Public views of illegal migration policy and control strategies: A test of the core hypotheses

Journal of Criminal Justice 37 (2009) 317–327

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Journal of Criminal Justice

Public views of illegal migration policy and control strategies: A test of the core hypotheses Kevin Buckler a,⁎, Marc L. Swatt b, Patti Salinas a a b

Department of Criminal Justice, University of Texas at Brownsville, and Texas Southmost College, Brownsville, TX 78520, United States School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha, CPACS Room 218, 6001 Dodge Street, Omaha, NE 68182-0149, United States

a r t i c l e

i n f o

a b s t r a c t Illegal migration into the United States continues to be an important and contentious issue in the early stages of the twenty-first century. An important aspect of the contemporary migration debate is public opinion toward the various policy and control initiatives that have recently been discussed. This study used public opinion data from a 2006 study conducted by the Pew Research Center to test seven core hypotheses generated by prior academic research to explain variation in public support for cracking down on illegal migration into the United States (economic threat, culture threat, ethnic affect, core values, cultural affinity, contact, and group threat). The analysis found support for the economic threat, cultural threat, ethnic affect, core values, and cultural affinity hypotheses. The study found limited support for the contact hypothesis and no support for the group threat hypothesis. Semi-standardized coefficients were generated and suggested that the strongest predictors of support for enhanced controls on illegal migration were the cultural threat and cultural affinity measures. Implications of these findings are discussed. © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Despite popular sentiment that the United States is a “nation of migrants,” that has a tradition of being welcoming to migrants, American migration policy has historically fluctuated between hospitality and hostility (Behdad, 2005). Anti-migrant public opinion and policy mobilization has been a stable feature in the debate concerning migration since the mid-nineteenth century. In May of 1882, the federal government passed legislation known as the Chinese Exclusion Act. The Act barred Chinese skilled and unskilled workers from entering the United States for a period of ten years. The Act is significant because it was the first piece of legislation that challenged the open migration policy of the United States. The Act is also important because it established a precedent for restrictions on Asian migrants in the early 1900s and against European migrants in the 1920s (Gyory, 1998). In May of 1921, the federal government passed the Emergency Quota Act aimed at implementing a quota on the number of migrants that could be admitted into the United States. The 1921 Act established a 3 percent quota which limited the number of migrants that could be admitted from any given country to 3 percent of the number of persons already in the United States from the given country. The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the quota to 2 percent and was passed as a mechanism to restrict the flow of Europeans and Asians into the country.

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 956 621 1527; fax: +1 956 882 3859. E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Buckler). 0047-2352/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2009.06.008

Migration control efforts have persisted. Contemporary control efforts have, however, focused more on controlling illegal migration rather than general migration.1 In the mid-1980s, the Migration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Ronald Reagan. The Act made it illegal to knowingly recruit or hire illegal migrants and required that businesses force employees to attest as to their resident and migrant status. The Act also granted amnesty to some illegal migrants and granted a path toward citizenship to other illegal migrants. Most recently, there were efforts in 2005 and 2006, respectively, to pass federal legislation aimed at placing further controls on illegal migration. In 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act and in 2006 the U.S. Senate passed the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act; but neither bill became law because political consensus could not be reached concerning the specifics of either piece of proposed legislation. It is also important to note that several state- and-local-level jurisdictions have passed state laws and local ordinances in an effort to place enhanced restrictions on illegal migration (Barrett, 2007; Cepeda, 2007; Fears, 2007; Somashekhar, 2007). There have also been grass root, citizen-organized efforts to enhance controls on illegal migration. Several citizen-led anti-illegal migration organizations have been created using a “Minuteman” mantra. These organizations developed with the purpose of patrolling the border and lobbying legislative bodies to create policy to reduce illegal migration. For instance, the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (n.d.) have the following as their stated mission: “It is the mission of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps to see the borders and coastal boundaries of the

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United States secured against the unlawful and unauthorized entry of all individuals, contraband, and foreign military. We will employ all means of civil protest, demonstration, and political lobbying to accomplish this goal.” Thus, the most important contextual distinction between earlier migration reform efforts and contemporary reform efforts is the fact that recent migration reform has focused on illegal migration, specifically, rather than general migration. The more contemporary focus on illegal migration has seemingly been spurred by developments in migration trends into the United States. Migration trend data have clearly established that the recent influx of migration into the United States is from nearby Latin American nations. Three times as many Mexican migrants resided in the United States in 1980 than did in 1970, and the number of Mexican migrants nearly doubled from 1980 to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000 (Camarota, 2001). A substantial portion of this migration has been in the form of illegal migration. According to a recent Office of Migration Statistics report, 69 percent of the unauthorized migrant population in the United States originated from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Honduras (Department of Homeland Security, 2006). A majority of this illegal migration has been from Mexico; in 2006, 57 percent of the illegal migrants that entered the country were from Mexico (Department of Homeland Security, 2006). The close distal proximity of these Latin American nations makes illegal migration easier and makes efforts to control illegal migration more difficult. The issue of illegal migration into the United States rose to national prominence between the years 2005 and 2006. A Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe keyword search of The New York Times and The Washington Post using the term “illegal immigration”2 retrieved a total of 85 news articles for the year 2003. There were 302, 698, and 751 news articles published that referenced “illegal immigration” in the respective years of 2005, 2006, and 2007. Much of the attention on illegal migration focused on proposals to control the flow of illegal migrants into the country. Although the issue of illegal migration was clearly a topic of national importance during the aforementioned years, the federal government did not pass a major comprehensive migration reform bill. This was likely the result of several converging factors that prohibited political agreement and compromise. The notion of controlling illegal migration has been an issue that divides people along philosophical and ideological dimensions (see, for instance, the distinction in the views of Krikorian, 2008; Motomura, 2007). American businesses have a substantial interest in the issue of illegal migration because illegal migration is a source of cheap labor (Gutierrez, 1995). The most recent debate on illegal migration (2005–2007) occurred at a time in history when the country was experiencing a major demographic shift. Hispanics had surpassed African Americans as the largest minority population (Buckler, Unnever, & Cullen, 2008). Many in the Hispanic population viewed the contemporary debate on illegal migration as an attack on the Hispanic population in the United States. This prompted prominent Hispanic leaders to organize a series of high-profile, wellattended protests in opposition to HR 4437, a bill that contained several provisions that would have further criminalized illegal migration for people entering the nation illegally and people who have aided illegal migrants. Media outlets have recently noted the increasing power of the “Hispanic vote” (see, for instance, Roberts, Sawyer, & Shipman, 2008; Roth, 2008). Unlike previous historical crackdowns on migration, politicians were likely concerned that migration reform would offend a growing voting base that is comprised of people with similar ethnic characteristics to the persons that migration reform would target. In light of this current context surrounding the contemporary migration debate, this exploratory study sought to better understand how the general public views the issue of illegal migration. Public opinion toward proposed illegal migration control efforts is an important area of scholarly inquiry. While there has already been an impressive body of research on the correlates of opinions toward enhanced migration control efforts, the context of the issue has changed

recently. Most of the prior research was conducted at a time when Hispanics were a much smaller minority group in the United States. At the time of the study under analysis in this article, non-White Hispanics constituted the largest racial/ethnic group in the United States (73.9 percent of the population), but several government reports have noted the changing demographic landscape in the United States. Since 2000, Hispanics have accounted for one-half of the growth in the United States population (Fry, 2008). Census reports have also suggested that by 2050 the total White, non-Hispanic population may comprise only 50 percent of the population, compared to 69 percent in 2000 (Bergman, 2004). It is clear that the changing racial and ethnic demographics of the United States made it a much more diverse country than ever before. This changing social context suggests a need for further research on the correlates of public opinion toward enhanced control efforts. While some recent research has been conducted on the issue of public opinion toward illegal migration (see, for instance, Buckler, 2008), the data used for the current study were collected at the height of the current illegal migration debate. The current study was also important because it explored public support for a wide range of policy approaches and unofficial control efforts. In terms of official policy incentives, the study explored public support for the policy of deportation of illegal migrants, preventing illegal migrants from being eligible for social services, and a Constitutional amendment that would change the law in the United States and disallow automatic citizenship to children born to illegal migrants while they are in the United States. These three policy options are distinct in form and function. Deportation is a policy option that would completely remove illegal migrants from the United States. The social services ineligibility option is a strategy that would place hardships and additional burdens on illegal migrants once they have entered the country. The Constitutional amendment option is a strategy that seeks to reduce the desire to enter this country by changing the circumstances for children of illegal migrants as a result of the decisions of the child's parents. In the context of unofficial control strategy, the current study explored public support for the tactics of the Minuteman organizations (private groups of citizens who patrol the border areas). This is important because prior research has not explored public support toward grass roots citizen-led control efforts. This study reviewed the prior research on public opinion toward migration and illegal migration and identified seven main hypotheses from the prior studies that made predictions that are relevant to public opinion toward illegal migration policy and control strategy. The study then tested these hypotheses using data collected in 2006 as part of a Pew Research Center study. Implications of the findings are discussed. American public opinion and migration It is important for academic scholars to explore the determinants of public support for various methods of controlling illegal migration. By examining the correlates of public support, it is possible to develop a better understanding of the factors that lead people to support or oppose various policy and control strategies. Prior research has identified several hypotheses concerning the factors that explain why some people support general migration and illegal migration control policies while others do not. This article applies the logic of these factors to explaining variation in public support for various strategies to control illegal migration into the United States. The extension of the theoreticallyderived factors that have been used to account for variation in attitudes toward general migration to attitudes toward illegal migration is not problematic, for a variety of reasons. First, prior research by Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) applied many of the same hypotheses reviewed and tested in this analysis to undocumented migration (the economic threat hypothesis, the cultural affinity hypothesis, and the core values hypothesis). Since prior research had examined the influence of variables that measure many of these theoretical frameworks on

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perceptions of undocumented migration, this added validity to the approach of this study that applied these theoretical frameworks to perceptions of controlling illegal migration. Second, historically, legal migration and illegal migration patterns have correlated with one another. To illustrate this connection, data concerning the number of migrants who were granted legal status and the number of deportable illegal migrants detained by authorities were collected for the years 1970–2005 from the Department of Homeland Security Immigration Yearbook. The Pearson correlation coefficient for a two-tailed test was statistically significant (Pearson correlation coefficient = .37; p b .025). Another important manifestation of the connection between general migration and legal migration is how many of the same assertions generated to oppose general migration in prior eras are similar to contemporary arguments supportive of a crackdown on illegal migration. The impetus to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act was spearheaded by a downturn in economic conditions (Gyory, 1998). The current movement to get tough on illegal migration in the United States has been fueled by concerns that unskilled illegal migrants harm the economic vitality of American families by taking jobs that Americans could fill and that illegal migrants drive down wages because they accept these positions for lower wages than American citizens could accept (Mac Donald, Hanson, & Malanga, 2007). Lastly, a strong argument can be made that many of the same factors that are linked to public views of legal migration will also be important predictors of perceptions concerning illegal migration controls. The major difference between legal migration and illegal migration is whether a particular migrant followed all of the rules and regulations in place to lead to lawful citizenship. When legal migration occurs, individuals from other nations enter the United States; and when illegal migration occurs, individuals from other nations enter the United States. It is highly likely that the same attitudinal and demographic factors that predict support for controls on general migration (legal and illegal) will be applicable for predicting support for enhanced controls on illegal migration. The main difference between general migration and illegal migration is whether the migrant followed the laws of the United States in the migration process, thus, the concept of legal authoritarianism would likely be more predictive of support for enhanced controls on illegal migration in comparison to general migration.

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& Hempstead, 1996; Hood & Morris, 1997). The culture threat hypothesis suggests that respondents with more intense feelings that migrants represent a threat to American culture will be more likely to support enhanced efforts to control illegal migration. Prior research has taken a variety of different approaches to conceptualizing culture threat. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) measured this concept by gauging the respondent's belief in either isolationist or global mentalities. Hood and Morris (1997) assessed culture threat by asking respondents the degree to which they believed that Hispanics and Asians, respectively, contribute to American society. Buckler (2008) measured culture threat by using a scaled item from questions that asked respondents about the adjustment of moral views to a changing world, whether newer lifestyles lead to a social breakdown, and whether society should be more tolerant of different moral standards. Chander and Tsai (2001) measured culture threat through respondent fear of the impact of migration on the use of the English language in the United States. The prior research produced mixed support for the culture threat hypothesis. One potential reason for these mixed results may be that much of the prior research has not used measures that look to directly assess the hypothesis by asking respondents whether they believe that migrants present a threat to American culture or the American way of life. The current study utilized more direct measures of culture threat than had been used in many of the prior analyses. The ethnic affect hypothesis The ethnic affect hypothesis maintains that citizens who hold negative or stereotypical attitudes toward groups of people that frequently migrate into a nation will be more likely to support enhanced policy and strategies to control migration (Buckler, 2008; Citren et al., 1997; Golash-Boza, 2006; Hood & Morris, 1997; Lee & Fiske, 2006; Pantoja, 2006). Some researchers (Citren et al., 1997; Golash-Boza, 2006; Lee & Fiske, 2006) had found strong support for the ethnic affect hypothesis, while other researchers (Buckler, 2008; Hood & Morris, 1997; Pantoja, 2006) found limited support for the hypothesis and have suggested that the link between ethnic affect and migration attitudes must be further qualified by future research. Buckler (2008) found that ethnic affect predicted affective attitudes toward illegal migrants, but not policy-oriented opinions.

The economic threat hypothesis The core American values hypothesis The economic threat hypothesis suggests that the general public is very pragmatic in their judgments about methods to control illegal migration. According to the economic threat hypothesis, individuals who perceive that migrants present an economic threat to society will be more supportive of enhanced control measures and strategies (Binder, Polinard, & Wrinkle, 1997; Buckler, 2008; Citren, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Hood & Morris, 1997; Pantoja, 2006). Prior research has established strong support for direct measures of economic threat that asked respondents about migrant impact on American jobs or on the American tax system (Alvarez & Butterfield, 2000; Binder et al., 1997; Buckler, 2008; Citren et al., 1997). Research that has used more indirect measures of economic threat (income, education, occupation, and perceptions of the economic health of the nation) has produced inconsistent results (Chander & Tsai, 2001; Citren et al., 1997; Hood & Morris, 1997; Pantoja, 2006).

The core American values hypothesis suggests that core attitudes and beliefs are an important determinant of migration policy and control strategy preference. The core values hypothesis focuses on how core values, such as individualism, egalitarianism, and symbolic patriotism, condition citizen support for policy options to control migration. The current study used measures of individualism to test the core values hypothesis. Pantoja (2006) defined individualism as “the belief that individuals can and should get ahead on their own merit without government assistance” (p. 520) and also cited a definition of individualism from Feldman (1999) which suggested that individualism is also characterized by “the commitment to merit as the basis for the distribution of rewards in society” (p. 160). Pantoja (2006) and Buckler (2008) found individualism to be associated with respondent migration policy preference, and Buckler (2008) found individualism to be related to affective evaluation of illegal migrants as a population.

The culture threat hypothesis The culture affinity hypothesis Other hypotheses from the extant literature suggest that there are other factors that influence public judgments aside from pragmatic concerns of American citizens regarding the economy. The culture threat hypothesis suggests that anxieties over the cultural impact of migrants on American society will impact public judgment on policy and control efforts (Buckler, 2008; Chander & Tsai, 2001; Espenshade

The culture affinity hypothesis suggests that individuals who have close cultural and ethnic ties with their nation of origin are less likely to support policies to further eliminate or reduce the flow of illegal migrants into the United States. The primary method that has been used to test the culture affinity hypothesis has been to determine whether

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Hispanics are less likely than Whites to support tougher control mechanisms (Cain & Kiewiet, 1986; Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; Harwood, 1983, 1985; Miller, Polinard, & Wrinkle, 1984). Other researchers have argued that the proposed link between being Hispanic and being in opposition to harsher control methods may not be as straightforward. Branton (2007), de la Garza (1985), and de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia (1993) argued that it is a mistake to think of Hispanics as a one-dimensional solidified group; instead, their commentary suggested that Hispanic level of acculturation into American society is an important factor. Their discussion suggested that more acculturated Hispanics are more likely to mirror the values and attitudes held by Whites concerning migration policy; whereas less acculturated Hispanics will more stringently oppose additional policy and enhanced control proposals. Sanchez (2006) suggested that Hispanic public opinion on migration is a function of ethnic group consciousness. Much of the prior research has added validity to this argument; very few studies have found a “Hispanic” effect and some studies (Binder et al., 1997; Branton, 2007) found acculturation of Mexican Americans did impact their attitudes toward migration policy. The contact and group threat hypotheses The last two hypotheses identified in the extant research were the contact hypothesis and the group threat hypothesis. These two hypotheses are truly competing hypotheses in the sense that each hypothesis makes a prediction that is opposite to that which is inherent in the other hypothesis. The contact hypothesis maintains that contact with recent migrants or people perceived as being recent migrants will enable people to be less supportive of “get tough” control measures because contact with these people creates a situation whereby, in the words of Rothbart and John (1993), “hostility is reduced as a result of increasingly favorable attitudes toward individual group members, which then generalize to the group as a whole” (p. 42). The group threat hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that increased proximity of minority racial and ethnic groups increases the likelihood that members of the majority group will view these minority groups as a growing threat; thus, according to the group threat hypothesis, people with more contact with minority populations are more likely to support greater control measures (Blumer, 1958; Kinder & Mendelberg, 1995; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Van den Berghe, 1967). Most of the prior research tested these two competing hypotheses by generating contextual contact measures that recorded the percentage of the population in the respondent's immediate surroundings that were foreign-born (Citren et al., 1997; Pantoja, 2006), or were Hispanic or Asian (Buckler, 2008; Hood & Morris, 1997). Hood and Morris (1997) also used residence in the state of California as a measure of contact/ group threat. Fennelly and Federico (2008) measured the group threat and contact hypothesis by creating a rural residence variable. The findings of these previous studies were mixed. Some research produced no support for either hypothesis—in essence, a null effect using the theoretically derived measures (Citren et al., 1997; Pantoja, 2006). Some research has produced support for the group threat hypothesis (Alvarez & Butterfield, 2000; Fennelly & Federico, 2008; Hood & Morris, 1997). Buckler (2008) and Hood and Morris (1997) found some support for the contact hypothesis. In the Buckler (2008) study, as percent of population Hispanic increased, negative affective evaluation of illegal migrants declined, but percent population Hispanic had no effect on perceptions toward policy to control illegal migration. In the Hood and Morris (1997) analysis, as percent Asian increased, negative attitudes toward migration decreased, but percent Hispanic population exerted no influence on perceptions of migration. Pettigrew and Tropp's (2006) meta-analysis of intergroup contact theory produced evidence supportive of the contact hypothesis. The meta-analysis examined 713 independent samples from 515 different studies of interracial and inter-ethnic contact and found broad support for the notion that intergroup contact reduces intergroup prejudice.

Methods Data The data used in this study originated from a survey that was conducted by the Pew Research Center and was sponsored by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and the Pew Hispanic Center. The survey was conducted between February 8, 2006 and March 7, 2006. The sample was a national sample of adults. The study also over-sampled adults in Chicago, Illinois; Las Vegas, Nevada; Phoenix, Arizona; Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; and Washington, D.C. Eighty-eight percent of the sample reported that they were born in the United States and 78 percent of the sample reported that both of their parents were born in the United States. Unfortunately, there was no reliable way of determining whether any of the respondents in the sample were illegal migrants.3 The data reported in the descriptive and multivariate analyses were weighted based on demographic information. The original sample included 6,003 respondents; but the survey items used as the dependent variables were only asked to 3,000 of the respondents. In addition, after respondents with missing values on the variables used in the analyses were handled through listwise deletion procedures, the number of usable responses ranged between 1,056 and 715 depending on the dependent variable of interest.4 Table 1 provides weighted summary descriptive statistics for each of the dependent and independent variables used in the

Table 1 Descriptive statistics Mean Dependent variables Deportation Minuteman tactics Social service eligibility Constitutional amendment

SD

Min.

Max.

.50 .53 .66 .43

.50 .49 .47 .49

0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1

Economic threat Global economic condition Local economic condition Personal economic condition Family member lost job Take jobs Income tax inequality Family income Education

2.78 1.92 2.42 .20 1.51 .60 5.21 4.31

.83 .99 .85 .40 .85 .49 2.36 1.71

1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1

4 3 4 1 3 1 9 7

Culture threat

7.83

1.91

4

11

Ethnic affect General view of Hispanics Hispanic stereotype

2.00 6.56

.77 1.25

1 5

4 10

Core value Individualism: government benefits Individualism: hard work

.39 .68

.48 .36

0 0

1 1

Cultural affinity Hispanic Both parents U.S. born

.14 .78

.45 .41

0 0

1 1

Contact/group threat Objective migrant contact Subjective migrant contact

12.43 3.11

10.41 .92

0 1

73 4

Structural location controls African American Other race Female Age Religion Conservative Over sample

.15 .05 .48 41.70 3.66 3.15 .68

.36 .23 .50 16.07 1.52 .96 .46

0 0 0 18 1 1 0

1 1 1 97 7 5 1

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analyses. Table 2 also provides descriptive information for the demographic variables used in the analyses, reported by percent. Dependent variables Four different dependent variables were used in the analysis. Each dependent variable measured a distinct aspect of public views toward the control of illegal migration. The variable deportation measured respondent views about whether illegal migrants currently living in the United States should be forced to go back to their native country or whether they should be granted a legal status that allows them to remain in the United States (1= forced to go home, 0 = should be granted legal status that allows them to remain). Fifty percent of the weighted sample believed that illegal migrants should be forced to leave the United States through deportation proceedings. A second dependent variable, Minutemen tactics, measured the extent to which the respondent supported the tactics of the civilian border security efforts by the groups that refer to themselves as the Minutemen (1= approve of the tactics, 0 = disapprove of the tactics). Fifty-three percent of the weighted sample supported the tactics of the Minuteman organizations. The tactics of the Minuteman groups are not official government policy strategies that were discussed to curb illegal migration; in fact, the tactics of the Minutemen were condemned at the highest levels of government as being vigilante in nature (Baker, 2005). The tactics of the

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Minuteman groups do, however, represent a clear strategy to control illegal migration that can either be supported or opposed by the general public. It is also reasonable to believe that the factors that account for variation in public support for official policy options are many of the same factors that would account for variation in public support for citizen-led control strategies. The third dependent variable focused on opinion toward social service benefits granted to illegal migrants. For the variable social service eligibility, respondents were asked whether illegal aliens who reside in the United States should be eligible for social service benefits provided by federal, state, and local governments (1 = should not be eligible, 0 = should be eligible). Sixty-six percent of the weighted sample believed that illegal migrants should not be eligible for social service benefits. The last dependent variable focused on the issue of the citizenship of children born in the United States to illegal migrants. The variable Constitutional amendment measured whether the respondent agreed that the U.S. Constitution should be amended to prohibit the children of illegal migrants born in the United States from being endowed with citizenship rights at birth (1 = Constitution should be amended to reflect such a prohibition, 0 = Constitution should remain unchanged). Forty-three percent of the weighted sample supported a Constitutional amendment to prohibit children of illegal migrants from being endowed with citizenship rights at birth. Independent variables

Table 2 Demographic profile of the samples (reported as percentages) 1

2

3

4

5

6

Black Hispanic Other Female

12.0 11.3 6.1 52.0

13.6 13.1 6.3 51.2

15.5 14.2 5.9 47.9

10.6 17.1 4.7 39.6

15.3 14.1 5.9 47.8

15.5 14.3 5.8 47.7

Conservative Very liberal Liberal Moderate Conservative Very conservative

5.1 15.5 43.2 30.6 5.5

5.7 16.0 42.0 30.5 5.7

5.9 16.0 41.7 30.0 6.4

6.1 15.0 39.5 32.1 7.2

6.0 15.9 41.6 30.1 6.5

5.9 16.0 41.6 30.0 6.5

Religion Never Seldom Once/twice a month A few times a year Once a week More than once a week

11.4 14.8 18.7 15.4 26.9 12.8

12.1 14.9 18.7 15.7 25.9 12.6

10.0 15.8 20.1 18.6 23.7 11.8

9.7 17.0 18.8 19.8 23.8 10.8

10.1 15.8 20.0 18.7 23.7 11.7

10.0 15.7 20.1 18.6 23.8 11.7

Income Less than 10K 10K to under 20K 20K to under 30K 30K to under 40K 40K to under 50K 50K to under 75K 75K to under 100K 100K to under 150K 150K or more

4.9 9.4 10.4 11.2 10.6 17.6 14.8 11.8 9.2

6.8 11.2 11.8 11.7 10.4 16.8 13.5 10.2 7.5

6.7 10.4 10.4 11.8 9.9 17.0 14.3 11.4 8.1

5.3 10.1 10.0 11.5 10.8 17.0 14.3 11.4 9.7

6.8 10.4 10.4 11.7 9.9 17.0 14.4 11.4 8.1

6.8 10.4 10.5 11.8 9.9 17.0 14.2 11.4 8.1

Education None or grade 1–8 Grade 9–11 High school graduate or GED Vocational after high school AS or some college Four-year college degree Post-undergraduate

2.2 5.7 23.6 2.4 23.9 25.0 17.1

4.2 12.0 27.8 2.4 24.9 17.4 11.2

4.6 10.2 28.5 2.1 26.4 17.7 10.6

6.1 10.3 25.9 2.0 25.0 19.5 11.3

4.6 10.1 28.7 2.1 26.4 17.7 10.5

4.6 10.2 28.5 2.1 26.5 17.4 10.6

Both parents U.S. born

79.4

78.0

78.5

74.9

78.7

78.5

1 = original sample (n = between 6,003 and 5,640 depending on the variable of interest); 2 = weighted sample; 3 = weighted sample, deportation cases (n = 1,037); 4 = weighted sample, Minuteman cases (n = 715); 5 = weighted sample, social service cases (n = 1,054); 6 = weighted sample, Constitutional amendment cases (n = 1,056).

Economic threat Eight different variables were used to assess the impact of economic threat on public support for measures to control illegal migration. First, a global economic variable that recorded respondent perception of economic conditions in the United States was used as a measure of economic threat (1 = excellent, 2 = good, 3 = only fair, 4 = poor). Second, the variable local economic was constructed from a question that asked respondents to rate the availability of jobs in their local community (1= plenty of jobs available, 2 = lots of some jobs and few of others, 3 = jobs are difficult to find). A third variable, personal economic, measured respondent perception of their own personal economic condition (1= excellent shape, 2 = good shape, 3 = only fair shape, 4 = poor shape). A fourth variable, lost job, measured whether the respondent believed that they, or a family member, had ever lost a job or not gotten a job because an employer hired migrant workers instead (1= yes, 0 = no). The fifth variable, take jobs, measured respondent views on whether they thought that migrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs that Americans don't want (1= take unwanted jobs, 2 = both, 3 = take jobs away). Sixth, the variable tax inequality measured whether the respondent believed that migrants pay their fair share of taxes (1 = no, 0 = yes). The seventh variable, family income, was measured using a ninepoint scale (1 = $9,999 or less; 2 = $10,000 to $19,999; 3 = $20,000 to $29,000; 4 = $30,000 to $39,999; 5 = $40,000 to $49,999; 6 = $50,000 to $74,999; 7 = $75,000 to $99,999; 8 = $100,000 to $149,999; 9 = $150,000 and over). The last measure of economic threat was education (1= none, or grades one to eight; 2 = high school incomplete, grades nine to eleven; 3 = high school graduate or GED; 4 = technical, trade, or vocational school after high school; 5 = some college but no four-year degree, associate's degree included; 6 = college graduate, four-year degree; 7 = postgraduate training or professional schooling after four-year college degree). Culture threat Culture threat was measured by using a four-item summed scale (α = .642).5 Respondents were asked whether they believed that recent migrants have learned the English language within a reasonable amount of time (1= yes they have, 2 = no they have not). A second item provided respondents with the following statement and asked whether

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the respondent agreed with the statement: “Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Would you say you completely disagree, mostly disagree, mostly agree, or completely agree?” (1= completely disagree, 2 = mostly disagree, 3 = mostly agree, 4 = completely agree). Respondents were also asked whether they mostly agreed with Statement 1, “The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society,” or Statement 2, “The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values.” (1 = Statement 1; 2 = Statement 2). Lastly, respondents were asked whether today's migrants, compared to the migrants of the early 1900s are more willing, about as willing, or less willing to adapt to the American way of life (1= more willing to adapt, 2 = about as willing to adapt, 3 = less willing to adapt). Single item deletion analysis was generated and the highest alpha value was obtained when all four measures were included. Ethnic affect Ethnic affect was measured using two different variables. For the first measure, general views of Hispanics, respondents were asked whether their views of Hispanics, as a population, were favorable or unfavorable (1 = very favorable, 2 = mostly favorable, 3 = mostly unfavorable, 4 = very unfavorable). A second measure of ethnic affect was a fiveitem scaled variable (α = .631) that was comprised of items that asked respondents whether they believed a series of statements applied to migrants of Latin countries (Hispanic stereotype). Respondents were asked whether: they work very hard (1= applies, 2 = does not apply); they often end up on welfare (1= does not apply, 2 = applies); they do very well in school (1= applies, 2 = does not apply); they significantly increase crime (1= does not apply, 2 = applies); and they have strong family values (1= applies, 2 = does not apply). Single item deletion analysis was generated and the highest alpha value was obtained when all five measures were included.

parents born in the U.S., 0 = one or both parents were not born in the U.S.).

Contact and group threat Two different variables were used to assess the effects of the contact and group threat hypotheses. The variable objective contact measured the objective level of contact that the respondent had with recent migrants by recording the percentage of foreign born persons in the respondent's zip code. A variable was also constructed to measure subjective contact. A question from the survey asked each respondent to assess how many recent migrants the respondent would say lives in their area (1 = none, 2 = only a few, 3 = some, 4 = many).

Covariates The multivariate analyses reported in this study controlled for several covariates. Respondent race was incorporated as a control variable. African American (1 = African American; 0 = non-African American) and other race (1 = other race, 0 = not some other race) variables were created. The variable female was included (1 = female, 0 = male). Age was controlled by using a continuous measure that recorded the actual age (in years) of the respondent. Religion was measured by using a survey item that asked respondents “Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?” (1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = a few times a year, 4 = once or twice a month, 5 = once a week, 6 = more than once a week). The variable conservative was also included as a control variable (1 = very liberal, 2 = liberal, 3 = moderate, 4 = conservative, 5 = very conservative). Lastly, an over sample measure was created to control for whether the respondent was part of the over sample (1 = respondent was part of the over sampling, 0 = respondent was not part of the over sampling) mentioned in the “data” section.

Individualism The concept of individualism was measured using two dichotomous variables. Respondents were asked whether they believed Statement 1, “Poor people have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return,” or Statement 2, “Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them.” Those agreeing with Statement 1 were coded as a value of one and those agreeing with Statement 2 were coded a value of zero on the variable government benefits. Respondents were also asked whether they agreed with Statement 1, “Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're willing to work hard,” or Statement 2, “Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people.” For the variable hard work, respondents who agreed with Statement 1 were coded as a value of one and those that agreed with Statement 2 were coded a value of zero. An effort was made to combine these two variables into one measure but alpha analysis suggested that the variables were conceptually distinct (α = .285). Cultural affinity Two variables were used to measure culture affinity. A variable that coded whether respondents indicated that they were Hispanic or non-Hispanic (1 = Hispanic, 0 = non-Hispanic) was created. White respondents were used as the reference category. Even though the proportion of the population that was White, non-Hispanic was declining; in 2006 (the year of the study), White, non-Hispanic persons comprised the clear majority population; thus, White, nonHispanic respondents were the appropriate comparison group for the study. A measure both parents U.S. born recorded whether both of the respondent's parents were born in the United States (1 = both

Missing data Table 2 reports percentages for the demographic measures used as independent variables of interest and covariates in the analyses. The percentage-based information is reported for the original unweighted sample, for the entire weighted sample, and for the weighted sample of cases used in each of the multivariate analyses reported in this study. The reported multivariate analyses were generated using listwise deletion. This resulted in a large number of cases being removed prior to the analysis. There is nothing reported in Table 4 that is alarming with respect to whether the analyses were biased due to missing cases. See Note 4 for a more detailed discussion of the influence of missing data on the multivariate results.

Research strategy This study used logistic regression analysis to predict public support for four different policy and control approaches to responding to illegal migration. Zero-order Pearson correlation coefficients were generated to check for collinearity issues amongst the independent variables. The highest Pearson correlation coefficient between independent variables was .55 (family income and local economic conditions). No variance inflation factor exceeded the value of 1.86.

Findings Descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The findings from the multivariate regression analyses are reported in Tables 3 and 4.

K. Buckler et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 37 (2009) 317–327 Table 3 Regression analyses predicting support for deportation and Minuteman tactics Deportation

Minuteman tactics

SE

Odds ratio

βR

.01 .01 − .04 .01 .81 .38 − .03 .12

.07 .06 .08 .16 .07 .12 .03 .03

1.01 1.01 .96 1.01 2.25⁎⁎⁎ 1.46⁎⁎ .96 1.13⁎⁎

.01 .01 .02 .01 .59 .15 .06 .17

Culture threat

.34

.03

1.41⁎⁎⁎

Ethnic affect Hispanics: general view Hispanic stereotype

.39 .23

.08 .05

Core value: individualism Government benefits Hard work

.26 .29

SE

Odds ratio

βR

.05 − .36 − .14 .62 .52 .74 − .13 .11

.10 .08 .11 .23 .10 .16 .04 .05

1.05 .69⁎⁎⁎ .86 1.86⁎⁎ 1.68⁎⁎⁎ 2.10⁎⁎⁎ .87⁎⁎⁎ 1.12⁎

.03 .29 .08 .20 .36 .28 .22 .16

.50

.20

.04

1.22⁎⁎⁎

.29

1.48⁎⁎⁎ 1.26⁎⁎⁎

.26 .24

.22 .20

.10 .07

1.25⁎ 1.22⁎⁎

.15 .21

.12 .12

1.30⁎ 1.33⁎

.11 .12

.66 .13

.16 .17

1.93⁎⁎⁎ 1.13

.27 .05

− 1.62 .03

.23 .16

.19⁎⁎⁎ 1.03

.41 .01

− 1.49 1.15

.29 .20

.22⁎⁎⁎ 3.15⁎⁎⁎

.38 .38

− .01 − .05

.01 .06

.98⁎ .94

.13 .04

− .01 − .13

.01 .08

b Economic threat Global economic Local economic Personal economic Lost job Take jobs Tax inequality Family income Education

Cultural affinity Hispanic Two parents U.S. born Contact/group threat Objective contact Subjective contact

b

.98 .97

.10 .11

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effect. Hispanics were less likely than Whites to support mass deportation of illegal migrants. There was limited support for the contact hypothesis. Objective migrant contact was statistically associated with less support for deportation. Lastly, several of the covariates were statistically significant. African Americans and members of “other” races were less likely than Whites to support deportation of illegal migrants. Older interviewees were less likely to support deportation. Conservatives were more likely to support forcing illegal migrants out of the United States. Some of the findings concerning deportation support were especially noteworthy. As noted, this model found that Hispanics were more likely than Whites to support deportation. In a separate analysis (not reported), the dependent variable of interest was reverse coded (1 = should be granted legal status that allows them to remain, 0 = forced to go home) to produce a more meaningful odds ratio. Hispanics were 5.05 times more likely than Whites to believe that illegal migrants should be granted legal status that allows them to remain in the United States. Individuals who believed that migrants take jobs from American citizens were 2.25 times more likely than those who do not believe that migrants take jobs from American citizens to support deportation of illegal migrants. Individuals who believed that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes were 1.46

Table 4 Regression analyses predicting support for social service eligibility and Constitutional amendment Social service eligibility

Covariates African American Other race Female Age Religion Conservative Over sample

− .88 − .52 .03 − .01 − .05 .28 .19

Sample size Cox & Snell R2 Nagelkerke R2

1,037 .36 .48

.16 .23 .11 .01 .03 .06 .12

.41⁎⁎⁎ .59⁎ 1.03 .98⁎⁎⁎ .94 1.32⁎⁎⁎ 1.21

.28 .11 .01 .23 .08 .24 .08

− 1.02 .27 − .54 − .01 − .10 .33 –

.23 .33 .15 .01 .05 .08 –

.35⁎⁎⁎ 1.31 .57⁎⁎⁎ .99 .90⁎ 1.39⁎⁎⁎ –

.28 .05 .25 .04 .14 .28 –

715 .39 .53

⁎p b .05. ⁎⁎p b .01. ⁎⁎⁎p b .001.

Support for deportation With respect to support for deportation, there was general support for five of the seven hypotheses (economic threat, culture threat, ethnic affect, core values, cultural affinity, and contact). Four different economic threat variables exerted a statistically significant influence on support for deportation. Individuals who believed that migrants take jobs from Americans, who believed that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes, and who earn more income and are more highly educated were statistically more likely to support deportation. Interviewees who believed that migrants present a threat to American culture were also statistically more likely to support forcing illegal migrants to leave the United States. Both measures of negative ethnic affect were significant predictors of support for deportation; individuals who held negative attitudes toward Hispanics and who subscribed to Hispanic stereotypes were more likely to support deportation. Core American values also exerted an influence on deportation support. Interviewees who ascribed to the individualistic beliefs that the poor take advantage of social service systems without contributing to society in return and who held strong beliefs about the value of getting ahead through hard work were more supportive of forcing illegal migrants to leave the country. There was also a cultural affinity

Constitutional amendment

SE

Odds ratio

βR

b

SE

Odds ratio

βR

.01 − .26 .04 .37 .33 .49 − .02 .18

.07 .06 .08 .18 .08 .13 .03 .04

1.01 .76⁎⁎⁎ 1.04 1.45⁎ 1.40⁎⁎⁎ 1.65⁎⁎⁎ .97 1.20⁎⁎⁎

.01 .22 .02 .12 .24 .19 .05 .26

− .11 − .01 .04 .34 .20 .36 .08 − .05

.06 .05 .07 .14 .06 .11 .02 .03

.05 .99 1.04 1.41⁎ 1.22⁎⁎⁎ 1.44⁎⁎ 1.08⁎⁎ .94

.08 .01 .03 .11 .14 .14 .14 .07

Culture threat

.23

.03

1.26⁎⁎⁎

.33

.27

.03

1.31⁎⁎⁎

.39

Ethnic affect Hispanics: general view Hispanic stereotype

.07 .21

.07 .05

1.23⁎ 1.24⁎⁎⁎

.13 .22

.07 .15

.07 .04

1.07 1.17⁎⁎⁎

.05 .16

Core value: individualism Government benefits Hard work

.97 .40

.13 .12

2.65⁎⁎⁎ 1.49⁎⁎⁎

.42 .17

.27 .00

.11 .11

1.31⁎ 1.00

.11 .01

− 1.48 .85

.21 .16

.22⁎⁎⁎ 2.35⁎⁎⁎

.38 .28

− .58 .17

.20 .15

.56⁎⁎ 1.19

.14 .05

Contact/group threat Objective contact Subjective contact

− .01 − .01

.01 .06

.98⁎ .99

.13 .01

.01 .06

.01 .05

1.00 1.06

.01 .05

Covariates African American Other race Female Age Religion Conservative Over sample

− .53 − .10 − .39 − .01 − .05 .21 .23

.16 .24 .11 .01 .03 .06 .12

.58⁎⁎⁎ .90 .67⁎⁎⁎ .99 .94 1.23⁎⁎⁎ 1.26

.16 .02 .18 .04 .07 .18 .10

− .40 − .03 .14 .01 − .05 .18 .16

.15 .22 .10 .01 .03 .05 .11

.66⁎⁎ .96 1.15 1.00⁎⁎ .94 1.20⁎⁎⁎ 1.17

.12 .01 .07 .13 .08 .16 .07

Sample size Cox & Snell R2 Nagelkerke R2

1,054 .33 .46

b Economic threat Global economic Local economic Personal economic Lost job Take jobs Tax inequality Family income Education

Cultural affinity Hispanic Two parents U.S. born

⁎p b .05. ⁎⁎p b .01. ⁎⁎⁎p b .001.

1,056 .21 .28

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times more likely to support deportation. It appeared that in this study, public opinion toward deportation was determined largely by ethnic identification with the persons that would have been targets of deportation (illegal migrants) and pragmatic concerns about the economic impact of illegal migration. Net of these ethnic identification and pragmatic economic threat effects, the general public was also impacted by perceptions of culture threat and ethnic affect. Respondents' who held negative attitudes toward Hispanics were 1.48 times more likely to support deportation. Individuals who believed that migrants present a threat to American culture were 1.41 times more likely to support deportation.

Support for Minuteman tactics In terms of public support for Minuteman tactics, there was support in the data for five of the seven hypotheses (economic threat, culture threat, ethnic affect, core values, and cultural affinity). The findings from the economic threat measures produced conflicting findings with respect to the stated hypotheses. The relationship between the more direct measures of economic threat and support for Minuteman tactics were statistically significant and were in the theoretically expected direction. People who believed that a family member had lost a job to a migrant, who believed that migrants generally take jobs from American citizens, and who believe that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes were more likely to support Minuteman tactics. Interestingly, net of all other factors, people who thought jobs were more difficult to find locally were less likely to support Minuteman tactics. Higher income persons were less likely to support Minuteman tactics and more educated people were more likely to support the tactics of the organization. Most of the measures of culture threat, ethnic affect, and individualism were also significant predictors of support for Minuteman tactics. Interviewees who believed that migrants are a threat to American culture, who held negative views toward Hispanics, who ascribe to Hispanic stereotypes, and who believed that the poor take advantage of the social services system were more likely to support the tactics of the Minuteman organizations. Culture affinity measures were also statistically significant predictors of support for Minuteman tactics. Hispanics were less likely than Whites to support these tactics, while persons whose parents were both born in the United States were more likely to support Minuteman intervention along the border. In terms of the covariates, African Americans were less likely than Whites, females were less likely than males, and religious people were less likely than nonreligious persons to support Minuteman activities along the border. Conservatives were more likely to support Minuteman tactics. Particularly noteworthy were the findings concerning culture affinity, economic threat, culture threat, and individualism. In an unreported analysis that reverse coded the dependent variable of interest (1 = oppose Minuteman tactics, 0 = support Minuteman tactics), Hispanics were found to be 4.51 times more likely than Whites to oppose Minuteman tactics. Individuals whose parents (both) were born in the United States were 3.15 times more likely to support Minuteman tactics. Individuals in the survey who believed that a family member had lost a job (1.86 times), believed that migrants take jobs (1.68), and who believed that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes (2.10 times) were more likely to support Minuteman tactics. After accounting for these ethnic identification and economic threat factors, people who held an individualistic belief that poor people get benefits without doing anything in return were 1.93 times more likely to support Minuteman tactics. Interviewees who held negative views toward Hispanics were 1.25 times more likely to support Minuteman tactics and people who held stereotyped views toward Hispanics were 1.22 times more likely to support these citizen-initiated tactics.

Support for denial of social services For the model predicting support for the denial of social service benefits to illegal migrants, six of the seven hypotheses were supported (economic threat, culture threat, ethnic affect, core values, cultural affinity, and contact). In terms of economic threat, interviewees who reported that a they or a family member had been denied a job because it went to an illegal migrant were more likely to support the denial of social services to illegal migrant populations. People who generally perceived that illegal migrants take jobs from American citizens and who believe that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes were also more likely to support denial of social service benefits. Higher educated persons were more likely to support denial of social service benefits. Interviewees who perceived that jobs were difficult to find locally were less likely to support denial of social service benefits to illegal migrant populations. Interviewees who believed that migrants represent a threat to American culture were more likely to support denial of social services to illegal migrants. Ethnic affect measures were also significant predictors of support for denial of social service; as negative views of Hispanics and adherence to Hispanic stereotypes increased, support for denial of social services increased. The measures of individualism were also statistically significant. People who perceived that poor people get something for nothing and who had stronger beliefs about the value of hard work as a mechanism to get ahead were more likely to support denying social services to illegal migrants. With respect to cultural affinity, Hispanics were less likely to support the idea of denial of social services and persons whose parents were both born in the United States were more likely to support this policy approach. Objective contact with people born outside the United States was statistically associated with the dependent measure; more contact led to less support for denial of social services. African Americans were less likely than Whites to support this policy option. Males and conservatives were more likely to support this policy option. The highest odds ratios were observed for the cultural affinity and individualism measures. In an analysis (unreported) that reverse coded the dependent variable of interest (1 = oppose denial of social services, 0 = support denial of social services), the results produced an odd ratio of 4.43 for the Hispanic measure. This means that Hispanics were 4.43 times more likely than Whites to oppose denial of social service benefits to illegal migrants. Similarly, persons whose parents were both born in the United States were 2.65 times more likely to support denial of social services than were persons who had at least one parent born outside the United States. Interviewees who reported holding a strong individualistic belief that poor people often get something for nothing in return were 2.66 times more likely to support denial of social services. Individuals who believed that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes were 1.65 times more likely to support denial of social service benefits. Support for a Constitutional amendment For the model that predicted support for a Constitutional amendment prohibiting children born to illegal migrants from becoming United States citizens, five of the seven hypotheses received support. In terms of economic threat, interviewees who believed that they or a family member had lost a job to a migrant, who generally believed that migrants take jobs from American citizens, and who believed that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes were statistically more likely to support a Constitutional amendment. Persons who believed that migrants represent a threat to American culture and who ascribed to Hispanic stereotypes (ethnic affect) were more likely to support such an amendment. Interviewees who believed that poor people frequently receive benefits without giving something in return were more likely to support a Constitutional amendment. The cultural affinity measure of Hispanic respondent was negatively associated with support for an

K. Buckler et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 37 (2009) 317–327

amendment; Hispanics were less likely than Whites to support the amendment. With respect to the covariates, African Americans were less likely than Whites to support the amendment, older persons were more likely to support the measure, and conservatives were more likely to support the amendment. The independent variables and covariates explained less variation in the dependent measure than in any of the other models. The odds ratios for this model were also considerably lower than for the other three models. Based on an unreported model that reverse coded the dependent variable (1 = oppose Constitutional amendment, 0 = support Constitutional amendment), Hispanics were found to be 1.78 times as likely, compared to Whites, to oppose the amendment. Individuals who believed that migrants do not pay their fair share of taxes were 1.44 times as likely to support the amendment and persons who believed that they or a family member had lost a job to a migrant were 1.41 times as likely to support such a policy. People who perceived more culture threat were 1.31 times as likely to support the amendment. Interviewees who held the individualistic belief that poor people often get benefits without providing anything in return were 1.31 times more likely to support the amendment. Relative contribution of each theoretically derived hypothesis Support was found in each of the models for at least five of the theoretically derived hypotheses. Given the cumulative findings of the analysis, it was difficult to ascertain the relative predictive power of the measures derived from each hypothesis. To address this issue, an adjusted semi-standardized coefficient was calculated for each independent variable and covariate for each of the models.6 The adjusted semi-standardized coefficient allows assessment of the relative strength of the independent variables and covariates in predicting the dependent variable of interest. The adjusted semistructured coefficients are reported in Tables 3 and 4 using the βR symbol. Relative to all other theoretically derived hypotheses in the analyses, the strongest effects were observed for two sets of variables: culture threat and cultural affinity. The culture threat measure was among the strongest predictors of support for a Constitutional amendment, limiting social service benefits, and deportation. The cultural affinity hypothesis (particularly the Hispanic variable) was strong in predicting opposition to Minuteman activities, denial of social service benefits, and deportation. It was also noteworthy that the economic threat variable take jobs was the strongest predictor of support for deportation and the core value of individualism was the strongest predictor of support for the denial of social service benefits. Discussion Unlike many of the prior analyses of the correlates of public support for enhanced control of migration into the United States, these data suggested cultural affinity has a strong impact on public support of enhanced control efforts. Prior research had suggested that Hispanic support for enhanced control measures is much more complex than cultural affinity as measured by Hispanic ethnicity. The strong Hispanic effect observed in these analyses was particularly noteworthy. There were potentially two different explanations of the strong Hispanic effect observed in this study: (1) the “Hispanic convergence” argument, and (2) the methodological artifact argument. The “Hispanic convergence” argument is the idea that in the midst of feelings that Hispanics are being attacked, Hispanic public opinion on illegal migration policy converges to the point that the differences that prior research identified based on nation of origin or acculturation is replaced either in the short-term or the long-term with unification. In essence, this explanation suggests that when attacked, the broader identification of “Hispanic,” or “Latino,” takes precedent over nation of origin and acculturation distinctions. This assertion was anecdotally supported in terms of the context within

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which the survey was conducted. These data were collected in February and March of 2006 at the height of the counter movement in opposition to proposed federal legislation to crack down on illegal migration and the individuals that assist illegal migrants. This finding could also be a methodological artifact. While some research suggested that there is little difference in Hispanic public opinion toward migration across national origin (Hood, Morris, & Shirkey, 1997), other research identified national origin distinctions (de la Garza, DeSipio, Garcia, & Falcon, 1992; de la Garza, Falcon, & Garcia, 1993; de la Garza, Falcon, Garcia, & Garcia, 1993). If a certain national origin group is overrepresented or underrepresented in a particular sample, the effect of being Hispanic on migration attitudes could be inflated or deflated. Unfortunately, the study of the sample used in this research did not contain a question about national origin. Even more problematic was the fact that the prior multivariate studies of public opinion on migration that were comprehensive (in that they tested multiple hypotheses) had not adequately addressed this issue either. In this respect, the task for future research is to continue to explore: (1) the extent of differences in Hispanic views of migration across nation of origin; (2) whether Hispanic public opinion on migration is converging in the midst of feelings of threat attributable to the recent public discourse on migration reform; and (3) assuming that there is credence to the “Hispanic convergence” argument, whether this convergence will be long-lasting or confined to shortterm phases where Hispanics feel they are being collectively attacked. Although this article cannot suggest, with a high degree of certainty, that the observed Hispanic effect is the product of Hispanic convergence on the issue, there are good reasons to believe that the Hispanic opinion may be converging. The protest events of 2006 offered a rarity in the history of the United States; the protests involved a widespread major collective movement for the rights of Hispanics. An argument can be made that such a successful endeavor7 will have long-lasting effects in terms of generating more Hispanic-driven demands for egalitarian and just treatment. Considering the pervasiveness and strength of the homeland security movement, such a scenario becomes even more likely. As the homeland security mantra becomes further imbedded in public policy and general public discourse, it is likely that calls for additional security mechanisms will intensify. It is also likely that these calls will continue to involve the theme of border security, envisioning Hispanic migrants as either a direct target of this movement or as necessary collateral casualties in the war on terrorism. Either scenario would likely result in further hardened attitudes between supporters of tougher border security and those who support further Hispanic migration into the United States. This finding has implications in terms of social and criminal justice. The Hispanic population of the United States has dramatically increased in the past ten years. The U.S. Census Bureau has projected that the Hispanic population of the United States will continue to grow. At the time of this survey, there was a clear divide amongst Hispanics and members of the population who were White, non-Hispanic on the issue of controlling illegal migration. It appears that policy efforts directed toward controlling illegal migration in the future will be met with stern resistance from Hispanics, especially if the dialogue and approach are perceived as threatening by members of the Hispanic population. By extension, it is likely that efforts by the criminal justice system to control illegal migration will be viewed by increasingly large segments of the population as illegitimate, once again, especially if the sociopolitical dialogue surrounding such enforcement efforts is viewed as threatening by Hispanic populations in the United States. While the opinions of Hispanics may be converging, these data also suggested that citizens who fear the cultural impact of an increasing Hispanic population may also be prepared to strongly oppose illegal migration into the United States. This article also produces support for the notion that economic threat concerns and core American values are important secondary issues that influence public support for greater controls on illegal migration.

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Historically, economic concerns have played an important role in migration reform debates. It appears that the contemporary illegal migration reform debate is no different. Persons who believe migrants are a threat to the economic vitality of the United States support enhanced controls of illegal migration. Individuals who hold strong individualistic values will also likely support enhanced illegal migration control efforts. Contextually, these two findings have important implications with respect to the criminal justice system. Recently, the United States has entered a period of economic hardship; and this economic downturn has had a tremendous impact on state budgets (Muir & Marquez, 2009). Experts have stated that they are unsure how long the economic downturn will last and how bad the growing economic downturn will eventually be (Spoto, 2009). Given this contextual reality, the link between economic threat and public support for enhanced control of illegal migration will likely only intensify. Thus, segments of the population who make a connection between illegal migration and macro- or micro-level economic difficulties will likely support, and call for, greater justice system involvement in addressing illegal migration.

(due to discarding partial case information), it was reasonable to conclude that no appreciable bias occurred and there was no reason to suspect that using listwise deletion limits the generalizability of these conclusions. 5. The scale used in the multiple regression analyses was an additive scale. The analyses, however, were generated using two different approaches: (1) the additive scale that was used in the reported regression models, and (2) a variable that standardized the items. The second approach that standardized the items was generated using principal components factor analysis with oblimin rotation. The factor analysis forced scores to load onto one factor. This second approach avoids the problem of allowing different scaled items to contribute equally. The regression results from the two approaches were identical in terms of the variables that were statistically significant and in terms of the pseudo R2 values; the largest difference in R2 between a model using the additive approach and the factor score approach was .01. The results section of this article reports the results of the models using the additive scale. 6. Roncek (1996) suggested the use of a semi-standardized coefficient to assess the relative strength of predictor variables when using Poisson/negative binomial and logit models (see also Beichner & Spohn, 2005; Gibson, Swatt, & Jolicouer, 2002; Swatt, 2002; Swatt & He, 2006 for applications). The formula Roncek suggested is βR = bsx, where βR represents the semi-standardized coefficient, b is the unstandardized regression coefficient for the respective predictor variable x, and sx is the standard deviation of the respective predictor variable of interest. Bring (1994) was critical of Roncek's semi-standardized coefficients, on the basis that these coefficients represent a mixture of two statistics based on different samples. Bring (1994) suggested an i si adjusted semi-standardized coefficient: adjβR ¼ pbffiffiffiffiffiffi , where VIF represents the

Conclusions

variance inflation score for the predictor variable of interest. This study used the Bring (1994) method to calculate the semi-standardized coefficient. 7. The term “successful endeavor” is used to describe the migration reform movement based on a straightforward conceptualization of what a successful social reaction campaign would entail. Two clear indicators of success used by any special interest organization or movement would be the number of people that became involved in the campaign and the response of mass media to the movement. Using these two criteria, it would be difficult to judge the success of the movement as anything other than successful. The movement resulted in massive numbers of people who became involved in protests across very diverse American cities during the months of February, March, April, and May of 2006. The protest movement garnered substantial attention in the national press. A search of the Vanderbilt News Archives (http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/) produced findings which suggested that ABC, CBS, and NBC provided extensive coverage of the protests on their nightly news programs in April and May of 2006.

VIFi

Research should continue to explore the correlates of public support for enhanced controls on illegal migration. Future research should continue to explore Hispanic attitudes toward various control policies. This would facilitate understanding of whether convergence is occurring. Hispanic public opinion research should also be undertaken in ways that allows researchers to understand Hispanic public opinion relative to White and African American opinions. Future research should also continue to explore how culture threat, economic threat, and core American values influence public opinion. Notes 1. There is substantial difficulty in developing adequate terminology to navigate discussions of illegal migration and migration (see Passel, Van Hook, & Bean, 2004 for a more detailed discussion). Much of the problem concerns the classification, for counting purposes, of migrant persons who have entered the country. This article uses the term “illegal migrant” or “illegal migration” as the key operational (dependent) variable of interest. Furthermore, this operational term is defined to refer to the same groups of people that Passel (2005) refers to as “unauthorized migrants.” The “illegal migrant” or “illegal migration” terms are used to refer to a person that: (1) resides in the United States, (2) is not a United States citizen, (3) has not been admitted for permanent residence, and (4) is not in a set of specific authorized temporary statuses permitting longer term residence and work. This article uses the term “illegal” instead of “undocumented” because the survey items that were used as dependent variables used the term “illegal.” In addition, this article uses the term “migrant” instead of “immigrant” because it encompasses a broader group of people (including people who are in the country illegally but have no intent to remain here permanently). The difference in terminology is likely not problematic in this article. As Passel notes (2005, p. 2), many different labels are used to refer to groups of people from other nations who are not in the United States legally. 2. The term “illegal immigration” was used to conduct this media search because the term “illegal immigration” is used most frequently in popular culture and socially to refer to this issue. 3. The survey asked a question about citizenship (“Are you a citizen of the United States, or not?”), but a response was recorded for only 14 percent of the sample (yes, a U.S. citizen = 7 percent; no, not a U.S. resident = 5.3 percent; refused to answer = 1.1 percent; no data recorded = 86.6 percent). The item was not used in the multivariate analyses reported in the study because of the erratic data collection for this question. 4. In order to examine the appropriateness of the missing cases at random (MCAR) assumption underlying the listwise deletion procedure, an indicator of missingness for each of the dependent variables was created. This variable was regressed on the demographic independent variables and covariates. The results of this analysis demonstrated that some of the variables were significant predictors of missingness (namely, that older individuals were more likely to have complete data for the deportation, social services, and Constitutional amendment variables, and that individuals who were non-Hispanic, female, and had lower incomes were more likely to have complete data for the Minuteman support variable). All models, however, resulted in a poor fit to the data (evidenced by psuedo-R squares less than .02), suggesting that the violation of the MCAR assumption was very slight. As Allison (2002) demonstrated, in these situations listwise deletion still produces reasonable estimates of coefficients. As such, although these estimates were slightly less efficient

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Statutes cited Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (2005). Chinese Exclusion Act (1882). Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (2006). Emergency Quota Act (1921). Immigration Act (1924). Migration Reform and Control Act (1986).