Public policy analysis: The next generation of theory

Public Policy Analysis: The Next Generation of Theory’

LAWRENCE C. WALTERS* RAY R. SUDWEEKS Brigham Young University

ABSZXACZ’: Many criticisms of micro-economics as a theoretical foundation for public policy analysis have emerged in recent years. Relatively few of these criticisms attempt to provide an alternative theoretical foundation, however. This paper examines four such attempts in the work of socio-economists, public discourse advocates, the “public ideas” work at Harvard and the pragmatic liberalism of Charles Anderson. All four agree on the importance of values in public policy. Other commonalities and disparities between the approaches are discussed. Three sources of individual values are identified. The implications for resolving value conflicts and the appropriate role for policy analysis are considered, along with the kind of predictive power which should be expected from theories underlying policy analysis.

INTRODUCTION While not yet universally accepted by academics, telling criticisms have laid bare the practical poverty of both pluralism and micro-economics as a foundation for public policy analysis. Theoretical accounts of political and economic behavior have been largely discredited when those theories are based solely on the view that individuals act always and only out of self-interest. In recent years, several efforts have been made to offer modifications, supplements or replacements of existing theory. Even prominent economists are beginning to seriously enter these discussions. (e.g., Aaron, Mann and Taylor, 1994) The purpose of this paper is to compare and evaluate some of these proposals. *Direct all correspondence to: Lawrence C. Walters, Public Policy Analysis: The Next Generation of Theory Institute of Public Management, Marriott School of Management, 760 TNRB, P.O. Box 23162, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602.3162. e-mail: [email protected].

Journal of Socio-Economics, Volume 25, No. 4, pp, 42.5452 Copyright 0 JAI Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 1053-5357

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In the following section, we briefly review the theoretical foundations of public policy analysis, looking at how the discipline has been developed, and how it has been criticized. Sections III through VI review four different efforts to provide a new or at least revised foundation and rationale for the practical giving of advice to public decision makers. These approaches include: l

The socio-economics

l

The rhetorical/argumentative approach emerging from city planning cially the work of John Forester, Frank Fischer and their colleagues;

l

The “public ideas” proposals coming from Harvard, and

l

The “pragmatic

Following these disparities between of the approaches might be extended.

of Amitai Etzioni and others;

liberalism”

in espe-

of Charles Anderson.

discussions, an attempt is made to identify commonalities and the approaches. Section VIII then discusses the short-comings and attempts to offer suggestions for how the current theory Some concluding thoughts are presented in the final section. DEVELOPMENT

AND CRITICISMS

The history of public policy analysis and the policy sciences has been recorded elsewhere (e.g., deleon, 1988). It is neither necessary nor productive to restate the full history here. For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that much of the initial impetus for policy analysis in the 1960s came as a result of the attempt to apply “scientific principles” to social phenomena. The conceptual model was straight out of the nineteenth century view of science: develop law-like statements about human and social endeavors, which in turn would allow government officials to forecast and manage not only the economy but every public aspect of human relations. “If we can send a man to the moon and back, surely we can eliminate poverty,” was the common attitude. Clearly, the effort stumbled badly. During this period, economics made what appeared to be significant strides in the development of its theory. Based on comparatively simple assumptions about individual human behavior, relatively powerful predictions were developed regarding how individuals, firms and other entities would respond to various incentives and policies, as well as fiscal and monetary changes. There was relatively little empirical basis for these predictions, but the theories were elegant and the other social sciences were simply unable to match economics for predictive potential. In fact, economics was so successful that other disciplines began to adopt similar conceptual frames for theoretical work in their own fields. While public policy analysis is the focus of this paper, law, sociology, political science and psychology have all been strongly influenced by micro-economic thought. Partially in response to this imperialism, social scientists began to systematically examine and test the basic behavioral assumptions of economics. (Kahneman, Slavic, & Tversky, 1982; Hirschman, 198 1; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Tversky

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& Simonson, 1993) At the same time that economic reasoning was beginning to pervade public policy discussions and decisions, these scholars were demonstrating that the very foundations of micro-economics are flawed. The point is that public policy analysis has generally come to be dominated by theories based on the view that individual actors are all that matter, and that these actors consistently attempt to maximize their own well-being. According to the prevailing theory, whether we are discussing the behavior of bureaucrats, elected officials, voters, the poor, polluters or criminals, the same basic maxims of behavior apply. Increasingly, this theory is being challenged. There is now a large literature disputing the behavioral assumptions of economics based on both empirical and theoretical grounds. (e.g., Hawkesworth, 1988; Brown, 1992; Gilhoy & Wade, 1992; Aaron, et al., 1994; and the writers referenced below) Unfortunately, finding a replacement theory has not been straightforward. It is one thing to argue that self-interest is an inadequate explanation for the wide range of observed human behavior. It is quite another to provide a sufficiently rich alternative which still has significant predictive power. This paper attempts to review some of the more prominent proposals for augmenting existing theory. The objective of our endeavor is to explore the potential for synthesis between these four approaches, and to consider the question of whether such a synthesis yet provides an adequate theoretical foundation for giving advice to public decision makers. From such a theory we should be able to elicit an understanding of both the appropriate role of the policy analyst, and the criteria which should be used to evaluate the quality of the advice given. There are at least two key issues at stake here, based on questions which have been raised concerning the viability of policy analysis as an intellectual and practical endeavor. First, there is the question of the essential legitimacy of expert advice. Some writers have argued that “objective expertise” has no special claim to standing. (Formaini, 1990; MacIntyre, 1984) But virtually all executives and many legislators do have a relatively small group of advisors who become immersed in a particular policy area. In addition, there are individuals in society who by virtue of experience, training or effort are more familiar with a given policy issue than most participants in the policy process. Should we really pay no more attention to them than we do to barbers and taxi drivers, two groups also given to strong opinion? But this raises the second issue. How do we tell when we are getting good advice? Decision makers are often faced with “expert” opinion which conflicts, and even if there,is apparent consensus among the experts, how can the decision maker tell whether the recommendations warrant action? From the analyst’s perspective, if we assume that giving advice has some legitimacy, what standards should professional advice givers-policy analysts-use to evaluate their own work and that of their colleagues? Again, what constitutes good analysis?

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These two issues-legitimacy and quality control-are p~icul~ly difficult to address currently because of the historical role of neoclassical economics in the development of the discipline and the direction taken by most of the proposed alternatives to economics as a foundation for policy analysis. The drive to appear scientific made economics an attractive foundation for policy analysis, but a “scientific” o~entation and economic theory in combination resulted in an under-developed capacity to deal with “non-scientific” concepts such as individual moral commitment. Now that the assumptions of economics are being challenged, policy analysts find themselves hard pressed to consider, evaluate and incorporate proposed alternatives. One of the general criticisms common to all of the approaches considered below is the rejection of self-interest as the sole motivator of human action. Values, principles, moral commitments, emotion are all offered as additional motivating factors, even by some economists. But generally speaking, when one raises the specter of values in a policy debate, most analysts run for the convenient cover of “politics.” The refrain goes something like, “Ah, well, I did a nice bit of analysis. Now it’s in the political arena, and who knows what will happen.” Or, simply, “It’s just politics.” This attitude implies that when values, emotion and moral commitment are at stake the analyst has little if anything of merit to say. The position has even been characterized as simply acknowledging the role of “high politics,” meaning to say that political institutions in democracies were created precisely to achieve a resolution of these conflicting values, so it is quite natural that analysts, “objective expertise,” should have nothing to say and should absent the stage. (Formaini, 1990) Unfortunately such a position seriously compromises the possibility of the very enterprise of policy analysis. Every policy argument has embedded in it both empirical claims and normative claims. (Paris & Reynolds, 1985) Every call for action at least implicitly asserts that some values are sufficiently important in this instance to justify action. Thus, in order for an analyst to give advice, that is, in order to make a recommendation, a value position must be adopted, at least implicitly. To be sure, there is a continuum of empirical content and another of value content. Different issues will rely more or less heavily on these two dimensions. Issues which are predominantly empirical can be described as ‘&carrepair” problems. There is substantial agreement on the objective (we want the car to work well). The only question is what part should be replaced, or what adjustment should be made to achieve the desired end. Other problems though turn on the question of what values should be p~amount, and have little empirical content. It would be at least odd for policy analysis to have nothing at all to say on these value-ladened issues. Given that all recommendations for action have some value content, if we accept the view that policy analysts have little or nothing to say about values, then inevitably they have little or nothing to say.

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As a consequence, we see that the emphasis on a scientific approach has left policy analysis with an underdeveloped capacity to deal with questions of values and moral commitment. The reliance on self-interest as the sole human motivator originally enhanced the apparent scientific development of the field, but now leaves the enterprise theoretically barren. The elaboration of a theory of policy analysis to accommodate values is, thus, critical to the future of the activity, both for its legitimacy and quality. As a result, we shall focus on several value-related issues in considering this set of proposals for theoretical extensions. These include: l

What is the view of human nature either inherent or explicit in the approach?

l

What values, if any, are espoused by proponents?

l

How are competing

l

What is the appropriate role of policy analysis and the analyst?

value claims to be resolved?

Few of the authors considered here explicitly offer answers to these questions, so we must interpolate and attempt to infer the answers from what is stated in their writings. Since our objective is to ferret out answers to these questions, relatively little space is devoted to elaborately reporting the overall approach. Every effort is made to be fair and representative, but the synopses should be taken as admittedly biased samplings. SOCIO-ECONOMICS For some years now, scholars in a variety of fields have been testing the assumptions of micro-economics and prodding at the borders between their disciplines and economics. One of the major challenges to neoclassical economic theory comes from those engaged in the development of “socio-economics.” While this effort builds on earlier work by Hirschman (1970, 1981), Sen (1977, 1982), Tversky and Kahneman (1982) and others, Amitai Etzioni has been a leading proponent of this inter-disciplinary effort. Consequently, this review will draw heavily on Etzioni’s work, supplemented by the conference volume which emerged from the first international conference on socio-economics conducted at Harvard in 1989. (Etzioni & Lawrence, 1991) As Swedberg notes, “socio-economics is basically a response against something else, namely, the narrow vision of mainstream economics.” (Swedberg, 1991, p. 13) The principal contribution of socio-economics is the rejection of self-interest as the sole motivator of human nature, and the addition of community as a motivating/constraining influence. Socio-economists do not reject the notion that self-interest motivates some decisions, but they argue that a richer, more empirically accurate view is that people are motivated at times by self-interest, and at times by a “moral dimension.” (Etzioni, 1988) This moral component emerges from a sense of caring about others and the general community. The

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argument is that persons are always embedded or situated in a social context and encumbered by ties of community. Further, Etzioni agrees with Sandel in that “certain of our [social] roles are partly constitutive of the persons we are . . .” (Sandel, 1984 p. 6 cited by Etzioni & Lawrence, p. 62) The bottom line for socio-economists is that “individual and community both command a fundamental moral standing” (Sandel, 1984). Indeed, Socio-economics seeks to encompass the influence of both individuals and society. It attempts to combine aggregative analysis with collective analysis by assuming that collective factors provide the context and are ‘priors’ within which individuals act, and which in turn are affected by them. (Etzioni, 1993, p. 118)

View of Human

Nature

The central concerns of socio-economics are with the concept of the acting self, with the basis of choices, and with the right to choose. One result is that people as decision makers are taken to have the following attributes: goals are not seen in the neat terms the economist confounded;

assumes, but are quite

l

Human

l

People act both out of self-interest nity;

l

People are sensitive to considerations

l

People are likely to move in step with others, but are able to strike out on their own.

and out of caring about others and commuother than efficiency;

and

In the socio-economic view, most decisions are manifestations of habit not interest maximization, and are in any event constrained by emotion and values. (Etzioni and Lawrence, p. 6) These constraints appear to take the form of emotional/institutional frames which define the feasible. Values Espoused It is useful at this point to digress briefly and anticipate

somewhat later findings. We shall see that there are three different aspects to this question of which values are espoused. First, there is a distinction made between the process of arriving at a policy decision and the outcomes of that process. Some writers argue persuasively from a position which focuses on process-related values. Others, while not ignoring process, are more concerned with the outcomes, and the question of which values should be used to guide policy decisions. Among this latter group, another division exists between those who seek to guide policy decisions and those who seek to identify values which are essential to our collective success, even if that implies a substantial effort to educate and train the public.

~ocio-economists are generally supportive of democratic processes and broad participation, but their major thrust is to argue that the values embedded in a community have moral standing and ought to influence policy decisions. In some ways this is a puzzling position, because while communities and institutions are seen as vital in defining, guiding, constraining and motivating the individual, rarely do Etzioni or his colleagues clearly describe the nature and content of the values in our communities. In one exception to this pattern, Etzioni (1991) attempts to answer two relevant questions. The first, “What belongs in the moral dimension?” Etzioni answers by providing four criteria, which if met qualify a behavior as moral. First, people must sense an imperative to &have in a certain way, a sense of duty. Second, individuals who act morally are able to generalize their behavior, to justify an act to others and to themselves by pointing to general rules. Third, Etzioni argues that moral preferences must be symmetrical in that there must be a willingness to accord other, comparable people, under comparable circumstances, the same standing or right. Finally, Etzioni argues that moral preferences affirm or express a commitment, rather than involving the consumption of a good or service, and thus he hopes to avoid subjecting such preferences to any means-ends analysis. The second question Etzioni raises is that of “whose morals?’ He answers this question by concluding “. . , on most matters, for most people, at most times, consensus forms the moral standard . I . . To the extent that a policy proposal promotes some value already endorsed by the con~muniiy, its acceptance is ‘home free.“’ (pp. 461-452) If consensus is not present, values cannot, in Etzioni’s view, be simply inserted into the population. He argues that “moral principles must come first, followed by policies that build on them.” (p. 462) Thus it would seem that subject to the four criteria enumerated above, community consensus provides the moral standard for policy analysis, and socio-economics appears to emphasize the importance of community values in reaching policy decisions, while avoiding the value prescriptions of Wilson (1994), Popenoe (1994) and others. In one other exception to the general silence on which values should prevail, Etzioni f 1993) comes close to defining the general values of society when he discusses “‘reasonable, workable public policy in the public interest” and “the political institutions entrusted with crafting policies in the common interest.” Further, Etzioni argues that public institutions should be constructed or modified such that: l

Vulnerable members of the community are not neglected;

l

Long-term needs of the community are considered;

* Shared needs that have no specific group payoffs are not shortchanged; l

Politicians respond ta the changing needs and interests of the community, to genuinely democratic forces; and

+ Particular needs do not take priority over the public interest,

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In this same article, Etzioni argues that special interests are at the core of our systemic problems. (Etzioni, 1993, pp. 130-131) This view of the public interest is very close to that articulated by Goodsell (1990), in which he defends the notion of the public interest in public discourse. According to Goodsell, public officials “convey, perpetuate and inculcate certain values” when they use the term public interest. These values include: l

l

~gu~~~-~z~r~lj~: An adherence to law, the constitution and basic precepts of moral behavior such as honesty and integrity. Fo~~tical responsiveness: Conformity

to the overriding

wishes of citizens or rele-

vant groups. l

l

l

l

Political consensus: Contending groups within the public are required to defend their positions in terms broader than naked self-interest. Concern for logic: Connectedness between advocated public policy and its underlying normative purposes. The case must be made that the societal purposes are valid as articulated; that the advocated policy will tend to advance these purposes; and that the advocated policy itself is reasonable and coherent. Concern for e&x%: Probable effects of a policy have been investigated found to be beneficial. Implies a future o~entation and a comprehensiveness the scope of the investigation. Agenda awureness: Concern (Goodsell, pp. 103-107).

for the inarticulated

needs

within

and in

the society

Thus, it may not be too presumptuous to impute to socio-economics a primary concern with values in determining policy outcomes. The articulation of those values is to be found in community consensus and the constellation of values surrounding “the public interest” as articulated in part by Etzioni, but more fully by Goodsell in a parallel presentation. Resolution

of Competing

Value Claims

Etzioni discusses two somewhat different types of conflict resolution. The first is really intended to avoid major conflicts between nations or national institutions. This resolution scheme Etzioni calls “encapsulated conflict.” (Etzioni, 1988, 1991) In this type of conflict management, it is necessary to first encapsulate the conflict by ruling out certain types of expressions of conflict (e.g., violence, price wars). The creation of such an institution encapsulating the conflicting parties eventually reduces the conflict to competition, which Etzioni sees as not only acceptable but healthy. Thus, unresolvable value conflicts may continue, but the terms of expression are deemed acceptable by all, and the resulting competition is at least tolerable. In considering the role of the policy analyst in resolving value conflicts, Etzioni (1991) takes a somewhat different tack on this issue. He argues that the first obli-

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gation of the analyst is to inform the client or community and urge a

involved of the conflict

quest for a third option or limited partial resolutions that circumvent the problem. .. In the meantime, an effort [should be] made to evolve consensus, push for new technological development, change economic conditions, or alter some other major factor that will allow a resolution to the stalemate . (p. 466)

Role of the Policy Analyst

Socio-economists have no problem with countenancing advice givers. In fact, it seems clear that they would like to be given the opportunity to do more of this sort of coaching. Nonetheless, the view of the policy analyst implicit in their work is quite similar to the traditional view, with an important addition. States Etzioni: “One may argue whether individuals or institutions are more powerful; however, one conclusion is clear: policy analysis should consider both individual, aggregative factors and institutional factors.” (Etzioni, 1993, p. 120) The means available for making such an accommodation are traditional social science methods, with an expanded list of explanatory variables. To cite the “minimum platform” of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics: “The independent variables in any proposition member of socio-economic theory have to include at least one non-economic variable and one economic one.” (Etzioni & Lawrence, p. 348. italics in original) POLICY DISCOURSE

The largest body of revisionist work is represented by what we will term the Public Policy Discourse school, which at times we will abbreviate to simply policy discourse. The movement is in fact large enough that White recently published an article in which she distinguished three distinct perspectives within the public discourse movement (1994). For our purposes, we include here the work of Frank Fischer and John Forester as well as other scholars included in the Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning (1993), along with Donald Schon’s book The Reflective Practitioner (1983). The policy discourse movement began as a reaction to the failings of the traditional paradigm of rationalistic problem solving. Proponents of policy discourse contend that the traditional paradigm is constrained by an overly scientific, and therefore overly simplistic view of human nature. Dryzek identifies the theoretical underpinnings of the traditional positivistic paradigm in terms of objectivism and instrumental rationality. In this model, objectivism is defined as “A single and universally applicable set of rules for the unambiguous establishment of causal relationships.” Instrumental rationality is defined as a process of “determining the best means to a given end.” (pp. 213-217) According to proponents of policy discourse, the traditional paradigm falls short primarily because it fails to take into account the roles of values and frames

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in policy analysis. At the heart of the policy discourse movement lies the premise that value judgments are an inescapable part of policy issues. Since facts and values must be considered together, it is not possible to analyze policy issues by scientific means alone. The inclusion of value judgments in the equation necessitates, in their view, a rhetorical approach to analysis. And since values vary widely, the only way to gain consensus on policy issues is to broaden the scope of conversation to include not only the means to an end, but the end itself. A second complaint policy discourse scholars raise with the traditional paradigm is that an overly scientific view towards policy analysis promoted the development of a technocracy. This trend is seen as anti-democratic to the extent that it marginalizes citizen participation in the governing process. View of Human

Nature

Most policy discourse scholars do not explicitly state their assumptions about human nature. While typically they make no mention of micro-economics or pluralism, they clearly reject instrumental rationality because of its inability to deal with the “complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts that exist in human behavior” (Schon, 1983, p. 50). We can therefore assume that they believe human nature to be more complex than a simple self-interest model would lead us to believe. Indeed, it appears that humanity regularly confronts value conflicts and, either from external forces or from internal choices, a complex, unstable and uncertain world. Values Espoused

While acknowledging the role of values in policy analysis, most scholars in this area focus on the policy process. The central value in public discourse theory seems to be limited to what Frank Fischer and John Dryzek both refer to as “participatory and discursive democracy,” or in other words, open communication and unrestricted participation (Dryzek, 1993, p. 229). Similarly, because consensus regarding values is unlikely in most controversial policy debates, Schon suggests the best possible solution is to establish an atmosphere of “cooperative inquiry” (1983). Frame reflective discourse is the practice which Schon presents as a means of facilitating the development of such an atmosphere. Schon uses the notion of a frame in a manner similar to Bobrow and Dryzek (1988) as the set of priors and predispositions which tend to define the interesting, “determine the strategies of attention,” and “the values which will shape their practice” (Schon, 1988, p. 309). Thus frame retlective discourse is systematic reflection on the adequacy of our most fundamental assumptions. Resolving

Competing

Value Claims

Forester and Kaplan both contend that in order for policy analysts to communicate effectively, they must use stories or narratives as their primary means of

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presenting analysis (for a similar argument applied to economics see McCloskey, 1985). When they develop a story with a plot, analysts are able to give structure, coherence, and meaning to otherwise potentially complex and messy problems. In Kaplan’s words, “A plot. . . grasp[s] together and integrate[s] into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events.” (1993, p. 172) Kaplan acknowledges that a compelling plot is not sufficient to constitute a “good” story. A good story must not only be interesting, it must also be true. (see also Kaplan, 1986) According to Kaplan, by examining the internal connection among the five main elements of a narrative-namely who, what, where, when, and how-we can informally assess the truth of a story. When the interaction among these five elements is consistent, intuitively we are inclined to believe a story is plausible. Dunn (1993) and MacRae (1993) both discuss more formal guidelines for ensuring that the rhetoric of policy analysts supports the democratic ideal put forth by Fischer and Dryzek. Dunn argues that policy reform involves directed and purposive efforts to change a social system and therefore necessarily involves valuative as well as factual outcomes. Policy analysis therefore must be concerned not only with competing explanatory hypotheses but competing ethical hypotheses as well. (see also Paris & Reynolds, 1985) Dunn states that: argumentation is a process of rational advocacy in which stakeholders engage in the competitive reconstruction of knowledge claims. This competitive reconstruction, in contrast to the competitive replication of experiments, leads toward a pragmatic and dialectical conception of truth in which social discourse plays a reflective and critical role in producing new knowledge. Knowledge is no longer based on deductive certainty or empirical correspondence but on the relative adequacy of knowledge claims embedded in ongoing social processes. (p. 264)

Building on the jurisprudential metaphor and the work of Stephen Toulmin (1958), Dunn offers what he calls “a transactional model of argumentation.” This model draws upon the tradition of formal logic but also provides for specific tests to assess the relevancy, adequacy, and cogency of competing assumptions and knowledge claims. Similarly, MacRae modifies Toulmin’s original scheme of argumentation and offers his own set of guidelines for what he calls “reasoned proposal selection.” MacRae identifies two distinct discourse scenarios: consensual and adversarial. He also identifies two stages in the policy making process: proposal identification and proposal selection. During proposal identification, policy analysts generally engage in consensual discourse as they identify possible alternatives. The following guidelines for reasonable proposal selection are applicable for consensual discourse (p. 301): l

Ensure completeness

l

Focus on ends rather than means;

of the set of valuative criteria;

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Compare alternatives

as opposed to evaluating

l

Provide full information tives; and

l

Provide quantitative

alternatives

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inde~ndently;

as opposed to facts that support only certain altema-

information

where needed-for

example, to test unqualified

qualitative arguments. MacRae contends that efforts to produce the best proposal are best served when these guidelines are adhered to. However, when the larger public policy community-policy makers, the public, and analysts -meet to select a final proposal, discourse commonly becomes adversarial. MacRae suggests that the appropriate guidelines for adversarial discourse represent the antithesis of the consensual discourse guidelines. Role of Policy Analysis Public discourse advocates argue that given the importance of values in policy issues, analysis can never be merely a “rational problem solving method” of scienti~cally distilling truth. The role of the policy analyst is therefore much broader than our traditional paradigms would suggest. Far more than mere gatherers and organizers of facts, policy analysts are practical ethicists who assess the political landscape and construct a sense of values as they determine which facts matter and which facts do not. (Fischer & Forester, 1993) In support of p~icipato~ democracy, the discourse scholars maintain that communication is the critical function for policy analysts. As noted, Forester and Kaplan both contend that in order for policy analysts to communicate effectively, they must use stories or narratives as their primary means of presenting analysis, stories with structure, coherence, and meaning. Although Schiin focuses mainly on the individual performance of professionals, he does briefly touch on the subject of policy analysts and their role in a larger context: There seems, then, to be some growing recognition of the need for cooperative inquiry within adversarial contexts. The idea of reflective practice leads to a vision of professionals as agents of society’s reflective conversation with its situation, agents who engage in cooperative inquiry within a framework of institutionalized contention. fp. 3.53)

Speaking specifically of policy analysts, he refers to them as “. . . participants in a larger societal conversation; when they play their parts well, they help that conversation to become a reflective one.” THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS The public ideas work coming out of Harvard is in many ways similar to that of policy discourse scholars. Like policy discourse proponents, the Harvard group rejects the notion that policy analysis is first and foremost rational scientific problem solving. (Reich, 1988) They further agree with the discourse advocates that

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while values play an important role in public policy decisions, the great diversity of values across the population makes it difficult to identify a core set of values which can be universally applied in decision making. And since the role of values in public decisions renders scientific analysis insufficient, argumentative analysis must be employed to evaluate alternatives. However, unlike policy discourse theorists, public ideas proponents move beyond a simple rejection of instrumental rationality. Policy discourse scholars suggest that the motivating factors behind human behavior are so complex that they are unknown and in effect, locked in some mysterious black box. Public ideas scholars open the black box and argue that the problem with the scientific approach is the fundamentally incorrect assumption that self-interest rules human behavior. Although self-interest has a significant influence on human behavior, people are also motivated by a sense of social good or public interest. View of Human

Nature

While self-interest exerts a powerful influence on human behavior, Reich and others argue that humans are also motivated by values, ideas, and purposes that cannot be explained by self-interest. Furthermore, in many instances, people are capable of seeking what is good for society, without regard for immediate individual benefit. As evidence of this, Reich cites passage of legislation regarding civil rights, the environment, and health and safety issues. (p. 4) Values Espoused

Reich identifies and traces three streams of philosophical thought which have shaped American policy making-namely bureaucratic expertise, democratic deliberation, and utilitarianism. He then argues that through the course of this century, bureaucratic expertise and utilitarianism have come to dominate democratic deliberation. But only democratic deliberation begins with a view of human nature which allows for more than self-interested behavior. The ideals of working together for the public good and educating and involving the citizenry are central to the notion of democratic deliberation. The underlying premise of the public ideas school is that in order to insure the continued strength and success of democratic institutions, a society must involve as many of its citizens as possible in public policy discourse. Thus, the primary thrust of this group appears to be a concern with process-related values of broad base participation, though they do make reference to and use of the concept of the public interest as a value which should guide public deliberations. Resolving

Competing

Value Claims

In this view, competing or conflicting values will likely emerge in cases where both problem definition and prescriptions are unclear. The conflicts are resolved or at least rendered manageable in the process by which “a group learns its way from a current state of affairs to one that is better.” (Heifetz & Sinder, 1988, p.

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190) This learning process will entail substantial public discussion and consideration of alternative ways of understanding the problem at hand, in addition to alternative solutions. Values will be carefully explicated, juxtaposed with apparently similar values, hypothetically extrapolated to different contexts, and scrutinized with regard to underlying metaphors, assumptions and patterns. Through this process of public discussion and public learning, workable positions and policies will surface and receive support. Role of Policy Analysis

The inability of the rational scientific model to deal with questions of values leaves us in need of a new way of thinking about policy analysis. The only way to adequately deal with the role that value judgments play in policy issues is to reason by argument rather than scientific analysis. Consistent with the ideals of democratic deliberation, the Harvard scholars claim that the role of the analyst is to engage in and give structure to public discourse. Reich suggests that: the responsibility of policy analysts is not only to choose the best means of achieving a given objective. It is also to offer alternative ways of understanding public problems and possible solutions, and thus to expose underlying norms to critical examination. The analyst can provoke such examination in several ways: by juxtaposing widely accepted but morally or politically inconsistent assumptions about certain public problems and their solutions, by questioning the conventional metaphors and analogies used to justify plausible but novel interpretations of large events, by revealing underlying similarities and patterns in the public’s approach to seemingly unconnected situations, and by advancing alternative future scenarios premised on how society might cope with certain problems. (p. 6)

Therefore, the expertise of an analyst lies in the ability to make sense of complex issues, articulate various ways of thinking about those issues, and focus public attention on important issues. Furthermore, as policy issues will always involve an intertwining of facts and values, proper analysis must be argumentative as well as scientific. The bottom line then, is similar to that drawn by the Argumentative Turn scholars: Analysts must be persuasive, wise and truthful in the stories they tell. PRAGMATIC

LIBERALISM

Charles W. Anderson, in his book Pragmatic Liberalism, proposes a theory of practical political reason which offers significant potential for providing a foundation for policy analysis. (Anderson, 1990) Anderson sees his theory applying not only to the state but to all forms of organized human endeavor. According to Anderson, . perhaps the most distinctive feature of pragmatic liberalism then is the proposition that the performance of the diverse functional associations that make up our society is a matter of public concern and that participation in them is a form of public responsibility and an act of citizenship. (p. 3)

The focus of pra~~~at~c liberalism is thus on ~rnprov~n~ performance, on good practice and rational enterprise, where enterprise is defined to include vi~u~ly any purposive community of practice. Again, citing Anderson, Pragmatic liberalism is a discipline of political judgment. Its principal norm of argument is that policy grounded in liberal principle must be shown simultaneously to serve the public good and to enhance the performance of some particular substantive enterprise. (p. 4)

Anderson points to classicaf ljberalism with its emphasis on individual action and individual rights against the state to distinguish pragmatic liberalism, which he states “is primarily a theory of the relation of the state to individuals engaged in and affected by various forms of collective action.” (p. 58) Central to Anders~n’s theory is the tension that exists between good practice on the one hand and innavation and inquiry on the other. For Anderson, there exist communities of practice which maintain standards of what is currently understood to be best practice in a given domain. These communities also train new comers, much as the guilds trained apprentices. Most decisions that are made and actions that are taken are done so based on what is perceived to be best practice, and it is these communities of practice which define, defend and promulgate the standard. The djstin~tive Feature of pragmatic hberahsm, in the family of liberal theories, is its emphasis on practice, on the importance of traditions of conscious, collectivefy devised technique. . . . [For pragmatic liberalism, the] crucial test of the worth of an idea or project is how it works out in practice (p. 38-39).

But Anderson also argues that current perceptions of best practice do not necessarily imply stasis. For a variety of reasons ranging from changing conditions to changing needs, currently understood best practice may be judged to fall short of what is needed. Consequently, there are also communities of inquiry, which actively seek for ways t.o improve practice over current standards of performance. Clearly, there are at times tensions between the two communities. To resolve these conflicts requires “d~sc~~~~~~d discourse, discourse in which there are substantive as well as proced~ai tests of the worth of statements.” (p. 47, Italics in original) View of Human Nature Anderson embraces human rationality, but shifts the definition of rational away from the unnecessarily confining view provided by classical liberalism and neoclassical economics. He argues that calculated self-interest could not be the basing point for political thought, for personal preference could not be divorced from the collaborative, collective rationality of socially founded patterns of thought. (p. 11)

Rather, Anderson defines rationality as a collective product, “a progressive, evolutionary refinement of practical technique through criticism, trial and error,

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and systematization.” (p. 11) So for Anderson, as with the socio-economists, being human necessarily entails being embedded in a community, but Anderson specifies that the purpose of the collective and collaborative effort is to do as well as we can, and to improve performance in the future. Again, letting Anderson speak for himself: But pragmatism adds the substantive elements of craftsmanship and social responsibility in the pursuit of purpose to a liberal ethic which would otherwise be founded only on the norms of individual interest and impartial procedure. The idea then is to avoid the excesses both of formal liberalism, where rigid abstract notions of right can themselves become inflexible and thus arbitrary in application, and a pure subjective pragmatism, which may have no standard of public action other than simple effectiveness or an indeterminate idea of the public will. (p. 12)

Values Espoused

Anderson is quite clear on the values he wishes to pursue. He describes them as the “liberal principles,” and takes for granted their acceptance in liberal society. Stated briefly, these values include: l

Responsiveness

to individual

*

Non-~bi~r~iness; efficiency

will;

and economy; and

l

Soad

l

Fairness in dist~butions and in distinctions

of recognition

and reward.

In addition, of course, there is the value of improved performance from substantive enterprises. Anderson notes that formal liberal political theory cannot tell us which principle to apply to particular kinds of cases and controversies (p. 9). In fact, a major purpose of the book is to develop a method that shows how liberal theory can be applied in practice without becoming lost in relativism. (p. 10) Resolution

of Conflicting

Value Claims

Anderson argues that a single authoritative policy for a community cannot arise from simple discussion, “merely from an airing of all points of view.” (p. 167) While Anderson does not disparage broad based democratic participation, he argues such participation by itself is inadequate to reach a defensible policy statement. He then proceeds to identify four “themes for reason.” . . . themes which must arise and be taken into account if a community is to contrive a course of action that will at once enhance the realization of liberal values and perfect the performance of a substantive enterprise (p. 168).

These themes are:

l

Reasons of Trust~shi~, in which a policy is justified by showing that it follows from a conception of established norms of good practice;

*

Critical Reason, which focuses on principles meeting standards expressed as general rules;

l

Entrepreneurial Reason, which focuses on projects and the means for their realization, and justifies policies in terms of potential gains in performance;

l

Meliorative Reason, which aims at securing agreement, and justifies policies by showing why a particular proposal might satisfy diverse aims and values.

and justifies

policies in terms of

that none of these basic methods of political reason can stand by itself as a basis for public choice. Rather, there is an “organic reiationship between them. All are required if political judgment is to be wise and practical.” (p. 177) What Anderson advocates is disciplined discourse and deliberation from all four perspectives, with a serious possibility that some actors will change their minds as a result. Ultimately, however, there is no technique of reason that is sufficient to bring closure to political argument. The result of the “organic” deliberation will be to choose one mode of reasoning as the basis for the decision. Says Anderson, Anderson

argues

Thus, in the end, we decide on a specific course of action because of the irn~~au~e of some feature of practice; or because of inefficiency or injusfice, or responsiveness to ~ad~vjdual need, or on the basis of some other neglected value: or because

preserving

of the impalement particular reform, 179-180).

promised by a proposed scheme; or becanse of the workab~lit~1 of a its ability to satisfy divergent considerations and interests (p.

Role of Policy Analysis For Anderson, the role of policy analysis in public deliberation is to speak for neglected perspectives. “. . . the vital role of the intellectual is to bring balance to deliberation. _ . . The function of the policy analyst, thus understood, is to keep the ~gument open, not to presume to settle it. . , . complicating matters when everything seems most obvious to others . . .” (p. 178)

The authors represented in the preceding sections come from somewhat different backgrounds, and approach the topic of public policy analysis from different perspectives. In this section, an attempt is made to identify the similarities and common ground established between the various views, as well as the disparities and differences. If there is substantial agreement on key points, it may well be that scholars are well on the way to elaborating a new foundation for policy analysis. At the very least, identifying common threads in otherwise inde~ndent theoretical work may suggest key requirements which should be included in emerging new theories, Certainly, one such common thread is the rejection of neoclassical

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economic assumptions regarding human motivation. But this is only a beginning, since it says little or nothing about a replacement theory. In the following paragraphs, the focus is on positive positions and contributions, rather than the finesse with which economic man is impaled. Commonalities

One important point of common ground among these authors is the view that values and principles play a role in at least some individual decisions. None of the writers argue that self-interest is never involved in human action, and all argue that values do provide an important defining, guiding and constraining function for individuals. Further, this structuring and constraining influence is seen as both desirable and inevitable. A second point in common is the view that values and principles frequently have their source in and are inculcated by communities or institutions. The public policy discourse group is probably the most vague on where values come from, but at least for the other writers there is a well articulated view that values emerge in the socialization process and depend in important ways on the communities to which individuals belong. A third commonality is the view that while values are important in decisions, and they frequently come from external sources, these values are not fixed but may change over time. This is true both for the individual and the community. There is learning and adaptation to new circumstances, as well as the possibility of being convinced through argumentation and evidence to modify principles. Clearly, marginal changes are more likely and are accomplished more readily than more fundamental changes, but all of the writers would hold open the possibility of change even in the most fundamental values. The final point of common ground for our purposes is that public discourse is an essential component of rational public decisions, precisely because values differ across the population. Since individual values are often initially ill-formed and in any event can be influenced by persuasion and discussion, consensus or at least substantial agreement on public policy requires the opportunity for discussion and persuasion. (see Hummel, 1991, for a similar argument applied to professional knowledge acquisition) Disparities

There are three important differences in the approaches taken by this set of writers. The first is the relative focus on values related to the process by which decisions are reached versus the criteria which should be used to make decisions. The authors writing with Fischer and Forester are much more concerned with the processes used to reach public decisions than with the criteria actually employed in making any given decision. This is true as well for Reich and his Harvard colleagues. In both these cases, the central concern is the promotion of public

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discourse, and a focus on improving the process of public participation in collective decision making. For the socio-economists and especially for Anderson, process is not irrelevant, but there is much greater concern for the criteria which should be used in making a decision. The socio-economists are concerned with the public interest and community-held values, and Anderson with liberal values and improved enterprise performance. But both appear more centered on what the decision should be than are the other two, more process-oriented groups. A second difference lies in the degree to which notions of community and institutions are prominent as a source of values and influence on individual decision making. As noted above there is relative agreement that values are important, and even that values emerge in the socialization process. But there is a marked difference in the degree to which communities and institutions enter into the theories espoused. Clearly, the socio-economists, coming as they do from a sociological perspective, place great emphasis on the importance of institutions. On the other hand, those who focus more on the processes of public discourse are much less concerned about the role of institutions in defining individual values. This is not to say that they reject or even ignore the importance of institutions since they acknowledge the importance of frames of reference, but rather that the emphasis is in a very different direction. The third point of difference is the degree to which a particular set of values is seen as fundamental or common to society. Again, the public discourse scholars pay very little attention to what the values are in public discourse, focusing instead on the value of broadly based democratic participation and free expression. Anderson is the most clear and complete in his description of the important values underlying US and even western society. The socio-economists, at least those who agree with Etzioni, espouse the value of the public interest, and Reich and his co-authors also make reference to the concept. Finally, these writers have rather different views of the appropriate role for policy analysis. Socio-economists appear fairly content with the traditional role played by analysts, if additional explanatory variables reflecting the role of institutions are included in the models used. Both policy discourse writers and public ideas advocates stress the role of the analyst as communicator, facilitator of public discussion and even educator. In addition to traditional skills, they would see an understanding of argumentation and narrative form as an important competence for policy analysts. Anderson differs somewhat by suggesting that the analyst’s primary responsibility is to speak up for neglected perspectives. What emerges then from a consideration of the differences between these groups is a set of distinctions based largely on the relative importance of the process used to reach public decisions versus providing guidance to society on how to evaluate a particular set of options. Those who feel to emphasize process (Fischer, Forester, Reich, etc.) are content with advocating broad-based participation and

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free expression. Those who are concerned with how decisions should be made (Anderson, Etzioni, etc.) are more concerned with where values come from, how they influence public decision making, how those values are reinforced or modified, and even what the values should be. With these similarities and differences in mind, we turn to the question of synthesis and extension in the next section. OBSERVATIONS

AND EXTENSIONS

Source of Human Values One of the insights provided by this review is an understanding of the source of values. Rather than assume tastes, preferences and values are given and immutable, all of these writers consider values as both central to policy discussions and changeable over time. While some may emphasize one source of values over another, three sources for individual value judgments are articulated. First, the socio-economists point out that values come in large measure from the institutions within which we live. (Etzioni and Lawrence, 1991) This view is consistent with the work of Mary Douglas (1986), the frames of reference described by the policy discourse group, and the “community of practice” developed by Charles Anderson. All argue that the way we view the world, and consequently what we take to be important, how we think about things, and what we consider to be good practice are to a substantial degree a function of the social institutions and communities to which we belong. Some of this socialization takes place as children and has life-long effects. (Wilson, 1993, 1994) But the influence of institutions is also felt as we change our affiliations. Heineman, Bluhm, Peterson and Keamy (1990) point out, for example, that some values originate in the roles one plays in the policy process. Actors will “naturally” tend to respond to issues within the framework of the norms and expectations of the institutions with which they are affiliated. But institutions themselves are not immutable. They change over time as a result of the actions taken by what Anderson terms the community of inquiry and the policy discourse group calls public discourse. It is important to note that this public discourse is more than simply a way to express and tally individual preferences, though these functions may be served as well. As Reich and his co-authors note, it is often the case that individuals have no preferences or clearly stated values on a given policy issue. (see particularly Majone, 1988, pp. 160-164) One of the functions of public discussion in such a situation is to enable people to form an opinion and to identify their values, thus providing a second source for individual values. To be sure, people are subject to misinformation and manipulation, but this does not change the fact that public discourse tills an important role in educating those involved. A third source of values can be found in individual insights gained from personal experience, what Schijn would call reflective practice. Individuals commonly encounter problematic situations in which it is not clear how to view

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the problem based on the value frames derived either from a common sense of best practice or from public discourse. In such cases, an individual moves into a mode of inquiry, reflecting on past experiences-comparing them to one another and to the new situation at hand, thus ratiocinating toward a new frame. Returning to the notions of practice and inquiry put forth by Anderson, these three sources of values can be summarized by adding an additional dimension, that of community and individual. Communities of practice establish institutions and transfer frames of reference and modes of thought. Communities of inquiry engage in public discourse and experimentation. While individuals have a more or less well-developed sense of good practice, they also engage in inquiry. However, at the individual level these two activities are closely inter-twined in reflective practice. Resolving Value Conflicts

If there are three sources of the values held by individuals, one must ask how conflicting value judgments which come from the different sources are to be resolved. For example, one individual’s community traditions may say that gambling ought not to be permitted in the community. Yet the public discourse may currently be asserting that there are potential employment and tax benefits to be realized, with relatively few unfortunate consequences. How should such conflicts be resolved? Most of the writers discussed here would agree that in the case of a value conflict, more discussion is called for. (see particularly MacRae and Schon) In fact, this is often the major prescription offered. Unfortunately, the response is inadequate on two grounds. (see Anderson, pp. 167-168 for a slightly different treatment of these issues) First, there are limited resources. Broad based participation is both time consuming and resource intensive. It would prove impractical to resolve the national health care reform debate by simply holding a national “town meeting,” bringing out all the facts and perspectives, and continuing the discussion until reasonable consensus emerged. Second, there is the aggregation problem. As Arrow (1963), Riker (1982) and others have pointed out, collective decisions are a function of both the preferences of the participants and the decision rules employed. For a given set of preferences, a different agenda order or different method for counting votes will yield a very different result. What status should we accord then to popular, “town meeting” type decisions? As Riker observes, while such decisions should be acted upon, they do not assume any special sanctity. Further, to simply insure high participation says nothing about how the actual conflicts should be resolved. In essence, we have returned to the “high politics” conclusion. The point is that simply continuing the discussion will be expensive in terms of time and effort, and the result willnot necessarily be superior to decisions arrived at through other means.

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In fact, one must consider the nature of the policy problem in order to understand how decisions are made. Dunn (1988) describes policy problems along a continuum from well-structured to ill-structured, based on the number of decision makers, the number of alternatives, the degree of value conflict, and the level of knowledge regarding policy outcomes. Polsby (1984) observes that at least for the cases he considers, when there is broad consensus on the nature of the problem, the available options and the preferred alternative, there is little interest in inquiry and analysis. On the other hand, when problems are ill-structured, to use Dunn’s term, or there is substantial disagreement as to the nature of the problem, the available options or the decision criteria which should be employed, then inquiry and analysis are more likely to be employed and receive a hearing. But it is important to observe the nature of the hearing given and the inquiry conducted. To say that decision makers are more likely to entertain inquiry is not necessarily to say that broadly based citizen participation in the debate will follow. On the contrary, it appears more likely that the publics involved in the discussion will actually shrink. Whether decisions are made in the executive or legislative branch, the number of people involved will be relatively small. Consider for example an issue before a local city council. In a recent budget hearing in one local community, a citizen proposal was made to use city resources to hire additional policemen and station them at the local high school whenever school is in session. Note that the proposal came from the local Parent-Teachers Association, and was first made in a public hearing before the city council. The proposal was initially opposed by the Mayor and the police chief on administrative grounds, and by other citizens who objected to raising taxes or other revenues to fund police expansion. While there was a two-hour discussion of the proposal during the public hearing, the response of the city council was to defer the matter for “further study.” In this case, further study included staff review by the city budget office and the council’s administrative assistant, and discussion by the council during a regularly scheduled “work meeting.” These work meetings are open to the public, but the council is under no obligation to take public input. Following the work meeting, the formal decision was made during another public meeting. So, the decision process for this relatively minor albeit contentious issue was to move the debate out of the broad-based forum, solicit “expert” analysis from the staff, limit most discussion to a relatively small number of key participants, then go public with the final decision. We do not argue that this process is undemocratic or that the decision was in any way flawed. It does seem however that this pattern is relatively common at all levels of government, especially with more complex and contentious issues. Two problems can arise when this shrinking occurs. The first has to do with the balance of arguments presented by those remaining participants. Consider the example of the Cuban missile crisis, as described by Janis (1982). The process described by Janis as Groupthink prevailed and the lack of opposition or at least

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variety in the perspectives represented in the discussion led to what is generally considered a sub-optimal decision. The second difficulty has to do with feedback and accountability to the larger polity. If this inquiry is to inform and guide institutional learning (the function of communities of inquiry), then the feedback loop must be present. Further, if decision makers are to be accountable to the publics they serve, not only the decision but the underlying rationale must be communicated to those publics for consideration, evaluation and ratification, at least through the electoral process. All too often, the feedback is either missing altogether, or it is greatly attenuated. The public has little understanding of why certain decisions are made, and the relevant institutions gain little from the analysis and debate. The Role of Policy Analysis

The solution to these problems is to assure balance as the public shrinks and feedback when a decision is reached. The first objective would assure that the discussion remains representative of all relevant perspectives as the number of participants is reduced. The second objective would assure accountability and productive institutional inquiry. Both of these objectives suggest the appropriate role for the policy analyst. First, the analyst has a responsibility to keep public discourse focused and complete, as Reich and his co-authors suggest. Second, the analyst should work to keep the shrinking of publics balanced, rich and reflective. As Anderson notes, this is often difficult, and certainly requires an acknowledgment from decision makers that the role is essential to good decision making, even if it is somewhat irritating in the instance. Third, policy analysts can help insure accountability to larger communities. Reporting fully and fairly to the larger public, and rendering an accounting for the job performed by government is an often neglected function which would in the long run greatly improve public confidence in government action. Finally, the analyst can promote the educational functions of public discourse. While it is often the case that both bureaucrats and elected officials express rather extreme cynicism regarding the capacity of the public to understand complex issues, if the enterprise is to succeed and prosper, the institutions must experiment and learn. The policy analyst can play a vital role in achieving such an end. The Issue of Predictive

Power

In section two, we argued that one of the reasons for the success of self-interest based models in policy analysis relates to their ability to yield predictions of human behavior in diverse settings and in response to a wide range of policy initiatives. From this perspective, alternative theories should improve on the predictive power of policy analysis. It is important to note that post-positivist authors (e.g., Balfour and Mesaros, 1994; Kaplan, 1993) and others (e.g., Kiel, 1993; MacIntyre, 1984) would consider this criterion to be completely misguided.

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Analysis could clarify and evaluate the choice of outcomes to assure that appropriate outcomes are pursued.

l

Analysis could identify and evaluate the potential policy levers or options available to the decision maker.

l

Analysis could test and evaluate the hypothesized options and outcomes.

*

Analysis

relationships

between policy

could evaluate the process used to select outcomes and policy options.

Thus the notion of predictive power which should be of interest to the policy analysis community is one which enables us to argue with confidence (though probably never certainty) that if a given policy is adopted, desired and appropriate outcomes will result. Good analysis would therefore enhance our ability as a community and polity to answer the following questions in the affirmative: 1.

Are we acting from the appropriate

3I.

Do we accurately understand implicit and explicit‘?

3.

Are the affected parties informed, the policy?

4.

Does the process adequately

5.

Is the narrative persuasive?

value position? the necessary

empirical

relationships,

both

educated and learning from the process and

embody appropriate

levels of participation?

Clearly, this checklist is both ambitious and ambiguous, but it does provide a start as we attempt to establish legitimacy and quality standards as a profession.

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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS In this paper, we have outlined four major attempts to extend the theory underlying policy analysis. We find that there are substantial regions of agreement between the various approaches. There are also areas of differing emphasis. Further, it appears that all are incomplete statements, and that there is much work still needed to develop an adequate theoretical foundation for giving and evaluating professional public policy advice. Clearly, one of the most important areas of needed development centers on what analysts can say productively about essentially normative claims. We have identified two possibilities. One is to take the view of the public discourse advocates, and to focus solely on the process of public decision making and the nature and levels of public participation. It does not appear that by itself such an approach is likely to produce the desired outcomes of quality public decisions. Anderson notes that merely increasing the amount of talking does not assure that a decision will be reached. Further, as noted above, increased discussion is expensive and does not yield results which are intrinsically superior to decisions reached in other ways. This is not to say that public discussion is not important, but it does suggest that in itself, increased participation and discussion do not offer an adequate goal or standard for policy analysis. The second option is to identify the values which should guide public decision making and elaborate them more fully. Whether we take the “public interest” approach of Etzioni, the somewhat richer liberal values and good performance standard offered by Anderson, or some other articulation of appropriate values, the appropriate articulation of the principles to be employed is a vital issue. In this regard, Anderson’s work seems to present a very useful starting point and method for proceeding. The preceding section of the paper attempts to provide some initial synthesizing formulations and extensions to the work reviewed here. Three sources of human values were identified, and a largely empirical observation of how value conflicts are resolved was offered. Finally, a rather rich role for the policy analyst and a comparatively ambitious quality standard for analysis was suggested. An important task remaining is the enhancement of our understanding regarding the choice between established practice, or the institutional norms and values, and the “striking out” implied by notions of inquiry and even self-interest. Anderson offers four modes of reason, or potential justifications, for making a choice: l

Established norms of good practice;

l

Greater adherence to good principles;

l

Potential gains in performance; and

l

Broad-based support and agreement achieved through the satisfaction of diverse aims.

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Anderson notes that while discourse may change which of these is predominant in a given situation, only one will be used as the criterion of choice in a given decision. But this leaves open the question of how discourse may change our mind, or when it should. When are arguments and stories sufficiently compelling that decision makers should adopt one view over another? It seems likely that answering these questions will provide theoreticians and analysts with a rich research agenda for some time yet.

Acknowledgments:

We have benefited from the comments of Anand Desai, Lee Friedman, Carol Walters, N. Dale Wright, David K. Hart and Michael Thompson. Remaining errors, omissions and dumb statements are of course the rcsponhihility of the authors.

NOTES 1. Presented

at the APPAM Research Conference, Chicago, IL, October 1994. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics. Paris, July 1994.

REFERENCES Aaron, H. J. Mann, T. E. & Taylor, T. (Eds.) (1994). Values and public policy. Washington: Brookings Institution. Anderson, C. W. (1990). Prugmatic liberalism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Arrow, K. ( 1963). Social choice and individual values, 2nd Ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Balfour, D. L. & Mesaros, W. (1994). Connecting the local narratives: Public administration as a hermeneutic science. Public Administration Review, 54(6): 559-564. Bobrow, D. B., & Dryzek, J. S. (1987). Policy analysis by design. University of Pittsburgh Press. Brown, P. (1992). The failure of market failure. Journal ofSocio-economics, 2I( I): I-24. deleon, P. ( 1988). Advice and consent: The development of the policy sciences. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Douglas, M. (1986). How institutions think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Dryzek, J. S. (1993). Policy analysis and planning: from science to argument. In Fischer, F., & Forester, J. (Eds.) 1993. The argumentafive turn in policy analysis and planning. Durham: Duke University Press. Dunn, W. N. (1993). Policy reforms as arguments. In Fischer, F., & Forester, J. (Eds.) The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. Durham: Duke University Press. Dunn, W. N. (1988). Public policy analysis: An introduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Etzioni, A. ( 1993). Public policy in a new key. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Etzioni, A. (1991). A responsive society: Collected essays on guiding deliberate social change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Etzioni, A. (1988). Tlze morul dimension: Toward a new economics. New York: The Free Press. Etzioni, A., & Lawrence, P. T. (Eds.) (1991). Socio-economics: Toward (I new synthesis. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. Fischer, F., & Forester, J. (Eds.) (1993). The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. Durham: Duke University Press. Formaini, R. (I 990). The myth of scientific public policy. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Gillroy, J. M., & Wade, M. (Eds.) (1992). The moral dimensions ofpublic policy choice: Beyond the market paradigm. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

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