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Review Essays
Review Essays by Thomas Wright Thomas Wright is Executive Director of Studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a lecturer at the Harris School for Public Policy at the University of Chicago.
The Next American Century: How the United States Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise, by Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen. Simon and Shuster, New York, Paperback Edition, 2010.
The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century, by Parag Khanna. Random House, New York, Paperback Edition, 2009.
The Post-American World, by Fareed Zakaria. W.W. Norton, New York, Paperback Edition, 2009.
The page numbers in this essay refer to the 2008 edition of The Next American Century.
# 2010 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Summer 2010
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Review Essays For the first century and a half of its existence, the United States tried to remain aloof from great power security competition and regarded the metrics and practices of that contest with disdain. Yet, since it entered into the fray in December 1941, Americans have been terrified by the prospect of a decline in their relative power. The Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb, Sputnik, the mythical missile gap of the 1960 election, the supposed emergence of a multipolar world in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the rise of Japan in the mid-1980s all induced high levels of anxiety among the American people. While there was a short respite in the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, for the past half-decade, fears of relative decline have returned with a vengeance. The rapid rise of China and the more muted ascent of India—together with the unforeseen difficulties in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the fight against international terrorism—have combined to reawaken concerns about the end of the American era. These concerns reached fever pitch following the international financial crisis of 2008–2009. The public has noticed. According to one opinion poll at the end of 2009, more Americans believe that China will be the next decade’s most powerful state than believe that the United States will continue to occupy that position.1 Of course, just because Americans have been unduly alarmed by warnings of relative decline in the past does not mean that the alarm is also false this time round. In the fable ‘‘The Boy Who Cried Wolf,’’ the wolf did come in the end. These three books describe the rise of new powers and argue that they can be co-opted into the U.S.-led international order. These books represent a relatively new departure from those American Cassandras warning of relative decline. They argue that the rise of new powers may actually be good for the United States. Billions of people around the world will be better off economically and the new great powers generally share the same interests and concerns as the United States. They will therefore play an important role in tackling global problems if the United States allows them to do so. The danger lies not in the rise of the new powers, per se, but in the possibility that the United States may respond in a fearful and self-destructive manner. As Yogi Berra observed, predictions are difficult to make—especially about the future. History is replete with examples of strategic planners failing to understand the distribution of power and the intentions of other major states. The English philosopher, scientist, and statesman Francis Bacon once warned that ‘‘there is nothing among civil affairs more subject to error than the forming of a true and right valuation of the power and forces of an empire.’’2 Analysts tend to rely upon metrics like GDP and military spending, although 1 Peter Wallsten, ‘‘Democrats’ Blues Grow Deeper in New Poll,’’ Wall Street Journal Online, December 17 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126100346902694549.html. 2 Quoted in William Wohforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 9.
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Review Essays less tangible factors, including strategic competence, military innovation, and the attraction of a country’s model to others, are often crucial. The strategist must appreciate the uncertainty of great power politics, both present and future, but sometimes this appreciation can constrain debate by crowding out falsifiable hypotheses that generate thought and insight. Happily, these three books provide a mix of the uncertain and the bold. Fareed Zakaria (The Post-American World) offers a sophisticated, nuanced, and contingent strategic appraisal of China and India’s rise but does not propose a coherent new strategy for the United States to cope with this development. Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen (The Next American Century) and Parag Khanna (The Second World) lay out some fascinating and provocative hypotheses about world politics and recommend clear, and even radical, strategies for the United States. However, they fail to anticipate the consequences if other countries do not behave as they expect them to. Thus, there is much food for thought, but also much to criticize, in all three books. Three views on the relative decline of the United States The central idea pervading the three books is that American hegemony is passing away and future leadership of the international order will be shared between America and other major powers. The reasons for this shift are largely to be found in the rising powers themselves but weaknesses in the American domestic system are also somewhat responsible. The United States must address its own shortcomings and increase cooperation with the rising powers if it is to tackle the threats and challenges of the 21st century. Within this framework, there are subtle but important differences between the three books. The Post-American World Zakaria, author of From Wealth to Power, an important book on the rise of American power in the nineteenth century, the editor of Newsweek International, and host of a popular show on CNN. He believes that the rapid rise of other nations, particularly China and India, presage a shift in the international order away from a system of American dominance and toward ‘‘one defined and directed from many places and by many people.’’(4–5) All roads no longer lead to Washington, and while it remains a superpower, it is ‘‘an enfeebled one.’’ (42, 217) India is not nearly as successful as China but it has acquired a strategic importance because of the way in which it can offset the impact of China’s rise. Although Zakaria tells the reader early on that his focus is on the rise of the rest rather than the decline of the United States, he is deeply concerned by a crisis in the American domestic system. Despite the international financial crisis, Zakaria does not believe that the United States is afflicted by the same Summer 2010
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Review Essays economic woes that doomed the British Empire. He writes, ‘‘the economic dysfunctions in America today are real, but, by and large, they are not the product of deep inefficiencies within the American economy, nor are they reflections of cultural decay.’’ (211) This is Zakaria at his best—offering a sober but not fatalistic analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the American economy. However, he then segues to argue that the United States is in the midst of a political crisis—‘‘the American political system seems to have lost its ability to create broad coalitions to solve complex problems.’’ (211) He also laments that an ‘‘antiquated and overly rigid political system. . .has been captured by money, special interests, a sensationalist media, and ideological attack groups.’’ (212). Zakaria is concerned that U.S. foreign policy over the past decade deepened the country’s international challenges instead of addressing them. He asks, ‘‘How did the United States blow it? The United States has had an extraordinary hand to play in global politics—the best of any country in history. Yet, by almost any measure. . .Washington has played this hand badly. America has had a period of unparalleled influence. What does it have to show for it?’’ (219). For Zakaria, the Obama administration’s overarching foreign policy challenge is to ‘‘create a new system of international relations. . .that produces genuine and effective global cooperation on the great issues that plague us all.’’ (xxx) This is perhaps the boldest statement in the book and somewhat inconsistent with his later treatment of China as a challenger of America, and India as an ally. Indeed, the preface to the paperback edition places a greater emphasis on shared interests among the world’s major powers and the potential for cooperation and new partnerships than the rest of the text. This tension may explain why the chapter dedicated to proposing a new purpose for U.S. foreign policy is surprisingly thin. Instead of proposing a comprehensive strategy to establish a new international order, Zakaria offers a vague set of ‘‘New Rules for a New Age.’’ Some are useful. The fourth—‘‘Al la carte order’’—advises the United States to retain flexible and overlapping multilateral organizations and networks so as not to get bogged down in a single forum. Others are maddeningly imprecise. The first calls upon American leaders to choose and prioritize instead of seeking to accomplish everything. Zakaria wisely cautions against U.S. involvement in every crisis that erupts, but letting some fires burn is easier in the abstract than in the particular. Zakaria only hints at his preferences instead of elaborating upon them. This leaves the reader wondering about what these choices will mean in practice and curious about what he thinks about the real tradeoffs involved. The second says that the United States should abide by the international rules which it had a hand in writing—America cannot abandon the rules in ‘‘special cases’’ where it serves its interests. Again, fair enough, except that earlier he wrote favorably of the U.S.–India nuclear deal which many countries (and some Americans) perceive as incompatible with the spirit of the non-proliferation regime. Zakaria also calls upon the United States to 482
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Review Essays emulate Bismarck, who has become something of an unlikely hero among American foreign policy experts, not Britain. This, however, is a sanitized reference to the German White Revolutionary’s capacity for diplomatic genius with Russia, Austria, and Britain rather than his brutal wielding of power and aggression to secure Prussia’s ambitions of a unified Germany. Even so, it is unlikely that the United States could handle the secrecy, realpolitik, and deceit at the heart of Bismarck’s foreign policy and continually produce the genius widely believed necessary to execute such a strategy.
The Next American Century The Next American Century is a profoundly optimistic book. Co-authors Hachigian, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and Sutphen, currently White House Deputy Chief of Staff, argue that the rise of new powers is good for the United States and will lead to an increase in cooperation internationally as the world’s ‘‘pivotal powers’’ collaborate to tackle shared challenges. For Hachigian and Sutphen, the world is plagued by ‘‘thorny problems;’’ be it ‘‘disease, Iran’s nuclear program, genocide, unsecured nuclear material, failing states, biological weapons or global warming.’’ ‘‘America should draw in the reemerging powers—China, India, and Russia—and make room for them at the table with the EU and Japan, while being sure that they all pay for the privilege. With their new status would come new responsibility to rebuild the liberal world order.’’(18) The authors call this strategy ‘‘strategic collaboration.’’ Like Zakaria, Hachigian and Sutphen are also perturbed by weakness at home—the ‘‘fiscal mess, underperforming education system, oil dependency, broken health care system, inadequate worker protection, and crumbling infrastructure.’’ (18) Thus, the first component of strategic collaboration is for ‘‘America to put its own house in order.’’ (173) The United States should then construct close relationships with the pivotal powers and collaborate with them through a C6 (the United States, China, the European Union, India, Russia, and Japan), which they describe as a modern day version of the Concert of Europe. Hachigian and Sutphen make a significant contribution by highlighting the numerous areas where the interests of the United States and pivotal powers overlap and by offering concrete suggestions for deepening cooperation. However, their primary concern has to do with threats to the American homeland–‘‘Jihadists, Nukes, and Germs’’ (27) –rather than America’s position in the world more generally. It is unclear that other nations prioritize the tackling of these threats over other, more traditional, geopolitical concerns such as expanding their own regional influence. Certainly, Chinese behavior in 2009 raises serious doubts about their willingness to bolster international efforts on climate change, cybersecurity, and preventing Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Summer 2010
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Review Essays The authors recognize that a more powerful China may challenge U.S. interests in Asia but these concerns appear secondary to their belief that common threats will be prioritized on either side of the Atlantic. They are also confident that policies that incur the objections of Russia and China, such as support for Taiwan or NATO expansion (both of which are described as ‘‘cold war holdovers,’’ ‘‘chronic irritants,’’ and deserving of ‘‘regular scrutiny’’), will be accepted if they are couched in more palatable ways (177). This is a theme of the book—other nations are concerned by the style of U.S. policy rather than by its substance and there are no significant tradeoffs involved if the United States wants to accommodate China’s concerns. In one passage, they criticize the false promise of primacy, referring to the idea that the United Sates must maintain military dominance so other nations are dissuaded from becoming peer competitors. However, they also recognize that China may complicate America’s role in East Asia and argue that the United States must maintain a first class military and a military edge. They never quite explain the difference between primacy and maintaining a military edge in all regional theaters and areas of potential conflict. Unfortunately, they do not address the likely Chinese military threat to the United States, which will probably come in the form of denying access to the Asian theatre and attempting to cripple America’s power projection capabilities rather than as a threat to attack the continental United States itself (which is something of a strawman in the book).
The Second World As Parag Khanna, senior research fellow and director of the global governance initiative at the New America Foundation, sees it, three empires— the United States, China, and the European Union—are engaged in an unprecedented ‘‘truly global competition’’ (xvi). They ‘‘use their military, economic, and political power to build spheres of influence around the world, competing to mediate conflicts, shape markets, and spread customs.’’ (xvi). The zone of competition, which he describes with considerable insight, is the ‘‘second world,’’ which stretches from the Middle East and Central Asia to Latin America and Southeast Asia. Each superpower offers something different. The United States provides military protection and the promise of democracy and human rights. The European Union offers deep reform and the prospect of membership in its club, while China offers trade, investment, and a blind eye to other regimes’ behavior inside their own borders. In a polemical final chapter, Khanna is deeply pessimistic about the United States, which he sees as now holding ‘‘the mantle of Perfidious Albion,’’ and argues that a geopolitical mutiny against America is well under way (323). ‘‘Could America, long the first world icon, slip into the second world,’’ he asks. In answering, he approvingly cites Arnold Toynbee’s argument that the most common causes of decline are militarism and the deterioration of a creative 484
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Review Essays minority. (326) ‘‘Strong arms and strongmen,’’ Khanna writes, ‘‘cannot mask America’s relative decline since they are the chief symbols of it.’’ ‘‘Imperial overstretch,’’ a declining ‘‘quality of life,’’ a ‘‘dependency on foreign financing and defecting allies’’ that present ‘‘nearly insurmountable (economic) vulnerabilities,’’ and a poor health care system all threaten America’s leadership position (326). A great strength of Khanna’s book, particularly compared to Hachigian and Sutphen’s, is his recognition, informed by an impressive grasp of theory and history, that international politics remains inherently competitive, despite globalization, and humans can behave in ways that are not collectively rational. However, instead of preparing for a new era of competition, this leads him to propose a tripartite arrangement where the United States, the European Union, and China cooperate in managing the international order. In contrast to the many commentators who believe that a grand bargain with China is achievable without actually sacrificing anything that really matters to the United States, he recognizes that such an arrangement would need to address ‘‘core interests’’ and should include negotiation over specific countries where spheres of influence overlap and contradict one another. Khanna puts it gently but his is a truly radical strategy—the clear implication is that the United States should pull back from its global commitments and allow China and the European Union to take responsibility for their own spheres of influence. A ‘‘G3 institution of the United States, the EU, and China would be the most appropriate forum to establish deeper working relations among the superpowers.’’ (340) He believes that, with such an approach, ‘‘America could actually increase its influence if it tempers its power. The path between dominance and retrenchment is the active creation of an international constitution with broad allegiance, inspiring a collective maturation.’’ (340) Khanna’s strategy, if followed to its logical conclusion, could amount to a revolutionary liquidation of the 1940s international order in favor of a negotiated settlement that would grant China uncontested leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. In return, China would have to accept other rule-based elements of the international order and cooperate with the United States to navigate clashes of interests as they emerge. Unfortunately, he does not deal with the possibility that such a dramatic change in the international order could be hugely destabilizing and could lead to regional arms races as middle tier powers sought to come to terms with the vacuum left by a retreating America.
General observations The dangers of mirror imaging While there is much to admire in these three books, I was struck by the fact that The Next American Century and The Second World assume that the Summer 2010
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Review Essays future of international politics will no longer be a competition for power and influence because the major powers all share common interests and challenges. Great powers may compete economically, but they will inexorably be driven to cooperate in key areas. Indeed for Khanna, the United States has incentives to cooperate that are so strong that it should be willing to cut a deal with China to divide the world into spheres of influence. For Hachigian and Sutphen, the compatibility of interests and worldview is raised as a near certainty, not just a possibility. Being a certainty, there is no need to develop a strategy that could cope with alternative scenarios. Of the three books, Zakaria’s is more attuned to the possibility that the future may be competitive—one heading, for instance, is called ‘‘The Virtues of Competition’’ (219) and he discusses the demand for American power in Asia. However, even Zakaria generally assumes that the levels of cooperation between the major powers will equal or exceed those of the past decade and that relations with China are only likely to worsen if the United States pursues poor policies. Is international politics destined to be a competition, or can it be reduced to a complicated exercise in problem solving? Surely it is possible that other major powers may not share America’s perception of global threats and challenges. They may be affected by terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease but could attach greater importance to other challenges, such as expanding their influence regionally or weakening America’s relationship with key allies and partners. As authoritarian states, China and Russia may not want to ‘‘pay to play’’ to strengthen a liberal international order (The Next American Century, 185). By not treating this possibility seriously, these books are in danger of mirror imaging, i.e. assuming that the preferences of other actors will reflect one’s own. The emergence of a serious rift between the United States and China could occur because of deliberate policy choices made in Washington DC or Beijing. Yet it could also emerge inadvertently, unexpectedly, and despite the best intentions of leaders on both sides of the Pacific. For example, a succession crisis in North Korea could raise questions about the China–Korean border, the potential presence of Chinese troops in Korea, the alignment of a unified Korea, and the role of the United States. Recognizing the competitive and potentially conflictual nature of a bipolar or multipolar world would have led the authors in interesting directions. Instead of assuming that an entente with China and Russia is viable and desirable on the terms that would likely be offered, they might have explored strategic choices in the event that China’s interests collide with those of the United States, making a strategic partnership impossible. How can Americans ensure that the rivalry is defined by de´tente, which respects mutual coexistence and seeks to limit rivalry while not eliminating it, rather than containment, which is several notches up on the escalation chain and has the ultimate aim of sowing the seeds of destruction in one’s rival? What is the likely character of a future competition in Asia and why should the United States partake in it? What are America’s key advantages in a competition with China, 486
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Review Essays and how can it build upon them while respecting China’s legitimate aspirations for a greater role in international order? These are questions left unanswered because they largely went unasked. Influence and relative power are not always correlated A corollary of assuming a cooperative world is the assumption that the United States must prepare to do less in the international order. As these books put it, with its freedom of movement constrained once again, the United States will not be able to solve all of the world’s problems and should prepare itself for a scaling back of its influence. This argument risks conflating power and influence. Foreign policy decisions taken in Washington, DC have always been of greatest consequence when American power is challenged and the stakes are high—World War II, the heights of the Cold War, and following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. By contrast, at times of relative calm (including during the supposed unipolar moment of the 1990s) foreign policy is largely neglected and the strategic choices available to American presidents are narrow. During his tenure, President Clinton lacked the domestic support necessary to commit ground troops in Kosovo or to invade Afghanistan to counter the growing threat of al-Qaeda. The perception of America’s relative decline may increase, not decrease, the demands on American power. It is likely that it will create a more competitive international environment in which the stakes of policy debates will be higher, the costs of mistakes greater, and the demands upon policymakers will grow by orders of magnitude. The rise of new powers is likely to result in the tabling of issues—such as the future of the post World War II order in Asia—that have long been considered settled. Allies are increasingly likely to call upon the United States for assistance and support as they warily eye ascendant neighbors. For instance, the 2009 Australian Defense White Paper voiced concern about the credibility of American power in East Asia and suggested hedging against the possibility of decline. To address this fear, the United States will be expected to deepen and expand its commitment in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Thus, the consequence of U.S. strategic choices, and U.S. influence more generally, may rise. This is not necessarily to be welcomed—better less influence in a more harmonious world—but it will have significant implications. Coping with the challenge Is America capable of dealing with a changed international environment? These books paint a picture of an America in crisis and urge policymakers to tend to problems at home as urgent priorities. The pessimism about the United States appears overblown, however the United States has many Summer 2010
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Review Essays hidden strengths over its likely competitors. Moreover, while China’s annual growth rate greatly exceeds that of the United States now, it is not unusual for developing countries, and it would be historically unprecedented for this to continue once China becomes wealthy. Even if it is true, as Zakaria argues, that U.S. politics is more partisan and deadlocked than ever before, it is hard to make the case that it seriously impairs U.S. policy toward the rise of new powers, particularly China. U.S. policy toward East Asia is remarkably bi-partisan. The lines of division are within the parties, not between them, and successive administrations have pursued broadly similar approaches toward China. The controversial elements of U.S. foreign policy, particularly with respect to the invasion of Iraq and the war on terrorism, are uncontroversial within China and may even be welcomed by its leadership as a distraction from East Asia and Southeast Asia. The U.S. presence in Asia is widely desired by China’s neighbors. The issue is whether and how U.S.–Asia policy should evolve and change. With the important exception of trade policy, such adjustments are largely the prerogative of the executive branch and are unlikely to be blocked by the U.S. legislative process. In a more competitive world, the preeminent foreign policy challenge facing the United States will be how to preserve the open and liberal international order that has served it so well for over 60 years. For, if it were to collapse, the consequences could be profoundly destructive for the international system. Preserving the status quo probably means that the United States will have to do more, not less, than at present. A strategist seeking to understand how the United States can accomplish this, given significant constraints, will not find the means of doing so in these otherwise interesting, intelligent, and provocative books.
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The Next American Century: How the United States Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise, by Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen. Simon and Shuster, New York, Paperback Edition, 2010.
The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century, by Parag Khanna. Random House, New York, Paperback Edition, 2009.
The Post-American World, by Fareed Zakaria. W.W. Norton, New York, Paperback Edition, 2009.
The page numbers in this essay refer to the 2008 edition of The Next American Century.
# 2010 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Summer 2010
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479
Review Essays For the first century and a half of its existence, the United States tried to remain aloof from great power security competition and regarded the metrics and practices of that contest with disdain. Yet, since it entered into the fray in December 1941, Americans have been terrified by the prospect of a decline in their relative power. The Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb, Sputnik, the mythical missile gap of the 1960 election, the supposed emergence of a multipolar world in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the rise of Japan in the mid-1980s all induced high levels of anxiety among the American people. While there was a short respite in the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, for the past half-decade, fears of relative decline have returned with a vengeance. The rapid rise of China and the more muted ascent of India—together with the unforeseen difficulties in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the fight against international terrorism—have combined to reawaken concerns about the end of the American era. These concerns reached fever pitch following the international financial crisis of 2008–2009. The public has noticed. According to one opinion poll at the end of 2009, more Americans believe that China will be the next decade’s most powerful state than believe that the United States will continue to occupy that position.1 Of course, just because Americans have been unduly alarmed by warnings of relative decline in the past does not mean that the alarm is also false this time round. In the fable ‘‘The Boy Who Cried Wolf,’’ the wolf did come in the end. These three books describe the rise of new powers and argue that they can be co-opted into the U.S.-led international order. These books represent a relatively new departure from those American Cassandras warning of relative decline. They argue that the rise of new powers may actually be good for the United States. Billions of people around the world will be better off economically and the new great powers generally share the same interests and concerns as the United States. They will therefore play an important role in tackling global problems if the United States allows them to do so. The danger lies not in the rise of the new powers, per se, but in the possibility that the United States may respond in a fearful and self-destructive manner. As Yogi Berra observed, predictions are difficult to make—especially about the future. History is replete with examples of strategic planners failing to understand the distribution of power and the intentions of other major states. The English philosopher, scientist, and statesman Francis Bacon once warned that ‘‘there is nothing among civil affairs more subject to error than the forming of a true and right valuation of the power and forces of an empire.’’2 Analysts tend to rely upon metrics like GDP and military spending, although 1 Peter Wallsten, ‘‘Democrats’ Blues Grow Deeper in New Poll,’’ Wall Street Journal Online, December 17 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126100346902694549.html. 2 Quoted in William Wohforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 9.
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Review Essays less tangible factors, including strategic competence, military innovation, and the attraction of a country’s model to others, are often crucial. The strategist must appreciate the uncertainty of great power politics, both present and future, but sometimes this appreciation can constrain debate by crowding out falsifiable hypotheses that generate thought and insight. Happily, these three books provide a mix of the uncertain and the bold. Fareed Zakaria (The Post-American World) offers a sophisticated, nuanced, and contingent strategic appraisal of China and India’s rise but does not propose a coherent new strategy for the United States to cope with this development. Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen (The Next American Century) and Parag Khanna (The Second World) lay out some fascinating and provocative hypotheses about world politics and recommend clear, and even radical, strategies for the United States. However, they fail to anticipate the consequences if other countries do not behave as they expect them to. Thus, there is much food for thought, but also much to criticize, in all three books. Three views on the relative decline of the United States The central idea pervading the three books is that American hegemony is passing away and future leadership of the international order will be shared between America and other major powers. The reasons for this shift are largely to be found in the rising powers themselves but weaknesses in the American domestic system are also somewhat responsible. The United States must address its own shortcomings and increase cooperation with the rising powers if it is to tackle the threats and challenges of the 21st century. Within this framework, there are subtle but important differences between the three books. The Post-American World Zakaria, author of From Wealth to Power, an important book on the rise of American power in the nineteenth century, the editor of Newsweek International, and host of a popular show on CNN. He believes that the rapid rise of other nations, particularly China and India, presage a shift in the international order away from a system of American dominance and toward ‘‘one defined and directed from many places and by many people.’’(4–5) All roads no longer lead to Washington, and while it remains a superpower, it is ‘‘an enfeebled one.’’ (42, 217) India is not nearly as successful as China but it has acquired a strategic importance because of the way in which it can offset the impact of China’s rise. Although Zakaria tells the reader early on that his focus is on the rise of the rest rather than the decline of the United States, he is deeply concerned by a crisis in the American domestic system. Despite the international financial crisis, Zakaria does not believe that the United States is afflicted by the same Summer 2010
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Review Essays economic woes that doomed the British Empire. He writes, ‘‘the economic dysfunctions in America today are real, but, by and large, they are not the product of deep inefficiencies within the American economy, nor are they reflections of cultural decay.’’ (211) This is Zakaria at his best—offering a sober but not fatalistic analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the American economy. However, he then segues to argue that the United States is in the midst of a political crisis—‘‘the American political system seems to have lost its ability to create broad coalitions to solve complex problems.’’ (211) He also laments that an ‘‘antiquated and overly rigid political system. . .has been captured by money, special interests, a sensationalist media, and ideological attack groups.’’ (212). Zakaria is concerned that U.S. foreign policy over the past decade deepened the country’s international challenges instead of addressing them. He asks, ‘‘How did the United States blow it? The United States has had an extraordinary hand to play in global politics—the best of any country in history. Yet, by almost any measure. . .Washington has played this hand badly. America has had a period of unparalleled influence. What does it have to show for it?’’ (219). For Zakaria, the Obama administration’s overarching foreign policy challenge is to ‘‘create a new system of international relations. . .that produces genuine and effective global cooperation on the great issues that plague us all.’’ (xxx) This is perhaps the boldest statement in the book and somewhat inconsistent with his later treatment of China as a challenger of America, and India as an ally. Indeed, the preface to the paperback edition places a greater emphasis on shared interests among the world’s major powers and the potential for cooperation and new partnerships than the rest of the text. This tension may explain why the chapter dedicated to proposing a new purpose for U.S. foreign policy is surprisingly thin. Instead of proposing a comprehensive strategy to establish a new international order, Zakaria offers a vague set of ‘‘New Rules for a New Age.’’ Some are useful. The fourth—‘‘Al la carte order’’—advises the United States to retain flexible and overlapping multilateral organizations and networks so as not to get bogged down in a single forum. Others are maddeningly imprecise. The first calls upon American leaders to choose and prioritize instead of seeking to accomplish everything. Zakaria wisely cautions against U.S. involvement in every crisis that erupts, but letting some fires burn is easier in the abstract than in the particular. Zakaria only hints at his preferences instead of elaborating upon them. This leaves the reader wondering about what these choices will mean in practice and curious about what he thinks about the real tradeoffs involved. The second says that the United States should abide by the international rules which it had a hand in writing—America cannot abandon the rules in ‘‘special cases’’ where it serves its interests. Again, fair enough, except that earlier he wrote favorably of the U.S.–India nuclear deal which many countries (and some Americans) perceive as incompatible with the spirit of the non-proliferation regime. Zakaria also calls upon the United States to 482
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Review Essays emulate Bismarck, who has become something of an unlikely hero among American foreign policy experts, not Britain. This, however, is a sanitized reference to the German White Revolutionary’s capacity for diplomatic genius with Russia, Austria, and Britain rather than his brutal wielding of power and aggression to secure Prussia’s ambitions of a unified Germany. Even so, it is unlikely that the United States could handle the secrecy, realpolitik, and deceit at the heart of Bismarck’s foreign policy and continually produce the genius widely believed necessary to execute such a strategy.
The Next American Century The Next American Century is a profoundly optimistic book. Co-authors Hachigian, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and Sutphen, currently White House Deputy Chief of Staff, argue that the rise of new powers is good for the United States and will lead to an increase in cooperation internationally as the world’s ‘‘pivotal powers’’ collaborate to tackle shared challenges. For Hachigian and Sutphen, the world is plagued by ‘‘thorny problems;’’ be it ‘‘disease, Iran’s nuclear program, genocide, unsecured nuclear material, failing states, biological weapons or global warming.’’ ‘‘America should draw in the reemerging powers—China, India, and Russia—and make room for them at the table with the EU and Japan, while being sure that they all pay for the privilege. With their new status would come new responsibility to rebuild the liberal world order.’’(18) The authors call this strategy ‘‘strategic collaboration.’’ Like Zakaria, Hachigian and Sutphen are also perturbed by weakness at home—the ‘‘fiscal mess, underperforming education system, oil dependency, broken health care system, inadequate worker protection, and crumbling infrastructure.’’ (18) Thus, the first component of strategic collaboration is for ‘‘America to put its own house in order.’’ (173) The United States should then construct close relationships with the pivotal powers and collaborate with them through a C6 (the United States, China, the European Union, India, Russia, and Japan), which they describe as a modern day version of the Concert of Europe. Hachigian and Sutphen make a significant contribution by highlighting the numerous areas where the interests of the United States and pivotal powers overlap and by offering concrete suggestions for deepening cooperation. However, their primary concern has to do with threats to the American homeland–‘‘Jihadists, Nukes, and Germs’’ (27) –rather than America’s position in the world more generally. It is unclear that other nations prioritize the tackling of these threats over other, more traditional, geopolitical concerns such as expanding their own regional influence. Certainly, Chinese behavior in 2009 raises serious doubts about their willingness to bolster international efforts on climate change, cybersecurity, and preventing Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Summer 2010
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Review Essays The authors recognize that a more powerful China may challenge U.S. interests in Asia but these concerns appear secondary to their belief that common threats will be prioritized on either side of the Atlantic. They are also confident that policies that incur the objections of Russia and China, such as support for Taiwan or NATO expansion (both of which are described as ‘‘cold war holdovers,’’ ‘‘chronic irritants,’’ and deserving of ‘‘regular scrutiny’’), will be accepted if they are couched in more palatable ways (177). This is a theme of the book—other nations are concerned by the style of U.S. policy rather than by its substance and there are no significant tradeoffs involved if the United States wants to accommodate China’s concerns. In one passage, they criticize the false promise of primacy, referring to the idea that the United Sates must maintain military dominance so other nations are dissuaded from becoming peer competitors. However, they also recognize that China may complicate America’s role in East Asia and argue that the United States must maintain a first class military and a military edge. They never quite explain the difference between primacy and maintaining a military edge in all regional theaters and areas of potential conflict. Unfortunately, they do not address the likely Chinese military threat to the United States, which will probably come in the form of denying access to the Asian theatre and attempting to cripple America’s power projection capabilities rather than as a threat to attack the continental United States itself (which is something of a strawman in the book).
The Second World As Parag Khanna, senior research fellow and director of the global governance initiative at the New America Foundation, sees it, three empires— the United States, China, and the European Union—are engaged in an unprecedented ‘‘truly global competition’’ (xvi). They ‘‘use their military, economic, and political power to build spheres of influence around the world, competing to mediate conflicts, shape markets, and spread customs.’’ (xvi). The zone of competition, which he describes with considerable insight, is the ‘‘second world,’’ which stretches from the Middle East and Central Asia to Latin America and Southeast Asia. Each superpower offers something different. The United States provides military protection and the promise of democracy and human rights. The European Union offers deep reform and the prospect of membership in its club, while China offers trade, investment, and a blind eye to other regimes’ behavior inside their own borders. In a polemical final chapter, Khanna is deeply pessimistic about the United States, which he sees as now holding ‘‘the mantle of Perfidious Albion,’’ and argues that a geopolitical mutiny against America is well under way (323). ‘‘Could America, long the first world icon, slip into the second world,’’ he asks. In answering, he approvingly cites Arnold Toynbee’s argument that the most common causes of decline are militarism and the deterioration of a creative 484
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Review Essays minority. (326) ‘‘Strong arms and strongmen,’’ Khanna writes, ‘‘cannot mask America’s relative decline since they are the chief symbols of it.’’ ‘‘Imperial overstretch,’’ a declining ‘‘quality of life,’’ a ‘‘dependency on foreign financing and defecting allies’’ that present ‘‘nearly insurmountable (economic) vulnerabilities,’’ and a poor health care system all threaten America’s leadership position (326). A great strength of Khanna’s book, particularly compared to Hachigian and Sutphen’s, is his recognition, informed by an impressive grasp of theory and history, that international politics remains inherently competitive, despite globalization, and humans can behave in ways that are not collectively rational. However, instead of preparing for a new era of competition, this leads him to propose a tripartite arrangement where the United States, the European Union, and China cooperate in managing the international order. In contrast to the many commentators who believe that a grand bargain with China is achievable without actually sacrificing anything that really matters to the United States, he recognizes that such an arrangement would need to address ‘‘core interests’’ and should include negotiation over specific countries where spheres of influence overlap and contradict one another. Khanna puts it gently but his is a truly radical strategy—the clear implication is that the United States should pull back from its global commitments and allow China and the European Union to take responsibility for their own spheres of influence. A ‘‘G3 institution of the United States, the EU, and China would be the most appropriate forum to establish deeper working relations among the superpowers.’’ (340) He believes that, with such an approach, ‘‘America could actually increase its influence if it tempers its power. The path between dominance and retrenchment is the active creation of an international constitution with broad allegiance, inspiring a collective maturation.’’ (340) Khanna’s strategy, if followed to its logical conclusion, could amount to a revolutionary liquidation of the 1940s international order in favor of a negotiated settlement that would grant China uncontested leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. In return, China would have to accept other rule-based elements of the international order and cooperate with the United States to navigate clashes of interests as they emerge. Unfortunately, he does not deal with the possibility that such a dramatic change in the international order could be hugely destabilizing and could lead to regional arms races as middle tier powers sought to come to terms with the vacuum left by a retreating America.
General observations The dangers of mirror imaging While there is much to admire in these three books, I was struck by the fact that The Next American Century and The Second World assume that the Summer 2010
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Review Essays future of international politics will no longer be a competition for power and influence because the major powers all share common interests and challenges. Great powers may compete economically, but they will inexorably be driven to cooperate in key areas. Indeed for Khanna, the United States has incentives to cooperate that are so strong that it should be willing to cut a deal with China to divide the world into spheres of influence. For Hachigian and Sutphen, the compatibility of interests and worldview is raised as a near certainty, not just a possibility. Being a certainty, there is no need to develop a strategy that could cope with alternative scenarios. Of the three books, Zakaria’s is more attuned to the possibility that the future may be competitive—one heading, for instance, is called ‘‘The Virtues of Competition’’ (219) and he discusses the demand for American power in Asia. However, even Zakaria generally assumes that the levels of cooperation between the major powers will equal or exceed those of the past decade and that relations with China are only likely to worsen if the United States pursues poor policies. Is international politics destined to be a competition, or can it be reduced to a complicated exercise in problem solving? Surely it is possible that other major powers may not share America’s perception of global threats and challenges. They may be affected by terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease but could attach greater importance to other challenges, such as expanding their influence regionally or weakening America’s relationship with key allies and partners. As authoritarian states, China and Russia may not want to ‘‘pay to play’’ to strengthen a liberal international order (The Next American Century, 185). By not treating this possibility seriously, these books are in danger of mirror imaging, i.e. assuming that the preferences of other actors will reflect one’s own. The emergence of a serious rift between the United States and China could occur because of deliberate policy choices made in Washington DC or Beijing. Yet it could also emerge inadvertently, unexpectedly, and despite the best intentions of leaders on both sides of the Pacific. For example, a succession crisis in North Korea could raise questions about the China–Korean border, the potential presence of Chinese troops in Korea, the alignment of a unified Korea, and the role of the United States. Recognizing the competitive and potentially conflictual nature of a bipolar or multipolar world would have led the authors in interesting directions. Instead of assuming that an entente with China and Russia is viable and desirable on the terms that would likely be offered, they might have explored strategic choices in the event that China’s interests collide with those of the United States, making a strategic partnership impossible. How can Americans ensure that the rivalry is defined by de´tente, which respects mutual coexistence and seeks to limit rivalry while not eliminating it, rather than containment, which is several notches up on the escalation chain and has the ultimate aim of sowing the seeds of destruction in one’s rival? What is the likely character of a future competition in Asia and why should the United States partake in it? What are America’s key advantages in a competition with China, 486
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Review Essays and how can it build upon them while respecting China’s legitimate aspirations for a greater role in international order? These are questions left unanswered because they largely went unasked. Influence and relative power are not always correlated A corollary of assuming a cooperative world is the assumption that the United States must prepare to do less in the international order. As these books put it, with its freedom of movement constrained once again, the United States will not be able to solve all of the world’s problems and should prepare itself for a scaling back of its influence. This argument risks conflating power and influence. Foreign policy decisions taken in Washington, DC have always been of greatest consequence when American power is challenged and the stakes are high—World War II, the heights of the Cold War, and following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. By contrast, at times of relative calm (including during the supposed unipolar moment of the 1990s) foreign policy is largely neglected and the strategic choices available to American presidents are narrow. During his tenure, President Clinton lacked the domestic support necessary to commit ground troops in Kosovo or to invade Afghanistan to counter the growing threat of al-Qaeda. The perception of America’s relative decline may increase, not decrease, the demands on American power. It is likely that it will create a more competitive international environment in which the stakes of policy debates will be higher, the costs of mistakes greater, and the demands upon policymakers will grow by orders of magnitude. The rise of new powers is likely to result in the tabling of issues—such as the future of the post World War II order in Asia—that have long been considered settled. Allies are increasingly likely to call upon the United States for assistance and support as they warily eye ascendant neighbors. For instance, the 2009 Australian Defense White Paper voiced concern about the credibility of American power in East Asia and suggested hedging against the possibility of decline. To address this fear, the United States will be expected to deepen and expand its commitment in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Thus, the consequence of U.S. strategic choices, and U.S. influence more generally, may rise. This is not necessarily to be welcomed—better less influence in a more harmonious world—but it will have significant implications. Coping with the challenge Is America capable of dealing with a changed international environment? These books paint a picture of an America in crisis and urge policymakers to tend to problems at home as urgent priorities. The pessimism about the United States appears overblown, however the United States has many Summer 2010
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Review Essays hidden strengths over its likely competitors. Moreover, while China’s annual growth rate greatly exceeds that of the United States now, it is not unusual for developing countries, and it would be historically unprecedented for this to continue once China becomes wealthy. Even if it is true, as Zakaria argues, that U.S. politics is more partisan and deadlocked than ever before, it is hard to make the case that it seriously impairs U.S. policy toward the rise of new powers, particularly China. U.S. policy toward East Asia is remarkably bi-partisan. The lines of division are within the parties, not between them, and successive administrations have pursued broadly similar approaches toward China. The controversial elements of U.S. foreign policy, particularly with respect to the invasion of Iraq and the war on terrorism, are uncontroversial within China and may even be welcomed by its leadership as a distraction from East Asia and Southeast Asia. The U.S. presence in Asia is widely desired by China’s neighbors. The issue is whether and how U.S.–Asia policy should evolve and change. With the important exception of trade policy, such adjustments are largely the prerogative of the executive branch and are unlikely to be blocked by the U.S. legislative process. In a more competitive world, the preeminent foreign policy challenge facing the United States will be how to preserve the open and liberal international order that has served it so well for over 60 years. For, if it were to collapse, the consequences could be profoundly destructive for the international system. Preserving the status quo probably means that the United States will have to do more, not less, than at present. A strategist seeking to understand how the United States can accomplish this, given significant constraints, will not find the means of doing so in these otherwise interesting, intelligent, and provocative books.
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