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Children and Youth Services Review 30 (2008) 647 – 653 www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth
Resistance to evaluation in batterers' programs in Israel Guy Enosh ⁎ School of Social Work, Faculty of Welfare and Health Sciences, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa, 31905, Israel Available online 5 February 2008
Abstract The goal of the current paper is to clarify methodological concerns stemming from efforts to evaluate batterers' services, and specifically, issues concerning resistance to assessment, evaluation, and change. Whereas most published work dealing with evaluation of batterers' programs has focused on outcomes, the following paper focuses on the problems encountered by the researcher, and the researcher's methodological errors in an attempt to negotiate between the requirements of valid research, the politics of bureaucracy, and the distrustful attitudes of program participants, including both therapists and clients. Thus, the paper emphasizes the pitfalls of evaluation efforts conducted in a highly bureaucratic milieu, on the one hand, and the resolution of sensitive issues such as intimate violence, on the other. In this sense, the paper may be classified as meta-action-research, or an autoethnography of ‘batterers programs evaluation research,’ in which the researcher describes and analyses the pitfalls of evaluation research, while trying to construct a heuristic knowledge-base for himself and other researchers working under similar conditions. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Program evaluation; Resistance; Batterers; Bureaucracy
1. Introduction The state of Israel is in the process of establishing treatment programs for batterers, ranging along a continuum from voluntary or semi-voluntary referrals, through court mandated referrals, court mandates for “hard core” and “hard to treat” court mandated cases, in-prison programs for convicted batterers, and special programs for released ex-convicts batterers. As commendable as such an encompassing net of services may be, without proper evaluation of programs, little is known of their effectiveness in achieving their main treatment goal — cessation of violence and transformation of the typical patterns of dominance and control that characterize batterers' relationships with their partners. The goal of the current paper is the construction of knowledge (Shadish, 2006; Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 1991) regarding methodological concerns arising in the evaluation of batterers' services, specifically, issues of resistance to assessment, evaluation, and change. Whereas most published work on the evaluation of batterers' programs has focused on outcome issues (Adams, 1989; Babcock & LaTaillade, 2000; Babcock & Steiner, 1999; Bennett & Williams, 2001; Davis & Taylor, 1999; Gondolf, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2004), the following paper focuses on the problems encountered by the research and the researcher's methodological errors in his attempt to negotiate the ⁎ Tel.: +972 4 8288528; fax: +972 4 8246832. E-mail addresses:
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requirements of valid research, the politics of bureaucracy, and the mistrust of program participants, including therapists and clients. Thus, the paper focuses on the pitfalls of evaluations conducted in highly bureaucratic milieu, on the one hand, and dealing with sensitive issues such as intimate violence, on the other. In this sense, the paper may be viewed as a meta-action-research, or an auto-ethnography of ‘batterers’ programs evaluation research,’ in which the researcher describes and analyses the pitfalls of evaluation research, while trying to construct a heuristic knowledgebase for himself and other researchers working under similar conditions.1 2. The context of batterers' programs in Israel The problem of domestic violence in general, and specifically husbands' physical abuse of their wives, has gained growing public recognition in the last 20 years, as an increasing number of governmental agencies have been authorized and constructed to deal with these issues. In 1991, the Law for Preventing Domestic Violence was enacted as part of the penal code in Israel. Following the legislation, there was a public cry to extend governmental responses to and treatment of this social problem, and to develop interventions that would go beyond battered women's shelters that existed before the legislation. Specifically, there was a call for social responsiveness to focus on the perpetrators as well as on the victims. In late 1991, the Ministry of Work and Welfare (MoW) resolved to create a network of community agencies, known as Centers for Treatment and Prevention of Domestic Violence, that would assume a more holistic, systemic approach, and offer support for the victims and treatment for the batterers. The centers operate within local communities as semi-independent extensions of local welfare departments, but were concurrently under the supervision of the Individuals and Families Branch of the MoW. More recently, in the mid-1990s, the Adults Probation Office, a unit within the Corrections Branch of the MoW that operates all probation activities for adults in Israel, decided to develop specialized resources for treating perpetrators of domestic violence. According to the resolution, the probation period defined for some of the male batterers could be used to treat the violence, given the well-known statistics that most couples who experienced intimate violence continue living together. Consequently, therapy groups in various departments of MoW services throughout the country were established, conducted by probation officers who were specifically trained by the Probation Office to conduct group treatments of batterers. As described in details below, most while the majority of male batterers who attend sessions at Centers for Treatment and Prevention of Domestic Violence are self-referred, referrals to probation services are court mandated. Together, these two systems treat the vast majority of batterers in Israel. Over the last decade, three additional services were established. The first, called Bet-Noam (“House of Calmness”), serves as a residential facility for hard-core batterers referred by court order, based on recommendation of the probation officer (Keynan et al., 2003). The second unit, an intensive treatment unit dedicated uniquely to deal with batterers, was created within the prison system, and serves as a within-prison residential care, called Bet-Tikva (“House of Hope”). The third, Maftehot (“Keys”), is another community-based residential unit intended to treat former prison inmates who served a prison sentence for domestic violence. Whereas the number of Centers and the number of probation officers specializing in domestic violence increase annually, the three more recently established agencies are each a single unit in its domain. Nonetheless, there is hope that, if proven efficient, more such units will be created. Conceptually, these systems delineate the “career” cycle of a batterer — from pre-trial, voluntary admission based on recognition of a problem and search for help, through the court-ordered probation system, pre-prison intensive residential treatment, specialized prison units, and finally, post-release residential units for former prison inmates. 3. Evaluation of batterers' programs Shadish (2006) identifies five concerns common to all types of program evaluation. First is a concern with how to construct valid knowledge. This concern has both philosophical and methodological components. From a philosophical perspective, the researcher must deal with the question of what can be known regarding the program. From the methodological standpoint, the main question is, how can we know that what we learn is valid knowledge? The second issue is valuing; or how we place value on evaluation results? In other words, how do we judge what is important 1 Each of the described research endeavors was carried out with other colleagues (Buchbinder, Enosh, & Eisikovits, 2005; Enosh, Haj-Yhia, Eisikovits, & Dotan, 2006; Shamai, Buchbinder, & Enosh, 2002), to whom, and to their insights I am greatly indebted. However, the sole responsibility for this paper and its shortcomings is mine alone.
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knowledge, how important the knowledge is, what should we know or look for. This question leads us to the third issue of how programs change. The ultimate goal of all program evaluation efforts is to gain some valuable knowledge of the program in order to improve it, or to learn how to reproduce its achievements by implementing the program elsewhere. Such goals call for making a change in the current program or in other programs — an issue that is strongly related to organizational change and resistance to change. The fourth issue is how to use evaluation results in the policy process, how to disseminate knowledge in a way that makes a difference beyond the specific program under evaluation. The fifth and final issue is, given the implications of all the preceding issues for what the evaluator actually does in any given evaluation, is how to organize the evaluation practice. The paper is an attempt to transmit lessons learned in the process of evaluating the above five agencies and their operations. It will focus on pitfalls of evaluation, rather than on the “successes.” This specific focus emerges from the frustrating realization that although many texts have been written on program evaluation, very few actually deal with various forms of resistance to evaluation, which our experience has shown to be paramount. Ehrmann (2007) suggests several categories which can be used to analyze resistance to program evaluation, and several ways of dealing with such resistance. First, he suggests that resistance may be overt or covert: resistance may be expressed openly and in protest, or implicitly, through the failure to follow instructions or requests. Second, he suggests that resistance may be active or passive: participants may do things to hinder the evaluation, or merely avoid doing things that are required for the evaluation process. Furthermore, resistance may be intentional or unintentional and finally, resistance may be rational for those resisting, serving their goals, or it may be irrational, operating against their best interests. 4. Description of the research projects Three evaluation projects serve as the basis for the current paper. By the time of writing, the first study (a comparative evaluation of the Centers, the Probation system, and the Bet-Noam Residential Unit) has been concluded, whereas the two remaining projects are still in progress. However, all three studies share two major themes. First, these research projects involve agencies that deal with the highly sensitive issue of intimate violence; second, they are part of a highly bureaucratized environment. Although several concerns that were identified while conducting the first study have been taken into consideration in the design of the two subsequent studies, several key evaluation problems arose in all three projects. Therefore, pitfalls of evaluation and possible solutions will be based from examples drawn from all three research projects. The following short description highlights the formal goals of each evaluation project, its funding sources, and the structure of the steering committee established to overview the study. While funding and oversight may appear at first glance, to be superfluous information, they were found to play a major role in influencing the performance of the research. 4.1. The comparative study: centers, the probation system, and the residential facility The first study was a large-scale evaluation attempt designed to compare and analyze the effectiveness of three types of programs — Centers for Treatment and Prevention of Family Violence, treatments given by Probation Officers, and treatments given in Beit Noam, the residential facility for batterers (Enosh et al., 2006). The study had three formal goals: (1) to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs, (2) analyze dropout from the programs, and (3) conduct a costbenefit analysis. The study was commissioned by the MoW, in conjunction with the National Insurance Institute of Israel. The steering committee of the study comprised one representative of the National Insurance Institute of Israel, the Chief Scientist of the MoW, two representatives of the branch of Individual and Family Services, and two representatives of the Adults Probation Office. Although the study was officially designed to compare the residential facility with the two other agencies, the residential facility had no representative on the steering committee, since it was considered part of the Individual and Families branch. This lack of representation may explain some of the difficulties that subsequently arose in the communications with and cooperation from the staff of the residential facility and its manager. 4.2. The “knowledge-base” at the in-prison unit The second study is an evaluation and attempt at understanding the heuristic working procedures and knowledge of Beit Tikva, a unique in-prison program (Buchbinder et al., 2005). This study was constructed as a cooperative endeavor
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with the staff of the in-prison program. Based on staff requests, the formal goals of this study is an attempt to elicit the heuristic knowledge-base that is being developed through the staff's ongoing trial and error process of working with prisoners who are sentenced for domestic violence crimes. The study has no steering committee, and is funded by the researchers' internal research budgets. 4.3. The post-prison unit The third study is an ongoing process evaluation of Maftehot (“Keys”), a recently established post-prison residential facility for released prisoners convicted for domestic violence (Shamai et al., 2002). The plan for the post-prison residential facility was created by the Authority for Prisoners’ Rehabilitation and the National Insurance Institute of Israel about six years ago. However, although the research team was awarded the tender to conduct this study about four years ago, the plan was not realized due to budgetary constraints. Based on lessons learned in the comparative evaluation study, we the researchers proposed that the study as a process evaluation, emphasizing the need to use qualitative methods, including interviews and observations, rather than quantitative instruments focusing on outcome evaluation. The steering committee for the study comprises representatives of the Prisoners' Rehabilitation Authority, the National Insurance Institute of Israel, and the director of the post-prison residential facility. 5. Methodological pitfalls in the evaluation of domestic violence programs The pitfalls of the evaluation research we encountered was participants' resistance to evaluation and assessment, emanating from the inherent gap between research goals on the one hand, and bureaucratic hindrances, administrative turf-conflicts, misinformation and disinformation provided by key personnel, control issues, and lack of cooperation, on the other. 5.1. Lack of cooperation from program clients: batterers and their spouses Cooperation of program clients in the process of information collection is essential in the process of knowledge construction. One of the first problems encountered in the researchers' attempt to conduct an outcome evaluation, was the lack of cooperation by batterers and even more so, by their spouses. Whereas lack of cooperation from batterers may be expected and may be perceived as a rational resistance (Ehrmann, 2007), lack of cooperation from spouses was a surprise, and was perceived as irrational, passive resistance. In several Centers and Probation units, groups were conducted, in which none of the men was willing to participate in the evaluation study. Of the groups that did participate in the evaluation, cooperation in the sense of willingness to participate in the study ranged from 13% to 100% per group. Overall, in the Centers, only 67% of the eligible men participated, and in the probation system 64%. Offers of monetary compensation to participants in the study did not increase participation. Furthermore, the original research plan of the comparative study called for the batterers participating in groups to complete a self-report questionnaire using the CTS as a measure of violence, and for spouses to fill a corresponding questionnaire as a validation instrument. However, only 35% of the spouses were willing to collaborate with the researchers, to complete a questionnaire and be interviewed regarding the effects of the program on their men's violence. 5.2. Increased admission, misinterpretation, and social desirability effects Each self-report questionnaire was administered twice — at the beginning and at the end of the group life. An expected pitfall of evaluation was a lack of sincerity and accuracy in batterers' self-report, expressing itself in denial and minimization of violence (Henning & Holdford, 2006; Henning, Jones, & Holdford, 2005). Indeed, the reported level of violence by batterers was extremely low, indicating a tendency to deny and minimize their level of violence. However, interestingly enough, self-reports at the follow-up stage, indicated a higher prevalence of violence during the group's lifetime, as compared to the initial self-reports. This finding was quite contrary to the expected reduction in violence. Three major explanations may be suggested: First, interpreting the results straightforwardly, group-work tended to increase men's violence, and caused some of them to be more violent in this specific period, and to be honest about it (hardly likely). The second possible interpretation is that following the group-work treatment, the men
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developed increased awareness of their violent behavior, but misinterpreted the questionnaire as referring to the period preceding group therapy. A third explanation is that as a result of their participation in the group process, the men were more willing to placate the researchers – perceived as part of the “system” – by reporting more violence than they had initially reported, resulting in a social desirability bias. In any case, the use of quantitative, closed-ended questionnaires in evaluating the outcomes of group therapy for batterers, proved to be futile. 5.3. Misinformation and disinformation by administrators Whereas misinformation and disinformation in the form of unintentional or intentional minimization and denial was an expected behavior among batterers, it was much less expected from the therapists and administrators whom the researchers perceived as partners and stakeholders in the evaluation process. Yet, the problem of misinformation, and sometimes even direct disinformation was the hallmark of responses by administrators at all levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, from the senior-most echelons of the Ministry of Welfare (MoW), to the local agency directors. In the current context, misinformation is defined as wrong or inaccurate information regarding the research project, due to administrators' lack of accurate knowledge and/or their need for face saving, or the need to present their agency's work environment and achievements more positively than they actually are. Administrators and directors were requested to provide basic information on the Centers and the Probation Services, as input in the design of a sampling procedure for the comparative study. Researchers requested rough estimates of the annual number of groups conducted in each center, the average length of group-work in terms of months or number of sessions, and the number of participants in each group. The researchers informed that nine of the centers located in larger metropolitan areas operate men's groups on a regular basis, while the centers in other locations (at the time there were about 36 centers) operated on a more limited scale. Furthermore, high-ranking officials, based on their “knowledge of the field” and relationships with the heads of local agencies, informed us that the researchers should receive complete and unconditional cooperation from the workers at the centers. However, first-hand information collected by the researchers themselves was incongruent with the “official” account if the operations. The majority of the Centers surveyed claimed that group-work was conducted only sporadically, on the basis of a sufficient number of batterers who are willing to participate. Thus, six months into the study, the researchers were compelled to conclude that the planned sample was not feasible and a major change in the planned sampling procedure was required. Eventually the sampling procedure consisted of approaching all 36 centers, and sampling 17 of them. An extreme case of misinformation arose when we addressed the validity of the sample. Given the limited cooperation of client and workers, we were concerned that the sample would not be representative of the general batterers' population served by the Centers and the Probation system. We asked the MoW for some basic sociodemographic statistics on this population which received services from the two branches of the Ministry. As the MoW collects annual data from all the units and agencies under its supervision, this request and the response seemed to be almost trivial, and were initially received almost enthusiastically by the relevant MoW officials. However, when it came to actual delivery, the researcher learned that MoW data was coded using specialized software that does not support statistical analysis of even the simplest descriptive uses. After one month of intensive work by the Ministry's technicians, the relevant data was transferred into a flat data file, to be analyzed using a statistical package. However, at that point, it became clear that there was no possibility of separating the batterers from the remainder of the male population served by the office agencies. Although officially, “domestic violence” is a coded field, this information was not available. Using Ehrmann's (2007) terminology, we encountered unintentional and irrational resistance. Whereas misinformation is defined as mistaken information unintentionally provided by key informants or personnel, disinformation is defined as the intentional provision of mistaken information, in order to achieve various goals, specifically to avoid committing oneself or assuming responsibility in different contexts. Although much rarer than misinformation, instances of disinformation also occurred throughout the research project. Thus, for example, in the comparative study, therapists were requested to complete a form assessing the violent background and the dangerousness of each client-batterer. We stressed that this information, would be used only as a means of corroborating batterers' self-reports of batterers, by supplying the researchers with a less-biased source of information. However, most therapists participating in the project declined to complete such forms, claiming they had no access to such information. An interesting variation of the above problem arose in the case of one of the smaller units. As in all other agencies, the workers were asked to assess the dangerousness of the batterers in therapy before and after treatment, and the level
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of change achieved. However, in this particular case, the unit director insisted that she and her coworkers had no access to their clients' “violent past” and therefore could not assess the past dangerousness of their clients. When the researchers insisted on the submission of assessments of dangerousness and levels of change, the director rated all clients as fully rehabilitated and non-violent (10 on a scale of 1–10). Yet, she stipulated that the assessment is subject to continued treatment in the community following the men's return to the community. Thus, the assessment tool was rendered meaningless. 5.4. Lack of cooperation by agency staff at various hierarchical levels No groups were sampled in two major local agencies serving large metropolitan areas, where group-work had taken place on a regular basis. Officially, the reason given to the research team was that none of the men in the groups was willing to participate in the study. Since voluntary participation was a condition of the study, these agencies were not sampled at all. Given the relative success achieved in enlisting clients in otherwise similar agencies, the reasonable conclusion is that the workers at the agency somehow transmitted their distrust of the study to their clients. Lack of cooperation was not, however, limited to the local level. As explained, the comparative study focused on services rendered by two separate branches of MoW. The directors of one branch seemed to cooperate willingly, despite occasional misinformation, while the director of the second branch did her best to hinder the study, while all the while applauding the importance of the evaluation process. Two examples will suffice. The third stage of data collection involved contacting the batterers six months after the end of therapy, requesting their consent to another interview, a typical follow-up procedure. It immediately transpired that the former group members had no recollection of their participation in the study and therefore their consent to a re-interview was best obtained when the men were approached by their therapists and agencies. Since all the interviewers were female, a condition of the study required that these faceto-face interviews take place within the agency or in public places, rather than in the men's homes. However, the director of the relevant MoW branch refused to allow “her” employees to “waste their time” in contacting clients who are no longer in therapy. She pettily refused to allocate of any office space for the purpose of the study, and gave her consent to participate in the study subject to the availability of an empty room at each local agency for the researchers' use. The second example occurred during the cost-benefit analysis phase of the project. While one branch reported cost per unit, the second director of services insisted that costs would be calculated by the office's accountant by “estimating the average cost per unit.” After waiting for four months of data for the delivery of the data, the research team was forced to approach a more senior official to expedite the delivery of the data. Two days following the intervention of the “powers that be,” the figures were supplied to the research team. The validity of the said data remains for the reader to judge. 5.5. The use of power vs. placating resistance Ehrmann (2007) noted that program participants “assume that ‘evaluation’ or ‘assessment’ equals grading” and that “participating in an assessment is to surrender power to someone else and open one's self for possible penalties” (p.1). Thus, resistance by program officers may arise out of fear of “failure” yet may also reflect resistance to authority and an attempt to divert what they perceived as unwarranted interference in a well conducted program. The paper has elaborated on several methodological pitfalls that became obvious in an attempt to evaluate batterers' services in Israel. The major question that arises remains whether it is possible to avoid such pitfalls of evaluation. The following discussion offers some possible solutions discussed in the literature as well as solutions that the researchers attempted to implement. Methodological literature on enlisting cooperation from unwilling key personnel calls for a partnership approach (Asthana, Richardson, & Halliday, 2002; Israel, Schulz, Parker, & Becker, 2001), and discovering the hidden agendas and needs of such parties. According to the partnership approach, cooperation is enlisted when such needs and agendas are satisfied. However, such approaches may fall under the phrase of ‘easier said than done.’ It is even possible that addressing demands from the field may not only fail to enroll cooperation, but may increase suspicions. Thus, for example, several major local agencies noted their “need to understand the study better”, and to understand “how it may contribute to their work,” and expressed their desire to understand what they are “getting out of this.” Following several phone and face-to-face meetings on these issues, it was agreed that the researchers would give a lecture to the staff of each agency (about 25 therapists in each agency) on the state-of-art in group-work with male batterers, as the context for the present study. Although the therapists expressed their enjoyment at the presentations, and enthusiasm to
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participate at the study, ultimately not a single batterer who participated in group-work in those agencies was willing to participate in the study. In the face of complete lack of cooperation in one of the specialized units, and failure to enlist cooperation despite repeated attempts and the use of all conceivable means of communication, the researchers were compelled to request the intervention of hierarchical bureaucratic authority. Not surprisingly, the requested agency information arrived one day after the official's intervention. In summary, conducting an evaluation within a bureaucratic milieu raises the issue of how to obtain cooperation from resistant stakeholders. While most current literature on political issues, recommends the use of cooperative approaches, experience indicates that an adversarial, authoritative approach may be a better solution in certain situations. One may adopt a system's perspective, and claim that the relationships between therapists and researchers, as well as between therapists and the supervisory managerial strata, reflect the relationships between therapists and batterers. The therapist, by definition, occupies a position of authority, and employs a combination of authority and incentives to direct the unwilling client into the required direction of change or (at least) cooperation; the researcher conducting an evaluation may similarly find herself using similar combinations of authority and incentive to induce therapists and directors in the field to cooperate with the research project. References Adams, D. (1989). Feminist-based interventions for battering men. In L. Caesar & K. Hamberger (Eds.), Treating men who batter: Theory, practice and programs (pp. 3−23). New York: Springer. Asthana, S., Richardson, S., & Halliday, J. (2002). Partnership working in public policy provision: A framework for evaluation. Social Policy & Administration, 36(7), 780−795. Babcock, J., & LaTaillade, J. (2000). Evaluating interventions for men who batter. In J. Vincent & E. Jouriles (Eds.), Domestic violence: Guidelines for research-informed practice (pp. 37−77). Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Babcock, J., & Steiner, R. (1999). The relationship between treatment, incarceration, and recidivism of battering: A program evaluation of Seattle's coordinated community response to domestic violence. Journal of Family Psychology, 13, 46−59. Bennett, L., & Williams, O. (2001). In brief: Controversies and recent studies of batterer intervention program effectiveness. Applied Research Forum, National Online Resource Center on Violence Against Women. Available: www.vawnet.org Buchbinder, E., Enosh, G., & Eisikovits, Z. (2005). A research proposal for evaluation and construction of the knowledge base of treatment at the Bet-Tikva unit at Hermon prison. Haifa, Israel: School of Social Work, Faculty of Welfare and Health Sciences. Davis, R., & Taylor, B. (1999). Does batterer treatment reduce violence? A synthesis of the literature. Women and Criminal Justice, 10, 69−93. Ehrmann, S. (2007). Resistance to evaluation and assessment. Available: http://www.tltgroup.org/Flashlight/Handbook/Resistance.htm Enosh, G., Haj-Yhia, M., Eisikovits, Z., & Dotan, G. (2006). The evaluation of batterers' treatment programs in Israel: A research report presented to the Ministry of Welfare and The National Insurance Institute of Israel. Haifa, Israel: Center for the Study of Society, University of Haifa. Gondolf, E. (1999). A comparison of reassault rates in four batterer programs: Do court referral, program length and services matter? Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 14, 41−61. Gondolf, E. (2000). Mandatory court review and batterer program compliance. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 15, 437−438. Gondolf, E. (2000). Reassault at 30-months after batterer program intake. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 44, 111−128. Gondolf, E. W. (2004). Evaluating batterer counseling programs: A difficult task showing some effects and implications. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 9, 605−631. Henning, K., & Holdford, R. (2006). Minimization, denial, and victim blaming by batterers. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 33, 110−130. Henning, K., Jones, A. R., & Holdford, R. (2005). “I didn't do it, but if I did I had a good reason”: Minimization, denial, and attributions of blame among male and female domestic violence offenders. Journal of Family Violence, 20, 131−139. Israel, B. A., Schulz, A. J., Parker, E., & Becker, A. B. (2001). Community-based participatory research: Policy recommendations for promoting a partnership approach in health research. Education for Health, 14, 182−197. Keynan, O., Rosenberg, H., Beili, B., Nir, M., Levin, S., Mor, A., et al. (2003). Beit Noam: Residential program for violent men. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 7, 207−236. Shadish, W. R. (2006). The common threads in program evaluation. Preventing Chronic Disease [serial online], 3(1). Available: www.cdc.gov/pcd/ issues/2006/jan/05_0166.htm Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Leviton, L. C. (1991). Foundations of program evaluation: Theories of practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Shamai, M., Buchbinder, E., & Enosh, G. (2002). The evaluation of a therapeutic residential facility for ex-prisoners convicted for wife battering — A longitudinal follow-up. Research proposal presented to the Prisoners Rehabilitation Service and the National Insurance Institute of Israel. Haifa, Israel: School of Social Work, Faculty of Welfare and Health Sciences, University of Haifa. Guy Enosh is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Social Work at the University of Haifa, Israel. His work is focused on family violence and interpersonal conflicts. He has conducted a series of evaluation studies of intervention programs for batterers in Israel.