Risky business: Partisan volatility and electoral choice in Canada, 1988

Electoral Studies (1992),

11~2, 138-156

Risky Business: Partisan Volatility and Electoral Choice in Canada, 1988 HAROLD

Department

D. CLARKE

of Political Science, University of North Texas, PO Box 5338, Denton, Texas 76203-5338, USA ALLANKORNBERG Department

of Political

Science,

Duke

University

The key question for the electorate wilt be who can best manage change in the years ahead? We intend to run on our record of the past and plan for the future. Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney Let the people decide.

Liberal leader, John Turner

This paper investigates the effects of partisanship, issue concerns and party leader images on voting behaviour in the November 1988 Canadian fedeml election. The 1988 campaign, characterized by a heated debate between the governing Progressive Conservatives and the opposition Liberals concerning the (de)merits of free trade with the United States, produced a second consecutive Conservative parliamentary majority for only the first time since the end of World War I. This result, coming in the wake of the 1984 ‘Tory tide’ that dealt the then governing Liberals their worst defeat in Canadian history raises the possibility that the 1980s was a period of partisan realignment. Such a realignment, if it occurred, would mark a major change in an electorate that long has been distinguished by partisan weakness and instability (Meisel, 1975; LeDuc et al., 1984). However, analyses of national cross-sectional and panel survey data gathered throughout the 1980s’ demonstrate conclusively that there has been no realignment and that, similar to earlier elections, voting in 1988 was strongly affected by highly volatile short-term forces. Post-1988 surveys show that partisanship remains weak and unstable, and it is very likely that such forces will remain ascendant in the foreseeable future. Party Support

and Partisan

Dealignment,

1!3%-88

record shattering victory in the 1984 election, Shortly after the Conservatives’ public support for the Tories quickly waned. Our 1985-87 survey data show that the percentage of PC identifiers, which had grown from 28 per cent to 40 per cent between 1980 and 1984 declined to 30 per cent within a year after the election (Fig. 1). Even the latter figure, which was only slightly above the party’s 1965-80 0261-3794/92/02/0138-19/$03.00

0

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Butterworth-Heinemann

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D. CLARKE AND ALAN

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KORNBERG

was not sustained, but rather fell to 25 per cent in 1986 and to 24 per cent in 1987.* The precipitous post-1984 decline in Tory partisanship, however, was not accompanied by a complete recovery of Liberal identifications, and the NDP’s group of identifiers remained much smaller than its vote intention share in the polls during this period. Much larger gains were registered in the group without any party identification. By 1986, 27 per cent were non-identifiers, this being more than twice the pre-1984 average. However, the 1985-87 partisan distributions were themselves shot-dived. In the run-up to the 1988 election the percentage of Conservatives had rebounded to 37 per cent, whereas 33 per cent and 16 per cent were Liberals and New Democrats respectively, and 12 per cent were non-identifiers. These figures changed only slightly in the post-election survey. Although a comparison of aggregate data on the distribution of federal party identification for the 1970s with that for the 1980s (Pig. 1) might tempt one to conclude otherwise, panel data measuring individual-level change3 demonstrate that the massive partisan instability evident in the past decade is not novel. Between 1974 and 1979 32 per cent of the electorate either switched their federal party identifications or moved from being an identifier to being a non-identifier or vice versa, and between 1979 and 1980 24 per cent did so (Table 1). These levels of individual-level partisan instability neither increased nor decreased in the 1980s; in the 1980-84 panel 21 per cent switched identifications and 12 per cent adopted or abandoned an identification, and between 1984 and 1988 (preelection survey) 19 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively, did so. Partisan instability over very short time intervals also continued; in the 1988 pre-post election panel some 12 per cent switched parties and 11 per cent moved to or from being non-identifiers. The perpetuation of high levels of individual-level partisan instability in the midand late-1980s and the volatility in the percentages of Conservative and other party identifiers in this period demonstrate that the 1984 and 1988 Conservative victories were not products of realignment. Rather, increases in the percentage of voters not average,

50 i

5o /- - -49

NDP

No identification

65

68

74

79

80

81

83

84

85

86

a7

881

Survey FIG. 1. Federal

party identification,

1965-89

a02

89

140

Partisan Volatility and Electoral Choice TABLE1. Patterns of federal party identification, 1974-88 national panels

Pattern

Stable identification Switched parties

To/from non-identification Stable non-identification (N)

74-79

79-80

6f.3 16.1

% 72.2 12.0

16.2 5.4 (1299)

11.8 4.0 (1690)

* 88I- 1988 Pre-Election Survey; 88II-

SO-83 83-84

6Z.9 15.6

13.7 3.8 (834)

Panel 80-84

6T.6 18.1

12.6 5.7 (1294)

84-881* 881-8811’ 84-8811

% 62.6 21.3

11.7 4.4 (600)

% 65.6 18.7

% 72.8 11.5

11.1 4.6 (794)

10.5 5.2 (1429)

6:4 19.8

10.8 5.0 (675)

1988 Post-Election Survey

claiming any party identification whatsoever and decreases in the percentages of ‘very strong’ identifiers (Fig. 2) suggest that the post-1984 period was one of further dealignment in an electorate already characterized by weak and ephemeral party ties. This also is suggested by mean strength of party identification scores4 which show that party attachments weakened discernibly after 1984, strengthened modestly at the time of the 1988 election, and then weakened again in 1989. It does not appear that this pattern simply reflects the demobilization of partisan sentiments in nonelection years. Rather, all of the figures for non-election years from the mid-1980s onwards (1985-87, 1989) are lower than those for 1983, the only pre-1984 nonelection year for which such data are available. However, even if the post-1984 period was not characterized by a ‘dealignment of degree’, partisan attachments already were sufficiently weak and unstable to make the 1988 election one in which voting behaviour would be heavily influenced by short-term forces. As in earlier elections, issue concerns and party leader images assumed major importance.

m

% Very

strong

1.6

25

16 t 'a0

-1 0.8 0.6 0.4

0.2

0.0

65

68

74

* non-election

79

80

year

83* 84

85* 86*

87* 88

Mean

89

FIG. 2. Strength of federal party identification, 1965-89

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Free Trade: The Making

141

of a Single Issue Election

Undoubtedly 1988 will be remembered as the year of the free trade election. Relations between their country and its southern neighbour always loom large for Canadians, and Prime Minister Mulroney’s decision to enter into a free trade agreement with the United States virtually guaranteed that the pact would be an issue in a forthcoming election. The Liberals’ decision to oppose the agreement, to use their majority in the Senate to thwart passage of the free trade Bill, and the prime minister’s decision to use this action as a pretext for calling an election meant that it would be a salient one. However, at the beginning of the campaign it was not obvious that free trade would dominate the issue agenda. The Conservatives planned to downplay free trade, to convince voters that they deserved credit for a re-invigoured economy and, more generally, to argue that they were competent administrators who could ‘manage change’.5 The dynamics of the campaign quickly overturned this strategy. Liberal leader John Turner had been under heavy fire within his own party since its 1984 defeat,” and grumbling by Liberal backbenchers and party influentials gave way to outright hostility and sporadic rebellion. As the intraparty guerrilla warfare being waged against him continued into the 1988 campaign itself, Turner cast about for an issue that could mobilize public support and thereby salvage his party’s prospects and his own political career. The free trade agreement was an attractive choice. It offered Turner the opportunity to lead the anti-free trade forces and thereby marginalize the NDP, which since 1984 had threatened to displace the Liberals as the principal opposition party. The Liberals ability to exploit the issue was enhanced by the New Democrats indecision regarding how much emphasis they wished to place on free trade. Free trade also was an attractive issue because the agreement could be represented as the beginning of a process that would make Canada a social and political as well as an economic satellite of the United States. The Conservatives and their leaders, the prime minister, thereby could be portrayed as being in league with and subservient to the colossus to the south, whereas the Liberals and their leaders could be cast in the role of saviours of the country from domination by the rapacious Americans. Although the free trade pact was the Liberals best hope of avoiding disaster, they needed an opportunity to dramatize their opposition. The nationally televised debates between the party leaders provided it and Turner rose to the occasion, accusing the prime minister in effect of selling out his country. In the immediate aftermath of the debates, several polls revealed a dramatic shift in support in the Liberals favour, and some even showed them surging ahead of the Conservatives.’ The remainder of the campaign was dominated by a vituperative controversy over the free trade agreement between the Liberals and the PCs, one in which the New Democrats and their issue concerns became increasingly irrelevant. The extent to which free trade captured public attention is shown in responses to the ‘most important election issue’ question+ in our post-election survey-fully 89 per cent cited free trade. All other issues, including unemployment which had been salient in 1984,‘) were mentioned by less than 2 per cent (Table 2). Although free trade was the issue, it was a position issue and this meant that its electoral impact depended heavily on the distribution of public opinion on it and the dynamics thereof. The 1988 pre- and post-election surveys asked respondents about the consequences of free trade and whether they were in favour or opposed

Partisan Volatility and Electoral Choice

142 TABLE

2. Party-closest on most important issue, 1988 federal election

Most important issue Liberal

Issue Free trade Other economic: Other:

Deficit Taxes Unemployment

Abortion Daycare Environment Meech Lake Miscellaneous None, don’t know All issues

89.4% 1.4 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.9 2.8 3.6

Party closest NDP Other

Conservative

None

26%

47

15

1

12

12%

28

18

10

31

24%

44

15

2

16

to it.i” Comparing answers from the two surveys indicates that, with the exception of a strong consensus that the pact would hurt some sectors of the economy, public opinion was deeply divided, but moved in a positive (pro-free trade) direction. In the pre-election wave 31 per cent believed that free trade would benefit all regions and provinces and 36 per cent thought it would ensure the country’s future prosperity. In the post-election wave, these percentages were 37 per cent and 46 per cent respectively. Opinions regarding non-economic consequences also showed deep divisions and a modest aggregate dynamic favourlng the agreement. Before the election 37 per cent believed free trade would threaten Canadian culture and the arts and 44 per cent worried about a possible threat to the country’s sovereignty. Afterwards, these percentages declined by 4 and 5 per cent respectively. Thus, unlike its projected economic effects, only minorities were persuaded by the opposition parties arguments about the agreement’s cultural and political dangers. The pact’s opponents also failed to convince a majority that it endangered cherished social programmes-only 41 per cent agreed that it threatened them. These figures suggest that the flow of opinion on free trade moved in the government’s direction over the totality of the campaign.” This is correct. In the preelection survey 39 per cent favoured free trade, 45 per cent were opposed and I6 per cent were undecided, and in the post-election one 50 per cent favoured it, 40 per cent were opposed and 10 per cent remained unsure. This movement in public opinion was not linear. Polls conducted during the campaign indicate that support for free trade ebbed in the wake of the party leaders heated discussion of the issue in the aforementioned television debates (Maser, 1989: 64). Similarly, analysing our pre-election survey data by date of interview shows that opinion regarding the pact was almost evenly divided (at 41%) before the debates, but the percentage opposed increased to 50 per cent immediately afterwards, while that in favour declined to 35 per cent. Although opinion subsequently fluctuated, a trend in favour of free trade was evident among those interviewed in the closing week of the campaign. Sources of Opinion: To determine the sources of opinion on the consequences of the free trade agreement we employed an additive index” of the number of perceived problems as the dependent variable in a regression analysis of the 1984-88 panel data. Predictor variables included measures of sociotropic, egocentric and future-oriented economic judgements, as well as more general evaluations

HAROLD D. CLARKE ANDALLANKORNBERC

143

of the extent to which the federal government was equitable and effective in its operation.‘3 The rationale for including such evaluative measures is that arguments concerning the benefits of free trade were articulated by the governing party and these arguments required voters to make complex prospective judgements. Presumably one basis for doing so would be assessments of the performance of the incumbent government. Our hypothesis was that voters who were pleased with how the government had managed the economy and other important policy areas and who were confident of its ability to handle the country’s affairs in the future would be more receptive to PC arguments that free trade held more advantages than problems. Also, because of the close association between the PCs and pro-free trade sentiment, we included measures of federal and provincial party identifications in 1984.14 Using 1984 party identification enabled us to determine the extent to which opinions on free trade were products of previously established party allegiances. Finally, we included measures of age, annual family income, gender, level of formal education, and region/ethnic&y I5 to investigate if public opinion on the pact was directly affected by voters’ sociodemographic characteristics. Since the overall governmental performance index includes sociotropic economic evaluations as one component, the analysis was performed twice, once using the general measure and once using the specific economic variable. The results (Table 3) demonstrate that people who had favourable evaluations of the government’s handling of the national economy and its performance more generally, and those who believed the government and the larger political system were operating equitably and fairly were more likely to minimize problems associated with the agreement. Similarly, those who were sanguine about their own and the country’s economic prospects and the government’s ability to facilitate them were more likely to discount arguments against it. As anticipated, federal and provincial

TAEXE3. Regression analysis of perceived problems with free trade, 1984-88 Model A Predictor variables

Age

Education Gender Income Region/ethnic&y:

national panel Model B

b

B

b

B

-0.00

-0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.10 0.03 -0.26 -0.03 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 (t> -0.17 -0.27 -0.11

-0.00

-0.03

0.06 0.05 -0.09” 0.22 -1.20” -0.49 -0.65” -0.72” -0.17’ -0.09 -0.23J @I -0.16 -0.26” -O.llC

Atlantic Quebec-French Quebec-Non-French Prairies British Columbia Economic evaluations: Sociotropic Egocentric Future General government performance Equity/fairness evaluations Federal party identification, 1984 Provincial party identification, 1984 Constant 4.11:1 Adjusted R2 = 0.26 3 - p 5 0.001; h I 0.01; c I 0.05; one-tailed test t - variable not included in model

0.04

0.02 0.02 -0.10

0.07 -0.09h 0.25 -1.24” -0.45 -0.56” -0.67h (t> -0.06 -0.20” -0.06’ -0.15” -0.26” -0.10’

0.03

-0.26 -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 (t> -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 -0.16 -0.27 -0.11 4.09 0.25

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Partisan Volatility and Electoral Choice

PC identifiers were less likely to articulate problems. Francophone Quebecers and residents of the Prairies and British Columbia also were less likely than Ontarians (the reference region/ethnicity category) to perceive problems. These relationships may be interpreted as reflecting the historic discontents of non-Ontarians with Canada’s ‘National Policy’ of high tariffs on imported manufactured products. Finally, persons with lower incomes were more likely to articulate problems. This latter finding suggests that the opposition parties arguments that free trade would pose differential risks for various occupational groups, with the jobs of lower income blue-collar workers being in greatest jeopardy, had some resonance for such persons. Party

Leaders:

Affect,

Character,

Competence

The brokerage electioneering strategies adopted by Canadian parties virtually ensure that party leader images will have a significant impact on voting behaviour (e.g., Clarke et al., 1984; Brodie and Jenson, 1990). For elections in the Trudeau era (1968-80) these strategies had worked strongly in the Liberals favour as their leader enjoyed higher levels of public affection than did his NDP and especially, his Conservative rivals. From 1984 onward this was no longer true. Although John Turner had been widely regarded as an engaging, almost charismatic figure when he was a cabinet minister in the 1970s upon returning to public life shortly before the 1984 election he quickly fell from grace. In our 1984 survey Turner’s affect score on a loo-point ‘thermometer scale”” was only 47, 8 points lower than Trudeau’s had been at the time of his last (1980) election. Public affection for Turner did not increase afterwards, and even his unexpectedly strong debate performance during the 1988 campaign left his thermometer ratings mired well below the neutral point in our pre- and post-election surveys (Table 4). The electorate’s reaction to the Conservative leader, Brain Mulroney, and his NDP counterpart, Ed Broadbent, followed different courses. In 1984 Mulroney’s thermometer score was 61, the third highest recorded for any party leader in the several national surveys. Public infatuation with the new prime minister quickly waned, however, and in 1987 his score stood at a dismal 40 points. As his party’s fortunes subsequently improved in the polls, public feelings about the prime minister made a modest recovery as well, rising to 48 and 50 in our 1988 pre- and postelection surveys. Feelings about Ed Broadbent, the NDP chieftan, also were very stable over the course of the 1988 campaign, but his pre- and post-election ratings were still mediocre (54 in both cases), and slightly below his 1984 score (56). Although none of the three party leaders was popular in 1988, most voters rated them differently and many changed their feelings about them over time. In relative terms, 37 per cent (post-election survey) gave the highest score to Mulroney whereas 35 per cent favoured Broadbent. As might be anticipated, Turner trailed badly-only 16 per cent ranked him ahead of his rivals (12 per cent gave the leaders tied scores). Indeed, his unpopularity was so pervasive that only 40 per cent of Liberal party identifiers ranked him ahead of his rivals. In sharp contrast, 70 per cent and 87 per cent of the PC and NDP identifiers, respectively, preferred their own party’s leader. The dynamism of party leader images enhances their potential impact as short-term forces on electoral choice. In the aggregate. public feelings about the leaders in 1988 differed only marginally from 1984 when 43 per cent favoured Mulroney, 29 per cent Broadbent, and Turner trailed badly at 11 per cent

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CLARKE AND ALLAN KORNBERG

Party leader images, 1984-1988 national surveys

A. Leader and party

affect ratings*

Leader and party

1984 47 45

1987 44 51

survey 1988pre

Turner 46 Liberal Party 51 Mulroney 61 41 48 PC Party 60 44 53 Broadbent 56 53 54 NDP 46 47 46 * mean scores on lOOpoint thermometer scales

1988post

44 51 50

54 54 46

B. Leader character

Turner:

and competence ratings’* Survey 1988 post 1987 Character t 5.3

Competence Mulroney: Character 4:9 Competence 4.7 Broadbent: Character t Competence t ** - mean scores on IO-point scale t - data not available

4.8 5.5 5.7 6.4 5.8

(17 per cent gave the leaders tied scores). However, individual-level feelings about party leaders were highly changeable. The 1984-88 panel data show that only 54 per cent of those ranking Mulroney ahead of other leaders in former years did so in the latter, and the comparable figures for Turner and Broadbent were 32 per cent and 61 per cent respectively. Additionally, even those who consistently preferred a particular leader frequently changed their feelings about him, most often in a negative direction. This negativity also is reflected in the content of the leaders’ images. Two important dimensions of such images are ‘competence’ and ‘character’ (Kinder and Abelson, 1981; Kinder, 1983). To determine how the electorate perceived the leaders on these dimensions, the 1988 post-election respondents were asked to rank each leader on ten-point ‘performance’ and ‘honesty and ethics’ scales. All three received very mediocre rankings (means of 4.8 to 6.4) on both dimensions, with Broadbent’s scores being the highest and Turner’s the lowest (Table 4). Comparable 1987 data indicate that the public’s perception of Mulroney’s leadership qualities, especially views of his performance as prime minister, improved modestly in the year preceding the election. The increases were not large, but they were enough to move him ahead of his Liberal rival on both dimensions by the time of the 1988 election. Modelling

the 1988 Vote

Previous research on Canadian voting behaviour (Clarke et al., 1979; 1984; Archer, 1987) makes it abundantly clear that sociodemographic variables have very limited ability to explain voting behaviour and that a well-specified model should include measures of public reactions to salient issues and feelings about party leaders as well as federal and provincial party identifications. However, the properties of

146

Partisan Volatility and Electoral Choice

partisanship in Canada complicate the construction of such a model. Sizeable minorities (averaging 23 per cent for the 1974-88 surveys) identify with different parties at the federal and provincial levels of government, and attachments at one level influence attitudes and behaviour at the other (Clarke and Stewart, 1987; Martinez, 1989; Uslaner, 1989). Also, current partisan attachments are endogenous to leader and issue forces (Clarke and Stewart, 1985; 1987; Archer, 1987). Thus, our model of the 1988 vote is one in which federal and provincial party identifications are measured in 1984 and feelings about leaders and issues, in 1988. In this specification 1984 party identification captures long-term partisan forces as well as short-term ones operating at earlier points in time. The model is: V, = a + b,FPID,_,

+ b,PPIDt_,

+ b&Y, + Cb4_JEt + Cb,_,,DE,

+ e,

where: V, = Liberal Conservative, NDP vote at time t a = constant FPZD,_, = federal party identification at time t-l PPID,_, = provincial party identification at time t-l IS, = issue orientations at time t LE, = leader orientations at time t DE, = sociodemographic variables at time t e, = error term

In this model federal and provincial party identifications are measured as sevenpoint scales,17 and feelings about party leaders are tapped using the lOGpoint thermometer scales. Two issue measures are employed. One is respondents designations of which party was closest to them on the ‘most important issue’ weighted by evaluations of the importance of that issue in their voting decision.‘* A second is a seven-point additive index of the number of perceived problems with the free trade agreement. As shown above, the agreement was effectively the only issue in 1988, and this index enables us to determine how public reactions to the issue, unmediated by declared party preferences on it, infhrenced the vote. The socio demographic variables include age, education, gender, income and region.‘” Since the voting variables are dichotomies,20 probit is an appropriate estimation technique. As anticipated, choosing a party as closest on the most important issue positively influenced the likelihood of voting for it (Table 5). Party leader images also performed as expected; in the Liberal vote analysis feelings about John Turner had a positive intluence, whereas feelings about Mulroney and Broadbent had negative ones. Comparable patterns were evident in the PC and NDP analyses, although feelings about Broadbent were not a significant predictor of PC voting, and feelings about Turner were not significant in the NDP analysis. Also, 1984 federal party identification operated as expected and, in the Liberal case, provincial party identification did so as well. The estimated R*,s ranged from 0.67 to 0.80, suggesting that the model had considerable explanatory power. Substituting the free trade problems index for party closest on the most important issue yielded similar results (data not shown). Voters who thought that the free trade agreement would cause problems were more likely to vote Liberal or NDP, and less likely to cast a PC ballot. Feelings about party leaders and the federal and provincial party identifications had a variety of significant effects, and in every case the sign on the coefficients was in the expected direction, Again, the model’s explanatory power was impressive, with R2,s ranging from 0.64 to 0.74.

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TABLE5. Probit analyses of voting in the 1988 federal election, including party closest on most important issue

Predictor variables Region:

Atlantic Quebec Prairies British Columbia

Liberal

1988 vote PC

-0.04 0.14 -0.70b 0.18 0.43’ -1.00’ -0.14 -0.75b Age 0.01 0.00 Education -O.lY -0.05 0.32= 0.17 Gender Income 0.16 0.07 Federal party identification, 1984 O.lY 0.22” Provincial party identification, 1984 0.10’ 0.02 Party leader affect: Turner 0.021 -0.01’ -0.02” 0.02” Mulroney -0.01’ -0.01 Broadbent Party closest, most important issue 0.44 0.54 Constant -0.44 -1.05’ Estimated R2 0.78 0.80 % correctly predicted 90 92 2 - p < 0.001; b - p < 0.01; c - p < 0.05; one-tailed test

NDP -0.09 0.35 0.05 0.53” -0.01 0.07 -0.31= -0.20b 0.20” 0.06 -0.00 -O.OlC 0.03” 0.38= -0.32 0.67 91

The analyses also reveal that some of the sociodemographic variables had significant coefficients. In the model including party closest on the most important issue, for example, Quebecers and residents of the Prairies and British Columbia were less likely than Ontarians (the reference category) to vote Liberal, and those living in the latter two regions were more likely to vote PC and NDP, respectively. Also, women and those with higher annual family incomes were more likely than men to vote Liberal and less likely to vote NDP. It is important to note, however, that the individual and collective effects of the sociodemographic variables were extremely modest. Rerunning the analyses excluding these variables shows that the variance explained decreases only very marginally. For the model employing party closest on most important issue, the variance in PC voting explained was 79 per cent, only 1 per cent less than that for the analysis that included the 7 sociodemographic variables. The comparable decreases in Liberal and NDP voting were 5 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively. Similarly small decreases occur for the model using the free trade problems index. The meagre explanatory power of the several sociodemographic variables lends force to the argument that short-term forces associated with highly volatile issue concerns and party leader images are the key determinants of electoral choice in Canada. The importance of issues and leader images also can be illustrated by a closer examination of the magnitude of the effects of issue and leader variables. Unlike OLS regression coefficients, probit estimates do not have straightforward interpretations (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984: 43). However, one can appreciate the effect of changes in an independent variable on the probability of voting for a particular party by manipulating the values of this variable while fixing other variables at empirically plausible and/or theoretically interesting values. Here, we computed the probabilities that voters would cast a Conservative, Liberal or NDP ballot as their attitudes toward the free trade agreement and feelings about party leaders changed.*’

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Partisan Volatility and Electoral Choice

We first calculated these probabilities for persons perceiving varying numbers of problems with free trade. Our scenario assumed that a person voting for a particular party in 1988 identified weakly with it at both the federal and provincial levels in 1984. We also assumed that the voter had average party leader affect scores. In terms of demographics, we assumed that the voter was a 43 year-old man living in Ontario with a secondary school education and an annual family income in the $30,000-39,999 range. The results indicate that changes in the number of perceived problems with free trade were strongly associated with large changes in voting probabilities. Conservative identifiers with average feelings about the three leaders had an 0.84 probability of casting a Tory ballot if they failed to see any problems with free trade. The probability remained slightly above 0.50 if they saw as many as four problems, and then declined to only 0.27 if they saw the maximum number (6). Liberal and NDP probabilities were mirror images in that they increased sharply as the number of perceived problems increased. Clearly, the extent to which free trade was seen as problematic powerfully affected electoral choice. Our analysis of party leader effects on voting choice focuses on Liberal leader, John Turner. To determine how the Liberals would have fared had their unpopular leader been held in higher regard, we considered scenarios in which a voter perceived an average number of problems with free trade and had average feelings about rival party leaders. Turner’s popularity scores were successively set to those for Turner himself in the 1984 election survey, and then at the scores of his predecessor, Pierre Trudeau, in each of the 19681980 surveys. We investigated these scenarios for seven sets of party identifiers, ranging from persons with very strong Liberal identifications in federal and provincial politics to those who strongly identified with other parties. The analyses show that a more popular John Turner would have had a sizeable impact on the likelihood of a Liberal vote among identifiers with his own party. Although effects on identifiers with other parties and nonidentifiers also were evident, even if Turner had been as popular as Trudeau had been 20 years earlier, Liberal vote probabilities for these groups would have remained below 0.50.22 The (Very)

Short-Term

Dynamics

of Party Support

Public reaction to the dispute over free trade in the second leader debate and the temporary improvement in the Liberals’ standing in the polls, as well as the subsequent recovery of Conservative strength, underscore the extreme volatility of Canadian political attitudes during the 1988 election campaign. Using the 1988 prepost panel to map net individual-level change reveals that slightly over 17 per cent of those expressing a vote intention before the election voted for a different party. The Conservatives were the most successful in holding their support; nationally, 91 per cent of those intending to cast a Tory ballot did so. Regionally, they were most successful in retaining support in Quebec (96%) and least successful in the Atlantic provinces and British Columbia (86%). Voters deserting the PCs divided relatively equally; 5 per cent moving to the Liberals and 3 per cent to the NDP. Both of the latter parties fared less well in retaining their pre-election supporters-23 per cent and 21 per cent of those intending to vote Liberal and NDP, respectively, voted for another party. Both parties suffered their greatest losses in Quebec, where 39 per cent and 30 per cent of the pre-election Liberals and New Democrats, respectively, deserted. They were most successful in British Columbia, where 84 per cent of the

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TABLE6.Probit analysis of voting dynamics, 1988 pre-post election panel Predictor variables Changing party leader effect: Turner Mulroney Broadbent Attitude towards free trade: Consistently favourable Opposed - favourable Favourable - opposed Constant Estimated R2 % Correctly predicted

Voters moving to <-> from Liberal PC NDP 0.28” -0.39” -0.4? -1.30* -1.57” -0.64

0.80” 0.47 76

-0.35b 0.43b 0.17 0.86”

4.60 -0.02 -0.03

0.83 84

-0.29’ -0.06 0.37b -0.57’

-0.8& 0.19 o.39b 0.34 68

p _ p < 0,001; b - < 0.01; c - p < 0.05; one-tailed test

pre-election Liberals and 92 per cent of the pre-election New Democrats stayed with their parties. Neither the Liberals nor the PCs won the battle for the undecideds, capturing 38 per cent and 30 per cent of these groups, respectively and, indicative of the extent to which the dynamics of the campaign effectively marginalized the NDP, only 16 per cent of the pre-election undecided voted for New Democratic candidates. To determine how changing feelings about party leaders and the free trade issue influenced movements in party support during the campaign we analysed the behaviour of three (overlapping) groups, that is, those who moved to and from the Conservatives, Liberals, and NDP, respectively, across our pre- and post-election surveys.23 Predictor variables in the model included changes in party leader thermometer scores and dummy variable measures of pre- and post-election attitudes towards free trade. In a second set of analyses we employed these predictors plus evaluations of Turner’s debate performance. Probit estimates reveal that people who changed their feelings about the leaders tended to change their party support-seven of the nine leader coefficients in three analyses, all with the correct signs, were statistically significant (Table 6). Similarly, persons who were consistently favourable towards free trade and those who moved from unfavourable to favourable were more likely than those who were consistently opposed (the reference category) to move to the Conservatives and from the Liberals and the NDP. Also, favourable reactions to Turner’s debate performance influenced people to abandon the Tories and vote for the Liberals (data not shown), but comparisons of R2s for the analyses which include and exclude the debate variable indicates that the debate effect was very small. Electoral Volatility: the 1980s and Afterwards Almost immediately after their 1984 election success-a triumph so complete that some observers speculated that it marked a basic redistribution of partisan forcesthe governing Conservatives suffered a dramatic loss of public support, before rebounding to victory on 21 November 1988. The sharp fluctuations in public

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support for the PCs during the 1980s illustrates one of the most important attributes of the Canadian electorate, its volatility. Between 1984 and 1988 one in five Canadians switched their federal party identification and one in ten either began or stopped identifying with one of the national parties. Even during the brief twomonth period surrounding the 1988 election nearly one voter in four did so. The impression of ongoing volatility rather than realignment is strongly reinforced by post-election trends in party support. Public opinion polls reveal that since the 1988 election the Conservatives again have suffered enormous losses, whereas the Liberals and NDP have registered sizeable gains.24 Similarly, in our September 1989 national survey only 28 per cent reported a Conservative identification and 37 per cent and 16 per cent respectively, were Liberals and New Democrats (Fig. 1). The PC percentage is exactly the party’s national average for the 1965-80 period and some 11 per cent less than that at the time of the 1988 election. This pattern of rapid and substantial Conservative losses and opposition party gains is precisely what occurred after 1984, and it emphasizes the continuing weakness of Canadians’ partisan attachments. As Canada enters the 1990s the political context remains one in which voters’ issue concerns and party leader images are highly changeable short-term forces that make federal elections ‘risky business’ for all of the national political parties. Analyses of voting behaviour in the 1988 election illustrates the importance of such forces. Similar to earlier Canadian elections sociodemographic variables had a variety of significant effects, but collectively they explained only very modest amounts of the variance in voting. In sharp contrast, issues, or rather, one issue was very important. In 1988 controversy concerning the Tory government’s proposed free trade agreement with the United States completely dominated the issue agenda. In a campaign in which the New Democrats became largely irrelevant, the Liberals represented free trade as a choice between national independence and subordination-perhaps even eventual absorption-by their powerful neighbour. The Conservatives, in contrast, portrayed it as a choice between continuing and even greater economic prosperity as opposed to the loss of the friendship and, ultimately, of access to the markets of that neighbour. Messrs Turner and Mulroney’s bitter charges and counter charges on the issue climaxed in the second of their nationally televised debates in which the former accused the latter of selling out to the Americans. Turner’s performance prompted a sharp improvement in his party’s standings and a modest increase in his own popularity. The Liberal surge was highly transitory, however, and our analyses show that in the end the Conservatives did not have to convince voters that the agreement was a perfect one to obtain their support, only that any problems it might eventually pose were not pervasive. Public feelings about the three national party leaders also were important in 1988. In particular, a more popular John Turner would have increased the propensity to vote Liberal among various groups of party identifiers, with the strongest effects being among those who identified with his party. However, the fact remained that Turner was decidely unpopular. Indeed, only a minority of his own party’s partisans preferred him to his rivals. In retrospect, Turner’s unpopularity represented an important lost opportunity for the Liberals. given the lack of strong affection for either Prime Minister Mulroney or the NDP leader, Ed Broadbent. One might therefore argue that rather than Mulroney winning the 1988 election, Turner and the NDP lost it.

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One could also argue the opposite, that although the prime minister inspired no great affection in the electorate, he demonstrated that he was an able political tactician who employed resources at his command to build a winning coalition when it was most needed, on election day. Particularly noteworthy were his efforts to build support in his native province of Quebec where, in preparation for the 1988 election, he made excellent use of the patronage at his disposal. Mulroney’s attempts to attract Quebecois support had other facets as well. One of his government’s two major policy initiatives, the Meech Lake constitutional accord, was considerably more popular in Quebec than in any other region, and the second, the free trade agreement, was more popular in Quebec than any region except the Prairies.25 In wooing Quebec, the prime minister recognized that because of Canada’s highly skewed distribution of population, voting patterns in the province have done much to decide the outcome of virtually every national election since Confederation. Despite his success in bringing many Quebec voters into the Tory camp in 1988, there is no evidence that Mulroney is a ‘political magician’ who can conjure a period of Conservative hegemony in national politics such as that enjoyed by the Liberals for much of the past half century. On the contrary, post-1988 events, especially the abortive attempt by the prime minister and his government to achieve agreement on the ill-fated Meech Lake Constitutional Accord and their decision to impose a highly unpopular General Goods and Services Tax (GST) have had significant negative effects on Conservative popularity in Quebec and other parts of the country including the party’s long-time bastion, the Prairies, where PC support has been eroded by the new Reform Party.26 Many observers already have concluded that Meech Lake and the GST spell disaster for the Tories in the next election. However, the weakness of Canadians’ partisan allegiances and the extreme volatility of party support caution that it is too early to write the obituary for the Conservatives and their leader. They may not be able to resurrect themselves as they did in preparation for the 1988 campaign, but the continuing dominance of short-term forces in Canadian electoral politics guarantees them a chance to do so. Notes 1. The principal data sources for this study are pre- and post-election surveys of national probability samples of the Canadian electorate. During the 1988 campaign (10 October-20 November) interviews were conducted with 2168 respondents (weighted N = 2215) and after the election (23 November 1988-10 January 1989) with 1946 respondents (weighted N = 2010). The two sets of interviews include panel compo nents, with 1462 (weighted N = 1516) of those interviewed in the preelection survey participating in the post-election one, and 858 (weighted N = 868) of the 1988 preelection respondents participating in a 1984 national post-election survey. The 1984 survey data have a 1983-84 panel component, and the 1983 data, in turn, are linked to 1974-80 panels. We also employ data gathered in 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1989 national cross-sectional surveys as well as those from the 1965-80 Canadian national election studies. All analyses and interpretations of these data are the responsibility of the authors, and further details concerning the 1983-89 surveys may be obtained from them upon request. The 1965-80 data are archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Michigan. 2. Given the emphasis on the impact of the economy in studies of the dynamics of party support (see, e.g., Monroe, 1984; Miller, 1989) one might be tempted to hypothesize that the erosion of PC support after the 1984 election reflected negative trends in

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8. 9.

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Partisan Volatility and Electoral Choice important macroeconomic indicators such as rates of inflation and unemployment. In fact, however, price increases were quite stable between 1984 and 1988 (range: 4.0%-4.4%) and levels of unemployment fell (from 11.2% to 7.8%). Moreover, although there are insufficient data points to conduct an aggregate time series analysis of the impact of the economy on party identification, Box Jenkins analyses of monthly CIPO (Gallup) poll vote intention shares show that neither inflation nor unemployment had significant effects on PC popularity between 1984 and 1988. Rather, the decrease in the party’s support was strongly associated with various political interventions, most notably a continuing series of scandals involving cabinet ministers (see, e.g., Gratton, 1988). The PCs also benefited from some political events and conditions, especially widely publicized attempts by disaffected Liberals to oust their leader, John Turner (see below). Details concerning these analyses are available upon request. Panel data are required for accurate measures of individual-level instability in political attitudes and behavior. See Gutek (1978); Niemi, Katz and Neuman (1980); and MacDermid (1989). Non-identifiers are scored 0, and ‘not very strong’, ‘fairly strong’, and ‘very strong’ identifiers are scored 1, 2 and 3, respectively. For accounts of the 1988 campaign see Frizzell, Pammett and Westell(l989); and LeDuc (1989). Turner’s widely publicized gaffes during the 1984 campaign and his lacklustre performance on the hustings were widely cited as contributing factors in the party’s debacle. See Frizzell and Westell (1985); Kay et al. (1985); Komberg and Clarke (1988); and Penniman (1988). In the post-election survey 50% stated that Turner had impressed them ‘most favourably’ in the leader debates. Mulroney and Broadbent favourably impressed 23% and 12%, respectively. Poll data on trends in party support in the campaign are reported in Frizzell, Pammett and Westell (1989: 95). Respondents were asked ‘In your opinion what was the most important issue in the election? In our 1984 post-election survey 60% cited economic issues (unemployment - 31%, ‘the state of the economy’ - 22%, deficits and the currency - 5%, inflation - l%, taxes - 1%). No other issue except ‘time for change’ (10%) was cited by more than 3%. Free trade, a non-issue in 1984, received no mentions. See Kornberg and Clarke (1988: 356). Respondents were asked if they ‘agreed’ or ‘disagreed’ with the following statements: (a) ‘the free trade agreement ensures Canada’s future prosperity’; (b) ‘the free trade agreement threatens Canada’s political independence’; (c) ‘economically the free trade agreement helps some industries but it hurts others’; (d) ‘the free trade agreement threaten’s Canadian culture and the arts’; (e) ‘the free trade agreement benefits all of Canada economically, not just certain regions or provinces’; (f) ‘the free trade agreement could threaten important programs such as unemployment insurance and medical care’. Items (a)-(e) were asked in both waves of interviewing; (t) was asked in the postelection wave only. The question sequence concluded by asking: ‘Overall, are you in favour of the free trade agreement or opposed to it?’ Observers have argued that this was largely a product of the massive public relations campaign including a media blitz launched by corporate supporters of free trade after the televised debates. This campaign focused strongly on the credibility of Turner’s opposition to the agreement and questioned his competence to manage the country’s economic affairs. See, Maser (1989: 67-70). For the free trade items (a) and (e), ‘disagree’ responses are scored 1, ‘agree’ responses, 0. For items (b), (c), (d) and (D, ‘agree’ responses are scored 1; ‘disagree’ responses, 0. Confirmatory factor analyses using LISREL 7 weighted least squares procedures (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1988) indicate that thinking about free trade was structured in terms of two highly correlated (o = 0.75) factors (x’- = 5.81, p = 0.562). The general prosperity, political sovereignty, culture and the arts, and social programs items loaded on factor one, and the sectoral and regional economic items on factor two. Although an alternative single-factor model does not perform as well (xJs = 35.52, p = O.OOl), the latter‘s fit is not bad considering sample size (N = 2010) (Carmines, 1986: 40-4 I), and all items except (c), which has little variance, have impressive loadings (range = 0.75-0.90).

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These results and the desire to avoid multicollinearity problems occasioned by using strongly correlated variables in subsequent multivariate analyses prompted us to adopt a single-factor measurement model of perceived problems with free trade. For ease of interpretation the recorded free trade variables are summed to produce a ‘free trade problems’ index ranging from 0 (no problems) to 6 (six problems). The sociotropic, egocentric and future-oriented economic evaluation measures are factor scores based on a principal components analysis (varimax rotation) of six variables tapping retrospective, contemporaneous and prospective judgments about national and personal economic conditions. For details on these variables see Clarke and Komberg (1989). The governmental effectiveness index is based on responses to the following questions. How well does the federal government: (a) ‘provide welfare services for anyone who needs them’; (b) ‘make sure that everyone who wants to work has the opportunity to do so’; (c) ‘protect people’s lives and property’; (d) ‘ensure that inflation is kept under control’; (f) ‘ensure that everyone has their health needs looked after’; (g) ‘clean up and protect the environment’; (h) ‘ensure that people get all the education they are capable of. Response categories are scored ‘very well’ = 1; ‘fairly well’ = 0; “not very well’ = -1; and the variables are summed to produce an index ranging from +8 to -8. The equity/fairness index is based on ‘agree-disagree’ responses to the following statements: (a) ‘in Canada some people don’t pay enough taxes whereas others pay too much’; (b) ‘in Canada what people become depends on what they can do, and not on who they are or who they know’; (c) ‘in Canada the federal government treats some groups much better than others’; (d) ‘over the years the federal civil service in Ottawa has treated all Canadians equally’; (e) ‘over the years political parties generally have tried to look after the best interests of all Canadians, and not just the interests of those who vote for them’; (f) ‘in Canada some groups get too much and others get too little’; (g) ‘over the years the federal courts generally have acted speedily and treated people fairly’; (h) ‘parliament in Canada does not represent everyone fairly’; (i) ‘in some countries there may be one law for the rich and another for the poor, but that’s not the way the federal government works in Canada’. ‘Agree’ responses to items (b), (d), (e), (g) and (i) are scored 1 and ‘disagree’ responses, 0. ‘Disagree’ responses to items (a), (c), (f) and 07) are scored 1, ‘agree’ responses, 0. The recoded variables are summed to form the equity/fairness index. The measures of federal and provincial party identification in this analysis are scored: very strong Conservative = +3; fairly strong Conservative = +2; weak or leaning Conservative = 1; non-identifier = 0; weak or leaning other party identifier = -1; fairly strong other party identifier = -2; very strong other party identifier = -3. Age is measured in years; annual family income has eight categories ranging from $10,000 per year or less = 1 to $70,000 per year or more = 8; gender is women = 1, men = 0; formal education is elementary or less = 1, some secondary = 2, completed secondary or technical, community college = 3, some university = 4, completed university (B.A., B.Sc. or more) = 5. Region/ethnic&y is a set of dummy variables with Ontario as the reference category. The thermometer scale question sequence was posed as follows: Think for a moment about a thermometer scale which runs from 1 to 100 degrees. 50 is the neutral point. If your feelings are warm toward something, give it a score higher than 50, the warmer your feelings, the higher the score. If your feelings are cool toward something, give it a score less than 50. The cooler your feelings, the lower the score.’ After this preamble, respondents were asked to rate each of the federal parties and their leaders. The specific measures used depends on which party’s vote is being considered. Thus, in the Conservative vote analysis we use the measure described in note 14 above, whereas for Liberal voting the identification measures run from very strong Liberal (+3) to very strong other party identifier (-3) and for NDP voting, from very strong New Democrat (+3) to very strong other party identifier (-3). The scoring of this variable varies according to whether Liberal, Conservative or NDP voting is being analysed. In the Liberal case, for example, voters selecting the Liberals as closest on the most important election issue are scored 1, those selecting another party, - 1, and those selecting no party or saying there was no important issue, 0. These scores are weighted by multiplying them by a variable assessing the perceived

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Volatility and Electoral Choice

importance of the issue in the vote decision. The latter variable is scored: ‘very important’ = 3; ‘fairly important’ = 2; ‘not very important’; ‘no important issue’ or ‘don’t know’ = 1. The resulting index ranges from +3 to -3. The measures of age, education, gender and income are described in note 15 above. There were insufficient non-french Quebecers in the 1984-88 panel to permit analyses of them as a separate group. The reference region category is Ontario, with other regions (Atlantic, Quebec, Prairies and British Columbia) scored as O-l dummy variables. In the Liberal vote analysis the dependent variable is vote Liberal = 1; vote for the other party = 0. In the Conservative and NDP analyses, the dependent variables are vote Conservative = 1; vote other party = 0; and vote NDP = 1; vote other party = 0, respectively. These calculations concern direct effects only. The responsiveness of party identitlcation to issue and leader forces means that the total effects of changing issue perceptions and party leader affect would be magnified by changes in some voters partisan attachments The fact that changes in affection for Mr. Turner have differential effects on Liberal vote probabilities for various groups of party identifiers suggests the presence of a Turner affect-party identification interaction effect on Liberal voting. Since the interaction term is highly correlated with federal party identification and Turner affect, we tested for the impact of the interaction using a difference in x2 test (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). Although the test is statistically significant, the summary statistics (R* and the percentage correctly classified) do not increase, thereby suggesting it has minimal substantive import. In the Conservative analysis persons moving to the party are scored 1; those moving away, 0. Analogous scoring is employed in the Liberal and NDP analyses. The therms meter scale change variables for the party leaders are scored leader score increased = 1; score is unchanged = 0, score decreased = - 1. The free trade dummy variables are constructed using combinations of respondents opinions favouring or opposing the fta in the pre- and post-election surveys, with those being consistently opposed to or undecided about the pact constituting the reference category. The Turner debate variable is: favourably impressed by Turner = 1; favourably impressed by another leader = -1; not impressed by any leader, equally impressed by all leaders, or did not watch debates = 0. In December 1988, one month after the 1988 election, the CIPO (Gallup) poll showed that the Conservatives were favoured by 49% of the electorate, with Liberal and NDP shares being 28% and 20%. respectively. By May 1990, PC support had fallen to 18%, whereas 47% supported the Liberals, and 24% favoured the NDP. PC support has remained below 20% since then. The 1988 preelection survey shows that on average only 25% outside of Quebec favoured the Meech Lake Accord but 53% of Quebecers favoured it. The free trade agreement was favoured by 45% in Quebec and the Prairies, by 38% in British Columbia, and by 34% in the Atlantic provinces and Ontario. The Reform Party is an ideologically conservative party led by Preston Manning, son of former Social Credit leader, E.C. Manning. The party received 2.1% of the popular vote in 1988, with nearly two-thirds of its ballot being cast in the province of Alberta. Polls conducted in the autumn of 1990 indicate that Reform now has the support of upwards of one-third of Prairie voters. Observers have speculated that this level of strength would be sufficient for the party to win as many as 36 seats in the next federal election. References

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Michael S. Lewis-Beck (editors), New Tools For Social Scientists, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986). Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett, Political Choice in Canadu, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979). Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett, Absent Mandate: The Politics of Discontent in Canada, (Agincourt, Ont: Gage Publishers, 1984). Harold D. Clarke and Allan Komberg, ‘Public reactions to economic performance and political support in Canada’, in Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Gary Zuk (editors), Economic Decline and Political Change, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989). Harold D. Clarke and Marianne C. Stewart, ‘Short-term forces and partisan change in Canada: 1974-80’, Electoral Studies, 5, 1985, pp. 123-41. Harold D. Clarke and Marianne C. Stewart, ‘Partisan inconsistency and partisan change in federal states: the case of Canada’, American Journal of Political Science, 31, 1987, pp. 383-407. Alan Frizzell and Anthony Westell, The Canadian General Election of 1984, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1985). Alan Frizzell, Jon H. Pammett and Anthony Westell, 7YbeCanadian General Election of 1988, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989)). Michel Gratton, ‘So, eat Are 7be Boys Saying? An Inside Look at Brian Mulroney in Power, (Toronto: Paperjacks, 1988). Barbara Gutek, ‘On the accuracy of retrospective attitudinal data’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 42, 1978, pp. 390-401. Karl G. Joreskog and Dag Sorbom, LISREL 7: A Guide to the Program and Applications, (Chicago: SPSS, Inc, 1988). Barry Kay, Steven D. Brown, John Curtis, Ronald D. Lambert and John M. Wilson, ‘The character of electoral change: A pre~~na~ report from the 1984 national election study’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian political science association, Montreal, 31 May-2 June, 1985. Donald R. Kinder, ‘Diversity and complexity in American public opinion’, in Ada W. Finifter (editor), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983). Donald R. Kinder and R.P. Abelson, ‘Appraising presidentiaf candidates: personality and affect in the 1980 campaign’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American political science association, 3-6 September, 1981. Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke, ‘Canada’s tory tide: electoral change and partisan instability in the 198Os’, in Barry Cooper, Allan Komberg and William Mishler (editors), The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988). Lawrence LeDuc, ‘The Canadian federal election of 1988’, Electoral Studies, 8, 1989, pp. 163-8. Lawrence LeDuc, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson and Jon H. Pammett, ‘Partisan instability in Canada: evidence from a new panel study’, American Political Science Review, 78, 1984, pp. 470-84. Robert H. MacDermid, ‘The recall of past partisanship: feeble memories or frail concepts?’ Canadian Journal of Political Science, 22, 1989, pp. 363-77. Richard D. McKelvey and William Zavoina, ‘A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level dependent variables’, Journal of ~at~e~tical Sociology, 4, 1975, pp. 103-20. Michael Martinez, ‘Partisan reinforcement in context and cognition: Canadian federal partisanships, 1974-79’, paper presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the Midwest political science association, Chicago, April 1989. Peter Maser, ‘On the hustings’, in Alan Frizzell, Jon H. Pammett and Anthony Westell (editors), T&e Canadian Generai Election of 1988. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989). John Meisel, Working Papers on Canadian Politics, 2nd edn (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1975). William L. Miller, ‘Studying how the economy affects public attitudes and behavior: problems and prospects’, in Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Gary Zuk (editors), Economic Decline and Political Change, (Pittsburgh: llniversity of Pittsburgh Press, 1989).

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Kristen Monroe, Presidential Popularity and the Economy, (New York: Praeger, 1984). Richard Niemi, Richard Katz and David Newman, ‘Reconstructing past partisanship: the failure of the party identification recall questions’, American Journal of Political Science, 24, 1980, pp. 633-51. Howard Penniman (editor), Canada at the Polls, 1984, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988). Eric Uslaner, ‘Splitting image: partisan affiliations in Canada’s ‘two political worlds”, unpublished manuscript, (College Park: University of Maryland, 1989).