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Reflections on the Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
Reflections on the Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy by Bing West Bing West is a Marine Corps infantry veteran of Vietnam, where he took part in a successful Marine counterinsurgency program, the Combined Action Platoons. Based on his experiences in Vietnam, he wrote a classic study of CI entitled The Village. He also served as an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration. He is the author of three books on the Iraq War, including the The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq.
Abstract: Our foreign policy elites, the press, our elected representatives and the general public internalize ‘‘lessons’’ from each war, although the lessons may be wrong or misapplied. How we arrive at such consensus lessons is a mystery. It is too early to predict what lessons from Iraq will guide future U.S. decisionmaking. But on the situation as it now stands, it is possible to make some broad generalizations concerning what went right in Iraq and what went wrong.
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bjective observers may well conclude that invading Iraq was a national mistake. However ill-conceived the invasion may have been, Iraq did not collapse, as many in the mainstream press and half the Congress predicted in mid-2006. The end was not equivalent to Vietnam in 1975. It will take another decade to determine whether Iraq evolves into a stable nation whose institutions reflect tolerance, the rule of law and basic democratic principles. However, al Qaeda, America’s mortal enemy, has suffered a major defeat in Iraq. Claiming to champion the Sunnis, al Qaeda had entered Iraq after the invasion in 2003. Five years later, the Sunnis in Iraq had turned on the hated al Qaeda and had largely driven them from the country. As 2008 comes to an end, all indications are that violence in Iraq has diminished sharply. Although al Qaeda, clinging to a last lair around Mosul, continues to mount suicide bombings, it has lost control of the Sunni population. Inside the Shiite ranks, the Mahdi Army militia has been broken as a military organization, with its titular leader, Moqtada Sadr, hiding in Iran. The Pentagon has announced a deployment schedule for American forces that will lead to an eventual drawdown of troops in Iraq. While major problems persist, civil war has so far been averted. The continuing challenge is not winning battles but rather persuading the Shiites to compromise. That this problem may be close to some degree of resolution is
# 2008 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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Reflections on the Iraq War suggested by the fact that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has acceded to American entreaties to incorporate Sunni forces such as ‘‘The Sons of Iraq’’ into the government security forces.1 While this represents real progress, corruption continues to infect all levels of government activity. The remaining issues in Iraq are political rather than military. Based on my experiences in that country since 2001, I have developed a number of observations about the Iraq War. Although no two conflicts are exactly the same, some of these observations may have implications for U.S. foreign policy in the future. Successful Counterinsurgency Depends upon the Will of the Indigenous People Given America’s role in the world and the sort of security environment likely to prevail in the foreseeable future, U.S. forces can be expected to confront insurgencies as a matter of course. While success in a conventional war usually involves breaking the will of the belligerent government, success in a counterinsurgency is dependent on influencing the will of the people. This was illustrated in Iraq. In that conflict, the essential precondition for the success of the surge of U.S. troops in 2007 was the shift in attitude by the Sunni tribes. That change in attitude, which preceded the arrival of General David Petraeus, was due to the aggressive yet decent behavior of tens of thousands of American troops, in contrast with the savage behavior of al Qaeda. The Sunnis would not have turned against al Qaeda without the encouragement and active aid of the U.S. forces and commanders. Conversely, had the sullen pro-al Qaeda attitude the Sunni harbored in 2004 prevailed in 2007, the surge strategy would have failed. Even as brilliant a general as Petraeus could not have turned around the insurgency without the accompanying change in the attitude of the people. A counterinsurgency is not primarily about maneuvering armies. Counterinsurgencies are bottom-up endeavors, the success of which is largely dependent upon aggressive patrolling by small units in order to provide security to the indigenous population and the receptivity of the local population to the security being offered to them. One of the most extraordinary indigenous leaders in Iraq was Sheik Abu Risha Sattar, from Anbar Province. Sattar initiated the Sunni ‘‘Awakening’’. Shortly before he was assassinated by al Qaeda in 2007, he told me, ‘‘You Americans did not convince us. We Sunnis had to convince ourselves.’’ This ‘‘lesson’’ from Iraq should serve as a caution to those who believe that success in Afghanistan can be achieved by the same means that have led to 1
Jeffery Fleishman, ‘‘Iraq Takes Control of US-Backed Sunni Fighters,’’ Los Angeles Times, October 2, 2008.
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WEST an improved situation in Iraq. A ‘‘surge’’ in Afghanistan will not necessarily assure victory in that beleaguered country. The Afghan people have to convince themselves. But because the dominant Pashtun tribes occupy both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border and U.S. forces are not permitted to threaten the Taliban/al Qaeda sanctuary on the Pakistani side, the likelihood of a ‘‘Pashtun Awakening’’ on the model the Sunni Awakening is not likely to occur. Instead, stability requires placing American advisers and/or platoons in villages inside Afghanistan until Afghan soldiers and police acquire competence. This will take years. Although Afghanistan is supposedly ‘‘the good war’’ supported by both U.S. political parties, the nature of the insurgency will test the patience and the pocketbook of the American people.
The United States Must Take ‘‘Nation-building’’ More Seriously Influenced by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, a set of principles long internalized by the U.S. military that emphasizes the requirement for an ‘‘exit strategy,’’ the U.S. military has tended to ignore ‘‘nation-building.’’ But if generals are thinking about an exit strategy, they are not thinking about ‘‘war termination’’—how to convert military success into political success. This cultural aversion to conducting stability operations is reflected by the fact that operational planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom took 18 months while planning for postwar stabilization began half-heartedly only a couple of months before the invasion. The commitment to an exit strategy in the Department of Defense is illustrated by the fact that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted to win on the battlefields of Iraq (and Afghanistan) and get out as quickly as possible. While his successor, Robert Gates, has accepted the mission of nationbuilding, he has avoided any public elaboration concerning what that mission entails or whether it can be accomplished. For years, the U.S. military has railed at the lack of organization and commitment by the civilian side of government. DoD has argued that in the field, there aren’t enough experts in such areas as agriculture, education, banking, local governance, etc. Although by 2008, an impressive number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams had been deployed, many embedded with U.S. brigades, the nub of the problem went much deeper. The fundamental problem is sovereignty, which creates a dilemma. On the one hand, we are in other countries only because their governments cannot stand on their own. But the principle of sovereignty means that we cannot replace incompetent or corrupt officials of the host government. We are merely advisers rather than decision-makers. Iraq epitomized the dilemma. In 2004, the United States, guided by a high-minded desire to institute a moreor-less liberal democratic political order, implemented instead what amounted 56
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Reflections on the Iraq War to a dysfunctional political structure resulting in a sectarian census posing as a democratic election. The new Shiite rulers realized they could not remain in power without the support of the Americans. So they permitted the United States to remain, fighting their battles while hectoring the Iraqi government grudgingly to make reforms. This is not a model for future nation-building. While Iraq is on the path toward stability following the depredation and terror of the Saddam era, we won’t be able to judge definitively for several more years. It is clear, however, that the more than $20 billion the United States spent on reconstruction was basically wasted. It is also clear that the United States lacks a comprehensive approach to nation-building that matches U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and excellence in military operations. Finally, it is clear that corruption in Iraq is widespread and that the United States, despite its support of the Iraqi government, has no authority to curtail it or prosecute those who engage in it. Although it offends the U.S. military to know that many Iraqi officers and high officials are on the take, the fact is that there are many examples of corrupt states providing security and services for the people. While corruption often impedes nation building, it can also—paradoxically—sometimes contribute to nation building. The Nobel Prize-winning economist, Professor Roger Myerson has illustrated the difference outcomes. For example, counterinsurgency experts often cite Chiang Kai-shek’s government in China in 1949 as an example of how corruption corrodes a regime, leading to insurgent victory. But according to Myerson, ‘‘The problem was that highly connected government agents took profits from their positions without providing the governance and services that were expected of them.’’2 Chiang failed as a leader because he did not insure that his subordinates were rewarded only when they performed their jobs correctly. When they were rewarded even while failing, those failures aided the insurgents by spreading the perception that Chiang’s rule was doomed, motivating his subordinates to steal more while they could. They did nothing to prevent the collapse they had engineered by their own ineptitude. Conversely, the British in India in the 1860s granted local authority as a property right to landlords called zamindars. Thus permitted to tax and benefit themselves, the Zamindar bureaucracy ruthlessly stamped out any anti-British movements because a rebellion meant the end of their livelihoods. Similarly, what corrupt regimes in Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Russia have in common is a system in which apparatchiks understand that they must do their jobs to engage in graft. Despite payoffs and corruption at all levels, Iraq seems to be lurching toward a functioning government, allowing the United States to stand aside from the nation-building role. However, the Iraq example may not 2
Roger B. Myerson, Foundations of the State in Theory and Practice, University of Chicago web site, October, 2007. p. 15.
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WEST be transferable to Afghanistan, where warlords, insurgents and officials in Kabul, provide revenues of $ three billion a year, almost half of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product. It is not clear how the United States, in the role of adviser to a sovereign government, can build a stable, democratic, economically viable nation, under these conditions. Risk Assessment Requires Objectivity and Dispassion For three years, the military strategy in Iraq rattled down the wrong track for the same reasons that the U.S. financial sector crashed in September of 2008. Those at the top were out of touch and overconfident, the fiduciary responsibility for risk assessment was foregone and the quantitative measures were inadequate for understanding the problem. In 2005, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the head of the Central Command and the top generals in Iraq were all telling President Bush the same thing: American soldiers were an antibody in an Arab culture and the counterinsurgency mission belonged to the Iraqis. Rumsfeld used the analogy of riding a bicycle. Sooner or later, you had to take off the training wheels, remove the hand from the seat and let the new rider fall a few times. In other words, as American forces pulled out, the Iraqis would fall on their faces a few times, or never learn how to ride the bike. Risk happens. In fact, the only way to mitigate that risk was to order American soldiers to clear and then to hold the cities. That meant committing American forces in larger numbers for an indefinite amount of time. In October of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice endorsed this approach, saying that ‘‘our political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions.’’3 Rumsfeld reacted with consternation, as did General George Casey, the overall commander in Iraq, and General John Abizaid, commander of Central Command. ‘‘Reducing the size and visibility of the coalition forces in Iraq,’’ Abizaid said, ‘‘is a part of our counterinsurgency strategy.’’ That contradicted a cornerstone of the counterinsurgency doctrine: protecting the population. The secretary of state’s frame of reference was different from that of the secretary of defense and the military commanders on the ground. Unfortunately, the president did not resolve the contradiction. He envisioned a victory that eschewed risk, while the military pursued a transition that increased risk. In addition, risk management was bungled within the military. To use business terms, Casey, as the commander of the coalition force in Iraq was the Chief Executive Officer. Abizaid, as the theater commander, was overseeing 3
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rice, October 19, 2005.
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Reflections on the Iraq War the effort as a member of the Board of Trustees. But rather than providing dispassionate risk assessment of alternative approaches in Iraq, Abazaid, committed to the idea that Americans were antibodies to Iraq culture, was philosophically predisposed to agree with Casey about the mission: shift responsibility to the Iraqis as quickly as possible and get out in accordance with the Weinberger Doctrine’s principle of a rapid ‘‘exit strategy.’’ The degree of risk was further obfuscated by a lack of consistent measures for tracking progress or setbacks. Part of the problem is US military culture itself. The US military is trained to have a ‘‘can-do’’ spirit. Every battalion and division commander intends to succeed, and the Iraq end-oftour reports reflected success and ignored or explained away failures. No commander at any level wanted to ask for extra manpower and admit failure. The most obvious measures – the number of attacks, roadside bombs and casualties–were discounted by the introduction of more esoteric measures, such as the polling of Iraqi civilians that showed a dislike of Americans. This led to the misleading conclusion that the presence of American soldiers was as much a cause of violence as it was a deterrent. Lest we be too harsh on military assessments, the investment banks on Wall Street that employed the brightest analysts from the Ivy Leagues totally botched assessing the risks they were running in the subprime mortgage market. Wall Street lost its war and many firms went out of business. Our military did much better in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is disturbing that in September 2008, after seven years of fighting in Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for a comprehensive strategic review, saying he was not confident we were winning. It was not clear whether assessing risk rested with the Central Command, NATO, the Chairman or the Secretary of Defense. Yet what stands out from the Iraqi campaign assessments is the necessity for a dispassionate review provided by an assessor from outside the immediate operational command.
Intelligence is Never Certain In 2002, against the emotional background of 9/11, the Bush administration concluded that it had to preempt the possible transfer of weapons of mass destruction from Saddam to a terrorist group. Of course, the invasion uncovered no WMD; Saddam had been bluffing to keep Iran off balance. Consequently, distrust of intelligence that does not include admissions by an adversary, has solidified as a lesson inside the Congress and the press. But tyrannical regimes are by definition opaque. It will be a struggle for the new administration to accumulate sufficient data to persuade the Congress of the wisdom of launching a strike, let alone a war, in circumstances where the adversary denies the evidence. Iran’s nuclear program is a clear beneficiary of this ‘‘lesson.’’ Winter 2009
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WEST American Society has not Adapted to a Basic Change in Warfare Armies are institutions that foster and protect civilization. Without the shield of military force, commerce and scholarship cannot progress. For the past thousand years, Western armies have imposed codes of conduct governing behavior in war and battle. A fundamental role of warfare, enforced by summary execution, was the requirement that soldiers wear uniforms to distinguish them from the population. The rationale of course was to protect the civilian population from indiscriminate slaughter. Gradually, the U.S. military adopted a doctrine of victory based on decisive battles and the destruction of the opposing army. Once its military power was destroyed, as in World War II, the vanquished foe would then submit to American terms. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the traditional US theory of victory called for operations that swiftly routed the Taliban and of Saddam’s army. But in each case, the vanquished refused to accept the outcome of these conventional campaigns. Instead, they adopted guerrilla tactics, continuing to resist while finding sanctuary among civilian populations that were either intimidated or sympathetic or both. In the past, Western armies had employed Draconian methods against such enemies. In the 1950s, the British in Malaya placed the ethnic Chinese population in ‘‘strategic hamlets’’ surrounded by barbed wire in order to separate them from the insurgents. In Vietnam in the 1960s, the U.S. military moved tens of thousands of villagers out of Viet Cong areas and into refugee camps. In the twenty-first century, such harsh methods are eschewed. Morality does not change, but governments frequently change the rules of war. In Iraq, the Counterinsurgency Manual stated that a key goal was establishing the rule of law, to include: ‘‘a government that derives its powers from the governed, sustainable security institutions and fundamental human rights.’’4 The problem was that such a mission was beyond the skill set of soldiers and did not match the conditions on the ground. While American soldiers acted as arresting officers subject to strict rules of evidence, Iraqi judges, U.S. review boards, and the Iraqi National Assembly flouted ‘‘the rule of law’’ and let prisoners go whenever it suited them. The liberal principles of the United States and Europe were at odds with the requirements necessary for fighting a war against an enemy who did not wear a uniform. Eight out of ten insurgents sent to prison in Iraq were released within ten months. The high command claimed that only between one and nine percent of those sent to jail were ever re-arrested. That statistic alone was proof of terrible police work, given that the violent crime rate in Iraq—murder, kidnapping, robbery—was staggering. Insisting upon the liberal American rule of law resulted in a catch-&-release cycle that prolonged 4
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FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Department of the Army, December, 2006 p D8.
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Reflections on the Iraq War the war and angered the troops. Imprisoning insurgents for less than a year in the course of a multi-year insurgency did not make sense. There were 400,000 prisoners of war incarcerated within the United States during World War II. Had they not been wearing uniforms, their cases would still be pending in state and civilian courts. The 200-odd prisoners at Guantanamo received remarkable pro-bono legal attention and lavish press coverage. ‘‘Elite political culture,’’ CIA Director Michael Hayden said, ‘‘seems to be squeezing, at least psychically, that operational space; . . . its (CIA) legitimacy is being questioned by certain segments of the population.’’5 Most egregiously, the Supreme Court has accorded insurgents not in uniform an array of rights almost equivalent to an American citizen. At the end of 2008, the United States held more than 15,000 prisoners in Iraq and several thousand more in Afghanistan. Perhaps 5,000 were dedicated Islamic terrorists who would kill again if given a chance. By extending protections to insurgents, the Supreme Court has created the likelihood that the military legal system will grind to a halt. Thanks to these judicial decisions, an enemy who wears a uniform while fighting Americans is foolish. By wearing civilian clothes, he can hide among the population and, if detained, demand civil rights beyond the capacity of the United States judicial system to administer. Neither the Court nor the Executive and Congressional branches have codified a set of rules for dealing with enemies who wear civilian clothes as camouflage. Fighting a War While Politically Divided is a Recipe for Defeat Even the most successful wars have been characterized by blunders and mistakes that have led to heavy casualties and delayed victory. During World War II, our nation highlighted courage and quietly accepted mistakes. Today, we highlight mistakes and quietly accept valor, if we acknowledge it at all. During the terrible struggle for the island of Iwo Jima in 1945, nearly six thousand Americans died, many more than in five years in Iraq. Although some historians judge Iwo Jima to have been a strategic blunder, it is nonetheless honored as a symbol of the determination of the American fighting man to destroy the enemy and emerge victorious, regardless of the carnage and cost. In the words of Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, ‘‘uncommon valor was a common virtue’’ on Iwo Jima. Today, the press and Congress would be apoplectic about such strategic error and would decry the loss of lives. Scant attention would be accorded to the heroic resolve to seize that island fortress once the battle was joined. During the Vietnam War, the American spirit was dragged down by the cost in casualties, by the opposition of many college youths fearing the draft, by the ambivalence of the foreign policy elite toward the war, and by the lack 5
Michael Hayden, Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, September 21, 2007.
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WEST of demonstrable progress in a war of attrition. In the case of Iraq, there were disagreements about the causes of the war, its costs, and the likelihood of success. In addition, many general officers, both retired and active duty, privately and publicly questioned whether several fellow generals and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were fit for command. In the Iraq War, the president asked for no sacrifice by the American people. ‘‘I think a lot of people are in this fight,’’ Bush said. ‘‘I mean, they sacrifice peace of mind when they see the terrible images of violence on TV every night.’’6 Terrible images weren’t sacrifice; instead, they turned viewers against the war, making it easy for politicians to repudiate their earlier votes authorizing the invasion. Without sharing in any sacrifice, the voters had scant stake in the war. At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest that American society has been willing to sacrifice, whether the issue be Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else. As measured by casualties or costs in terms of the gross domestic product, Iraq was not a major war like Vietnam, let alone World War II. Additionally, American society is now largely disconnected from the military. Less than one in a hundred high school graduates serve in the infantry. Three-quarters of high school graduates do not meet the military physical or mental entry standards, while Ivy League graduates no longer feel an obligation to serve a tour in the military before getting on with their careers. The martial values of our society have deteriorated. During World War II, the press scarcely mentioned and never photographed the dozens of public hangings of American soldiers, and never mentioned the shootings of German civilians or captured prisoners. The press considered such stories to be out of bounds. In Iraq, the killings of civilians in Haditha in late 2006 were characterized as a massacre and received vastly more press attention than any valorous action in the war. And the hue and cry about Haditha was not motivated by a thirst for justice; when subsequent investigations exonerated most of the troops involved at Haditha, the press wrote little and said less. Courage, Aristotle said, is the virtue that makes all other virtues possible. Geopolitical wisdom is admirable, but martial valor is essential to sustain a democracy. American society takes courage for granted, and the press ignores it. When we fight the next war, this attitude will poorly serve the nation. Will soldiers risk their lives, if society ignores courage? Secretary of Defense Gates took the post at the Pentagon intent on bringing Democrats and Republicans together on Iraq, where he said steady progress was being made. Far from promoting reconciliation in the States, progress in Iraq increased the bitterness at home. ‘‘I say to our soldiers,’’ Odierno told me, ‘‘you’re finishing it so it wasn’t in vain for those who came before.’’ Despite Odierno’s sentiment, some politicians did insist the sacrifices were in vain. Senator Harry Reid’s comment in 2006 that the ‘‘war was lost’’ disgraced America. Senator Jim Webb cited 6
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Tom Friedman on President Bush, New York Times, July 29, 2007.
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Reflections on the Iraq War polls questioning the military’s support for the war. Had a poll reported low morale on the beaches of Normandy in June of 1944, would the Senate have voted to end the war? Despite the appearance of softness and lack of martial spirit, American society produces the world’s toughest warriors, who keep coming, year after year. Despite a lack of encouragement from society, especially its elite, our warrior class selects itself. Fortunately, in contrast to the Vietnam War, no major portion of American society has, so far, turned against its soldiers during the Iraq war. But no nation can sustain its values by claiming to support the soldier while opposing his mission. The truth is that the nation determines the mission. National security cannot be sustained when domestic party affiliation and ideology determine the support for a war. Iraq was a symptom, not the cause of the ideological polarization of American society. The notion that America would unite behind a ‘‘good war’’ was a palliative. Although sacrifice on a national scale is not required for every conflict, a healthy society does not treat war as an extension of domestic political competition. While the American military was able to adapt to changing conditions in Iraq, overcoming earlier mistakes, American society became more divisive. As Rome and Athens demonstrated two thousand years ago, every military, no matter how strong its internal code, eventually mirrors its society. Society was not unified in supporting the battle in Iraq. It was easy to criticize the Bush administration with all its faults. It is less easy to question whether our society retains sufficient unity to be the world’s greatest power. Despite our most fervent hopes for peace and stability, it is likely that America will again be tested by force of arms under circumstances as ambiguous as those in Iraq. As Commander in Chief, the President Must Make the Hard Decisions In the U.S. system of government, the President, advised by his National Security Council, determines war policy and approves strategy. In Iraq, President Bush presided more than decided, acting like the chairman of the board rather than the chief executive. He waited for his staff to produce consensus options. Once he selected an option, he considered his job done. While the insurgency in Iraq was at odds with the president’s intellectual framework regarding war, his biggest failure was not understanding that the Pentagon disagreed with his strategic goals in Iraq. In 2003, the Pentagon, motivated by the Weinberger Doctrine’s emphasis on an exit strategy, wanted to extract the US military from as quickly as possible, leaving the insurgency to the Iraqis deal with insurgents. The president on the other hand, wanted Iraq rebuilt and the insurgency quelled, requiring a long-term U.S. military involvement. At the outset of the Iraq War, President Bush fully accepted what Eliot Cohen has called the ‘‘normal’’ theory of civil-military relations, which calls for a clear line of Winter 2009
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WEST demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then conduct the actual war.7 From 2003 through the summer of 2006, Washington existed inside its own bubble. The interagency process concocted policy goals disconnected from the military strategy pursued on the battlefield. Although policy is supposed to direct the selection of a war-making strategy, that didn’t happen until Bush decided on a surge in January of 2007. In doing so, President Bush abandoned the normal theory of civilmilitary relations. He adopted a new approach to the war, replacing the uniformed and civilian leaders who were adherents of the failed operational approach with others who shared his commitment to victory rather than ‘‘playing for a tie.’’ While the surge and the counterinsurgency strategy implemented by Gen. David Petraeus was not the only reason for the turnaround in Iraq, it was able to leverage the changed attitudes of the Sunni, represented by the ‘‘Anbar Awakening’’ and to help break the back of both al Qaeda and the Shia Mahdi Army. The challenges to US foreign and defense policy are not likely to change in 2009. The American people will be ill-served by another eight years of corrosive divisiveness. President Barack Obama must make clear the lines of responsibility for the strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and—standing quite apart from that general—who is responsible for risk assessment. Granting al Qaeda a sanctuary in western Pakistan for another four years increases the risk of another devastating attack on U.S. soil. The new president must grasp the nature of the war in Afghanistan and understand the implications of military courses of action against west Pakistan. He must resist the notion that he can remain aloof, delegating military matters to the military while he attends to domestic concerns and affairs of state. Above all, he must be prepared to lead a nation that is still at war.
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Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002).
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Abstract: Our foreign policy elites, the press, our elected representatives and the general public internalize ‘‘lessons’’ from each war, although the lessons may be wrong or misapplied. How we arrive at such consensus lessons is a mystery. It is too early to predict what lessons from Iraq will guide future U.S. decisionmaking. But on the situation as it now stands, it is possible to make some broad generalizations concerning what went right in Iraq and what went wrong.
O
bjective observers may well conclude that invading Iraq was a national mistake. However ill-conceived the invasion may have been, Iraq did not collapse, as many in the mainstream press and half the Congress predicted in mid-2006. The end was not equivalent to Vietnam in 1975. It will take another decade to determine whether Iraq evolves into a stable nation whose institutions reflect tolerance, the rule of law and basic democratic principles. However, al Qaeda, America’s mortal enemy, has suffered a major defeat in Iraq. Claiming to champion the Sunnis, al Qaeda had entered Iraq after the invasion in 2003. Five years later, the Sunnis in Iraq had turned on the hated al Qaeda and had largely driven them from the country. As 2008 comes to an end, all indications are that violence in Iraq has diminished sharply. Although al Qaeda, clinging to a last lair around Mosul, continues to mount suicide bombings, it has lost control of the Sunni population. Inside the Shiite ranks, the Mahdi Army militia has been broken as a military organization, with its titular leader, Moqtada Sadr, hiding in Iran. The Pentagon has announced a deployment schedule for American forces that will lead to an eventual drawdown of troops in Iraq. While major problems persist, civil war has so far been averted. The continuing challenge is not winning battles but rather persuading the Shiites to compromise. That this problem may be close to some degree of resolution is
# 2008 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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Reflections on the Iraq War suggested by the fact that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has acceded to American entreaties to incorporate Sunni forces such as ‘‘The Sons of Iraq’’ into the government security forces.1 While this represents real progress, corruption continues to infect all levels of government activity. The remaining issues in Iraq are political rather than military. Based on my experiences in that country since 2001, I have developed a number of observations about the Iraq War. Although no two conflicts are exactly the same, some of these observations may have implications for U.S. foreign policy in the future. Successful Counterinsurgency Depends upon the Will of the Indigenous People Given America’s role in the world and the sort of security environment likely to prevail in the foreseeable future, U.S. forces can be expected to confront insurgencies as a matter of course. While success in a conventional war usually involves breaking the will of the belligerent government, success in a counterinsurgency is dependent on influencing the will of the people. This was illustrated in Iraq. In that conflict, the essential precondition for the success of the surge of U.S. troops in 2007 was the shift in attitude by the Sunni tribes. That change in attitude, which preceded the arrival of General David Petraeus, was due to the aggressive yet decent behavior of tens of thousands of American troops, in contrast with the savage behavior of al Qaeda. The Sunnis would not have turned against al Qaeda without the encouragement and active aid of the U.S. forces and commanders. Conversely, had the sullen pro-al Qaeda attitude the Sunni harbored in 2004 prevailed in 2007, the surge strategy would have failed. Even as brilliant a general as Petraeus could not have turned around the insurgency without the accompanying change in the attitude of the people. A counterinsurgency is not primarily about maneuvering armies. Counterinsurgencies are bottom-up endeavors, the success of which is largely dependent upon aggressive patrolling by small units in order to provide security to the indigenous population and the receptivity of the local population to the security being offered to them. One of the most extraordinary indigenous leaders in Iraq was Sheik Abu Risha Sattar, from Anbar Province. Sattar initiated the Sunni ‘‘Awakening’’. Shortly before he was assassinated by al Qaeda in 2007, he told me, ‘‘You Americans did not convince us. We Sunnis had to convince ourselves.’’ This ‘‘lesson’’ from Iraq should serve as a caution to those who believe that success in Afghanistan can be achieved by the same means that have led to 1
Jeffery Fleishman, ‘‘Iraq Takes Control of US-Backed Sunni Fighters,’’ Los Angeles Times, October 2, 2008.
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WEST an improved situation in Iraq. A ‘‘surge’’ in Afghanistan will not necessarily assure victory in that beleaguered country. The Afghan people have to convince themselves. But because the dominant Pashtun tribes occupy both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border and U.S. forces are not permitted to threaten the Taliban/al Qaeda sanctuary on the Pakistani side, the likelihood of a ‘‘Pashtun Awakening’’ on the model the Sunni Awakening is not likely to occur. Instead, stability requires placing American advisers and/or platoons in villages inside Afghanistan until Afghan soldiers and police acquire competence. This will take years. Although Afghanistan is supposedly ‘‘the good war’’ supported by both U.S. political parties, the nature of the insurgency will test the patience and the pocketbook of the American people.
The United States Must Take ‘‘Nation-building’’ More Seriously Influenced by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, a set of principles long internalized by the U.S. military that emphasizes the requirement for an ‘‘exit strategy,’’ the U.S. military has tended to ignore ‘‘nation-building.’’ But if generals are thinking about an exit strategy, they are not thinking about ‘‘war termination’’—how to convert military success into political success. This cultural aversion to conducting stability operations is reflected by the fact that operational planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom took 18 months while planning for postwar stabilization began half-heartedly only a couple of months before the invasion. The commitment to an exit strategy in the Department of Defense is illustrated by the fact that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted to win on the battlefields of Iraq (and Afghanistan) and get out as quickly as possible. While his successor, Robert Gates, has accepted the mission of nationbuilding, he has avoided any public elaboration concerning what that mission entails or whether it can be accomplished. For years, the U.S. military has railed at the lack of organization and commitment by the civilian side of government. DoD has argued that in the field, there aren’t enough experts in such areas as agriculture, education, banking, local governance, etc. Although by 2008, an impressive number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams had been deployed, many embedded with U.S. brigades, the nub of the problem went much deeper. The fundamental problem is sovereignty, which creates a dilemma. On the one hand, we are in other countries only because their governments cannot stand on their own. But the principle of sovereignty means that we cannot replace incompetent or corrupt officials of the host government. We are merely advisers rather than decision-makers. Iraq epitomized the dilemma. In 2004, the United States, guided by a high-minded desire to institute a moreor-less liberal democratic political order, implemented instead what amounted 56
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Reflections on the Iraq War to a dysfunctional political structure resulting in a sectarian census posing as a democratic election. The new Shiite rulers realized they could not remain in power without the support of the Americans. So they permitted the United States to remain, fighting their battles while hectoring the Iraqi government grudgingly to make reforms. This is not a model for future nation-building. While Iraq is on the path toward stability following the depredation and terror of the Saddam era, we won’t be able to judge definitively for several more years. It is clear, however, that the more than $20 billion the United States spent on reconstruction was basically wasted. It is also clear that the United States lacks a comprehensive approach to nation-building that matches U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and excellence in military operations. Finally, it is clear that corruption in Iraq is widespread and that the United States, despite its support of the Iraqi government, has no authority to curtail it or prosecute those who engage in it. Although it offends the U.S. military to know that many Iraqi officers and high officials are on the take, the fact is that there are many examples of corrupt states providing security and services for the people. While corruption often impedes nation building, it can also—paradoxically—sometimes contribute to nation building. The Nobel Prize-winning economist, Professor Roger Myerson has illustrated the difference outcomes. For example, counterinsurgency experts often cite Chiang Kai-shek’s government in China in 1949 as an example of how corruption corrodes a regime, leading to insurgent victory. But according to Myerson, ‘‘The problem was that highly connected government agents took profits from their positions without providing the governance and services that were expected of them.’’2 Chiang failed as a leader because he did not insure that his subordinates were rewarded only when they performed their jobs correctly. When they were rewarded even while failing, those failures aided the insurgents by spreading the perception that Chiang’s rule was doomed, motivating his subordinates to steal more while they could. They did nothing to prevent the collapse they had engineered by their own ineptitude. Conversely, the British in India in the 1860s granted local authority as a property right to landlords called zamindars. Thus permitted to tax and benefit themselves, the Zamindar bureaucracy ruthlessly stamped out any anti-British movements because a rebellion meant the end of their livelihoods. Similarly, what corrupt regimes in Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Russia have in common is a system in which apparatchiks understand that they must do their jobs to engage in graft. Despite payoffs and corruption at all levels, Iraq seems to be lurching toward a functioning government, allowing the United States to stand aside from the nation-building role. However, the Iraq example may not 2
Roger B. Myerson, Foundations of the State in Theory and Practice, University of Chicago web site, October, 2007. p. 15.
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WEST be transferable to Afghanistan, where warlords, insurgents and officials in Kabul, provide revenues of $ three billion a year, almost half of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product. It is not clear how the United States, in the role of adviser to a sovereign government, can build a stable, democratic, economically viable nation, under these conditions. Risk Assessment Requires Objectivity and Dispassion For three years, the military strategy in Iraq rattled down the wrong track for the same reasons that the U.S. financial sector crashed in September of 2008. Those at the top were out of touch and overconfident, the fiduciary responsibility for risk assessment was foregone and the quantitative measures were inadequate for understanding the problem. In 2005, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the head of the Central Command and the top generals in Iraq were all telling President Bush the same thing: American soldiers were an antibody in an Arab culture and the counterinsurgency mission belonged to the Iraqis. Rumsfeld used the analogy of riding a bicycle. Sooner or later, you had to take off the training wheels, remove the hand from the seat and let the new rider fall a few times. In other words, as American forces pulled out, the Iraqis would fall on their faces a few times, or never learn how to ride the bike. Risk happens. In fact, the only way to mitigate that risk was to order American soldiers to clear and then to hold the cities. That meant committing American forces in larger numbers for an indefinite amount of time. In October of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice endorsed this approach, saying that ‘‘our political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions.’’3 Rumsfeld reacted with consternation, as did General George Casey, the overall commander in Iraq, and General John Abizaid, commander of Central Command. ‘‘Reducing the size and visibility of the coalition forces in Iraq,’’ Abizaid said, ‘‘is a part of our counterinsurgency strategy.’’ That contradicted a cornerstone of the counterinsurgency doctrine: protecting the population. The secretary of state’s frame of reference was different from that of the secretary of defense and the military commanders on the ground. Unfortunately, the president did not resolve the contradiction. He envisioned a victory that eschewed risk, while the military pursued a transition that increased risk. In addition, risk management was bungled within the military. To use business terms, Casey, as the commander of the coalition force in Iraq was the Chief Executive Officer. Abizaid, as the theater commander, was overseeing 3
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rice, October 19, 2005.
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Reflections on the Iraq War the effort as a member of the Board of Trustees. But rather than providing dispassionate risk assessment of alternative approaches in Iraq, Abazaid, committed to the idea that Americans were antibodies to Iraq culture, was philosophically predisposed to agree with Casey about the mission: shift responsibility to the Iraqis as quickly as possible and get out in accordance with the Weinberger Doctrine’s principle of a rapid ‘‘exit strategy.’’ The degree of risk was further obfuscated by a lack of consistent measures for tracking progress or setbacks. Part of the problem is US military culture itself. The US military is trained to have a ‘‘can-do’’ spirit. Every battalion and division commander intends to succeed, and the Iraq end-oftour reports reflected success and ignored or explained away failures. No commander at any level wanted to ask for extra manpower and admit failure. The most obvious measures – the number of attacks, roadside bombs and casualties–were discounted by the introduction of more esoteric measures, such as the polling of Iraqi civilians that showed a dislike of Americans. This led to the misleading conclusion that the presence of American soldiers was as much a cause of violence as it was a deterrent. Lest we be too harsh on military assessments, the investment banks on Wall Street that employed the brightest analysts from the Ivy Leagues totally botched assessing the risks they were running in the subprime mortgage market. Wall Street lost its war and many firms went out of business. Our military did much better in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is disturbing that in September 2008, after seven years of fighting in Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for a comprehensive strategic review, saying he was not confident we were winning. It was not clear whether assessing risk rested with the Central Command, NATO, the Chairman or the Secretary of Defense. Yet what stands out from the Iraqi campaign assessments is the necessity for a dispassionate review provided by an assessor from outside the immediate operational command.
Intelligence is Never Certain In 2002, against the emotional background of 9/11, the Bush administration concluded that it had to preempt the possible transfer of weapons of mass destruction from Saddam to a terrorist group. Of course, the invasion uncovered no WMD; Saddam had been bluffing to keep Iran off balance. Consequently, distrust of intelligence that does not include admissions by an adversary, has solidified as a lesson inside the Congress and the press. But tyrannical regimes are by definition opaque. It will be a struggle for the new administration to accumulate sufficient data to persuade the Congress of the wisdom of launching a strike, let alone a war, in circumstances where the adversary denies the evidence. Iran’s nuclear program is a clear beneficiary of this ‘‘lesson.’’ Winter 2009
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WEST American Society has not Adapted to a Basic Change in Warfare Armies are institutions that foster and protect civilization. Without the shield of military force, commerce and scholarship cannot progress. For the past thousand years, Western armies have imposed codes of conduct governing behavior in war and battle. A fundamental role of warfare, enforced by summary execution, was the requirement that soldiers wear uniforms to distinguish them from the population. The rationale of course was to protect the civilian population from indiscriminate slaughter. Gradually, the U.S. military adopted a doctrine of victory based on decisive battles and the destruction of the opposing army. Once its military power was destroyed, as in World War II, the vanquished foe would then submit to American terms. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the traditional US theory of victory called for operations that swiftly routed the Taliban and of Saddam’s army. But in each case, the vanquished refused to accept the outcome of these conventional campaigns. Instead, they adopted guerrilla tactics, continuing to resist while finding sanctuary among civilian populations that were either intimidated or sympathetic or both. In the past, Western armies had employed Draconian methods against such enemies. In the 1950s, the British in Malaya placed the ethnic Chinese population in ‘‘strategic hamlets’’ surrounded by barbed wire in order to separate them from the insurgents. In Vietnam in the 1960s, the U.S. military moved tens of thousands of villagers out of Viet Cong areas and into refugee camps. In the twenty-first century, such harsh methods are eschewed. Morality does not change, but governments frequently change the rules of war. In Iraq, the Counterinsurgency Manual stated that a key goal was establishing the rule of law, to include: ‘‘a government that derives its powers from the governed, sustainable security institutions and fundamental human rights.’’4 The problem was that such a mission was beyond the skill set of soldiers and did not match the conditions on the ground. While American soldiers acted as arresting officers subject to strict rules of evidence, Iraqi judges, U.S. review boards, and the Iraqi National Assembly flouted ‘‘the rule of law’’ and let prisoners go whenever it suited them. The liberal principles of the United States and Europe were at odds with the requirements necessary for fighting a war against an enemy who did not wear a uniform. Eight out of ten insurgents sent to prison in Iraq were released within ten months. The high command claimed that only between one and nine percent of those sent to jail were ever re-arrested. That statistic alone was proof of terrible police work, given that the violent crime rate in Iraq—murder, kidnapping, robbery—was staggering. Insisting upon the liberal American rule of law resulted in a catch-&-release cycle that prolonged 4
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FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Department of the Army, December, 2006 p D8.
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Reflections on the Iraq War the war and angered the troops. Imprisoning insurgents for less than a year in the course of a multi-year insurgency did not make sense. There were 400,000 prisoners of war incarcerated within the United States during World War II. Had they not been wearing uniforms, their cases would still be pending in state and civilian courts. The 200-odd prisoners at Guantanamo received remarkable pro-bono legal attention and lavish press coverage. ‘‘Elite political culture,’’ CIA Director Michael Hayden said, ‘‘seems to be squeezing, at least psychically, that operational space; . . . its (CIA) legitimacy is being questioned by certain segments of the population.’’5 Most egregiously, the Supreme Court has accorded insurgents not in uniform an array of rights almost equivalent to an American citizen. At the end of 2008, the United States held more than 15,000 prisoners in Iraq and several thousand more in Afghanistan. Perhaps 5,000 were dedicated Islamic terrorists who would kill again if given a chance. By extending protections to insurgents, the Supreme Court has created the likelihood that the military legal system will grind to a halt. Thanks to these judicial decisions, an enemy who wears a uniform while fighting Americans is foolish. By wearing civilian clothes, he can hide among the population and, if detained, demand civil rights beyond the capacity of the United States judicial system to administer. Neither the Court nor the Executive and Congressional branches have codified a set of rules for dealing with enemies who wear civilian clothes as camouflage. Fighting a War While Politically Divided is a Recipe for Defeat Even the most successful wars have been characterized by blunders and mistakes that have led to heavy casualties and delayed victory. During World War II, our nation highlighted courage and quietly accepted mistakes. Today, we highlight mistakes and quietly accept valor, if we acknowledge it at all. During the terrible struggle for the island of Iwo Jima in 1945, nearly six thousand Americans died, many more than in five years in Iraq. Although some historians judge Iwo Jima to have been a strategic blunder, it is nonetheless honored as a symbol of the determination of the American fighting man to destroy the enemy and emerge victorious, regardless of the carnage and cost. In the words of Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, ‘‘uncommon valor was a common virtue’’ on Iwo Jima. Today, the press and Congress would be apoplectic about such strategic error and would decry the loss of lives. Scant attention would be accorded to the heroic resolve to seize that island fortress once the battle was joined. During the Vietnam War, the American spirit was dragged down by the cost in casualties, by the opposition of many college youths fearing the draft, by the ambivalence of the foreign policy elite toward the war, and by the lack 5
Michael Hayden, Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, September 21, 2007.
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WEST of demonstrable progress in a war of attrition. In the case of Iraq, there were disagreements about the causes of the war, its costs, and the likelihood of success. In addition, many general officers, both retired and active duty, privately and publicly questioned whether several fellow generals and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were fit for command. In the Iraq War, the president asked for no sacrifice by the American people. ‘‘I think a lot of people are in this fight,’’ Bush said. ‘‘I mean, they sacrifice peace of mind when they see the terrible images of violence on TV every night.’’6 Terrible images weren’t sacrifice; instead, they turned viewers against the war, making it easy for politicians to repudiate their earlier votes authorizing the invasion. Without sharing in any sacrifice, the voters had scant stake in the war. At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest that American society has been willing to sacrifice, whether the issue be Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else. As measured by casualties or costs in terms of the gross domestic product, Iraq was not a major war like Vietnam, let alone World War II. Additionally, American society is now largely disconnected from the military. Less than one in a hundred high school graduates serve in the infantry. Three-quarters of high school graduates do not meet the military physical or mental entry standards, while Ivy League graduates no longer feel an obligation to serve a tour in the military before getting on with their careers. The martial values of our society have deteriorated. During World War II, the press scarcely mentioned and never photographed the dozens of public hangings of American soldiers, and never mentioned the shootings of German civilians or captured prisoners. The press considered such stories to be out of bounds. In Iraq, the killings of civilians in Haditha in late 2006 were characterized as a massacre and received vastly more press attention than any valorous action in the war. And the hue and cry about Haditha was not motivated by a thirst for justice; when subsequent investigations exonerated most of the troops involved at Haditha, the press wrote little and said less. Courage, Aristotle said, is the virtue that makes all other virtues possible. Geopolitical wisdom is admirable, but martial valor is essential to sustain a democracy. American society takes courage for granted, and the press ignores it. When we fight the next war, this attitude will poorly serve the nation. Will soldiers risk their lives, if society ignores courage? Secretary of Defense Gates took the post at the Pentagon intent on bringing Democrats and Republicans together on Iraq, where he said steady progress was being made. Far from promoting reconciliation in the States, progress in Iraq increased the bitterness at home. ‘‘I say to our soldiers,’’ Odierno told me, ‘‘you’re finishing it so it wasn’t in vain for those who came before.’’ Despite Odierno’s sentiment, some politicians did insist the sacrifices were in vain. Senator Harry Reid’s comment in 2006 that the ‘‘war was lost’’ disgraced America. Senator Jim Webb cited 6
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Tom Friedman on President Bush, New York Times, July 29, 2007.
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Reflections on the Iraq War polls questioning the military’s support for the war. Had a poll reported low morale on the beaches of Normandy in June of 1944, would the Senate have voted to end the war? Despite the appearance of softness and lack of martial spirit, American society produces the world’s toughest warriors, who keep coming, year after year. Despite a lack of encouragement from society, especially its elite, our warrior class selects itself. Fortunately, in contrast to the Vietnam War, no major portion of American society has, so far, turned against its soldiers during the Iraq war. But no nation can sustain its values by claiming to support the soldier while opposing his mission. The truth is that the nation determines the mission. National security cannot be sustained when domestic party affiliation and ideology determine the support for a war. Iraq was a symptom, not the cause of the ideological polarization of American society. The notion that America would unite behind a ‘‘good war’’ was a palliative. Although sacrifice on a national scale is not required for every conflict, a healthy society does not treat war as an extension of domestic political competition. While the American military was able to adapt to changing conditions in Iraq, overcoming earlier mistakes, American society became more divisive. As Rome and Athens demonstrated two thousand years ago, every military, no matter how strong its internal code, eventually mirrors its society. Society was not unified in supporting the battle in Iraq. It was easy to criticize the Bush administration with all its faults. It is less easy to question whether our society retains sufficient unity to be the world’s greatest power. Despite our most fervent hopes for peace and stability, it is likely that America will again be tested by force of arms under circumstances as ambiguous as those in Iraq. As Commander in Chief, the President Must Make the Hard Decisions In the U.S. system of government, the President, advised by his National Security Council, determines war policy and approves strategy. In Iraq, President Bush presided more than decided, acting like the chairman of the board rather than the chief executive. He waited for his staff to produce consensus options. Once he selected an option, he considered his job done. While the insurgency in Iraq was at odds with the president’s intellectual framework regarding war, his biggest failure was not understanding that the Pentagon disagreed with his strategic goals in Iraq. In 2003, the Pentagon, motivated by the Weinberger Doctrine’s emphasis on an exit strategy, wanted to extract the US military from as quickly as possible, leaving the insurgency to the Iraqis deal with insurgents. The president on the other hand, wanted Iraq rebuilt and the insurgency quelled, requiring a long-term U.S. military involvement. At the outset of the Iraq War, President Bush fully accepted what Eliot Cohen has called the ‘‘normal’’ theory of civil-military relations, which calls for a clear line of Winter 2009
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WEST demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then conduct the actual war.7 From 2003 through the summer of 2006, Washington existed inside its own bubble. The interagency process concocted policy goals disconnected from the military strategy pursued on the battlefield. Although policy is supposed to direct the selection of a war-making strategy, that didn’t happen until Bush decided on a surge in January of 2007. In doing so, President Bush abandoned the normal theory of civilmilitary relations. He adopted a new approach to the war, replacing the uniformed and civilian leaders who were adherents of the failed operational approach with others who shared his commitment to victory rather than ‘‘playing for a tie.’’ While the surge and the counterinsurgency strategy implemented by Gen. David Petraeus was not the only reason for the turnaround in Iraq, it was able to leverage the changed attitudes of the Sunni, represented by the ‘‘Anbar Awakening’’ and to help break the back of both al Qaeda and the Shia Mahdi Army. The challenges to US foreign and defense policy are not likely to change in 2009. The American people will be ill-served by another eight years of corrosive divisiveness. President Barack Obama must make clear the lines of responsibility for the strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and—standing quite apart from that general—who is responsible for risk assessment. Granting al Qaeda a sanctuary in western Pakistan for another four years increases the risk of another devastating attack on U.S. soil. The new president must grasp the nature of the war in Afghanistan and understand the implications of military courses of action against west Pakistan. He must resist the notion that he can remain aloof, delegating military matters to the military while he attends to domestic concerns and affairs of state. Above all, he must be prepared to lead a nation that is still at war.
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Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002).
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