Puzzling, powering and perpetuating: Long-term decision-making by the Dutch Delta Committee

Futures 76 (2016) 7–17

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Puzzling, powering and perpetuating: Long-term decision-making by the Dutch Delta Committee Martijn van der Steena,b , Nancy Chin-A-Fata,* , Martinus Vinkc,d, Mark van Twista,e a

NSOB, The Hague, The Netherlands Professor of Strategy & Foresight, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Public Administration & Sociology, Rotterdam, The Netherlands c Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands d PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment agency, The Hague, The Netherlands e Professor of Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Public Administration & Sociology, Rotterdam, The Netherlands b

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Article history: Received 4 December 2014 Received in revised form 13 January 2016 Accepted 13 January 2016 Available online 22 January 2016

Long term policy issues like climate change adaptation are considered wicked in the sense that uncertain knowledge and volatile societal understandings associated to the issue might jeopardize long term sustainment of adaptation policies. Uncertainty or sudden societal opposition might politically be employed to dismantle earlier made policies or investments and therefore threaten long term adaptive capacity. This article highlights how successful long-term decision-making can be understood as a matter of puzzling over uncertainty and powering for getting things done, but above all requires sustainment of these decisions on the long term. For doing so the paper analyses the decision-making process of the Dutch Delta Committee in 2008, which firmly put the climate adaptation issue on the Dutch political agenda and subsequently sustained the issue on the policy agenda through the creation of a Delta Commissioner, a Delta Fund and a Delta Act. Our analysis illustrates how the crucial actors in and around the Second Delta Committee deployed strategies of puzzling, powering, and what we define as perpetuation to deal with the long-term policy issue of climate adaptation. The latter is especially important for policy issues that require a long-term continued effort by policy-makers, or will only manifest themselves on the long term. Then, it is not only important to create meaning and organize power now, but also to maintain and ensure that meaning and power for time to come. ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Long-term decision making Policy Scenarios Climate issues Government

1. Introduction The low laying Netherlands is characterized by its delta nature, with estuaries and marshlands that since medieval periods onwards were reclaimed from the sea by Dutch farmers unified in thousands of local water boards. The Netherlands consists for a large part of land that was reclaimed from the water, by a patchwork of smaller and larger water-works. This constitutes a diverse landscape of drainage canals and rivers embanked by dykes that is in constant need of maintenance.

* Corresponding author at: NSOB, Lange Voorhout 17, 2514 EB The Hague, The Netherlands. Fax: +31 6 4574 12 12. E-mail address: [email protected] (N. Chin-A-Fat). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.01.001 0016-3287/ ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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From Napoleonic times the Dutch state took a central role in protecting the Netherlands against floods and currently the ministry of water management with its own executive agency Rijkswaterstaat is responsible for Dutch flood safety, in cooperation with the political elected bodies of the local Water boards. That system worked well for ages. However, strong challenges lie ahead; rising sea level and more intense rainfall due to climate change, in addition to ongoing soil subsidence pose new long term challenges to the traditional tasks of water management (de Vries and Wolsink, 2009; Koningsveld, Mulder, Stive, Van Der Valk, & Van Der Weck, 2008; Prak and Luiten van Zanden, 2013; Vink, Benson, Boezeman, Cook, Dewulf, & Termeer, 2014; Warner, Wester, Vink, & Dewulf, in press). These new developments have regenerated the political debate about water management; there is little societal discussion about the relevance of possible rising sea levels for a country partly below the current sea level. But although the topic is generally considered important, the sense of urgency to actually invest in water management has diminished over time. Partly, this is an effect of the relative success of the current water-works; ever since the large flood of 1953 the waterworks of the succeeding Delta Plan have kept the country safe, and apart from some recent hiccups after near flooding in 1993 and 1995 the sense of urgency faded (Warner, 2008). Nevertheless soil subsidence and climate change do pose serious threats to the nation that could become ‘real’ in the distant future. At the same time these threats are inherently speculative. They represent a future that is not yet here and that inevitably generates debate about what the future will be like and what that means for interventions now. Understanding the process of reaching sustainable agreement and policy action about long-term wicked policy issues like climate change, requires more than the linear assumption that proper climate knowledge will automatically lead to proper decision-making (Biesbroek et al., 2015; Vink, Dewulf, & Termeer, 2013). To the contrary the classic seminal work of Heclo (1974) might be highly relevant. Heclo argues that decision-making over complex long term policy problems requires a strategy that addresses two sides of the same coin; processes of puzzling and powering (Heclo, 1974). Puzzling refers to activities that generate definitions of a societal problems and possible solutions to solve a societal problem. Puzzling is important because in a collective process policy actors develop a shared meaning to direct their efforts. However, to be effective puzzling needs to be accompanied by a powering strategy. To get things done in a plural society different actors need to join in a process and eventually agree, buy into the process, or at least not block the process (Heclo, 1974). That is partly a matter of ‘pure power play’, but as Heclo argues this is highly intertwined with the puzzling. Puzzling sets up powering, just like powering bounds or opens up the space for puzzling. These are not crisp separate categories, but in their interplay puzzling and powering generate dynamics around complex policy issues that might explain why climate adaptation is not such a linear process. For long-term policy issues however, puzzling about uncertain future problems might not create enough urgency to empower a policy proposal. In addition to that, what might generate societal urgency today may face competing short-term interests in the future. Hence, solutions that help rally powerful stakeholders can work today, but do not necessarily hold for long. Even worse, it is often easy to resolve present-day puzzles and build coalitions of power at the expense of the long-term. Therefore, this paper links the two concepts together, to better understand the difficulties of long-term decision-making, and to provide possible repertoire ‘out’ of the difficulty of long-term decision-making. We address the question how longterm decision-making can be understood as a mutual process of puzzling and powering over long-term climate issues, which also requires deliberate efforts of perpetuating to consolidate policies in the future? We do so by zooming in on the Second Dutch Delta Committee (Delta Committee, 2008d) which in 2008 succeeded in defining the climate adaptation issue in a societally legitimate, though scientifically selective way (Enserink, Kwakkel, & Veenman, 2013; Vink, Boezeman, Dewulf, & Termeer, 2013). Through strategically positioning the scientific knowledge in the societal debate the political advisory Committee not only created sufficient societal support (Boezeman, Vink, & Leroy, 2013; M. J. Vink, Boezeman, et al., 2013), but also succeeded in perpetuating its puzzling and powering on the national policy agenda for the long term. To gain a deeper understanding of this particular policy success we will start with building a theoretical framework that adds the concept of perpetuating to the theoretical work on puzzling and powering over long-term issues. Then, we elaborate on our research-method and describe how we opened the black box of the administrative processes of long-term problem solving. After that, we contextualize our conceptual findings in view of traditional Dutch water management policy and present the results and analysis of our concrete case study, the Delta Committee. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for our understanding of long-term policy making, and stress the importance of the processes of perpetuating in relation to existing theory on puzzling and powering around long-term policy issues, and draw our conclusions. 2. Theoretical framework 2.1. Wicked problems The vast increase in literature on climate change of the last decade did not make governments unambiguously adapt to the impacts of climate change (Biesbroek et al., 2010). Like in the Dutch case adaptation to (potential) climate change impacts often concerns expensive infrastructural works, but may also concern more institutional changes enabling governments to deal more effectively with the potential impacts but changes power configurations (Gupta et al., 2010). Due to the long term at which impacts will become visible outcomes are intrinsically uncertain and since the expensive costs and institutional restructuring may touch upon budgets and responsibilities, adapting to climate change does not seem to be a straightforward technical challenge. Correspondingly, scholars have referred to climate change as a wicked problem, which

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does not refer to witchcraft, but to the erratic appearance of the problem and the difficulty in solving the problem. The wickedness is believed to stem from uncertainty in outcomes and the ambiguity in societal understandings to the problem, which change over time. This ambiguity poses challenges to decision makers in formulating policy proposals that fit the societal understandings. The long term at which the climate change related proposals aim at, in combination with the uncertainty associated with the long term make some authors even refer to climate change as a wicked problem ‘par excellence’, which makes expensive adaptation policies inherently daunting to communicate, negotiate and ensure for the longer term (Hulme, 2009; Jordan, Huitema, Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010; Rittel and Webber, 1972; Termeer, Dewulf, & Breeman, 2013). 2.2. Puzzling and powering over wicked problems In dealing with wicked problems like climate change, policy makers conduct a variety of interrelated processes. First they need to find out what the challenge will be and what the possible options are in light of the uncertainties associated to the challenge. This clearly is a process in which scenario studies play a role and think tanks or experts enter the fore (Asselt, 2010; Stone, 2007; van Vliet, Kok, & Veldkamp, 2010; Varum and Melo, 2010). Secondly, for getting things done policy makers will have to find support from the many different stakeholders and societal players involved. Although the later may be considered a political process, the aforementioned scenario studies do play a strong role in this process too as storylines mobilizing the necessary support. In policy sciences, authors like Heclo (1974) and others (Hall, 2002; Culpepper, 2002; Hoppe, 2011; Visser & Hemerijck, 1997; M. J. Vink et al., 2013 M. J. Vink, Dewulf et al., 2013) define this as policymakers who (1) will have to puzzle over how to make sense of uncertain knowledge and ambiguous societal understanding for coming up with plausible solutions that fit a societal context, and (2) have to power over support for getting things done. The focus of puzzling lies on the formulation of an adequate definition of the problem and the identification of options for solving them (Dunn, 2003). The puzzle is solved once policymakers find the right or at least the best answer to it. However, an inevitable counterpart to this informational game of puzzling is the issue of power; the right answer is not necessarily the one that is supported, just as the solutions or problem definitions that carry broad support necessarily have to be correct. Solving complex policy issues is not only a cognitive and informational matter; knowledge matters, but it is not the only element that does. Informational choices have impact for power, and vice versa (Hoppe, 2011). In the case of adaptation to climate change Van Buuren et al. (2014) and M. J. Vink, Dewulf et al. (2013) show that more information not necessarily reduces uncertainty, let alone solve the controversy of wicked policy issues. Not only is there often more than one good solution to the puzzle, there also often is fragmented support for a variety of problem definitions. Dunn (2003) and Hall (1993) refer to this aspect as the powering of policy making; the ability to mobilize enough support for an interpretation of the problem and of the solution. In order to resolve wicked policy issues policy-makers need to construct arguments with regards to content that are not only true with regards to content but also mobilize the necessary power—to mobilize power to support it or to neutralize the power of opposition against it. Solving wicked problems requires cognitive and informational problem-solving – puzzling – and requires the mobilization and (re) construction of power coalitions— powering. 2.3. A discursive perspective on the interplay between puzzling and powering The interplay between puzzling and powering can be analyzed on a discursive level (Buuren et al., 2014; Steen, 2009; M. J. Vink, Dewulf et al., 2013). The analysis of problem and solution is presented in narratives and frames that allow power to be organized around it. E.g., in order to work, a problem-solution need not only be right, it should also be able to buy-in enough support from crucial stakeholders; a more cynical view on the discursive interplay between puzzling and powering is that stories first and foremost need to mobilize power, and should also contain some level of evidence and truth. In both cases, puzzling and powering interact; by strategically selecting frames and partners, agents shape the process of sensemaking and the power play over what frame arrives on the policy agenda (Hoppe, 2011). Since knowledge about the longer-term is intrinsically speculative and subject to deep uncertainties, the discursive element in puzzling and powering over long-term issues becomes especially important. The future does not yet exist and can only take “form” in narratives, images, and other more or less graphical presentations. Futures-narratives (Van der Steen, 2009a,b) are causal stories that connect images of what the future may be like to imminent policy-actions; strong narratives about the future help both in terms of puzzling and powering. A classic example of a futures-narrative that facilitates the interplay between puzzling and powering is that of “green-energy”. A dichotomous frame of environment versus economy leads to a continuation of the status quo, as neither end of the dichotomy is strong enough to fight the other off. Reframing the issue into ‘clean energy’ allows for both economic opportunity and environmental sustainability, which helps to mobilize the required power to overcome deeply vested interests in the status quo. Moreover, the “green energy”-frame connects short-term benefits to longer-term goals; for instance by providing economic incentives for “green energy” now, to help get a larger “energy transition” underway. A sustainable future then does not only benefit future generations, but also generates “green growth” in “green jobs”. The frame does not dichotomize long-term and short-term interests, but places them in coherence with each other. As in all frames, counter-frames build on opposite arguments are possible. The point here is that the construction of a strong futures-narrative creates a productive interplay of puzzling and powering to achieve results in wicked long-term policy issues.

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2.4. Securing the long term: perpetuating In light of the uncertain future and the complexity of dealing with the wide variety of narratives and strategies which come along with future policy issues, it is imminent for long-term policy to build coalitions and narratives that are robust enough to stand the test of time. For the resolution of wicked long-term issues it is not enough to create temporary coalitions that create a decision or policy now. It is equally important to sustain the policy over a longer period of time, given that the knowledge about the future remains deeply uncertain and that the debate can be re-opened at any time. Hence, it is not only imminent to achieve a long-term decision about policy, but also to perpetuate it for the longer term to come. Perpetuating should prevent opportunistic deflection from the policy, or changes of it in the face of economic decline or political opposition. In order to achieve and maintain long-term policy strategies for longer term wicked policy issues it is imminent to successfully combine puzzling, powering and perpetuating. 3. Methodology For answering the theoretical question of how perpetuation plays an additional role in long term policy making next to the well described interplaying processes of puzzling and powering, we did a qualitative case study research. Although we are aware of the limitations of case study research in drawing general conclusions on cause-effects in policy research, we follow Flyvbjerg (2006),Gerring (2004) and Thomas (2011) in their assessment of case study research as a method for gaining understanding of the relations between a wide variety of variables in context. 3.1. Access to data Our data collection was conducted in an empirical research project commissioned by the Dutch Delta Commissioner,1 that made a historiography of the policy process which took place before, during and after the Second Delta Committee, which eventually led to the installment of the Delta Commissioner in 2009 (van Twist, Schultz, van der Steen, & Ferket, 2014). For the preparation of the historiography, we were granted access to the complete archives of the Second Delta Committee. These archives consisted of more than a thousand documents, including research reports, which were written by the Committee itself, or were drafted on behalf of it. The set included reports on climate change and water issues in the Netherlands, meeting reports of the Committee, sent letters and documents that the Committee received, and footages like photos of the two Delta Committees, and a video which was shown at the presentation of the final report of the second Delta Committee. In addition we studied scientific literature, articles and other documents on the history of the Dutch water policy in order to gain more insight in the installment of the second Delta Committee. That provided us with a firm and factual basis for our study in formal documents and other written texts. 3.2. Data collection and analysis The research was conducted in four rounds of data collection and analysis. In a first round of analysis we particularly focused on the archived documents of only the Delta Committee. During the analysis we discovered that the Committee had been part of broader network of actors embedded in a wider policy process. Therefore, in a second round we extended our analysis to other parties as well. We broadened the scope of the documentstudy with documents that described the process a political-administrative position. We primarily used documents from the Ministry of Public Works for that and also analyzed documents from both Chambers of Parliament (minutes of debates, parliamentary questions, amendments, proposals). In order to gain more in-depth insight in the meaning actors assigned to the events and how this meaning played out in concrete policy actions, we conducted a third round of analysis on the basis of a set of semi-structured interviews with 18 stakeholders. The stakeholders were all at some point directly involved in the puzzling and powering processes of the Second Delta Committee. We conducted our interviews in the period between September and November 2012. The interviews lasted from 45 min to 1 h and were conducted by two interviewers. One interviewer asked the questions, while the other made a report of the interview. We asked all the respondent two main questions: (1) how do you look back on the period around the second Delta Committee and the installation of the Delta Commissioner? and (2) what is your opinion of the choice of installing a Delta Commissioner as a special government commissioner? From these questions, the interview proceeded more as a dialogue, around topics the interviewer or interviewee considered particularly interesting. We asked the interviewees to focus on the part of the process that they had a personal experience with, and only partially reflect on the process as a whole. The interviews were especially useful for obtaining additional information about the events that had a more confidential character and were not documented like the Eerbeek sessions presented in Section 4. In the fourth phase of our analysis we analyzed the data and ordered them in a chronological periodization, to refrain from a thematic or otherwise substantive ordering of our data. We then wrote a historiography of events, which contained

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The Delta Commissioner is the administrative coordinator of the Dutch Delta Programme; the successor of the Second Delta Committee.

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the data from the interviews (Author, 2014). We discussed the historiography with representatives of the different stakeholders and it was recognized as a correct account of the process. Then, we wrote an analysis of the process, were we distinguished the different phases of the process, which we discuss in terms of puzzling and powering, and where relevant, also perpetuating. We wrote this narrative in a report that we circulated among interviewees and stakeholders, and that we discussed with them. We used their feedback to edit the narrative, but overall stakeholders recognized the narrative as an analytical representation of their practical actions at the time. Also, stakeholders recognized the importance of the perpetuating-actions, even though there was debate about the intentionality of these. However, in hindsight, the concept of puzzling, powering, and perpetuating was considered an important characteristic of the process; the authors were asked twice by the Delta Commissioner to present the findings and the concepts to an audience of staff, stakeholders, and academics. 4. Results 4.1. Context: Dutch flood risk management as a wicked policy issue In 1953 a disastrous flood struck the Netherlands with catastrophic consequences: 1855 people drowned, 47,000 homes and 500 km of dykes were destroyed, and many acres of fertile agriculture land was ruined by salt water. To prevent such a disaster for the future the government announced firm measures. A National Committee was installed to come up with a master plan to protect The Netherlands from future flooding. This first Delta Committee designed what became known as “The Delta Works”; comprehensive set of waterworks, dykes, and coastal protection works to manage the water and protect the land against storm surges. In addition to the unmistaken effect on the physical landscape the Delta Works became iconic in Dutch culture for having conquered the sea for good. However, in spite of the iconic character of the Delta Works water management remains a contested issue.2 Different actors propose different plans for how to manage the water and the Delta. Some propose building more dykes and stronger water works, while others claim that more space for water is required; the water should not be contained and discharged, but should be given more space by means of controlled flooding if needed (van Staveren, Warner, van Tatenhove, & Wester, 2014; van Stokkom, Smits, & Leuven, 2005). In addition, some argue that the risk of flooding should be privatized, so that people who deliberately take the risk of living and building in flood-risk areas pay higher fees for insurance. Others say that flood risk management is first and foremost a public task that should be taken care of by government and not by the market (Botzen and Van Den Bergh, 2008; Mees, Driessen, & Runhaar, 2012; Terpstra and Gutteling, 2008). In short, water management is a wicked issue (Rittel and Webber, 1972) characterized by many different problem definitions or frames pointing towards different solutions. Traditionally these wicked issues were dealt with in locally organized water boards. From Napoleonic times however, the Dutch state took a central role in protecting the Netherlands against floods. Currently the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment with its executive agency Rijkswaterstaat is responsible for flood safety in close cooperation with the local Water Boards. In the end, no party in the water management is powerful enough to make decisions by itself. A variety of parties is involved in the decision-making about water management, and water issues always require collaboration and at least some degree of consensus between different parties and interests. When climate change gained attention in societal debate, and both experts and politicians started questioning the vulnerability of the Netherlands in view of a changing climate and associated sea level rise the Dutch Cabinet commissioned a political advisory Committee. The advisory Committee was labeled the Second Delta Committee; after the first Delta Committee and its iconic Delta Works (Boezeman et al., 2013). In the next section we will describe the phases in the policy process that constituted the puzzling and powering over the climate issue and eventually lead to the perpetuation of the climate issue on the policy agenda. 4.2. Puzzling, powering, and perpetuating: the case of the Dutch Delta Committee 4.2.1. Phase 1: the Second Delta Committee From the early 2000s new challenges gained attention in the water management sector. Soil subsidence and climate change were recognized as important long-term challenges for the traditional tasks of water management. Although the every-day risk of flooding was largely under control, new threats and challenges challenged that feeling of control. Many public and private actors in the field of water management shared the idea that something should be done, but there was little consensus over what had to be done exactly. There was a lot of discussion in the field of water management about the need for a new water vision and a regeneration of water management in The Netherlands. However, the course of this new vision was not clear; some pushed for renewal of the water works, while others stressed the importance of controlled flooding; yet others pointed at the role of the private sector and the privatization of flooding risk, for instance by raising the importance of private insurance for water management. Furthermore, the means for investments in water management

2 The Delta Committee (2007). Start report of the second Delta Committee: the research assignment and the choices to make. Version 3 October 2007. The Hague: Ministry of Transport Public Works and Water Management.

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were under ever more pressure; maintenance of existing water works was not a “sexy” topic to build a political profile on and the water boards and the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat faced imminent budgetary restraints. Pressure was building up around water management; where was the policy field heading, and more importantly, was enough being done to ensure the future flood safety of the Dutch Delta? In 2005 hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans, which caused a renewed sense of urgency in the former Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. A similar flood in The Netherlands was not considered very likely, but the consensus was that it could happen and that without a renewed effort for water management the risk of a disaster would increase each year. This critical review of the flood risk also renewed attention for an already reported problem with the existing water works; various reports of experts mentioned that not all of the Dutch dikes met the prescribed safety norms anymore. In addition, experts called for a new and updated set of safety norms for the infrastructural works, as the existing norms were set in 1953 and did not recon with possible effects of climate change. Various actors in the water sector increasingly questioned whether current safety norms and levels of flood protection were sufficient in view of a changing climate. Because this internal reflections coincided with questions from the Ministry of Finance about the budget for flood protection, and the Dutch Senate passed a resolution urging the government to strengthen its vision on long-term strategic planning in relation to the changing climate, the newly formed cabinet Balkenende IV finally called for more attention to the Dutch flood safety and for possible directions for this field. To instigate that discussion, the Ministry published its new “Water Vision”, which formed the base for a Committee to investigate coastal flood protection in view of climate change (Cabinet Balkenende IV, 2007). The assignment of for the Second Delta Committee was translated into a request for advice on the following four topics:3 a The expected sea-level rise, the interaction between the increase and the drain of the large Dutch rivers and other climatic and social developments until 2100–2200 that are important for the Dutch coast; b The implications of these developments for the Dutch coast; c Possible strategies for a coherent approach that leads to sustainable development of the Dutch coast, on the basis of a and b and; d Indicate what the social value of these strategies is on the short and the long term, in addition to the safety for the hinterland. The assignment gave the Committee an interventionist character; it was asked to come up with recommendations for the government. In that light it is important to also take into account the Chairman chosen for the Committee; the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management appointed former minister and professor Cees Veerman as chairman. Veerman was a highly respected and reputed politician and scientist, but was more renowned for his skill to mold the variety of interests and ideas of public and private partners into joint consensus. The Committee was installed on September 7th 2007 (Ministry of Transport Public Works and Water Management, 2007). 4.2.2. Phase 2: redefining the scope of the Committee The rather closed assignment appeared problematic for the Committee and ‘backstage’ the Committee decided to redefine its assignment. The Committee saw five reasons for that. Firstly, the time horizon of 2200 was exceptionally long and the Committee thought it would be difficult to come up with any sensible claim about uncertainties and projections and above all the Committee feared that the long horizon would limit societal and political urgency for the required investments. Instead the Committee aimed at a time-scale that was still “far out” but close enough to trigger societal arousal. Thirdly, in the field of water management the models showed that most of the problems from climate change would not be on the coastline but along the rivers. Accordingly the Committee extended its geographical scope. Fourthly, the Committee wanted to move away from the crisis-prevention frame implied by the original assignment and reframed its assignment accordingly into an adaptation frame. Fifthly, the Committee had to define its position in the running climate change debate. The reports of the IPCC and other institutes pointed in the same general direction, but failed to create a societal sense of urgency about the effects of climate change in the Netherlands. Because the Committee was hesitant to positioning itself as a “Climate Committee”, and wanted to look for a less specific and “environmentalist” profile, the Committee redefined its scope to the safeguarding of the future prosperity of the Netherlands in view of climate change, and with that took a more economy and wealth approach to the issue (see also: Boezeman et al., 2013). 4.2.3. Phase 3: research and deliberation The Committee considered it important to ground its work in the ‘state of the art’ of climate research. Therefore, the Committee consulted a broad range of climate experts to collect the most up to date knowledge about water management. Furthermore, the Committee asked the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) to apply the scenarios of the effects of climate change to the specific situation in The Netherlands, and to calculate an extra scenario that deviates from the usual IPCC-scenarios (see also: Enserink et al., 2013; Vellinga, Katsman, Sterl, & Beersma, 2008). In addition the Committee

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Ministry of Transport Public Works and Water Management (2007). Regulation Committee Sustainable Coastal Development. 7 September 2007.

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combined scenarios of climate change to economic and social foresight about the consequences of development for the “earning capacity” of the Dutch Delta and the economic costs of possible floods. The Committee was of the opinion that it broadened the scope of existing research usually focusing on climate change itself instead of its economic or social effects. The hydrology of the entire Delta instead of dyke enforcement became the focus of the Committee and more research was conducted to map the hydrology and its socio economic impacts in view of climate change. Parallel to the Committee-work and dialogue with societal players the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management also anticipated a “safe landing” of the Committees’ proposals (see also: Boezeman et al., 2013). The directorgeneral of the Ministry was of the opinion that it would be helpful to start to work on the ministries response to the Committees’ report. This was an interesting move, because the Committee was not yet bringing out a report and had officially not yet taken a position. Nonetheless, the Ministry organized a series of “free-thinking sessions” in which possible conclusions of the report could be discussed and the various parties in the water sector could come up with individual strategies, which could be adopted by the Ministry anticipating better cooperation in later state. These sessions became known as “the Eerbeek sessions”, as they were hosted in the village of Eerbeek. The powerful players in the water sector participated in these sessions: government officials, water boards, civil servants from the ministry, the secretariat and members of the Committee, but also private partners such as big engineering firms. It is important to note that political parties were not involved in the Eerbeek sessions. People participated on the basis of confidentiality. The Committee was informed of the Eerbeek-sessions, but had no formal relationship with the Eerbeek-sessions. 4.2.4. Phase 4: the final report and recommendations In September 2008 the second Delta Committee came out with its final report. In its report, the Committee issued fierce warnings to the Dutch government (Delta Committee, 2008c), but also to society as a whole; climate change was a real threat to the wealth earned in the Dutch Delta. It used the frame that “the threat is urgent, but not imminent”; the message was that of a warning, but also of a plan to go forward (Delta Committee, 2008d; M. J. Vink, Boezeman, et al., 2013). The Committee called for firm steps, but also stressed that there was time to carefully plan ahead and that now was the best time to do so. In the presentation of the report the Committee made explicit reference to the 1953 disaster and the subsequent iconic Delta Works. Accordingly, the Committee presented its proposals not as “a new course”, but as a “continuation and a next step for the original Delta Works”. Because the Committee feared that the attention for water management would quickly fade away (Delta Committee, 2008a) the Committee proposed substantial institutional changes in Dutch water management. The Committee recommended setting up a Delta Program managed by a Delta Director, financed by a Delta fund all backed up by a Delta Act; all institutional backing to sustain the initiative if political attention would shift away. A leaked inside-memo from the Delta Committee revealed that inside the Committee members spoke of the Delta Director as a “Delta Dictator”, a figure that would be above the parties and that would be positioned somewhere in-between the government (the Minister and the Cabinet) and public administration (Delta Committee, 2008b). All of these institutional proposals were intended to position the Delta-program away from every-day politics and administrative strives over short term interests and financial resources. The Committee not only succeeded in communicating the content of the issue, and building a coalition of interests and political power in the water sector to support its message, but it also proposed an institutional arrangement to safeguard it after the initial political support for the Committee’s recommendations would fade away. 4.2.5. Phase 5: institutionalizing the recommendations Most of the institutional measures proposed were realized in the period shortly after the Committee’s report came out. Almost all of the stakeholders in the field adopted the proposals of the Committee, and despite the economic crisis after some debate the institutional proposals were accorded in Parliament. The governmental partners went along with the idea of a fund, although not as big as the Committee had advised: “A solid Delta fund will be set up, which will make a fast implementation of the Delta Program possible through a structural money flow of at least from 2020 s 1 billion annually from the Intra Fund” (Ministry of General Affairs, 2009). The Delta Committee had recommended an amount of s 1.5 billion, but according to most interviewees this amount was most of all symbolic. The exact number was not the real point, what mattered was that there was now a structural and substantial stream of funding, positioned away from everyday politics. Similarly the Delta Act proposed by the Committee was accorded by Parliament. The act would backup the Delta Fund, a Delta Programme and the Delta Director as a central coordinator located above all administrative parties. As one interviewee formulated it: “we needed a construction which would endure the political storm”. On June 28, 2011 the proposal for the Delta Act was accepted unanimously in Parliament and on January 1, 2012 the Delta Act was approved. 5. Analysis In this section we will analyze how the Second Delta Committee was able of organizing support for rather far reaching recommendations. We will do so by employing the classical notions on puzzling, powering. In addition we will propose the concept of perpetuating for explaining how the Committee sustained its decisions in view of fading attention and possible societal opposition in the future.

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5.1. Puzzling over what is at stake The reformulation of the Second Delta Committee’s assignment into a broadened scope and a shortened time line was clearly a process of puzzling over meaning as described by Heclo (1974) and Dunn (2003). The Committee shortened the time horizon because if felt that the uncertainties in looking ahead 200 years were too large to make any claim of substantive coherence. Partly, that was a problem of prognostic uncertainty; but more importantly it was also a matter of imagination. The Committee felt that 2200 would not contribute to recognition of the issue, nor would it lead to any common problem definition. For the Committee, solving the puzzle was done in such a way that simultaneously shaped a process of powering ( Buuren et al., 2014; M. J. Vink, Dewulf, et al., 2013). An important sidestep related to that timeline was that the Committee commissioned further research by the Dutch meteorological institute (KNMI) to come up with new climate scenarios that were tailor-made for the Dutch Delta. The Committee still based its argument on the IPCC-scenarios, but added new KNMI-scenarios to that. These extra scenarios pointed at more risk for the Delta than the original IPCC-scenarios. This added to the problem-definition of the Committee. There was still time to adapt to climate change, but the effects were not to be underestimated. This included the risk of “overestimating” the risks (see also: Enserink et al., 2013), but the Committee deliberately choose to do so for reasons of public support. By reformulating its assignment in terms of geographical scope, the Committee went beyond water works and laid the foundation for a narrative of national “survival”. This also meant that the Committee was no longer limited to discuss climate impacts for coastal safety, but also of the inland water works around rivers, and the preservation of drinking water reserves. The Committee reframed its scope and scale to the entire country. This implied that many of the recommendations would have to be carried out by local governments, provinces, water boards, and citizens. The Committee was a national Committee, but by reframing its scope implied ties to local processes and decentralized governmental levels. A third element of puzzling was that the Committee positioned itself as a continuation of the already existing “Delta Works”. It renamed itself “the Second Delta Committee”, which positioned the Committee in the legacy of the iconic Delta Works that were designed by the first Delta Committee back in the 60ies. The Committee underpinned this positioning by arguing that it was completing the Delta Works, rather than initiating a new program. The Committee framed its recommendations as “a next step” in a continuing struggle with the sea. Factually the Committee was taking an entirely new direction, with a much broader focus than before, but it presented itself as a continuation of existing efforts. The urgency presented by the Committee was more about intensifying rather than a radical change of strategy, whereas the more factual reality was that the Committee proposed a new strategy and scope for water management 5.2. Powering for getting things done Van Buuren et al. (2014) see powering strategies in context of climate change as the ability to mobilize supporters around a specific option and/or neutralize opponents’ attempts to block those, and M. J. Vink, Boezeman, et al. (2013) add a discursive element that interrelates powering with puzzling strategies. Our analysis suggests that the Committee used a powering strategy that was closely related to its puzzling strategy. The Committee hardly engaged in any confrontation with opponents and also did not openly lobby for its proposals. The Committee seemed to rely on support yielded by the chosen framing of its scope, rather than actively going out to ensure the support of stakeholders. We have shown that the Committee strategically planned its communication strategy to the broad public. Another example of this discursive powering strategy closely related to the puzzling strategy are the ‘Eerbeek’ sessions conducted by the Ministry. The Eerbeek-session became the nexus of connecting the different societal and administrative players to the Committees’ proposals. Even though they are hardly mentioned in the official documents, all interviewees stress the crucial importance of the Eerbeek sessions in priming all actors for the Committee report through discussing long-term issues. The sessions became a round-table for the powerful stakeholders around the issue of water management to familiarize themselves with the ideas of the Committee—even though the Committee had not yet presented those ideas, nor was it an official participant in the sessions. It is important to note that the Eerbeek sessions did not include all of the different interests and stakes. In essence the sessions featured different stakeholders with a mutual interest in more attention for water management; it was a broad dialogue, but not an open or inclusive one. Participants represented different branches of one cluster of interests. Nevertheless, the sessions created a joint narrative of what was happening in the Delta and what was needed. The powerful stakeholders brought in their own knowledge and ideas, which the ministry could take into account in preparing its official response to the Committee report later that year. 5.3. Perpetuating decisions for the future In addition to the classically defined processes of puzzling and powering which as we show are nicely reflected in the work of the second Delta Committee (see also: M. J. Vink, Boezeman, et al., 2013) the Committee illustrates how additional activities created conditions for the sustainment of the puzzling and powering outcomes. Where genuine policy making over complex matter depends on puzzling over what is at stake and interrelated power organization among stakeholders, politicians and administration for getting things done, policy making for the long term requires stability between decisions

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made now and the far future when decisions are intended to materialize. Especially in the case of climate adaptation, which requires long term investment for expensive infrastructural works anticipating future high sea levels, reverting earlier made decisions or investments due to political opposition or shifts in budgets ‘on the way’ might have serious consequences for future impacts. Interesting about the Second Delta Committee is that it not only succeeded in arranging a potentially difficult political decision by smart puzzling and related powering, but that it did so in a way that ensured its effects for years to come. The Committee feared that its initial societal and political support would soon fade away and that financial constraints or economic headwind would redirect budgets away from climate adaptation. In that sense, the biggest problem for the Committee was not to create a decision now, but to sustain the effects of that decision for the longer-term. Therefore, the Committee proposed a threefold institutional structure of (a) the Delta-fund, (b) a Delta Commissioner and (c) a Delta-Act that effectively put the entire issue of climate adaptation outside of the scope of the everyday political debate and related four-yearly budgeting cycles. This institutionalization (Fund, Commissioner, Act) allowed for future adaptation-specific negotiations and budgeting, to respond to changing circumstances in and around the issue of water management. However, the institutionalization minimized the threat of competition between short-term demands in the near or farther future. The institutionalization places barriers and watersheds in the policy-processes. The Delta Commissioner allows for negotiation with stakeholders and governmental organizations—if occupied with adaptation, the Delta Fund guarantees for budgets even in times of economic decline, and the Delta Act legally underpins this arrangements and limits influences from everyday politics. We define this institutionalization as a perpetuation of the puzzling and powering done by the Committee in 2008. By the threefold institutionalization future political negotiations or sudden societal opposition can no longer jeopardize the effects of the puzzling and powering done by the Committee in 2008. It is not possible to ‘test’ the effectiveness of these perpetuating measures, since the time-span is too short to make definitive claims. However, it is noteworthy that the Delta program was not affected by the extreme austerity of the financial-crisis period, and that not even were attempts made to stall investments or to shave-off the fund. Up till 2015 the Delta program has been able to work in relative calm, which is at least a sign of a degree of perpetuating capacity (Table 1). 6. Conclusion and discussion This paper started with the question how todays’ processes of puzzling and powering over long-term climate issues can be consolidated to guarantee adequate policies in the future? To answer that question we analyzed the case of the Dutch Second Delta Committee, which we present as a successful case of ensuring long-term decision-making. We theoretically defined how dealing with a long-term wicked policy issue boils down to and interplay between three policy processes: puzzling, powering, and perpetuating. In line with Heclo’s notions on puzzling and powering, the case illustrated how these processes are not separate but deeply intertwined processes. Choices about problem-definitions are of great importance for the mobilization of power and for the parties that are part of the process; puzzling is not only about fact finding in wicked policy problems, but also about defining scope, focus and time-horizon, which enhance the chances for rallying support. It is interesting to see that the Committee used the long time-horizon to create urgency. The long time horizon allowed the Committee to frame the adaptation challenge as “important but not yet urgent”. In puzzling and powering the future posed a problem, but at the same time the future also appeared as part of the solution, and therefore allowed for organizing support. Table 1 Critical interventions that composed the strategies of puzzling, powering, and perpetuating. “X” stands for a primary contribution to a strategy, “x” refers to a secondary contribution to a strategy. Critical interventions

Strategies of puzzling

Strategies of powering

Reinterpreting the research assignment, and narrow or broaden the scope on certain aspects: use the long term (100 years) as “time to prepare” and soften the effects of the drastic changes that are needed to adapt to climate change Creating multiple scenarios and different storylines about possible futures, to create a narrative of “importance” Reframing the assignment from a technical issue of “water works” and civil engineering in the coastline regions, towards a social, economic, and even cultural issue that concerns every citizen everywhere Position itself in a long tradition of water works and a continuation of current practice rather than a radical deviation from that Organizing the Eerbeek-sessions and creating a powerful network of parties and political support The Eerbeek session ensured fast governments’ response, so that the political momentum could be used to its full potential Installing a Delta Commissioner, who is responsible for the progress and the consistency of the Delta Program Setting up a Delta Fund, which guarantees a structural money flow of at least from 2020 s 1 billion annually Enforcing a Delta Act, which provides the legal existence of the Delta Program

X

x

X

x

X

x

X

x

Strategies of perpetuating

x

x

X X X x

X

x

X

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In addition to the classically defined processes of puzzling and powering, the case showed a third process that we defined as perpetuation. Apart from successfully puzzling and powering towards agreement and decision-making, the Committee secured the decision for the long term by making three institutionalizations part of the solution it proposed. Through institutionally allocating decision making and budgeting away from the day-to-day political debate, the Committee perpetuated its recommendations for the future. Or in more general terms: what makes long-term issues hard to address now is also what makes them vulnerable in the years after a decision has been made; because they remain distant, not urgent, hard to prove, and open for new arguments, debate can be reopened at any time. New solutions and other power-coalitions can emerge, as the deep uncertainty about the cause of the issue and the effectiveness of the current solution remains. In case of the Second Delta Committee, the Committee proposed an institutional arrangement as part of the adaptation recommendations. Together with the rest of the adaptation measures the Committee proposed government and parliament accorded the institutional arrangements. Although the Delta Program can still be changed or amended if political representation demands so, doing so now takes serious political effort in formulating a counter-narrative and an equally strong coalition of power. This raises a barrier for changing the program in the midst of political struggles or turf-wars. Although we are aware of the limitations of a single case study for drawing general conclusions about specific policy processes, we believe the case of the Dutch Delta Committee shows how Heclo’s (1974) classical notions of puzzling and powering can apply to the issue of climate adaptation. The notions of puzzling and powering might be an answer to the more linear notions of climate adaptation criticized by others (Biesbroek et al., 2015) and helps to better understand success and failure in climate adaptation governance. Moreover, the concept of perpetuation helps to understand how decisions made in climate adaptation can be sustained for the long-term. It is too early to call the program a long term success, but it is significant that even during the worst financial, economic, and monetary crisis in recent history of The Netherlands, the program remained untouched by political pressure or budgetary turf wars within the civil service. Attention for explicitly perpetuating actions when designing policy and institutional arrangements for long time programs is an interesting lead for the policy-practice and for further research. However, it is too early to simply generalize this finding towards other contexts. 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