Rebuilding EU fish stocks and fisheries, a process under way?

Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

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Marine Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Rebuilding EU fish stocks and fisheries, a process under way? b f ¨ ¨ M. Cardinale a,n, H. Dorner , A. Abella c, J.L. Andersen d, J. Casey e, R. Doring , E. Kirkegaard g, h,i b j f A. Motova , J. Anderson , E.J. Simmonds , C. Stransky a

Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Aquatic Resources, Institute of Marine Research, Turistgatan 5, 45330 Lysekil, Sweden European Commission – Joint Research Center Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC), Maritime Affairs Unit, FISHREG – Scientific Support to Fisheries TP 051, I-21027 Ispra (VA), Italy c Regional Agency for the Protection of the Environment in Tuscany (ARPAT) Via Marradi 114, Livorno 56126, Italy d Institute of Food and Resource Economics (FOI), University of Copenhagen Rolighedsvej 25 1958 Frederiksberg Denmark e Cefas, Pakefield Road, Lowestoft, Suffolk, NR33 0HT, UK f Johann Heinrich von Th¨ unen Institute (Federal Research Institute for Rural Areas, Forestry and Fisheries), Institute of Sea Fisheries, Palmaille 9, 22767 Hamburg, Germany g DTU Aqua, National Institute of Aquatic Resources, Technical University of Denmark, Charlottenlund Slot, Jægersborg Alle´ 1, 2920 Charlottenlund, Denmark h European Regional Policy Institute, S. Konarskio str. 49, LT-03123, Vilnius, Lithuania i Vilnius University Faculty of Economics, Department of Economic Policy, Sauletekio av. 9, LT-10222 Vilnius, Lithuania j Aberdeen, UK b

a r t i c l e i n f o

abstract

Article history: Received 23 July 2012 Received in revised form 8 October 2012 Accepted 8 October 2012

As a signatory to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the European Union (EU) has made a commitment to maintain or restore fish stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and where possible not later than 2015. So how has the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) fared in trying to achieve this objective? The development of the status of 41 commercially exploited fish stocks from the North East Atlantic, North Sea and Baltic Sea (FAO Area 27) was analysed together with the economic performance of the fleets exploiting those stocks. The analyses indicate that the exploitation status for many of the stocks has greatly improved during the last 10 years while the economic performance of the fleets over the same period has been highly variable. The main economic indicators (gross value added (GVA) and operating cash flow (OCF)) have gradually improved at a time when the general economic situation, which has a great influence on the markets, costs and purchase power, has worsened. While recognizing that much remains to be done to achieve the objective of the WSSD, the analyses indicate that actions implemented in the last decade under the CFP have led to an improvement in the status of many commercially important fish stocks and their fleets towards levels that are closer to those producing MSY. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: North East Atlantic Stock assessment Recovery of fish stocks Common Fisheries Policy MSY

1. Introduction Around 80% of the world’s exploited fish stocks are currently considered to be overexploited [1]. Recent re-analysis of worldwide catch data indicates an increasing percentage of overexploited, depleted, and in some cases recovering stocks and decreasing trends in the proportion of underexploited and moderately exploited stocks [2]. In this respect, the European marine resources as a whole are no exception [3]. As a signatory to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) [4], the European Union (EU) has made a commitment to maintain or restore stocks to levels that can produce the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), with the aim of achieving these goals on an urgent basis and where possible not later than 2015. MSY is

n

Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Cardinale).

0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.10.002

generally defined as the maximum use that a renewable resource can sustain without impairing its renewability through natural growth and replenishment (OECD definition; http://stats.oecd. org/glossary/; accessed on 28.09.2012). Moreover, the plan of implementation adopted during the WSSD encourages the application of the ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAF) [5] by 2010, the elimination of destructive fishing practices and the establishment of marine protected areas consistent with international laws and based on scientific information. Nonetheless, 10 years after the WSSD, most stocks in European waters (88%) are still considered to be overfished and 30% of them are estimated to be outside safe biological limits, which means that they may not be able to replenish [3]. Thus, up to 2010, Europe is still far from achieving the objectives agreed at the WSSD in 2002 [6]. In this perspective, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been considered ineffective in terms of reducing fishing capacity [7] as well as in rebuilding marine ecosystems [8] but see also [9] for a critique. Furthermore, the fishery sector is still

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M. Cardinale et al. / Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

considered to suffer from overfishing, fleet overcapacity, heavy subsidies, low economic resilience and decline in the volume of catches and mean sizes of fish caught [10]. According to latest estimates, in order to restore overfished stocks, the global fishing capacity needs to be cut by 36–43% from the 2008 level, with a likely loss of employment of 12–15 millions fishers and costing US$ 96–358 billion for buyback [11]. Considered from this standpoint, it is indisputable that most of the management objectives of the WSSD have not yet been accomplished, and thus up to 2010 the CFP has not been successful [12]. This is especially true regarding the proposed phasing out of subsidies, the prohibition, reduction or limitation of fishing practices that have a negative impact on the marine habitat such as bottom trawling, and the elimination of discards through the use of highly selective gears [13,14]. The recurrent and pessimistic ‘‘mantra’’ that the CFP has completely failed, is not only pervading the most recent scientific literature but has also become the common perception of the general public, the media and numerous stakeholders [15], although this perception is not universal [16,17]. European waters encompass several large marine ecosystems, such as the North East Atlantic, Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas. Such ecoregions are ecologically unique and support diverse communities of marine organisms which historically have been subject to different levels of exploitation and different advisory and management regimes [18]. Given the diversity of such eco-regions and their different historical developments, the question whether it is reasonable to accept the sweeping generalization that the CFP has completely failed and the status and outlook for stocks and fisheries in European waters is generally pessimistic has been addressed. Has there really been no significant progress towards CFP objectives during the last 10 years in any of the European seas? To address these questions, the status of commercially exploited fish stocks from the North East Atlantic, North Sea and Baltic Sea (Fig. 1; FAO Area 27) has been analysed together with the economic performance of the EU fleets exploiting those stocks [19].

Fig. 1. Map of the ICES area with the different stocks analysed. The colouring (light and darker blue) indicates in- and outside Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (according to http://www.vliz.be/vmdcdata/marbound/; accessed on the 28/09/ 2012) (see Table 1 for details). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

2. Materials and methods 2.1. Stock assessment data Using the results of the 2011 ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea; http://ices.dk/advice/icesadvice.asp; accessed on 28.09.2012) assessments for fish stocks from the Northeast Atlantic, North Sea and Baltic Sea [20], the following metrics, where available, were collated: Fishing mortality (F, the instantaneous rate of fishing mortality i.e. the rate per unit time at which fish are dying due to fishing) Spawning stock biomass (SSB, the biomass of fish able to reproduce) Management target biological reference points (i.e. Ftarget and SSBtarget) The assembled metrics are given in Table 1 and following [6,16,21] and [22], the exploitation rate and biomass were compared against their management target biological reference points, i.e. Ftarget and SSBtarget. The ratio between F and Ftarget and between SSB and SSBtarget are indicators of the exploitation rate and spawning stock biomass relative to their respective management target biological reference points, with values over 1 indicating that F is greater than Ftarget and values under 1 indicating that SSB is below SSBtarget. In our analysis, SSBtarget is either the value corresponding to the value for SSBtrigger as estimated by ICES or the target level of SSB specified in any agreed management plan (i.e.SSBMP). Both values usually correspond to the level of SSB below which recruitment is likely to be impaired. If stocks are assessed to be below the SSBtrigger or SSBMP reference points, ICES would advise that remedial action should be taken. Therefore, when SSB is above SSBtarget the probability of impaired recruitment is expected to be low. SSBtarget is considered the lower bound of fluctuation around the SSB that corresponds to MSY. It is therefore a biomass reference point that triggers a cautious response; the cautious response is to reduce fishing mortality to allow a stock to rebuild and fluctuate around a notional value of SSB that corresponds to MSY. This concept evolves from the precautionary approach (PA) reference point SSBPA that ICES has used as a basis for fisheries advice since the late 1990s and therefore in the ICES framework, SSBtarget is usually equal to or higher than the former SSBPA [20]. For five stocks, and in absence of a defined SSBtrigger or SSBMP, SSBPA as SSBtarget was chosen. For about 19% of the stocks in Table 1, neither SSBtarget, SSBMP nor SSBPA are defined by ICES. To estimate a proxy of SSBtarget, the maximum observed SSB in the time series (SSBMAX) was estimated and then calculated the average ratio between SSBtarget and SSBMAX for those stocks for which an estimate of SSBtarget was available. SSBtarget estimates were on average around 39% of the observed SSBMAX and thus this value was used for those stocks for which SSBtarget cannot be defined (Table 1). Ftarget was chosen as the value generally referred to by ICES as the estimated proxy of FMSY or defined as F target in the current management plan (FMP) [20]. These values are estimated using simulations or yield per recruit analysis and are used to generate yearly catch advice that is used as basis by EU to set annual TACs. For two stocks, and in absence of a defined Ftarget or FMP, FPA as Ftarget [20] was chosen. Using the data in Table 1, we also fitted a GAM (i.e. generalized additive model) assuming a gaussian distribution and identity link to explore the effect of different variables (i.e. predictors) on the estimated change in F between 2001 and 2010 (i.e. response). The predictors used were area group, species group, the ratio

Table 1 Summary of the biological data collated from ICES sources and used in the analysis. Area is the ICES area as defined in Fig. 1, Area and Species group are the categorization used in the GLM analysis, Acronym is the stock acronym as used in the figures, Ftarget is the target fishing mortality, Ftarget and SSBtarget rationale is the basis for Ftarget and SSBtarget, EU TAC is the EU share of the total TAC for each stock (see text for details). Area group

Species

Species group

Acronym

Ftarget

Ftarget rationale

SSBtarget

SSBtarget rationale

F2001

F2010

SSB2001

SSB2010

EU TAC %

I and II I and II I and II II and IVa IIIa IIIa and SDs22-24 IIIa, IV, VI, VII, VIIIa,b,d IIIb-d IIIc and d IIId IIId (SD 30) IIId (SD 32) IIId (SDs 25-29) IV IV IV, IIIa, VI IV, IIIa (West) IV,VIId IV,VIId, IIIa IXa Va Va Va Va Vb Vb Vb VIa VIa Via (North) VIb VIIa VIIa and VIIg,h,j,k VIId VIIe VIIe-k VIIf,g VIIIa, b VIIIc, IXa VIIIc, IXa VIIIc, IXa

Arctic Arctic Arctic North Sea Baltic Sea Baltic Sea North Sea Baltic Sea Baltic Sea Baltic Sea Baltic Sea Baltic Sea Baltic Sea North Sea North Sea North Sea North Sea North Sea North Sea Western Seas Arctic Arctic Arctic Arctic Arctic Arctic Arctic Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas Western Seas

Cod Haddock Saithe Herring Sole Herring Hake Sprat Cod Cod Herring Herring Herring Plaice Sole Saithe Haddock Whiting Cod Horse mackrel Cod Haddock Herring Saithe Cod Haddock Saithe Cod Haddock Herring Haddock Cod Herring Sole Plaice Cod Sole Sole Hake Four-spotted megrim Megrim

Demersal predator Demersal predator Demersal predator Pelagic fish Flatfish Pelagic fish Demersal predator Pelagic fish Demersal predator Demersal predator Pelagic fish Pelagic fish Pelagic fish Flatfish Flatfish Demersal predator Demersal predator Demersal predator Demersal predator Pelagic fish Demersal predator Demersal predator Pelagic fish Demersal predator Demersal predator Demersal predator Demersal predator Demersal predator Demersal predator Pelagic fish Demersal predator Demersal predator Pelagic fish Flatfish Flatfish Demersal predator Flatfish Flatfish Demersal predator Flatfish Flatfish

CODARC HADARC SAIACR HERNOR SOLKAT HERWBA HKENOR SPRBAL CODWBAL CODEBAL HERBOB HERGOR HERBAL PALNOR SOLNOR SAINOR HADNOR WHINOR CODNOR HMASOU CODICE HADICE HERICE SAIICE CODFAP HADFAP SAIFAP CODWES HADWES HERVIAN HADROC CODIRE HERVIIA SOLVIID PLAVIIE CODCEL SOLCEL SOLBBI HKESOU FMEGBBI MEGBBI

0.40 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.24 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.19 0.35 0.16 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.33 0.47 0.22 0.28 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.25 0.29 0.19 0.40 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.17

FMP FMP FMP FMP FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMP FMSY FMSY FMSY FMP FMP FMP FMP FMP FMSY FMSY FMP FPA FMSY FMSY FMSY FPA FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY FMSY

460000 80000 220000 1300000 2000 110000 51119* 673920* 23000 240000 200000 60000 689897* 230000 35000 200000 140000 135965* 150000 117070* 220000 71000* 300000 80000 40000 35000 55000 22000 30000 75000 9000 10000 44000 8000 2400 8800 2200 13000 17355* 3134* 1004*

SSBMP SSBMP SSBMP SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger

0.84 0.27 0.20 0.36 0.33 0.47 0.86 0.34 1.23 1.07 0.17 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.61 0.31 0.765 0.65 0.98 0.08 0.76 0.64 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.27 0.38 0.83 1.07 0.25 0.40 1.63 0.84 0.44 0.53 0.92 0.35 0.62 0.81 0.31 0.26

0.29 0.25 0.33 0.12 0.34 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.58 0.25 0.13 0.43 0.32 0.24 0.34 0.60 0.233 0.27 0.68 0.09 0.33 0.46 0.13 0.37 0.41 0.30 0.38 0.82 0.15 0.27 0.15 1.19 0.08 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.26 0.39 0.52 0.34 0.08

241243 100486 349261 886094 2440 142270 31083 1224000 26796 115853 386111 81917 402497 230500 38600 209000 135081 216173 50161 298260 166618 63531 313000 71519 46314 55009 90288 10186 11879 69353 6961 2044 38625 8555 2718 6457 1944 11969 9700 3573 1195

1134247 361519 393155 1301092 1834 95152 131075 891000 25642 232139 617784 76800 535120 460700 35200 197300 182559 205826 52733 241400 297607 116130 386000 95513 31404 22262 110606 6581 17109 61649 17109 947 114319 10224 2629 6317 3869 11765 18700 4797 717

5 3 2 73 100 99 100 92 100 90 100 100 92 98 100 53 97 100 84 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92 96 99 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

n

SSBtrigger SSBPA SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBMP SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBPA SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBMP SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBPA SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger SSBtrigger

M. Cardinale et al. / Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

Area

SSBtarget estimated as 39% of the SSBMAX, see text for details.

45

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M. Cardinale et al. / Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

between F in 2001 and Ftarget and between SSB in 2001 and SSBtarget. The areas were grouped into the regions of Baltic Sea, North Sea, Arctic and Western Seas while the different species were assigned to demersal predator, flatfish and pelagic species (Table 1). Area group and species group were treated as random effects in the model and the final model was selected using AIC (Akaike Information Criteria) and significance of the predictor (i.e. p o0.05). To simplify the interpretation of the results, the maximum degrees of freedom (measured as number of knots k) allowed to the smoothing functions were limited for the variables month and depth (k¼4). In total, relevant information for 41 fish stocks comprising 10 different species were available (Table 1). These 41 stocks represent the most important commercial stocks in the area for which ICES produces yearly advice [20]. The EU share of the TAC from these stocks is on average about 71% (Table 1).

2.2. Economic analysis For the evaluation of changes in the economic performances of the fisheries sector, data collected by the 22 EU Member States (MS) implementing the EU Data Collection Framework (DCF) [23,24] and published in an aggregated format within the 2011 Annual Economic Report on the European Fishing Fleet [19] were analysed. The main indicators showing economic performance of EU fleets used for this analysis are: Gross Value Added (GVA): the contribution of the sector to the economy. It is defined here as gross income from operating activities after adjusting for operating subsidies and indirect taxes. Operating Cash Flow (OCF): the total income minus all operating costs. Economic Profit (EP): the income minus all production costs, depreciation and opportunity costs. Economic profit or loss is calculated using an estimated value for the opportunity cost of capital, which uses the rate of return obtained from investing in a low risk market instrument such as government bonds and data on the current tangible asset value of the fleet. Therefore, according to economic theory, an economic loss implies that the fleet generated a lower return on invested capital than would have been achieved by investing the capital elsewhere. The OCF on the other hand is the sum of total operating costs (including wages and excluding capital costs) subtracted from total income, while GVA is the remuneration of both the crew and capital employed (often used as a proxy for resource rent). For this analysis GVA and economic profits should be considered the most appropriate indicators. GVA shows what the fishing sector contributes to the overall economy, while economic profit shows whether the fleet is generating sufficient returns on capital invested. For the managers or owners of the resource (‘society’), these should be the most important information for long-term management decisions. OCF is a measure of short term profitability; if the OCF is negative, then insufficient income is generated to cover operational costs. Only complete datasets provided by EU Member States, published in the 2011 Annual Economic Report on the European Fishing Fleet [19] and including the above indicators were used in the analysis. The data refers to vessels fishing in FAO area 27 only (see also Table 1). Generally, direct subsidies as the payment of direct income subsidies are often considered the only reason why many fleets are still able to stay in business. Thus, the ability of EU fleets to remain viable with and without existing levels of direct income subsidies has also been assessed.

3. Results 3.1. Biological analysis The stock status for 41 fish stocks in 2001 and 2010 both in terms of F and SSB and their associated values of Ftarget and SSBtarget are given in Table 1. In 2010, 18 of the stocks analysed (44%) were fished at or below the estimate long term target F level, compared to only five (12%) in 2001. The proportion of stocks for which F has declined was significantly greater than those for which F has increased (Fisher exact test; p o0.001). The average fishing mortality has fallen from 2.1 times Ftarget in 2001 to 1.3 times Ftarget in 2010 (Table 1). Fishing mortality and the ratio between F and Ftarget has significantly declined (Figs. 2 and 3; Fisher exact test; po0.001), while SSB has significantly increased over the last decade (Fig. 4; Fisher exact test; po0.001). There is a significant negative relationship (p o0.05; r2 ¼0.52) between F estimated in 2001 and the change in F between 2001 and 2010. There is a significant negative relationship between the ratio F to Ftarget in 2001 and the change of the ratio F to Ftarget between 2001 and 2010 (po0.05; r2 ¼ 0.59). Albeit not significant, there is also a negative relationship between the ratio of SSB to SSBtarget in 2001 and the change of the same ratio between 2001 and 2010 (Fig. 4). Furthermore, the proportion of stocks for which SSB increased between 2001 and 2010 is significantly greater the proportion for which SSB decreased (Fisher exact test; po0.001). The negative relationships between F estimated in 2001 and the change in F between 2001 and 2010, is consistent with the expectation that stocks subject to high exploitation rates in 2001 (i.e. high F and high ration F on Ftarget) have shown the best improvement over the last 10 years. This was confirmed by the results of the GAM model with random effect, which are presented in Table 2. Analysis of the residuals did not reveal any major departure from the main model assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance (data not shown). The model results showed that changes in F between 2001 and 2010 are not dependent on the area, species or the ratio SSB on SSBtarget estimated in 2001. On the other hand, there is a clear negative effect of the ratio of F on Ftarget estimated in 2001 on the changes in F between 2001 and 2010, indicating that the exploitation rates have declined more for those stocks subject to high exploitation rates in 2001 and confirming the results presented in Fig. 3. Finally, when comparing the stock status between 2001 and 2010 both in terms of F and SSB, a general shift towards Ftarget and SSBtarget has occurred during the last 10 years as demonstrated by the shift of the centroid of the stock status (i.e. SSB and F) relative to the targets (i.e. SSBtarget and Ftarget) (Fig. 5). 3.2. Economic analysis 3.2.1. Economic performance of the EU fleets According to results contained in the 2011 Annual Economic Report (AER) on the EU fishing fleet, GVA generated by the EU fleet from FAO area 27 was h1.55 billion in 2009, corresponding to an increase of 13% from 2008. During the same period OCF increased by h0.78 billion. However, once vessel depreciation and estimated opportunity costs were taken into consideration, the EU fleet in FAO area 27 moved into an economic loss making position in 2009, with an estimated loss of h118.6 million (Table 3). A total of 247 EU fleet segments were included in this analysis, representing 83% of all EU fishing vessels and 84% of EU fleet total income in 2009. According to the data provided by Member States at fleet segment level, 134 fleet segments generated economic losses in 2009, while 113 fleets generated economic profits, however only 34 fleet segments generated a negative cash flow. Therefore, the data suggest that 113 fleet segments (46%) generated enough income to

M. Cardinale et al. / Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

47

Fig. 2. Changes in F between 2001 and 2010 in relation to F estimated in 2001.

Fig. 3. Changes in the ratio F on Ftarget between 2001 and 2010 in relation to the ratio F on Ftarget estimated in 2001.

cover all operational costs and exceed the risk free rate of return obtainable from investing their capital elsewhere. Only 34 fleet segments (14%) did not generate enough income to cover operational costs and therefore made no return on capital invested

in 2009. Moreover, economic performance varies considerably between fleet segments and passive gears, which consume less fuel and generally perform better than fleets operating with active gears (Fig. 6).

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M. Cardinale et al. / Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

Fig. 4. Changes in the ratio SSB on SSBtarget between 2001 and 2010 in relation to the ratio SSB on SSBtarget estimated in 2001.

Table 2 Summary of the GAM model used to test the influence of area, species group, the ratio F2001/Ftarget and the ratio SSB2001/SSBtarget on the estimated change in F between 2001 and 2010. Response Change in F between 2001 and 2010 GLM: Gaussian df

2.1

Variable Area Species group F2001/Ftarget SSB2001/SSBtarget Intercept model adjusted r2

F

16.8 Value  0.2 0.53

p ns ns o0.0001 ns se 0.02

n 41

DEV 55.8%

p o0.0001

3.2.2. Direct income subsidies to the EU fleet According to the latest data, direct income subsidies were approximately 4.4% of total EU fleet income in 2009. Direct subsidies data reported by Member States should include ‘‘direct payments’’, e.g. compensation for stopping fishing, refunds of fuel duty or similar lump sum compensation payments. It excludes social benefit payments, indirect subsidies, e.g. reduced duty on inputs such as fuel, investment subsidies. As the direct subsidies data (and all fleet economic data) requested under the DCF relates to the active fleet only, amounts paid for permanent cessation of fishing activities (decommissioning) should not be included, and ‘compensation for stopping fishing’ should refer to temporary measures only. Also, according to the wording of the current EU legislation, capital investment subsidies such as vessel modernization should also not be included. Results in Table 3 suggest that when the data is aggregated by fishing gear type at EU level, all gear types generated an overall positive OCF in 2009, even when direct income subsidies were excluded from the calculation. In addition, although some gear types (i.e. demersal trawl, beam trawl and passive and mobile polyvalent) show overall economic losses without direct income subsidies, the inclusion of direct income subsidies in the calculation simply reduces the extent of their losses (Table 3). Only vessels using dredges, purse seines and hooks moved from an overall loss to profit making position due to direct income subsidies in 2009.

Fig. 5. Ellipsoids of the ratio F on Ftarget and SSB on SSBtarget estimated in 2001 and in 2010 and superimposed normal-probability contours over the scatterplot of the data (i.e. the shaded colour). The 95% probability is marked with a dotted line.

Fig. 7 shows the outcome for passive gears (many of which operate in coastal fisheries) and vessels using dredges, which had the highest ratios of direct income subsidies to total income in 2009, both at around 14%. In comparison, despite receiving around 45% of the total amount of direct income subsidies paid to the EU fleet in 2009, the ratio of direct income subsidies to total income for vessels using demersal trawls and seines was just 3.8%. Analysis at fleet segment level reveals that over 80 of all the segments analysed did not receive any direct income subsidies in 2009, representing 31% of the total number of vessels, 27% of the

6000

49

Total income Operating cash flow (OCF)

Gross Value Added (GVA) Economic profit / Loss

 129.7  36.9 100.4 10.7  72.8  3.1 14.6  33.4 2.0 76.4  87.2 –  159.1

5000

€million

4000 3000 2000 1000

 47.7  32.1 123.6 35.8  60.4 0.3 18.8  23.3 12.5 76.6  77.7 – 26.3

0 -1000

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Some segments were excluded due to incomplete datasets and thus do not represent the entire EU fleet. n

6113 826 610 1130 1366 6493 2577 3085 5883 13,289 2354 13,714 57,440 83% 49 24 26 15 18 24 15 27 15 12 22 83 330 Demersal trawl/seine Beam trawl Pelagic trawl Dredges Purse seine Drift and fixed nets Fixed pots and traps Gears using hooks Passive gears Polyvalent passive gears Passive and mobile polyvalent Inactive vessels All selected gears* Coverage

585.2 123.9 2 098.2 98.1 116.6 24.3 52.8 41.4 53.4 71.5 30.1 – 3295.5 88%

2071.4 362.4 756.8 157.0 552.1 101.5 118.2 448.6 57.0 432.8 358.5 – 5416.3 84%

82.0 4.8 23.2 25.1 12.4 3.4 4.1 10.1 10.5 0.2 9.6 – 185.4 92%

2182.6 399.5 811.0 184.4 564.5 105.5 131.8 459.5 75.7 434.6 369.9 – 5718.9 84%

952.4 124.5 447.3 103.1 248.0 63.3 76.2 192.3 34.5 300.8 194.8 – 2737.2

438.4 36.4 301.0 72.1 49.7 29.9 47.3 75.6 38.3 170.4 99.8 – 1358.9

356.4 31.6 277.8 47.0 37.3 26.6 43.1 65.5 27.8 170.2 90.2 – 1173.5

Fig. 6. EU fleet economic performance indicators between 2002 and 2009 in FAO area 27.

Number Number of of fleet segments vessels

Weight of Income from landings landings (h (1000 t) million)

7000

Gear type

Table 3 Economic performance of the different EU fishing fleets in 2009 in FAO area 27.

Direct subsidies (h million)

Total income (h million)

Gross Value Added (h million)

Operating cash flow (OCF) with direct income subsidies (h million)

Operating cash flow (OCF) Economic Profit/loss with direct income without direct income subsidies (h million) subsidies (h million)

Economic Profit/loss without direct income subsidies (h million)

M. Cardinale et al. / Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

total fleet income and 32% of the total generated GVA (Table 4). The majority of direct income subsidies (83%) paid to the fleet in 2009 was allocated to around one quarter of the number of active fleet segments (62 out of 187 segments, representing 49% of the total number of vessels, 39% of total income and 34% of GVA generated). The level of direct income subsidies paid to EU fleets varies between MS (Fig. 8). In 2009, seven MS fishing in FAO area 27 paid more than 3% of total fleet income in the form of direct income subsidies. The highest level of direct income subsidy was paid to the Polish fleet (around 38% in 2008 and 2009) and is the result of intensive use of aid for temporary cessation of fishing activities in the Baltic Sea. The Irish fleet had the second highest level of support in 2009 (18% of total income). In the case of Latvia, where direct income subsidies to the fleet were just below 15% of total income in 2009, premiums for permanent cessation was the main purpose. Support for temporary cessation of EU fleets is time-restricted as well as value restricted in accordance to the requirements of the European Fisheries Fund (EFF 2007– 2013). Looking at the changes that have taken place over the last decade within the former Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG, 2000–2006) and the current EFF, it is important to highlight the change in rules surrounding fleet financial support related to capacity enhancing subsidies [25]. Subsidies for the construction of new vessels ceased in 2005 and there has been a significant reduction in financial support for modernization (funding for increases in engine power are no longer supported). These changes, along with capacity reduction schemes, resulted in a reduction in the total number of vessels in the EU Fleet register by 12.2% between 2004 and 2009 (EU 25), representing an average annual reduction of 2.3% [26]. The EFF interim evaluations [27] show that the majority of subsidies until October 2010 were focused on permanent and temporary cessation of fleet activity (33%), which most likely implies a reduction in the fishing pressure on resources. A further 29% was dedicated to investment in aquaculture, marketing and fish processing. Only 4% of aid was paid for investments on board fishing vessels and gear selectivity (small projects supported by h25,000 on average). This is different to the historical FIFG support where 16.8% of funding was used for construction of new vessels and modernization of the existing fleet.

4. Discussion The exploitation status for the most important stocks in the North East Atlantic has greatly improved during the last 10 years. As early as in 2007, a similar analysis still depicted a situation of long term unsustainability (SSBcurrent oSSBtarget) and excessive

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Fig. 7. GVA, OCF and direct subsidies of the EU fleet as % of income by gear type in 2009 in FAO area 27. Table 4 Distribution of the direct subsidies between EU fishing fleet segments in 2009 in FAO area 27. Direct income subsidies as % of total fleet income

Number of active segments

Number of vessels (%)

Total income (%)

Direct income subsidies (%)

Gross Value Added (GVA) (%)

Operating Cash Flow (OCF) (%)

None 0–1% 1–3% 3–10% 410% Total

125 20 35 43 20 243

46 5 15 21 13 100

30 4 35 27 4 100

0 0 22 42 36 100

37 4 35 21 3 100

40 3 34 15 8 100

Fig. 8. Direct subsidies as % of total income of the EU fleet estimated by EU Member State in 2008–2009 in FAO area 27.

exploitation rates (i.e. Fcurrent 4Ftarget) [22]. This pattern is a clear indication that management measures introduced following the 2002 reform of the CFP have been at least partly effective in moving towards WSSD objectives. Nevertheless, in recent years, a much more pessimistic picture of the state of European fish stocks and fisheries has continued to be portrayed through the publication of numerous papers and statements [6]. Such publications invariably allege that the several objectives of the WSSD have not been achieved, and based directly on this, they conclude the CFP has failed [15 and references therein]. The current reform of the CFP has attracted considerable public and media attention and

scrutiny from the scientific community. When talking about public perception, the European public has been led to believe that the CFP is currently under reform because it has completely failed to achieve all its targets. However, one of the reason (but obviously not the only reason) why the CFP is currently under reform is a result of the legal requirement that the CFP (as every European Common Policy), has to be reviewed at regular 10 year intervals and the last reform was conducted in 2002. It should also be noted that the 2009 Green Paper on the CFP reform [3] refers to stock assessments by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in 2008 and thus is based on stock information dating from up to 2007. Instead, it is rarely acknowledged the fact that a significant progress towards achieving MSY objectives has indeed been made during the last 10 years (but see [16] and this study). Many problems remain of course and considerable room for improvement was outlined in the 2009 Green Paper on the CFP reform [3] and in the new CFP proposed by the Commission [13,14]. It is also obvious that bringing stocks back to MSY after several decades of overexploitation [28] is not something one can achieve overnight. The history of the exploitation of European fisheries resources is one of the longest around the globe, with the trawl fisheries in the North Sea having developed more than 150 years ago and long-line fisheries more than 200 years ago [29]. Therefore, it is undoubted that bringing the EU fish stocks to the healthy state required by the WSSD and MSY objectives is a process which will take time, but as the analysis presented here clearly shows, at least, the process is under way. Within the last 10 years, a significant improvement in the status of many of the managed EU stocks in the North Eastern Atlantic has been observed, and the latest Communication of the Commission on fishing opportunities for 2013 [30] also pointed

M. Cardinale et al. / Marine Policy 39 (2013) 43–52

out improvements in fish stocks status in European waters. Interestingly, a similar pattern has also been observed for USA stocks [31]. Obviously, the 41 stocks analysed here comprise only a subset of all stocks fished in EU waters and only about 25% of the stocks for which ICES provides advice, although they represent the most important ones from a commercial standpoint within the ICES area [20]. On the other hand, the stocks included in the analysis are those considered as data-rich. For several other species and stocks, there is insufficient information to reliably assess their current status and make the relevant comparisons with the situation in 2001. Hence, for the majority of stocks, it is not possible to assess if their status has indeed improved in the last decade. In addition, Mediterranean and Black Sea stocks for which the situation is considered to be critical [32–34] have not been included in the present analysis because appropriate timeseries of F and SSB and estimates of Ftarget and SSBtarget are not available. The most likely explanations for both the existence of longer time series of data and a general improvement of stock status in the ICES area reside with the foundation of ICES itself, and its provision of advice to fishery managers for over a century. Such advice has enabled measures to manage fisheries in the ICES area for much longer than in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. In spite of the general improvement in stock status in the ICES area, there is considerable room for further improvement and there is no doubt that in order to have all stocks managed at MSY before 2015, a greater deal of fisheries stakeholder commitment would have been required over the last decade. It is also clear that it is unrealistic that the MSY target for all stocks can be achieved by 2015 although progress towards MSY targets is at least being made as well as that is also unrealistic to achieve simultaneously MSY targets for every stock in mixed fisheries contexts. It can also be argued that current SSB and F targets used by the EU to set annual TACs are not necessarily close enough to MSY. Obviously, major challenges remain and possible strategies to further improve the situation of fish stocks discussed in scientific and political fora include inter alia creating large marine reserves, time and area limitations for specific fishing gears, improvements in gear selectivity, integrated maritime management, balanced harvesting, banning discards, regionalization of management, individual transferable quotas (i.e. ITQs), multi-annual management plans [13,14,35], a list which is not exhaustive. Sizeselectivity harvesting also constitutes an issue for future management as most of the fisheries still rely on individuals that are caught much before the age or size at maturation and much smaller than optimal size [34,36]. Recovering the stock size and structure of an overexploited stock is an additional target for management [34] as well as the historical spatial structure and geographical distribution of the stocks [37]. Finally, it is important to stress that recovery does not necessarily imply rebuilding to historically observed levels. Stocks might recover numerically but not necessarily rebuild to previous biomass levels nor to biological features characteristics of a pristine status because overfishing may lead to changes in phenotypic characteristics of the stock (i.e. smaller size at maturation, reduced growth, and changes in natural mortality rates), some of which might have genetic basis [38]. Beside the biological status of the stocks, the economic analysis reveals diverse economic performance of EU fleets exploiting those stocks, showing that results may differ from fleet to fleet and from country to country. The economic indicators suggest a slow recovery even when the general economic situation, which has a great influence on the markets and purchasing power, is decreasing. However, discussions and additional work should be carried out to evaluate the influence of fuel tax exemptions on the economic performance of the EU fleet. Further changes proposed by the Commission in the new CFP

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regulation [14] derive from the intention of using economic management instruments such as transferable concessions for reducing over-capacity and increase economic efficiency. Nevertheless, even when the main guidelines are well designed, the implementation of the CFP is carried out at national level and usually conditioned by political decisions, which are not always in line with the economic background. Moreover, it has been argued that without massive subsidies, European fisheries would be bankrupt [15]. As shown in this paper, such a statement is too general and certainly does not apply to all EU fleets. Therefore, it would be wrong to generalize by saying that direct income subsidies have enabled some fishing gears to continue operating when otherwise they would not have generated enough income to cover their operational costs. This is likely to be the case for a minority of vessels within each gear type or segment, but not the general rule. It is widely accepted that parts of the EU fleet have become overcapitalized due to large capital investments in EU fisheries businesses over the past few decades and these results suggest such overcapitalization still negatively affects the economic performance of the EU fishing fleet. Of course it is unquestionable that severe problems remain for the effective and successful management of European marine fisheries. The pertinent issues that remain to be tackled are highlighted in the 2009 Green Paper on the reform of the CFP [3] and taken up in the Commission’s proposal for a new CFP [14]. However, the analysis demonstrates that the process is clearly underway, both from a biological and economic perspective. Therefore the sweeping statement that all European fish stocks and fisheries are in a dire state is not supported by recent data. With the exception of most of the cod stocks, which remain heavily overfished, commercially-important stocks such as plaice, sole, haddock, whiting and saithe are all exploited close to the rate that will deliver MSY. Even for cod, there are recent indications that some stocks, which have been overfished for decades, e.g. the Eastern Baltic Sea and Celtic Sea cod, are currently being exploited at a sustainable rate [39–41]. While much remains to be done, there are clear indications that actions already implemented under the CFP have led to an improvement in the status of many commercially important fish stocks towards levels that are capable of producing MSY.

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