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Rationalizing police operations: Some explanatory factors
RATIONALIZING POLICE OPERATIONS: SOME EXPLANATORY FACTORS
MICHAEL STEINMAN Department
of Political Science University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, Nebraska 68588
ABSTRACT This stud?, attempts to explain different degrees of bureaucratization or rationalization in a sample of 949 municipal police departments in the United States. The dependent variable operationalizes rationalization in terms of officer education and training. Factors expected to explain r,ariations among departments are the backgrounds and expectations of department chiefs. the manner in which chiefs are chosen, and departmental sizes and workloads. Two major patterns of explanation resulted after analyzing a number of independent variables: the educational achievements and administrative training of chiefs; and department size. These findings underline the key role played by chiefs who appear to appreciate both the benefits and the costs of rationalization.
Introduction Max Weber tells us that bureaucratic action is rational action. Carefully fashioned goals give birth to empirically verifiable determinations of what must be done to achieve them most economically and effectively. Our century has been profoundly affected by a belief in the utility of collective action molded by the application of rational standards. Weber called such collective action bureaucratic behavior. A consequence of this belief is a world dominated by the presence and policies of bureaucratic organizations. This study attempts to identify factors explaining different degrees of bureaucratization or rationalization found in a sample
of municipal police departments in the United States. The dependent variable operationalizes rationalization in terms of officer education and training. Factors .expected to explain variations among departments are the backgrounds and expectations of department chiefs, the manner in which chiefs are chosen, and departmental sizes and workloads. This study differs from earlier efforts in two ways. It is not focused on one or a few departments thereby avoiding the limitations of case studies. Furthermore, it uses a relatively large number of factors to construct the dependent variable. While this may create some methodological challenges, it also produces a more realistic understanding of the subject.
221
MICHAEL
U-L
THE
RATIONALIZATION BEHAVIOR
OF POLICE
Max Weber wrote that the most potentially effective mode of collective effort is through the use of bureaucratic structures and processes (Gerth and Mills, 1958). Weber viewed bureaucratic action as based on rational determinations of how to accomplish specific ends. These rational determinations are developed by individuals with relevant skills and made part of the operating rules of the group. The rules are “legitimate” precisely because they are rational (i.e., based upon objective, functional conclusions about how to achieve collective goals as economically and completely as possible). Every student of administration is familiar with the characteristics of Weber’s ideal type depiction of bureaucracy (see Blumberg. 1979:71-74: Gerth and Mills. 1958). These add up to a collective situation wherein individuals trained to do specific jobs work in a full-time capacity on those jobs being careful to maintain records describing their efforts. There is a hierarchy of formal authority enabling superiors to hold subordinates accountable for their actions. This permits the entire operation, in theory, to function in a well-coordinated way with a minimum of wasteful duplication. Weber’s ideal type describes the essence of bureaucracy. A very diverse body of literature has developed over the years about how to manipulate this essence for maximum effect. Two general approaches or schools of administration summarize this diversity. Burns and Stalker (1961) label them the mechanistic and organic approaches while McGregor (1960) calls them Theory X and Theory Y. The mechanistic or Theory X approach is much closer to Weber’s ideal type in that it calls for a very well-developed division of labor, a comparatively tall hierarchy. little or no allocation of discretion, and relatively fixed task assignments. The organic or Theory Y appreach, on the other hand. advocates a much less specific and fixed division of labor, a flatter hierarchy permitting partici-
STEINlvlXN
patory decision making. and a re1ativ.c openness to change and the unexpected. Although considerably different in their assumptions and prescriptions. both approaches are ultimately based on an aspiration to be rational. Contemporary police departments are managed in ways resembling both polar extremes and every degree of gray in between. from quasi-military organizations to freer form versions of team policing. However, they all share an ambition to order their structures and operations according to demands and conditions dehning their goals and jobs (see Caiden. 1977: Lundman. 1980:51-59). An interest among police departments in operating more rationally or bureaucratically originated around the early years of this century. This was a time when the use of merit systems was making considerable headway at all levels of government. when the city manager form of government was gaining popularity. and when increasing numbers of practitioners as well as citizens were falling in love with the “science of administration.” Seeking greater administrative efficiency and effectiveness in their patrol operations. departments sought professional status for their officers (Price. 1977:65: Wilson. 1973: 155- 166). This meant emphasizing greater control by the chief. limiting officer performance to roles directly related to crime and criminals. more rigorous entrance requirements. officer commitments to law enforcement careers. higher technical competence. and formal standard operating procedures (Henderson, 1975: 107- 132; Poole. Regoli. and Lotz. 1978:525-534). The “new professionalism” of the 1970s was largely a reaction to this. It advocated more contacts with citizens, less militarism. more attention to service delivery. and using specialists for specific problems (Wilson. 1973: 155-166). While this more recent trend may have been part of a national trend toward the “new public administration” (Marini. 1971). it had something very important in common with its antecedent. Both had police managements trying to make department operations fit more uni-
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
objective notions of what works best (Caiden, 1977). The idea that police officers are professionals is still promoted for essentially the same reason: to influence officers to behave in particular ways. It is useful to explore the notion of police professionalism briefly because it says a great deal about the problems of running a department. In another article. Wilson wrote that:
versalistic,
A professional department is one governed by values derived from general. impersonal rules which bind all members of the organization and whose relevance is independent of circumstances of time, place, or personality. A non-professional department . on the other hand. relies to a greater extent
on particular judgments-that is, judgments based on the significance to a particular person of his particular reactions to particular others
(1968b: 17.5).
Wilson’s description of professional behavior among police is consistent with other treatments of professional status. The following features of professional status are typically included (Blau and Scott, 1962; Blumberg, 1979; Etzioni, 1961; and Niederhoffer. 1967): 1. Possession of professional status is contingent on the acquisition and practiced application of a sophisticated set of operating procedures. 2. These procedures are in turn based on empirically verifiable knowledge about real problems and situations. A true professional has acquired this knowledge as well as the procedures which are based on the knowledge. Obtaining such a professional education is a difficult, challenging endeavor engaged in over a period of years. 3; Professionals are motivated primarily by a commitment to provide a service. Using professional knowledge and skill solely for personal gain is contrary to a commitment to render the correct service for every individually unique need and situation. 4. Professionals belong to associations which help generate and share new expert knowledge and ensure that only
Some Explanatory
Factors
223
those functionally worthy obtain a professional credential. Associational membership contributes to the development and maintenance of a professional culture that values learning, knowledge, and a service commitment. 5. Professionals tend to have more status in the community than non-professionals as manifested by the privileges and authority often given them by the community. 6. Professionals are guided in their application of expert knowledge and procedures by codes of ethics that protect the interests of clients. Codes promote and protect the commitment to service delivery and are enforced by professional associations. The close relationship between the bureaucratization of departments and the professionalization of their officers has led some to conclude that there are two kinds of professionalism in police departments (Baker. Meyer, and Rudoni, 1979:99-111; Fairchild, 1979:73-85; and Ritzer, 1971). One is an organizational or collective professionalism focusing on the development of appropriate bureaucratic structures and procedures. The other is an individually based professionalism stressing the independent functional efficacy of well-trained and equipped officers. Another way of viewing this situation is implicit in Talcott Parsons’ notion that all organizational activities fall into essentially one of three functional categories (Parsons, 1967). The institutional function worries primarily about relating an organization to its environment however defined. The managerial function specifies the more general goals adopted by those performing the former function and does various other tasks usually associated with management (recruiting, training, budgeting, planning). Finally, the technical function includes performances directly related to goal accomplishment: the teacher teaching and the nurse healing. Although operationalizing Parsons’ schema may be difficult, it does suggest another way of viewing the bureaucratization/professionalization of operations. Bu-
MICHAEL
224
reaucratization is an attempt to rationalize essentially coordinative organizational functions associated with Parsons’ institutional and especially managerial categories. Professionalization is the same effort applied to technical performances. Each road runs parallel to the other. Each attempts to rationalize something different.
THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS RATIONALIZATION
OF
Wilson’s description of professional and nonprofessional police behaviors shows that the former produces benefits. However, there are also costs (Goldstein. 1977; Lundman, 1980; and Wilson. 1968a). This section explores both briefly. A major benefit of rationalization is that it offers managers more potential to control their subordinates. Holding government agencies accountable for what they do and fail to do is a considerable challenge. Designing lines of communication and authority per Weber can give chiefs and their assistants more clout among the rank and file. Doig (1979) and Blumberg (1979) identify some difficulties in using such designs in police departments. Nevertheless, it is clear that chiefs of departments without standard bureaucratic tools have much less opportunity to know about and influence the actions of their officers. A rationalized performance of the managerial task can produce a feeling of security among officers. By knowing their formal responsibilities, officers may feel protected from demands inconsistent with their job descriptions. Furthermore. officers who know what their superiors expect from them may tend to do their jobs with confidence that they will not be interfered with; may anticipate support if problems develop; and may expect to receive various kinds of resources in doing their work. These potential benefits are important given the discretion officers often have. Wilson has observed that most chiefs are less concerned that every specific operating procedure is followed by every officer than
STEINMAN
that no officers create crisis situations leading to bad press and troubles with the community (Wilson. 1969). If this is generalI> true. then officers have a great deal of discretion. Other observers have also Lvritten about the existence of officer discretion and its origins (Brown. 1981: Carte. lY73:274281: Davis. 1971: Doig, 1979:61-71: Goldstein. 1977: and Skolnick. 1975. to name a few). While administrative rules are not going to eradicate this discretion. they can control it to some degree. This is an especially important matter in departments organized in quasi-military ways where arbitrary uses of discretion based on spontaneous officer decisions can occur (Skolnick. 1975: 11). Another considerable benefit of rationalization relates to the compliance problem from a different direction. Police have typically tended to focus on technical expertise in justifying their professional status (Price, 1977: 15: Skolnick. 1975:235). This is not surprising. Police have a basically reactive role. They lack reliable theories of cause and effect explaining criminal activity to anticipate situations (Brown. 1981:33). As a result. they experience uncertainty with respect to when problems will develop: where they will develop; who wiH be involved: whether physical violence will take place: whether citizens will react to police efforts: and what kind of consequences from public complaints will result for officers and their departments. Many public bureaucracies experience uncertainty because of goal ambiguity. questions about appropriate implementation strategies. and unclear lines of responsibility lY7Y: 193-20s: (Cohen, 300-33s: Manning. 197Y:207. March IYXI :X3-577; Padgett. lYXO:%3-604; and Thompson. lY67). This is even more the case for police departments. Skolnick’s description of the police working personality as heavily intluenced by an awareness of potential physical danger is part of this reactive posture and helps to explain the stress on technical proficiency (Skolnick. lY75:12-48). Aspiring to professional status may be an appropriate defensive reaction given this uncertainty (Blumberg. lY7Y: 115).
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
While added technical proficiency is a benefit to police in and of itself, the vision of professional status that it inspires generates a further benefit. Being a professional should mean being sensitive and committed to extra-departmental, universalistic values. Instead of defining their roles only in terms of departmental divisions of labor (Skolnick, 1975:231), officers, conscious of their professional status, also may be aware of their higher identities as representatives of the rule of law. Such awareness may exert an additional restraint on officers tempted to apply their own subjective preferences to particular situations. One study found that officers “with a sense of calling to the field” were less cynical and alienated from their work (Poole, Regoli, and Lotz, 1978:525-534). This must be considered a major benefit by those committed to objective, unbiased police behavior. Rationalization of any kind has its costs however. It is not a panacea by any means. There is a great deal of literature testifying to the problems that arise when managerial initiatives come up against the ‘*doers” in an organization (Blau and Scott. 1962; Peabody, 1964; and Thompson, 1961:485-521, for example). Professional status-is an individual possession in the classical sense. Having professional credentials acknowledges a persona1 expert capacity entitling one to a significant degree of functional autonomy. This is not an autonomy delegated by hierarchical superiors. It is founded on the individual’s own proficiency and knowledge. Bureaucratic acknowledgment of true professional status. in other words. is superfluous. Such status is allocated by peers. not by hierarchies. Officers with professional self-images may run into problems with their departments. Management’s job is to get subordinates to behave in ways acceptable to it. The individual officer may have his/her own notion of aceptable behavior based on a reading of what is called for on the street (Krantz. et al.. 1979: Reis. 1971, for example). Price lists the following risks that professionalism poses for management:
Some Explanatory
Factors
375 __.
1. Professional status leads to greater functional autonomy for line officers. 2. Professional status is more associated with officers formulating their own role definitions than by taking definitions developed by department superiors. 3. Professional status can be associated with loyalty to one’s career rather than to one’s employing department. 4. Professional values may threaten the tradition of secrecy which many officers see as crucial to their apprehension function (Reworded-l 977:94-97) These risks primarily apply to the capacities of management to influence the actions of officers and their relations with their communities. Police rhetoric about professional status is often only that-rhetoric. This is particularly obvious in comparing police recruitment, training. and performance with those of the more classical professions (medicine, education, law, etc.). Wilson generously calls the police a “sub-profession” ( 1968:29-3(J). However, if officers put a high priority on their individual ability to perform. they will create problems for their superiors if their actions fall outside departmental norms. That bureaucratic rules in a democracy are often viewed as “enabling” makes this possibility all the greater (Skolnick, 1975:235). For example. one study found that officers wanted less confining standard operating procedures governing investigations than those preferred by their superiors (Krantz et al., 1979:204). Thus. superordinate control of line officers is often very difficult and approximate. This is also the case in trying to bring about changes in departmental procedure. Regardless of department procedures, officers will probably continue to do their jobs in much the same way. Reports might be written on different forms and sent to different desks: but individual cops will still tend to perform their primary responsibility-patrol-in the same manner. Neiderhoffer observed that there was cynicism and opposition in the 1960s when some departments were attempting to establish more contemporary notions of professional
hlICHAEL
116
ways (Niederhoffer, 1963: 16). Blumberg’s conclusion that the drive toward professional status may be one generation’s attempt to wrest influence from another may help to explain this (1979: 114). In addition. rationalization can mean less heterogeneity among officers in a department if very careful efforts are not made to apply physical standards more liberally. Narrow standards can mean the exclusion of many women. Orientals, and Hispanics from the ranks (Goldstein. 1977:289). Beyond the legal problems this can cause, it can limit department effectiveness by reinforcing the “them and us” relationship that often exists between departments and communities. Finally. rationalization can also lead to higher salary demands by officers and their unions. While higher salaries can improve morale and feelings of efficacy. they can also strain municipal budgets. Rationalization is, consequently, a twoedged sword. It carries important advantages for management as well as officers. In generating greater technical proficiency and commitment among the latter, however, it also creates potential compliance and other problems. While these problems would probably exist without rationalization. their likelihood and possible seriousness may be heightened with it.
THE
RESEARCH
QUESTION
Not all municipal departments have pursued the goals of rationalization in the same way or to the same extent. There are marked differences among them with respect to entrance standards. terms of training, and emphases in training, prerequisites to promotion. communications equipment. and many other matters. Given the benefits and difficulties associated with rationaiization this is not surprising. Each department must consider its own needs. community relations. and future to approach rationalization in a way promotive of its own interests. Whether this happens through conscious systematic evaluations or through gradual series of adjustments to situations as
STEINhlAN
they arise may be beside the point. The fact remains that departments ha\,e rationalized their operations in different ways and to different degrees. This study‘s goal is to try to identif! correlates of rationalization. This is not an easy task. City police departments are like people. Each is unique in a variety of ways. Yet each has been exposed to many of the same challenges: to appear rational in an age that values rationality; to use scarce resources of many kinds as efficiently and effectively as possible: to compare well with other like departments: to keep up with significant changes in the demographics of their communities and in the law that thev enforce: and. generally speaking. to survive in environments that usually are fragmented jurisdictionally and sometimes hostile. The central question is this: what factors are associated with different degrees of rationalization’? Rationalization is a very complex phenomenon encompassing many structural and procedural details. This paper, consequently, will treat only one dimension of it: those organizational aspects relating to the education and training of officers. An essential feature of rationalization is a personnel force skilled in various task assignments and knowledgable in organizational rules and procedures. The literature on police behavior speaks with some frequency on the importance of education (strictly functional as well as more academic) (Baker and Meyer, lY7Y:YY-Ill; and Banton. lY6-I. for example). Reworded. then. the central question of this paper is: what factors arc associated with different degrees of rationalization insofar as this includes the existence of various educational requirements. incentives. and opportunities? Six categories of independent variables represent different perspectives in trying to answer this question. Four of the groupings concern the chiefs of respondent departments. Given that chiefs have considerable opportunities’ to influence department procedures. it was hypothesized that aspects of their educational and training backgrounds. expectations about potential accomplishments. and
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
work experience would have some relationship with the dependent variable. The expectation was that chiefs in more rationalized departments would tend (1) to have had more exposure to educational and training experiences; (2) to focus on community satisfaction as a top priority and be more optimistic about potential accomplishment; and (3) to have work experience suggesting an openness to change (employment in more than one department or sector of the criminal justice system and fewer years in law enforcement). It was expected that chiefs chosen by competitive examinations would tend to be associated with greater rationalization than those chosen by political appointment. It was also hypothesized that different kinds of departments would tend to have different degrees of rationalization given their sizes and workloads-that is. larger departments and those confronting a greater demand for services would tend to be organized along more rational lines.
METHODOLOGY Data for this study were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data were collected by the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. in its National Manpower Sllrve~‘. 197.5-1976, with funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The author of this paper assumes all responsibility for its analyses and interpretations. The data set provides detailed information about many aspects of large department operations. It covers 1.207 departments distributed across the country and across state and substate levels of government. This paper uses responses only from municipalities (N=949). ,Much of the data on various aspects of department structure and procedure describe facets of rationalization as it concerns education. Ten such variables were used to create a summary dependent variable identifying each department’s level of rationalization (or R-level) with respect
Some Explanatory
227
Factors
to education. These ten items were chosen after an analysis of twenty-eight total items initially thought to reflect different aspects of rationalization. Factor analysis confirmed that the ten loaded strongly on a single dimension while the other 1X items did not. Thus. attention is confined to one dimension of rationalization as measured by the ten items listed in Table 1. Computing each department’s R-level involved giving one point every time its operations were consistent with one of the ten variables. The most rigorous of these variables is the minimum education requirement. This study defines rationalization for the variable. minimum education requirement. as one or more years of college. Having written jobhescripTABLE 1 VARIABLES CONSTITUTING LEVEL OF RATIONALIZATION (R-LEVEL)
1. Minimum educational requirements for new officers (one year of college). 2. Existence of a formal training program.
in-service
3. Written job descriptions line officers.
for all
4. Flexible work schedules for officers wanting to take classroom work. 5. Book subsidies for officers to take classroom work. 6. Salary increases college degree.
for officers
7. Formal educational a basis for promotion.
wanting with a
achievement
8. Requirement that officers take a special course to be supervisors. 9. Specialized training required for handling noncriminal matters (crisis intervention. social work, for example). 10. Being in the top 20 percent of the sample in training expenditures for last complete fiscal year (excluding trainee salaries).
as
MICHAEL
228
STEINMAN
TABLE 2 DEPARTMENT R-LEVELS Number
of Points
Frequency
Percetltclge of Strttzple
L
17 51 Y7 169 1Y2 192 10X x4 31 6 Total Mean Standard
Deviation
949 5.232 1.869
tions involves trying to inform officers ot their responsibilities and. to some degree. how to perform them. This is. then. a factor contributing to officer education. The other variables need no additional explanation. Table 2 shows the R-levels of the departments studied. The frequency distribution in Table 2 crudely approximates a normal distribution, with a slight imbalance toward higher R-levels. Twenty-seven variables were then identified as potential correlates of departmental R-levels. These variables reflect the current wisdom of the organization theory and police management literatures discussed earlier. They include measures cjf the following: the education and training of the chief; the chief’s vision of the future; methods for selecting the chief; the experience of the chief: the size of the department; and the department’s workload.’
FINDINGS The correlations between the twenty-seven independent
R-level variables
and ap-
pear in Table 3. If we use a cutoff of r = 0.16 as an arbitrary indication of a substantive relationship between an independent and the dependent variable. three categories listed in Table 3 have at least some variables that have a relationship to R-level: chiefs’ education/training background. department characteristics (particularly budget factors). and department workload. These relationships are in the expected direction. Higher R-levels are observed for ( 1) chiefs with more education or training: (2) chiefs in departments of larger size and with greater workloads: (3) chiefs with experience in other departments: (4) chiefs with community satisfaction as a top priority; and (5) chiefs who have been in their current departments for a shorter period of time (one to five years). On the other hand, no relationship with R-level is observed for (I) chief’s views about the potential for improving department operations and about where the big local obstacles for effective law enforcement are: and (3) chief’s method of selection or previous experience. If we wish to determine the factors most
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
Some Explanatory
229
Factors
TABLE 3 CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENTVARIABLESWITH R-LEVEL lndependenr
Pearson r
Variables
Chief’s Educational/Training Background: 1. Has chief had special training in administration. management. labor relations, and budget planning and evaluation? 2. Chief’s academic education before starting law enforcement career. 3. Chief’s current level of educational achievement. 4. Did chief continue academic education after starting law enforcement career? 5. Has chief graduated from a regional or national training institute (e.g., FBI National Academy)?
N
0.307”
932
0.166* 0.400*
932 932
0.268*
932
0.118*
887
0.169”
932
Chief’s Vision of the Future: 6. Is chief’s top priority
community satisfaction or statistical goals describing crime and the department’s response? 7. Chief’s belief in the potential of improving crime control and operations through staffing, structural, and procedural changes. 8. Chief’s view that major obstacles to law enforcement are intra-departmental or located in the law enforcement system generally.
-0.069
915
-0.031
785
0.084
932
Selection of Chief: _ 9. Was chief selected by competitive political appointment?
examination
or
Chief’s Experience: 10. Did chief come to his position from inside or outside his department? 11. Pievious service as chief in another department. 12. Previous experience in police work or in other sectors of the law enforcement system (e.g., corrections). 13. Chief’s age. 14. Number of years chief has been in law enforcement. 15. Number of years chief has been in present department. 16. Number of years chief has been chief in present department. Department
0.178* 0.189
932 932
0.036 -0.100* -0.018 -0.16*
877 912 914 906
0.100”
909
0.21*
932
0.156* 0.172* 0.087
878 932 919
Characteristics:
17. Total number of full-time employees. 18. Total number of voluntary resignations in one year among sworn officers (June 30. 1973 to June 30. 1974). 19. Total number of sworn officers. 20. Presence of unions and collective bargaining.
MICHAEL
730
STEINMAN
TABLE 3 (continued)
Irltieppetdent Vuriables 21. Total 12. Total
Prtrrsot1 t
.I’
expenditures for last complete fiscal year. pavroll expenditures for last complete fiscal ,
year. Department
Workload:
23. Total
number
of Part I crimes reported
33. Total 75. Total 26. Total 77. Total
number number number number
of of of of
predictive of R-level. bivariate correlations
we must move from to regression analysis
because many of the independent are related to one another.
variables
Because a regression including 27 related independent variables is not meaningful and is obviously subject to multicollinearity. we eliminated from our regression: (1) those variables
not having
statistically
significant
bivariate relationships with the dependent variable and (3) I4 variables highly correlated with each other and with education and training. For example.
chief’s chief’s
current levels of educational achievement arc highly correlated with their levels of academic achievement. before they began their careers (Pearson r = O.-Ml), whether they continued their education after starting their careers (Pearson r = 0.557). being recruited as chief from inside their departments (Pearson r = 0.35). and previous service as chief elsewhere (Pearson r = 0.754). In addition. variables correlating highly with total department expenditures wcrc omitted for the same reason. They are total payroll expenditures (Pearson r = 0.X65). number of sworn officers (Pearson r = 0.75). and number of (Pearson r = 0.762). were correlated with crimes (0.717). arrests (0.573), (O.M,7).
and
number
in 197-l.
Part II crimes reported in lY74. arrests for Part 1 crimes in lY7-1. arrests for Part II crimes in 197-l. calls for service in 1974.
full-time employees Total cxpenditurcs number of Part I for Part I crimes of calls
for
service
().‘3x’:
Y_iq
0. IS6 :
93’
0.713 0.207. 0.‘34 __
780 737 Y31
Regression analysis results reported in Table 4 are consistent with tindings reported in Table 3. Three variables have strong and signihcant relationships with R-level. Two of the three variables in Table -l describe aspects of the educational and training backgrounds of respondent chiefs. The third variable strongly related to R-level is departmental workload as measured by total expenditures. Together. the three variables in Table -l explain 25.7 percent of the variance in R-level. Two of the variables describe the chiefs of the departments in the sample: whether a chief has had some specialized training in managerial functions (Beta = 0. IX) and each chief’s current level of educational attainment (Beta = O.ZY6). It makes sense that chiefs who have sought additional managerial trainins out of a belief in its utility and experienced it would tend to see value in it for their officers. That there is a solid correlation linking R-level to chiefs who continued their academic studies after starting their careers (Pearson r = 0.2%) implies the possibly greater salience of education for those already on the job. This. too. makes sense. Chiefs committed to their .jobs and aspiring to do them better may be able to appreciate the hen&its of an academic education more than those who have no job cxperiences to which to relate it.
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
Some Explanatory
Factors
231
TABLE 4 THE IMPARTOF THREE FACTORSON R-LEVEL IN 932 MUNICIPAL.POLICEDEPARTMENTS’” Independent
Variable
Has chief had special training in administration, management. labor relations. and budget planning and evaluation? Chief’s current level of educational achievement. Total expenditures for last complete fiscal year. n Multiple Multiple *Multiple
R R’
regression
0.453
0. 1x
0.075
36.318
0.75 1
0.296
0.076
96.449
0.335
0.248
0.039
72.668
932 .X)7 .257 analysis.
A third variable in Table 4 helping to explain R-level in a major way is the total expenditures of a department for an entire fiscal year (Beta = 0.248). The larger a department is. as reflected in this factor and others describing departmental workload, the more need there is for consciously coordinating effort. The more money is appropriated and spent. the more care must be taken that it is spent properly and well. The more people there are in a department, the more managers and policy makers must be concerned about getting uniform. acceptable performances from everyone. These are administrative challenges that can be met. more or less successfully through rationalization. Officers with more education and training may have a better idea of what is expected of them by their superiors and communities.
CONCLUSIONS Rationalization of collective effort can benefit personnel in all parts of an organization. It means having necessary skills. physical resources. information. and appropriate amounts of guidance from above for people doing the technical work (using Parson’s term). It means having a better handle on
what is happening in an organization and more possibilities for managers and policy makers to influence its future. Given the importance of police work for a community and the consequent necessity of keeping it within acceptable behavioral parameters. some minimally satisfactory level of rationalization is almost a sine qua non for having an effective. responsive delivery of police services. Basic to rationalization is a clear understanding of goals and acceptable methods for trying to accomplish them. The education of personnel in every internal and environmental facet of job performance. therefore, is a value. Technical workers cannot do their jobs properly if they do not know what they should be doing. or how to do it. Likewise. managers and policy makers must know as much as they can about community expectations and the potential of their organizations to satisfy them. The purpose of this study was to identify correlates of rationalization (R-level). as defined in terms of minimal education requirements of officers and opportunities and incentives for them to obtain further training and academic instruction. Analyzing a number of independent variables has produced two major patterns of explanation.
232
MICHAEL
There is clearly a relationship between department R-levels and the educational achievements and administrative training of chiefs. People who become chiefs are, almost by definition. upwardly mobile and somewhat ambitious. However. chiefs in departments with higher R-levels tend to be ambitious in more functional ways. They tend to be better educated and to have had more training appropriate to their managerial responsibilities. Other. more modest correlations tying higher R-levels to chiefs coming to their jobs from other departments (0.178) and to chiefs with previous experience as chief elsewhere (1.89) provide additional evidence of this ambition. The correlation between R-level and the number of years an individual has been chief in his department (-0.16) is too small to furnish conclusive proof of this ambition even though the relationship goes in the -‘right” direction. These findings tend to support the argument that rationalization is a device used by newer chiefs to gain more control over their departments (Blumberg, 1979: Henderson, 1975: 107-132). That chiefs in departments with higher R-levels tend to have more active orientations may explain two null findings. Table 3 reports no relationship between R-level and how chiefs are selected; and regression analysis shows no relationship with chiefs’ priorities for their departments. Wanting to be a chief. especially in a large department. may be enough to explain the tendency toward rationalization. Method of selection-competitive examination or political appointment-may be irrelevant. Likewise. individual ambitions may be more important than the particular goals chiefs have for their departments. Another pattern of explanation involves the size of departments. Higher R-levels were associated with departments having larger annual expenditures. This is not surprising. Departments with bigger budgets (and more officers) have an objectively greater need to rationalize their operations. Correlations among variables describing size and workload provide even more reason to stress education and training.
STEINMAN
Education and training. if effective. certainly can influence individual police performances; but also it can be ignored. Niederhoffer (1967) notes the higher value police place on what they learn on the streets as against what they hear during formal training. Harris (1978:273-291) reports on the mixed evaluations of officers about the utility of classroom instruction. Goldstein observes that education may not lead to more sensitive and tolerant police behaviors (1977:388). Rationalization. or at least the education/training side of it. is no panacea. It is. nevertheless. one of the major managerial tools available to chiefs. Finally. these findings underline the kev role played by chiefs. They suggest a sensitivity among chiefs about the benefits and costs of rationalization. The correlation between chiefs in smaller departments with lower R-levels may indicate less of a perceived need for formal rationalization, more reliance on informal methods of control. and a higher estimate by these chiefs of their ability to manage affairs directly and effectively. Individual chiefs may find little incentive to go very far down the road toward rationalization if their departments are relatively small. Indeed. the costs of rationalization noted earlier may seem altogether too high given the limited need for it. Chiefs in larger departments may have every reason to go as far as they can: but the road may be longer than it seems. and the costs of travelling it greater than anticipated.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT I am very gratcl’ul to Prolcssor> Susan Welch and John Comer for their assistance and advice on this study.
NOTES
’
Unlortunately. the dataset did not provtde ?traightl’orward inl’ormation on the population sizes and geographic locatmns of the communities served by rcxpondent departments. Inferences can he made. however. ahout the importance of population Gre Irom some of the independent variables grouped under the last two catqories of variables listed in Tahlc 3. \uch ;I\ department Gze. workload. and expenditure\.
Rationalizing
Police
Operations:
Some Explanatory
233
Factors
ing: The Boston experience. ton Books.
REFERENCES Baker. R.. and Meyer. F.A.. Jr. (1979). Effects of variations on police policy. In Evaluaring alremarivc law-enforcement policies, eds. Authors, pp. 3-S. Lexington. MA: Lexington Books Baker. R.: Meyer. F.A., Jr.; and Rudoni. D. (1979). Police professionalism: The need for clarity. In Evaluating alternative law-enforcement policies, pp. 99-111. Banton. M. (1964). The policeman niry. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
in the commu-
Lexington.
MA: Lexing-
Lundman. R.J. (1980). Police and policing. York: Holt. Rinehart. and Winston. Manning. P.K. (1977). Police work: organization of policing. Cambridge, Press. March. change.
New
The sociul MA: MIT
J.G. (1981). Footnotes to organizational Admin. Sci. Q. 261563-577.
Marini. F.. ed. (1971). Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective. Scranton. PA: Chandler.
Blau. P.M.. and Scott. W.R. (1962). Formal organizations: A comparative approach. San Francisco: Chandler.
McGregor. New York:
Blumberg. A.S. (1979). Criminal justice: Issues and ironies. 2d ed. New York: New Viewpoints.
Niederhoffer. A. (1963). A study of police cynicism. New York University. New Ph.D. dissertation. York.
Burns. T.. and Stalker. G.M. (1961). mem of innovarion. London: Tavistock
The managePublications.
Caiden. G.E. (1977). Police reviralization. Lexington. MA: Lexington Books. Carte. G.E. (1973). Auguste origins of police professionalism. Admin. 1:274-281.
Vollmer and the /. of Police SC. and
Cohen. L.J. (1979). The federal impact of local law-enforcement policy: Reevaluating expectations. In Dererminanrs of law-enforcement polirics. eds. F.A. Meyer. Jr.. and R. Baker. pp. 193-205. Lexington MA: Lexington Books. Davis. K.C. (1971). Discrerionary justice: A prehminary inquiry. Urbana. IL: University of Illinois Press. Doig. J. (1979). The search for managerial control: Lessons from the police world. In Evaluating alternarive law-enforcement policies, pp. 61-71. Etzioni. A. (1961). A comparative analysis of complex organizarions. New York: Free Press. Fairchild. E.S. (1979). Organizational structure and control of discretion in police organizations. In Et,aluaring alrernative law-enforcement policies, pp. 73-85. Gerth. H.H.. and Mills. C.W., eds. and trans. ( 1958). From Max Weber: Essuys in sociology. New York: Oxford University Press. Goldstein. H. (1977). bridge. MA: Ballinger.
Policing a free sociery. Cam-
D. (1960). The human side of emerprise. McGraw-Hill.
-_ (1967). Doubleday.
Behind
the shield.
Padgett. J.F. (1980). Managing garbage chies. Admin. Sci. Q. 25. no. 4:583-6&l.
New
York:
can hierar-
Parsons. T. (1967). Some ingredients of the general theory of formal organization. In Adminisrrarive theory and education. ed. A.W. Halpin. pp. 40-72. New York: Macmillan. Peabody, R.L. (1964). Organizational New York: Atherton Press.
authoriry.
Poole, E.D.: Regoli. R.M.: and Lotz. R. (1979). Linkages between professionalism. work alienation. and cynicism in large and small police departments. Sot. Sci. Q. 59. no. 3:525-534. Price, B.R. (1977). Police professionalism: Rhetoric and acdon. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Reiss. A.J. (1971). The police and the public. New Haven, CO: Yale University Press. Ritzer. G. (1971). Professionalism and the individual. In The professions and their prospecrs, ed. E. Friedson, pp. 62-63. Beverly Hills. CA: Sage. Skolnick. J.H. (1975). Justice wirhout nial. 2d ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Thompson. New York:
J.D. (1967). McGraw-Hill.
Thompson, V. and organization
(1961). conflict.
Organizauons
in action.
Hierarchy. specialization. Admin. Sci. Q. 5:485-521.
Wilson. J.W. (1968a). Varieries of police behavior. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press.
Harris. R.N. (1978). The police academy and the professional self-image. In Policing: A view from rhe street. eds. P.K. Manning. and J.V. Maanen. pp. 273-291. Santa Monica. CA: Goodyear.
-. (1968b). The police and the delinquent in two cities. In City politics and public policy. ed. Author. pp. 173-195. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Henderson. T.A. (1975). The relative effects of community complexit\ and of sheriffs upon the professionalism of sheriff departments. Am. J. of Pal. Sci. XIX. no. 1:107-132.
-. (1969). The police administrator as a policymaker. In Urban government: A reader in administration and politics. ed. E.C. Banfield. pp. 655-665. New York: Free Press.
Krantz. S.: Gilman. C.R.: and Nadworny.
-. police
B.: Benda. E.J. (1979).
C.G.: Hallstrom. Policepolicymak-
(1973). Emerging pattern in American administration. Police J. 46: 155-166.
MICHAEL STEINMAN Department
of Political Science University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, Nebraska 68588
ABSTRACT This stud?, attempts to explain different degrees of bureaucratization or rationalization in a sample of 949 municipal police departments in the United States. The dependent variable operationalizes rationalization in terms of officer education and training. Factors expected to explain r,ariations among departments are the backgrounds and expectations of department chiefs. the manner in which chiefs are chosen, and departmental sizes and workloads. Two major patterns of explanation resulted after analyzing a number of independent variables: the educational achievements and administrative training of chiefs; and department size. These findings underline the key role played by chiefs who appear to appreciate both the benefits and the costs of rationalization.
Introduction Max Weber tells us that bureaucratic action is rational action. Carefully fashioned goals give birth to empirically verifiable determinations of what must be done to achieve them most economically and effectively. Our century has been profoundly affected by a belief in the utility of collective action molded by the application of rational standards. Weber called such collective action bureaucratic behavior. A consequence of this belief is a world dominated by the presence and policies of bureaucratic organizations. This study attempts to identify factors explaining different degrees of bureaucratization or rationalization found in a sample
of municipal police departments in the United States. The dependent variable operationalizes rationalization in terms of officer education and training. Factors .expected to explain variations among departments are the backgrounds and expectations of department chiefs, the manner in which chiefs are chosen, and departmental sizes and workloads. This study differs from earlier efforts in two ways. It is not focused on one or a few departments thereby avoiding the limitations of case studies. Furthermore, it uses a relatively large number of factors to construct the dependent variable. While this may create some methodological challenges, it also produces a more realistic understanding of the subject.
221
MICHAEL
U-L
THE
RATIONALIZATION BEHAVIOR
OF POLICE
Max Weber wrote that the most potentially effective mode of collective effort is through the use of bureaucratic structures and processes (Gerth and Mills, 1958). Weber viewed bureaucratic action as based on rational determinations of how to accomplish specific ends. These rational determinations are developed by individuals with relevant skills and made part of the operating rules of the group. The rules are “legitimate” precisely because they are rational (i.e., based upon objective, functional conclusions about how to achieve collective goals as economically and completely as possible). Every student of administration is familiar with the characteristics of Weber’s ideal type depiction of bureaucracy (see Blumberg. 1979:71-74: Gerth and Mills. 1958). These add up to a collective situation wherein individuals trained to do specific jobs work in a full-time capacity on those jobs being careful to maintain records describing their efforts. There is a hierarchy of formal authority enabling superiors to hold subordinates accountable for their actions. This permits the entire operation, in theory, to function in a well-coordinated way with a minimum of wasteful duplication. Weber’s ideal type describes the essence of bureaucracy. A very diverse body of literature has developed over the years about how to manipulate this essence for maximum effect. Two general approaches or schools of administration summarize this diversity. Burns and Stalker (1961) label them the mechanistic and organic approaches while McGregor (1960) calls them Theory X and Theory Y. The mechanistic or Theory X approach is much closer to Weber’s ideal type in that it calls for a very well-developed division of labor, a comparatively tall hierarchy. little or no allocation of discretion, and relatively fixed task assignments. The organic or Theory Y appreach, on the other hand. advocates a much less specific and fixed division of labor, a flatter hierarchy permitting partici-
STEINlvlXN
patory decision making. and a re1ativ.c openness to change and the unexpected. Although considerably different in their assumptions and prescriptions. both approaches are ultimately based on an aspiration to be rational. Contemporary police departments are managed in ways resembling both polar extremes and every degree of gray in between. from quasi-military organizations to freer form versions of team policing. However, they all share an ambition to order their structures and operations according to demands and conditions dehning their goals and jobs (see Caiden. 1977: Lundman. 1980:51-59). An interest among police departments in operating more rationally or bureaucratically originated around the early years of this century. This was a time when the use of merit systems was making considerable headway at all levels of government. when the city manager form of government was gaining popularity. and when increasing numbers of practitioners as well as citizens were falling in love with the “science of administration.” Seeking greater administrative efficiency and effectiveness in their patrol operations. departments sought professional status for their officers (Price. 1977:65: Wilson. 1973: 155- 166). This meant emphasizing greater control by the chief. limiting officer performance to roles directly related to crime and criminals. more rigorous entrance requirements. officer commitments to law enforcement careers. higher technical competence. and formal standard operating procedures (Henderson, 1975: 107- 132; Poole. Regoli. and Lotz. 1978:525-534). The “new professionalism” of the 1970s was largely a reaction to this. It advocated more contacts with citizens, less militarism. more attention to service delivery. and using specialists for specific problems (Wilson. 1973: 155-166). While this more recent trend may have been part of a national trend toward the “new public administration” (Marini. 1971). it had something very important in common with its antecedent. Both had police managements trying to make department operations fit more uni-
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
objective notions of what works best (Caiden, 1977). The idea that police officers are professionals is still promoted for essentially the same reason: to influence officers to behave in particular ways. It is useful to explore the notion of police professionalism briefly because it says a great deal about the problems of running a department. In another article. Wilson wrote that:
versalistic,
A professional department is one governed by values derived from general. impersonal rules which bind all members of the organization and whose relevance is independent of circumstances of time, place, or personality. A non-professional department . on the other hand. relies to a greater extent
on particular judgments-that is, judgments based on the significance to a particular person of his particular reactions to particular others
(1968b: 17.5).
Wilson’s description of professional behavior among police is consistent with other treatments of professional status. The following features of professional status are typically included (Blau and Scott, 1962; Blumberg, 1979; Etzioni, 1961; and Niederhoffer. 1967): 1. Possession of professional status is contingent on the acquisition and practiced application of a sophisticated set of operating procedures. 2. These procedures are in turn based on empirically verifiable knowledge about real problems and situations. A true professional has acquired this knowledge as well as the procedures which are based on the knowledge. Obtaining such a professional education is a difficult, challenging endeavor engaged in over a period of years. 3; Professionals are motivated primarily by a commitment to provide a service. Using professional knowledge and skill solely for personal gain is contrary to a commitment to render the correct service for every individually unique need and situation. 4. Professionals belong to associations which help generate and share new expert knowledge and ensure that only
Some Explanatory
Factors
223
those functionally worthy obtain a professional credential. Associational membership contributes to the development and maintenance of a professional culture that values learning, knowledge, and a service commitment. 5. Professionals tend to have more status in the community than non-professionals as manifested by the privileges and authority often given them by the community. 6. Professionals are guided in their application of expert knowledge and procedures by codes of ethics that protect the interests of clients. Codes promote and protect the commitment to service delivery and are enforced by professional associations. The close relationship between the bureaucratization of departments and the professionalization of their officers has led some to conclude that there are two kinds of professionalism in police departments (Baker. Meyer, and Rudoni, 1979:99-111; Fairchild, 1979:73-85; and Ritzer, 1971). One is an organizational or collective professionalism focusing on the development of appropriate bureaucratic structures and procedures. The other is an individually based professionalism stressing the independent functional efficacy of well-trained and equipped officers. Another way of viewing this situation is implicit in Talcott Parsons’ notion that all organizational activities fall into essentially one of three functional categories (Parsons, 1967). The institutional function worries primarily about relating an organization to its environment however defined. The managerial function specifies the more general goals adopted by those performing the former function and does various other tasks usually associated with management (recruiting, training, budgeting, planning). Finally, the technical function includes performances directly related to goal accomplishment: the teacher teaching and the nurse healing. Although operationalizing Parsons’ schema may be difficult, it does suggest another way of viewing the bureaucratization/professionalization of operations. Bu-
MICHAEL
224
reaucratization is an attempt to rationalize essentially coordinative organizational functions associated with Parsons’ institutional and especially managerial categories. Professionalization is the same effort applied to technical performances. Each road runs parallel to the other. Each attempts to rationalize something different.
THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS RATIONALIZATION
OF
Wilson’s description of professional and nonprofessional police behaviors shows that the former produces benefits. However, there are also costs (Goldstein. 1977; Lundman, 1980; and Wilson. 1968a). This section explores both briefly. A major benefit of rationalization is that it offers managers more potential to control their subordinates. Holding government agencies accountable for what they do and fail to do is a considerable challenge. Designing lines of communication and authority per Weber can give chiefs and their assistants more clout among the rank and file. Doig (1979) and Blumberg (1979) identify some difficulties in using such designs in police departments. Nevertheless, it is clear that chiefs of departments without standard bureaucratic tools have much less opportunity to know about and influence the actions of their officers. A rationalized performance of the managerial task can produce a feeling of security among officers. By knowing their formal responsibilities, officers may feel protected from demands inconsistent with their job descriptions. Furthermore. officers who know what their superiors expect from them may tend to do their jobs with confidence that they will not be interfered with; may anticipate support if problems develop; and may expect to receive various kinds of resources in doing their work. These potential benefits are important given the discretion officers often have. Wilson has observed that most chiefs are less concerned that every specific operating procedure is followed by every officer than
STEINMAN
that no officers create crisis situations leading to bad press and troubles with the community (Wilson. 1969). If this is generalI> true. then officers have a great deal of discretion. Other observers have also Lvritten about the existence of officer discretion and its origins (Brown. 1981: Carte. lY73:274281: Davis. 1971: Doig, 1979:61-71: Goldstein. 1977: and Skolnick. 1975. to name a few). While administrative rules are not going to eradicate this discretion. they can control it to some degree. This is an especially important matter in departments organized in quasi-military ways where arbitrary uses of discretion based on spontaneous officer decisions can occur (Skolnick. 1975: 11). Another considerable benefit of rationalization relates to the compliance problem from a different direction. Police have typically tended to focus on technical expertise in justifying their professional status (Price, 1977: 15: Skolnick. 1975:235). This is not surprising. Police have a basically reactive role. They lack reliable theories of cause and effect explaining criminal activity to anticipate situations (Brown. 1981:33). As a result. they experience uncertainty with respect to when problems will develop: where they will develop; who wiH be involved: whether physical violence will take place: whether citizens will react to police efforts: and what kind of consequences from public complaints will result for officers and their departments. Many public bureaucracies experience uncertainty because of goal ambiguity. questions about appropriate implementation strategies. and unclear lines of responsibility lY7Y: 193-20s: (Cohen, 300-33s: Manning. 197Y:207. March IYXI :X3-577; Padgett. lYXO:%3-604; and Thompson. lY67). This is even more the case for police departments. Skolnick’s description of the police working personality as heavily intluenced by an awareness of potential physical danger is part of this reactive posture and helps to explain the stress on technical proficiency (Skolnick. lY75:12-48). Aspiring to professional status may be an appropriate defensive reaction given this uncertainty (Blumberg. lY7Y: 115).
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
While added technical proficiency is a benefit to police in and of itself, the vision of professional status that it inspires generates a further benefit. Being a professional should mean being sensitive and committed to extra-departmental, universalistic values. Instead of defining their roles only in terms of departmental divisions of labor (Skolnick, 1975:231), officers, conscious of their professional status, also may be aware of their higher identities as representatives of the rule of law. Such awareness may exert an additional restraint on officers tempted to apply their own subjective preferences to particular situations. One study found that officers “with a sense of calling to the field” were less cynical and alienated from their work (Poole, Regoli, and Lotz, 1978:525-534). This must be considered a major benefit by those committed to objective, unbiased police behavior. Rationalization of any kind has its costs however. It is not a panacea by any means. There is a great deal of literature testifying to the problems that arise when managerial initiatives come up against the ‘*doers” in an organization (Blau and Scott. 1962; Peabody, 1964; and Thompson, 1961:485-521, for example). Professional status-is an individual possession in the classical sense. Having professional credentials acknowledges a persona1 expert capacity entitling one to a significant degree of functional autonomy. This is not an autonomy delegated by hierarchical superiors. It is founded on the individual’s own proficiency and knowledge. Bureaucratic acknowledgment of true professional status. in other words. is superfluous. Such status is allocated by peers. not by hierarchies. Officers with professional self-images may run into problems with their departments. Management’s job is to get subordinates to behave in ways acceptable to it. The individual officer may have his/her own notion of aceptable behavior based on a reading of what is called for on the street (Krantz. et al.. 1979: Reis. 1971, for example). Price lists the following risks that professionalism poses for management:
Some Explanatory
Factors
375 __.
1. Professional status leads to greater functional autonomy for line officers. 2. Professional status is more associated with officers formulating their own role definitions than by taking definitions developed by department superiors. 3. Professional status can be associated with loyalty to one’s career rather than to one’s employing department. 4. Professional values may threaten the tradition of secrecy which many officers see as crucial to their apprehension function (Reworded-l 977:94-97) These risks primarily apply to the capacities of management to influence the actions of officers and their relations with their communities. Police rhetoric about professional status is often only that-rhetoric. This is particularly obvious in comparing police recruitment, training. and performance with those of the more classical professions (medicine, education, law, etc.). Wilson generously calls the police a “sub-profession” ( 1968:29-3(J). However, if officers put a high priority on their individual ability to perform. they will create problems for their superiors if their actions fall outside departmental norms. That bureaucratic rules in a democracy are often viewed as “enabling” makes this possibility all the greater (Skolnick, 1975:235). For example. one study found that officers wanted less confining standard operating procedures governing investigations than those preferred by their superiors (Krantz et al., 1979:204). Thus. superordinate control of line officers is often very difficult and approximate. This is also the case in trying to bring about changes in departmental procedure. Regardless of department procedures, officers will probably continue to do their jobs in much the same way. Reports might be written on different forms and sent to different desks: but individual cops will still tend to perform their primary responsibility-patrol-in the same manner. Neiderhoffer observed that there was cynicism and opposition in the 1960s when some departments were attempting to establish more contemporary notions of professional
hlICHAEL
116
ways (Niederhoffer, 1963: 16). Blumberg’s conclusion that the drive toward professional status may be one generation’s attempt to wrest influence from another may help to explain this (1979: 114). In addition. rationalization can mean less heterogeneity among officers in a department if very careful efforts are not made to apply physical standards more liberally. Narrow standards can mean the exclusion of many women. Orientals, and Hispanics from the ranks (Goldstein. 1977:289). Beyond the legal problems this can cause, it can limit department effectiveness by reinforcing the “them and us” relationship that often exists between departments and communities. Finally. rationalization can also lead to higher salary demands by officers and their unions. While higher salaries can improve morale and feelings of efficacy. they can also strain municipal budgets. Rationalization is, consequently, a twoedged sword. It carries important advantages for management as well as officers. In generating greater technical proficiency and commitment among the latter, however, it also creates potential compliance and other problems. While these problems would probably exist without rationalization. their likelihood and possible seriousness may be heightened with it.
THE
RESEARCH
QUESTION
Not all municipal departments have pursued the goals of rationalization in the same way or to the same extent. There are marked differences among them with respect to entrance standards. terms of training, and emphases in training, prerequisites to promotion. communications equipment. and many other matters. Given the benefits and difficulties associated with rationaiization this is not surprising. Each department must consider its own needs. community relations. and future to approach rationalization in a way promotive of its own interests. Whether this happens through conscious systematic evaluations or through gradual series of adjustments to situations as
STEINhlAN
they arise may be beside the point. The fact remains that departments ha\,e rationalized their operations in different ways and to different degrees. This study‘s goal is to try to identif! correlates of rationalization. This is not an easy task. City police departments are like people. Each is unique in a variety of ways. Yet each has been exposed to many of the same challenges: to appear rational in an age that values rationality; to use scarce resources of many kinds as efficiently and effectively as possible: to compare well with other like departments: to keep up with significant changes in the demographics of their communities and in the law that thev enforce: and. generally speaking. to survive in environments that usually are fragmented jurisdictionally and sometimes hostile. The central question is this: what factors are associated with different degrees of rationalization’? Rationalization is a very complex phenomenon encompassing many structural and procedural details. This paper, consequently, will treat only one dimension of it: those organizational aspects relating to the education and training of officers. An essential feature of rationalization is a personnel force skilled in various task assignments and knowledgable in organizational rules and procedures. The literature on police behavior speaks with some frequency on the importance of education (strictly functional as well as more academic) (Baker and Meyer, lY7Y:YY-Ill; and Banton. lY6-I. for example). Reworded. then. the central question of this paper is: what factors arc associated with different degrees of rationalization insofar as this includes the existence of various educational requirements. incentives. and opportunities? Six categories of independent variables represent different perspectives in trying to answer this question. Four of the groupings concern the chiefs of respondent departments. Given that chiefs have considerable opportunities’ to influence department procedures. it was hypothesized that aspects of their educational and training backgrounds. expectations about potential accomplishments. and
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
work experience would have some relationship with the dependent variable. The expectation was that chiefs in more rationalized departments would tend (1) to have had more exposure to educational and training experiences; (2) to focus on community satisfaction as a top priority and be more optimistic about potential accomplishment; and (3) to have work experience suggesting an openness to change (employment in more than one department or sector of the criminal justice system and fewer years in law enforcement). It was expected that chiefs chosen by competitive examinations would tend to be associated with greater rationalization than those chosen by political appointment. It was also hypothesized that different kinds of departments would tend to have different degrees of rationalization given their sizes and workloads-that is. larger departments and those confronting a greater demand for services would tend to be organized along more rational lines.
METHODOLOGY Data for this study were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data were collected by the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. in its National Manpower Sllrve~‘. 197.5-1976, with funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The author of this paper assumes all responsibility for its analyses and interpretations. The data set provides detailed information about many aspects of large department operations. It covers 1.207 departments distributed across the country and across state and substate levels of government. This paper uses responses only from municipalities (N=949). ,Much of the data on various aspects of department structure and procedure describe facets of rationalization as it concerns education. Ten such variables were used to create a summary dependent variable identifying each department’s level of rationalization (or R-level) with respect
Some Explanatory
227
Factors
to education. These ten items were chosen after an analysis of twenty-eight total items initially thought to reflect different aspects of rationalization. Factor analysis confirmed that the ten loaded strongly on a single dimension while the other 1X items did not. Thus. attention is confined to one dimension of rationalization as measured by the ten items listed in Table 1. Computing each department’s R-level involved giving one point every time its operations were consistent with one of the ten variables. The most rigorous of these variables is the minimum education requirement. This study defines rationalization for the variable. minimum education requirement. as one or more years of college. Having written jobhescripTABLE 1 VARIABLES CONSTITUTING LEVEL OF RATIONALIZATION (R-LEVEL)
1. Minimum educational requirements for new officers (one year of college). 2. Existence of a formal training program.
in-service
3. Written job descriptions line officers.
for all
4. Flexible work schedules for officers wanting to take classroom work. 5. Book subsidies for officers to take classroom work. 6. Salary increases college degree.
for officers
7. Formal educational a basis for promotion.
wanting with a
achievement
8. Requirement that officers take a special course to be supervisors. 9. Specialized training required for handling noncriminal matters (crisis intervention. social work, for example). 10. Being in the top 20 percent of the sample in training expenditures for last complete fiscal year (excluding trainee salaries).
as
MICHAEL
228
STEINMAN
TABLE 2 DEPARTMENT R-LEVELS Number
of Points
Frequency
Percetltclge of Strttzple
L
17 51 Y7 169 1Y2 192 10X x4 31 6 Total Mean Standard
Deviation
949 5.232 1.869
tions involves trying to inform officers ot their responsibilities and. to some degree. how to perform them. This is. then. a factor contributing to officer education. The other variables need no additional explanation. Table 2 shows the R-levels of the departments studied. The frequency distribution in Table 2 crudely approximates a normal distribution, with a slight imbalance toward higher R-levels. Twenty-seven variables were then identified as potential correlates of departmental R-levels. These variables reflect the current wisdom of the organization theory and police management literatures discussed earlier. They include measures cjf the following: the education and training of the chief; the chief’s vision of the future; methods for selecting the chief; the experience of the chief: the size of the department; and the department’s workload.’
FINDINGS The correlations between the twenty-seven independent
R-level variables
and ap-
pear in Table 3. If we use a cutoff of r = 0.16 as an arbitrary indication of a substantive relationship between an independent and the dependent variable. three categories listed in Table 3 have at least some variables that have a relationship to R-level: chiefs’ education/training background. department characteristics (particularly budget factors). and department workload. These relationships are in the expected direction. Higher R-levels are observed for ( 1) chiefs with more education or training: (2) chiefs in departments of larger size and with greater workloads: (3) chiefs with experience in other departments: (4) chiefs with community satisfaction as a top priority; and (5) chiefs who have been in their current departments for a shorter period of time (one to five years). On the other hand, no relationship with R-level is observed for (I) chief’s views about the potential for improving department operations and about where the big local obstacles for effective law enforcement are: and (3) chief’s method of selection or previous experience. If we wish to determine the factors most
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
Some Explanatory
229
Factors
TABLE 3 CORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENTVARIABLESWITH R-LEVEL lndependenr
Pearson r
Variables
Chief’s Educational/Training Background: 1. Has chief had special training in administration. management. labor relations, and budget planning and evaluation? 2. Chief’s academic education before starting law enforcement career. 3. Chief’s current level of educational achievement. 4. Did chief continue academic education after starting law enforcement career? 5. Has chief graduated from a regional or national training institute (e.g., FBI National Academy)?
N
0.307”
932
0.166* 0.400*
932 932
0.268*
932
0.118*
887
0.169”
932
Chief’s Vision of the Future: 6. Is chief’s top priority
community satisfaction or statistical goals describing crime and the department’s response? 7. Chief’s belief in the potential of improving crime control and operations through staffing, structural, and procedural changes. 8. Chief’s view that major obstacles to law enforcement are intra-departmental or located in the law enforcement system generally.
-0.069
915
-0.031
785
0.084
932
Selection of Chief: _ 9. Was chief selected by competitive political appointment?
examination
or
Chief’s Experience: 10. Did chief come to his position from inside or outside his department? 11. Pievious service as chief in another department. 12. Previous experience in police work or in other sectors of the law enforcement system (e.g., corrections). 13. Chief’s age. 14. Number of years chief has been in law enforcement. 15. Number of years chief has been in present department. 16. Number of years chief has been chief in present department. Department
0.178* 0.189
932 932
0.036 -0.100* -0.018 -0.16*
877 912 914 906
0.100”
909
0.21*
932
0.156* 0.172* 0.087
878 932 919
Characteristics:
17. Total number of full-time employees. 18. Total number of voluntary resignations in one year among sworn officers (June 30. 1973 to June 30. 1974). 19. Total number of sworn officers. 20. Presence of unions and collective bargaining.
MICHAEL
730
STEINMAN
TABLE 3 (continued)
Irltieppetdent Vuriables 21. Total 12. Total
Prtrrsot1 t
.I’
expenditures for last complete fiscal year. pavroll expenditures for last complete fiscal ,
year. Department
Workload:
23. Total
number
of Part I crimes reported
33. Total 75. Total 26. Total 77. Total
number number number number
of of of of
predictive of R-level. bivariate correlations
we must move from to regression analysis
because many of the independent are related to one another.
variables
Because a regression including 27 related independent variables is not meaningful and is obviously subject to multicollinearity. we eliminated from our regression: (1) those variables
not having
statistically
significant
bivariate relationships with the dependent variable and (3) I4 variables highly correlated with each other and with education and training. For example.
chief’s chief’s
current levels of educational achievement arc highly correlated with their levels of academic achievement. before they began their careers (Pearson r = O.-Ml), whether they continued their education after starting their careers (Pearson r = 0.557). being recruited as chief from inside their departments (Pearson r = 0.35). and previous service as chief elsewhere (Pearson r = 0.754). In addition. variables correlating highly with total department expenditures wcrc omitted for the same reason. They are total payroll expenditures (Pearson r = 0.X65). number of sworn officers (Pearson r = 0.75). and number of (Pearson r = 0.762). were correlated with crimes (0.717). arrests (0.573), (O.M,7).
and
number
in 197-l.
Part II crimes reported in lY74. arrests for Part 1 crimes in lY7-1. arrests for Part II crimes in 197-l. calls for service in 1974.
full-time employees Total cxpenditurcs number of Part I for Part I crimes of calls
for
service
().‘3x’:
Y_iq
0. IS6 :
93’
0.713 0.207. 0.‘34 __
780 737 Y31
Regression analysis results reported in Table 4 are consistent with tindings reported in Table 3. Three variables have strong and signihcant relationships with R-level. Two of the three variables in Table -l describe aspects of the educational and training backgrounds of respondent chiefs. The third variable strongly related to R-level is departmental workload as measured by total expenditures. Together. the three variables in Table -l explain 25.7 percent of the variance in R-level. Two of the variables describe the chiefs of the departments in the sample: whether a chief has had some specialized training in managerial functions (Beta = 0. IX) and each chief’s current level of educational attainment (Beta = O.ZY6). It makes sense that chiefs who have sought additional managerial trainins out of a belief in its utility and experienced it would tend to see value in it for their officers. That there is a solid correlation linking R-level to chiefs who continued their academic studies after starting their careers (Pearson r = 0.2%) implies the possibly greater salience of education for those already on the job. This. too. makes sense. Chiefs committed to their .jobs and aspiring to do them better may be able to appreciate the hen&its of an academic education more than those who have no job cxperiences to which to relate it.
Rationalizing
Police Operations:
Some Explanatory
Factors
231
TABLE 4 THE IMPARTOF THREE FACTORSON R-LEVEL IN 932 MUNICIPAL.POLICEDEPARTMENTS’” Independent
Variable
Has chief had special training in administration, management. labor relations. and budget planning and evaluation? Chief’s current level of educational achievement. Total expenditures for last complete fiscal year. n Multiple Multiple *Multiple
R R’
regression
0.453
0. 1x
0.075
36.318
0.75 1
0.296
0.076
96.449
0.335
0.248
0.039
72.668
932 .X)7 .257 analysis.
A third variable in Table 4 helping to explain R-level in a major way is the total expenditures of a department for an entire fiscal year (Beta = 0.248). The larger a department is. as reflected in this factor and others describing departmental workload, the more need there is for consciously coordinating effort. The more money is appropriated and spent. the more care must be taken that it is spent properly and well. The more people there are in a department, the more managers and policy makers must be concerned about getting uniform. acceptable performances from everyone. These are administrative challenges that can be met. more or less successfully through rationalization. Officers with more education and training may have a better idea of what is expected of them by their superiors and communities.
CONCLUSIONS Rationalization of collective effort can benefit personnel in all parts of an organization. It means having necessary skills. physical resources. information. and appropriate amounts of guidance from above for people doing the technical work (using Parson’s term). It means having a better handle on
what is happening in an organization and more possibilities for managers and policy makers to influence its future. Given the importance of police work for a community and the consequent necessity of keeping it within acceptable behavioral parameters. some minimally satisfactory level of rationalization is almost a sine qua non for having an effective. responsive delivery of police services. Basic to rationalization is a clear understanding of goals and acceptable methods for trying to accomplish them. The education of personnel in every internal and environmental facet of job performance. therefore, is a value. Technical workers cannot do their jobs properly if they do not know what they should be doing. or how to do it. Likewise. managers and policy makers must know as much as they can about community expectations and the potential of their organizations to satisfy them. The purpose of this study was to identify correlates of rationalization (R-level). as defined in terms of minimal education requirements of officers and opportunities and incentives for them to obtain further training and academic instruction. Analyzing a number of independent variables has produced two major patterns of explanation.
232
MICHAEL
There is clearly a relationship between department R-levels and the educational achievements and administrative training of chiefs. People who become chiefs are, almost by definition. upwardly mobile and somewhat ambitious. However. chiefs in departments with higher R-levels tend to be ambitious in more functional ways. They tend to be better educated and to have had more training appropriate to their managerial responsibilities. Other. more modest correlations tying higher R-levels to chiefs coming to their jobs from other departments (0.178) and to chiefs with previous experience as chief elsewhere (1.89) provide additional evidence of this ambition. The correlation between R-level and the number of years an individual has been chief in his department (-0.16) is too small to furnish conclusive proof of this ambition even though the relationship goes in the -‘right” direction. These findings tend to support the argument that rationalization is a device used by newer chiefs to gain more control over their departments (Blumberg, 1979: Henderson, 1975: 107-132). That chiefs in departments with higher R-levels tend to have more active orientations may explain two null findings. Table 3 reports no relationship between R-level and how chiefs are selected; and regression analysis shows no relationship with chiefs’ priorities for their departments. Wanting to be a chief. especially in a large department. may be enough to explain the tendency toward rationalization. Method of selection-competitive examination or political appointment-may be irrelevant. Likewise. individual ambitions may be more important than the particular goals chiefs have for their departments. Another pattern of explanation involves the size of departments. Higher R-levels were associated with departments having larger annual expenditures. This is not surprising. Departments with bigger budgets (and more officers) have an objectively greater need to rationalize their operations. Correlations among variables describing size and workload provide even more reason to stress education and training.
STEINMAN
Education and training. if effective. certainly can influence individual police performances; but also it can be ignored. Niederhoffer (1967) notes the higher value police place on what they learn on the streets as against what they hear during formal training. Harris (1978:273-291) reports on the mixed evaluations of officers about the utility of classroom instruction. Goldstein observes that education may not lead to more sensitive and tolerant police behaviors (1977:388). Rationalization. or at least the education/training side of it. is no panacea. It is. nevertheless. one of the major managerial tools available to chiefs. Finally. these findings underline the kev role played by chiefs. They suggest a sensitivity among chiefs about the benefits and costs of rationalization. The correlation between chiefs in smaller departments with lower R-levels may indicate less of a perceived need for formal rationalization, more reliance on informal methods of control. and a higher estimate by these chiefs of their ability to manage affairs directly and effectively. Individual chiefs may find little incentive to go very far down the road toward rationalization if their departments are relatively small. Indeed. the costs of rationalization noted earlier may seem altogether too high given the limited need for it. Chiefs in larger departments may have every reason to go as far as they can: but the road may be longer than it seems. and the costs of travelling it greater than anticipated.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT I am very gratcl’ul to Prolcssor> Susan Welch and John Comer for their assistance and advice on this study.
NOTES
’
Unlortunately. the dataset did not provtde ?traightl’orward inl’ormation on the population sizes and geographic locatmns of the communities served by rcxpondent departments. Inferences can he made. however. ahout the importance of population Gre Irom some of the independent variables grouped under the last two catqories of variables listed in Tahlc 3. \uch ;I\ department Gze. workload. and expenditure\.
Rationalizing
Police
Operations:
Some Explanatory
233
Factors
ing: The Boston experience. ton Books.
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