Medical Hypotheses (2000) 54(2), 169–171 © 2000 Harcourt Publishers Ltd DOI: 10.1054/mehy.1999.0007, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on
ÔReceptor componentÕ and Ôactive componentÕ in the psychology and psychopathology of perception J. Feigenberg,1 J. Zislin2 1
Jerusalem, Israel 2The Jerusalem Mental Health Center, Kfar Shaul Hospital, affiliated to the Hebrew University-Hadassa Medical School, Jerusalem, Israel
Summary Sensory perception should not be regarded as one starting only (and solely) when the receptor is being stimulated. Along with the receptor component, the active component plays an essential role in the perception process. The main elements forming the active component are: expectation of a certain signal, prediction of the signal most probable in this particular situation, and an affective distinction determining the necessity of the signal for the individual perceiving the signal. Hence, a sequence of sensory phenomena can be formed (both for the normal and pathological states) depending on the relation between the receptor and active components. © 2000 Harcourt Publishers Ltd
THE BERNSTEIN THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGY OF ACTIVITY: INITIAL CONCEPTION Over three centuries (from René Descartes to Ivan P. Pavlov) the reflectory theory that has been the leading approach in the research the nervous system functioning. An animal’s behavior was looked upon as a series of reflexes, each of which was a reflector arc, starting with a receptor (one of the sensory organs) at the input and an effector (muscle, gland) at the output. The initiative of each motor action was attributed only to the receptor which had been acted on by one or another external stimulus. As to the receptor, it was regarded as the only point from which any sensory act or any perception started. Analysis of the psychophysiology of movements and motor control via the central nervous system (Nikolay A. Bernstein), resulted in the creation of the concept of physiology of activity (1,2). The previous concept, where
Received 18 August 1998 Accepted 21 January 1999 Correspondence to: Josef Zislin MD, Kfar Shaul Hospital, Jerusalem, 91060, Israel. Phone: +972 2 6551567; Fax: +972 2 6512274; E-mail:
[email protected]
an animal is a reflectory and reactive system (in other words, a passive system), was replaced by the concept of an animal as an active system. The more complicated the activity, the less it depends on the starting external sensory signal and the more it depends on the activity of the organism. According to Nikolay A. Bernstein, animal actions are viewed as follows. The reaction of a living organism depends on the significance of the input signal which affects the receptor and initiates a respective action. All actions form a sequence. At one end of the sequence, motor actions occur which are wholly determined by the initiating stimulus (starting signal). Reflexes proper belong just here. In the middle of the sequence there are motor actions for which a corresponding stimulus (signal) continues performing its initiating role, but in this case the actual meaning of actions no longer depends on the signal itself. As a matter of fact, the starting signal turns into a ‘trigger’ signal. The situation is similar to what takes place in a country at war. For example, a flare signal, which is a visual warning for soldiers indicating that the attack is about to start, initiates certain actions. The program of this actions has nothing to do with the physical characteristics of that flare signal. The program depends on the plan of attack which had been devised beforehand, as well as on the current battle situation. At the 169
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other end of the sequence, motor actions take place for which neither the starting signal nor the trigger signal plays any decisive role. Moreover, none of these signals may be present at all. The program of these arbitrary actions and the stimulus initiating their start are wholly determined within the individual. Movement along this sequence coincides with the gradual transition from passive motor actions to an ever-increasing activity. N. Bernstein’s conception of physiology of activity was based on the findings connected with the motor actions of humans and animals. (3–8) DISTURBANCES IN SENSORY PROCESSES AS DEFINED BY THE THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGY OF ACTIVITY: ILLUSION AND HALLUCINATIONS Anyway, not only the motor sphere but also the sensory sphere of humans and animals belong to active beings.(8–11) Perception processes can be arranged in a sequence depending on the significance of the input signal affecting the receptor (one of the sensory organs) and stimulating perception. At one end of this sequence, receptor signals are generated entirely determining perception. As to the perception processes taking place in the middle of the sequence, the situation is the following: the signal received by the receptor is either unclear or buried in the noise, the latter being most typical. In this case, the receptor component is not efficient enough to perceive the signal adequately. To provide adequate perception, ‘the receptor component’ is to be supplemented by an ‘active component’ including the following elements: expectation of a certain signal, prediction of the signal most probable in this particular situation, and an affective distinction determining the necessity of the signal for the individual perceiving the signal. As a matter of fact, cases when perception is determined only by the active component or only by the receptor component are quite rare. Usually, ‘the active component’ contributes to an adequate perception of a signal which is not clear enough and which is coming via the receptor. In situations which are not coincident with the previous experience of the individual perceiving the signal, ‘the active component’ stops playing the role of a corrector in relation to the ‘receptor component’ and thus may cause incorrect, false perception. This is similar to a situation when we deal with a healthy person in the grip of illusion. Such illusions quite often occur in the sphere of visual and auditory perception. In case of pathology, when ‘the active component’ of the perception process has undergone a unhealthy change and affective saturation, it acquires a greater impact and distorts the information coming from ‘the receptor component’. Thus appear illusions caused by a Medical Hypotheses (2000) 54(2), 169–171
unhealthy state, and their ‘active component’ that has undergone pathological changes no longer contributes to adequate perception. On the contrary, it becomes a hindrance to adequate perception. In some cases the role of the ‘receptor component’ becomes less effective, though it continues carrying out its initiating role in the perception process. As an illustration, let us take functional hallucinations (first described by K.Kahlbaum in 1866. In this case auditory verbal hallucinations arise in the noise (only on the condition that such noise is present) which are thematically associated with the affectively saturated pathological suffering of the sick person. In case of functional hallucinations the ‘receptor component’ retains its initiating role all through the period: there are no hallucinations when there is no ‘noise’. As to the contents of hallucinations, it is totally determined by ‘the active component’. Supposedly a similar situation can exist in the visual sphere: when eyeballs are pressed the visual hallucinations can arise. This phenomena has been described in alcoholics. In our opinion, functional hallucinations bear analogy to images observed in the Rorschach test. What unites these phenomena is that in either case takes place the process of singling out semantically significant information from the ‘noise’ chaos. When verbal hallucinations are meant, regarded as a particular case of auditory hallucinations, the presence of the receptor component actually plays no role. It is the active component that makes the hallucination image complete. On the contrary, a valid verbal signal can suppress verbal hallucinations (12). The peculiarity of this situation is that the active component proper is pathological. Now, an extreme manifestation of such pathology is the hallucinatory paranoid syndrome that can be characterized as follows: hallucinations are closely interwoven with delusional interpretations, and hallucinatory phenomena does not require any receptory ‘replenishment’. CONCLUSION The proposed binary model examines the spectrum of sensor processes both in the normal and pathologic(al) states in terms of physiology of activity, i.e. as the relationship of two components: ‘the receptor component’ and ‘the active component’. Proceeding from this concept, a sequence can be formed, at one end of which sensor processes take place, mainly determined by the receptor component, while at the other end perception processes take place, whose contents for the most part are determined by the active component. Illusions, functional hallucinations and verbal hallucinations (which had been described as separate phenomena over hundred years © 2000 Harcourt Publishers Ltd
Relation between receptor and active components
ago) combined with perception processes in the normal state, are arranged in a sequence. Their places depend on the relationship and role of the receptor and the active components. To clarify the role of each of these elements taken separately, as well as to explain the dynamics of their relationship in cases of pathology, new investigations are necessary. REFERENCES 1. Bernstein N. Physiology of movement and activity. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1990 (in Russian). 2. Bernstein N. The Co-ordination and Regulation of Movements. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967. 3. Whiting H.T.A., ed. Human Motor Action: Berstein Reassessed. North Holland: Elsener, 1967. 4. M.L. Latash, Turvey M.T., eds. Dexterity and its Development. New Jersey: L.Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, 1996. 5. Bewegungskoordination und sportliche Leistung integra tive betrachtet. II-nd Bernstein-Konferenz. Hrsg. P. Hirtz u F. Nucke.Hamburg: Czwalina Verlag, 1997.
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6. Feigenberg J. The Model of the Future in Motor Control. Progress in Motor Control, v.I: Bernstein traditions in Movement Studies. Ed. by Latash M. Human Kinetics 1998: 89–103. 7. Feigenberg J. Wahrscheinlichkeitsprognostizierung in System der zielgerichtenen Aktivant. Afra-Verlag, 1998. 8. Feigenberg J.M., Latash ML., Turvey M.T., eds. N.A. Bernstein: The Reformer of Neuroscience. In: Dexterity and its Development. New Jersey: L.Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, 1996: 247–275. 9. Feigenberg J.M. Physiology of activity in sensorial sphere (perception, illusion, hallucinations). Independent Psychiatric Journal (Moscow) 1997; 4: 27–31. 10. Zislin J., Feigenberg J. Hallucinations and other sensory disturbances, looked upon as physiology of activity. Abstracts of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Israel Society for Biological Psychiatry. Isr. J. Psychiatry 1998; 35. 11. Feigenberg J. Probability Prognosis and its Significance in Normal and Pathological Subjects. In: A Handbook of Contemporary Soviet Psychology. N.Y.-London, 1969, 345–369. 12. Collins M.N., Cull C.A., Sireling L. Pilot Study of treatment of persistent auditory hallucinations by modified auditory input. Br Med J 1989; 299: 431–432.
Medical Hypotheses (2000) 54(2), 169–171