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Reason or religion
Letters– Every cell is sacred?
Reason or religion
From Stephen Wilson You suggest that the ability to turn skin cells into embryoniclike stem cells “avoids the moral objections that go with” harvesting embryonic material (24 November, p 3). In fact, if we retain an arbitrary definition of life and death, this new technology poses new quandaries. If a life could be created from any old piece of human tissue, then the classic division of opinion arises. Some people might become morally distraught at the disposal of dandruff, while others could be reassured that aborting a pregnancy in the first trimester is not so much a killing as an amputation.
From Valerie Stone I am surprised anyone would be so naive as to believe that science will eventually conquer all nature’s mysteries, as you report Peter Atkins does (10 November, p 6). Historians and philosophers of science have already shown through analyses of scientific revolutions and of chaotic systems that this cannot happen. Consideration of evolutionary biology gives us a similar lesson: science is done with human brains, using human cognition, and so is necessarily constrained by what our brains can and cannot represent about the universe. But all that aside, any scientist knows that the moment all mysteries are conquered is the moment their grant money dries up. Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
If there is no difference in the “aliveness” of an embryo and a skin cell, then no moral dilemmas are resolved until we develop a more sophisticated understanding of what a life really is. Five Dock, New South Wales, Australia
Trade whose emissions? From Richard Wing In your editorial on climate change (1 December, p 5) you say: “make each country responsible for all its carbon emissions”. If a Japanese company owns a factory in China which is making goods to sell to customers in the US, then whose emissions are they? Alfreton, Derbyshire, UK 34 | NewScientist | 22/29 December 2007
From John Falla It may be true, as your editorial states, that replacing religion with science is fanciful (10 November, p 3). But what’s not fanciful is separating the state and religion. Prying the dying hands of the Anglican church from the British state is a move that is long overdue. What is also not fanciful is separating education and religion. I am appalled by the continued state funding of faith schools in the UK. London, UK From Peter Scott Why is belief so dangerous? Well, if people allow themselves to be persuaded to accept one absurd idea, it becomes much easier to make them accept others, such as statements that Muslims, blacks or Jews are inferior or damned, for example. From there, it is a small step to condoning and justifying the destruction of those groups. As Mark Twain said, “Faith is believing something you know ain’t true.” North Walsham, Norfolk, UK From John Osborn What good is religion? I’ll tell you. It is by far the greatest labour-
saving device ever invented. Why? Because once you believe, you never have to think again. The amount of painful effort this must have saved throughout history is enormous! Martinez, California, US
Not even probable From Gerry Harant Andrew Baker says, following David Hume, that we cannot be sure the sun will come up tomorrow based on the understanding that it has always come up before (24 November, p 22). From this he argues that science cannot establish the existence of the causal links required to apply the precautionary principle and take action against threats such as global warming. The global warming deniers are not troubled by such philosophical niceties when they make their disastrous decisions, which affect all of the planet. Their arguments are based on the certainties of the fossil fuel market and the absolute truths of the stock exchange. They can rely on their deep insight that superior power beats superior knowledge every time. Unlike Baker, I feel quite capable of coping with the awful knowledge that in our misguided zeal to expose the near certainty of global catastrophe, we may well be inflicting irreparable damage on somebody’s belief in what they heard in introductory philosophy. Blackburn, Victoria, Australia
From Trevor Hussey Baker’s conclusion that science should offer probabilistic predictions to policy-makers may be both sensible and important. But it is not rationally justifiable by his own arguments. If we invoke Hume’s doubts about induction to undermine causal explanations, then we must accept that they apply equally to probabilities. The measurements that supported a given probability in the past may not do so in the future. The fact that things predicted with a high probability have, in the past, proved more likely to happen than those with a low probability does not mean that they will continue to do so. To appeal to Karl Popper’s thesis that scientists should not pursue truth but should seek to falsify their hypotheses does not help. That thesis rests on the inductive assumption that, once refuted, a hypothesis will prove false in future. High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK Andrew Baker writes: ● Hume realised that his demonstration of the impossibility of establishing causation had huge implications, especially since it meant that even using probabilities was problematic. But probability, Hume said, was the best way out that we knew of. Somehow we must reconcile his arguments to achieve practical outcomes like management.
China in a bull shop From Julius Wroblewski Your cover story on the rise of China as an economic and technological power (10 November, p 48) included a sombre article (“It’s raining men”, p 63) dealing with the potentially destabilising effect of China’s evolving glut of males. If China dropped its hostility to homosexuality and allowed gay marriage, millions of gay men www.newscientist.com
Reason or religion
From Stephen Wilson You suggest that the ability to turn skin cells into embryoniclike stem cells “avoids the moral objections that go with” harvesting embryonic material (24 November, p 3). In fact, if we retain an arbitrary definition of life and death, this new technology poses new quandaries. If a life could be created from any old piece of human tissue, then the classic division of opinion arises. Some people might become morally distraught at the disposal of dandruff, while others could be reassured that aborting a pregnancy in the first trimester is not so much a killing as an amputation.
From Valerie Stone I am surprised anyone would be so naive as to believe that science will eventually conquer all nature’s mysteries, as you report Peter Atkins does (10 November, p 6). Historians and philosophers of science have already shown through analyses of scientific revolutions and of chaotic systems that this cannot happen. Consideration of evolutionary biology gives us a similar lesson: science is done with human brains, using human cognition, and so is necessarily constrained by what our brains can and cannot represent about the universe. But all that aside, any scientist knows that the moment all mysteries are conquered is the moment their grant money dries up. Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
If there is no difference in the “aliveness” of an embryo and a skin cell, then no moral dilemmas are resolved until we develop a more sophisticated understanding of what a life really is. Five Dock, New South Wales, Australia
Trade whose emissions? From Richard Wing In your editorial on climate change (1 December, p 5) you say: “make each country responsible for all its carbon emissions”. If a Japanese company owns a factory in China which is making goods to sell to customers in the US, then whose emissions are they? Alfreton, Derbyshire, UK 34 | NewScientist | 22/29 December 2007
From John Falla It may be true, as your editorial states, that replacing religion with science is fanciful (10 November, p 3). But what’s not fanciful is separating the state and religion. Prying the dying hands of the Anglican church from the British state is a move that is long overdue. What is also not fanciful is separating education and religion. I am appalled by the continued state funding of faith schools in the UK. London, UK From Peter Scott Why is belief so dangerous? Well, if people allow themselves to be persuaded to accept one absurd idea, it becomes much easier to make them accept others, such as statements that Muslims, blacks or Jews are inferior or damned, for example. From there, it is a small step to condoning and justifying the destruction of those groups. As Mark Twain said, “Faith is believing something you know ain’t true.” North Walsham, Norfolk, UK From John Osborn What good is religion? I’ll tell you. It is by far the greatest labour-
saving device ever invented. Why? Because once you believe, you never have to think again. The amount of painful effort this must have saved throughout history is enormous! Martinez, California, US
Not even probable From Gerry Harant Andrew Baker says, following David Hume, that we cannot be sure the sun will come up tomorrow based on the understanding that it has always come up before (24 November, p 22). From this he argues that science cannot establish the existence of the causal links required to apply the precautionary principle and take action against threats such as global warming. The global warming deniers are not troubled by such philosophical niceties when they make their disastrous decisions, which affect all of the planet. Their arguments are based on the certainties of the fossil fuel market and the absolute truths of the stock exchange. They can rely on their deep insight that superior power beats superior knowledge every time. Unlike Baker, I feel quite capable of coping with the awful knowledge that in our misguided zeal to expose the near certainty of global catastrophe, we may well be inflicting irreparable damage on somebody’s belief in what they heard in introductory philosophy. Blackburn, Victoria, Australia
From Trevor Hussey Baker’s conclusion that science should offer probabilistic predictions to policy-makers may be both sensible and important. But it is not rationally justifiable by his own arguments. If we invoke Hume’s doubts about induction to undermine causal explanations, then we must accept that they apply equally to probabilities. The measurements that supported a given probability in the past may not do so in the future. The fact that things predicted with a high probability have, in the past, proved more likely to happen than those with a low probability does not mean that they will continue to do so. To appeal to Karl Popper’s thesis that scientists should not pursue truth but should seek to falsify their hypotheses does not help. That thesis rests on the inductive assumption that, once refuted, a hypothesis will prove false in future. High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK Andrew Baker writes: ● Hume realised that his demonstration of the impossibility of establishing causation had huge implications, especially since it meant that even using probabilities was problematic. But probability, Hume said, was the best way out that we knew of. Somehow we must reconcile his arguments to achieve practical outcomes like management.
China in a bull shop From Julius Wroblewski Your cover story on the rise of China as an economic and technological power (10 November, p 48) included a sombre article (“It’s raining men”, p 63) dealing with the potentially destabilising effect of China’s evolving glut of males. If China dropped its hostility to homosexuality and allowed gay marriage, millions of gay men www.newscientist.com