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Red guards: Weapon in the power struggle
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS:
Red Guards: Weapon In the short span of two months, from Aug. 18 to Oct. 18, the Peking leadership launched five mass rallies, with attendances in the millions, in Tien An Men (Gate of Heavenly Peace) Square in Peking, with the purpose of dramatically propelling the “Great Cultural Revolution”-to create at high speed an entirely new culture for the Chinese people, with Mao Tse-tung’s thought as the central dogma. HsinhLta (New China News Agency) reported that there were one million Red Guards and “revolutionary teachers and students from all parts of the country” in Tien An Men on Aug. 18, half a million on Aug. 31, one million on Sept. $5, one and a half million on Oct. I (the 17th anniversary of the establishing of the Chinese Communist regime) and as many again on Oct. 18. According to Hsinhua, Chairman Mao spent many hours at each rally, and his “close comrade-in-arms” Defense hlinister Lin Piao spoke “on behalf of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party” at each of the rallies except the one on Oct. 18. Though he was present on that date, he did not speak. The mass mobilizing of the adolescent Red Guards from all parts of an essentially agricultural COunkY, where transportation is by no means adequate, indicates the importance both Mao and Lin attach to this “shock force of revolution” to act as an instrument on their behalf and to enforce their decisions in reshaping Chinese society. (See Communist Affairs, IV/4, July-Aug., pp. 21-22 and 29.) While Mao’s main concern is to ensure the revolution against a return to “capitalism” and a deviation to “revisionism,” Lin’s chief motive is more likely to safeguard his position against rivals who stand in the way of succession when Mao passes away. In each of the speeches he made at the first four mass rallies, Lin praised Mao as “our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman” and declared that Mao Tse-tung’s thought was “our compass in the great proletarian cultural revolution.” This excessive adulation evidently was motivated principally by his desire to use the blessing of Mao as a shield to fend off opposition from other important elements in the Party Central Committee. His statements have hammered away at the need “to overthrow through struggle the small handful of persons within the Party who have been in authority and have taken the capitalist road” (Chih-jang Jih-paa [Liberation Army Daily], Oct. I I). Although as yet none of the “small handful of persons within the Party” has been identified, it is an open secret that Lin’s dart was aimed each time at Liu Shao-chi and his supporters in the provincial committees of the Party. Liu Shao-chi, who retains his formal title of Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, and who was number-two man, after Mao, in the Standing Committee of the Politburo until the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee was convened Aug. I-I 2 (see Communist Affairs, W/4, July-Aug., p. 21), has been con-
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in the Power Struggle solidating his strength in the Party organizations ever since the Peking regime came to power 17 years ago. Many of the secretaries of the Party regional bureau and province committees are either Liu’s supporters or former subordinates. While it took Mao’s directive from the top and Lin’s maneuvering within the capital to remove Liu from the Standing Committee of the Politburo, it will take a much longer time and much greater intra-Party struggle to rid the provincial Party S~IWCture of Liu’s influence. In order to bypass the established institutions of the Party and to intimidate the potential and actual opponents of the currently dominant faction of the Peking leadership, the Red Guards have been ushered inmaking their debut at the Aug. 18 mass rally-as the shock force fighting in the van of the “great cultural revolution.” (Hsinhua, Aug. 31.) “It is very gratifying that in this great revolution large numbers of previously unknown revolutionary young people have become courageous and daring shock forces. . . . They are daring to speak out and follow through in action,” the Party’s ideological organ Hung Ch’i (Red Flag) stated in its Aug. 21 editorial. All upper schools have been closed in order to cleanse them of “bourgeois” and “capitalist” influences, and the Red Guards, teen-age schoolless students, come from the following five “Red” categories of families: workers; poor, lower and middle peasants; soldiers; revolutionary cadres; and revolutionary martyrs. But those whose families do not fit in any of the categories may also be admitted to the organization if they have denounced their own families and are prepared to go along with the Red Guards. (Kwangmin Jih-pao [Brightness Daily], Peking, Aug. 26.) In the field of operation, the Red Guards have been given unusual rights and freedoms in a Communist country. They are allowed to stage street demonstrations; beyond freedoms of association, speech and publication, they enjoy the right to use Mao Tse-tung’s thought as a yardstick to criticize Party and state leaders at any and all levels (Jen-min Jih-pao [Peking People’s Daily], Aug. 23). “No matter how high his position, how great his prestige and how senior his career, we shall strike him down and cause him to lose his post in the govemment so long as he does not act in accordance with Mao Tse-tung’s thought” (Hung Ch’i, Aug. 2 I ) . In the space of two months, with big-character poster campaigns and by resorting to physical violence, the Red Guards have spread fear and intimidation through“Without such a large-scale mass out the population. movement,” editorialized Hung Ch’i on Sept. 23, “it would be impossible to destroy the social basis on which the handful of bourgeois rightists rests and to carry through the great proletarian cultural revolution thoroughly and in depth.” The Hung Ch’i editorial of Aug. 21 stated, “The big-character posters are powerful weapons wielded by the young shock forces against all ~MMUNIST
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monsters and demons. Like sharp swords and daggers, their big-character posters hit the enemy where it hurts and touch him to the quick.” Quoting Mao Tse-tung’s saying that “where the broom does not reach, the dust does not vanish of itself,” Jen-min Jih-pao (Aug. 23) echoed the Hung Ch’i tune: “Tens of thousands of ‘Red Guards’ have raised the iron broom and, within a few days, made a clean sweep of many names, customs and habits that represented the ideology of the exploiting classes. This is a revolutionary act of destroying the old and building the new. . . . The revolutionary actions of the ‘Red Guards’ are a powerful current that will not be checked by any diehard forces.” Ever since Aug. I 8, the Red Guards have been goaded to “bombard the headquarters” and to “overthrow through struggle the small handful of persons within the Party who have been in authority.” But as it is de Chinese Communist Party that controls the government structure and, through its various Party committees in the country, exercises control over the whole population, the Red Guards cannot launch their attacks on Party headquarters without seriously undermining the power image of the Party itself. According to reports sent from Peking by TASS, Agence France Presse and Mm’nichi Shimbun correspondents, the first secretaries of the Party committees in Kansu, Shansi, Shensi, Heilungkiang, Anhwei, Kwangtung, and Kweichow have all been under attack. Liu Lan-tao, first secretary of the Northwest China Bureau of the Central Committee-there are six Central Committee regional bureaus-was criticized by the Red Guards in their war of big-character posters. Li Hsuehfeng, first secretary of the North China Bureau, who only in June was appointed first secretary of the Party’s important Peking Municipal Committee, replacing Peng Chen (one of the first to be purged in the cause of the “great cultural revolution”), was charged with “following the capitalist road” (London Times, Oct. 20). Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the Southwest China Bureau, was denounced as a “revisionist” by the Red Guards, who demanded that he be burned alive (TASS, Oct. 19). Thus, damage has already been done to the cohesion of the Chinese Comrnunist Party structure in the provinces. It would appear that the revolutionary fervor of the Red Guards carried them a bit too far for their sponsors’ taste, when, in their war of big-character posters on de walls of Peking and other big cities, these “shock forces of the cultural revolution” not only denounced Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi-who, like Premier Chou En-lai, lacks a proletarian family backgroundas pro-revisionist and demanded that he be “burned,” but also dared to say that neither Chairman Mao nor Defense Minister Lin Pia”with rich-peasant and merchant family backgrounds respectively-belongs to the five “Red” categories. (TJTT, Prague, Oct. 17.) In August, September and October, workers and peasants were reported to be fighting back in Sian, Tientsin, T&an, and Tsingtao, in north China ; in Foochow and Canton, in south China; and in Changsha, in Mao Tsetung’s native province of Hnnan. During a two-day (Aug. 25-26) demonstration against the Red Guards
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,,staged by workers in Tsingtao, 1~ persons were reported beaten and injured (Pravda, Oct. 22). In its editorial on Sept. II, Jen-min Jih-pao lamented: “In peassome areas, the leaders . . . incited the uninformed ants and workers to rise in opposition to the revolutionary students.” From Peking, Minister of National Defense Lin Piao urged the Red Guards: “Carry out the struggle by reasoning and not by coercion or force. Don’t hit people” (Hsinhua, Aug. 31). Premier Chou En-lai issued instructions on Oct. 27, according to an Associated Press report from Tokyo, to curb large-scale arrivals in Peking of Red Guards from the different provinces, and also persuaded Peking’s Red Guard units to postpone further mass trips to the provinces. Apparently the Peking leadership has had second thoughts about Chairman Mao’s assertion that “disorder is a very good thing.” One phenomenon that could hardly escape the notice of the one and a half million present at the Oct. 18 rally was the absence of another forceful speech by Defense Minister Lin Piao. This time the Peking leadership merely drove through the packed Tien An Men. “Chairman Mao glowed with health and was filled to the brim with energy and vitality as he stood the whole time in the first open car. . . ..In high spirits, Comrade Lin Piao, Chairman Mao’s close comrade-in-arms, stood in the second open car and together with him reviewed the great army of the cultural revolution” (Peking Review, Oct. 21) . Had revolutionary rhetoric reached the saturation point? Was opposition within the Central Committee growing? In the latter part of October, Peking’s propaganda machinery appeared to be running down. The Red Guards, stated the Peking Review of Oct. 2 I, would “staunchly defend and carry out the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao . . . defend Chairman Mao to the last, defend the Party’s Central Committee, defend Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s thought to the last, and they vowed to carry through the great proletarian cultural revolution to the end.” Despite their success in upsetting the psychological and social stability of the country, the Red Guards have been ineffective as a major tool in the power struggle, according to the evidence. As the avowed objective of the dogmatists is to sweep away all the old culture and habits, would they voluntarily stop their struggle in the Confucian ‘Middle Way?”
Vietnamese
Communists
Begin Adjustment
to Reality
Despite military and political setbacks during the last several months, the Vietnamese Communists, both North and South, have expressed their determination to continue their armed struggle until all Vietnam is theirs. They have spurned numerous peace proposals from both involved and noninvolved parties and individuals, insisting that nothing less than their oft-reiterated formula for the surrender of South Vietnam is acceptable as a basis for negotiation. At the same time, however, there have been indications that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are becoming increasingly aware of their difficulties and may be laying the groundwork for a protracted conflict played in a lower key than heretofore.
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Again in 1966 the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) comrades failed to make any military gains during the summ er monsoon season and were heavily defeated in several engagements. Allied “search and destroy” operations have kept Communist main force units continually off-balance, while air attacks have made it exceedingly difficult for them to carry through any significant operations. Large PAVN units failed miserably in attempts to move across the demilitarized zone at the 17th Parallel and occupy a strong position in Quang Tri Province. Two PAVN and Viet Cong main force units have recently been pinned against the sea and destroyed in Binh Dinh Province, northeast of Saigon, in what was one of the major Allied victories of the war. Other catastrophes befell Communist units in the Cambodian border area and in the Mekong Delta. The Communists have won no significant military engagement in more than a year. Losses of Communist manpower have continued to increase. The kill ratio has steadily widened in favor of the Allies. Particularly significant has been the rising number of POW’s and defectors. These totaled over 2,000 in each of three months in 1966. Another development of special note has been the There were group surrenders first group surrenders. in the Binh Dinh battle and on at least one occasion in the Delta. Political setbacks for the Communists have also marked the recent period. Although pacification in the South Vietnamese countryside has not made much progress, and the Viet Cong have in some areas stren,&ened their political grip, certain events have adversely affected the Communist position. Probably the most important of these was the highly successful South Vietnamese Constituent Assembly election of Sept. II, in which 80 per cent of the registered electorate turned out to vote for a constitution-forming body, despite Viet Cong efforts to sabotage the balloting by terror and other forms of intimidation. Remarkably high voting turnout occurred in rural contested areas, which apparently demonstrated not only that the Viet Cong’s influence was less than what many had believed, but also the surprising capacity of the Saigon government to carry out a plan to which it was willing to apply a full measure of determination and follow-through. Another internal development marking a “minus” for the Viet Cong has been Saigon’s accord with the rebellious mountain tribes of the Central Plateau, involving relatively generous concessions on the part of the Ky government and some indications that it may actually carry out its part of the bargain. Peace in the highlands should greatly assist the struggle against the Viet Cong in this critical area. On balance, the Saigon government has probably gamed strength in the international arena, while Hanoi has lost points because of its obstinacy on peace terms. Saigon’s hand has been strengthened by evidence of the increasing stability and deftness of Marshal Ky’s administration and by the gradually enlarging aid commitments from other governments. Futhermore, Saigon’s participation in a responsible way in such multilateral Asian gatherings as the Manila Conference
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of Oct. 24-25 undoubtedly adds to South Vietnam’s prestige at Hanoi’s expense. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese Communists have given no indication that any of this has weakened their determination to continue fighting. They have rejected several proposals in the last two months. President Johnson’s offer to schedule the withdrawal of American forces if PAVN forces were also pulled out was described by Hanoi on Sept. IO as an “insolent allegation” and an “attempt to justify . . . piratical acts.” On Sept. 24 an article in the Lao Dong Party newspaper Nhan Dun entitled, “New Stage, Old Farce,” denounced Ambassador Goldberg’s conditional bombing suspension offer before the U.N. as a sinister attempt to “force the South Vietnamese people to lay down their arms” and a ploy to “soothe the wrath of the world’s people . . .” U Thant then took another turn at the Hanoi pillory as his three-point peace proposal calling for reduced military activity by both sides was described by Nhan DQ~ on Oct. 6 as a view which “conforms to the dark scheme of the U.S. imperialists to sow confusion about the Vietnam situation.” The indefatigable British came up for more punishment in October by offering still another proposal for peace. It involved mutual “de-escalation” and the convening of a conference in the framework of the “essentials” of the 1954 Geneva accords to hammer out both an armistice and political settlement. Hanoi heaped its usual scorn upon these U.K. efforts, terming them a “rehash of U.S. , . . blackmailing efforts” and “dancing to the U.S. tune.” The North Vietnamese apparently considered it fitting to stress a musical motif in connection with Great Britain’s activities, one of their commentaries being entitled, “U.S. Jazz, British Band.” Finally, at the end of October, Hanoi dismissed the Manila Conference as a “war conference of Johnson and his lackeys” and the Manila communique offering peace proposals as a “shopworn tune.” Although there is evidence that North Vietnam has come under greater Soviet influence in the last year, there is no firm indication that Moscow is exerting pressure on Hanoi to come to terms on peace talks. Some observers have speculated that Ho Chi Minh and his circle are dissillusioned by the evidences of internal disarray in China and by Peking’s refusal to cooperate with the other Communist states to help North Vietnam, and have therefore decided to look to the U.S.S.R. for guidance and support. Unconfirmed reports have it that Premier Pham Van Dong and Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap conferred secretly with Russian leaders in August, either about peace prospects or military aid, or both. Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi came to Moscow in early September to discuss the flow of aid, a subject which undoubtedly also involved &o-Soviet relations and Peking’s obstructionism on the matter of Communist unity in aiding Vietnam. Peking, of course, continues its shrill denunciation of Soviet “collusion” in U.S. “plots” to “enslave the Asian people.” Regardless of what Hanoi may think privately about the present Chinese course, it has been extremely careful not to join any of the other world Communist parties in condemning the excesses of Peking’s Red Guard movement and other manifestations of upheaval in China. COMMUNIST
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In fact, Hanoi has guardedly praised the “glorious thought of Mao Tse-tung” and the “great proletarian cultural revolution” now wracking mainland China. While North Vietnam and the Viet Cong hurl defiance at those proposing an end of hostilities, they do from time to time give evidence of a sense of realism regarding their grim task of continuing the war. Ever since last winter, Hanoi leaders have occasionally injected rational assessment into their statements on the situation (see earlier manifestations in Commu7zist Affairs, IV/I, Jan.-Feb., pp. 21-25). Evidence of internal strains and popular discontent under harsh wartime conditions was evident in the annual reports to the National Assembly last April by Premier Pham Van Dong and Supreme Court Chairman Pham Van Bach, who spoke of economic, administrative and political “shortcomings,” “machinations of bad elements” in the population, “rumor-mongering,” etc. The theme of espionage and sabotage by South Vietnamese and American “agents” has recurred frequently in the Party journals. In July the Fatherland Front, a heterogeneous grouping of organizations promoting Hanoi’s version of “peaceful reunification,” described the war situation as “extremely serious” and appealed for Communists everywhere to “act more resolutely and effectively to thwart U.S. plans.” Military analyses appearing in both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong publications have tended to be “pep talks” reminding the Communist fighters of their assets which will surely bring them ultimate victory, but at the same time the commentators have not neglected to point out the advantages held by the United States and South Vietnam on the battlefield which will make this a long war instead of the quick triumph promised earlier. In August and September “political affairs” conferences were held in both North and South to review “political tasks” of the Military Transportation Service of North Vietnam and the “Liberation Armed Forces” in the South. Serious problems concerning morale and efficiency were evident in the Aesopian language used to report these meetings. Hanoi Radio carried a call for a better spirit of “socialist cooperation” in carrying out the “heavy but glorious” task of transportation [ed. note: under U.S. bombing], while the Viet Cong army newspaper stated that the other conference agreed that “political work must particularly stress . . . fostering the spirit of fighting a protracted war . . . ” and decried “rightist tendencies and unsteady viewpoints.” When National Liberation Front Chairman Nguyen Huu The gave an interview to Australian Communist newsman Wilfred Burchett in late August, he seemed to be indicating preparations for a long struggle which might be carried out on a lower level of violence than heretofore. He stressed the “political and moral” strength of the Viet Cong, claimed a “decisive” rather than “exclusive” voice for the NLF in any future political settlement, and issued a broad invitation for more non-Communist participation in the Front. He even invited former Diem regime officials to come in on the basis of opposition to American “enslavement” of Vietnam. As the lack of support by significant nonCommunist South Vietnamese political leaders has been one of the major weaknesses of the NLF, any ser-
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jous campaign to lure such cooperation would certainly have to include a diminution of the excessive Viet Cong violence which has been one of the principal deterrents to wider acceptance of the attractively worded political program of the Front.
Indonesia
One Year After
Slowly groping its way out of internal chaos andback into the community of nations, Indonesia still faces monumental tasks a year after the attempted leftist puts& of Sept. 3o-Oct. I, 1965. (See Communst Affairs, III/s, Sept.-Oct. 1965, pp. g-11.) Significant advances have been made in restoring external relations, but other grave economic, political and social problems remain. Though communism has been eliminated as an immediate threat, a revival of organized Marxism-Leninism is quite possible unless real progress is made in the solution of these issues. Indonesia’s bankrupt economy is undoubtedly the major problem. With production and distribution in most lines still failing or chaotic, inflation soaring to new heights, and a mountain of foreign debt hanging over the government, the tasks facing the new government are staggering. Only the resilience and patience of the Indonesian peasant, who lives largely outside the modern money economy, prevents the nation from foundering in this legacy of Sukarno’s ignorance and cavalier neglect of economic realities. Political uncertainties and discontent over miserable living conditions may provide an opportunity for Communist revival. Apparently the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), while smashed as an effective organization, was not as thoroughly rooted out as earlier thought. Despite the anti-Communist bloodbath which followed the Sept. 30 affair, some of the PKI apparatus probably survives in the person of PKI leaders who escaped the army and police dragnets. The Neu York Times reported on Aug. 23 some alleged details of the capture and execution of D. N. Aidit, the PKI Chairman, and said that the other two top leaders, Njoto and M. H. Lukman, had probably also been shot. As for other Politburo members, the paper went on to state that Njono and candidate-member Per-is Parede have been sentenced to death by military tribunals, although there has been no confirmation of execution. It reported that 15 other members of the 52-man Central Committee were known dead and that others are presumed to have perished in the mass killings of last November-January in the countryside. Newspapers in Djakarta reported on Oct. 30 that another top PKI leader, Sal&man, was captured early in October but was subsequently shot to death while trying to escape from a military guard. The army has never given an official account of either the purge of the Communist leadership or the mass killings of lower-echelon personnel throughout the country, and it seems concerned that underground Communist elements still pose a threat. Roadblocks abound to testify to the uneasiness of the military authorities. General Nasution stated on the first anniversary of the Sept. 30 affair that “the old order [ed. note: the Communists and their sympathizers] is now launching guerrilla activity in the political and economic fields
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which at tunes culminates in a counteroffensive.” There are reports that not all the PKI cells have been destroyed and that escaped leaders work underground. Leaders of the student organizations in Djakarta which have been in the forefront of the anti-Communist and anti-Sukamo movements, announced on Sept. 17 that their members were conducting a new drive to root out “Communist agents” who they said had been infiltrating the capital at the rate of 200 a week since June. Earlier the military commander of the Djakarta region had stated that three PKI leaders (Sakirman, Sanusi and Tjugito) had infiltrated the city and that Communist elements were attempting to incite strife between pro-Sukarno and anti-&&am0 groups. On Sept. 20, Reuters reported a statement by an army regimental commander in central Java that his unit had occupied a Communist stronghold in the Banjumas area after a heavy exchange of fire. There are recurring reports that the purges have not yet eliminated PKI sympathizers from armed forces units in central and east Java. President Sukarno remains a serious problem to the new leaders, despite being reduced almost to a figurehead by the careful maneuvering of General Suharto and his civilian colleagues to strip him of both power and prestige. While the trial of ex-Foreign Minister Subandrio in October for complicity in the Communist coup attempt further tarnished Sukarno’s image, it was not sensational enough to be decisive in this regard. Sukarno apparently retains sufficient popularity in central and east Java and among certain armed forces units to deter Suharto and company from deposing him entirely, and he occasionally gets away with a fiery speech denouncing all that has happened in the last year. On the other hand, the intensity of anti-Sukarno sentiment among the students, intellectuals and Moslem organizations is making it increasingly difficult for the army to retain the President witbout a direct clash with these groups. Severe army crackdowns on student antiSukarno demonstrations have already led to bloodshed and ill feeling. However, the basic problem is that the old political order has passed with the demise of “Sukarnoism” and a new one has not yet arisen to fill the vacuum. Despite desire for a new order, neither the army nor any other group has the kind of top-to-bottom organization which the PKI had and which could give reality to these hopes. Under its new leadership, Indonesia has taken vigorous steps toward putting its foreign relations in order. An end to the senseless “confrontation” against Malaysia was negotiated in June and formally signed in August. Trade with Singapore, crucial to Indonesia’s foreign commerce, was resumed Sept. 12, accompanied by a credit of 150 million Malaysian dollars to Indonesian traders. At a conference of Western creditor nations held in Tokyo in September to consider extending credit and revising terms for repayments of the heavy external Indonesian debt, the Suharto government pledged a “pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to economic problems” which would include a revival of foreign investment. Adam MaI&, the capable and energetic Foreign Minister, has personally tackled the problem of relations
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with the two major world powers and the U.N. He journeyed to Washington in September to obtain emergency economic assistance in desperately needed commodities and to Moscow in October to discuss rescheduling the enormous Indonesian debt to the U.S.S.R. which was incurred mostly for armaments. After the Moscow meeting he said his talks had brought “understanding and closer relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia . . .” Malik also led the Indonesian delegation to New York and resumed Indonesia’s seat in the U.N. without objection from the membership. It appears that the careful reaction of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to Indonesian events of the last year has enabled Djakarta to re-establish its international ties in a highly favorable atmosphere. Moscow’s relative equanimity in the face of the PKI’s destruction again reflects the Kremlin’s traditional willingness to sacrifice foreign Communist parties to the preservation of state interests. Relations with Communist China, on the other hand, have deteriorated to the breaking point. Peking’s embassy in Djakarta is virtually under blockade, and most of its outlying consulates are closed. Malik has claimed that Indonesia has tried to avoid a complete rupture, but that Peking has made this very difficult by incessant attacks. The Chinese have reacted with extreme abuse to the most pointed evidence of Indonesia’s restored status in international affairs-a reported request by the United States and several Southeast Asian nations that Djakarta use its good offices to mediate the Vietnam war. Peking angrily described Indonesia as a “new pawn in the U.S. peace talks swindle.”
Hungarian Communists Move Closer to Moscow Unlike the Yugoslav and Romanian leaders, who have come to regard nationalism and independence from the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of their policy, the Hungarian Party leadership recently reverted to stressing “proletarian internationalism” and friendship with the Soviet Union. The first intimation of the new Hungarian Party line came with the speech of First Secretary Janos Kadar at the 23rd Soviet Party Congress, in which he called for a strengthening of Hungarian-Soviet friendship and declared that “Hungarian Communists adhere to the opinion that the principle of fraternal relations with the Soviet Union was and always will continue to be the touchstone of true internationalism. There never was and never will be anti-soviet communism.” The new stress on close friendship with the U.S.S.R. has since been taken up by a number of Hungarian Party officials, notably by Zoltan Komocsin, Central Committee secretary in charge of international affairs, and again in a recent lecture of Premier Gyula Kallai before the political academy of the Hungarian Party Central Committee. The importance attached to this rediscovery of “Communist international solidarity” becomes apparent in the intensive treatment accorded it in the Hungarian press. A summary of Kallai’s speech took up two full pages in the June 8 issue of the Party paper Napszabadsag. Independence should not be confused with a “quest for isolation and introversion.” The building of socialism within the framework ~MMUNIST
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of “independent national economies” he considered to be “natural, correct and useful” only as long as particular national interests are not opposed to the common interest of the “Socialist world system.” (Nepszabadsag, June 8.) Following the lead of Kadar and Komocsin, Kallai by indirection criticized Romanian and Chinese Communists, warned against “nationalist, anti-Soviet trends in the policies of some countries,” and projected as the ultimate goal, “the restoration of the unity of the whole movement on the basis of a correct political line of strategy and tactics.” (Ibid.) Such unity of action, he asserted, was particularly important with reference to the war in Vietnam, since only “proletarian internationalism” could provide a strong “binding link” among the countries of the “socialist world system.” The true touchstone of “proletarian internationalism,” he stated, seconding Party leader Janos Kadar, was above all solidarity and fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union. Such cooperation, as practised by COMECON, he pointed out, “accelerates the building of socialism, while isolation slows it down.” (Ibid.) Declaring that, under present conditions, peaceful coexistence would have to give way to the need to “push back imperialist aggression,” he was, however, at pains to stress that the inevitable “cooling off” of relations with the United States should and need not necessarily lead to a worsening of relations with all capitalist countries. (Ibid.) If one compares these statements with the tenor of sentiments prevailing in Hungary not much longer than a year ago, one cannot fail to notice a decided change in attitudes. Only in April 1965, for example, Party leaders were at pains to stress that there was now no single center of the international Communist movement and that the Soviet Union was no longer the sole and absolute example that all socialist states had to follow. (Tarsadalmi Szemle, April 1965.) In order to account for this perceptible eastward orientation of the Hungarian Party, a number of factors must be taken into consideration. During 1965 it had become clear to leading Hungarian Communists that serious economic shortcomings had developed and that the easygoing, consumer-oriented policy, adopted by Kadar to woo the Hungarian public and to heal the deep wounds of 1956, would have to give way to an inevitable belt-tightening. Initial measures were taken as early as January 1965 but the worst shock came towards the end of the year, when a series of steep price increases affecting some basic food staples had to be announced. (Nepszabadsag, Nov. 21 and 30, 1965.) The new restrictive economic policies met with much popular resentment and resulted in the loss of much of the stability and relative popularity previously enjoyed by the Kadar regime. The regime undoubtedly found it necessary to look to Moscow for political upport and resolved to pay the price by expressing loyalty to, and greater conformity with, Soviet policies. If political weakness is one important factor in the new orientation, economic weakness is a still more persuasive one. In order to overcome Hungary’s inexorable poverty in resources and raw materials and to make up for serious defects in the system of economic planning
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pd management, Party leaders moved toward increasmg economic dependence on the Soviet Union, whence Hungary receives most of her oil and power supplies. Lack of resources and lagging industrial development certainly make Hungary more receptive to COMECON, and the need for credits increases her dependence on the industrially more developed countries within the bloc. Moreover, from the point of view of the Hungarian Party, the resurgence of nationalism in East Europe appears to be fraught with dangers and difficulties. Romanian success in reasserting national interests against Soviet pressures has had a deep impact on Hungarian public opinion. But Romanian nationalism, too, has led to a perceptible hardening of Bucharest’s policies toward the Magyar minority groups within Romania. Public pressures and increasing hostility of Hungarian opinion toward Romania brought about a considerable worsening of Hungarian-Romanian relations and have, unquestionably, tended to force Radar even closer to Moscow. Last but by no means least, Hungarian nationalism is far more explosive and threatening to the Communist Party than nationalism in most other Soviet bloc countries. This fact was brought home to Hungarian Communists by the events leading to the revolution of 1956, a lesson not easily forgotten. Ethnically non-Slav and deeply anti-Russian, Hungarians do not share the same fears, nor harbor the same traditional anti-German historical memories as do Czechs, Poles, Russians or Yugoslavs. Hungarian nationalism is, thus, far more difficult to contain. Not easily channeled into forms acceptable to, and congruous with, the rule of the Communist Party, it is thus felt by Party leaders to be potentially extremely dangerous, a fact attested to by warnings against the evils of nationalism, chauvinism and irredentism in recent lectures and speeches of high Hungarian Party functionaries. (Z. Komocsin, Nepszabadsag, March 24, and G. Kallai, Ibid., June 8.)
Where Is Alexei Adzhubei Now? The ides of October, the second anniversary of Khrushchgv’s fall from power, marked the second anniversary as well of the sudden transformation of his sonin-law Alexei Adzhubei - editor-in-chief of Zzvestiia, member of the CPSU Central Committee, special emissary for Khrushchev -into a nonperson. Now, two years after his sudden disappearance from the scene, the Oct. 14 issue of Literaturnaya Rossiya mentions that another literary journal, Moskva, No. g, 1966, contains an article by Alexei Adzhubei titled “A Trip to the Depths of the Brain with an Intelligent Guide.” Stripped of the perquisites of position and power, he was given an obscure post on the editorial staff of Sovetskii Soyuz (Soviet Union), a periodical designed for foreign, not domestic readership. An article by Adzhubei on Western achievements in the field of brain research, which appeared in Sovetshii Soyuz earlier this year, was apparently the basis for his article in Moskva -which is published for Soviet readers. “A Trip to the Depths of the Brain . . .” is a far cry from a signed page-one editorial in Zzvestiia, but it is a way of informing the public that Adzhubei is still around.
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Red Guards: Weapon In the short span of two months, from Aug. 18 to Oct. 18, the Peking leadership launched five mass rallies, with attendances in the millions, in Tien An Men (Gate of Heavenly Peace) Square in Peking, with the purpose of dramatically propelling the “Great Cultural Revolution”-to create at high speed an entirely new culture for the Chinese people, with Mao Tse-tung’s thought as the central dogma. HsinhLta (New China News Agency) reported that there were one million Red Guards and “revolutionary teachers and students from all parts of the country” in Tien An Men on Aug. 18, half a million on Aug. 31, one million on Sept. $5, one and a half million on Oct. I (the 17th anniversary of the establishing of the Chinese Communist regime) and as many again on Oct. 18. According to Hsinhua, Chairman Mao spent many hours at each rally, and his “close comrade-in-arms” Defense hlinister Lin Piao spoke “on behalf of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party” at each of the rallies except the one on Oct. 18. Though he was present on that date, he did not speak. The mass mobilizing of the adolescent Red Guards from all parts of an essentially agricultural COunkY, where transportation is by no means adequate, indicates the importance both Mao and Lin attach to this “shock force of revolution” to act as an instrument on their behalf and to enforce their decisions in reshaping Chinese society. (See Communist Affairs, IV/4, July-Aug., pp. 21-22 and 29.) While Mao’s main concern is to ensure the revolution against a return to “capitalism” and a deviation to “revisionism,” Lin’s chief motive is more likely to safeguard his position against rivals who stand in the way of succession when Mao passes away. In each of the speeches he made at the first four mass rallies, Lin praised Mao as “our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman” and declared that Mao Tse-tung’s thought was “our compass in the great proletarian cultural revolution.” This excessive adulation evidently was motivated principally by his desire to use the blessing of Mao as a shield to fend off opposition from other important elements in the Party Central Committee. His statements have hammered away at the need “to overthrow through struggle the small handful of persons within the Party who have been in authority and have taken the capitalist road” (Chih-jang Jih-paa [Liberation Army Daily], Oct. I I). Although as yet none of the “small handful of persons within the Party” has been identified, it is an open secret that Lin’s dart was aimed each time at Liu Shao-chi and his supporters in the provincial committees of the Party. Liu Shao-chi, who retains his formal title of Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, and who was number-two man, after Mao, in the Standing Committee of the Politburo until the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee was convened Aug. I-I 2 (see Communist Affairs, W/4, July-Aug., p. 21), has been con-
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in the Power Struggle solidating his strength in the Party organizations ever since the Peking regime came to power 17 years ago. Many of the secretaries of the Party regional bureau and province committees are either Liu’s supporters or former subordinates. While it took Mao’s directive from the top and Lin’s maneuvering within the capital to remove Liu from the Standing Committee of the Politburo, it will take a much longer time and much greater intra-Party struggle to rid the provincial Party S~IWCture of Liu’s influence. In order to bypass the established institutions of the Party and to intimidate the potential and actual opponents of the currently dominant faction of the Peking leadership, the Red Guards have been ushered inmaking their debut at the Aug. 18 mass rally-as the shock force fighting in the van of the “great cultural revolution.” (Hsinhua, Aug. 31.) “It is very gratifying that in this great revolution large numbers of previously unknown revolutionary young people have become courageous and daring shock forces. . . . They are daring to speak out and follow through in action,” the Party’s ideological organ Hung Ch’i (Red Flag) stated in its Aug. 21 editorial. All upper schools have been closed in order to cleanse them of “bourgeois” and “capitalist” influences, and the Red Guards, teen-age schoolless students, come from the following five “Red” categories of families: workers; poor, lower and middle peasants; soldiers; revolutionary cadres; and revolutionary martyrs. But those whose families do not fit in any of the categories may also be admitted to the organization if they have denounced their own families and are prepared to go along with the Red Guards. (Kwangmin Jih-pao [Brightness Daily], Peking, Aug. 26.) In the field of operation, the Red Guards have been given unusual rights and freedoms in a Communist country. They are allowed to stage street demonstrations; beyond freedoms of association, speech and publication, they enjoy the right to use Mao Tse-tung’s thought as a yardstick to criticize Party and state leaders at any and all levels (Jen-min Jih-pao [Peking People’s Daily], Aug. 23). “No matter how high his position, how great his prestige and how senior his career, we shall strike him down and cause him to lose his post in the govemment so long as he does not act in accordance with Mao Tse-tung’s thought” (Hung Ch’i, Aug. 2 I ) . In the space of two months, with big-character poster campaigns and by resorting to physical violence, the Red Guards have spread fear and intimidation through“Without such a large-scale mass out the population. movement,” editorialized Hung Ch’i on Sept. 23, “it would be impossible to destroy the social basis on which the handful of bourgeois rightists rests and to carry through the great proletarian cultural revolution thoroughly and in depth.” The Hung Ch’i editorial of Aug. 21 stated, “The big-character posters are powerful weapons wielded by the young shock forces against all ~MMUNIST
h’FAIW
monsters and demons. Like sharp swords and daggers, their big-character posters hit the enemy where it hurts and touch him to the quick.” Quoting Mao Tse-tung’s saying that “where the broom does not reach, the dust does not vanish of itself,” Jen-min Jih-pao (Aug. 23) echoed the Hung Ch’i tune: “Tens of thousands of ‘Red Guards’ have raised the iron broom and, within a few days, made a clean sweep of many names, customs and habits that represented the ideology of the exploiting classes. This is a revolutionary act of destroying the old and building the new. . . . The revolutionary actions of the ‘Red Guards’ are a powerful current that will not be checked by any diehard forces.” Ever since Aug. I 8, the Red Guards have been goaded to “bombard the headquarters” and to “overthrow through struggle the small handful of persons within the Party who have been in authority.” But as it is de Chinese Communist Party that controls the government structure and, through its various Party committees in the country, exercises control over the whole population, the Red Guards cannot launch their attacks on Party headquarters without seriously undermining the power image of the Party itself. According to reports sent from Peking by TASS, Agence France Presse and Mm’nichi Shimbun correspondents, the first secretaries of the Party committees in Kansu, Shansi, Shensi, Heilungkiang, Anhwei, Kwangtung, and Kweichow have all been under attack. Liu Lan-tao, first secretary of the Northwest China Bureau of the Central Committee-there are six Central Committee regional bureaus-was criticized by the Red Guards in their war of big-character posters. Li Hsuehfeng, first secretary of the North China Bureau, who only in June was appointed first secretary of the Party’s important Peking Municipal Committee, replacing Peng Chen (one of the first to be purged in the cause of the “great cultural revolution”), was charged with “following the capitalist road” (London Times, Oct. 20). Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the Southwest China Bureau, was denounced as a “revisionist” by the Red Guards, who demanded that he be burned alive (TASS, Oct. 19). Thus, damage has already been done to the cohesion of the Chinese Comrnunist Party structure in the provinces. It would appear that the revolutionary fervor of the Red Guards carried them a bit too far for their sponsors’ taste, when, in their war of big-character posters on de walls of Peking and other big cities, these “shock forces of the cultural revolution” not only denounced Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi-who, like Premier Chou En-lai, lacks a proletarian family backgroundas pro-revisionist and demanded that he be “burned,” but also dared to say that neither Chairman Mao nor Defense Minister Lin Pia”with rich-peasant and merchant family backgrounds respectively-belongs to the five “Red” categories. (TJTT, Prague, Oct. 17.) In August, September and October, workers and peasants were reported to be fighting back in Sian, Tientsin, T&an, and Tsingtao, in north China ; in Foochow and Canton, in south China; and in Changsha, in Mao Tsetung’s native province of Hnnan. During a two-day (Aug. 25-26) demonstration against the Red Guards
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,,staged by workers in Tsingtao, 1~ persons were reported beaten and injured (Pravda, Oct. 22). In its editorial on Sept. II, Jen-min Jih-pao lamented: “In peassome areas, the leaders . . . incited the uninformed ants and workers to rise in opposition to the revolutionary students.” From Peking, Minister of National Defense Lin Piao urged the Red Guards: “Carry out the struggle by reasoning and not by coercion or force. Don’t hit people” (Hsinhua, Aug. 31). Premier Chou En-lai issued instructions on Oct. 27, according to an Associated Press report from Tokyo, to curb large-scale arrivals in Peking of Red Guards from the different provinces, and also persuaded Peking’s Red Guard units to postpone further mass trips to the provinces. Apparently the Peking leadership has had second thoughts about Chairman Mao’s assertion that “disorder is a very good thing.” One phenomenon that could hardly escape the notice of the one and a half million present at the Oct. 18 rally was the absence of another forceful speech by Defense Minister Lin Piao. This time the Peking leadership merely drove through the packed Tien An Men. “Chairman Mao glowed with health and was filled to the brim with energy and vitality as he stood the whole time in the first open car. . . ..In high spirits, Comrade Lin Piao, Chairman Mao’s close comrade-in-arms, stood in the second open car and together with him reviewed the great army of the cultural revolution” (Peking Review, Oct. 21) . Had revolutionary rhetoric reached the saturation point? Was opposition within the Central Committee growing? In the latter part of October, Peking’s propaganda machinery appeared to be running down. The Red Guards, stated the Peking Review of Oct. 2 I, would “staunchly defend and carry out the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao . . . defend Chairman Mao to the last, defend the Party’s Central Committee, defend Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s thought to the last, and they vowed to carry through the great proletarian cultural revolution to the end.” Despite their success in upsetting the psychological and social stability of the country, the Red Guards have been ineffective as a major tool in the power struggle, according to the evidence. As the avowed objective of the dogmatists is to sweep away all the old culture and habits, would they voluntarily stop their struggle in the Confucian ‘Middle Way?”
Vietnamese
Communists
Begin Adjustment
to Reality
Despite military and political setbacks during the last several months, the Vietnamese Communists, both North and South, have expressed their determination to continue their armed struggle until all Vietnam is theirs. They have spurned numerous peace proposals from both involved and noninvolved parties and individuals, insisting that nothing less than their oft-reiterated formula for the surrender of South Vietnam is acceptable as a basis for negotiation. At the same time, however, there have been indications that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are becoming increasingly aware of their difficulties and may be laying the groundwork for a protracted conflict played in a lower key than heretofore.
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Again in 1966 the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) comrades failed to make any military gains during the summ er monsoon season and were heavily defeated in several engagements. Allied “search and destroy” operations have kept Communist main force units continually off-balance, while air attacks have made it exceedingly difficult for them to carry through any significant operations. Large PAVN units failed miserably in attempts to move across the demilitarized zone at the 17th Parallel and occupy a strong position in Quang Tri Province. Two PAVN and Viet Cong main force units have recently been pinned against the sea and destroyed in Binh Dinh Province, northeast of Saigon, in what was one of the major Allied victories of the war. Other catastrophes befell Communist units in the Cambodian border area and in the Mekong Delta. The Communists have won no significant military engagement in more than a year. Losses of Communist manpower have continued to increase. The kill ratio has steadily widened in favor of the Allies. Particularly significant has been the rising number of POW’s and defectors. These totaled over 2,000 in each of three months in 1966. Another development of special note has been the There were group surrenders first group surrenders. in the Binh Dinh battle and on at least one occasion in the Delta. Political setbacks for the Communists have also marked the recent period. Although pacification in the South Vietnamese countryside has not made much progress, and the Viet Cong have in some areas stren,&ened their political grip, certain events have adversely affected the Communist position. Probably the most important of these was the highly successful South Vietnamese Constituent Assembly election of Sept. II, in which 80 per cent of the registered electorate turned out to vote for a constitution-forming body, despite Viet Cong efforts to sabotage the balloting by terror and other forms of intimidation. Remarkably high voting turnout occurred in rural contested areas, which apparently demonstrated not only that the Viet Cong’s influence was less than what many had believed, but also the surprising capacity of the Saigon government to carry out a plan to which it was willing to apply a full measure of determination and follow-through. Another internal development marking a “minus” for the Viet Cong has been Saigon’s accord with the rebellious mountain tribes of the Central Plateau, involving relatively generous concessions on the part of the Ky government and some indications that it may actually carry out its part of the bargain. Peace in the highlands should greatly assist the struggle against the Viet Cong in this critical area. On balance, the Saigon government has probably gamed strength in the international arena, while Hanoi has lost points because of its obstinacy on peace terms. Saigon’s hand has been strengthened by evidence of the increasing stability and deftness of Marshal Ky’s administration and by the gradually enlarging aid commitments from other governments. Futhermore, Saigon’s participation in a responsible way in such multilateral Asian gatherings as the Manila Conference
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of Oct. 24-25 undoubtedly adds to South Vietnam’s prestige at Hanoi’s expense. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese Communists have given no indication that any of this has weakened their determination to continue fighting. They have rejected several proposals in the last two months. President Johnson’s offer to schedule the withdrawal of American forces if PAVN forces were also pulled out was described by Hanoi on Sept. IO as an “insolent allegation” and an “attempt to justify . . . piratical acts.” On Sept. 24 an article in the Lao Dong Party newspaper Nhan Dun entitled, “New Stage, Old Farce,” denounced Ambassador Goldberg’s conditional bombing suspension offer before the U.N. as a sinister attempt to “force the South Vietnamese people to lay down their arms” and a ploy to “soothe the wrath of the world’s people . . .” U Thant then took another turn at the Hanoi pillory as his three-point peace proposal calling for reduced military activity by both sides was described by Nhan DQ~ on Oct. 6 as a view which “conforms to the dark scheme of the U.S. imperialists to sow confusion about the Vietnam situation.” The indefatigable British came up for more punishment in October by offering still another proposal for peace. It involved mutual “de-escalation” and the convening of a conference in the framework of the “essentials” of the 1954 Geneva accords to hammer out both an armistice and political settlement. Hanoi heaped its usual scorn upon these U.K. efforts, terming them a “rehash of U.S. , . . blackmailing efforts” and “dancing to the U.S. tune.” The North Vietnamese apparently considered it fitting to stress a musical motif in connection with Great Britain’s activities, one of their commentaries being entitled, “U.S. Jazz, British Band.” Finally, at the end of October, Hanoi dismissed the Manila Conference as a “war conference of Johnson and his lackeys” and the Manila communique offering peace proposals as a “shopworn tune.” Although there is evidence that North Vietnam has come under greater Soviet influence in the last year, there is no firm indication that Moscow is exerting pressure on Hanoi to come to terms on peace talks. Some observers have speculated that Ho Chi Minh and his circle are dissillusioned by the evidences of internal disarray in China and by Peking’s refusal to cooperate with the other Communist states to help North Vietnam, and have therefore decided to look to the U.S.S.R. for guidance and support. Unconfirmed reports have it that Premier Pham Van Dong and Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap conferred secretly with Russian leaders in August, either about peace prospects or military aid, or both. Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi came to Moscow in early September to discuss the flow of aid, a subject which undoubtedly also involved &o-Soviet relations and Peking’s obstructionism on the matter of Communist unity in aiding Vietnam. Peking, of course, continues its shrill denunciation of Soviet “collusion” in U.S. “plots” to “enslave the Asian people.” Regardless of what Hanoi may think privately about the present Chinese course, it has been extremely careful not to join any of the other world Communist parties in condemning the excesses of Peking’s Red Guard movement and other manifestations of upheaval in China. COMMUNIST
Aimme
In fact, Hanoi has guardedly praised the “glorious thought of Mao Tse-tung” and the “great proletarian cultural revolution” now wracking mainland China. While North Vietnam and the Viet Cong hurl defiance at those proposing an end of hostilities, they do from time to time give evidence of a sense of realism regarding their grim task of continuing the war. Ever since last winter, Hanoi leaders have occasionally injected rational assessment into their statements on the situation (see earlier manifestations in Commu7zist Affairs, IV/I, Jan.-Feb., pp. 21-25). Evidence of internal strains and popular discontent under harsh wartime conditions was evident in the annual reports to the National Assembly last April by Premier Pham Van Dong and Supreme Court Chairman Pham Van Bach, who spoke of economic, administrative and political “shortcomings,” “machinations of bad elements” in the population, “rumor-mongering,” etc. The theme of espionage and sabotage by South Vietnamese and American “agents” has recurred frequently in the Party journals. In July the Fatherland Front, a heterogeneous grouping of organizations promoting Hanoi’s version of “peaceful reunification,” described the war situation as “extremely serious” and appealed for Communists everywhere to “act more resolutely and effectively to thwart U.S. plans.” Military analyses appearing in both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong publications have tended to be “pep talks” reminding the Communist fighters of their assets which will surely bring them ultimate victory, but at the same time the commentators have not neglected to point out the advantages held by the United States and South Vietnam on the battlefield which will make this a long war instead of the quick triumph promised earlier. In August and September “political affairs” conferences were held in both North and South to review “political tasks” of the Military Transportation Service of North Vietnam and the “Liberation Armed Forces” in the South. Serious problems concerning morale and efficiency were evident in the Aesopian language used to report these meetings. Hanoi Radio carried a call for a better spirit of “socialist cooperation” in carrying out the “heavy but glorious” task of transportation [ed. note: under U.S. bombing], while the Viet Cong army newspaper stated that the other conference agreed that “political work must particularly stress . . . fostering the spirit of fighting a protracted war . . . ” and decried “rightist tendencies and unsteady viewpoints.” When National Liberation Front Chairman Nguyen Huu The gave an interview to Australian Communist newsman Wilfred Burchett in late August, he seemed to be indicating preparations for a long struggle which might be carried out on a lower level of violence than heretofore. He stressed the “political and moral” strength of the Viet Cong, claimed a “decisive” rather than “exclusive” voice for the NLF in any future political settlement, and issued a broad invitation for more non-Communist participation in the Front. He even invited former Diem regime officials to come in on the basis of opposition to American “enslavement” of Vietnam. As the lack of support by significant nonCommunist South Vietnamese political leaders has been one of the major weaknesses of the NLF, any ser-
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jous campaign to lure such cooperation would certainly have to include a diminution of the excessive Viet Cong violence which has been one of the principal deterrents to wider acceptance of the attractively worded political program of the Front.
Indonesia
One Year After
Slowly groping its way out of internal chaos andback into the community of nations, Indonesia still faces monumental tasks a year after the attempted leftist puts& of Sept. 3o-Oct. I, 1965. (See Communst Affairs, III/s, Sept.-Oct. 1965, pp. g-11.) Significant advances have been made in restoring external relations, but other grave economic, political and social problems remain. Though communism has been eliminated as an immediate threat, a revival of organized Marxism-Leninism is quite possible unless real progress is made in the solution of these issues. Indonesia’s bankrupt economy is undoubtedly the major problem. With production and distribution in most lines still failing or chaotic, inflation soaring to new heights, and a mountain of foreign debt hanging over the government, the tasks facing the new government are staggering. Only the resilience and patience of the Indonesian peasant, who lives largely outside the modern money economy, prevents the nation from foundering in this legacy of Sukarno’s ignorance and cavalier neglect of economic realities. Political uncertainties and discontent over miserable living conditions may provide an opportunity for Communist revival. Apparently the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), while smashed as an effective organization, was not as thoroughly rooted out as earlier thought. Despite the anti-Communist bloodbath which followed the Sept. 30 affair, some of the PKI apparatus probably survives in the person of PKI leaders who escaped the army and police dragnets. The Neu York Times reported on Aug. 23 some alleged details of the capture and execution of D. N. Aidit, the PKI Chairman, and said that the other two top leaders, Njoto and M. H. Lukman, had probably also been shot. As for other Politburo members, the paper went on to state that Njono and candidate-member Per-is Parede have been sentenced to death by military tribunals, although there has been no confirmation of execution. It reported that 15 other members of the 52-man Central Committee were known dead and that others are presumed to have perished in the mass killings of last November-January in the countryside. Newspapers in Djakarta reported on Oct. 30 that another top PKI leader, Sal&man, was captured early in October but was subsequently shot to death while trying to escape from a military guard. The army has never given an official account of either the purge of the Communist leadership or the mass killings of lower-echelon personnel throughout the country, and it seems concerned that underground Communist elements still pose a threat. Roadblocks abound to testify to the uneasiness of the military authorities. General Nasution stated on the first anniversary of the Sept. 30 affair that “the old order [ed. note: the Communists and their sympathizers] is now launching guerrilla activity in the political and economic fields
1.5
which at tunes culminates in a counteroffensive.” There are reports that not all the PKI cells have been destroyed and that escaped leaders work underground. Leaders of the student organizations in Djakarta which have been in the forefront of the anti-Communist and anti-Sukamo movements, announced on Sept. 17 that their members were conducting a new drive to root out “Communist agents” who they said had been infiltrating the capital at the rate of 200 a week since June. Earlier the military commander of the Djakarta region had stated that three PKI leaders (Sakirman, Sanusi and Tjugito) had infiltrated the city and that Communist elements were attempting to incite strife between pro-Sukarno and anti-&&am0 groups. On Sept. 20, Reuters reported a statement by an army regimental commander in central Java that his unit had occupied a Communist stronghold in the Banjumas area after a heavy exchange of fire. There are recurring reports that the purges have not yet eliminated PKI sympathizers from armed forces units in central and east Java. President Sukarno remains a serious problem to the new leaders, despite being reduced almost to a figurehead by the careful maneuvering of General Suharto and his civilian colleagues to strip him of both power and prestige. While the trial of ex-Foreign Minister Subandrio in October for complicity in the Communist coup attempt further tarnished Sukarno’s image, it was not sensational enough to be decisive in this regard. Sukarno apparently retains sufficient popularity in central and east Java and among certain armed forces units to deter Suharto and company from deposing him entirely, and he occasionally gets away with a fiery speech denouncing all that has happened in the last year. On the other hand, the intensity of anti-Sukarno sentiment among the students, intellectuals and Moslem organizations is making it increasingly difficult for the army to retain the President witbout a direct clash with these groups. Severe army crackdowns on student antiSukarno demonstrations have already led to bloodshed and ill feeling. However, the basic problem is that the old political order has passed with the demise of “Sukarnoism” and a new one has not yet arisen to fill the vacuum. Despite desire for a new order, neither the army nor any other group has the kind of top-to-bottom organization which the PKI had and which could give reality to these hopes. Under its new leadership, Indonesia has taken vigorous steps toward putting its foreign relations in order. An end to the senseless “confrontation” against Malaysia was negotiated in June and formally signed in August. Trade with Singapore, crucial to Indonesia’s foreign commerce, was resumed Sept. 12, accompanied by a credit of 150 million Malaysian dollars to Indonesian traders. At a conference of Western creditor nations held in Tokyo in September to consider extending credit and revising terms for repayments of the heavy external Indonesian debt, the Suharto government pledged a “pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to economic problems” which would include a revival of foreign investment. Adam MaI&, the capable and energetic Foreign Minister, has personally tackled the problem of relations
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with the two major world powers and the U.N. He journeyed to Washington in September to obtain emergency economic assistance in desperately needed commodities and to Moscow in October to discuss rescheduling the enormous Indonesian debt to the U.S.S.R. which was incurred mostly for armaments. After the Moscow meeting he said his talks had brought “understanding and closer relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia . . .” Malik also led the Indonesian delegation to New York and resumed Indonesia’s seat in the U.N. without objection from the membership. It appears that the careful reaction of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to Indonesian events of the last year has enabled Djakarta to re-establish its international ties in a highly favorable atmosphere. Moscow’s relative equanimity in the face of the PKI’s destruction again reflects the Kremlin’s traditional willingness to sacrifice foreign Communist parties to the preservation of state interests. Relations with Communist China, on the other hand, have deteriorated to the breaking point. Peking’s embassy in Djakarta is virtually under blockade, and most of its outlying consulates are closed. Malik has claimed that Indonesia has tried to avoid a complete rupture, but that Peking has made this very difficult by incessant attacks. The Chinese have reacted with extreme abuse to the most pointed evidence of Indonesia’s restored status in international affairs-a reported request by the United States and several Southeast Asian nations that Djakarta use its good offices to mediate the Vietnam war. Peking angrily described Indonesia as a “new pawn in the U.S. peace talks swindle.”
Hungarian Communists Move Closer to Moscow Unlike the Yugoslav and Romanian leaders, who have come to regard nationalism and independence from the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of their policy, the Hungarian Party leadership recently reverted to stressing “proletarian internationalism” and friendship with the Soviet Union. The first intimation of the new Hungarian Party line came with the speech of First Secretary Janos Kadar at the 23rd Soviet Party Congress, in which he called for a strengthening of Hungarian-Soviet friendship and declared that “Hungarian Communists adhere to the opinion that the principle of fraternal relations with the Soviet Union was and always will continue to be the touchstone of true internationalism. There never was and never will be anti-soviet communism.” The new stress on close friendship with the U.S.S.R. has since been taken up by a number of Hungarian Party officials, notably by Zoltan Komocsin, Central Committee secretary in charge of international affairs, and again in a recent lecture of Premier Gyula Kallai before the political academy of the Hungarian Party Central Committee. The importance attached to this rediscovery of “Communist international solidarity” becomes apparent in the intensive treatment accorded it in the Hungarian press. A summary of Kallai’s speech took up two full pages in the June 8 issue of the Party paper Napszabadsag. Independence should not be confused with a “quest for isolation and introversion.” The building of socialism within the framework ~MMUNIST
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of “independent national economies” he considered to be “natural, correct and useful” only as long as particular national interests are not opposed to the common interest of the “Socialist world system.” (Nepszabadsag, June 8.) Following the lead of Kadar and Komocsin, Kallai by indirection criticized Romanian and Chinese Communists, warned against “nationalist, anti-Soviet trends in the policies of some countries,” and projected as the ultimate goal, “the restoration of the unity of the whole movement on the basis of a correct political line of strategy and tactics.” (Ibid.) Such unity of action, he asserted, was particularly important with reference to the war in Vietnam, since only “proletarian internationalism” could provide a strong “binding link” among the countries of the “socialist world system.” The true touchstone of “proletarian internationalism,” he stated, seconding Party leader Janos Kadar, was above all solidarity and fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union. Such cooperation, as practised by COMECON, he pointed out, “accelerates the building of socialism, while isolation slows it down.” (Ibid.) Declaring that, under present conditions, peaceful coexistence would have to give way to the need to “push back imperialist aggression,” he was, however, at pains to stress that the inevitable “cooling off” of relations with the United States should and need not necessarily lead to a worsening of relations with all capitalist countries. (Ibid.) If one compares these statements with the tenor of sentiments prevailing in Hungary not much longer than a year ago, one cannot fail to notice a decided change in attitudes. Only in April 1965, for example, Party leaders were at pains to stress that there was now no single center of the international Communist movement and that the Soviet Union was no longer the sole and absolute example that all socialist states had to follow. (Tarsadalmi Szemle, April 1965.) In order to account for this perceptible eastward orientation of the Hungarian Party, a number of factors must be taken into consideration. During 1965 it had become clear to leading Hungarian Communists that serious economic shortcomings had developed and that the easygoing, consumer-oriented policy, adopted by Kadar to woo the Hungarian public and to heal the deep wounds of 1956, would have to give way to an inevitable belt-tightening. Initial measures were taken as early as January 1965 but the worst shock came towards the end of the year, when a series of steep price increases affecting some basic food staples had to be announced. (Nepszabadsag, Nov. 21 and 30, 1965.) The new restrictive economic policies met with much popular resentment and resulted in the loss of much of the stability and relative popularity previously enjoyed by the Kadar regime. The regime undoubtedly found it necessary to look to Moscow for political upport and resolved to pay the price by expressing loyalty to, and greater conformity with, Soviet policies. If political weakness is one important factor in the new orientation, economic weakness is a still more persuasive one. In order to overcome Hungary’s inexorable poverty in resources and raw materials and to make up for serious defects in the system of economic planning
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pd management, Party leaders moved toward increasmg economic dependence on the Soviet Union, whence Hungary receives most of her oil and power supplies. Lack of resources and lagging industrial development certainly make Hungary more receptive to COMECON, and the need for credits increases her dependence on the industrially more developed countries within the bloc. Moreover, from the point of view of the Hungarian Party, the resurgence of nationalism in East Europe appears to be fraught with dangers and difficulties. Romanian success in reasserting national interests against Soviet pressures has had a deep impact on Hungarian public opinion. But Romanian nationalism, too, has led to a perceptible hardening of Bucharest’s policies toward the Magyar minority groups within Romania. Public pressures and increasing hostility of Hungarian opinion toward Romania brought about a considerable worsening of Hungarian-Romanian relations and have, unquestionably, tended to force Radar even closer to Moscow. Last but by no means least, Hungarian nationalism is far more explosive and threatening to the Communist Party than nationalism in most other Soviet bloc countries. This fact was brought home to Hungarian Communists by the events leading to the revolution of 1956, a lesson not easily forgotten. Ethnically non-Slav and deeply anti-Russian, Hungarians do not share the same fears, nor harbor the same traditional anti-German historical memories as do Czechs, Poles, Russians or Yugoslavs. Hungarian nationalism is, thus, far more difficult to contain. Not easily channeled into forms acceptable to, and congruous with, the rule of the Communist Party, it is thus felt by Party leaders to be potentially extremely dangerous, a fact attested to by warnings against the evils of nationalism, chauvinism and irredentism in recent lectures and speeches of high Hungarian Party functionaries. (Z. Komocsin, Nepszabadsag, March 24, and G. Kallai, Ibid., June 8.)
Where Is Alexei Adzhubei Now? The ides of October, the second anniversary of Khrushchgv’s fall from power, marked the second anniversary as well of the sudden transformation of his sonin-law Alexei Adzhubei - editor-in-chief of Zzvestiia, member of the CPSU Central Committee, special emissary for Khrushchev -into a nonperson. Now, two years after his sudden disappearance from the scene, the Oct. 14 issue of Literaturnaya Rossiya mentions that another literary journal, Moskva, No. g, 1966, contains an article by Alexei Adzhubei titled “A Trip to the Depths of the Brain with an Intelligent Guide.” Stripped of the perquisites of position and power, he was given an obscure post on the editorial staff of Sovetskii Soyuz (Soviet Union), a periodical designed for foreign, not domestic readership. An article by Adzhubei on Western achievements in the field of brain research, which appeared in Sovetshii Soyuz earlier this year, was apparently the basis for his article in Moskva -which is published for Soviet readers. “A Trip to the Depths of the Brain . . .” is a far cry from a signed page-one editorial in Zzvestiia, but it is a way of informing the public that Adzhubei is still around.
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