Resettlement and climate change vulnerability: Evidence from rural China

Global Environmental Change 35 (2015) 62–69

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Resettlement and climate change vulnerability: Evidence from rural China Sarah Rogers* , Tao Xue School of Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Article history: Received 9 February 2015 Received in revised form 5 August 2015 Accepted 13 August 2015 Available online xxx

The literature on migration and climate change has become increasingly attuned to the role of climatic factors in already complex migration dynamics, and amid different kinds of mobility. However, to date little evidence has been provided of the relationship between resettlement and climate change, including the degree to which resettlement may shape the vulnerability of households or communities. In this article we ask: is there any evidence that resettlement may be a driver of vulnerability and if so, what factors make resettled households more vulnerable when compared to non-resettled households? These questions are considered with reference to new evidence drawn from a livelihoods-based vulnerability analysis in a drought-prone, poverty county in China’s Shanxi Province, which encompassed households involved in local poverty resettlement programs. Evidence of the characteristics of resettled households compared to non-resettled households shows that resettlement adversely impacts on the household asset base, particularly in terms of financial and natural capital. It may therefore be a driver of vulnerability. At a time when the Chinese government is repackaging resettlement as a climate change adaptation measure, this article provides evidence that resettlement as it is currently practiced has the potential to amplify rather than alleviate household vulnerability to climate change. ã 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Resettlement Vulnerability China Adaptation Livelihood security Migration

1. Introduction The literature addressing the migration-climate change nexus has become progressively more nuanced, one aspect of which has been the unravelling of alarmist and simplistic narratives around climate refugees (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Bettini, 2013). Largely concerned with climate-induced displacements and migration as a climate change adaptation strategy, the literature now seeks an understanding of the role of climatic factors in existing, complex migration dynamics (Bardsley and Hugo, 2010; McLeman and Hunter, 2010; Warner, 2010; Warner et al., 2010; Black et al., 2011; Findlay, 2011; Piguet et al., 2011; de Sherbinin et al., 2012; Adams and Adger, 2013; International Organization for Migration, 2014). Within this literature, while different kinds of mobility and their relation to environmental change have been disentangled (see Hunter, 2005; McLeman and Hunter, 2010; McLeman, 2011; Piguet et al., 2011; Kothari, 2014), the relationship between resettlement (development-induced displacement within state borders) organised by the state and vulnerability to climate change is only now beginning to be interrogated (Barnett, 2012; Wilmsen and Webber,

* Corresponding author at: School of Geography, University of Melbourne, 221 Bouverie St., Carlton 3053, Victoria, Australia. Fax: +61 383440631. E-mail address: [email protected] (S. Rogers). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.08.005 0959-3780/ ã 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

2015). Throughout the following article we define vulnerability as the ability or inability of individuals and social groupings to respond to any external stress placed on their livelihoods and wellbeing (Kelly and Adger, 2000, p. 328). In our case study, that external stress is increased water stress as a result of frequent droughts and rising temperatures. Resettlement occurs for many reasons, most of them unrelated to climatic stress. It has long been understood that resettlement entails risks to livelihood security (Cernea, 1997), and more recently, it has been acknowledged that the socio-economic impacts of resettlement on communities imply increased vulnerability to climate change, and perhaps maladaptation, meaning adaptation that increases vulnerability (Barnett and Webber, 2009; Barnett and O’Neill, 2012). However, the degree to which resettlement shapes the vulnerability of households to climate change relative to non-resettled households has not yet been established. In this article we ask: is there any evidence that resettlement may drive vulnerability to climate change and if so, what factors make resettled households more vulnerable when compared to non-resettled households? These questions are considered with reference to new evidence drawn from fieldwork in a drought-prone, poverty county (Ji County) in China’s Shanxi Province. In doing so, we contribute to a more informed discussion – recently initiated elsewhere (see Wilmsen and Webber, 2015)

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– of the shifts that may be needed in resettlement practice to avoid resettlement-related maladaptation. China is a particularly productive site for research on the relationship between resettlement and vulnerability to climate change. State-led resettlement is widespread and resettlement is used for increasingly varied purposes: forced resettlement occurs as a result of large infrastructure projects such as dams (Croll, 1999; Webber and McDonald, 2004; Heggelund, 2006; Brown and Xu, 2010; Wilmsen et al., 2011) and the South-North Water Transfer project (State Council South-North Water Transfer Construction Committee Office, 2015); and ‘voluntary’ resettlement occurs for poverty alleviation and environmental goals—so-called ‘poverty’ and ‘ecological’ resettlement (Merkle, 2003; Rogers and Wang, 2006; Dickinson and Webber, 2007; Yeh, 2009; Tashi and Foggin, 2012; Xue et al., 2013). Most recently, resettlement has been included in China’s first National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, earmarked as a means of taking pressure off vulnerable environments and of removing people from areas at high risk of climate-related disasters (National Development and Reform Commission, 2013). This approach is already being implemented: poverty and ecological resettlement are one of the primary climate change adaptation strategies being investigated for communities affected by desertification in Ningxia Province, as part of the work of the Swiss-funded Adapting to Climate Change in China program (Adapting to Climate Change in China, 2014). This repackaging of an existing practice as a climate change adaptation measure is highly problematic when the relationship between resettlement and climate change vulnerability is not well understood. To better understand this relationship means not just examining the experiences of existing resettlement programs to guide future organised climate-related resettlements (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015), but also considering how socio-economic and climatic factors may converge to produce differences in the vulnerability of resettled and non-resettled households, regardless of whether or not the resettlement is climate change-related.

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2. Approach and methods Vulnerability analyses grounded in a rural livelihoods approach are increasingly common (see Ford and Smit, 2004; Eakin, 2005; Osbahr et al., 2008; Paavola, 2008; Eriksen and Silva, 2009), and have two key strengths that are central to understanding the vulnerability of resettled and non-resettled households. The first is that through their analysis of household assets and livelihood strategies they are attuned to the uneven distribution of resources, as well as to the exogenous forces that shape or mediate that distribution of resources. As such, they offer an understanding of why one group may be more vulnerable than another (Park et al., 2012, p. 5). The second strength is that these studies are cognisant that human and biophysical vulnerability are interlinked: in other words, that vulnerability does not exist in isolation (Kelly and Adger, 2000, p. 328; Turner et al., 2003; Adger, 2006; Ziervogel et al., 2006). Livelihoods-based analyses of vulnerability identify specific climatic risks and how they interact with household livelihoods, which entails an understanding of coping and adaptive strategies (Eriksen et al., 2005). A livelihoods-based approach to climate change vulnerability can therefore be said to encompass an understanding of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity, within an existing organising framework for studying rural households as economic units. The broader livelihoods-based vulnerability study that this article draws on was conducted by the authors in 2012–2013 in four administrative villages within two of Ji County’s townships (see Fig. 1). These administrative villages are collections of smaller, dispersed ‘natural’ villages. The larger study was comprised of semi-structured interviews with 53 households and 18 local officials (at the county, township and village level), supplemented by secondary data collection. Ji County was chosen as a case study in consultation with Shanxi Normal University in Linfen, and on the basis that it was experiencing climatic stress (increased water stress). Two poorer and two wealthier villages were then chosen in consultation with the county government, to enable comparison of

Fig. 1. Case study location.

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livelihood vulnerability using income as an initial proxy for vulnerability. There are several poverty resettlement projects in Ji County, but this article focuses on the circumstances of one village, one of the wealthier of the four villages. The village is not named to protect the anonymity of village and township officials, and all respondents have been given pseudonyms. According to Mr Yan, the village head, this village has 1150 registered residents living in four natural villages, a per capita annual net income of 2–3000 RMB, and farming area of 3780 mu ( 1 mu is equivalent to 666.7 m2). The largest natural village has shops, transport into the county centre, and a basic health clinic; the other natural villages have no public facilities. For this article we draw on interviews with the village head, a township official and a county official from the Poverty Alleviation Office, as well as 15 household interviews. The age distribution of the main interviewee is 20–30 years (n = 1), 30– 40 years (n = 4), 40–50 years (n = 9) and 50+ years (n = 1); the gender distribution of interviewees is male only (n = 12) and both female and male household members (n = 3). Of the 15 households we interviewed, six had been resettled through a county government resettlement program. Sampling of households and local officials was either opportunistic or through chain referral. For each of the 15 households we developed in-depth livelihood profiles and also discussed drought conditions and coping strategies in response to water stress. This data is used to compare the characteristics of resettled households with respect to nonresettled households, and to draw conclusions about relative vulnerability. The aim is not to quantify vulnerability through aggregated indicators, but in line with Blaikie et al. (1994), to employ a degree of selectivity (informed by theory and context) in examining asset profiles and the major factors contributing to livelihood vulnerability. Thus vulnerability is understood as a dynamic state or condition, as opposed to an outcome (Eakin and Luers, 2006, p. 370). As such, the results below focus on a comparison of resettled and non-resettled households in two key aspects of local livelihoods and how they interact in the context of specialisation and increased water stress: financial capital, particularly income; and natural capital, particularly land resources. Some data on assets is presented in charts for easy comparison, followed by more detailed explanation and comparison drawing on thematic analysis of interview material. As a small case study with qualitative methods, our findings cannot be extrapolated to other sites. Ji County is not necessarily representative of other counties in China, given its status as a poverty county (see below), its strong specialisation in apple production, and its relatively stable labour force (Ji County Statistics Office, 2002, 2008). Our analysis is also constrained by the fact that pre-resettlement data was not collected, hence a comparison of livelihood vulnerability pre- and post-resettlement is not possible. Nonetheless, the available evidence highlights a number of new findings in relation to resettlement and relative vulnerability that can assist in directing future research and in refining resettlement practice. Before turning to the results though, we first introduce a number of key characteristics of rural livelihoods in Ji County that are essential to understanding the vulnerability context of resettled and non-resettled households. 3. Vulnerability context Ji County is a nationally designated poverty county that lies on the Loess Plateau in Shanxi Province. There are 592 such counties across China, accounting for approximately 63% of China’s poor population (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011b), and attracting more than 70% of national poverty reduction funds, in the form of subsidised loan programs, public works, and additional development capital (Park et al., 2002; State Council Information Office,

2011). Ji County has a characteristically loess topography, with steep gullies, plateaus, and elevation ranging from 440 to 1820 m, meaning that many of its villages are remote from the county centre, and can be difficult to access. Ji County’s average per capita net income was 2106 RMB in 2010, well below the provincial average for rural areas (4736 RMB), as well as the average net per capita income of China’s poverty counties (3274 RMB) (Linfen Statistics Bureau, 2011; National Bureau of Statistics, 2011b, 2011a). While the county remains poor due to its continued reliance on agriculture (Ji County has few industrial enterprises), for the past two decades the county government has led a push to specialise in apple production, taking advantage of the county’s elevation and large diurnal temperature variations. The amount of arable land devoted to apple orchards continues to grow (Ji County Statistics Office, 2008; Zhao, 2011), and all of the households interviewed for this study (including all resettled households) are now engaged in apple production. Ji County’s agricultural economy is therefore highly specialised, but remains household-based and small-scale, with relatively basic orchard management. The key climatic risk facing apple-producing households in Ji County is increased agricultural water stress. The county has low annual rainfall (the 1981–2012 annual mean was 498.43 mm) and highly variable rainfall, particularly in spring (coefficient of variation 0.51) and summer (coefficient of variation 0.30) (Jixian Weather Bureau, 2012), which is when the water demand of apple trees is highest. Ji County also lies in a region with rising temperatures and a statistically significant decrease in precipitation, amounting to 20–29 mm per decade over the past five decades (Wan et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012). In recent decades, North China has also experienced more frequent severe droughts, and longer drought duration (Zou et al., 2005; Barriopedro et al., 2012). Under some climate change scenarios, precipitation in this region may increase in the future; however, this increase is likely to come from more intense rather than more frequent rainfall (Chen et al., 2012). Coupled with increased evaporation from higher temperatures and continued drought risk (Wang, 2005; Li et al., 2012), this suggests that agricultural water stress will continue to be a very real risk to household livelihoods, and is highly likely to be exacerbated by climate change. This scarcity is compounded by poor infrastructure. Water infrastructure for agriculture in Ji County is inadequate in protecting against agricultural water stress. Water is drawn from unreliable groundwater sources, and there is limited rainwater collection, meaning that households have a limited ability to cope with water stress. Some households do have pipes running into their orchards, but according to Mr Bai and Mr Yue (both nonresettled households), in times of drought when additional agricultural water is needed, there is no water in their pipes. The water stress faced by households is also related to the process of specialisation. Apple trees are sensitive to high temperatures and have higher water demand than wheat and corn crops (Lei et al., 2014), which were grown in Ji County prior to specialisation. The impacts of water stress as described by households include reduced yield, reduced apple size, cracks appearing on the skin, discolouration, and the failure of new saplings. While exposure to water stress is common to both resettled and non-resettled households, as discussed below, there are other factors that differentiate their vulnerability, including their ability to cope with water stress. A final aspect of livelihoods in Ji County is poverty resettlement (fupin yimin or yidi banqian ). Poverty resettlement is part of a nationwide central government push to consolidate services in more centralised villages, and to encourage out-migration from smaller, poorly-serviced, natural villages. It is estimated that 2.6 million people have already been resettled for poverty alleviation purposes, while a target of a further 2.4 million

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people was set for the period 2011–2015 (Xue et al., 2013). There are a number of poverty resettlement projects in Ji County, led primarily by the Poverty Alleviation Office, that encompass house construction, public infrastructure building, and agricultural development assistance. Resettlement in Ji County occurs primarily within the boundaries of an administrative village, linked to a strategy called “small villages merged into big villages” (xiaocun bingru dacun ), whereby villages with few remaining residents (typically less than 100), will be targeted for resettlement. According to Mr Du from Ji County’s Poverty Alleviation Office, in 2012 there was a plan to resettle 500 people, though 830 people had already been resettled. Mr Du reported the resettlement allowance as being 5000 RMB per person (financed by the central government), though households consistently reported a lower rate of 3400 RMB per person, and as low as 1000 RMB. The administrative village we focus on contains both a resettlement area within the largest (and better serviced) natural village, and a newly established resettlement village further down the road (see Fig. 2). The organisation of these two resettlement projects is slightly different. Households in the resettlement area have not moved from far away, and so retain their existing land allocation (and orchards) and simply move into upgraded housing in a new section of the village. In the newly established village, however, 70 new houses have been built and new orchards established on reclaimed forestry land. In 2012, Mr Wang – the head of the new resettlement village – told us that 15 households (including his own) had already relocated from four remote natural villages. Much of the land in the old villages was earlier converted into forest as part of the Grain for Green program. Grain for Green was introduced in 1999 to address desertification and land degradation: sloping land of a gradient exceeding 25 is converted from farming land to forestry, and farmers are compensated with a cash subsidy. As a result, these resettled households have been allocated new land, and in the process are being integrated into the local apple industry.

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4. Results This section discusses key differences in the livelihood profiles of resettled and non-resettled households with a particular focus on financial and natural capital. It is these aspects of livelihoods in Ji County that most clearly differentiate resettled and nonresettled households. We first briefly discuss the other capitals. No major differences were identified in the social capital of resettled and non-resettled households. While resettlement is often associated with significant social dislocation, these resettlements have been done within the boundaries of an administrative village, with en bloc resettlement of natural villages. This means that households have largely retained their social networks within and beyond the village. For resettlement practice, this shows the advantages of local, en bloc resettlement, given the risk of social dislocation. In terms of human capital, resettled households were not found to have fewer years of education than non-resettled households (no household interviewed had completed more than junior high). Some households had additional skills, such as experience in small business or in factories, while others did not, but this is true for both resettled and non-resettled households. And while interviews covered labour availability, no conclusions can be drawn given that those households with newly established orchards have not yet had any need for additional hired labour. In terms of physical capital, resettlement has certainly been beneficial to resettled households, particularly those who have relocated from remote natural villages. As Mr Wang explained, his old village had only three to five households, there was no electricity, no running water, and poor transport and housing infrastructure. He previously lived in a yaodong (a cave house common to the Loess Plateau) and cooked with wood, but now lives in a stand-alone brick house and cooks with gas. The new resettlement village is also being linked by a paved road to the main road into the village. For those relocating to this new resettlement village, their physical capital has certainly been enhanced through resettlement, giving them the same kind of

Fig. 2. New housing and young apple orchard in the new resettlement village (top); housing and established orchard in an existing natural village (bottom) (Rogers, 2012).

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access as other non-resettled households. In terms of human, social and physical capital, therefore, resettled and non-resettled households share many characteristics. In these respects, resettlement cannot be said to drive relative vulnerability, and in the case of physical capital at least, has brought benefits to resettled households. A detailed discussion of financial and natural capital, however, highlights the ways in which resettlement can impact negatively on the livelihoods of resettled households. Fig. 3 compares the gross annual household income of resettled and non-resettled households. It shows that resettled households are more likely to fall into low income brackets, and are the only households with income at or below 10,000 RMB per year. In absolute terms, a household with a gross income of 10,000 RMB or below can be considered to be living on or below the new national poverty line of 2300 RMB net income per person, while relatively speaking they are much poorer than other households within the village. All but one of the households with an income above 30,000 RMB per year are non-resettled households, which suggests that it is more difficult for resettled households to attain higher incomes. That the resettled households we interviewed had such low incomes when compared to non-resettled households is highly problematic given the poverty alleviation goals of these projects. While we are hampered by a lack of pre-resettlement data such that we cannot isolate the effect of resettlement on income (there may be other effects such as the selection of particularly poor households for resettlement or their relocation into a comparatively wealthy administrative village), we can identify the ways in which the resettlement process restricts household income. In the case of Ji County, it is primarily a consequence of a shift in livelihood strategies post-resettlement. Mr Wang told us that in the old villages people grew grain and vegetable crops. Their livelihoods have now, with government urging and assistance, become centred on apple production. But Ji County’s full-size Fuji apple trees typically take seven to eight years to produce marketable fruit, hence there is a period following resettlement where income generation is insecure. Mr Wang, who lives with his wife, daughter, son-in-law and grandchild, was relying on a small wheat crop and on remittances from a son living in a nearby city (for an annual gross income of 10,000 RMB) while waiting for his orchard to mature. In fact, four of the six resettled households interviewed were reliant on off-farm temporary labouring jobs to supplement their income before their first harvest. And while these young orchards are not generating income, they still require significant inputs of fertiliser and pesticides (which are major household expenses), as well as labour, which limits how far and how long households can work off-farm.

Related to the lower income of resettled households is the issue of debt. Debt is not unique to resettled households, as some nonresettled households have also borrowed to invest in new housing, to pay for high medical expenses, or for major social expenditure (particularly weddings). The issue is rather that resettlement allowances are low compared to the cost of new housing, meaning that all resettled households are servicing major debts. The resettlement allowance in Ji County is supposed to be 5000 RMB per person, though several resettled households reported receiving only 3400 RMB per person. This allowance is inadequate when according to Mr Wang, the cost of a new house is 60–70,000 RMB. And given that resettled households have lower income overall (at least for the period post-resettlement), they have less ability to service this debt. Debt also has flow on effects in terms of ability to cope with water stress. Mr Wang explained that irrigation water is too expensive, so he does not use any water on his orchards, and even if he had extra money he would not install water pipes as he needs to pay back the loan on his new house. In Ji County, the combination of low income while orchards are maturing and household debt as a result of resettlement highlights the relative financial insecurity of resettled versus non-resettled households. That is not to say that non-resettled households in this administrative village are not financial insecure (some of them are) but to say that a number of factors converge to limit the ability of resettled households in particular to accumulate financial capital. This insecurity is particularly acute in the period immediately following resettlement. Such a finding is certainly not unprecedented: elsewhere, resettlement in China has been found to be associated with insecurity in financial capital, be that high levels of debt, substantial increases in household expenses despite higher income, or greater inequality in income within villages (Tashi and Foggin, 2012; Xue et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2015). But in Ji County financial insecurity is closely tied to a push to specialise into apple production. A discussion of natural capital, particularly land resources, provides further insight into the livelihoods of resettled and nonresettled households in Ji County. Figure 4 compares land allocations across the two groups. It is evident that land allocations in this administrative village are generally low: only two nonresettled households have been able to accumulate more than 15 mu of land. All resettled households have less than 15 mu. Clearly resettlement is occurring in the context of already strained land availability, due to the village’s loess topography, and to the closure of approximately 3000 mu of sloping land under the Grain for Green program. Non-resettled households face these same restrictions on their livelihoods, but seem to have some possibility of extensification.

5

4

3 2

Non-reseled Reseled

1

41,000+

31-40,000

21-30,000

11-20,000

≤10,000

0

RMB p/year Fig. 3. Household annual gross income compared (n = 15).

No. of households

No. of households

5 4

3 Non-reseled Reseled

2 1 0 ≤5 mu

6-10 mu 11-15 mu 16-20 mu 21+ mu

Fig. 4. Household land allocations compared (n = 15).

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The situation of the three resettled households who have moved into the new resettlement village and been allocated new land (as opposed to the three households who have resettled but retained their old land allocation) suggests that land availability in the new resettlement village is particularly constrained. Mr Zhang and his wife (in their 40s) had decided to resettle slightly later than other families and had been allocated only one mu as most of the land had already been distributed. They rent an additional three mu from the village committee, but even so, this is a very small allocation to support two adults and two dependent children (one at university and one at middle school). Mrs Zhou, her husband and two sons had been allocated three mu and were renting an additional 7–8 mu in a different village. Mr Wang rents only two of his 15 mu, but is in a somewhat privileged position as natural village head. Given that an additional 55 households were expected to move into this new village (it is unclear whether or not land has already been set aside for them), land resources here can be considered to be even more constrained. The quality of land resources is also important: the ideal farmland for apple orchards is flat and consolidated. All households interviewed in this administrative village had predominantly flat land, in contrast to other villages in the county where households typically had a mix of flat and sloping land, given the topography of the region. Resettled households have equal access to flat land: they are not disadvantaged in this way. However, both resettled and non-resettled households have poor access to consolidated landholdings: all 15 households had parcelled land, sometimes up to six pieces, which is highly inefficient for labour and other inputs. Household landholdings need to be understood within the context of specialisation. In this administrative village apple growing began in the late 1980s, and according to Mr Yang (the head of the administrative village), 95% of the village’s income now comes from apples. When households in Ji County are resettled, they are provided with subsidised saplings and perhaps given some training on how to look after apple trees. Like any other household in the county, they are encouraged to avoid water stress by not planting competing crops between the rows of apple trees. Many households (resettled and non-resettled) in this administrative village do continue to retain some degree of diversification, but this tends to be on more marginal land or is for household consumption rather than sale. Most land, and the best land, is devoted to apple orchards, and resettled households are being fully integrated into this local industry. But they are starting at a disadvantage: once their orchards begin producing, lower landholdings mean lower overall yield and therefore lower income longer-term. Hence, while the period post-resettlement is certainly one of financial insecurity, the financial capital of resettled households (compared to non-resettled households) is likely to be constrained in the longer-term as well, as a result of insufficient land allocations. These differences in financial capital (influenced by natural capital) are particularly important because strong financial capital acts as a buffer in times of water stress. While the livelihoods of all households in this administrative village are highly exposed to water stress, there are some notable differences in the perceptions of coping and of risk. Some non-resettled households expressed far less concern about the impacts of drought than resettled households. As Mr Wei and his wife noted, while in a good year they could earn 60–70,000 RMB, in a drought year they could still earn 40–50,000 RMB. This (relative) degree of security is possible given a good apple price and highly productive trees. In contrast, resettled households explained that when there is a drought there is not enough water for household use, so there is no method to protect their orchards; and that if drought impacts on their income, they will simply work in off-farm unskilled (and therefore low-

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paying) jobs close to the village. Mr Zhang (in the new resettlement village) explained that while he would like to install water pipes in his orchard, he did not have the funds, and he also noted that the environmental conditions in the resettled village were no better than in the old village. Mr Li and his wife (who had moved into the resettlement area within an existing natural village), explained that the cost of transporting water from other sources is too high. This picture of household livelihoods provides some evidence that resettled households are more vulnerable to climate change (in this case increased water stress) relative to non-resettled households within the same administrative village. They are more vulnerable because of financial insecurity, which constrains their ability to cope with the water stress to which household livelihoods in Ji County are exposed. This relative insecurity can be attributed to the resettlement process: first, inadequate compensation results in households going into debt to finance new housing; second, the establishment of new, specialised livelihoods (an integral part of the resettlement process in Ji County) constrains income in the short-term; and third, lower land allocations are likely to act as a constraint on financial capital in the longer-term. So in response to the question posed at the beginning of this article, there is evidence here that in the context of agricultural specialisation and increased water stress, constrained financial capital and smaller land allocations interact to make resettled households more vulnerable than non-resettled households. It is reasonable to conclude that resettlement is the key factor driving this relative vulnerability, but further research that includes data on the pre-existing conditions of resettled households as well as their experiences post-resettlement is now needed to further understand the vulnerability risk of resettlement. 5. Discussion That resettlement can create livelihood insecurity is not a new finding. The influential impoverishment risks and reconstruction model, for instance, identifies loss of land and economic marginalisation as potential risks of any development-induced resettlement, and it has long been understood that rather than just focusing on compensation, the implementation of resettlement projects must address the longer-term reconstruction of livelihoods (Cernea, 1997; Cernea and McDowell, 2000). Elsewhere in the resettlement literature two key lessons have been proposed should resettlement be considered as a response to climate change: first, to avoid resettlement if possible, and second, where not possible, to treat resettlement as requiring more than just material compensation (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015). That longerterm livelihood security is being achieved in existing resettlement practice in China is questionable. Resettlement allowances are clearly inadequate: in the case of Ji County it is difficult to conclude that households have been properly compensated for the loss of use value on their land and the replacement value of their houses (Barnett and Webber, 2009, p. 28). And as others have noted, officials involved in the resettlement process tend to consider their job done once households have physically moved into their new houses, and therefore do not focus on supporting projects (Xue et al., 2013). Our findings in this regard are more mixed: resettled households have been offered training in pesticide and fertiliser use in apple orchards, but the lack of investment in water resources to protect from water stress is a major concern. What the impoverishment risks and reconstruction model, and what the existing resettlement literature does not adequately address, is the interaction between socio-economic and climatic factors, and subsequent implications for vulnerability to climate change. It has been recognised that resettlement into localities expected to experience increased climatic impacts may place resettled communities at risk, and that resettlement has the

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potential to exacerbate regional water shortages (de Sherbinin et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2015), but our evidence offers a more nuanced interpretation of this relationship between resettlement and vulnerability to climate change. Two additional lessons for resettlement practice are offered. First, vulnerability to climate change – encompassing an understanding of exposure to climatic risk and how that risk interacts with households livelihoods, including the ability of households to cope with or adapt to that risk – needs to be integrated into resettlement planning. This applies not just to resettlement organised in response to climate change, but to existing resettlement practice, be that for poverty, environmental or infrastructure-related purposes, and particularly where resettlers will still be engaged in agriculture. With reference to North China, this means taking into consideration how household livelihoods post-resettlement may be impacted by increased water stress, driven by both changing precipitation patterns and increasing temperatures. As others have noted, the selection of resettlement location is crucial to longer-term livelihood security (Tan et al., 2013). A number of questions arise: what kind of agricultural production will households be engaged in; to what extent will they rely on agriculture for income generation; what are the climatic risks to the particular crop(s); what coping and adaptive strategies will households be able (and unable) to employ in response to climatic risks; and in what ways could households be supported to better adapt to these risks? A further issue is whether or not resettlement involves a wholescale change in land allocation, which shapes the vulnerability of resettled households in particular ways. Such an understanding of vulnerability may prompt new interventions to support resettled households, such as training in water use management and the construction of water resource infrastructure (particularly rainwater collection). For specialised agricultural livelihoods that require long-term investment, such as fruit production, options may include income protection for the period following resettlement and skill development to open up new possibilities for off-farm work. Another alternative is the phased re-allocation of land or some degree of burden-sharing amongst farmers to avoid such a large shock to household livelihoods. An assessment of vulnerability to climate change as part of resettlement planning may also result in a more careful consideration of resettlement sites, or conclude that in-situ solutions are ultimately more sustainable. The risk is that if resettlement projects fail to take into account vulnerability as it relates to the reconstruction of household livelihoods postresettlement, and fail to propose interventions to support adaptive capacity, they are highly likely to result in maladaptation. The second lesson relates to methodology and practice: what is an appropriate framework for integrating climate change vulnerability into resettlement planning? This question may seem to preclude a critique of resettlement in China as dispossessing those on the margins to further the political and economic goals of the central state (Webber, 2012). But given that climate change adaptation has been added to the list of reasons why planned resettlement is pursued, and that resettlement does not appear to be shifting from its central place in the practice of development in China, there is an urgent need to bring questions of vulnerability to climate change to the fore. There is certainly a need to be attuned to local context. In Ji County, agricultural specialisation plays an important role in shaping the vulnerability of resettled and nonresettled households, but the nature of vulnerability will likely differ in other locations. There is also a need to unpack the characteristics of human systems and their interaction with climate processes. Hence a conceptual link is needed between resettlement and climate change vulnerability. As others have noted, the language of livelihoods has become central to the praxis

of development-induced resettlement, though it tends to be characterised by a bias towards income restoration at the expense of a more integrated approach (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015). What livelihoods-based vulnerability studies demonstrate is that a more complete understanding of livelihoods, one that directly considers the interaction between different kinds of capital, livelihood strategies, and climatic risk, is certainly capable of identifying and explaining the relationship between resettlement and vulnerability at local scales. Further targeted studies that delve into the complexity of these interactions in the context of resettlement practice in different localities are now needed. 6. Conclusion While there have been attempts to better understand the relationship between resettlement and vulnerability to climate change (Barnett and O’Neill, 2012; Wilmsen and Webber, 2015), in general, this relationship has received very little attention in the existing migration-climate change literature. In this article we have provided evidence of differences in the relative vulnerability of resettled and non-resettled households in rural China. A qualitative analysis based on a small sample has clear limitations, and our lack of pre-resettlement data means that only tentative conclusions can be drawn. Further research is required to be more definitive about the impacts of resettlement on climate change vulnerability. Nonetheless, certain characteristics of Ji County’s resettled households suggest that resettlement can impact adversely on financial and natural capital (and therefore on relative vulnerability), and that resettlement and climate change adaptation policy need to be carefully attuned to this possibility. Resettled households, particularly those whose land has been completely reallocated, are likely to be amongst the most vulnerable within a specialised agricultural community. In China there is a particular urgency to pursuing further research of this nature: while the adverse impacts of existing resettlement projects (for infrastructure construction, environmental restoration and poverty alleviation) are now relatively well documented, resettlement is being repackaged as a climate change adaptation measure. This article sheds light on why resettlement as it is currently practiced in China runs the risk of greater relative vulnerability to climate change. While the specific risks that resettlers face will differ according to their socio-economic and climatic contexts, constrained financial and natural capital are key concerns. Given this knowledge, all planned resettlements climate change-related or not - should be taking vulnerability to climate change into account in the reconstruction of livelihoods post-resettlement. Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants of this study in Ji County for their patience, insight and hospitality. Thanks to Professor Michael Webber for comments on an early draft and to two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and constructive feedback. This research was supported by a NCCARF SEI-network Adaptation Leadership Award and a University of Melbourne Overseas Research Experience Scholarship. References Adams, H., Adger, N.W., 2013. Changing places: migration and adaptation to climate change. In: Sygna, L., O’Brien, K., Wolf, J. (Eds.), The Changing Environment for Human Security: Transformative Approaches to Research, Policy, and Action. Routledge-Earthscan, London, pp. 413–423. Adapting to Climate Change in China, 2014. Where we work. ACCC Project Management Office. Retrieved from http://www.ccadaptation.org.cn/ACCC_1E/ item_10770704_307961.html (accessed 13.01.15.).

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