&e, 1979); United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Alternative Method for Determining Relative Riskfor Highway Routing of Radioactive Material Shipments (Washington, DC: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, 1981); D.H. Johnson, W.E. Kastenberg, and J.M. Griesmeyer, “Perspectives on the Risks of Alternative Fuel Cycles,” American Journal of Public Health 7 1(9)( 198 1): 1050-1057; P. Ayyaswamy, B. Hauss, and T. Hseih, Estimates of the Risks Associated with Dam Failure, UCLA-ENG-7423 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974); CL. Comar and L.A. Sagan, “Health Effects of Energy Production Conversion,” Annual Review of Engineeting l( 1976): 58 l-600; V.T. Covello, “The Perception of Technological Risks: A Literature Review,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 23( 1983): 285-297; L.D. Hamilton, “Areas of Uncertainty in Estimates of Health Risks” (Paper presented at the Symposium on Energy and Human Health: Human Costs of Electric Power Generation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1979); M.G. Morgan, S.C. Morris, A.K. Meier, and D.L. Shenk, “A Probabilistic Methodology for Estimating Air Pollution Health Effects from Coal Fired Power Plants,” Energy Systems and Pohcy 2( 1978): 287-3 10; National Academy of Sciences, Thf? Effect of Populations of Exposures to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations (BEIR) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972); D. Okrent, “Risk-Benefit Evaluation for Large Technological Systems,” Nuclear Safety 20( 1979): 148-164; P. Slavic, B. Fischoff, and S. Lichtenstein, “Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk,” in Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough?, edited by R. Schwing and W.A. Albers, Jr. (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 181-214. 2. E.J. Johnson and A. Tversky, “Affect, Generalization and the Perception of Risk,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45( l)( 1983): 20-3 1. 3. T.R. Tyler and F.L. Cook, “The Mass Media and Judgments of Risk: Distinguishing Impact of Personal and Societal Level Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47(4)(1984): 693-704. 4. G. Comstock, “Violence in Television Content: An Overview,” in Television and Behavior,
Vol. 2, edited by D. Pearl, L. Bouthilet, and J. Lazar (Rockville, MD: National Institute of Mental Health, 1982) pp. 108-125; F.L. Cook, T.R. Tyler, E.G. Goetz, M.T. Gordon, D. Protess, D. Leff, and H.L. Molotch, “Media and Agenda-Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 47(1983): 16-45; R.P. Hawkins and S. Pingree, “Television’s Influence on Social Reality,” in Television and Behavior, Vol. 2, edited by D. Pearl, L. Bouthilet, and J. Lazar (Rockville, MD: National Institute of Mental Health, 1982), pp. 224-247. 5. T.R. Tyler and F.L. Cook, “The Mass Media and Judgments of Risk.” 6. M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, Belief Attitua’e,Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975); H. Schuman and M.P. Johnson, “Attitudes and Behavior,” Annual Review of Sociology 2( 1976): 16 l-207. 7. D.O. Sears, R.R. Lau, T.R. Tyler, and H.M. Allen Jr., “Self Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting,” American Political Science Review 74(1980): 670-684.
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8. T.R. Tyler and F.L. Cook, “The Mass Media and Judgments of Risk.” 9. D.O. Sears and R.E. Whitney, “Political Persuasion,” in Handbook of Communication, edited by I. Pool and W. Schramm (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1973), pp. 253-289. 10. G.R. Hawkes, M. Pilisuk, M.C. Stiles, and C. Acredolo, “Assessing Risk: A Public Analysis of the Medfly Eradication Program,” Public Opinion Quarter@ 48( 1984): 443-45 1. 11. D.A. Dillman, Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method (New York: Wiley, 1978). 12. Twelve radicals are grouped with the liberals. One ultra-conservative is grouped with the conservatives. 13. These total more than 100% because some individuals selected more than one answer. 14. These total more than 100% because some respondents chose more than one answer. 15. J.B. Elshtain, “The Politics of Gender: Why Women Sound a Different Role,” The Progressive 48(2) (1984): 22-25. 16. D.R. Kinder and D.O. Sears, “Political Behavior,” in Handbook of Social Psychology, 3rd ed., edited by G. Lindzey (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985). 17. C. Kerr, Z7reUses of the University(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 18. J. Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Knopf, 1964); J. McDermott, “Technology: The Opiate of the Intellectuals,” New York Review of Books (July 3 1, 1969).