- Email: [email protected]
Rejoinder to Burgess
JOUHNAL
OF ESPkXISIEKTAL
SOCIAL
PbYCHOLOGY
Rejoinder JAMES State
University
7,
551-557
( 1971)
to Burgess T. of
TEDESCHI New
York
at Albany
AND STEPHEN
E.
University
of
BERGER Miami
Any graduate level course on research design which chooses to examine contemporary experiments in social psychology quickly reveals to the student that any experiment can in retrospect be subject to alternative interpretations. The “best” experiment is often defined as one which eliminates the greatest number of alternative interpretations (Platt, 1964). However, three types of experiments may be carried out in science: (I) tests of predictions deduced from more general propositions; (II) exploratory studies whose main function is to generate Iiypotheses; and (III) development of new experimental paradigms or techniques of measurement. The criterion of elimination of alternative hypotheses is applicable only to the first type of experiment. A critical comment on almost any experiment may focus upon the control of extraneous variables, operationalization of theoretical conanalysis of results, and interpretations structs, details of procedure, given to the data. Burgess has faithfully touched all of these bases and it must be admitted that he has scored some points. But he missed the main point of the experiment, clearly cited in the introduction to the original paper: What is most ideally required for the study of aggression is a research paradigm which can be used with children as well as adults and which uses a behavioral response that can be unambiguously interpreted as harmintending aggression directed toward another person. The present study attempted to produce such a research paradigm (Berger & Tedeschi, 1969, p. 353).
It is clear that the major emphasis was on a Type III experiment. Anyone evaluating a new paradigm for the study of aggression might seek face validity through the selection of populations generally believed to display different operant levels of aggressive behavior. It was 551
ss2
TEDESCIII
AND
HEHGEH
plausible, therefore, to comp:Wc juvcnilc dc~linc~wnts aid “normal” children. If no diffcrencr was obs~~rvc~l ill opcrmt lcv& of :lggressi\Tc behavior, thc,rc would be reason to suspect that the research paradigm is not sensitive to the critical variable of interest. Similarly, and zchntever the reason, it is clear that generally Black Americans clre involved in more antisocial acts than are Whites (Neumeyer, 1961), and the research paradigm could be expected to reflect this difference. It should be noted that the authors did expect differences within racial groups (e.g., black delinquents were expected to be more aggressive than black “normals”). The research paradigm “tried out” was a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Each preadolescent boy played against “the house” but believed he participated with a boy “just like you.” The matrix values utilized for the experiment arc known to generate a rather high level of competitive behavior (Jones, Steele, Gahagen, & Tedeschi, 1968; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Steele & Tedeschi, 1967). The “house” cooperated on 25 of the 50 iterations of the game. At the conclusion of every seventh trial, the subject was given the option to authorize the experimenter to take $10 in play money away from the “other boy.” Across conditions, subjects incurred opportunity costs of 2, 5, 8, or 11 dollars for exercising their unilateral power options. The plausible assumption was made that a valid paradigm for the study of aggression should be sensitive to the costs of exercising power, at least for “normal” subjects. Those who are familiar with the current literature on the topic of conflict, particularly the research employing various game paradigms, will not be astonished that we interpreted much of the behavior of the subjects in the experiment in terms of exploitation, vulnerability, “toughskill. Combined with the game paradigm, the cueness,” and strategic frustration hypothesis of Berkowitz (1962) led the present authors to state:
. . . aggression would be manifested only when appropriate provided. The exploitation-vulnerability characteristics associated PDG might he expected to elicit differential aggressive behavior above populations even when operant levels are not different
cues are with the from the (p, 355).
The only time a person is vulnerable to exploitation in a PDG is when he makes the cooperative response; that is, the only time a player can lose while the other player wins is when the former cooperates and the latter competes. Burgess takes issue with the interpretations given to responses in the PDG, not only by the present authors but presumably by all others who
BE JOINDEH
TO
553
BUHCESS
use the same language. Part of the objection probably stems from confusion concerning the nature of reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma play. Burgess states: “Whether he won or lost on any particular trial was a matter of pure chance. The fact that one group won more than another is no evidence for the empIoyment of skill since given the matrix supplied, a position habit would have produced the same results.” It was clear to the experimenters that all subjects were interested in winning M & M candies and hence attempted to gain monopoly money by his strategy selections (as instructed to do). All subjects had ample opportunity to learn that the “house” was vulnerable to exploitation and that the “best” policy was to compete on every trial. To cooperate on even SO% of the trials was not “altruistic” as suggested by Burgess so much as it was self-defeating in the context of the manifest goals of both experimenter and subject. Subjects who competed most in the context of the experiment by definition were more skillful in playing the gamethey won more play money!! Within the context of the PDG our critic’s comments are sometimes incomprehensible : . . unless they can present data to show that whites skillfully their strategy in response to their observation of the ‘other’s’ cooperation, while blacks did not, then they must concede observed differences in winnings is merely an artifact of matrix, containing as it does a built-in advantage to the autistic and that the only thing to be explained is the basic difference tiveness between blacks and whites.
modified 50% random that the the payoff competitor, in coopera-
Our interpretation that the differences in cooperative behavior were due to the generalized expectancies associated with the two populations is plausible and consistent with a rather sizeable body of evidence. In any case, winnings were not artifacts of a matrix biased toward the “house.” The payoff values were symmetrical-the same for both players. Given an insight into the game, it can be demonstrated that the 50% cooperative strategy adopted by the “house” biased the game in favor of the subjects. Other similar comments by the critic do not deserve detailed rebuttal. Given that all subjects played against the same preprogrammed schedule of responses by “the house,” their own skill brought about their own reinforcements. Given the notions of skill and control of own reinforccurcnts, it is not far-fetched to place the results of the experiment withiu the eontcaxt of the decision-making literature concerning I-E control orientation. The purpose was to join together rather divergent research “areas” ( i.e., conflict and aggression with personality research)
554
TEDESCHI
AND
BERGER
and the outcome was an hypothesis of cue-personality-aggression clearly offered on a post hoc basis. Thus, much of the discussion is of the character of a Type II experiment. It is unfortunate that the present authors chose to label the final paragraph of the research report as “Conclusions.” It simply did not occur to us that someone would mistake an experiment which had the mixed character of Types II and III for a Type I experiment. The experiment was clearly identified as a Type III experiment and the reader could simply read the undisguised post hoc search for coherence and hypotheses in a largely heuristic Type II discussion. Perhaps the last paragraph should have been identified as “Tentative Post Hoc Interpretations to be treated as Plausible Hypotheses That Might Be interesting to Test.” Within the context of the aspirations explicitly stated for the study most of the critical comments simply become irrelevant, because a Type III experiment that dabbles in Type II interpretations is castigated for not being a Type I experiment. Some of the comments made should be taken somewhat more seriously, however. Burgess argues that when . . . two groups of subjects whose mean scores on some measure are equal . . . and then one proceeds to split each group into two parts thereby producing four unequal means, one is in duty bound to present and explain all four of the new relationships created, and not just one of them. In the present example, if blacks are overall no more aggressive than whites, but after a cooperative response by “other,” they are more aggressive, then after exploitative choices by “other,” they should be less aggressive then whites. The flaw in this argument is the assumption that a failure to demonstrate a statistically significant difference between means implies that the means are identical. Not only is it possible for only one of the four new dependent variables to show a difference that is significant, such was actually the case in the present study. The reason for not reporting the other three dependent variables was that nothing was found and the reader would be innundated with dependent variables. The fact is that the critic offers a series of other possible dependent variables to test (trial n - 2, tl - 3, n - 7, etc.). The chief criteria for our acceptance of the trial n - 1 choice were: (a) black and white differed on this measure; (b) juvenile delinquents and “normals” differed on the measure; ( c ) the effects of opportunity costs became apparent when this measure was used; and (n) congruence with Berkowitz’ cueaggression hypothesis. That past experiments using the unmodified PDG have also shown that trial n - 1 data (albeit relating different responses than the experiment being discussed to give the critic his due) provide
REJOINDER
TO
BURGESS
555
smooth and interpretable relationships is merely supportive of the choice made. Burgess’ attempt to define a competitive game response as aggressive is not convincing. The authors provided the definition that the aggressor must intend to do harm to his target. Within the context of a PDG a competitive response may be considered as often a defensive measure (minimizing losses) as it is an offensive exploitative response (maximizing gains). Even in the later case, it is not clear that the offensive player intends to harm the other player so much as he is acting in a completely selfish manner, whatever the consequences to others. The elimination of the dependent population from the graph of the three-way interaction shown in Fig. 5 was for the purpose of clarifying the picture. Figure 3 shows the aggressiveness of dependent children (collapsed over race) as a function of opportunity costs and the authors explained that there “was no clear racial difference in the dependent population (p. 362).” Th c reader can therefore superimpose the dependent curve on Fig. 5 for himself if he so desires. In retrospect the authors ftel they failed to adequately point out that the differences in aggressiveness between juvenile delinquents and “normals” was greater than the differences between blacks and whites (see Figs. 4 and 5). The Zeitgeist probably pulled our attention toward the racial differences rather than similarities. Then, too, the attempt to find coherence in the research literature riveted our attention to the differences. It now seems clear, for instance, that the notion of “saving face” would probably be more relevant to the behavior of delinquent children, white and black, than to the differences between white and black children. In any case, the statements that “blacks increased in aggression until costs became excessively high. Whites demonstrated a general tendency to decline in use of aggression as costs went up . . .” are not entirely accurate. That one could also say that point for point there is an increase by whites at the highest cost level (but not if compared to the 5-point costs) does not falsify the statement made about the behavior of white boys. However, Burgess is correct to criticize the description of the behavior of black children. Suffice it to say that the black children remain at a high level of aggression as costs increase until costs become excessive. The error made in no way changes the interpretations offered that blacks were relatively insensitive to costs. Burgess considers his “most telling criticism” to be that black subjects were drawn from lower socioeconomic status levels than were white subjects. He then accuses us of dwelling upon racial differences in explaining the results. WC are told that only by introducing class variables into the analysis could we parcel them out, hence excluding
556
TEDESCHI
AND
them as causal factors. The present anticipate this argument:
BERGER
authors
went
out of their way to
There is little doubt that institutionalized populations are biased with disproportionate numbers from the lowest socioeconomic levels ( Nye, 1958 ). Most of the black subjects in the present study were from generally lower class levels than the white subjects . . . However, demographic factors associated with class must be translated into psychological factors to avoid inappropriate cause-effect statements across different levels of conceptual analyses. Psychological factors associated with class have been used in the above interpretations of the data (pp. 366-367).
The psychological factors proposed as highly correlated with socioeconomic class were related to propensities to take risks, I-E control, feelings of powerlessness, and so on. The authors did (and do) not view either socioeconomic status or class or race as explanatory concepts in psychology. Hence, the effort was made by assessing the available evidence to translate the sociological factors into correlated personality attributes which could plausibly lead to the behavioral differences observed. Again, in retrospect, the authors would argue that a white middle class bias was demonstrated by the paper under consideration. The very constructs of I-E control make sense only in the context of the types of goals and problems posed by the Establishment. But if by pretests a high Internal Control white preadolescent was selected to be placed on the streets of a Black ghetto, he would probably feel powerless, not able to mediate his own reinforcements, and would expect chance, luck, or fate to produce his outcomes. On the other hand, in the ghetto the black preadolescent who on a pretest scores high on External Control might well feel in control of his own reinforcements, though the rewards and means might not be “acceptable” in other cultural contexts. The value connotations of the I-E construct are difficult to notice from this side of the color line. In conclusion, it must be conceded that a Type II or Type III experiment should lead to cross-validation studies. It is an editorial decision whether to publish a paper of this kind without the cross-validation study included. Berger has been doing some other work on aggression utilizing the same tool, while Tedeschi (cf. 1970) has reported on a large program of research working with a similar paradigm. Despite the fact that Burgess seems to believe that an hypothesis can be found to be acceptable or not on the basis of a single study, this textbook form of idealism about science hardly ever holds in the real world. Hc even seems to imply that drawing conclusions from data not entirely your own is inappropriate. But science is a public endeavor and the task is to
l~l~JOIXI~I3t
TO
BUHGESS
557
integrate and make cohercmt as much data as one can. However well poorly we achieved our methodological and theoretical aims, the intent was not to harm.
or
REFEHENCES BERCER, S. E., & TEDESCHI, J. T. Aggressive behavior of delinquent, dependent, and “normal” white and black boys in social conflicts. lotclnal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 352-370. BEHK~~~IZ, L. Aggressioll: a social psychological udysis. New York: McCramHill, 1962. JONES, B., STEELE, Al., GAHAGAN, J., & TEDESCHI, J. T. Matrix values and cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. jorirnal of Pemx2aZity artd Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 148-153. NEUXIEYEH, M. H. ]rtwnik delinquency in modern society. (3rd ccl.). New York: Van Nostrand, 1961. PLXCT, J. R. Strong inference. Science, 1964, 146, 347-353. HAFOPORT, A., Kr CHAMMAH, A. M. Prisoner’s Dilemnan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965. STEELE, M. W., & TEIXSCI~ J. T. Matrix indices and strategy choices in mixed motive games. Jounuzl of Conflict Resolution, 1967, 11, 198-205. TEDEXXI~, J. 1’. Threats and promises. In P. Swingle (Ed. ), The structure of confiict. New York: Academic Press, 1970. pp 155-191.
OF ESPkXISIEKTAL
SOCIAL
PbYCHOLOGY
Rejoinder JAMES State
University
7,
551-557
( 1971)
to Burgess T. of
TEDESCHI New
York
at Albany
AND STEPHEN
E.
University
of
BERGER Miami
Any graduate level course on research design which chooses to examine contemporary experiments in social psychology quickly reveals to the student that any experiment can in retrospect be subject to alternative interpretations. The “best” experiment is often defined as one which eliminates the greatest number of alternative interpretations (Platt, 1964). However, three types of experiments may be carried out in science: (I) tests of predictions deduced from more general propositions; (II) exploratory studies whose main function is to generate Iiypotheses; and (III) development of new experimental paradigms or techniques of measurement. The criterion of elimination of alternative hypotheses is applicable only to the first type of experiment. A critical comment on almost any experiment may focus upon the control of extraneous variables, operationalization of theoretical conanalysis of results, and interpretations structs, details of procedure, given to the data. Burgess has faithfully touched all of these bases and it must be admitted that he has scored some points. But he missed the main point of the experiment, clearly cited in the introduction to the original paper: What is most ideally required for the study of aggression is a research paradigm which can be used with children as well as adults and which uses a behavioral response that can be unambiguously interpreted as harmintending aggression directed toward another person. The present study attempted to produce such a research paradigm (Berger & Tedeschi, 1969, p. 353).
It is clear that the major emphasis was on a Type III experiment. Anyone evaluating a new paradigm for the study of aggression might seek face validity through the selection of populations generally believed to display different operant levels of aggressive behavior. It was 551
ss2
TEDESCIII
AND
HEHGEH
plausible, therefore, to comp:Wc juvcnilc dc~linc~wnts aid “normal” children. If no diffcrencr was obs~~rvc~l ill opcrmt lcv& of :lggressi\Tc behavior, thc,rc would be reason to suspect that the research paradigm is not sensitive to the critical variable of interest. Similarly, and zchntever the reason, it is clear that generally Black Americans clre involved in more antisocial acts than are Whites (Neumeyer, 1961), and the research paradigm could be expected to reflect this difference. It should be noted that the authors did expect differences within racial groups (e.g., black delinquents were expected to be more aggressive than black “normals”). The research paradigm “tried out” was a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Each preadolescent boy played against “the house” but believed he participated with a boy “just like you.” The matrix values utilized for the experiment arc known to generate a rather high level of competitive behavior (Jones, Steele, Gahagen, & Tedeschi, 1968; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Steele & Tedeschi, 1967). The “house” cooperated on 25 of the 50 iterations of the game. At the conclusion of every seventh trial, the subject was given the option to authorize the experimenter to take $10 in play money away from the “other boy.” Across conditions, subjects incurred opportunity costs of 2, 5, 8, or 11 dollars for exercising their unilateral power options. The plausible assumption was made that a valid paradigm for the study of aggression should be sensitive to the costs of exercising power, at least for “normal” subjects. Those who are familiar with the current literature on the topic of conflict, particularly the research employing various game paradigms, will not be astonished that we interpreted much of the behavior of the subjects in the experiment in terms of exploitation, vulnerability, “toughskill. Combined with the game paradigm, the cueness,” and strategic frustration hypothesis of Berkowitz (1962) led the present authors to state:
. . . aggression would be manifested only when appropriate provided. The exploitation-vulnerability characteristics associated PDG might he expected to elicit differential aggressive behavior above populations even when operant levels are not different
cues are with the from the (p, 355).
The only time a person is vulnerable to exploitation in a PDG is when he makes the cooperative response; that is, the only time a player can lose while the other player wins is when the former cooperates and the latter competes. Burgess takes issue with the interpretations given to responses in the PDG, not only by the present authors but presumably by all others who
BE JOINDEH
TO
553
BUHCESS
use the same language. Part of the objection probably stems from confusion concerning the nature of reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma play. Burgess states: “Whether he won or lost on any particular trial was a matter of pure chance. The fact that one group won more than another is no evidence for the empIoyment of skill since given the matrix supplied, a position habit would have produced the same results.” It was clear to the experimenters that all subjects were interested in winning M & M candies and hence attempted to gain monopoly money by his strategy selections (as instructed to do). All subjects had ample opportunity to learn that the “house” was vulnerable to exploitation and that the “best” policy was to compete on every trial. To cooperate on even SO% of the trials was not “altruistic” as suggested by Burgess so much as it was self-defeating in the context of the manifest goals of both experimenter and subject. Subjects who competed most in the context of the experiment by definition were more skillful in playing the gamethey won more play money!! Within the context of the PDG our critic’s comments are sometimes incomprehensible : . . unless they can present data to show that whites skillfully their strategy in response to their observation of the ‘other’s’ cooperation, while blacks did not, then they must concede observed differences in winnings is merely an artifact of matrix, containing as it does a built-in advantage to the autistic and that the only thing to be explained is the basic difference tiveness between blacks and whites.
modified 50% random that the the payoff competitor, in coopera-
Our interpretation that the differences in cooperative behavior were due to the generalized expectancies associated with the two populations is plausible and consistent with a rather sizeable body of evidence. In any case, winnings were not artifacts of a matrix biased toward the “house.” The payoff values were symmetrical-the same for both players. Given an insight into the game, it can be demonstrated that the 50% cooperative strategy adopted by the “house” biased the game in favor of the subjects. Other similar comments by the critic do not deserve detailed rebuttal. Given that all subjects played against the same preprogrammed schedule of responses by “the house,” their own skill brought about their own reinforcements. Given the notions of skill and control of own reinforccurcnts, it is not far-fetched to place the results of the experiment withiu the eontcaxt of the decision-making literature concerning I-E control orientation. The purpose was to join together rather divergent research “areas” ( i.e., conflict and aggression with personality research)
554
TEDESCHI
AND
BERGER
and the outcome was an hypothesis of cue-personality-aggression clearly offered on a post hoc basis. Thus, much of the discussion is of the character of a Type II experiment. It is unfortunate that the present authors chose to label the final paragraph of the research report as “Conclusions.” It simply did not occur to us that someone would mistake an experiment which had the mixed character of Types II and III for a Type I experiment. The experiment was clearly identified as a Type III experiment and the reader could simply read the undisguised post hoc search for coherence and hypotheses in a largely heuristic Type II discussion. Perhaps the last paragraph should have been identified as “Tentative Post Hoc Interpretations to be treated as Plausible Hypotheses That Might Be interesting to Test.” Within the context of the aspirations explicitly stated for the study most of the critical comments simply become irrelevant, because a Type III experiment that dabbles in Type II interpretations is castigated for not being a Type I experiment. Some of the comments made should be taken somewhat more seriously, however. Burgess argues that when . . . two groups of subjects whose mean scores on some measure are equal . . . and then one proceeds to split each group into two parts thereby producing four unequal means, one is in duty bound to present and explain all four of the new relationships created, and not just one of them. In the present example, if blacks are overall no more aggressive than whites, but after a cooperative response by “other,” they are more aggressive, then after exploitative choices by “other,” they should be less aggressive then whites. The flaw in this argument is the assumption that a failure to demonstrate a statistically significant difference between means implies that the means are identical. Not only is it possible for only one of the four new dependent variables to show a difference that is significant, such was actually the case in the present study. The reason for not reporting the other three dependent variables was that nothing was found and the reader would be innundated with dependent variables. The fact is that the critic offers a series of other possible dependent variables to test (trial n - 2, tl - 3, n - 7, etc.). The chief criteria for our acceptance of the trial n - 1 choice were: (a) black and white differed on this measure; (b) juvenile delinquents and “normals” differed on the measure; ( c ) the effects of opportunity costs became apparent when this measure was used; and (n) congruence with Berkowitz’ cueaggression hypothesis. That past experiments using the unmodified PDG have also shown that trial n - 1 data (albeit relating different responses than the experiment being discussed to give the critic his due) provide
REJOINDER
TO
BURGESS
555
smooth and interpretable relationships is merely supportive of the choice made. Burgess’ attempt to define a competitive game response as aggressive is not convincing. The authors provided the definition that the aggressor must intend to do harm to his target. Within the context of a PDG a competitive response may be considered as often a defensive measure (minimizing losses) as it is an offensive exploitative response (maximizing gains). Even in the later case, it is not clear that the offensive player intends to harm the other player so much as he is acting in a completely selfish manner, whatever the consequences to others. The elimination of the dependent population from the graph of the three-way interaction shown in Fig. 5 was for the purpose of clarifying the picture. Figure 3 shows the aggressiveness of dependent children (collapsed over race) as a function of opportunity costs and the authors explained that there “was no clear racial difference in the dependent population (p. 362).” Th c reader can therefore superimpose the dependent curve on Fig. 5 for himself if he so desires. In retrospect the authors ftel they failed to adequately point out that the differences in aggressiveness between juvenile delinquents and “normals” was greater than the differences between blacks and whites (see Figs. 4 and 5). The Zeitgeist probably pulled our attention toward the racial differences rather than similarities. Then, too, the attempt to find coherence in the research literature riveted our attention to the differences. It now seems clear, for instance, that the notion of “saving face” would probably be more relevant to the behavior of delinquent children, white and black, than to the differences between white and black children. In any case, the statements that “blacks increased in aggression until costs became excessively high. Whites demonstrated a general tendency to decline in use of aggression as costs went up . . .” are not entirely accurate. That one could also say that point for point there is an increase by whites at the highest cost level (but not if compared to the 5-point costs) does not falsify the statement made about the behavior of white boys. However, Burgess is correct to criticize the description of the behavior of black children. Suffice it to say that the black children remain at a high level of aggression as costs increase until costs become excessive. The error made in no way changes the interpretations offered that blacks were relatively insensitive to costs. Burgess considers his “most telling criticism” to be that black subjects were drawn from lower socioeconomic status levels than were white subjects. He then accuses us of dwelling upon racial differences in explaining the results. WC are told that only by introducing class variables into the analysis could we parcel them out, hence excluding
556
TEDESCHI
AND
them as causal factors. The present anticipate this argument:
BERGER
authors
went
out of their way to
There is little doubt that institutionalized populations are biased with disproportionate numbers from the lowest socioeconomic levels ( Nye, 1958 ). Most of the black subjects in the present study were from generally lower class levels than the white subjects . . . However, demographic factors associated with class must be translated into psychological factors to avoid inappropriate cause-effect statements across different levels of conceptual analyses. Psychological factors associated with class have been used in the above interpretations of the data (pp. 366-367).
The psychological factors proposed as highly correlated with socioeconomic class were related to propensities to take risks, I-E control, feelings of powerlessness, and so on. The authors did (and do) not view either socioeconomic status or class or race as explanatory concepts in psychology. Hence, the effort was made by assessing the available evidence to translate the sociological factors into correlated personality attributes which could plausibly lead to the behavioral differences observed. Again, in retrospect, the authors would argue that a white middle class bias was demonstrated by the paper under consideration. The very constructs of I-E control make sense only in the context of the types of goals and problems posed by the Establishment. But if by pretests a high Internal Control white preadolescent was selected to be placed on the streets of a Black ghetto, he would probably feel powerless, not able to mediate his own reinforcements, and would expect chance, luck, or fate to produce his outcomes. On the other hand, in the ghetto the black preadolescent who on a pretest scores high on External Control might well feel in control of his own reinforcements, though the rewards and means might not be “acceptable” in other cultural contexts. The value connotations of the I-E construct are difficult to notice from this side of the color line. In conclusion, it must be conceded that a Type II or Type III experiment should lead to cross-validation studies. It is an editorial decision whether to publish a paper of this kind without the cross-validation study included. Berger has been doing some other work on aggression utilizing the same tool, while Tedeschi (cf. 1970) has reported on a large program of research working with a similar paradigm. Despite the fact that Burgess seems to believe that an hypothesis can be found to be acceptable or not on the basis of a single study, this textbook form of idealism about science hardly ever holds in the real world. Hc even seems to imply that drawing conclusions from data not entirely your own is inappropriate. But science is a public endeavor and the task is to
l~l~JOIXI~I3t
TO
BUHGESS
557
integrate and make cohercmt as much data as one can. However well poorly we achieved our methodological and theoretical aims, the intent was not to harm.
or
REFEHENCES BERCER, S. E., & TEDESCHI, J. T. Aggressive behavior of delinquent, dependent, and “normal” white and black boys in social conflicts. lotclnal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 352-370. BEHK~~~IZ, L. Aggressioll: a social psychological udysis. New York: McCramHill, 1962. JONES, B., STEELE, Al., GAHAGAN, J., & TEDESCHI, J. T. Matrix values and cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. jorirnal of Pemx2aZity artd Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 148-153. NEUXIEYEH, M. H. ]rtwnik delinquency in modern society. (3rd ccl.). New York: Van Nostrand, 1961. PLXCT, J. R. Strong inference. Science, 1964, 146, 347-353. HAFOPORT, A., Kr CHAMMAH, A. M. Prisoner’s Dilemnan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965. STEELE, M. W., & TEIXSCI~ J. T. Matrix indices and strategy choices in mixed motive games. Jounuzl of Conflict Resolution, 1967, 11, 198-205. TEDEXXI~, J. 1’. Threats and promises. In P. Swingle (Ed. ), The structure of confiict. New York: Academic Press, 1970. pp 155-191.