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Richard Titmuss, welfare as good conduct: a comment
European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 20 (2004) 799 – 801 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
Discussion
Richard Titmuss, welfare as good conduct: a comment Jim Tomlinson * School of International Studies, Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK Received 10 March 2004; accepted 11 March 2004 Available online 8 July 2004
Abstract This commentary on David Reisman’s article on the work of Richard Titmuss accepts Reisman’s view that Titmuss was the most important analyst of the postwar British ‘welfare state’, and that his analysis has much to teach current discussion of welfare. But, it argues, Titmuss’ inheritance from the tradition of ethical socialism, especially the work of R.H. Tawney, imparts significant weaknesses to his arguments. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: B3, D6, H1; Welfare and poverty Keywords: Richard Titmuss; Welfare state; Ethical socialism
David Reisman’s paper (2004) adds to his previous important explorations of Titmuss’ work, rightly seeking to encourage a new generation to read the work of the British welfare state’s most important analyst. As Reisman insists, Titmuss, with his collaborators, largely invented the postwar academic discipline of social policy in the UK. His legacy included pioneering and sophisticated empirical work, some with major policy consequences, especially the study of the costs of the NHS (Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 1956). It also included important ‘middle-range’ analysis of welfare provision, especially in the discussion of the ‘social division of welfare’ (Titmuss, 1958, Chap. 2). Third, it included work that, alongside detailed empirical analysis, attempted to construct a general argument about welfare, above all in the analysis of altruism in the context of blood supply (Titmuss, 1970).
* Tel.: +44-01895-274000. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Tomlinson). 0176-2680/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.05.004
800
J. Tomlinson / European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004) 799–801
This short essay focuses upon this last aspect of Titmuss’ work, because it is there that I believe Reisman gives less space than is justified to the (problematic) underpinnings of Titmuss’ argument. It is well known that Titmuss wrote the 1964 introduction to Tawney’s Equality. This introduction reveals Titmuss’ sympathy with Tawney’s arguments without explicitly stating how close much of his was to the latter’s ethical socialism. While commentators have sought to construct a long history of development of such a socialism (Dennis and Halsey, 1988), in truth, it was largely the work of Tawney alone. Embodied above all in The Acquisitive Society as well as Equality, Tawney’s work, reflecting his Christian commitment, told of mankind’s lapse from an altruistic (if imprecisely dated) past to an acquisitive, egotistical present (cf. Titmuss, 1943, pp. 18 – 19). Following on from this proposition, the aim of socialism is to ‘remoralise’ society by replacing acquisitive with other regarding motives. This theme—socialism as altruism—is exactly the same as that found in Titmuss’ work, not only in The Gift Relationship, but also, for example, in Commitment to Welfare. In the latter, Titmuss writes: ’Socialism is about community as well as equality. It is about what we contribute without price to the community. . .’ (Titmuss, 1968, p. 151). There are problems with Tawney’s attempt to create a new moral criterion of economic rewards according to ‘function’ to underpin his desired society (Collini, 1999, Chap. 9). But that aside, there is bigger problem in the way that Tawney, and Titmuss, attempt to analyse the relationship between society and its morals or values. The problem is their treatment of this relationship as one in which society is thought of as what Louis Althusser called an ‘expressive totality’ (Althusser and Balibar, 1970, pp. 96 –7). In such accounts, we can analyse all institutions in a society as (more or less adequate) expressions of some underlying principle. Thus, for Tawney, ‘acquisitiveness’ is the underlying principle of capitalism, a view endorsed by Titmuss. Conversely, socialism will be animated by a different principle—altruism. Reisman notes this ‘Manichean bipolarity’ in his recent article (p. 10) and has also briefly touched on it in his previous work on Titmuss (Reisman, 2001, pp. 263– 264). But it deserves a more central place in discussion of ethical socialism, and in consequence, in assessment of both Tawney and Titmuss. For ethical socialists, this bipolarity has at one end the market system or what Titmuss calls the ‘economic’ system. This is seen as characterised by the principle of acquisitiveness, both motivated by that principle and encouraging its extension. Conversely, the welfare system, motivated by altruism, in turn encourages the extension of this motive. It follows that the economic and the welfare principle are permanently in a state of fundamental incompatibility and hostility. Taking first the characterisation of the ‘economic’ system, the idea that this is motivated by acquisitiveness is hardly revelatory, but of course, it is far from self-evident that this principle gives us an adequate guide to the outcomes of market provision. It has long been contended that such private vices lead to public vices, and ethical socialism has failed to provide compelling arguments to the contrary (Tomlinson, 2002). But more importantly, here is the problem of the idea that once having identified this motivating force of the market system we can collapse all the effects of that system into a realization its principle. In particular, the diversity of legal frameworks, ownership arrangements, accounting rules,
J. Tomlinson / European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004) 799–801
801
market relations, links with finance, etc. mean that even if at some level of abstraction, the capitalist firm embodies the principle of acquisitiveness in its motive of ‘profit maximisation’, the consequences of the firms actions cannot be reduced to that principle. Similarly, as Barry Hindess has pointed out, it is impossible to reduce the effects of the welfare state to any one principle, whether it be the extension of ‘citizenship’ following T.H. Marshall, or ‘equality’ as hoped for by many socialists (Hindess, 1987, Chap. 3). The embodiment of the welfare state in particular institutions is both inescapable and a complete bar to it being helpfully understood as the realization of a principle. As many have pointed out, for good or ill, welfare provision always involves some regulation of the lives of recipients and some realisation of the aims of the suppliers as well as the recipients. Leaving aside the adequacy of Titmuss’ use of blood transfusion as a model of what altruism could do for welfare and society more generally (see Titmuss, 1997), the problem is that a welfare state could never be constructed so that that principle determined the outcome of welfare provision. Once altruism became embodied in particular institutions, it would be incapable of subordinating their effects to ensure they expressed its working. This idea of society as an expressive totality or, as in many socialist accounts, the playground for expressing two competing principles, is ubiquitous. Reisman himself gives expression to it (and suggests its weaknesses) when he writes that: ‘New Labour, pragmatic and prudent, showed less interest in remoralising the unequal society than in making the economic market function with ever greater efficiency’ (pp. 8 –9). In fact, New Labour, for good or ill, does not share the ‘Manichean bipolarity’ of the market as about achieving efficiency, and remoralisation as an opposing principle. For them ‘Fair is Efficient’ (Brown, 1994). We may not agree, but in discussing the issue, we need to move beyond the reductive temptations of the expressive totality.
References Abel-Smith, B., Titmuss, R.M., 1956. The Costs of the NHS. HMSO, London. Althusser, L., Balibar, E., 1970. Reading Capital. New Left Books, London. Brown, G., 1994. Fair is Efficient. Fabian Pamphlet 563. Fabian Society, London. Collini, S., 1999. English Pasts: Essays in the History of Culture. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford. Dennis, N., Halsey, A.H., 1988. English Ethical Socialism. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford. Hindess, B., 1987. Freedom, Equality, and the Market. Tavistock, London. Reisman, D., 2001. Richard Titmuss: Welfare and Society, 2nd ed. Palgrave, London. Reisman, D.A., 2004. Richard Titmuss: welfare as good conduct. European Journal of Political Economy (this issue). Titmuss, R.M., 1943. The Parent’s Revolt. Hamish Hamilton, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1958. Essays on the Welfare State. Allen and Unwin, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1968. Commitment to Welfare. Allen and Unwin, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1970. The Gift Relationship. Allen and Unwin, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1997. In: Oakley, A., Ashton, J. (Eds.), The Gift Relationship. LSE Books, London. Tomlinson, J., 2002. The limits of Tawney’s ethical socialism: a historical perspective on the Labour Party and the market. Contemporary British History 16, 1 – 16.
Discussion
Richard Titmuss, welfare as good conduct: a comment Jim Tomlinson * School of International Studies, Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK Received 10 March 2004; accepted 11 March 2004 Available online 8 July 2004
Abstract This commentary on David Reisman’s article on the work of Richard Titmuss accepts Reisman’s view that Titmuss was the most important analyst of the postwar British ‘welfare state’, and that his analysis has much to teach current discussion of welfare. But, it argues, Titmuss’ inheritance from the tradition of ethical socialism, especially the work of R.H. Tawney, imparts significant weaknesses to his arguments. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: B3, D6, H1; Welfare and poverty Keywords: Richard Titmuss; Welfare state; Ethical socialism
David Reisman’s paper (2004) adds to his previous important explorations of Titmuss’ work, rightly seeking to encourage a new generation to read the work of the British welfare state’s most important analyst. As Reisman insists, Titmuss, with his collaborators, largely invented the postwar academic discipline of social policy in the UK. His legacy included pioneering and sophisticated empirical work, some with major policy consequences, especially the study of the costs of the NHS (Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 1956). It also included important ‘middle-range’ analysis of welfare provision, especially in the discussion of the ‘social division of welfare’ (Titmuss, 1958, Chap. 2). Third, it included work that, alongside detailed empirical analysis, attempted to construct a general argument about welfare, above all in the analysis of altruism in the context of blood supply (Titmuss, 1970).
* Tel.: +44-01895-274000. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Tomlinson). 0176-2680/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.05.004
800
J. Tomlinson / European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004) 799–801
This short essay focuses upon this last aspect of Titmuss’ work, because it is there that I believe Reisman gives less space than is justified to the (problematic) underpinnings of Titmuss’ argument. It is well known that Titmuss wrote the 1964 introduction to Tawney’s Equality. This introduction reveals Titmuss’ sympathy with Tawney’s arguments without explicitly stating how close much of his was to the latter’s ethical socialism. While commentators have sought to construct a long history of development of such a socialism (Dennis and Halsey, 1988), in truth, it was largely the work of Tawney alone. Embodied above all in The Acquisitive Society as well as Equality, Tawney’s work, reflecting his Christian commitment, told of mankind’s lapse from an altruistic (if imprecisely dated) past to an acquisitive, egotistical present (cf. Titmuss, 1943, pp. 18 – 19). Following on from this proposition, the aim of socialism is to ‘remoralise’ society by replacing acquisitive with other regarding motives. This theme—socialism as altruism—is exactly the same as that found in Titmuss’ work, not only in The Gift Relationship, but also, for example, in Commitment to Welfare. In the latter, Titmuss writes: ’Socialism is about community as well as equality. It is about what we contribute without price to the community. . .’ (Titmuss, 1968, p. 151). There are problems with Tawney’s attempt to create a new moral criterion of economic rewards according to ‘function’ to underpin his desired society (Collini, 1999, Chap. 9). But that aside, there is bigger problem in the way that Tawney, and Titmuss, attempt to analyse the relationship between society and its morals or values. The problem is their treatment of this relationship as one in which society is thought of as what Louis Althusser called an ‘expressive totality’ (Althusser and Balibar, 1970, pp. 96 –7). In such accounts, we can analyse all institutions in a society as (more or less adequate) expressions of some underlying principle. Thus, for Tawney, ‘acquisitiveness’ is the underlying principle of capitalism, a view endorsed by Titmuss. Conversely, socialism will be animated by a different principle—altruism. Reisman notes this ‘Manichean bipolarity’ in his recent article (p. 10) and has also briefly touched on it in his previous work on Titmuss (Reisman, 2001, pp. 263– 264). But it deserves a more central place in discussion of ethical socialism, and in consequence, in assessment of both Tawney and Titmuss. For ethical socialists, this bipolarity has at one end the market system or what Titmuss calls the ‘economic’ system. This is seen as characterised by the principle of acquisitiveness, both motivated by that principle and encouraging its extension. Conversely, the welfare system, motivated by altruism, in turn encourages the extension of this motive. It follows that the economic and the welfare principle are permanently in a state of fundamental incompatibility and hostility. Taking first the characterisation of the ‘economic’ system, the idea that this is motivated by acquisitiveness is hardly revelatory, but of course, it is far from self-evident that this principle gives us an adequate guide to the outcomes of market provision. It has long been contended that such private vices lead to public vices, and ethical socialism has failed to provide compelling arguments to the contrary (Tomlinson, 2002). But more importantly, here is the problem of the idea that once having identified this motivating force of the market system we can collapse all the effects of that system into a realization its principle. In particular, the diversity of legal frameworks, ownership arrangements, accounting rules,
J. Tomlinson / European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004) 799–801
801
market relations, links with finance, etc. mean that even if at some level of abstraction, the capitalist firm embodies the principle of acquisitiveness in its motive of ‘profit maximisation’, the consequences of the firms actions cannot be reduced to that principle. Similarly, as Barry Hindess has pointed out, it is impossible to reduce the effects of the welfare state to any one principle, whether it be the extension of ‘citizenship’ following T.H. Marshall, or ‘equality’ as hoped for by many socialists (Hindess, 1987, Chap. 3). The embodiment of the welfare state in particular institutions is both inescapable and a complete bar to it being helpfully understood as the realization of a principle. As many have pointed out, for good or ill, welfare provision always involves some regulation of the lives of recipients and some realisation of the aims of the suppliers as well as the recipients. Leaving aside the adequacy of Titmuss’ use of blood transfusion as a model of what altruism could do for welfare and society more generally (see Titmuss, 1997), the problem is that a welfare state could never be constructed so that that principle determined the outcome of welfare provision. Once altruism became embodied in particular institutions, it would be incapable of subordinating their effects to ensure they expressed its working. This idea of society as an expressive totality or, as in many socialist accounts, the playground for expressing two competing principles, is ubiquitous. Reisman himself gives expression to it (and suggests its weaknesses) when he writes that: ‘New Labour, pragmatic and prudent, showed less interest in remoralising the unequal society than in making the economic market function with ever greater efficiency’ (pp. 8 –9). In fact, New Labour, for good or ill, does not share the ‘Manichean bipolarity’ of the market as about achieving efficiency, and remoralisation as an opposing principle. For them ‘Fair is Efficient’ (Brown, 1994). We may not agree, but in discussing the issue, we need to move beyond the reductive temptations of the expressive totality.
References Abel-Smith, B., Titmuss, R.M., 1956. The Costs of the NHS. HMSO, London. Althusser, L., Balibar, E., 1970. Reading Capital. New Left Books, London. Brown, G., 1994. Fair is Efficient. Fabian Pamphlet 563. Fabian Society, London. Collini, S., 1999. English Pasts: Essays in the History of Culture. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford. Dennis, N., Halsey, A.H., 1988. English Ethical Socialism. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford. Hindess, B., 1987. Freedom, Equality, and the Market. Tavistock, London. Reisman, D., 2001. Richard Titmuss: Welfare and Society, 2nd ed. Palgrave, London. Reisman, D.A., 2004. Richard Titmuss: welfare as good conduct. European Journal of Political Economy (this issue). Titmuss, R.M., 1943. The Parent’s Revolt. Hamish Hamilton, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1958. Essays on the Welfare State. Allen and Unwin, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1968. Commitment to Welfare. Allen and Unwin, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1970. The Gift Relationship. Allen and Unwin, London. Titmuss, R.M., 1997. In: Oakley, A., Ashton, J. (Eds.), The Gift Relationship. LSE Books, London. Tomlinson, J., 2002. The limits of Tawney’s ethical socialism: a historical perspective on the Labour Party and the market. Contemporary British History 16, 1 – 16.