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Relating operant techniques to programming and teaching
Journal of School Psychology Winter 1968 • Vol. VI, No. 2
RELATING OPERANT TECHNIQUES TO PROGRAMMING AND TEACHING
Siegfried Engelmann To bridge the gap between operant techniques and the problems of teaching classroom concepts, a distinction between two types of learning is introduced-fixed-response learning and variable-response learning. In fixed-response learning (saying the word red) only one response is taken as an indication that learning has taken place (that of saying red). The response dictates the criterion of performance for training and implies the kind of shaping that is needed to bring an inappropriate response to the desired criterion of performance. In the variable-response learning (learning the distinction between red and not-red things) the response used to demonstrate that learning has taken place is not fixed. It can be substituted by other responses. And it does not imply the kind of shaping that is needed to bring inappropriate responses to the desired criterion of performance. The distinction between fixed- and variable-response learning is then shown to be applicable to behavior modification problems and problems of programming. It is suggested that the distinction between fixed- and variable- can add a great deal to the precise application of operant techniques and to the analysis of teaching problems.
Despite the efforts of Skinner (1953) and others, there exists a considerable gap between operant techniques (as they are generally applied) and programming or instructional planning. Programming includes not only the specification of the steps that must be taken to induce given behavior, but also the branching specifications (what a teacher does if a child fails to respond adequately to the basic program). The gap between programming and operant techniques is evident in almost any teaching situation. If a teacher wants to teach the children how to multiply fractions, operant techniques do not tell her how to proceed. They may indicate generally, that the new learning should be broken down into small steps and that the teacher should have a firm idea of what kind of terminal behavior she expects in response to the presentation of specific stimuli. But even if she thoroughly specifies what she wants the children to d o - what types of questions she will present, what kind of responses they are to produce, etc.--and specifies what the children are able to do before training, she is left with no real direction, except perhaps that of experimenting to see which small steps lead to the desired learning. She is provided with no clear idea of the sub-skills she must teach to reach the desired criterion of performance. In practice, those who develop instructional programs are not without direction. They "intuitively" know what to teach. They know, for instance, that to demonstrate the color red one must systematically vary all of the visual aspects of objects except redness. However, the nature of the instructional planner's "intuition" is not specified within the operant framework. The reason is that operant techniques are premised on the idea that one deals with behavior, not with inferences from behavior.
J
Siegfried Engelmann is a Senior Educational Specialist at the institute for Research on Exceptional Children, University of
Illlnols.
89
J i
I
Kimble (1967) nicely summarizes the argument by noting that intelligent first-year graduate students readily acknowledge that the facts of psychology are descriptions of behavior and accounts of the circumstances under which behavior occurs. "From here it is but a brief step to recognize that these 'facts' are what we more typically call responses (descriptions of behavior) and stimuli (the circumstances under which behavior occurs). Thus the facts of psychology turn out to be Ss and Rs, a state of affairs which suggests with a certain insistence that the laws of psychology must be reducible to these terms and that an S-R psychology is an inevitability." (p. 76) However, the instructional planner does not deal in these facts. His facts are primarily the concepts that he wishes to demonstrate. Although it is possible to reduce his facts to the facts of S-R psychology (just as it is possible to explain automobile design or behavior in terms of atomic interaction) a great deal is lost in the process. For the instructional planner, behavior must be interpreted and viewed as instances of concepts or rules. That the instructional planner cannot effectively deal with behavior stripped of inferences can be demonstrated by the following illustration. An instructional planner is told that he is to teach the "concept" glick. The desired behavior is that the child indicates, using yes and no responses, whether the objects presented are glicks. The investigator simply presents a variety of common objects and asks alternatively, "Is this glick?" and "Is this non-glick?" If the instructional planner deals in "behaviors" he is provided at this point with all of the information he needs to develop a program for teaching glick. However, it is obvious that he cannot begin to develop a program until he receives more information. (Note that no specific response can be associated with glick.) H e needs information about the nature of the concept gIick. What is it? Only if he understands the structure of gIick can he hope to teach it systematically. Let's say that gI~ck means "between two pencils and heavier than one pound." And let's say that the instructional planner knows what gIiek means. He is now in a position to teach and correct the child. If the child indicates that an object is glick when it is between the two pencils, the instructional planner is able to infer from the child's responses where the presentation has failed and he knows which branch should be taken. The child has learned the "between" notion, but he hasn't learned the "heavierthan-one-pound" part. H e must be shown that judgments of gliek are based on between and heavier than one pound.
Fixed-Response and Variob[e-ResponseLearning T o coordinate operant techniques with instructional planning, one must distinguish between two types of response components that are encountered in a new-learning situation, fixed-response components and variable-response components. Fixed-response learning is the primary type dealt with in the therapeutic (and animal learning) setting. In fixedresponse learning, the response functions as the criterion of performance; the response implies the kinds of tests that will be administered, the kind 90
of shaping and branching that is needed to induce the desired response. In variable-response learning (the primary type dealt with in the classroom) a concept or rule--not the response--dictates the criterion of performance and implies the kind of presentation and "shaping" that is needed to induce appropriate behavior. An example of fixed-response learning would be one in which the practitioner attempts to teach a child to say the word red. The response determines the criterion of performance and the test of performance: Can the child say "'red"? Furthermore, the type of teaching that is needed for the child who cannot produce the response is clearly implied. If the child says, "reyu," the practitioner begins "shaping." H e operates from the assumption that there is an indefinitely large number of steps that can be introduced between "reyu" and "red." A comparison of the criterion response with the child's response provides a basis for shaping. Note that the child's response and the criterion are on the same continuum, so that a direct route is implied from the comparison of the child's response with the criterion.
Varlable-Response Learning Variable-response learning situations are radically different from fixedresponse situations. An example of a variable-response situation would be one in which a child has to demonstrate that he understands the concept red. T o test the child, the practitioner must introduce some kind of response, but the response he chooses is not fixed in the way it is when the child is required to say, "red." The practitioner can introduce any observable response he wishes. He may have the child tap his head when red things are presented. He may have the child point to things that are red. He may even have the child say "glick" in response to red things. A response is introduced because the practitioner must have some kind of test that indicates whether the child has learned the concept :and whether a branch in the program is needed to teach particular skills. However, the response in a simple variable-response situation determines neither the type of test the practitioner will introduce to demonstrate learning or the kind of instruction that is needed to induce desired learning. The type of tests are determined by the concept. We would not allow an investigator to introduce the test of having the children point to black-and-white pictures of objects such as apples and specify whether or not they are red. We would insist that the child responds to colored objects. However, we would accept any number of responses as signals of whether or not an object is red. We would recognize that saying the word red is only one of many possible tests for demonstrating understanding. Regardless of the type of test introduced in the variable-response situation, a particular set of presentational requirements is always implied. The presentational requirements for teaching a given concept are determined by the concept or rule, not by the response. T o be assured of teaching the concept red, we must demonstrate that redness has nothing to do with the position, shape, texture, or name of the object. We must demonstrate that red refers to an absolute (not a comparative) quality. 91
Each of these requirements is generated from the structure of the concept
red, and each requirement must be satisfied regardless of the kind of response introduced in the program. These requirements, in other words, are independent of the response and cannot be derived from the response. This point is critical. If we violate the presentational requirements of a concept, we may successfully teach some children, but we will probably not succeed with all. For example, if we present an apple and tell a child that the apple is red, the child may learn what redness is. However, our presentation was not adequate. We did not rule out the possibilities that red is another name for apple, that red has something to do with the texture, that red (like stem) is something that refers only to apples, etc. Perhaps most important, the analysis of the concept provides a standard for measuring the effectiveness of a teaching program. T h e rule is this: a program must be consistent with one and only one concept. If the presentation is consistent with more than one concept, mislearning can be viewed as a function of the presentation. If the presentation is consistent with only one concept, mislearning is less likely to be a function of the presentation. By working from an analysis of the concept being taught, one can specify whether a program is consistent with one and only one concept. Not all programs that satisfy the one-concept requirement are desirable. The concept requirements merely function as a minimum standard. A program must at least satisfy the concept requirements. At best, the program will be economical and "fun." Another difference between fixed-response and variable-response learning has to do with shaping. In the fixed-response situation, the need for shaping is arrived at by comparing the child's response (reyu) with the criterion response (red). This comparison also implies the steps that may be taken in shaping. In the variable-response situation, the response must be translated before small-step instruction can begin. T h e need for translation stems from the type of comparison that is called for in the variable-response learning situation. The child's response is to be compared with the concept. Obviously, a response is not on the same continuum as a concept. The only way a comparison is possible is to treat the response as an indicator of a concept. A mentalistic assumption of some kind is implied. Without the assumption, there is no way to compare the response with a concept. When the child's response is taken as an indication of the rule or concept from which he is operating, comparisons are possible. Now the problem is one of comparing a concept with a concept and of providing the kind of instruction that will appropriately "shape" behavior. To illustrate the procedure, let's say that a child always calls the second object presented "red," regardless of the object's color. If we treat the child's response as a response, we are provided with no particular direction, except to reinforce correct responses. If we interpret the child's response as an indication of his "concept," we can appreciate the nature of his mislearning. He believes that red has something to do with the order of presentation. We can now provide a series of tasks that shape his 92
understanding. (We may first present a row of green, identical objects and name them for the child; then we may present a row of green objects and name only the first two; then we may repeat the procedure with a row of red objects, then a row in which the last object differs in color from the others, etc.) This program derives from a comparison of the child's "concept" with the description of the concept red.
Applying the Fixed-Response and Varlable-Response Distinction In the preceding discussion, fixed-response and variable-response learning were treated as distinct entities. Actually, however, new-learning situations are usually specified in such a way that both fixed-response and variable-response components are involved. The child must learn new fixed responses and the rules for applying them. Unless the investigator acknowledges this distinction and develops his program accordingly, he may provide remedies that are uneconomical or inadequate. For example, he may provide positive reinforcement every time the child produces the word red in the presence of an apple. He will probably discover at some later time that the child has a serious misconception of how the word red is used. The same problems obtain in the behavior-modification setting. The investigator should not assume that the child will automatically learn the rule that governs reinforcers, nor should he assume that reinforcing the correct responses will automatically lead to the desired learning. The following possibilities confront the investigator in a given behavior-modification problem: 1. Possibly, the child cannot produce the fixed-response component that is involved in the task but understands the variable-response rule (the child cannot stand on his head but understands what he is supposed to do--as measured by tests of his understanding); 2. Possibly, the child can produce the fixed-response component but does not understand the variable-response rule (the child can stand on his head but cannot respond appropriately to the signal, "Stand on your head") ; 3. Possibly, the child cannot produce the fixed-response component and does not understand the variable-response rule (the e n i d cannot stand on his head and cannot indicate that he understands the signal, "Stand on your h e a d " ) ; 4. Possibly, the child can produce the fixed-response component and understands the variable-response rule (the child can stand on his head and can respond to the command, "Stand on your head"). Each of these possibilities implies a different focus, to bring the child to the desired criterion of performance. If the child can stand on his head and does understand the meaning of the signal, the program is simply one of reinforcement, of providing a strong pay-off for producing the behavior on command and perhaps a negative sanction for not producing it on command. If the child does not understand the meaning of the signal, "Stand on your head," a completely different type of training is implied. The first step the investigator must take in designlng a behavior93
modification program (after the objectives of training have been established) is to determine the type of training that is needed. H e should first concentrate on the fixed-response components of the task and make sure that the child can and will produce them appropriately. The investigator can then demonstrate the variable-response component. Consider the example in which the investigator wishes to teach a child to wear his glasses in situation X. He first establishes whether or not the child knows the fixed-response component of putting his gla~es on. He then introduces the variable-response rule, "If you wear your glasses in situation X, consequences Y will result." The investigator may use a model to demonstrate how the rule works. Next, the practitioner should provide some kind of test to make sure that the child understands the rule. If the child is verbal, the investigator can ask a series of questions, "Who is supposed to wear his glasses in situation X? What are you supposed to do in situation X ? . . . " If the child fails the tests, the investigator may have to introduce a less verbally demanding rule and a different type of test. If the child is verbally impoverished, the investigator may have to resort to simple operant conditioning, using the word "glasses" as a signal for the child to put his glasses on, and reinforcing desired behavior. The problem of teaching a child to attend in a learning situation clearly demands an understanding of the fixed- and variable-response components of the task. Simple reinforcement procedures cannot teach a child to "attend" in a way that will assure results. Since the child will be reinforced for certain types of overt behavior, such as sitting and facing the chalkboard, the presentation of reinforcers is consistent with at least two concepts: "attend to the material presented," and "sit and face the chalkboard." If the child ~s reinforced while he is supposed to be attending to the presentation of new material, the procedure may simply establish the fixed-response component of attention, while establishing a variable-response rule that is not intended. The child may suppose that he is being reinforced for sitting and facing the chalkboard. T o teach the desired variableresponse rule, the investigator must refer to the concept he wishes to induce. By "attention" he probably means, "There are certain things that will happen in the learning situation that are important; others are not important. You should focus on those that are important, remember them, and use them." The next step is to find approp/iate instances of the rule. In teaching the color red, the investigator must present red things and must have some way of pointing out the redness as distinguished from the other characteristics of the objects. Similarly, in teaching attention, the practitioner must present instances that involve attention, and he must have some way of pointing out "attention behavior." Instances of the attention rule would be situations in which the child receives pay-off for attending to a particular dimension of the presentation but receives no pay-off if he does not attend to tiffs dimension. T h e first examples should involve fixed-response components that are in the child's repertoire. The practitioner may start with a game of Simon Says, in which the child has to attend to what the practitioner says, not what he does. 94
The basis for pointing out the attention variable is the nile: "Pay attention to what I say. Listen!" He may then move into "fooler" games. In these the practitioner makes a mistake which the child is supposed to catch. For example, the practitioner tells the child that he will point to chairs; he then points to a chair, a chair, a table, a chair, etc. T h e child, in order to succeed in this game, must attend to the rule, "Point to chairs." The practitioner can proceed to other fooler games that involve increasingly difficult attention criteria. The child may at first have to learn new names before he can play tile game. T h e scope of the attention rule is systematically expanded to demonstrate that one must attend carefully in the learning situation if one is to succeed in the pay-off game. The practitioner can present this rule verbally. " I f you don't pay attention, I ' m going to fool you later on." And after the game, "See? You paid attention, so I couldn't fool you." or "See what happens when you don't pay attention? You didn't learn what vehicles are, so now you don't get any candy." The various attention tasks also imply certain fixed-responses, certain ground rules. Unless the child sits in a chair, looks where he is supposed to look, and responds when he is asked to respond, the "attention" learning will not proceed smoothly. Therefore, the practitioner may have to use strong reinforcers to sanction these fixed-response components. Although these fixed-response components are enforced, the practitioner does not assume that their enforcement is sufficient to teach the rule for attentiou he is trying to induce.
Developing Adequate Curricula Perhaps the most important application of the fixed- and variableresponse distinction is in the development of adequate programs. The planner who distinguishes between the two components recognizes that a basic program can be written without ever referring to children. H e cannot write a finished program without referring to children because his analysis of a concept tells him only which steps a child must take (which discrirrfnations he must learn, which words, and how they are to be used). It does not tell him anything about the relative difficulty of each step. The relative difficulty is determined by observing naive subjects who work on the initial program. If an instructional planner wishes to teach children how to use the word chair appropriately, he first consults the concept. What is a chair? What is the rule for chairness that will tell one how a chair differs from those things with which it might be confused, such as couches, tables, etc? After arriving at the description of chair (a piece of furniture with a back designed to accommodate one person in a sitting position, with legs bent at the knees), the instructional planner takes the description apart and translates each stipulation in the description into a discrimination task. Perhaps he begins by contrasting chairs with things that are not furniture, such as cars and houses. Next, he may contrast chairs with similar objects that do not have backs (stools). H e proceeds in tiffs manner until he has translated the entire description of what a chair is into discrimination tasks. 9S
Next, he specifies the fixed responses that are to be introduced into the program. During the first phases of instruction, he may have the child use the fixed response of pointing. The planner must write in a test to make sure that the child can point to familiar objects on command. Furthermore, he must specify a program for teaching the child who cannot respond. Later in the program, he may introduce the word chair and still later, the statement, "This is a chair." He must provide tests for the use of these responses and a program for the child who cannot perform adequately. In short, he can write an adequate (although unfinished) program without ever referring to children. His program will teach (although perhaps not with near-maximum efficiency) how to use the word chair appropriately. The distinction between fixed- and variable-response learn'ing represents an addition that can make behavioral psychology more applicable to the problems of classroom learning and instructional planning. Reinforcement is an important aspect of the stimulus environment in the learning situation. However, reinforcement theory does not imply programs. In the fixed-response situation, programs seem to derive from the response, but in more complex learning situations in which the focus is on inducing understanding of specific concepts, presentational requirements are dictated by the concept that is to be taught. By recognizing this distinction, one is provided with standards for teaching, for correcting, and for developing sound instructional programs. Operant techniques should be applied within these programs to make learning proceed as smoothly as possible.
Relerences Kimble, G. A., Foundations o[ conditioning and learning. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1967. Skinner, B. F., Science o[ human behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1953.
SCANNING THE JOURNALS The August, 1967 issue of the American Psychologist includes the following articles related to school psychology: "Preparation for Professional Psychology: An Example from a School Psychology Training Program," by Jack I. Bardon and Virginia D.C. Bennett "The Paradox in School Psychology: Extra and Intramural," by Lillian Zach "State Certification of School Psychologists: Recent Trends," by A.J. Traxler The October, 1967 issue of Exceptional Children published an article entitled: "Help for the Teacher of Disturbed Children in the Public School: The Use of Consultation for Problem Solving and Personal Growth," by Mary Ellen Knapp Williams Psychology in the Schools often contains articles relevant to school Psychology. In the January, 1967 issue see: "Role Delineation among the Guidance Professions," by Merville C. Shaw "An Experiment in Teacher-Psychologist Relations," by Ellen V. Piers "The Role of School Psychology in Public Education," by Marvin Fifield "Implications of Social Change for School Psychology," by Thelma G. Wolman
96
RELATING OPERANT TECHNIQUES TO PROGRAMMING AND TEACHING
Siegfried Engelmann To bridge the gap between operant techniques and the problems of teaching classroom concepts, a distinction between two types of learning is introduced-fixed-response learning and variable-response learning. In fixed-response learning (saying the word red) only one response is taken as an indication that learning has taken place (that of saying red). The response dictates the criterion of performance for training and implies the kind of shaping that is needed to bring an inappropriate response to the desired criterion of performance. In the variable-response learning (learning the distinction between red and not-red things) the response used to demonstrate that learning has taken place is not fixed. It can be substituted by other responses. And it does not imply the kind of shaping that is needed to bring inappropriate responses to the desired criterion of performance. The distinction between fixed- and variable-response learning is then shown to be applicable to behavior modification problems and problems of programming. It is suggested that the distinction between fixed- and variable- can add a great deal to the precise application of operant techniques and to the analysis of teaching problems.
Despite the efforts of Skinner (1953) and others, there exists a considerable gap between operant techniques (as they are generally applied) and programming or instructional planning. Programming includes not only the specification of the steps that must be taken to induce given behavior, but also the branching specifications (what a teacher does if a child fails to respond adequately to the basic program). The gap between programming and operant techniques is evident in almost any teaching situation. If a teacher wants to teach the children how to multiply fractions, operant techniques do not tell her how to proceed. They may indicate generally, that the new learning should be broken down into small steps and that the teacher should have a firm idea of what kind of terminal behavior she expects in response to the presentation of specific stimuli. But even if she thoroughly specifies what she wants the children to d o - what types of questions she will present, what kind of responses they are to produce, etc.--and specifies what the children are able to do before training, she is left with no real direction, except perhaps that of experimenting to see which small steps lead to the desired learning. She is provided with no clear idea of the sub-skills she must teach to reach the desired criterion of performance. In practice, those who develop instructional programs are not without direction. They "intuitively" know what to teach. They know, for instance, that to demonstrate the color red one must systematically vary all of the visual aspects of objects except redness. However, the nature of the instructional planner's "intuition" is not specified within the operant framework. The reason is that operant techniques are premised on the idea that one deals with behavior, not with inferences from behavior.
J
Siegfried Engelmann is a Senior Educational Specialist at the institute for Research on Exceptional Children, University of
Illlnols.
89
J i
I
Kimble (1967) nicely summarizes the argument by noting that intelligent first-year graduate students readily acknowledge that the facts of psychology are descriptions of behavior and accounts of the circumstances under which behavior occurs. "From here it is but a brief step to recognize that these 'facts' are what we more typically call responses (descriptions of behavior) and stimuli (the circumstances under which behavior occurs). Thus the facts of psychology turn out to be Ss and Rs, a state of affairs which suggests with a certain insistence that the laws of psychology must be reducible to these terms and that an S-R psychology is an inevitability." (p. 76) However, the instructional planner does not deal in these facts. His facts are primarily the concepts that he wishes to demonstrate. Although it is possible to reduce his facts to the facts of S-R psychology (just as it is possible to explain automobile design or behavior in terms of atomic interaction) a great deal is lost in the process. For the instructional planner, behavior must be interpreted and viewed as instances of concepts or rules. That the instructional planner cannot effectively deal with behavior stripped of inferences can be demonstrated by the following illustration. An instructional planner is told that he is to teach the "concept" glick. The desired behavior is that the child indicates, using yes and no responses, whether the objects presented are glicks. The investigator simply presents a variety of common objects and asks alternatively, "Is this glick?" and "Is this non-glick?" If the instructional planner deals in "behaviors" he is provided at this point with all of the information he needs to develop a program for teaching glick. However, it is obvious that he cannot begin to develop a program until he receives more information. (Note that no specific response can be associated with glick.) H e needs information about the nature of the concept gIick. What is it? Only if he understands the structure of gIick can he hope to teach it systematically. Let's say that gI~ck means "between two pencils and heavier than one pound." And let's say that the instructional planner knows what gIiek means. He is now in a position to teach and correct the child. If the child indicates that an object is glick when it is between the two pencils, the instructional planner is able to infer from the child's responses where the presentation has failed and he knows which branch should be taken. The child has learned the "between" notion, but he hasn't learned the "heavierthan-one-pound" part. H e must be shown that judgments of gliek are based on between and heavier than one pound.
Fixed-Response and Variob[e-ResponseLearning T o coordinate operant techniques with instructional planning, one must distinguish between two types of response components that are encountered in a new-learning situation, fixed-response components and variable-response components. Fixed-response learning is the primary type dealt with in the therapeutic (and animal learning) setting. In fixedresponse learning, the response functions as the criterion of performance; the response implies the kinds of tests that will be administered, the kind 90
of shaping and branching that is needed to induce the desired response. In variable-response learning (the primary type dealt with in the classroom) a concept or rule--not the response--dictates the criterion of performance and implies the kind of presentation and "shaping" that is needed to induce appropriate behavior. An example of fixed-response learning would be one in which the practitioner attempts to teach a child to say the word red. The response determines the criterion of performance and the test of performance: Can the child say "'red"? Furthermore, the type of teaching that is needed for the child who cannot produce the response is clearly implied. If the child says, "reyu," the practitioner begins "shaping." H e operates from the assumption that there is an indefinitely large number of steps that can be introduced between "reyu" and "red." A comparison of the criterion response with the child's response provides a basis for shaping. Note that the child's response and the criterion are on the same continuum, so that a direct route is implied from the comparison of the child's response with the criterion.
Varlable-Response Learning Variable-response learning situations are radically different from fixedresponse situations. An example of a variable-response situation would be one in which a child has to demonstrate that he understands the concept red. T o test the child, the practitioner must introduce some kind of response, but the response he chooses is not fixed in the way it is when the child is required to say, "red." The practitioner can introduce any observable response he wishes. He may have the child tap his head when red things are presented. He may have the child point to things that are red. He may even have the child say "glick" in response to red things. A response is introduced because the practitioner must have some kind of test that indicates whether the child has learned the concept :and whether a branch in the program is needed to teach particular skills. However, the response in a simple variable-response situation determines neither the type of test the practitioner will introduce to demonstrate learning or the kind of instruction that is needed to induce desired learning. The type of tests are determined by the concept. We would not allow an investigator to introduce the test of having the children point to black-and-white pictures of objects such as apples and specify whether or not they are red. We would insist that the child responds to colored objects. However, we would accept any number of responses as signals of whether or not an object is red. We would recognize that saying the word red is only one of many possible tests for demonstrating understanding. Regardless of the type of test introduced in the variable-response situation, a particular set of presentational requirements is always implied. The presentational requirements for teaching a given concept are determined by the concept or rule, not by the response. T o be assured of teaching the concept red, we must demonstrate that redness has nothing to do with the position, shape, texture, or name of the object. We must demonstrate that red refers to an absolute (not a comparative) quality. 91
Each of these requirements is generated from the structure of the concept
red, and each requirement must be satisfied regardless of the kind of response introduced in the program. These requirements, in other words, are independent of the response and cannot be derived from the response. This point is critical. If we violate the presentational requirements of a concept, we may successfully teach some children, but we will probably not succeed with all. For example, if we present an apple and tell a child that the apple is red, the child may learn what redness is. However, our presentation was not adequate. We did not rule out the possibilities that red is another name for apple, that red has something to do with the texture, that red (like stem) is something that refers only to apples, etc. Perhaps most important, the analysis of the concept provides a standard for measuring the effectiveness of a teaching program. T h e rule is this: a program must be consistent with one and only one concept. If the presentation is consistent with more than one concept, mislearning can be viewed as a function of the presentation. If the presentation is consistent with only one concept, mislearning is less likely to be a function of the presentation. By working from an analysis of the concept being taught, one can specify whether a program is consistent with one and only one concept. Not all programs that satisfy the one-concept requirement are desirable. The concept requirements merely function as a minimum standard. A program must at least satisfy the concept requirements. At best, the program will be economical and "fun." Another difference between fixed-response and variable-response learning has to do with shaping. In the fixed-response situation, the need for shaping is arrived at by comparing the child's response (reyu) with the criterion response (red). This comparison also implies the steps that may be taken in shaping. In the variable-response situation, the response must be translated before small-step instruction can begin. T h e need for translation stems from the type of comparison that is called for in the variable-response learning situation. The child's response is to be compared with the concept. Obviously, a response is not on the same continuum as a concept. The only way a comparison is possible is to treat the response as an indicator of a concept. A mentalistic assumption of some kind is implied. Without the assumption, there is no way to compare the response with a concept. When the child's response is taken as an indication of the rule or concept from which he is operating, comparisons are possible. Now the problem is one of comparing a concept with a concept and of providing the kind of instruction that will appropriately "shape" behavior. To illustrate the procedure, let's say that a child always calls the second object presented "red," regardless of the object's color. If we treat the child's response as a response, we are provided with no particular direction, except to reinforce correct responses. If we interpret the child's response as an indication of his "concept," we can appreciate the nature of his mislearning. He believes that red has something to do with the order of presentation. We can now provide a series of tasks that shape his 92
understanding. (We may first present a row of green, identical objects and name them for the child; then we may present a row of green objects and name only the first two; then we may repeat the procedure with a row of red objects, then a row in which the last object differs in color from the others, etc.) This program derives from a comparison of the child's "concept" with the description of the concept red.
Applying the Fixed-Response and Varlable-Response Distinction In the preceding discussion, fixed-response and variable-response learning were treated as distinct entities. Actually, however, new-learning situations are usually specified in such a way that both fixed-response and variable-response components are involved. The child must learn new fixed responses and the rules for applying them. Unless the investigator acknowledges this distinction and develops his program accordingly, he may provide remedies that are uneconomical or inadequate. For example, he may provide positive reinforcement every time the child produces the word red in the presence of an apple. He will probably discover at some later time that the child has a serious misconception of how the word red is used. The same problems obtain in the behavior-modification setting. The investigator should not assume that the child will automatically learn the rule that governs reinforcers, nor should he assume that reinforcing the correct responses will automatically lead to the desired learning. The following possibilities confront the investigator in a given behavior-modification problem: 1. Possibly, the child cannot produce the fixed-response component that is involved in the task but understands the variable-response rule (the child cannot stand on his head but understands what he is supposed to do--as measured by tests of his understanding); 2. Possibly, the child can produce the fixed-response component but does not understand the variable-response rule (the child can stand on his head but cannot respond appropriately to the signal, "Stand on your head") ; 3. Possibly, the child cannot produce the fixed-response component and does not understand the variable-response rule (the e n i d cannot stand on his head and cannot indicate that he understands the signal, "Stand on your h e a d " ) ; 4. Possibly, the child can produce the fixed-response component and understands the variable-response rule (the child can stand on his head and can respond to the command, "Stand on your head"). Each of these possibilities implies a different focus, to bring the child to the desired criterion of performance. If the child can stand on his head and does understand the meaning of the signal, the program is simply one of reinforcement, of providing a strong pay-off for producing the behavior on command and perhaps a negative sanction for not producing it on command. If the child does not understand the meaning of the signal, "Stand on your head," a completely different type of training is implied. The first step the investigator must take in designlng a behavior93
modification program (after the objectives of training have been established) is to determine the type of training that is needed. H e should first concentrate on the fixed-response components of the task and make sure that the child can and will produce them appropriately. The investigator can then demonstrate the variable-response component. Consider the example in which the investigator wishes to teach a child to wear his glasses in situation X. He first establishes whether or not the child knows the fixed-response component of putting his gla~es on. He then introduces the variable-response rule, "If you wear your glasses in situation X, consequences Y will result." The investigator may use a model to demonstrate how the rule works. Next, the practitioner should provide some kind of test to make sure that the child understands the rule. If the child is verbal, the investigator can ask a series of questions, "Who is supposed to wear his glasses in situation X? What are you supposed to do in situation X ? . . . " If the child fails the tests, the investigator may have to introduce a less verbally demanding rule and a different type of test. If the child is verbally impoverished, the investigator may have to resort to simple operant conditioning, using the word "glasses" as a signal for the child to put his glasses on, and reinforcing desired behavior. The problem of teaching a child to attend in a learning situation clearly demands an understanding of the fixed- and variable-response components of the task. Simple reinforcement procedures cannot teach a child to "attend" in a way that will assure results. Since the child will be reinforced for certain types of overt behavior, such as sitting and facing the chalkboard, the presentation of reinforcers is consistent with at least two concepts: "attend to the material presented," and "sit and face the chalkboard." If the child ~s reinforced while he is supposed to be attending to the presentation of new material, the procedure may simply establish the fixed-response component of attention, while establishing a variable-response rule that is not intended. The child may suppose that he is being reinforced for sitting and facing the chalkboard. T o teach the desired variableresponse rule, the investigator must refer to the concept he wishes to induce. By "attention" he probably means, "There are certain things that will happen in the learning situation that are important; others are not important. You should focus on those that are important, remember them, and use them." The next step is to find approp/iate instances of the rule. In teaching the color red, the investigator must present red things and must have some way of pointing out the redness as distinguished from the other characteristics of the objects. Similarly, in teaching attention, the practitioner must present instances that involve attention, and he must have some way of pointing out "attention behavior." Instances of the attention rule would be situations in which the child receives pay-off for attending to a particular dimension of the presentation but receives no pay-off if he does not attend to tiffs dimension. T h e first examples should involve fixed-response components that are in the child's repertoire. The practitioner may start with a game of Simon Says, in which the child has to attend to what the practitioner says, not what he does. 94
The basis for pointing out the attention variable is the nile: "Pay attention to what I say. Listen!" He may then move into "fooler" games. In these the practitioner makes a mistake which the child is supposed to catch. For example, the practitioner tells the child that he will point to chairs; he then points to a chair, a chair, a table, a chair, etc. T h e child, in order to succeed in this game, must attend to the rule, "Point to chairs." The practitioner can proceed to other fooler games that involve increasingly difficult attention criteria. The child may at first have to learn new names before he can play tile game. T h e scope of the attention rule is systematically expanded to demonstrate that one must attend carefully in the learning situation if one is to succeed in the pay-off game. The practitioner can present this rule verbally. " I f you don't pay attention, I ' m going to fool you later on." And after the game, "See? You paid attention, so I couldn't fool you." or "See what happens when you don't pay attention? You didn't learn what vehicles are, so now you don't get any candy." The various attention tasks also imply certain fixed-responses, certain ground rules. Unless the child sits in a chair, looks where he is supposed to look, and responds when he is asked to respond, the "attention" learning will not proceed smoothly. Therefore, the practitioner may have to use strong reinforcers to sanction these fixed-response components. Although these fixed-response components are enforced, the practitioner does not assume that their enforcement is sufficient to teach the rule for attentiou he is trying to induce.
Developing Adequate Curricula Perhaps the most important application of the fixed- and variableresponse distinction is in the development of adequate programs. The planner who distinguishes between the two components recognizes that a basic program can be written without ever referring to children. H e cannot write a finished program without referring to children because his analysis of a concept tells him only which steps a child must take (which discrirrfnations he must learn, which words, and how they are to be used). It does not tell him anything about the relative difficulty of each step. The relative difficulty is determined by observing naive subjects who work on the initial program. If an instructional planner wishes to teach children how to use the word chair appropriately, he first consults the concept. What is a chair? What is the rule for chairness that will tell one how a chair differs from those things with which it might be confused, such as couches, tables, etc? After arriving at the description of chair (a piece of furniture with a back designed to accommodate one person in a sitting position, with legs bent at the knees), the instructional planner takes the description apart and translates each stipulation in the description into a discrimination task. Perhaps he begins by contrasting chairs with things that are not furniture, such as cars and houses. Next, he may contrast chairs with similar objects that do not have backs (stools). H e proceeds in tiffs manner until he has translated the entire description of what a chair is into discrimination tasks. 9S
Next, he specifies the fixed responses that are to be introduced into the program. During the first phases of instruction, he may have the child use the fixed response of pointing. The planner must write in a test to make sure that the child can point to familiar objects on command. Furthermore, he must specify a program for teaching the child who cannot respond. Later in the program, he may introduce the word chair and still later, the statement, "This is a chair." He must provide tests for the use of these responses and a program for the child who cannot perform adequately. In short, he can write an adequate (although unfinished) program without ever referring to children. His program will teach (although perhaps not with near-maximum efficiency) how to use the word chair appropriately. The distinction between fixed- and variable-response learn'ing represents an addition that can make behavioral psychology more applicable to the problems of classroom learning and instructional planning. Reinforcement is an important aspect of the stimulus environment in the learning situation. However, reinforcement theory does not imply programs. In the fixed-response situation, programs seem to derive from the response, but in more complex learning situations in which the focus is on inducing understanding of specific concepts, presentational requirements are dictated by the concept that is to be taught. By recognizing this distinction, one is provided with standards for teaching, for correcting, and for developing sound instructional programs. Operant techniques should be applied within these programs to make learning proceed as smoothly as possible.
Relerences Kimble, G. A., Foundations o[ conditioning and learning. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1967. Skinner, B. F., Science o[ human behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1953.
SCANNING THE JOURNALS The August, 1967 issue of the American Psychologist includes the following articles related to school psychology: "Preparation for Professional Psychology: An Example from a School Psychology Training Program," by Jack I. Bardon and Virginia D.C. Bennett "The Paradox in School Psychology: Extra and Intramural," by Lillian Zach "State Certification of School Psychologists: Recent Trends," by A.J. Traxler The October, 1967 issue of Exceptional Children published an article entitled: "Help for the Teacher of Disturbed Children in the Public School: The Use of Consultation for Problem Solving and Personal Growth," by Mary Ellen Knapp Williams Psychology in the Schools often contains articles relevant to school Psychology. In the January, 1967 issue see: "Role Delineation among the Guidance Professions," by Merville C. Shaw "An Experiment in Teacher-Psychologist Relations," by Ellen V. Piers "The Role of School Psychology in Public Education," by Marvin Fifield "Implications of Social Change for School Psychology," by Thelma G. Wolman
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