Responding to urban crisis

Pergamon

PII: S0264-2751(00)00025-1

Cities, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 293–304, 2000  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0264-2751/00 $-see front matter

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Responding to urban crisis The emergency planning response to the bombing of Manchester city centre Gwyndaf Williams* and Stuart Batho School of Planning and Landscape, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK

Lynne Russell Department of Social Policy, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK

The role of local capacity building is central to the achievement of urban management objectives, particularly in the fields of regeneration and renewal. This is particularly the case in situations where local communities are attempting to respond to an urban crisis, where established relational webs and networks and the mobilisation capacity of the local policy community is critical. This paper focuses on the applicability of such concepts to the emergency planning response demonstrated within the City of Manchester immediately following the bombing of its commercial core in June 1996. Following a brief consideration of the relationship between disasters and emergency planning procedures, the paper focuses on the impact of the bomb on the city centre. It reviews local capacity for crisis management, paying particular attention to the temporal and spatial arrangements put in place both for handling the emergency and for the subsequent process of recovery. Finally, it evaluates the main lessons to be learnt from this experience, both for local institutional capacity and for successful emergency management.  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Keywords: Disasters, Emergency planning, Institutional collaboration, Urban regeneration, Manchester

Introduction

mental systems of a city simultaneously into disarray within seconds, yet the process of recovery can take years to complete. The ability of communities to recover from disasters is determined by a whole range of factors. However, central to the success of any disaster response is a community’s management capacity, based on its available resource capital, and its ability to effectively mobilise such capital to maximum effect (Bryson and Crosby, 1992). There is a growing recognition in the literature on urban governance more generally that institutional capital and institutional capacity-building are important components of a communitys ability to meet social and economic development goals. This paper aims to consider the suitability of such concepts for handling and responding to an urban crisis brought about by the impact of an unexpected disaster which fundamentally challenged one city’s capacity for city management (Gilbert, 1998; Varley, 1994).

The increasingly complex social, economic and political systems of modern cities have long demonstrated their resilience and capacity to cope in the face of challenge and change. In particular, over the past few decades cities within both the developed and developing world have had to come to terms with crisis situations arising from urban terrorism. The most recent large-scale attacks in Oklahoma City, Tokyo, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi serve as continuing reminders of the potential threat posed by terrorist organisations. Crisis in an urban system created by a terrorist attack presents urban managers with a myriad of challenges. With little or no warning a terrorist bombing can throw the social, economic and environ*Corresponding author. Tel.: ⫹ 44 161 275 6900; Fax: ⫹ 44 161 275 6893; e-mail: [email protected]

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It reviews the experience of local agencies in responding to the impact of the largest peacetime bomb ever detonated in Britain. The article begins by providing a conceptual overview of disasters and community capacity building in order to facilitate crisis management. A review of the impact of the bombing on Manchester’s city centre and the immediate emergency response is then provided. Particular attention is placed on the spatial and temporal arrangements put in place to handle the immediate emergency response and for initiating the longer-term process of recovery. Finally, the paper evaluates the factors that have helped deliver a successful co-ordinated recovery, and the lessons to be learnt from the Manchester experience for wider processes of urban management.

Conceptualising disaster Disasters have wide socio-economic and political consequences both for established institutional frameworks and for the management of urban society (Quarantelli, 1995; Parker and Hanmer, 1992; Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991). There are two broad categories of disaster, namely natural and technological, with terrorist attacks representing an example of the latter. Although each type of disaster creates its own unique problems, which in turn may necessitate different patterns of response, both natural and technological disasters are usually examined within the same conceptual and analytical framework (Kasperson and Pijawka, 1985). It is important to realise that rarely does a straightforward cause and effect relationship occur in a disaster situation, each being typified by a multi-event series of hazards (Smith, 1996; Morren, 1983). In the case of a bombing, the primary hazard is the sheer force of the bomb itself, which is likely to cause ground movement and structural damage to buildings. The physical movement of land and property may induce secondary hazards, such as ruptured gas pipes, and a tertiary hazard, perhaps in the form of fire, may ensue. Such a series of hazards will be accompanied by a whole series of disaster impacts. Attention initially focuses on the negative aspects of the event (particularly if there has been a loss of life), and the capacity of local agencies to respond. Whilst accompanying gains may be difficult to identify in the period immediately following a disaster, opportunities that arise may provide a catalyst or trigger for change. Smith (1996) develops the categorisation of disaster impacts further, dividing gains and losses into direct and indirect effects. Furthermore, within each of these categories tangible and intangible effects can be identified. Direct effects are the first order consequences occurring immediately after an event, and whilst the direct costs may be the most visible consequences, they may not be the most significant outcome. Direct gains are benefits that may accrue to residents following a disaster, and may take the form of financial aid and physical/environmental enhance294

ment programmes. Indirect effects generally emerge later, and may be difficult to directly attribute to a disaster – emotional, socio-economic disruption – and are less well understood.

Emergency planning Emergency planning is the process of “developing and implementing policies and programmes to avoid and cope with the risks to people and property from natural and man-made hazards” (Cigler, 1987, p. 5). However, the low probability of many disaster events does not facilitate highly developed political coalitions, and the comprehensive nature of emergency management is often little understood by public officials and citizens. Technical complexity and uncertainties of risk assessment, reinforced by a mismatch between emergency management responsibilities and fiscal capacity, frequently result in administrative inadequacies and complicate organisational learning. Discussions on the conceptualisation of disasters and their effective management tend to focus on time, this being encapsulated in a “disaster continuum”, which identifies four broad stages disasters pass through – pre-disaster mitigation, pre-disaster preparedness, post-disaster response and post-disaster recovery (Cuny, 1992). Although the transition between certain stages may not be clearly defined, each broad phase will require distinct action by the emergency services, as well as other groups and organisations. Pre-disaster mitigation involves hazard assessment and the development of methods to reduce vulnerability, and the scope of the risks involved. The urban environment examples include land-use regulation and the strictness of building codes. Pre-disaster preparedness involves the anticipation of the problems likely to occur following a disaster, and the development of appropriate response mechanisms. Such capabilities take a variety of forms, including the training of key emergency personnel, and the development of inter-agency co-operation and coordination agreements to facilitate coherent action (Flin, 1996; Home Office, 1994a, b). The aim of a disaster response is to restore normality as quickly as possible, with the initial stage of emergency response being both critical and immensely stressful. The extent of prior warning, and the ways in which this may allow avoidance or controlling actions to be taken are seen to be vital. The initial setting up of a critical control centre, the facilitating of mutual aid between the emergency services, the establishment of a cordon management system, and the formulation of communication structures more widely are all initial elements of such an emergency response (Flin, 1996; Horlick-Jones, 1994). Over time, the main focus of disaster management will switch from emergency response considerations to the development of a programme of recovery. A recovery programme will aim to rehabilitate communities,

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restore and enhance environments, reinforcing the view that “rapid and appropriate recovery from unexpected crisis situations is a test of institutional effectiveness” (Inam, 1999, p. 383). As a learning exercise it will additionally provide knowledge resources as mitigation for future disasters. Capacity to respond The success of a community’s emergency planning attempts will be determined by a whole range of different factors, including the extent of inter-governmental co-operation; the emphasis placed on co-ordinated and planned action; early and continued support by local officials empowered for action; and the implementation of visible, cost effective strategies by capable personnel (Cigler, 1987, p. 16). However, of central importance to the effective emergency management of a disaster is the quality and extent of a community’s management resource capacity, and the ability of a community to effectively harness, or mobilise, its resource capacity to maximum effect. Resource capacity is determined by a community’s physical, human and social capital. From a disaster management perspective it is a community’s social capital in particular that determines the ability of a community to effectively carry out emergency management. In the case of most disasters, lack of necessary human or physical resources is not a problem, with the main requirement being the effective mobilisation of these resources (Quarantelli, 1997). A community’s social capital can play a significant role in this mobilisation process, encompassing as it does “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). Social capital is conceived as a “stock of assets”, usually measured qualitatively in terms of the density of civic engagement in a community (Buckland and Rahman, 1999). The density and strength of relational webs or networks that exist in a locality can significantly determine a community’s emergency response capacity, and ability to manage change (Healey, 1997). The literature on community capacity has most recently looked at how social capital is mobilised through different institutional configurations to revitalise post-industrial urban landscapes; through meeting urban planning and development goals and place-marketing initiatives (Healey, 1998; Huxham, 1996; Fukiyama, 1995). The concept of institutional capacity can, however, usefully conceptualise the organisational ability of an urban community to regenerate itself after a disaster. Institutional capacity focuses on all organisations, and their associated webs of knowledge and relational resources involved in urban governance in its broadest sense. Institutional capacity, which is commonly embedded in social relations and interactions, requires a strong institutional presence at the local level and high levels of interaction. This facilitates both strongly articulated

patterns of coalition, and the development amongst participants of a mutual awareness that they are involved in a common enterprise. It is important to build-up and maintain institutional capacity, as it is argued that where rich dense networks exist broadly based collaborative planning can rapidly develop, allowing “rapid mobilisation to new circumstances … [enabling] flexible responses to be designed and developed” (Healey, 1998, p. 1541). An unexpected event, such as urban terrorism, clearly puts to the test the social capital that exists in a community, and the extent to which resource capital can be deployed. The British context In Great Britain response to disasters is organised at the local level, where knowledge of available resources is most complete and a co-ordinated response is possible. Disasters are dealt with by the emergency services; police, ambulance and fire services. There is no national disaster response team, or military response as exists in some countries (Flin, 1996). Emergency planning has been a function of local authorities since 1974, and until 1986 was essentially concerned with the potential effects of war, particularly that associated with the threat of a nuclear attack. In the late 1980s, with the collapse of Eastern European governmental structures, and following an unprecedented series of civil emergencies (e.g. Kings Cross, Piper Alpha, Clapham, Lockerbie and Kegworth), the British Government undertook a review of emergency planning arrangements (Department of Health, 1991). This review concluded that there was no requirement for a national specialist disaster response in Britain, and confirmed that emergency management should continue to be coordinated at the local level. The government did, however, change the emphasis of emergency planning towards peacetime crises, designed to cope with civil disasters. Emphasis was placed on the development of an integrated approach between the emergency services and emergency planning units within local authorities in order to facilitate the necessary co-ordination (Home Office, 1992, 1994a, b). However, central government retained a role, with different central government departments being nominated to take the lead in different types of emergency. In the case of terrorist incidents, depending on the nature of the crisis, central government co-ordination is led by the Home Office in conjunction with other departments. The Manchester context The City of Manchester, the main administrative and commercial centre of north-west England, lies at the heart of a conurbation of 2.6 million people, forming the second largest urban region in the British Isles outside London. A terrorist attack in the heart of the city centre was intended, therefore, to have social, economic and political consequences that would extend far beyond the boundaries of the city itself. 295

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Manchester was the world’s first city of the industrial revolution, reaching its zenith in the late nineteenth century. It essentially remains a Victorian city, with the urban fabric containing much tangible evidence of the city’s industrial past. Over the past two decades the city’s political and business elite has been preoccupied with the process of restructuring a postindustrial city (Williams, 1996). Their aspirations and confidence have grown immeasurably since the late 1980s arising from the pragmatic and enthusiastic adoption of public–private sector partnership working to meet development goals (Cochrane et al, 1996; Peck and Tickell, 1995; Williams, 1995, 1998). In an attempt to position Manchester as a European Regional Capital and to reassert the city’s position as an international city, political leaders are committed to pursuing an ambitious regeneration strategy, actively seeking out beneficial partnerships and displaying a positive and confident mood in its dealings with central government (Williams, 2001). Such institutional capital was centrally important in the city’s response to the bombing of its central area, and its capacity to promote and manage the recovery programme. Greater Manchester comprises 10 metropolitan districts, and between 1974 and 1986 the conurbation benefited from an over-arching metropolitan-wide county council. Emergency Planning was initially carried out by the Greater Manchester County Council on behalf of the metropolitan districts, but with its abolition it became necessary to transfer the emergency planning function to the Greater Manchester Fire and Civil Defence Authority, specifically created by the metropolitan districts. Following the national review of peace-time emergency planning, the structures were once again reconfigured in 1993. Responsibility for civil disasters was allocated to the individual metropolitan districts. Four of the 10 districts, including Manchester, chose to undertake the responsibility for emergency planning themselves, confident in the belief that they possessed the knowledge, resources and organisational capacity to cope with any civil emergency. The other six districts entered into an agency agreement with the metropolitan wide Fire and Emergency Planning Unit. In Manchester an Emergency Planning Team comprising two full time officers was established as a unit within the City Council, and made directly accountable to the authority’s Chief Executive. The unit has detailed knowledge of all personnel within the agencies that may be called upon in an emergency. In addition to the three main emergency services, specialist personnel are found within the local authority’s Engineers and Surveyors department, Social Services, Operational Services and City Catering. Well defined procedures are in place for calling in key personnel on a cascade principle, and a set of detailed plans have been developed to deal with emergencies by specific location (shopping centres, leisure and cultural facilities, and the international 296

airport). Training exercises are organised by the team to ensure other departments within the council, as well as other outside agencies, are aware of their role in an emergency, and how they should execute their responsibilities to maximum effect. The mobilisation of local resources at short notice is the key to an effective emergency response, and relevant personnel undoubtedly benefited from a major exercise in this field being undertaken within the city in late 1995.

The impact of the bomb On Saturday 15 June 1996, the city’s emergency management structure was put to the test when the local television station received a coded bomb warning at 9.41 am. Greater Manchester Police immediately put into action established emergency procedures, and the suspect vehicle was located parked close to a major road junction in the heart of the city’s commercial core. Inner and outer cordons were established, and the police in collaboration with major store security personnel immediately began to evacuate the 80,000 people estimated to be in the centre at the time (Figs 1 and 2). The inner cordon was set at 400–500 m from the bomb, with the outer cordon encircling the city centre followed the line of the inner relief road. This was aimed at preventing further people from entering the city whilst at the same time allowing people to leave. A bomb disposal team arrived a quarter of an hour prior to the device exploding, but with insufficient time to defuse the 1,500 kilo bomb. The force of the blast was felt up to eight kilometres away. Windows within a half kilometre radius of the epicentre of the blast were smashed as shock waves funnelled down streets, and this created the main element of personal injury as people rushed to flee. The immediate emergency response, once the aftershock had cleared, was a managed process. However, due to the scale of the disaster many “walking wounded” were moved in response to personal initiative involving private vehicles, police vehicles and public transport. Ambulances were seriously disrupted by the sheer amount of debris and broken glass.

Figure 1 Manchester city centre – sub-areas

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Figure 2 The city’s administrative and commercial core

Negative effects Amazingly no one was killed, but glass lacerations and other effects of the blast injured around 220 people. The damage to property was considerable, however, with a total of 1200 properties affected. Around a dozen buildings of functional and/or historic significance suffered major structural damage, half of which required demolition. In commercial terms, 672 businesses were displaced; 49,000 m2 of retail space, and 57,000 m2 of office space was immediately decommissioned; the city’s central indoor market was closed for months, as was a section of the main enclosed shopping centre. Residents from 50 apartments above the main shopping centre were temporarily displaced. In addition, many other aspects of the city’s infrastructure were affected. There was

major physical damage to roads, the city’s largest bus terminal was permanently closed, two multi-storey car parks were temporarily shut, and many key streets (including the city centre’s main north–south link) were closed for up to 18 months. In terms of the indirect costs of the blast, both tangible and intangible, losses were considerable. Many people experienced shock and trauma after the event, with examples of cardiac arrest and long periods away from work evident. A business survey of the economic costs found that two months after the bombing, lost or reduced retail turnover was estimated at £50 million, with a fifth of businesses directly affected still not trading at that stage. A third of non-retail businesses suffered a loss of activity, with overall trade in the city centre down a tenth even six months 297

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after the bomb. Small businesses that could not absorb the cost of lost trading were particularly vulnerable. Whilst 2500 workers were temporarily laid off, it is believed that a few hundred people permanently lost their jobs as a result of the disaster, and the cost of business relocations was estimated at over £5 million (Gordon, 1997). In addition, there was a major cost to the local authority of the loss of business rates, car parking fees, and market trading licences. The insurance loss cover for physical damage was estimated to be £100 million, but this figure increased substantially when loss of business activity was taken into account. The eventual rebuilding programme is expected to cost over £500 million in direct private and public realm activity, this in turn stimulating further investment in the surrounding area. Positive effects Whilst there is no denying the substantial losses felt by the city centre in the immediate aftermath, it did provide an opportunity to rebuild an enhanced city core, and a more competitive and liveable city centre. It provided the scope for modernising the urban fabric on a scale that would have otherwise been impossible within the existing built-up area, enabling contemporary concerns to be incorporated into the rebuilding process. Changing a city’s built environment is not only restricted by the inherited physical structures of the past, but also an associated legacy of political, economic and cultural norms. Disasters provide an impetus for change, resulting in a reassessment of cultural norms and political will. Although commercially successful, much of Manchester’s comprehensive redevelopment experience of the 1960s was perceived deficient in urban design terms, and the bomb offered the chance for a fresh start (Russell, 1998).

The emergency planning response A strong partnership was formed between the City Council, the emergency services and the major private land owners and occupiers to deal with the devastation caused by the bomb, which benefited from the remarkable coalition of interests already in place as a result of previous city centre initiatives. The immediate problem for businesses and the general public was one of access, with shop fronts missing and stock destroyed. The priority was to get the city back in business, restore and retain public confidence in the city centre, and to begin to consider ways of managing the recovery process. This began within 48 hours of the blast, with the City Council becoming the focus of attention and the catalyst for a range of initiatives both short and long term. From the initial emergency the City Council’s response was developed in a number of areas, focusing in particular on a re-occupancy strategy and business recovery, communication over cordon control and management, and the profiling of media relations. 298

Re-occupancy strategy An inner cordon was maintained around the area affected by the blast, initially enclosing 25 ha of the commercial core. It served a multi-purpose role in that it protected people from physical danger, helped preserve criminal evidence at the disaster scene, and as a management “tool” was central to the City Council’s re-occupancy strategy, allowing the controlled release of land over time and space. Indeed, the authorities were keen for owners to resume responsibility for their property as quickly as possible (Fig. 3). The re-opening of areas within the cordon depended critically on the assessment of damage to buildings and highways; on making the area safe for the general public; clearing debris (building materials, damaged stock, decomposing food); and setting up traffic diversions. The removal of dangerous building conditions was the responsibility of the local authority’s Architects Department, which had a predetermined plan originally drafted to respond to the impact of freak weather conditions. This defined a process for establishing priorities in dealing with widespread damage, and was put into effect within hours, enabling the necessary local authority staff to be mobilised. These surveyors possessed extensive experience, knowledge and skills in relation to dealing with dangerous buildings, even if the scale and overall urgency to respond quickly presented new challenges. By Sunday morning, an emergency response task force comprising the City Council and the Greater Manchester Police had held its first meeting. This “partnership” proved central to the success of a rapid response in a situation that had numbed participants. It was decided that the area within the inner cordon (which by Sunday was the only cordon in place) should be sub-divided into six management areas based on the street layout of the city. The most severely damaged area was at the epicentre of the blast (zone 6), with response to the devastation in zones 1– 5 being relatively standardised. A team of around 20 surveyors went through each zone deciding on the extent of the damage, and liaising with owners. Their task was to follow the pre-determined emergency plan, to assess the extent of the damage in the cordoned zone, giving initial priority to those buildings which were on main routes, but also identifying structures which were so badly damaged that they could not be made safe in the short term. The initial task was to isolate such buildings with hoardings and barricades, with the owner’s own contractors brought in wherever possible. The role of the City Architects Department was particularly intense during this first week. There was no time for full structural surveys; it was a question of identifying those buildings that were likely to prove most dangerous, based on the experience and skill of the surveyors. Zone 6 was designated a “crime scene”, and was dealt with separately. Access to this zone was restricted to the emerg-

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Figure 3 Cordon management and the release of land over time and space.

ency services, forensic specialists, and the City Council’s Principal Building Surveyor who was given delegated responsibility for this zone. Once buildings were secure, areas were released from public security, and the physical cordon reduced in scale. By Monday evening, the physical cordon was reduced to zone 6. This area was then divided into 10 sub-zones, based on an amalgam of land parcels along ownership lines, the extent of damage, and physical constraints. On Tuesday 18 June, three days after the blast, specific sub-zones were released, and it was hoped that substantial parts of the remainder would be transferred the following day. However, the process proved extremely complex, and the severity of damage to specific buildings prevented this. Nevertheless, by the end of Thursday 20 June, just three sub-areas remained under cordon regulations. The police began to remove staff from the cordon as sites were secured. Major firms were already employing their own security personnel on site, and had begun to initiate their own individual disaster recovery strategies (Graham, 1998). By Saturday 22 June, major site owners took full responsibility for the remaining land and property within the cordon. As the police withdrew from the cordon, building owners began the process of erecting 3 km of security fencing around what was then becoming one of the largest building sites in Europe. The area was sub-divided along ownership lines, involving the full collaboration of the main landowners – P&O (Arndale Shopping Centre, A1), Marks and Spencer (A2), Royal Insurance (A3), Frogmore Estates (B), and Prudential Assurance (C). Thus, a week after the blast the bomb-damaged area had been reduced to five major building sites, a con-

siderable achievement given the initial size of the cordoned off area. These five sites have provided the basis of the first phase of the rebuilding programme, a stage that was largely completed by November 1999. Communication Estimates suggest that between 5000 and 10,000 people descended on the Town Hall (the designated control centre) on the day following the blast, all with their own individual problems and agendas (retrieval of stock or personal possessions, concern over premises and financial security). Since there was no provision made within the emergency plan for responding to such numbers, it was decided that meetings for each of the areas within the cordon should be held in six committee rooms within the Town Hall (each corresponding to a specific zone). This became the central means of communication, with meetings being held continuously throughout the first week after the blast. These meetings provided people with a summary of progress, an outline of future plans, and answers to questions that arose. Emergency planning meetings between the City Council and the police were held at the start of each day. The results of these meetings were then communicated to the committee rooms, where people were told which areas would be opened up and how to gain access. Business recovery Of central importance for the immediate response stage was the relocation of businesses displaced by the bomb to get them trading again as quickly as possible. The City Council’s Valuers Department, in close 299

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co-operation with local commercial agents, compiled a database of available property in and around the city centre. The bulk of the work in relation to business relocation, however, was undertaken by a designated business recovery officer who subsequently became part of a team handling the small business response. By the end of the first week, most of the larger businesses, who had both the resources and the emergency planning frameworks in place, were well advanced with their business recovery strategies (Graham, 1998). An agreement was secured with the main banks that they would not foreclose on any business affected by the blast without liaising with the City Council. This was important not only for those small businesses directly affected, but also gave the banks confidence that a systematic approach was already being taken to business recovery. Furthermore, a onestop business advice and information service was established with the co-operation of local business development agencies, involving the short-term secondment of representatives from the major banks, building societies and insurance companies. Media relations A media and public relations strategy was formulated within three days of the explosion. As with the other recovery initiatives the City Council took the lead, but worked in collaboration with other key agencies within the city. The local authority’s Public Relations Office worked with established local agencies such as Marketing Manchester, the City Centre Partnership, and the major landowners and traders to develop and implement a concerted campaign. The aim was to maintain a high national and international profile during the initial period to restore confidence amongst city centre users; to encourage shoppers, tourists and business users to return to the city centre; to support traders in relocating; and to provide a framework for promoting the city’s views on the development of a strategic recovery and renewal strategy.

were, therefore, in place, and city leaders were able to mobilise the knowledge and relational resources that existed, and build upon them to achieve their objective of rebuilding. A strong partnership was established to rehabilitate the city and reconstruct the urban fabric; and to facilitate the refunctioning of the economic and socio-cultural systems of the city’s core. The aim was not simply to reinstate the bomb-damaged area, but rather to reinvigorate and revitalise the city centre as a whole. The process of thinking through the structures necessary for a recovery programme to be delivered was initiated during the first week after the blast, and was put in place within the first month. The key instruments were an appeal fund to support businesses and individuals most directly affected by the bomb, an urban design competition to facilitate a master planning response, and a task force to co-ordinate the entire rebuilding process. An examination of the rebuilding of Manchester is not part of the remit of this paper, but is the focus of a separate study (Williams, 2000). However, outlined briefly here is an overview of the instruments rapidly put in place to facilitate recovery.

Post-disaster recovery

Lord Mayor’s appeal fund This fund spearheaded the attempt to get businesses trading again, and it was established in response to donations and offers of help received in the period immediately after the blast. The fund’s creation was officially announced by the City Council on Wednesday 19 June, and was designed to “raise and distribute funds to those experiencing hardship, with a principal objective of assisting small businesses to re-establish”. It was to collect and disburse £2.5 million during its year of existence. A team of seconded financial and business services representatives interviewed all 672 businesses directly affected. They provided emotional support, helped draw up recovery and relocation business plans, and administered a series of short-term loans and grants. Thereafter, a Business Support Programme was put in place for longer-term support for the businesses affected.

Establishing the appropriate institutional framework for post-disaster recovery is an essential part of the emergency planning agenda, and not a separate urban management process. Of central importance is the development and mobilisation of resources, including institutional capacity, to respond creatively. To be successful, it is important that a coalition of local interests and established relational webs and networks are willing to work together to prepare and oversee an agreed strategy. In Manchester, there was ample evidence of public–private partnership working, and institutional capacity-building to achieve ambitious schemes, with the city becoming a British role model for such coalition building – “more successful than most in playing the partnership game” (Peck and Tickell, 1995, p. 79). Formal and informal networks

Urban design competition The opportunities afforded by the bombing were soon realised, and following encouragement by the then Deputy Prime Minister an “International Urban Design Competition” was launched on 17 July 1996. From the outset, it was decided that submissions to the competition should develop an urban framework that would provide momentum for positive change in the core and in its surrounding area. The time scale for the competition was tight, particularly given its launch over the summer period. The final decision on the competition winner was announced in early November 1996, less than four months after the initial announcement. Submissions were evaluated on the basis of the creation of a compelling urban design

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vision; imaginative interpretation of the design and development aspirations of the city; demonstration of clear deliverability; focus for private investment; and justification for public expenditure. From this process emerged an initial master plan, specific planning guidance for the bomb damaged area, and a series of annual implementation plans aimed at translating the agreed strategy into redevelopment programmes and projects. The Manchester Millennium Task Force The enormity of the rebuilding process arising from the scale of devastation was soon appreciated. Carrying out comprehensive redevelopment in the heart of a major city centre whilst maintaining a functioning commercial core represented a significant challenge, and it was decided that a specialist task force should be established for the purpose. The organisation – a public–private partnership company limited by guarantee – was fully operational within a month of the disaster. The initial remit of the task force was to promote the re-functioning of the city centre and the speediest possible reduction in the scale of the exclusion zone; to relocate the many businesses which had been displaced by the bomb; and to bring forward a strategy for rebuilding the central area over the following three years. It involved the establishment of a small dedicated team of public and private sector secondees, most of whom had worked with one another in the past. Existing relationships and past experiences proved crucial to its operational effectiveness. The City Council’s Deputy Chief Executive headed the task force, and the Board consisted of representatives from the private sector, the local authority, and from central government. The agency was programmed to complete its remit by Spring 2000, with the rebuilding programme substantially complete, and with the City Council thereafter managing the final elements of the programme. As the task force has evolved to deal with the complexity of masterplan implementation, its aims have been to co-ordinate the preparation of the recovery programme, to keep it under review and oversee its effective delivery; to assume responsibility for the creation of a regeneration framework for the core area and to secure the necessary public and private resources; and to account for the public sector resources utilised to support programme implementation.

Evaluating the emergency planning response Existing network of partnerships As previously stated, a strong partnership was formed to handle the immediate emergency response and for initiating the longer-term process of recovery. This partnership, led by the City Council, benefited from the coalition of interests that already existed in the city. In the years prior to the bombing, Manchester City Council was characterised by certain important

attributes, which helped develop the extent and quality of the city’s available social capital. It had been creative and radical in its approach to regeneration issues, working effectively with a Conservative central government; it had experience of fostering effective working partnerships between public sector, private sector and other local interests, not only in the context of regeneration programmes but also in relation to initiatives associated with Olympic Games bidding; and it possessed a culture which recognised the contribution of the private sector (Cochrane et al, 1996; Peck and Tickell, 1995). The development of strong relational webs within Manchester, and between Manchester City Council and central government, proved crucial both to the radical direction taken in response to the bomb, and the speed with which a recovery programme was put in place. Moreover, extensive collaboration between different organisations within the city to achieve specific socio-economic goals had led to strong personal relations between key “actors”. Good working relationships and a level of trust already existed between many of those who were to become the key players in the rebuilding process. These included the major land and property owners, without whose co-operation a radical approach to recovery would not have been possible. A significant amount of institutional-capacity existed, therefore, within the city, and there were people who through high profile processes, such as the successful Commonwealth Games bid, were capable of mobilising this capacity to maximum effect. There was also a level of confidence in the proposed strategy amongst government officials in London, whose support was necessary to carry through an ambitious regeneration scheme. By the mid-1990s, Manchester had a proven track record in carrying out successful regeneration initiatives. The then Deputy Prime Minister, who had taken an active interest in earlier regeneration initiatives within the city, working with some of the key public and private sector figures, agreed to give the proposed radical regeneration strategy his personal support. This gave the renewal process a high political profile, and was instrumental in securing both European funding and financial support from central government. Only in a city where many of the key players knew each other, were already working together, and above all trusted each other, could a new vision for the city have been brought together with such wide consensus, several different funding streams been secured, and a renewal programme delivered with such speed. Although the mobilisation of existing strong relational networks within the city is regarded as central to the success of the emergency response and recovery process, other key factors were identified as being particularly helpful.

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Pre-determined strategies Underpinning the success of the initial response was the City Council’s emergency planning process, which depended heavily on lead members from key departments coming together on a cascade principle set out by the existing plan (engineers and building surveyors, operational and building services staff, city catering facilities, the press office). The dedicated emergency control centre in the Town Hall was operational within half an hour of the explosion, operating for 24 hours a day in the initial stages, then 18 hours a day. This is equipped with 26 operating positions, 48 dedicated telephone extensions, the ability to work on three telephone systems, plus the provision of four radio networks and the necessary equipment to support this size of operation (Davey, 1997, p. 4).

On the day of the incident a helpline and a counselling line were set up, and this yielded hundreds of offers of help and money. It would have been impossible to begin the process of opening up the greater part of the area affected by the blast within 48 hours if there had not been predetermined strategies in place for dealing with dangerous buildings, even if modifications had to be made due to the scale of the disaster. Because the incident “working area” was so large, communications with the emergency services and building surveyors proved difficult to implement comprehensively, this being reinforced by the continuing danger from falling debris. There was a need for an audible warning system for contractors that circumvented the deafening noise of security alarms, many of which continued to ring for days. Furthermore, in order to limit the possibility of looting, all photographs released were centrally vetted. Despite the modifications that were made, experience following the bomb demonstrated the value of the pre-determined plan. Training All parties involved in the disaster response acknowledge the benefit of training, which helped increase the emergency response capacity within the city. Police staff at all levels had the confidence to act without waiting for direction, which was of paramount importance. The City Council had taken part in a nationally organised exercise with the emergency services of neighbouring authorities in the autumn of 1995, and this was felt to have been of immeasurable benefit in familiarising the appropriate people with the control room and the systems which had to be put in place. This exercise had involved many of the departments involved after the bomb, even if it had omitted the City Architects Department whose role in the emergency response was crucial. A great deal of “best practice” has been identified, however, and the senior police officers and emergency planning officers involved 302

are active on a regular basis in training courses across the country. Euro 96 On the weekend of the explosion, the city was host to the European Football Championships (Euro 96), with Russia and Germany destined to play the day following the blast. The structures, processes and additional levels of manpower set in place for Euro 96 proved valuable in facilitating the response to the bomb. Arrangements already existed, for example, for local authority officers to meet the police every day, and emergency accommodation that had been reserved at student residences within the city was subsequently used in relation to residents made homeless by the blast. Whilst the emergency response to the bomb blast in Manchester is generally considered to have been successful, with no loss of life and with a city centre that continued to function efficiently if sub-optimally, a number of lessons were learnt. Evacuating the area In the period immediately prior to the explosion there were potential evacuation problems, with much of the public assuming it to be a false alarm. The scale and impermeability of the area served only to exacerbate the problems of communication. Whilst the police toured the area in vehicles and a helicopter, and individual stores responded well to their emergency planning procedures, a few people were still in the area very close to the bomb when it went off, and some were badly injured. There were also problems in maintaining the inner cordon once it had been established. Whilst a proposed close-circuit security camera scheme was in the process of being planned for the commercial core, it was not in place at the time, and this hindered police checking of evacuation procedures at street level. As a consequence consideration is being given to the efficacy of a loudhailer mechanism being built into the camera system to facilitate communication, and a review undertaken of safe distances in setting up cordons in the light of injuries from flying glass. Communication The City Council’s Emergency Planning Officers, who had been contacted by the police, were travelling into the city when the bomb exploded. Retrospectively they felt the need for improved liaison at the outset with the police, ambulance and fire services to help ensure a fully integrated response. Resource constraints, however, have further encouraged collaboration, and there is evidence of the local authority emergency planning function being subsequently incorporated more fully with the traditional emergency services. Thus, a multi-agency city centre group has been established after the bombing, comp-

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lementing the city-wide group that was in existence prior to the disaster. Regulating cordon access Ensuring access for those people who needed to get through the cordons whilst excluding others who did not require access was a problem on the day of the blast, and during the days to follow. On the day of the bomb those people with emergency planning functions, as well as building surveyors travelling into the city centre, had difficulty in getting through the roadblocks of the outer cordon. To overcome this problem a number of people with emergency planning functions have now been issued with police passes to get through roadblocks. In the days following the bomb, the problem of surveyors, owner’s agents and contractors having appropriate access into the inner cordon, while still having a system which prevented access by members of the public, was resolved by nobody being allowed into the area without permission by the appropriate senior officer in the City Architect’s Department, who co-ordinated the system of passes. This system allowed some control over the non bona fide contractors and loss adjusters in the city, who threatened to further congest the core with their vehicles. There were isolated examples of contractors managing to break through the cordon before being arrested, and a limited amount of looting took place despite the police presence and the real physical danger to those involved. Nevertheless, overall the way in which the exclusion zone was controlled and subsequently opened up – allowing access to key holders and contractors to secure buildings, with the city council undertaking this work where necessary – was critical, and was generally successful in preventing further injury, physical dangers, or looting. The scale of the disaster The major constraint to an effective emergency response was the scale of the disaster. The predetermined plan did not envisage the extent of the physical damage or the response by those most directly affected – “we never anticipated that 5– 10,000 people would come to the Town Hall … or the 15,000 calls received in the first week”. There was a conflict in the immediate aftermath of the bomb between the need to implement the pre-determined plan in order to be able to re-open the city centre as soon as possible, and the pressure to respond to urgent requests from individuals who needed access to specific buildings. As a result of the scale and impact of the blast, it was not possible to plan in detail for more than a day at a time. In addition to this, there was considerable scope for relational tensions given the number of organisations involved. In a situation where small businesses in particular were traumatised, often with inadequate or non-existent insurance cover, and with all their resources tied up in unsold stock, appeals for calm in meetings with owners were not necessarily effective.

Lack of structures for recovery The effect of a large bomb in the retail and commercial centre of a major city demonstrated the need to incorporate the recovery of the area into the emergency-planning framework. Everything that happened in the first hours after the blast was the result of what was generally felt to be very effective emergency procedures. It quickly became clear, however, that the existing plan had a limited remit, not being geared up to facilitate the recovery process. Nevertheless, even though the recovery process began as an emergency response, it became a formal commitment within the first fortnight, and was rapidly followed by the establishment of specific instruments to deliver the renewal programme.

Conclusion This paper has focused on the immediate aftermath of the bomb, with attention being targeted on the response of main players to the initial emergency, and the key instruments put in place for the city’s subsequent recovery. The case of Manchester illustrates that rather than representing separate stages, the response and recovery phases were overlapping and intertwined. The process of establishing structures to facilitate the long-term recovery of the city centre was initiated whilst the response to the immediate problems thrown up by the devastation continued. Similarly, some aspects of the post-disaster response continued for many months, with the city’s buildings surveyors, for example, still having some involvement until Easter 1997, and the search for alternative business premises continuing intensively for six months. It is clear that the City Council played a pivotal role in developing a range of initiatives to ensure the re-opening and re-functioning of the city centre as swiftly as possible. The efficiency of the response demonstrates the need for core staffing in handling emergencies – to be able to get highways people in to close roads, and to use the city’s own operational and building service staff to secure premises where owners had failed to do so. Building control staff were absolutely central to the process of dealing with dangerous buildings, and the plans they had in place proved valuable in re-opening the city. Had such functions been privatised the process of re-opening the city would have been extremely difficult. Furthermore, the speed and co-ordination of the recovery process in the first days after the blast demonstrated the benefits of Manchester City Council’s decision to retain its own emergency-planning unit. Whilst the Police, Fire and Ambulance services were the first to deal with the emergency, it is inevitably the local authority that provides the continuity and in house expertise for recovery, a task which in the case of Manchester will take over five years to complete. Moreover, the recovery, and subsequent regeneration process has demonstrated the importance of local authorities in an overall strategic framework setting 303

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and co-ordinating role, and as a core facilitator of institutional capacity. Successful emergency response, and the subsequent development of a rehabilitation strategy, was only achieved, however, through collaborative working between key players, and the available institutional capital within the city. Despite the major physical damage and disruption caused there were no further injuries following the blast, the bulk of the city centre was re-opened within days, and the vast majority of small businesses survived despite having lost their premises and most of their stock. Partnership working that built upon existing relational networks within the city proved invaluable, both in relation to the immediate emergency response and the subsequent renewal process, with the whole process contributing towards making Manchester a more competitive and liveable city for the millennium.

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for sponsoring the research of which this study is a part (Grant No. F120/BC), and Manchester Millennium Ltd for their co-operation in facilitating the research.

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