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Relational processes in dialogue: The problem of intersubjectivity
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1989
RELATIONAL PROCESSES IN DIALOGUE: THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY BONNIE Department
J. LEADBEATER*
of Psychology, Barnard College, Columbia New York, NY 10027, U.S.A.
University,
Abstract Based on the theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, and more recently, Habermas, positive changes in cognitive, moral, and social development are seen to be the result of peer efforts to resolve conflicts through discursive
efforts to achieve a consensus. This conflict-consensus model of dialogues is elaborated and analyzed critically. With reference to the philosophical literature on the problem of intersubjectivity, the model is contrasted with empathy and hermeneutic models of the relational processes in dialogue. The needs for future researchers to consider both alternate models of interpersonal processes in dialogue and creative, in addition to consensus, outcomes of dialogue are discussed. INTRODUCTION A clear model of the dialogic processes believed to be implicated in developmental changes is emerging from a decade of research investigating the role of discussion in the development of rational solutions to cognitive, moral, and social problems. In this model, changes result from the equal respect that is afforded by peer relations and from the intrapsychic disequilibrium that is stimulated by peer conflicts. Dialogic efforts of age-matched peers to achieve a consensus is seen to promote the reformulation of the idiosyncratic reasoning of lower stage discussants to higher, more rational, generalizable levels (Berkowitz, -1985, 1988; Berkowitz 8c Gibbs, 1983; Damon & Killen, 1982; Kruger & Tomassello, 1986; Miller, 1982; Oser, 1984; Oser, Berkowitz, & Altof, 1985). This work has its theoretical underpinnings in Piaget’s ( 1934) and Kohlberg’s (1981) theories of moral reasoning and, more recently, has referred to Habermas’ (1979) vision of communicative competence. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate and analyze the theoretical supports and limitations of what I will call this conflict-consensus model of dialogic processes. I will argue that progress in understanding both the dialogic processes
Acknowledgements - This paper was based on a PhD dissertation, Teachers College, Columbta University. It was partially.funded by doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships from the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada. The ideas in this paper are indeed the products of intersubjective processes. They emerged in long discussions with several people including John Broughton, Paul Chevigny, Marshall Gladstone, Margaret Honey, Meryle Kaplan, Deanna Kuhn, Don Moss, and Rob Wozniak. *Correspondence should be addressed University, New Haven, CT 06520, U.S.A.
to the author
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at Department
of Psychology,
Yale
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implicated in developmental changes and the nature of those changes is threatened by an unquestioned acceptance of this model. I will also refer to the philosophical literature addressing the problem of “intersubjectivity” - of how shared meaning is possible to propose two alternate models. The first, following Alfred Schutz (1967), sees interpersonal empathy as the mechanism underlying the possibility of consensus. The second model, following hermeneutic theories of Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (1978a, 1983), criticizes the individualism in both the conflict-consensus and empathy models. From the perspective of a hermeneutic model, it is argued that dialogic processes may be conceived as mutual efforts to interpret the text of dialogue. In this model of dialogues, change is seen in the opening of the discussants to possible worlds of meaning. THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS
OF THE CONFLICT-CONSENSUS
MODEL
The conflict-consensus model has its roots, for developmental researchers, in Piaget’s vision of the role of peer cooperation in the development of moral reason. From his empirical observations of the marble game played by Swiss children, Piaget (1934) concludes as follows: The norms of reason, and in particular the important norm of reciprocity, the source of the logic of relations, can only develop in and through cooperation. Whether cooperation is an effect or a cause of reason, or both, reason requires cooperation in so far as being rational consists in ‘situating
oneself so as to submit the individual to the universal. (p. 107)
Merging the logical-mathematical definition of a “reciprocal” (i.e., that by which a given quantity is multiplied to give unity) with the definition of “reciprocity” (i.e., a social ideal of mutual or equal respect), Piaget subtly ties together logic, morality, and mutual respect. The complexities of this merger have not been unravelled, but rather,,have been carried through in subsequent developmental theory. Borrowing from Rawls’ (197 1) conception of justice as role-taking, Kohlberg (198 1) claims that the most logically valid principles of social justice are those that could be adopted behind a “veil of ignorance,” where each individual has an equal chance of being anyone in particular including the least advantaged member of society. The most valid or rational solution to conflicts is the most universal or reciprocal. The words unity, consensus, universality, reciprocity, generalizability all preserve the dual definition that construes the most valid argument as rationally the most logical, and socially the most reciprocal. Support for the conflict-consensus model has recently been found in Habermas’ (1979) theory of communicative competence, in which he attempts to “identify and construct universal conditions of possible understanding” (p. 1). Developmental researchers who see moral, social, or cognitive development in to universality find corroboration in the movement from egocentricism Habermas’ view that the stages of morality and of individual and collective identity formations “cannot be measured against the choice of correct strategies, but rather against the intersubjectivity of understanding achieved without force,
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that is against the expansion of the domain of consensual action together with the reestablishment of undistorted communication” (p. 120). In Habermas’ view progress toward the expansion of consensual action is prompted by communicative action by discussants who, under ideal speech conditions take the general position of any individual in a conflict (i.e., of equals or peers), and work toward a rational consensus (i.e., a position valid for all rational subjects). Bernstein (1976) summarizes Habermas’ concept of ideal speech as “that form of discourse in which there is no other compulsion but the compulsion of the argumentation itself, where there is a genuine symmetry among the participants involved, allowing a universal interchangeability of dialogue roles where no form of domination exists” (p. 212). The mechanism of change is the force of rationality itself which increasingly reduces contradictions through increasingly rational solutions. The most rational or logical position emerges as the individual participants in the dialogue subject their idiosyncratic beliefs to the weight of evidence and the force of rationality. As in Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories of imperative), the individual’s moral reasoning (and in Kant’s categorical idiosyncratic beliefs are equilibrated as they accommodate to more rational, logical, universal solutions which can be agreed on by all. McCarthy (1978) summarizes the assumptions in Habermas’ position as follows: The supposition that attaches to such an agreement (consensus) is that it represents a “rational consensus,” that is, that it is the result not of the peculiarities of the participants or their situation, but simply of them subjecting themselves to the weight of evidence and the force of argument. The agreement is regarded as valid not only for “us” (the actual participants). but as objectively valid, valid for all rational subjects (as potential participants) (p. 292)
Again the most rational is the most reciprocal. It is the agreement in which the peculiarities of the individual give way to the objectively valid solution. Individual idiosyncrasy is seen as a threat to rational agreement. According to Habermas ( 1979), competing opponents, “insofar as they are determined by the intention of influencing each other’s decision in a way oriented only to each’s [sic] own success” operate according to what he calls “strategic actions” (p. 117). Since this orientation to one’s own success limits the expansion of consensual action, Habermas concludes that “strategic actions must be institutionalized, that is, “embedded in intersubjectively binding norms that guarantee the fulfillment of the motivational conditions (necessary for communicative actions)” (ibid., p. 118). He prescribes the ideal speech conditions that serve as the “binding norms” or as the motivational guarantors of consensual actions, and as a regulator of the strategic actions of opponents. In ideal speech conditions, four validity claims are raised simultaneously and place obligations on both speaker and hearer in communicative actions. Utterances must be “comprehensible” (made in grammatically well-formed sentences), “true” (grounded in real objects or events in the world), “truthful” (express accurately the subjective intentions of each speaker), and “right or (satisfy the recognized norms for interpersonal relations in a appropriate”
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shared
life world)
(Habermas,
1979, pp. 2-5).
The rationality
of communicative
actions can be measured against their adherence to these validity claims. Failure of the participants to mutually recognize or, in the event of a breakdown in communication, to redeem any of these validity claims, results in the disruption
of consensus. However, according to Habermas (1979, p. 3), this failure marks the typical state of linguistic communications and validity claims must continuously be negotiated to bring about agreement: Coming to an understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement on the presupposed basis of validity claims that can be mutually recognized . . . . As soon as consensus is shaken, and the presuppositions that certain validity claims are satisfied (or could be vindicated) is suspended, the task of mutual interpretation is to acheive a new definition of the situation which all participants can share. (p. 3)
In this conflict-consensus model, individuals appear repeatedly entrapped by their own idiosyncratic, subjectively meaningful utterances about the world of things and social relations. What then motivates these individuals to submit their competitive interests or strategic actions to communicative action? Is it intersubjectively binding norms ? But how are these norms agreed on if the failure of validity claims marks typical communications? It seems that what is required for intersubjective understanding (consensual actions) presupposes what it is intended to explain (consensus). The argument borders on the tautology that consensus is guaranteed by agreement. Agreement seems to be achieved by formalizing the procedures of communicative interactions and distancing them from their origins in expressive subjects. If the desire of each competing opponent is oriented to his or her own success, what motivates the change from self-oriented communicative strategies to consensus-oriented communicative actions? Is it the coercive force of intersubjectively binding norms? But it is this kind of coercive conventionality that Habermas’ emancipatory theory of society hopes to escape. The problem seems to lie in the uneasy union of rationality and reciprocity. .In defining progress as expansion, dependent on the submission of individuals to validity claims that regulate conflicts among them, it seems that what is presupposed for a rational consensus is the reciprocity of mutual respect proposed by Piaget. But this respect is exactly what is absent from the intentions according to Habermas’ (1979) definition of their of competing opponents, strategic actions. On the other hand, were it possible to establish consensus by one’s agreements on the validity claims concerning linguistic comprehensibility, the truthfulness of intentional expression, the truth of propositions about real objects, and the legitimacy of existing norms and values, a negotiated consensus would be unnecessary. A further difficulty emerges from empirical evaluations of the development of the logic of argumentation based on the conflict-consensus model. Based on Habermas’ theory, Oser and his colleagues (Oser, 1984; Oser et al., 1985) have
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proposed age-linked, qualitative differences in the logic of argumentation that mark stages on the way to an endpoint in ideal rational speech. They describe five stages in the development of rationality in moral discussions, progressing from Stage 1 in which idiosyncratic views are repetitively offered and supported by only loosely related arguments, to higher stages in which the “logic of shared analysis appears as if it almost could be generated ‘without’ a partner” (p. 10). With development, the individual gradually submits his or her individual views to the objective force of the better argument. Dialogue at this highest level involves reasoning about the argumentation and aims at identifying shared meaning or rational consensus. Individual interests apparently fade as the discussants’ mutual recognition of the necessity of the logical position emerges. Despite the appeal of this ideal for regulating individualism in dialogue, the fleeting specter of disembodied, partnerless dialogues gives cause to reconsider the conflict-consensus model. Habermas (1979) writes that, with development, with itself (or step outside of itself) precisely in the ego “can identify distinguishing the merely subjective from the nonsubjective” (p. 100). However, it remains unclear how this self-observing ego would be able to step outside of its concrete roles, desires, personalities, emotions, etc., and deliver itself to the ideal . of progress through logic or consensus. Even were such a rational ideal a conscious aim, this view ignores unconscious motivation and the reality of unequal power relations. The infrequent occurrence, in mortal subjects, of Kohlberg’s (1981) and Oser et al.‘s (1985) highest levels of reasoning, which depend on this ability to set one’s own interests aside and don a “veil of ignorance,” demonstrates this point. Consideration of this problem of the relationship between individual minds and the possibility of universal truths has been addressed by many 19th and 20th century philosophers concerned with the problem of intersubjectivity. Proposed solutions to this problem vary widely and reveal alternatives to the conflictconsensus model of dialogue just described. THE PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEM
OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Husserl is generally credited with ushering in the modern debate on the problem of intersubjectivity in communication. He criticizes Descartes’ cogito, a rational ideal not unlike Piaget’s epistemic subject in its emphasis on the power of deductive logic as the foundation of certainty (Gruber & Voneche, 1977). Husserl (1960) argues that Descartes failed to question the conditions of existence of his solipsistic “knowing I” and thus could not explain how shared experience is possible. Although educated as a mathematician, Husserl introduced his Cartesian Meditations (1960) by saying that he was disillusioned with efforts to deduce philosophical certainty from first principles (as in physics, mathematics, and logic). Certainty could not be deduced from the individual, abstracted cogito. He advocated instead an “all-embracing self-investigation” to explain how “reality” is “there-for-everyone” (1960, p. 6). In the subsequent philosophical debates, Husserl’s meditations have been widely criticized for failing to overcome their solipsistic starting point in the private subjectivity of the individual, as transcendental ego (Elliston & McCormick, 1977). However, this
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question of how reality is “there-for-everyone” persists. Philosophers dealing with this problem (Hegel, 1807/1977; Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1960; Merleau-Ponty, 1973; Ortega y Gasset, 1957; Sartre, 1956, 1976; Scheler, 1954) have proposed theories ranging from the extreme of asserting the radical, ontological isolation of individuals condemned to the uncertainty and freedom of their own impenetrable consciousnesses, to the other extreme of asserting the fusion of consciousnesses in a unity or undifferentiated plurality that is guaranteed in co-being, co-action, or common language. Either the individual mind exists prior to knowing and solipsism is inescapable, or communal knowledge exists prior to individual reasoning and conventionality is then the trap; either subjects are primordially differentiated and the possibility of of shared knowledge or “truth” remains in question, or the differentiation individual consciousness is lost in an assumed shared meaning system. From the perspectives considering the problem of point of view of philosophical intersubjectivity as it relates to the possibility of communication, however, intersubjectivity is neither prevented by the existence of other consciousnesses nor guaranteed a priori. Rather, consensus is continuously reproduced by subjects actively engaged in interpretation of “true” or “common knowledge.” But how does this interpretation proceed? The poles of the debate on the problem of intersubjectivity in communication are illustrated in the differences between Habermas’ and Schutz’s theories. We have already witnessed the ideal submission of the individual to the universal “truths” in the ideal speech conditions described by Habermas. Seeking to identify and reconstruct the universal conditions of possible understanding in his universal pragmatics, he begins with a view of the idiosyncrasy or self-interest of individual consciousness. The question of how consensus is possible in dialogues, for Habermas, becomes one of how idiosyncrasy can be regulated. (norms, philosophical ideals or ideal speech Logical criteria, or procedures conditions) are needed to limit individualism. Turning next, briefly, to Schutz’s (1967) theory of intersubjectivity, it will be argued that an ongoing process of empathic communication is necessary to an understanding of what is going on in the separate minds of real communicants. From the perspective of Schutz’s empathy model of dialogue, only increasingly specific, sensitive, communication abilities (rather than increasingly general ones) would facilitate consensus. However, according to Schutz (1967) even with this empathy, the meaning grasped by the listener only approximates the speaker’s intended meaning and the individuals seem mired in the relativism of each one’s own experience. In contrast to Habermas’ theory where the peculiarities of the individual submit to the force of rational consensus, in Schutz’s model, consensus is overcome by the meaning of an experience for the individual. EMPATHY Schutz (in Wagner,
AND INDIVIDUAL
1970) delineates
EXPRESSION
the main questions of intersubjectivity
(1) How is the ‘other self constituted in my mind as a Self of basically the same (eidetic) characteristics as my own self? (2) How is the experience of a successful intercourse with another self possible: How is the experience of my ‘understanding’ the other and his ‘understanding’ of me constituted? (p. 165)
as:
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He suggests that intersubjective understanding is established in the ongoing process of communication. However, believing that meaningful individual experience exists prior to social experience, he insists on the impossibility of the identity of two streams of consciousness. The subjective experience of individual consciousnesses cannot simultaneously coincide exactly and exist separately. To resolve the dilemma of how understanding is possible given the separateness of individual experience, Schutz (1967), also referring to Husserl, distinguishes the. representative function of a sign (word) as indicating an external object or objective meaning from its expressive and interpretive functions. The latter include “what actually went on in the mind of the communicator, the person who used the sign . . . Everyone using or interpreting a sign associates with it a certain meaning having its origins in the unique quality of the experiences in which he once learned to use the sign” (p. 124). The meaning of words is established in a step-by-step synthesis of expression and interpretation in dialogues. However, even in Schutz’s ideal speech circumstances, in which the speaker selects his or her words with the intention of being understood and the listener’s interpretation draws on both his or her own experiences and knowledge of the other’s, the meaning of the lived experience of the speaker is plagued by “vagueness and uncertainty” (p. 128). As Schutz (1967) says, The subjective meaning that the interpreter does grasp is at best an approximation to the sign-user’s intended meaning, but never that meaning itself, for one’s knowledge of another person’s perspective is always necessarily limited. For exactly the same reason the person who expresses himself in signs is never quire sure of how he is being understood. (p. 129)
Beginning with the view of the idiosyncrasy of individual expression, Schutz’s theory is ultimately mired in the relativism of individual perspectives which cannot be overcome even in the ideal of procedurally regulated communication. For Schutz, the idiosyncrasy or uniqueness of ongoing conscious experience precludes the possibility of consensus. Both Habermas’ and Schutz’s theories begin with the view that meaningful individual expression exists prior to social experience. Discussants in ordinary dialogue are described as biased, subjectively focused individuals with competing interests, viewpoints, lived experience, or stocks of knowledge. For Habermas, validity claims regulate this individualism. For Schutz, empathy is the necessary but insufficient route to understanding the experience of another. For Habermas, the idiosyncrasy of individual thought or experience is overcome in the ideal of procedurally regulated communication but for Schutz, it precludes the possibility of consensus. A hermeneutic model of the dialectical process of shared meaning in dialogue moves away from this starting point in individual minds to a starting point in the text of the dialogue itself. The goal of discussion is neither the resolution of ccmpeting viewpoints in consensus nor empathic understanding. Rather, the goal of dialogue is to open the discussants to new or possible worlds of meaning through the interpretation of what is spoken. The discussants are not asked to submit to the force of the better argument, but rather to participate in a dialectic
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of speech and language. In this ongoing dialectic, the individual neither submits to the universal nor struggles with unending relativism; rather, both individual and universal are seen as irreducible poles of the dialectic of creative communication. THE
DIALECTIC
OF SPEECH
AND LANGUAGE
Analyzing the linguistic basis of truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Harvey (1982) suggests that language is the condition of the possibility of truth and falsity claims concerning the world (p. 285). This possibility, however, is realized through individual utterances. The truth is’continuously regenerated in the dialectic of language overdetermined by history and culture and speech overdetermined by individual experience. Briefly, Harvey’s argument runs as follows. For_Hegel(1887/1977), all sensory experience becomes meaningful only when uttered, that is, when it is isolated from the buzzing and booming of sensation and a “This” is named “Here” and “Now” (p.66). Language creates the universal or general categories which, while failing to express all that is sensed, express all that is utterable. “We do not say what in sense-certainty we mean to say” (p. 60). But because language historically exists prior to individual speech, “we are spoken by our words in as much as we speak at all” (Harvey, 1982, p. 287). Language preserves the truth of history and demands that the vanity of individual speech submit the falsity of its proclamations to the universality of words, sentences, and texts. But the truth of language is also only utterable; language exists only as it is spoken it is captured by individual speech. Using the analogy of the text (language in its historical form as written) and the reader, Harvey describes this mutual capturing of language by speech and speech by language as a life and death struggle. The reader must surrender to the voice of the text which, “via the labor of the reader’s attempt to hear,” produces a meaningful interpretation in which the text dies and is reborn in the reader’s understandings and misunderstandings (p. 294). Submitting to the text through reading, one also risks the loss of one’s own meaningful understandings -one’s world or world view. But the pain of reading or hearing and the violence of being read or heard has its rewards in the rebirth of meaning. Meaning is not static. This is a dialectic of assimilation and accommodation without equilibrium. According to Harvey (1982), what is understood and spoken by successive generations is recreated in the light of the historical and cultural changes that have occurred. In his words: We do not say again what was already said: indeed we cannot, since the same text later in time is granted a rebirth and a new world of meaning possibilities. Our children will not speak our language bui their own. Nevertheless it will be speech and it will be takes on the clothing of and reproduction that sustenance over time: a
a language. This intertextuality, in Hegelian terms, sexuality, progeneration, regeneration, production, does not immediately return to itself in its selfspiral of repetition that is not repetition. (p. 291)
The way of truth is via this repetitious re-reading or re-speaking of language. Language holds all of history and speech cannot express all we mean to say. The labor of this pregnant dialectic is unending.
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This dialectical vision of intersubjectivity suggests a theory of communicative performance very different from that of Habermas’ rationally driven argumentation and Schutz’s empathy model. This dialectic strives for renewal in the opening up of the world of possible meanings. The concept of rationality shifts from that exemplified by the ideals of deductive methodology and the conflation of the rational and reciprocal, to a broader notion of seeking the reasons why assertions are held (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 11). Rationality and generalizability take their place as the evaluative tools of reasoning, rather than as the ideals of dialogue. As Ricoeur (1978a) says, “Beyond my situations as reader, beyond the author’s situation, I offer myself to the possible ways of being-in-the-world which the text opens up and discovers for me” (p. 144). Neither individual speech nor language submits its claim to validity. Analogously, we might suggest that communicants who are open to the possible meanings of overdetermined speech and language escape both the competitive individualism of finding out what the other meant and whether he or she can defend that view, and the conventionality of a third person, principled perspective that assumes the objective singularity of shared meaning or rational consensus. THE INTERSUBJECTIVE
CONTEXT
OF DIALOGUE
Returning from philosophical models of communicative action to the question of the nature of dialogic processes implicated in developmental change, we must question the characteristics of the interrelational processes of individuals in actual communications. Philosophers have been more concerned with construction theories of interindividual relations of consciousness than with illuminating the processes of dialogue in face-to-face communications. Are communicants opponents engaged in rational battles encountering the force of the better idea? Do they struggle with understanding what each other meant? Are they exploring the ideas spoken by the text of their dialogue? What are the conditions of existence of a “conversing I” that make shared or sharing meanings possible or impossible? While such psychologized questions might send shudders through the philosopher, they are central to our understanding of dialogic processes. These processes may be understood as the conditions of interpersonal existence through which dialogue is either frozen by the procedural regulations of speech conditions, locked in individual consciousnesses, or passed into the playful dialectic of speech and language. If we understand by >‘existence” not only the philosophical problem of ontology (which might usefully divert us to an analysis of intersubjectivity in infant experience) but also the problem of here and now dialogic relations, we can wonder in what way the nature of conditions of existence of these relations makes sharing knowledge possible or indeed, impossible. These issues concerning the intersubjective context of dialogue have been partially considered by psychoanalysts, elaborating the processes of transference and countertransference (Lacan, 1981; Ricoeur, 1978b). However, their usefulness for understanding everyday dialogues has not been explored. Moreover, little empirical research exists to guide this exploration. Research by Berkowitz (1980a, 1980b), and Berkowitz and Gibbs (1979) on
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“transactive dialogic behavior” has suggested one way to proceed in the analysis of the interindividual relations in everyday dialogues. “Transactive dialogue behavior” is defined as “a cognitive operation upon another’s reasoning in the context of an attempt to resolve, explain, or comprehend differences in reasoning about moral issues” (Berkowitz, 1980a, p. 16). Berkowitz describes this behavior as a dialectical process in which “one’s own reasoning confronts the other’s antithetical reasoning in an ongoing dialogic dynamic” (p. 13). Emphasizing a conflict-consensus model of dialogues, Berkowitz does not directly question how shared meaning is possible in dialogues. However, he does highlight the importance of the changing relations of self and other to the dialogic processes in distinguishing the term “transactive” from “interactive” to emphasize the interpenetrative, reciprocal, bidirectional aspects of the dyads’ dialogue. Each of the 18 transacts that Berkowitz defines is further delineated as primarily representing the “personal focus” or perspective of Ego (self), Alter (other), or Dyad (both) and is also distinguished by its “mode” as either competitive (critiquing, devaluing, or conceding) or non-competitive (synthesizing or elaborating) with respect to the Alter’s perspective. Using these distinctions in personal focus and mode, differences were found by Leadbeater (1986, 1988) in the patterns of Ego, Alter, or Dyad-focused, competitive and non-competitive transacts in the dialogues of adolescent and adult friendship dyads discussing their opinions about disarmament. Three “relational transact patterns” were identified. The alter-focused non-competitive dyad members of Group 1 tended to affirm (paraphrase, complete, extend or request justifications of) their partners’ speech in the dialogue. The ego and alter-focused competitive dyad members of Group 2 tended to criticize (competitively extend, competitively paraphrase, criticize, and point out contradictions in) their partners’ speech and to clarify and refine their own position competitively. The alter-focused competitive and non-competitive dyad members of Group 3 tended to both affirm and criticize each others’ reasoning and to competitively clarify their own reasoning to a lesser degree than Group 2 dyads. Also using a modification of Berkowitz’s methodology, Damon and Killen (1982) studied patterns of peer communication that were associated with change in moral reasoning about the just distribution of rewards in kindergarten and Ist, 2nd and 3rd grade children. Children whose dialogues included more rejecting speech acts (e.g., disagreements and ridicule) were disproportionately represented in the “no change” group. In contrast, the interactions of children who changed were characterized by more reciprocal speech acts including and paraphrases) and transforming accepting statements (e.g., agreements statements (e.g., clarification and extensions). Finally, Kruger and Tomassello (1986) report that 7 and 11 year old children produced more other-oriented transactive statements and questions in moral discussions with peers than in discussions with their mothers. This suggests that not only the patterns of relational processes within dialogues but also the power relations in dialogues have an impact upon the external conditions of existence that make shared meaning possible.
183
Relational processes in dialogue These dialogues,
studies
begin
focusing
to address
on the nature
the problem and dynamics
of intersubjective of interpersonal
processes
in
communication
which facilitate or frustrate the resolution of belief-conflicts in dialogues. This of the dialectical methodology, however, adds. little to our understanding struggle of speech and language and also fails to illuminate the creative outcomes of dialogue - the new solutions generated, or new worlds of possible meanings opened. Research into the creative outcomes of dialogue awaits the development of new methodologies focusing on the evolving meanings of language repetitiously reproduced in individual speech and of speech repetitiously guided by language. The challenge for the next decade of research must be to consider new models of understanding of dialogic processes and their influence on developmental change. With this we are also asked to reconsider what develops. From the perspective of the conflict-consensus model, it is rational argumentation that develops. From the perspective of the empathy model, it is sensitive interpersonal understanding that is central to change. A more playful, creative, regenerative, or poetic model of development would be demanded by a hermeneutic model. Ricoeur (1983), for example, refers to the text as a kind of “metaphor” to be interpreted, one in which the “metaphorical reference maintains the ordinary vision in tension with the new one it suggests” (p. 241). Perhaps it is the ability to witness this tension that changes with age. On the other hand, it is possible that some integration of the developing abilities for rational argumentation, empathy, and interpretation hold the key to understanding the underlying developmental change in the resolution of dialogic processes cognitive, moral, and social conflicts. REFERENCES Berkowitz, M. (1980a). The role of transactive discussion in moral development: The history of a six-year program of research Part 1. Moral Education Forum, 5, (Summer), 15-27. Berkowitz, M. (1980b). The role of transactive discussion in moral development: The history of a six-year program of research - Part I I,.Moral Education Forum, 5, (Fall) 1326. Berkowitz, M. (1985). The role of discussion in moral education. In M. W. Berkowitz and F. Oser (Eds.), Moral education: Theory and application. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Berkowitz, M. (1989). Four perspectives on moral argumentation. In C. Harding (Ed.), Moral development: Philosophical and psychological z&es. Chicago: Precedent Press. Berkowitz, M., 8c Gibbs, J. (1979). A preliminary manual for coding transactive features of dyadic discussion. Unpublished manuscript, Marquette University, Milwaukee. Berkowitz, M., & Gibbs, J. (1983). Measuring the developmental features of moral discussion. Merrill-Palmer Quarterl? 29, 399-410. Bernstein, R. (1976). The restructunng of social and political theory. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Damon, W., & Killen, M. (1982). Peer interaction and the process of change in children’s moral reasoning. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 28, 347-367. Elliston, F., & McCormick, P. (Eds.) (1977). H usserl: Expositions and appraisals. London: University of Notre Dame Press. Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). Truth and method. New York: Seabury Press. Gruber, H. E., & Voneche, J. J. (1977). Th e essential Piaget. New York: Basic Books. Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the evolution of society. Boston: Beacon Press.
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Habermas, J. (1983). Untitled paper presented at the Conference on Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA. Harvey, I. (1982). The linguistic basis of truth for Hegel. Man and World, 15, 285-297. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Phenomenology ofspirit. New York: Oxford University Press. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. New York: Harper & Row. Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Kohlberg, L. (198 1). Essays on moral development. Vol. 1: The philosophy of moral development. New York: Harper & Row. Kruger, A. C., & Tomassello, M. (1986). Transactive discussions with peers and adults. Developmental Psychology, 22, 68 l-685. Lacan, J. (1981). The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. New York: Norton. Leadbeater, B. (1986). Qualitative and developmental differences in the relational processes of adolescent and adult dialogues: The dynamics of intersubjectivity. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Teachers College, Columbia University. Leadbeater, B. (1988). Qualitative differences in the relational processes of adolescent and adult dialogues. Human Development, 31, 313-326. McCarthy, T. (1978). The critical theory ofJurgen Habermas. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). The prose of the world. Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press. Miller, M. (1982). Learning how to contradict and still pursue a common end: The ontogenesis of moral argumentation. Unpublished paper, Max Planck Institut fur Sozialwissenschaften, Munich. Ortega y Gasset, J. (1957). Man and people. New York: Norton. Oser, F. (1984). Cognitive stages of interaction in moral discourse. In W. M. Kurtines &J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior and moral development. New York: Wiley. Oser, F., Berkowitz, M. W., & Altof, W. (1985). The development of argumentative logic. Paper presented at Society for Research in Child Development, Toronto, Canada. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ricoeur, P. (1978a). Explanation and understanding. In C. Reagan & D. Stewart (Eds.), The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Boston: Beacon Press. Ricoeur, P. (1978b). The question of proof in Freud’s writings. In C. Reagan & D. Stewart (Eds.), The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Boston: Beacon Press. Ricoeur, P. (1983). Response to Habermas. Paper presented at the Conference on Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA. Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and nothingness. New York: Washington Square Press. Sartre, J.-P. (1976). Critique of dialectical reason I: Theory of practical ensembles. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Scheler, M. (1954). The nature ofsympathy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Schutz, A. (1967). Thephenomenology of the social world. Chicago: Northwestern University Press. Wagner, H. R. (Ed.) (1970). Onphenomenology andsocial relations: Selected writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
17S184,
0732-l 18x/89 $3.00 + 0.00 0 1989 Pergamon Press plc
1989
RELATIONAL PROCESSES IN DIALOGUE: THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY BONNIE Department
J. LEADBEATER*
of Psychology, Barnard College, Columbia New York, NY 10027, U.S.A.
University,
Abstract Based on the theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, and more recently, Habermas, positive changes in cognitive, moral, and social development are seen to be the result of peer efforts to resolve conflicts through discursive
efforts to achieve a consensus. This conflict-consensus model of dialogues is elaborated and analyzed critically. With reference to the philosophical literature on the problem of intersubjectivity, the model is contrasted with empathy and hermeneutic models of the relational processes in dialogue. The needs for future researchers to consider both alternate models of interpersonal processes in dialogue and creative, in addition to consensus, outcomes of dialogue are discussed. INTRODUCTION A clear model of the dialogic processes believed to be implicated in developmental changes is emerging from a decade of research investigating the role of discussion in the development of rational solutions to cognitive, moral, and social problems. In this model, changes result from the equal respect that is afforded by peer relations and from the intrapsychic disequilibrium that is stimulated by peer conflicts. Dialogic efforts of age-matched peers to achieve a consensus is seen to promote the reformulation of the idiosyncratic reasoning of lower stage discussants to higher, more rational, generalizable levels (Berkowitz, -1985, 1988; Berkowitz 8c Gibbs, 1983; Damon & Killen, 1982; Kruger & Tomassello, 1986; Miller, 1982; Oser, 1984; Oser, Berkowitz, & Altof, 1985). This work has its theoretical underpinnings in Piaget’s ( 1934) and Kohlberg’s (1981) theories of moral reasoning and, more recently, has referred to Habermas’ (1979) vision of communicative competence. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate and analyze the theoretical supports and limitations of what I will call this conflict-consensus model of dialogic processes. I will argue that progress in understanding both the dialogic processes
Acknowledgements - This paper was based on a PhD dissertation, Teachers College, Columbta University. It was partially.funded by doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships from the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada. The ideas in this paper are indeed the products of intersubjective processes. They emerged in long discussions with several people including John Broughton, Paul Chevigny, Marshall Gladstone, Margaret Honey, Meryle Kaplan, Deanna Kuhn, Don Moss, and Rob Wozniak. *Correspondence should be addressed University, New Haven, CT 06520, U.S.A.
to the author
173
at Department
of Psychology,
Yale
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implicated in developmental changes and the nature of those changes is threatened by an unquestioned acceptance of this model. I will also refer to the philosophical literature addressing the problem of “intersubjectivity” - of how shared meaning is possible to propose two alternate models. The first, following Alfred Schutz (1967), sees interpersonal empathy as the mechanism underlying the possibility of consensus. The second model, following hermeneutic theories of Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (1978a, 1983), criticizes the individualism in both the conflict-consensus and empathy models. From the perspective of a hermeneutic model, it is argued that dialogic processes may be conceived as mutual efforts to interpret the text of dialogue. In this model of dialogues, change is seen in the opening of the discussants to possible worlds of meaning. THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS
OF THE CONFLICT-CONSENSUS
MODEL
The conflict-consensus model has its roots, for developmental researchers, in Piaget’s vision of the role of peer cooperation in the development of moral reason. From his empirical observations of the marble game played by Swiss children, Piaget (1934) concludes as follows: The norms of reason, and in particular the important norm of reciprocity, the source of the logic of relations, can only develop in and through cooperation. Whether cooperation is an effect or a cause of reason, or both, reason requires cooperation in so far as being rational consists in ‘situating
oneself so as to submit the individual to the universal. (p. 107)
Merging the logical-mathematical definition of a “reciprocal” (i.e., that by which a given quantity is multiplied to give unity) with the definition of “reciprocity” (i.e., a social ideal of mutual or equal respect), Piaget subtly ties together logic, morality, and mutual respect. The complexities of this merger have not been unravelled, but rather,,have been carried through in subsequent developmental theory. Borrowing from Rawls’ (197 1) conception of justice as role-taking, Kohlberg (198 1) claims that the most logically valid principles of social justice are those that could be adopted behind a “veil of ignorance,” where each individual has an equal chance of being anyone in particular including the least advantaged member of society. The most valid or rational solution to conflicts is the most universal or reciprocal. The words unity, consensus, universality, reciprocity, generalizability all preserve the dual definition that construes the most valid argument as rationally the most logical, and socially the most reciprocal. Support for the conflict-consensus model has recently been found in Habermas’ (1979) theory of communicative competence, in which he attempts to “identify and construct universal conditions of possible understanding” (p. 1). Developmental researchers who see moral, social, or cognitive development in to universality find corroboration in the movement from egocentricism Habermas’ view that the stages of morality and of individual and collective identity formations “cannot be measured against the choice of correct strategies, but rather against the intersubjectivity of understanding achieved without force,
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that is against the expansion of the domain of consensual action together with the reestablishment of undistorted communication” (p. 120). In Habermas’ view progress toward the expansion of consensual action is prompted by communicative action by discussants who, under ideal speech conditions take the general position of any individual in a conflict (i.e., of equals or peers), and work toward a rational consensus (i.e., a position valid for all rational subjects). Bernstein (1976) summarizes Habermas’ concept of ideal speech as “that form of discourse in which there is no other compulsion but the compulsion of the argumentation itself, where there is a genuine symmetry among the participants involved, allowing a universal interchangeability of dialogue roles where no form of domination exists” (p. 212). The mechanism of change is the force of rationality itself which increasingly reduces contradictions through increasingly rational solutions. The most rational or logical position emerges as the individual participants in the dialogue subject their idiosyncratic beliefs to the weight of evidence and the force of rationality. As in Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories of imperative), the individual’s moral reasoning (and in Kant’s categorical idiosyncratic beliefs are equilibrated as they accommodate to more rational, logical, universal solutions which can be agreed on by all. McCarthy (1978) summarizes the assumptions in Habermas’ position as follows: The supposition that attaches to such an agreement (consensus) is that it represents a “rational consensus,” that is, that it is the result not of the peculiarities of the participants or their situation, but simply of them subjecting themselves to the weight of evidence and the force of argument. The agreement is regarded as valid not only for “us” (the actual participants). but as objectively valid, valid for all rational subjects (as potential participants) (p. 292)
Again the most rational is the most reciprocal. It is the agreement in which the peculiarities of the individual give way to the objectively valid solution. Individual idiosyncrasy is seen as a threat to rational agreement. According to Habermas ( 1979), competing opponents, “insofar as they are determined by the intention of influencing each other’s decision in a way oriented only to each’s [sic] own success” operate according to what he calls “strategic actions” (p. 117). Since this orientation to one’s own success limits the expansion of consensual action, Habermas concludes that “strategic actions must be institutionalized, that is, “embedded in intersubjectively binding norms that guarantee the fulfillment of the motivational conditions (necessary for communicative actions)” (ibid., p. 118). He prescribes the ideal speech conditions that serve as the “binding norms” or as the motivational guarantors of consensual actions, and as a regulator of the strategic actions of opponents. In ideal speech conditions, four validity claims are raised simultaneously and place obligations on both speaker and hearer in communicative actions. Utterances must be “comprehensible” (made in grammatically well-formed sentences), “true” (grounded in real objects or events in the world), “truthful” (express accurately the subjective intentions of each speaker), and “right or (satisfy the recognized norms for interpersonal relations in a appropriate”
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shared
life world)
(Habermas,
1979, pp. 2-5).
The rationality
of communicative
actions can be measured against their adherence to these validity claims. Failure of the participants to mutually recognize or, in the event of a breakdown in communication, to redeem any of these validity claims, results in the disruption
of consensus. However, according to Habermas (1979, p. 3), this failure marks the typical state of linguistic communications and validity claims must continuously be negotiated to bring about agreement: Coming to an understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement on the presupposed basis of validity claims that can be mutually recognized . . . . As soon as consensus is shaken, and the presuppositions that certain validity claims are satisfied (or could be vindicated) is suspended, the task of mutual interpretation is to acheive a new definition of the situation which all participants can share. (p. 3)
In this conflict-consensus model, individuals appear repeatedly entrapped by their own idiosyncratic, subjectively meaningful utterances about the world of things and social relations. What then motivates these individuals to submit their competitive interests or strategic actions to communicative action? Is it intersubjectively binding norms ? But how are these norms agreed on if the failure of validity claims marks typical communications? It seems that what is required for intersubjective understanding (consensual actions) presupposes what it is intended to explain (consensus). The argument borders on the tautology that consensus is guaranteed by agreement. Agreement seems to be achieved by formalizing the procedures of communicative interactions and distancing them from their origins in expressive subjects. If the desire of each competing opponent is oriented to his or her own success, what motivates the change from self-oriented communicative strategies to consensus-oriented communicative actions? Is it the coercive force of intersubjectively binding norms? But it is this kind of coercive conventionality that Habermas’ emancipatory theory of society hopes to escape. The problem seems to lie in the uneasy union of rationality and reciprocity. .In defining progress as expansion, dependent on the submission of individuals to validity claims that regulate conflicts among them, it seems that what is presupposed for a rational consensus is the reciprocity of mutual respect proposed by Piaget. But this respect is exactly what is absent from the intentions according to Habermas’ (1979) definition of their of competing opponents, strategic actions. On the other hand, were it possible to establish consensus by one’s agreements on the validity claims concerning linguistic comprehensibility, the truthfulness of intentional expression, the truth of propositions about real objects, and the legitimacy of existing norms and values, a negotiated consensus would be unnecessary. A further difficulty emerges from empirical evaluations of the development of the logic of argumentation based on the conflict-consensus model. Based on Habermas’ theory, Oser and his colleagues (Oser, 1984; Oser et al., 1985) have
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proposed age-linked, qualitative differences in the logic of argumentation that mark stages on the way to an endpoint in ideal rational speech. They describe five stages in the development of rationality in moral discussions, progressing from Stage 1 in which idiosyncratic views are repetitively offered and supported by only loosely related arguments, to higher stages in which the “logic of shared analysis appears as if it almost could be generated ‘without’ a partner” (p. 10). With development, the individual gradually submits his or her individual views to the objective force of the better argument. Dialogue at this highest level involves reasoning about the argumentation and aims at identifying shared meaning or rational consensus. Individual interests apparently fade as the discussants’ mutual recognition of the necessity of the logical position emerges. Despite the appeal of this ideal for regulating individualism in dialogue, the fleeting specter of disembodied, partnerless dialogues gives cause to reconsider the conflict-consensus model. Habermas (1979) writes that, with development, with itself (or step outside of itself) precisely in the ego “can identify distinguishing the merely subjective from the nonsubjective” (p. 100). However, it remains unclear how this self-observing ego would be able to step outside of its concrete roles, desires, personalities, emotions, etc., and deliver itself to the ideal . of progress through logic or consensus. Even were such a rational ideal a conscious aim, this view ignores unconscious motivation and the reality of unequal power relations. The infrequent occurrence, in mortal subjects, of Kohlberg’s (1981) and Oser et al.‘s (1985) highest levels of reasoning, which depend on this ability to set one’s own interests aside and don a “veil of ignorance,” demonstrates this point. Consideration of this problem of the relationship between individual minds and the possibility of universal truths has been addressed by many 19th and 20th century philosophers concerned with the problem of intersubjectivity. Proposed solutions to this problem vary widely and reveal alternatives to the conflictconsensus model of dialogue just described. THE PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEM
OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Husserl is generally credited with ushering in the modern debate on the problem of intersubjectivity in communication. He criticizes Descartes’ cogito, a rational ideal not unlike Piaget’s epistemic subject in its emphasis on the power of deductive logic as the foundation of certainty (Gruber & Voneche, 1977). Husserl (1960) argues that Descartes failed to question the conditions of existence of his solipsistic “knowing I” and thus could not explain how shared experience is possible. Although educated as a mathematician, Husserl introduced his Cartesian Meditations (1960) by saying that he was disillusioned with efforts to deduce philosophical certainty from first principles (as in physics, mathematics, and logic). Certainty could not be deduced from the individual, abstracted cogito. He advocated instead an “all-embracing self-investigation” to explain how “reality” is “there-for-everyone” (1960, p. 6). In the subsequent philosophical debates, Husserl’s meditations have been widely criticized for failing to overcome their solipsistic starting point in the private subjectivity of the individual, as transcendental ego (Elliston & McCormick, 1977). However, this
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question of how reality is “there-for-everyone” persists. Philosophers dealing with this problem (Hegel, 1807/1977; Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1960; Merleau-Ponty, 1973; Ortega y Gasset, 1957; Sartre, 1956, 1976; Scheler, 1954) have proposed theories ranging from the extreme of asserting the radical, ontological isolation of individuals condemned to the uncertainty and freedom of their own impenetrable consciousnesses, to the other extreme of asserting the fusion of consciousnesses in a unity or undifferentiated plurality that is guaranteed in co-being, co-action, or common language. Either the individual mind exists prior to knowing and solipsism is inescapable, or communal knowledge exists prior to individual reasoning and conventionality is then the trap; either subjects are primordially differentiated and the possibility of of shared knowledge or “truth” remains in question, or the differentiation individual consciousness is lost in an assumed shared meaning system. From the perspectives considering the problem of point of view of philosophical intersubjectivity as it relates to the possibility of communication, however, intersubjectivity is neither prevented by the existence of other consciousnesses nor guaranteed a priori. Rather, consensus is continuously reproduced by subjects actively engaged in interpretation of “true” or “common knowledge.” But how does this interpretation proceed? The poles of the debate on the problem of intersubjectivity in communication are illustrated in the differences between Habermas’ and Schutz’s theories. We have already witnessed the ideal submission of the individual to the universal “truths” in the ideal speech conditions described by Habermas. Seeking to identify and reconstruct the universal conditions of possible understanding in his universal pragmatics, he begins with a view of the idiosyncrasy or self-interest of individual consciousness. The question of how consensus is possible in dialogues, for Habermas, becomes one of how idiosyncrasy can be regulated. (norms, philosophical ideals or ideal speech Logical criteria, or procedures conditions) are needed to limit individualism. Turning next, briefly, to Schutz’s (1967) theory of intersubjectivity, it will be argued that an ongoing process of empathic communication is necessary to an understanding of what is going on in the separate minds of real communicants. From the perspective of Schutz’s empathy model of dialogue, only increasingly specific, sensitive, communication abilities (rather than increasingly general ones) would facilitate consensus. However, according to Schutz (1967) even with this empathy, the meaning grasped by the listener only approximates the speaker’s intended meaning and the individuals seem mired in the relativism of each one’s own experience. In contrast to Habermas’ theory where the peculiarities of the individual submit to the force of rational consensus, in Schutz’s model, consensus is overcome by the meaning of an experience for the individual. EMPATHY Schutz (in Wagner,
AND INDIVIDUAL
1970) delineates
EXPRESSION
the main questions of intersubjectivity
(1) How is the ‘other self constituted in my mind as a Self of basically the same (eidetic) characteristics as my own self? (2) How is the experience of a successful intercourse with another self possible: How is the experience of my ‘understanding’ the other and his ‘understanding’ of me constituted? (p. 165)
as:
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He suggests that intersubjective understanding is established in the ongoing process of communication. However, believing that meaningful individual experience exists prior to social experience, he insists on the impossibility of the identity of two streams of consciousness. The subjective experience of individual consciousnesses cannot simultaneously coincide exactly and exist separately. To resolve the dilemma of how understanding is possible given the separateness of individual experience, Schutz (1967), also referring to Husserl, distinguishes the. representative function of a sign (word) as indicating an external object or objective meaning from its expressive and interpretive functions. The latter include “what actually went on in the mind of the communicator, the person who used the sign . . . Everyone using or interpreting a sign associates with it a certain meaning having its origins in the unique quality of the experiences in which he once learned to use the sign” (p. 124). The meaning of words is established in a step-by-step synthesis of expression and interpretation in dialogues. However, even in Schutz’s ideal speech circumstances, in which the speaker selects his or her words with the intention of being understood and the listener’s interpretation draws on both his or her own experiences and knowledge of the other’s, the meaning of the lived experience of the speaker is plagued by “vagueness and uncertainty” (p. 128). As Schutz (1967) says, The subjective meaning that the interpreter does grasp is at best an approximation to the sign-user’s intended meaning, but never that meaning itself, for one’s knowledge of another person’s perspective is always necessarily limited. For exactly the same reason the person who expresses himself in signs is never quire sure of how he is being understood. (p. 129)
Beginning with the view of the idiosyncrasy of individual expression, Schutz’s theory is ultimately mired in the relativism of individual perspectives which cannot be overcome even in the ideal of procedurally regulated communication. For Schutz, the idiosyncrasy or uniqueness of ongoing conscious experience precludes the possibility of consensus. Both Habermas’ and Schutz’s theories begin with the view that meaningful individual expression exists prior to social experience. Discussants in ordinary dialogue are described as biased, subjectively focused individuals with competing interests, viewpoints, lived experience, or stocks of knowledge. For Habermas, validity claims regulate this individualism. For Schutz, empathy is the necessary but insufficient route to understanding the experience of another. For Habermas, the idiosyncrasy of individual thought or experience is overcome in the ideal of procedurally regulated communication but for Schutz, it precludes the possibility of consensus. A hermeneutic model of the dialectical process of shared meaning in dialogue moves away from this starting point in individual minds to a starting point in the text of the dialogue itself. The goal of discussion is neither the resolution of ccmpeting viewpoints in consensus nor empathic understanding. Rather, the goal of dialogue is to open the discussants to new or possible worlds of meaning through the interpretation of what is spoken. The discussants are not asked to submit to the force of the better argument, but rather to participate in a dialectic
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of speech and language. In this ongoing dialectic, the individual neither submits to the universal nor struggles with unending relativism; rather, both individual and universal are seen as irreducible poles of the dialectic of creative communication. THE
DIALECTIC
OF SPEECH
AND LANGUAGE
Analyzing the linguistic basis of truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Harvey (1982) suggests that language is the condition of the possibility of truth and falsity claims concerning the world (p. 285). This possibility, however, is realized through individual utterances. The truth is’continuously regenerated in the dialectic of language overdetermined by history and culture and speech overdetermined by individual experience. Briefly, Harvey’s argument runs as follows. For_Hegel(1887/1977), all sensory experience becomes meaningful only when uttered, that is, when it is isolated from the buzzing and booming of sensation and a “This” is named “Here” and “Now” (p.66). Language creates the universal or general categories which, while failing to express all that is sensed, express all that is utterable. “We do not say what in sense-certainty we mean to say” (p. 60). But because language historically exists prior to individual speech, “we are spoken by our words in as much as we speak at all” (Harvey, 1982, p. 287). Language preserves the truth of history and demands that the vanity of individual speech submit the falsity of its proclamations to the universality of words, sentences, and texts. But the truth of language is also only utterable; language exists only as it is spoken it is captured by individual speech. Using the analogy of the text (language in its historical form as written) and the reader, Harvey describes this mutual capturing of language by speech and speech by language as a life and death struggle. The reader must surrender to the voice of the text which, “via the labor of the reader’s attempt to hear,” produces a meaningful interpretation in which the text dies and is reborn in the reader’s understandings and misunderstandings (p. 294). Submitting to the text through reading, one also risks the loss of one’s own meaningful understandings -one’s world or world view. But the pain of reading or hearing and the violence of being read or heard has its rewards in the rebirth of meaning. Meaning is not static. This is a dialectic of assimilation and accommodation without equilibrium. According to Harvey (1982), what is understood and spoken by successive generations is recreated in the light of the historical and cultural changes that have occurred. In his words: We do not say again what was already said: indeed we cannot, since the same text later in time is granted a rebirth and a new world of meaning possibilities. Our children will not speak our language bui their own. Nevertheless it will be speech and it will be takes on the clothing of and reproduction that sustenance over time: a
a language. This intertextuality, in Hegelian terms, sexuality, progeneration, regeneration, production, does not immediately return to itself in its selfspiral of repetition that is not repetition. (p. 291)
The way of truth is via this repetitious re-reading or re-speaking of language. Language holds all of history and speech cannot express all we mean to say. The labor of this pregnant dialectic is unending.
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This dialectical vision of intersubjectivity suggests a theory of communicative performance very different from that of Habermas’ rationally driven argumentation and Schutz’s empathy model. This dialectic strives for renewal in the opening up of the world of possible meanings. The concept of rationality shifts from that exemplified by the ideals of deductive methodology and the conflation of the rational and reciprocal, to a broader notion of seeking the reasons why assertions are held (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 11). Rationality and generalizability take their place as the evaluative tools of reasoning, rather than as the ideals of dialogue. As Ricoeur (1978a) says, “Beyond my situations as reader, beyond the author’s situation, I offer myself to the possible ways of being-in-the-world which the text opens up and discovers for me” (p. 144). Neither individual speech nor language submits its claim to validity. Analogously, we might suggest that communicants who are open to the possible meanings of overdetermined speech and language escape both the competitive individualism of finding out what the other meant and whether he or she can defend that view, and the conventionality of a third person, principled perspective that assumes the objective singularity of shared meaning or rational consensus. THE INTERSUBJECTIVE
CONTEXT
OF DIALOGUE
Returning from philosophical models of communicative action to the question of the nature of dialogic processes implicated in developmental change, we must question the characteristics of the interrelational processes of individuals in actual communications. Philosophers have been more concerned with construction theories of interindividual relations of consciousness than with illuminating the processes of dialogue in face-to-face communications. Are communicants opponents engaged in rational battles encountering the force of the better idea? Do they struggle with understanding what each other meant? Are they exploring the ideas spoken by the text of their dialogue? What are the conditions of existence of a “conversing I” that make shared or sharing meanings possible or impossible? While such psychologized questions might send shudders through the philosopher, they are central to our understanding of dialogic processes. These processes may be understood as the conditions of interpersonal existence through which dialogue is either frozen by the procedural regulations of speech conditions, locked in individual consciousnesses, or passed into the playful dialectic of speech and language. If we understand by >‘existence” not only the philosophical problem of ontology (which might usefully divert us to an analysis of intersubjectivity in infant experience) but also the problem of here and now dialogic relations, we can wonder in what way the nature of conditions of existence of these relations makes sharing knowledge possible or indeed, impossible. These issues concerning the intersubjective context of dialogue have been partially considered by psychoanalysts, elaborating the processes of transference and countertransference (Lacan, 1981; Ricoeur, 1978b). However, their usefulness for understanding everyday dialogues has not been explored. Moreover, little empirical research exists to guide this exploration. Research by Berkowitz (1980a, 1980b), and Berkowitz and Gibbs (1979) on
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“transactive dialogic behavior” has suggested one way to proceed in the analysis of the interindividual relations in everyday dialogues. “Transactive dialogue behavior” is defined as “a cognitive operation upon another’s reasoning in the context of an attempt to resolve, explain, or comprehend differences in reasoning about moral issues” (Berkowitz, 1980a, p. 16). Berkowitz describes this behavior as a dialectical process in which “one’s own reasoning confronts the other’s antithetical reasoning in an ongoing dialogic dynamic” (p. 13). Emphasizing a conflict-consensus model of dialogues, Berkowitz does not directly question how shared meaning is possible in dialogues. However, he does highlight the importance of the changing relations of self and other to the dialogic processes in distinguishing the term “transactive” from “interactive” to emphasize the interpenetrative, reciprocal, bidirectional aspects of the dyads’ dialogue. Each of the 18 transacts that Berkowitz defines is further delineated as primarily representing the “personal focus” or perspective of Ego (self), Alter (other), or Dyad (both) and is also distinguished by its “mode” as either competitive (critiquing, devaluing, or conceding) or non-competitive (synthesizing or elaborating) with respect to the Alter’s perspective. Using these distinctions in personal focus and mode, differences were found by Leadbeater (1986, 1988) in the patterns of Ego, Alter, or Dyad-focused, competitive and non-competitive transacts in the dialogues of adolescent and adult friendship dyads discussing their opinions about disarmament. Three “relational transact patterns” were identified. The alter-focused non-competitive dyad members of Group 1 tended to affirm (paraphrase, complete, extend or request justifications of) their partners’ speech in the dialogue. The ego and alter-focused competitive dyad members of Group 2 tended to criticize (competitively extend, competitively paraphrase, criticize, and point out contradictions in) their partners’ speech and to clarify and refine their own position competitively. The alter-focused competitive and non-competitive dyad members of Group 3 tended to both affirm and criticize each others’ reasoning and to competitively clarify their own reasoning to a lesser degree than Group 2 dyads. Also using a modification of Berkowitz’s methodology, Damon and Killen (1982) studied patterns of peer communication that were associated with change in moral reasoning about the just distribution of rewards in kindergarten and Ist, 2nd and 3rd grade children. Children whose dialogues included more rejecting speech acts (e.g., disagreements and ridicule) were disproportionately represented in the “no change” group. In contrast, the interactions of children who changed were characterized by more reciprocal speech acts including and paraphrases) and transforming accepting statements (e.g., agreements statements (e.g., clarification and extensions). Finally, Kruger and Tomassello (1986) report that 7 and 11 year old children produced more other-oriented transactive statements and questions in moral discussions with peers than in discussions with their mothers. This suggests that not only the patterns of relational processes within dialogues but also the power relations in dialogues have an impact upon the external conditions of existence that make shared meaning possible.
183
Relational processes in dialogue These dialogues,
studies
begin
focusing
to address
on the nature
the problem and dynamics
of intersubjective of interpersonal
processes
in
communication
which facilitate or frustrate the resolution of belief-conflicts in dialogues. This of the dialectical methodology, however, adds. little to our understanding struggle of speech and language and also fails to illuminate the creative outcomes of dialogue - the new solutions generated, or new worlds of possible meanings opened. Research into the creative outcomes of dialogue awaits the development of new methodologies focusing on the evolving meanings of language repetitiously reproduced in individual speech and of speech repetitiously guided by language. The challenge for the next decade of research must be to consider new models of understanding of dialogic processes and their influence on developmental change. With this we are also asked to reconsider what develops. From the perspective of the conflict-consensus model, it is rational argumentation that develops. From the perspective of the empathy model, it is sensitive interpersonal understanding that is central to change. A more playful, creative, regenerative, or poetic model of development would be demanded by a hermeneutic model. Ricoeur (1983), for example, refers to the text as a kind of “metaphor” to be interpreted, one in which the “metaphorical reference maintains the ordinary vision in tension with the new one it suggests” (p. 241). Perhaps it is the ability to witness this tension that changes with age. On the other hand, it is possible that some integration of the developing abilities for rational argumentation, empathy, and interpretation hold the key to understanding the underlying developmental change in the resolution of dialogic processes cognitive, moral, and social conflicts. REFERENCES Berkowitz, M. (1980a). The role of transactive discussion in moral development: The history of a six-year program of research Part 1. Moral Education Forum, 5, (Summer), 15-27. Berkowitz, M. (1980b). The role of transactive discussion in moral development: The history of a six-year program of research - Part I I,.Moral Education Forum, 5, (Fall) 1326. Berkowitz, M. (1985). The role of discussion in moral education. In M. W. Berkowitz and F. Oser (Eds.), Moral education: Theory and application. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Berkowitz, M. (1989). Four perspectives on moral argumentation. In C. Harding (Ed.), Moral development: Philosophical and psychological z&es. Chicago: Precedent Press. Berkowitz, M., 8c Gibbs, J. (1979). A preliminary manual for coding transactive features of dyadic discussion. Unpublished manuscript, Marquette University, Milwaukee. Berkowitz, M., & Gibbs, J. (1983). Measuring the developmental features of moral discussion. Merrill-Palmer Quarterl? 29, 399-410. Bernstein, R. (1976). The restructunng of social and political theory. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Damon, W., & Killen, M. (1982). Peer interaction and the process of change in children’s moral reasoning. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 28, 347-367. Elliston, F., & McCormick, P. (Eds.) (1977). H usserl: Expositions and appraisals. London: University of Notre Dame Press. Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). Truth and method. New York: Seabury Press. Gruber, H. E., & Voneche, J. J. (1977). Th e essential Piaget. New York: Basic Books. Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the evolution of society. Boston: Beacon Press.
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