Quota management in a context of non-transferability of fishing rights: The French case study

Ocean & Coastal Management 84 (2013) 13e22

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Quota management in a context of non-transferability of fishing rights: The French case study Zidane Larabi*, Olivier Guyader, Claire Macher, Fabienne Daurès Ifremer, UMR AMURE, Unité d’Economie Maritime, Département Ressources Biologiques et Environnement (RBE), BP 70, F-29280 Plouzané Cedex, France

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Available online 31 July 2013

The Common Fisheries Policy reform proposal is aiming to generalise the principle of individual transferable fishing concessions (TFCs) to all EU member states. In France, the transfer of quotas is prohibited by law. This paper considers the quota management system being implemented in this context. It demonstrates the originality of the French system as regards quota management, and how it has evolved to adapt to constraints associated with non-transferability. We show how the current system in practise allows producers to manage and exchange their landings track records while giving significant prerogatives to Producer Organisations (PO) in the collective management of quotas. The pooling of quotas by Producer Organisations in fact allows them to compensate to a large extent for the absence of transferability. The allocation of vessel quota is still quite limited insofar as many quotas are still underutilised. Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction In its Green Paper on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the European Commission proposes to instigate transferable fishing concessions to remedy overcapacity in the European fishing fleet (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Having abandoned the idea of creating a common market for fishing concessions, it is proposed that fishing rights should be transferable, but solely between member states, with member states free to organise and regulate the operating conditions for this market in order to override or circumvent certain untoward effects. These private concessions would be attributed for a minimum of fifteen years, and would apply to vessels of more than 12 m, and to all vessels carrying trawled gear (European Commission, 2011b). This proposal takes as starting point the observation that European fishing fleets are still too large in relation to the available resource. This overcapacity phenomenon is at the root of problems related to overexploitation of halieutic resources, and so ultimately of dwindling economic and social performances in the sector. Evaluation of the CFP has revealed that conservation measures e Total Allowable Catch (TAC) or other technical measures e have not

* Corresponding author. Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation de la Mer e Centre de Brest, Département Ressources Biologiques & Environnement, Laboratoire d’Économie Maritime, BP 70, 29280 Plouzané, France. Tel.: þ33 0 2 98 22 43 65; fax: þ33 0 2 98 22 47 76. E-mail address: [email protected] (Z. Larabi). 0964-5691/$ e see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2013.07.001

succeeded in significantly reducing overexploitation of resources and limiting negative impacts on ecosystems (European Commission, 2011a). Funding programmes to decommission vessels rolled out over the last 20 years have not succeeded either, despite considerable expenditure, in reducing fishing capacity and compensating for the effects of technical progress (Hatcher, 2000; Lindebo, 2005; Guyader et al., 2007; Report of Poseidon Aquatic Management Ltd, 2010). The diagnosis highlights the fact that, because of the common nature of the resource exploited, instigating individual transferable fishing rights can boost producers’ commitment to stewardship, and help curb the phenomenon of the ‘race’ for fish (Christy Jr., 1973). This conclusion draws, in fact, on numerous theoretical and empirical works encouraging the implementation of incentivebased fishery management methods, and in particular, rightsbased management (OECD, 2006; Grafton et al., 2006). The Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) is a tool for resolving the economic problems fisheries are experiencing, with the aim of eliminating overcapitalisation and improving overall financial efficiency in the sector (Moloney and Pearse, 1979). The introduction of transferability mechanisms must result in a selection process favouring fishers with the lowest production costs in the market, and therefore those operating with the greatest economic efficiency. This tool therefore provides a means of reducing fishing capacity without recourse to state funding (Clark, 2006; Copes, 1986; Fox et al., 2006; Squires et al., 1998). The utilisation of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) is already a reality in fisheries management in many countries,

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including New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, Canada, the United States and Chile, but their application has still not been extended to all nations (Arnason, 2002; Asche et al., 2008; Grafton, 1996; Grafton and McIlgorm, 2009; Newell et al., 2005). In the European Union, each Member State is free to choose the methods used to allocate and regulate quotas according to subsidiary principle. (MRAG et al., 2009) and (OECD, 2006) have shown that there exist widely diverse access regulation modes between member states, and between fisheries within member states. Fishing rights can take the form of licences, territory rights, and/or individual quotas. In some EU nations, for example the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and the United Kingdom, explicit individual quota markets already exist (González Laxe, 2006; Marchal et al., 2009). (Jentoft, 1989; Smit, 1997; Gutierrez et al., 2011); also demonstrate the importance of mechanisms of collective action, and in particular the role of co-management structures linking fishers’ organisations into a successful, fishing-rights based, kind of management. The issue of giving Producer Organisations (PO) a stronger role is also aired in the Common Fishing Policy reform proposals with a view to granting them more responsibility in managing quotas. In the case of France, the Marine Fisheries Act of 1997 (Loi d’orientation sur la pêche, 1997) and then the modernisation of agriculture and fishing law in 2010 (LMAP, 2010), reaffirmed the collective nature of halieutic resources, and the non-transferability of fishing quotas. These laws aim to prevent fishing rights from becoming inheritable assets, and to maintain economic and social equilibrium within the French territory. This paper examines the system of quota management as it is applied in France in the context of an absence of fishing rights transferability, and increasingly restrictive quotas. Our objective is to analyse the way in which the actors have adapted over the last few years to sidestep the absence of quota transferability, and in particular to study the role of Producer Organisations in the system of collective management of landings track records. The French quota management system has been very little described and analysed, unlike the management systems deployed in other European countries (Davidse, 2000; Davidse et al., 1999; González Laxe, 2006; Hatcher, 1997; Smit, 1997). This work draws essentially on an analysis of legal texts, data on fishing fleets, their production and quotas. The analysis also draws on selected results from an extensive survey conducted to examine the role of the administration and Producer Organisations in quota management.

This article describes, in the first part, the scope and recent evolution of quotas in France, as well as the main species concerned. The current organisation of the quota management system is then presented, as well as the different historical steps that have lead up to this management system. In the second part, the adaptation of actors e producers, producer organisations, administration e to the non-transferability of quotas is analysed, while considering the behaviours and measures of management implemented. The last part discusses the results obtained and the avenues for development of the quota management system in France. 2. Quota management in France: recent history and current situation 2.1. Size of quotas in France In 2010, France was allocated quotas by the European Commission for 45 species distributed over 146 management units (species-zones) located for the most part in the Atlantic. The only species concerning the Mediterranean Sea is bluefin tuna. The total French quota allocation is of the order of 284 000 metric tons, and its valorisation at the landing price per species is estimated at around V746 million in 2010. As regards the global production figure landed by French vessels, this is estimated at 461 000 metric tons representing a turnover of V1 104 million in 2008 (France Agrimer, 2008). The main species subject to the TAC and quota in terms of market value are anglerfish, common sole, nephrops, hake, blue whiting and pollack (cf. Table 1). The quotas for the eight first species represent 50% of the sum of French quotas, and 69% of their total value. As shown in Fig. 1, French quotas have decreased significantly since 2005, with a 27% drop in total tonnage and value. 2.2. Current organisation of the quota management system in France The three main actors in the organisation of quota management are:  The Department for marine fisheries aquaculture (DPMA) responsible for allocating and controlling national quotas on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.  The Producer Organisations, whose job it is to manage subquotas. In 2010, there were 19 producer organisations (PO)

Table 1 Evolution of values and tonnage for main species subject to quota: 2005e2010. Espèces

Average value in million Euros (2005e2010)

Cumulative percentage of value

Average quota in metric tons (2005e2010)

Cumulative percentage of tonnage

% Quota change (2005e2010)

Anglerfish Common sole Nephrops Hake Blue whiting Pollack Saithe Megrims Bigeye tuna Cod Whiting Bluefin tuna Albacore Haddock Anchovy Mackerel Others Total France

139.3 98.6 77.7 71.1 53.4 43.5 36.2 32.7 31.9 28.5 27.1 24.6 16.8 16.7 16.3 15.8 99.4 829.5

17% 30% 39% 48% 55% 60% 65% 69% 73% 76% 80% 83% 85% 87% 89% 91% 100% 100%

26 8 10 24 30 12 38 9 8 8 17 5 7 11 5 17 124 321

8% 11% 14% 22% 31% 35% 47% 50% 53% 55% 61% 63% 65% 68% 70% 75% 100% 100%

40% 4% 34% 59% 84% 17% 47% 18% 15% 21% 31% 71% 27% 19% 60% 48% 27% 27%

330 827 436 738 783 690 000 325 610 755 756 097 245 323 940 006 152 680

Source: Directorate for marine fisheries and aquaculture (DPMA), Ifremer Fisheries Information System (SIH).

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Fig. 1. Evolution in French quota quantities and values 2005e2010. Source: DPMA, Ifremer SIH.

recognised by the EU in France, of which 14 are on the Atlantic seaboard, 4 are in the Mediterranean, and 1 is in a French overseas territory. The Producer Organisations are also regrouped within associations such as ANOP (Association Nationale des Organisations de Producteurs) or FEDOPA (Fédération des Organisations de Producteurs de la Pêche Artisanale), that are responsible for representing them and defending their interests at both national and EU levels.

 Producer-vessel owners that are members or not of the Producer Organisations. Fig. 2 shows how the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) allocation system operates by species in terms of quotas allocated to Member States, sub-quotas by Producer Organisation, and then by producer. Relative stability allocation keys determine how TACs are allocated by species/zone for each country (Holden, 1994; European

Fig. 2. Current organisation of the management system of quotas in France.

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Fig. 3. Quota Monitoring Committee.

Commission, 2002). In the current organisation as defined by legal statutes dating from 2006 (Arrêté, 2006), the French quota is shared out by the DPMA into sub-quotas per Producer Organisation, and to entities outside the Producer Organisation when the national quota uptake rate for the fish stock concerned was more than 70% for one of the three preceding years. The distribution by the DPMA of the majority of national quotas into sub-quotas is governed by a distribution key between the Producer Organisations. This key is drawn up on a track-record criterion based on the average landings of member producers over the period 2001e2003. Sub-quotas are attributed for a maximum of 12 months. At the start of each year, the administration proceeds to update «administrative» transfers of track records in such a way as to take movements of producers between Producer Organisations into account along with sales of vessels and vessel decommissioning. During this inventory phase, the distribution of sub-quotas is provisional and only concerns 50% of the sub-quotas. On reception of the sub-quotas, the Producer Organisations must then establish a management plan within a month of the quota hand-out, and circulate this to all its members. Producers outside the POs retain access to the sub-quotas they have been allocated in the same way as Producer Organisations, as a function of all the unaffiliated producers’ track records. A quota monitoring committee (in French, a Comité de suivi des quotas or CSQ) was created by a legal statute in 2006 (Arrêté, 2006). Every month, it assembles representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and fishing, the PO federations (ANOP and FEDOPA) as well as the French National Committee for Maritime Fisheries and Marine Fish Farming (CNPMEM) that assumes the role of representative for the fishing sector as a whole, and notably for the nonProducer Organisations as shown in Fig. 3. The objective of this tripartite committee is to monitor:  Monthly evolutions in quota and sub-quota consumption so all POs are aware of their monthly sub-quota consumption rate as calculated from the synthesis of log book or sales data;  Exchanges of sub-quotas between national Producer Organisations;  Exchanges of quotas in France with other member states for which a reserve of quotas has been established;

 Vessels concerned by the fleet decommissioning programs, the track records of which will be fed into the national reserve or the Producer Organisations’ reserve;  The sale of vessels between producers, and decisions to proceed or not with the transfer of associated track records. As quota consumption for a given management unit approaches the total quota allocation, and in particular when the national consumption figure reaches 90%, the result may be national closure. The regulator then issues a closure notice for the management unit concerned. Otherwise, to fine tune quota consumption on a national scale, it will often be the case that the regulator will reallocate quotas for which consumption is under-subscribed in some POs to offset against the excess catches recorded by other Producer Organisations. Where a PO has exceeded its sub-quota, France will apply a community sanction structure that applies to all Member States (MS) to penalise the POs in question. The DPMA can allocate reductions in PO sub-quotas for the current year, or subsequent years, commensurate with the levels of excess as defined by the regulation (European Commission, 2009). 2.3. From national management to decentralised management at Producer Organisation level The national quota management system in France has been defined progressively, in stages as described by Fig. 4. Even though the community TAC and quotas system was initiated in 1983 (European Commission, 1983), French quotas have long been set higher than the catch capacity of French fishing vessels. The French quota did not depend, therefore, on any special distribution methodology, and national quotas were considered to be accessible to everyone e ‘open access’ was the general rule (Mesnil, 2008). It was only in 1990 that the State decided to divide up national quotas of certain species that had been fished to excess. The national quotas for six species (cod, pollack, hake, mackerel, plaice and sole) were in the first instance shared out between the various groups of regions constituting France’s coastline territories (Arrêté, 1990). A quotas management committee then distributed the sub-quotas by administrative region, maritime area, port and then, by Producer Organisation. The distribution principle follows the rule that quotas are allocated in sub-quotas as soon as the

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Fig. 4. Evolution of the quota management system in France from 1983 to 2011.

quota consumption figure reaches, or exceeds, 70% of that of the previous year. The distribution is applied according to a criterion of ‘sliding’ track records, based on the average landing for the last three years.1 Tensions between Producer Organisation federations and lack of agreement about quota distribution methods have prevented the system from operating in a fully productive way. The role of the Producers’ Organisations has therefore been limited to administering the task of bringing fishing products to market while applying the Common Market Organisation’s system (CMO) of withdrawal pricing (European Commission, 1999) (Lebon Le Squer, 1998). The Marine Fisheries Act of 1997:  affirms the role of the State in distributing fishing authorisations and quotas, and confirms their non-patrimonial and non-transferable character,  reserves access to national quotas for fishing vessels flying the French flag that have real financial associations with the French territory, to avoid ‘quota hopping’, whereby quotas are siphoned off by non-eligible third parties,  reinforces the POs’ role as regards quota management and management of landings on behalf of their members. The rules of quota management are nevertheless not explicitly formalised. From 1997 to 2004, the distribution of quotas as subquotas to POs remained subject to the ‘sliding’ track-records attached to vessels (track record ¼ vessel), but also to market trends, and a criterion of so-called « socio-economic equilibrium » to compensate for the fact that certain fishers do not hold landing trackrecords. From 2005 onwards, the DPMA decided to freeze the vessels’ track records with, as reference, the years 2001e2002e2003. The decision to freeze track records was taken to avoid systematically renewing vessel landings that had served for the calculation of subquota distributions between the Producer Organisations. A legal statute in 2006 (Arrêté, 2006) clarifies the quota allocation regulations in affirming that track records « constitute a method

for calculating how quotas may be divided up into sub-quotas between the POs». Landings track records were thenceforward assigned to the vessel-producer partnership (track record ¼ vessel owner) and became fixed on the basis of the average of historical landings recorded by these vessels for the period 2001e2003. While track records were individualised, they did not, for all that, constitute a right to have any claim on a particular quota. From 2008 onwards, a system of individual quotas was, for the first time, set up for the bluefin tuna fishery in the Mediterranean, against a background of heavy restrictions on the national quota. In 2009, following consultation with the PO’s, a series of preliminary experiments on individual catch limits were tested on six fish stocks: Roundnose grenadier, nephrops, common sole, blue ling, saithe, black scabbard fish (Note DPMA, 2009; Arrêté, 2010). These catch limits were made compulsory in 2011, but their implementation has been more or less effective within Producer Organisations overall. Hence, as Fig. 4 indicates, allocations of quotas per vessel are very recent, and are, as yet, little utilised (see Fig. 4 for more detailed information on this subject). Since 2010, the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (LMAP, 2010) has transferred responsibility for individual management of fishing authorisations (i.e. licences and related fishing effort) to the POs for certain fish stocks subject to community quotas in order to better align fishing capacity with quotas for certain fish stocks. It has also strengthened the POs’ powers to sanction their members in the event of transgressions with regard to Producer Organisation regulations.

3. How actors behaved in a context of non-transferability This section studies how the different actors e producers, producer organisations and administrations e adapted in practice in a context of official non-transferability of fishing quotas.

3.1. Producers 1 At that time, the allocation of national quotas as sub-quotas does not translate into quotas associated to individual vessels.

There are various behaviour profiles for track record handling on the part of producers:

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 Since 2006 (Arrêté, 2006), a vessel owner has a certain freedom to manage their own track records, concentrating them all on a single vessel, or transferring them to several other vessels of which they are the owner.  A producer can also sell their vessel on the second hand market and conserve the totality of the track records on condition that they remain active in their fishing activity, in other words, that they continue to own at least one active vessel in a fleet. Despite the fact that track records are not transferable in France, producers do have the option of transferring all or part of their track records when selling a vessel, on condition they set up a transfer protocol between the purchaser and the seller of the vessel. This transfer protocol must be agreed by the purchaser’s Producer Organisation, by the seller, and by the administration. A producer also has an option to sell a vessel abroad. In this case, the producer only sells the vessel’s hull, and the track records of the vessel are retained by the producer.  The conditions for retrieving track records in the framework of fleet decommissioning programs have also influenced the behaviour of producers. Under the current legislation in the framework of the 2006 legal statute, several scenarios can arise. An active producer who has applied for the decommissioning of one of his vessels retains his track records whether he is a member of a PO or not. He can therefore reallocate his track records to another vessel already in a fleet, or to a new vessel. The track records of an inactive producer who is a member of a PO would be split between the PO and the national reserve, with 50% being reallocated to the PO and 50% to the national reserve. For a vessel not affiliated to a Producer Organisation, it would be 100% of these track records that went to the national reserve.  Producers’ membership of a PO is voluntary. The incentive for membership is clearly that producers can thereby benefit from fishing opportunities available to the PO, and where relevant, from additional services provided by the PO (for example, application of a withdrawal price, professional representation etc.).

Fig. 5. Evolution in the total number of vessels and vessels less than 12 m long in the PO between 2001 and 2010. Source: DPMA, Ifremer SIH.

that would normally take place on the sale of a vessel. Only a small number of vessels are exported abroad, with, for example, a maximum of 19 vessels being exported in 2007 as shown in Table 2. There have been a large number of fleet decommissioning programs over the last few years, and these have contributed to a reduction in the number of registered vessels (Quillérou and Guyader, 2012). Table 2 shows the evolution of fleet decommissioning for vessels, on the one hand for the whole of the fleet, and on the other hand for vessels disposing of track records. Of 520 vessels decommissioned between 2006 and 2010, 314 (60%) concerned vessels with track records. These track records have been fed into the national reserve and/or the reserves of the POs, and this has created flexibility, generally, in track record management. Membership of the POs has increased significantly since the year 2000, reaching a maximum of 2 450 vessels in 2007 (þ30% between 2001 and 2007) as indicated in Fig. 5. The increase in the number of vessels within the POs is largely accounted for by membership of vessels less than 12 m long, which in the past were considered to be non-Producer Organisation vessels (Le Bihan, 1977). In 2010, these represented 60% of vessels in the POs, as against only 50% in 2000. With respect to the French Atlantic maritime region, vessels of less than 12 m represent no less than about 75% of the total fishing fleet (Leblond et al., 2011). The increased PO membership of 12-metre vessels can be explained by the incentives membership offers in terms of a guaranteed level of access to the quotas, and a better chance of avoiding closure, given the higher proportion of non-PO producer organisations closing their businesses than the POs themselves. In fact, the track records of these 12-metre vessels are often limited or non-existent because landings have been consistently underdeclared. Some POs have also actively encouraged higher membership among producers so as to increase the member numbers,

We have attempted to quantify these different producer behaviour profiles for the period following 2006. Even though it is not possible to trace track record transfers between producers with any degree of precision, an analysis of the second-hand market for fishing vessels shows that the number of vessels exchanged that had track records concerned between 110 and 178 vessels between 2006 and 2010, representing on average 57% of the total number of transactions for the period (cf. Table 2). The number of transactions on the second hand market is itself quite sizeable, since on average, 8% of vessels in the fleet were exchanged each year for the period. This demonstrates that despite the prohibition on track record transferability, in practice they are transferable through the sale of vessels. (Guyader et al., 2006) have also shown that a high proportion of the value of vessels available on the second-hand market consisted of the implicit value of “fishing rights” attached to vessels. It is important to note here e in the current context of falling quotas e that POs often oppose the recommended track record transfers

Table 2 Evolution of the Atlantic fleet, vessel transactions in the second-hand resale market, exports abroad and fleet decommissioning, with and without track records. Year

Number of vessels in the fleet

Vessels transactions

Vessels transactions with track records

Exports

Exports with tracks records

Decommissioning

Decommissioning with track records

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

3631 3592 3416 3263 3160

292 315 250 218 192

178 181 125 122 110

15 19 9 3 2

12 16 5 3 0

99 26 169 145 82

64 9 100 97 44

Source: DPMA, Ifremer SIH

Z. Larabi et al. / Ocean & Coastal Management 84 (2013) 13e22 Table 3 Principles for sub-quota management in the Producer Organisations. Degree of individualisation

PO quotas (no sharing) Fleet, gear, harbour quotas Vessel quotas

Rules of quota allocation Pooling

Non pooling

U U U

U U

thereby boosting their recognition at a national and European level and the financial resources needed for their operation at the same time. This has also enabled some POs to better control fluctuations in prices linked to these producers’ sales, in the absence of an effective mechanism to extend withdrawal prices to non-PO producers. Finally, the administration has also encouraged certain vessels to subscribe to the POs by handing out track records to them (as was the case, for example, for mackerel in 2006). As Fig. 5 shows, the number of members then fell due to the fleet decommissioning schemes described above. Since 2006, it has become harder for new producers to gain entry to the POs, with entry being increasingly dependent on the track records new members bring to the organisation. While in theory the entry of new producers is possible through the utilisation of the PO’s track record reserve dating from vessels decommissioning schemes, or sourced by the national reserve, these entries remain in reality very limited, or concern fisheries that are not subject to community quotas. Because of increasing pressure on quotas, the PO management committees may refuse requests for membership from producer vessels so as to preserve a margin of manœuvre with regard to the collective management of quotas. 3.2. Producer Organisations (POs) Collective quota management within the POs compensates to a certain extent for the absence of track record transferability. In fact, the pooling of quotas by POs offers producers a certain degree of flexibility so they can adjust their fishing activity and production independently of a strict referential for individual landings track records. So-called “collective” management in this way provides margins for manœuvre to buffer the effect of changes in fishing vessels’ strategy, and in particular in the case of mixed fisheries, or in the event that certain quotas are closed. It also allows some active fishers who do not possess track records to maintain their activity. This remains possible so long as the TAC and quotas are

Fig. 6. Evolution of sub-quota consumption rates for Producer Organisations: 2005e 2010 data as a percentage of total sub-quota value. Note: The number of stock being subject to distribution into sub-quotas rose from 73 in 2005 to 88 in 2010. Source: DPMA, Ifremer SIH.

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relatively high in relation to the fishing capacity of the PO members, or so long as the fleet decommissioning schemes allow sufficient leeway to adjust fishing capacity in relation to available sub-quota within the PO. In this context, quota management is not homogeneous between POs and within POs, depending on the fish stock concerned. Different ways of managing quotas were identified in POs (cf.Table 3), ranging from the kind of management where there is no allocation of their sub-quotas to the allocation of vessel quota:  When consumption rates are low, members can freely access the PO’s sub-quotas on condition that they are authorised to fish (i.e. they possess the appropriate fishing licences) for the fisheries concerned. The producers’ track records are pooled in the PO’s sub-quota, and the role of the PO is then limited to verifying that sub-quotas are not exceeded, and to preventing excess product being made available on the market. In other respects, this mode of management on the part of the PO assumes that the PO’s sub-quotas are under utilised in a sustainable way. In the case of non-PO producers, there are no management rules such as those put in place by the POs, and this generally results in the premature closure of the fishing activities concerned for these fishers.  When sub-quota consumption rates are higher, sub-quotas can be allocated by fleet, by gear type, or by port. The main objective of this type of allocation is to prevent conflicts in the utilisation of the PO’s sub-quotas. These conflicts can exist notably when the quota is not exploited at the same time of year by producers from different fleets.  Finally, when the quotas are subject to high levels of tension, certain POs allocate vessel quotas. Even if certain POs have had recourse to individual quotas for several years, their allocation is relatively recent. The main species concerned are often fish stocks under pressure, for example, sole in the Bay of Biscay, hake, nephrops, and mackerel. In 2010, 76 Producer Organisation sub-quotas were managed by means of quotas per vessel, this group representing 16% of sub-quotas in number, and about 30% of the overall value of landed quotas (Guyader et al., 2012). In this case, allocation can be based strictly on the member’s landings track-record for the period 2001e2003, but it is commonly the case that the allocation is found to be independent of these historical references. The vessel quota allocations are therefore established on the basis of criteria specific to the PO, such as dividing up the quota equally

Fig. 7. Evolution of sub-quota consumption rates for Producer Organisations: 2005e 2010 data as a percentage of the number of sub-quotas. Source: DPMA.

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between vessels of a single fleet, or again the utilisation of distribution keys that result in better alignment of quota with a vessel’s real production. These decisions about how quotas are allocated are discussed and validated by the management committees of the Producer Organisations. The aim of these measures is primarily to prevent sub-quotas being exceeded by Producer Organisations, and at the same time to foster a greater sense of responsibility on the part of members. If common regulations are not respected, a Producer Organisation can apply sanctions in line with the procedures set up by management: for example, non-compensation for withdrawals, seizure of fishing catches, non-renewal of fishing licences, exclusion from membership. Vessel quota can be said to be quite a limited practice to the extent that numerous quotas are still under-consumed. For each PO, we can identify the number of stocks, the volume of quota consumed, as well as the quota value as a function of categories of quota consumption rates. Fig. 6 shows that on average, 50% of the value of Producer Organisations’ quotas were less than 70% consumed for the period 2005e2010. The minimum consumption rate was 35% in 2005, and the maximum, 71% in 2009 for this category. About 22% of the total quota value was consumed between 70% and 90%. We can therefore conclude that only 25% of PO quotas, in terms of value and number of stocks (cf. Fig. 7), show an uptake rate of between 90% and 100%, and can therefore truly be said to be under pressure. French Producer Organisations also have the option to exchange quotas between themselves for the duration of one year so as to better adjust their sub-quotas to their members’ production (for more information, see Fig. 2). In 2010, these exchanges represented about 10 000 metric tons, or 4% in volume and value of French quotas. A negligible proportion of these exchanges become necessary when a PO finds it has taken on ‘sub-quotas on paper’ that do not in fact correspond to their members’ production zones, and so are not then consumed by the PO. In a context where quotas for certain species are falling, and quotas for other species may well be closed altogether, POs have been increasingly extending their exchanges to deal with other foreign POs, and they have done this via the national administration. These exchanges often concern the larger vessel owner-members of the Producer Organisation. The Producer Organisation can then consume the quotas it had acquired from other Member States, or exchange them again at national level with other Producer Organisations. This amounts to a quota bartering system that is not, in effect, subject to monetary compensation, but one where the exchange negotiated will, in fact, often take both the market value of the sub-quota species and the evolution of the TAC into account. The volume of exchanges of some quotas between French Producer Organisations is also strongly correlated with the volume of exchanges made between the French state and other Member States.

Fig. 8. Sub-quota consumption rates of Producer Organisations as a function of types of exchanges undertaken: 2010 data as a percentage of the number of sub-quotas. Source: DPMA.

A reserve that is specifically made up of quotas that are as yet unallocated between the POs has been created to source these exchanges. This mostly concerns species that are under-consumed. If this reserve is insufficient, following consultation with the Quotas monitoring commission, the administration can recall the subquotas distributed between the POs. Once the exchange has been arranged, the regulator then divides up the quotas received between the POs as dictated by the distribution key for the stock concerned. These exchanges are undertaken at intervals throughout the year, and are more frequent at the end or the start of the year, during what is sometimes referred to as the «end year quota swap» that takes place as fishing organisations try to avoid incurring penalties for catches in excess of national quotas. According to Andersen et al. (2008), exchanges between Member States only represented 4% of the total European quota in 2008. By 2010, exchanges in France had risen to 26% of the national quota in volume, and 12% in value. These exchanges between Member States are often based on mutual agreements established between the Member States themselves, and based on a standardised key in cod equivalent. The other exchanges depend on average prices for species in the different Member States, of the quota availability in the Member States, and the time of year. In 2010, the main species exchanged were Atlantic horse mackerel, mackerel, blue ling, and anchovy, for which quotas were retrieved, with saithe and hake serving mainly as exchange currency. The main countries with which France exchanges are Spain, the Netherlands, and to a lesser

3.3. Administration An option also exists within the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy to exchange all or a proportion of the quotas already allocated to France with other member nations, without, nonetheless, going against the underlying principle of fostering relative stability. The member state can, in the framework of community regulation:  Exchange catch quotas and/or quotas of effort for different species,  Proceed to transfer access rights between zones,  Borrow (by means of secured loans) quotas, with an obligation to return them the following year.

Fig. 9. Sub-quota consumption rates of Producer Organisations as a function of types of exchanges undertaken: 2010 data as a percentage of sub-quota value. Source: DPMA, Ifremer SIH.

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extent, the United Kingdom and Denmark. France exchanges in particular with these Member States, having long established agreements already in place such as the one signed in Bilbao in Spain for anchovy, or again with the Netherlands for sole. Figs. 8 and 9 reveal the advantages to POs of community exchanges on the one hand, and exchanges between POs on the other, and for the year 2010 in particular. If none of these exchanges had taken place, 29% of stocks managed by the POs (24% of quotas in value) would register consumption values in excess of 100%. This would translate into a large number of fishery closures. As these figures confirm, exchanges are therefore vital for POs and their member vessels, since they allow fine-tuning of available quotas to production capacities, and can therefore significantly reduce the overconsumption of quotas. Ultimately these exchanges allow the regulator to maximise France’s quota requirement. In other respects, the regulator can also reduce the incidence of catches exceeding quotas thanks to an interannual flexibility principle as applied to certain stocks. In the event that a national quota is under-utilised, or where additional quota is received from another Member State, the regulator can, under this scheme, carry forward up to 10% of a quota to the following year. This surplus of quotas is generally shared out by the regulator in the middle of the season in accordance with the keys of the respective Producer Organisations. 4. Conclusion and discussion This paper describes the system for managing TAC and quotas in France, and notably shows how the different actors have adapted to an official prohibition on quota transferability. The recent evolution of the management system has led the administration to relax quota management by allowing landings track records to be detached from fishing vessels. This has resulted in turn in more flexibility for producers in the management of their track records, and notably in their strategies for investment or disinvestment. However, track records are not considered as individual fishing rights. They cannot be integrated within the capital of an enterprise as an asset, as is the case in some countries, for example Iceland (Arnason, 1996). The system is ambiguous since in practice, track records can be transferred from one producer to another and then sold on unofficially when vessels change hands on the second-hand market. No official mechanism has been put in place to limit the concentration of track records, while this argument is often put forward as a key criticism of the instigation of Individual Transferable Quotas (Copes, 1986, 1996). While failing to give clear cut and secured rights to producers, the regulator has effectively given Producer Organisations important prerogatives in terms of managing their sub-quotas, as is the case in other countries (Hannesson, 2005). The management mechanisms put in place are highly dependent on the individual PO. Collective management based on the pooling of track records at PO level is to a large extent made possible by an underconsumption of large numbers of quotas. Exchanges between French POs and between Member States have, in part, compensated for the absence of transferability of quotas. State-funded fleet decommissioning schemes implemented over the last ten years, and geared to reducing fishing capacity for species subject to quota, have also given margin for manœuvre to Producer Organisations by reducing the nominal fishing capacity of their fleets, and by permitting some reallocation of track records. The question of whether in future quotas could be pooled must surely arise in the event that quotas were to become more restrictive (i.e. lowering of the TAC, reducing then halting EU funding for fleet decommissioning schemes as stipulated in the framework of CFP reform). For fish stocks under pressure, the POs in France have increasingly been forced to put targeted fishery sub-quotas per vessel in place, as

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in other countries (Asche et al., 2008). This movement must be accentuated if TACs are stabilised or adjusted downwards to attain the CFP objectives of maximum sustainable yield. In some instances, vessel quota allocations take over the respective vessels’ historical track records, but this is by no means systematic, and notably when a vessel’s real production no longer matches up to their capture track records. The principle of collective management with pooling of some quotas enables this type of adjustment to be made, but this assumes strong governance on the part of the Producer Organisations. Regroupings of Producer Organisations are in progress, and these changes of focus will most likely continue in years to come to the extent that fleet size and membership numbers will be adjusted downwards. In this context, one of the questions that arises is that of the critical size of Producer Organisations, and more precisely their capacity to manage quotas and provide services to their members. Since the year 2000, Producer Organisations have accepted membership of large numbers of vessels, and in particular of smaller vessels that do not always have any track records. This point can be viewed positively from the point of view of coastal fishery viability, but there are still many uncertainties in terms of securing individual fishing rights. The perspective of putting in place transferable fishing concessions (TFCs) also raises the question of how original allocations of quotas will be revised. Historical track records have, in effect, been calculated nearly 10 years ago and the strategies of vessels have since changed. These questions that relate essentially to equity have distribution implications (Guyader and Thebaud, 2001) that will be important to consider should TFC eventually see the light of day. One of the priorities that figures large in the framework of CFP reform is the prohibition on fishing discards. Fishers will be obliged to land all the commercial species that they catch. While the discards ban is seen as an incentive for fishers to strive to avoid unwanted catches by means of technical solutions such as more selective fishing gear, this will certainly lead to significant constraints on Producer Organisations from the point of view of the management of their sub-quotas. This could translate in the short term into some vessels that are not very selective, or vessels belonging to Producer Organisations that lack a significant track record for the discarded species, ceasing to operate. Meanwhile, the situation for non-Producer Organisation vessels risks becoming more difficult, and in particular for vessels that don’t hold a significant track record. In this case, the risk that their fishing activity will cease will increase, given that Producer Organisations are increasingly inclined to regard membership of vessels that have little or no track record unfavourably. Last but not least, the reform might actually also provide a window of opportunity for Producer Organisations, to the extent that their role could be strengthened in the framework of the project to decentralise administration, and delegate decisiontaking as regards fisheries management, while clarifying the roles and obligations of each of the actors involved. Acknowledgements We are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions. We would like to thank The Department for marine fisheries aquaculture for providing the data and sharing their knowledge of the data with us. We would also like to thank the Producer organisations who agreed to participate in the survey. References Andersen, J.L., Nielsen, M., Lindebo, E., 2008. Economic gains of liberalising access to fishing quotas within the European Union. Marine Policy 33, 497e503.

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