Road to price: User perspectives on road pricing in transition country

Transportation Research Part A 105 (2017) 79–94

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Transportation Research Part A journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tra

Road to price: User perspectives on road pricing in transition country

MARK

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Drazenko Glavica, , Mladenovic Milosb, Tapio Luttinenb, Svetlana Cicevica, Aleksandar Trifunovica a b

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering, Vojvode Stepe 305, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia Aalto University, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Rakentajanaukio 4, 02150 Espoo, Finland

AR TI CLE I NF O

AB S T R A CT

Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina Policy learning Road toll Transition country Road pricing acceptability Willingness to pay

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a country in transition, is currently implementing motorway pricing schemes due to the financial constraints. Considering the importance of user perspectives for a successful implementation of a road pricing scheme, and a lack of research in the South East Europe (SEE), drivers in BiH were surveyed. Total sample includes 15,321 respondents. Results indicate that 19% of respondents are unwilling to pay for road pricing, including a low average estimate for road tolls. In addition, the results provide comprehensive analysis of willingness-topay and willingness-to-accept, accounting for day of the week, vehicle origin, trip purpose, roadway use frequency, and income. The results are further interpreted in the context of a transition country, with high percentage of low income citizens, and lack of trust in public institutions. Planners can use the findings to determine the road toll price by relying on both willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values, while also aiming for financial sustainability. In order to provide recommendations for planning and policy learning in SEE, discussion provides recommendations for further analysis that should account for both economic and sociopolitical aspects. Recommendations include questions such as how should the burden of charges be allocated, how should the toll revenue be used, and what actions planners and politicians should take.

1. Introduction In the previous decades, several European countries have implemented motorway pricing systems, using mostly kilometre-based system or time-based vignette (Matthews and Nellthorp, 2012). These policy efforts have been framed by the European Parliament. For example, directive 2004/52/EC of the European Parliament focuses on the conditions for interoperability of electronic road toll systems in Europe, while directives 2006/38/EC and 2011/76/EU focus on recommendations for internalizing external costs of road transport. In general, the infrastructure pricing policy at the EU level primarily concerns freight traffic, while the question of pricing for passenger vehicles was left to the individual member states. Aside from the most of the European countries that have experience with road pricing, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presents a special case. Being a transition and post-conflict country, motorway road network did not exist until very recently. Moreover, there are no previous studies focused on road pricing, either in BiH or in other transition countries in the South East Europe (SEE). At this stage of infrastructural development in BiH, policy learning from countries

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Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Glavic), milos.mladenovic@aalto.fi (M. Milos), tapio.luttinen.@aalto.fi (T. Luttinen), [email protected] (S. Cicevic), [email protected] (A. Trifunovic). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2017.08.016 Received 22 June 2016; Received in revised form 2 December 2016; Accepted 10 August 2017 0965-8564/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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with previous road pricing experience can be an important source of additional knowledge (Pucher and Buehler, 2005; Glavic et al., 2015). However, context has a crucial significance for successful policy transfer and implementation of road pricing scheme (Noordegraaf et al., 2014). Accounting for specific questions in planning and policy-making in BiH faces the multidimensionality of economic and socio-political dimensions of road pricing (Pahaut and Sikow, 2006). For example, from an institutional perspective, it is important to take into account total revenue from road pricing, investment, maintenance and operations costs, organizational resources, and tolling technology features. On the contrary, the user perspective is equally important for determining the financially sustainable toll price, as well as for road pricing acceptability. Considering the lack of previous experience with road pricing in BiH, and multidimensionality of road pricing question, the objective of this research is twofold. First, this research investigates user perceptions related to road pricing in BiH. The second objective is developing a solid starting point for policy learning from the international road pricing experiences. The following section of this paper presents a background overview of interdependent economic and socio-political dimensions of road pricing, highlighting the importance of the user perspective on road pricing. The third section presents the context of road pricing in BiH. The fourth section presents research methodology, focused on a user survey. The survey aimed to investigate willingness to pay for travel time savings, as well as road toll value that would encourage the user to recede from using the motorway. The subsequent section presents the survey results, along with analytical relationships between different socio-economic variables and hypothetical toll price. Drawing from the survey results and previous international experiences, the sixth section develops a discussion about further policy learning in SEE countries. Policy learning questions are grounded in a liberal conception of democracy and questions of social justice. This combination of perspectives informs a range of practical issues for planning road pricing schemes. As an outcome, this research presents a unique case of road pricing planning, focused on a transition and post-conflict country, with a low average income, and with a delicate economic and political situation. 2. The multidimensionality of the road pricing question 2.1. The economic dimensions The theory of road pricing has strong origins in the economic theory. Since the seminal papers on road pricing, transport economists have argued that for the provision of scarce resource the user should pay an additional “tax” amount equal to the marginal external costs (Pigou, 1920; Knight, 1924). When a road user decides to travel additional kilometres, she imposes costs on herself (private costs), other road users, infrastructure, and the rest of the society (external costs) (Small, 1992a, 1992b; Nash and Matthews, 2013). Consequently, there is a need for the price to reflect these additional external costs, and act as a signal to the traveller’s decision-making on whether, how, when, and what route to travel (Morrison, 1986; Matthews and Nellthorp, 2012). Thus, the measurement of marginal social cost remains an essential starting point in any efficient pricing policy (Nash and Matthews, 2013). However, besides the externality issues, road pricing is an important source for infrastructural funding (Deakin, 1989). Following these two dimensions, it is often hypothesized about a minimum toll rate that would be affordable by the users, but also provide sufficient return on investment. The monetary borderline value where an individual would be willing to pay to secure the use of the goods or service is often referred to as willingness to pay (WTP) (Hanemann, 1991). In addition to WTP, economists often discuss willingness to accept (WTA), as the minimum amount an individual would be willing to accept to give up use of goods or services. In general, WTP and travel time savings strongly correlate to users’ income, as the increase in income increases the value of travel time savings (Calfee and Winston, 1998; Wardman, 1998; Hensher and Goodwin, 2004; Abrantes and Wardman, 2011). However, in addition to users’ income, previous research identifies several other factors affecting WTP (Calfee and Winston, 1998; Lam and Small, 2001; Brownstone et al., 2003; Hensher and Goodwin, 2004; Kockelman and Kalmanje, 2005; Hensher et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Jou et al., 2012; Elvik, 2013; Jou and Huang, 2014; Yusuf et al., 2014; Baumgarten and Middelkamp, 2015), including:

• Road type • Trip purpose • The amount of travel time savings • Total trip travel time • Day in a week • Time in a day • Frequency of motorway use • Distance travelled on the motorway • Total journey length • Estimated risk of traffic accidents 2.2. The socio-political dimensions Theoretical considerations of road pricing originating from a dominant focus on the economic perspective have been critiqued as imbalanced to the road pricing practice (Langmyhr, 1999; Rothengatter, 2003). In practice, regulating road transport externalities often requires a trade off between efficiency, effectiveness, and social feasibility (Verhoef et al., 1996). The question of user acceptability lies at the core of the socio-political dimension of road pricing (Ison, 1996, 2000; Owen et al., 2008), which can be exemplified with the extreme cases of boycott and demonstrations on road tolls (Raux and Souche, 2004). In the case of acceptability, 80

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previous research identifies several factors with intra-personal, inter-personal, and chronologically variability (Giuliano, 1992; Jakobsson et al., 2000; Viegas, 2001; Schade and Schlag, 2003; Steg, 2003; Santos and Rojey, 2004; Jaensirisak et al., 2005; Schade and Baum, 2007; Owen et al., 2008; Fürst and Dieplinger, 2014; Jou and Huang, 2014), including:

• Frequency of motorway use • Problem perception and awareness • Attribution of responsibility • Subjective knowledge • Mobility-related social norms and attitude towards car use • Perceived effectiveness • Environmental consciousness • Conviction about the introduction of road pricing In addition to the above factors, user acceptability relates to the social justice questions. The issues of social justice, as the wider societal distribution of benefits and burdens that creates winners and losers (May, 1992; Langmyhr, 1997; Oberholzer-Gee and WeckHannemann, 2002; Santos and Rojey, 2004; Ungemah, 2007; Levinson, 2010), can be crucial in jeopardizing implementation (Deakin et al., 1996; Langmyhr, 1997; Quinet and Vickerman, 2004). For example, it has been noted before that high income groups that place high value on their time will most likely constitute the winners (Else, 1986; Giuliano, 1992; Santos and Rojey, 2004). Beyond the income relation, losers might be those experiencing congestion caused by those who have changed travel behaviour due to road toll (Santos and Rojey, 2004). Moreover, losers might be those travellers valuing time savings below the toll price, but having only unattractive travel alternatives, thus in need to change to less attractive travel times, routes, or modes (Langmyhr, 1997). In particular, the issue of social justice in road pricing is partially related to the perceived infringement on freedom of movement (Jakobsson et al., 2000; Santos and Rojey, 2004). In addition, the social justice issue relates to the distribution of toll revenue (Jones, 1991; Santos and Rojey, 2004; King et al., 2007). Along with the questions of public acceptability, one of the crucial issues with road pricing is political acceptability (Santos and Rojey, 2004; Pahaut and Sikow, 2006; King et al., 2007; Owen et al., 2008; Chorus et al., 2011; Ardic et al., 2015). Politicians often perceive road pricing as complicated new charge for something that is free (King et al., 2007), and have preferences for policies with highly visible benefits, and distributed and low visibility costs (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002; Chorus et al., 2011). 3. Road pricing context in Bosnia and Herzegovina From the road pricing background, it is evident that the user perspective on road pricing is a critical element that must be accounted for in road pricing planning and policy-making. Continuing from this background, this section accounts for the road pricing context in BiH, as a SEE country in a transition to a market-based economy, and pluralist democracy (Anon., 2015b). Since 2008, BiH is a potential candidate country for the EU accession. However, BiH has a low national product, while the public sector lacks open, transparent, responsive, and accountable structure (Søberg, 2008). As a result, despite some success in civil service reform, BiH citizens still perceive a significant influence of corruption on the political life (Anon., 2004, 2005; Divjak and Pugh, 2008; Søberg, 2008). Citizens’ perception of corruption, and lack of effectiveness, especially toward European integration, results in a low confidence in state, law, and formal institutions (Chandler, 2006; Søberg, 2008; Efendic et al., 2011). In addition, BiH is characterized by an undeveloped civil society, segmented both horizontally and vertically, lacking mechanisms for participation in decision-making (Belloni, 2001; Bojkov, 2003; Chandler, 2006; Divjak and Pugh, 2008). Finally, similarly to other post-communist transition countries, passenger vehicle ownership rate has been increasing, as vehicles are bought not just as a need but also as a symbol of success and independence (Komornicki, 2003; Pucher and Buehler, 2005). In this complex socio-political context, BiH is currently in the process of building its first motorway infrastructure. So far, 140 km of motorway network have already been completed, with around 110 km planned or currently in construction. Strategically, this investment in transport infrastructure should have very high importance for country’s further economic development (Rietveld, 1989; Banister and Berechman, 2000). Strategic importance of motorway network for BiH is even higher due to the lack of competitive land transport alternatives, such as the railway transport. Considering that infrastructural investment planning and operations require substantial resources (Short and Kopp, 2005), planning and financing road infrastructure presents a significant challenge for a country in transition. Consequently, similarly to other SEE countries in transition, BiH needs to consider road pricing primarily because of the lack of public funding, the need to reduce public deficit and debt, and to increase the role of private sector in the economy (Timár, 1999; Murany, 2000; Brenck et al., 2005; Carpintero, 2010; Queiroz et al., 2013). As a result, all of the 140 km of motorways in BiH are under road pricing scheme as of the end of 2015. This is a similar situation with other SEE transition countries. For example, all 650 km of motorway network in Serbia, and 240 km of motorway network in Macedonia are tolled. 4. Methodology Considering the complexity of the socio-political situation, and the current state of motorway infrastructure and road pricing planning in BiH, the methodology aims to investigate users’ perspectives on road pricing. The theoretical foundation for the focus on investigating users’ perspectives bases on the premise that road pricing planning processes cannot avoid having an explicit normative standpoint (Langmyhr, 1997). Accounting for the normative standpoint is further positioned in the context of a country in transition 81

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Fig. 1. Survey locations.

towards deliberative democracy (Held, 2006). Thus, the methodological approach is framed by a modern liberal conception of democracy and social justice, replying upon theories of Rawls (1999, 2005), Sen (2011), Dworkin (2011), Walzer (2008), and Nozick (1974). This modern liberal perspective has challenged the previously dominant utilitarian perspective, which claimed that an act is morally right if it produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people. On the contrary, the liberal perspective argues for the focus on the distribution of benefits and burdens across citizens. Thus, the aim of the, non-utilitarian, research methodology is to enable accounting for distributive concerns, paying special attention to the voices of the worst-off groups. Following the line of reasoning that highlights the importance of users’ perspectives on road pricing, the methodology itself bases on a driver survey. Contrary to some previous road pricing research methodology based on modelling and simulation (Gupta et al., 2006), a survey has been selected as a method that can obtain the actual users’ perceptions of road pricing (Jakobsson et al., 2000; Harrington et al., 2001; Schade and Schlag, 2003; Fujii et al., 2004; Gaunt et al., 2007; Schade and Baum, 2007; Nikitas et al., 2011). Moreover, considering a lack of any previous research related to road pricing in BiH, the survey allowed for exploratory investigation. As opposed to previous research that use online questionnaires, the on-site driver survey targets the actual user group, i.e., potential motorway users. However, a driver survey requires the help of a surveyor, which introduces financial and organizational limitations. This survey was conducted during October and November 2012, on 13 locations across main highway network in BiH (Fig. 1). At the time of the survey, none of the roads in BiH were tolled. The questionnaire had a form of stated-preference surveys. In addition to the surveyor, the procedure involved presence of a police officer, who would direct the driver to stop the vehicle at an appropriate location, e.g., with road widening and stopping area. All driver surveys were performed in the period of 6 am to 6 pm. The locations on the road network have been selected to include major BiH roads, having in mind the planned motorway alignment. In addition, each location was chosen to ensure safe sight distance for the stopping vehicle, and ensure uninterrupted traffic flow (Fig. 2). Considering that at the time of the survey the construction of motorway network has just started, except two, all other locations were on two-lane roads. The process of selecting which vehicle should be stopped was randomized, and drivers had the option to refuse to participate in the survey. Before starting the survey, each respondent had been informed of the purpose of the study, explaining that the questions related to the building of the new motorway and potential introduction of road pricing on that motorway. No information had been provided on the use of the revenue from the road pricing. The survey consisted of total 13 questions. The length of the survey has been limited to avoid significant delay for the users, and preventing the occurrence of congestion or accidents at the survey points. General questions included the location of the survey, time and date, approximate trip origin and destination, frequency of motorway use, vehicle’s country of origin based on licence plates, trip purpose, and monthly income range. In addition to the general questions, the subjects have been asked two road pricing related 82

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Fig. 2. Examples from the field survey procedure.

questions. The first question asked subjects how much they are willing to pay for travel time savings of 30 min. Depending on the location of the survey, the second question had two variants. For the surveys that were conducted on two-lane roads, this question asked for a price estimate when the respondent would stop using a motorway, assuming they had an option to use a motorway instead of a two-lane road. In the second variant, for survey locations on the motorway, the question was framed as price estimate when the respondent would decide to recede use of that specific motorway. In both variants, the respondent was expected to select a price category in euros per 100 km. In the rest of the paper, the former question, related to willingness to pay for travel time savings, will be referred to as WTP, while the latter, related to maximum acceptable toll price, will be referred to as MAP. Both questions were included to avoid a common misconception of approximate equality between WTP and WTA (Hanemann, 1991). The reason for this misconception is that, for public goods, the relation between the two welfare measures depends on a substitution effect as well as an income effect. In fact, significant empirical divergences between WTP and WTA may indicate a general perception that the privatemarket goods available in their choice set are, collectively, a rather imperfect substitute for the public good under consideration. In addition, WTP and MAP questions aimed at depicting the similar hypothetical situation, despite the fact that WTP relates to travel time savings, while MAP relates to price per 100 km. In fact, 30 min of travel time savings is a good estimate for a trip of 100 km. For example, a 100 km trip on the motorway with a high travel speed can last 30 min shorter compared to a trip with a shorter distance and much lover travel speed due to travel on a two-lane road. Finally, drivers were also asked to provide any additional comments related to introduction of road pricing using an open-ended question. The total sample included 19,404 respondents. This number has been reduced to 15,321 after excluding incomplete or irregular answers. For estimating sample size reliability, the information on the total number of drivers in BiH was not available. However, considering there are approximately 800,000 registered vehicles in BiH, and assuming that this number is an approximation of the number of drivers, 15,321 survey responses amount to 1.9% of the driving population. From a statistical standpoint, this is a significant survey sample. The null hypothesis (H0) was: There is no statistically significant difference between user groups, with alternative hypothesis (Ha) being: There is significant statistical significance between user groups. The threshold for statistical significance (α) was set to 5%. Consequently, if probability (p) is smaller or equal to 0.05, H0 is rejected, and Ha is accepted. On the contrary, if p > 0.05, H0 is not rejected. The following six alternative hypotheses have been established.

• H1. There are statistically significant differences in WTP, as well as in MAP, considering weekday versus weekend motorway use. • H2. There are statistically significant differences in WTP, as well as in MAP, with respect to the origin of the vehicle. • H3. There are statistically significant differences in WTP, as well as in MAP, in relation to the trip purpose. • H4. There are statistically significant differences in WTP, as well as in MAP, with respect to the frequency of motorway usage. • H5. A monthly income category has statistically significant effect on users’ WTP, as well as MAP. • H6. Drivers' WTP is significantly different from MAP. As the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has determined that results do not significantly deviate from a normal distribution, the decision was to use Student’s T-test for H1 and H2, and ANOVA for H3 to H6. Dunnett’s T3 Post Hoc test has been used for additional comparison between WTP and MAP for H6, after determining homogeneity of results (Sig. < 0.05). Finally, logistic regression is used for predicting dependent variables for WTP and MAP.

5. Results Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for most of the survey questions. The highest percentage of respondents participated during the working day (86.5%), while 13.5% of respondents participated during the weekend. Vehicles with domestic registration plates constituted a majority, with a share of 90.4%. Considering this distribution, it is logical that most drivers use the motorway daily (35.4%) or weekly (32.3%), with a smaller percentage of drivers using the motorway monthly (21.6%), annually (9.6%) and for the first/second time (1.2%). The information on the average distances users travel in relationship to the frequency was obtained in post analysis, since the respondents have only provided an approximate origin, destination, and route of their trip. The total average of the distance travelled is 98.7 km. Average distances decrease from yearly to daily travellers, with values of 241.7, 142.6, 95.1, and 31.8 km, respectively. The highest percentage of trips had business trip purpose (38%), while work/school trips constituted 23.1%. 83

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Table 1 Summary descriptive statistics for some of the survey questions. Day Country of origin Trip purpose

How often do you use this road?

Working day Weekend Domestic Foreign Going to work/school Shopping and recreation Business trip Other Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly first/second time

86.5% 13.5% 90.4% 9.6% 23.1% 13.3% 38.0% 25.6% 35.4% 32.3% 21.6% 9.6% 1.2%

What is your monthly income group?

How much would you pay for 30 min travel time savings, expressed in €?

At what price will you recede use of the motorway, expressed in €/100 km?

< 400 € 401–600 € 601–1250 € 1251–1850 € > 1850 € Would not pay

56.1% 27.5% 11.5% 2.8% 2.1% 19.3%

0–2 € 2–5 € 5–10 € > 10 € Would not pay 0–2 € 2–5 € 5–10 € > 10 €

57.5% 19.4% 1.9% 1.9% 4.5% 37.7% 45.0% 7.7% 5.2%

> 10 €

Weekend

M AP

5-10 €

Working day

2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay > 10 € 5-10 €

WTP

Price category

Table 1 also shows results for the questions related to WTP and MAP. Considering the WTP question, the highest percentage of respondents is willing to pay up to two euros (57.5%), while data also points to a somewhat high percentage of respondents strongly reluctant to pay any value whatsoever (19.3%). The smallest number of respondents (1.9%) are willing to pay between five and ten euros, or more than ten euros. Considering the MAP question, the highest percentage of users (45%) would recede from using the motorway if the price is higher than five euros, with 4.5% of users again explicitly stating they would not pay the road toll. The answers to the income question provide important context, as the majority of the respondents (56.1%) has monthly income smaller than €400, while only 2.1% of respondents has monthly income higher than €1850. Fig. 3 shows the relationship between day of travel and WTP and MAP value categories. From this figure, one can conclude that there is a larger percentage of users that are not willing to pay road pricing while traveling during weekend (27.9%) as opposed to the trips being made during the workday (17.9%). A similar relationship exists for the MAP question, with those unwilling to pay during the weekend amounting to 5.9%, while those unwilling to pay during the weekday amounting to 4.2%. In addition, for both WTP and MAP, there is a higher percentage of those willing to pay up to €2 for travelling during the weekend. On the contrary, a higher percentage of those willing to pay more than €2 are those traveling during the weekday. For both travel during weekday and weekend, one can observe the higher number of responses selecting the higher price groups for MAP as compared to WTP. Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the percentage of respondents selecting WTP and MAP price categories in relation to the vehicle origin. For the WTP and MAP groups not willing to pay or willing to pay up to €2, a higher percentage of respondents is driving vehicles with domestic licence plates. On the contrary, higher percentages of respondents with foreign licence plates are selecting price categories above €2. For both vehicles with domestic and foreign licence plates, one can observe the higher percentages of respondents selecting the higher price groups for MAP as compared to WTP. However, the relative difference between respondents driving vehicles with domestic and foreign licence plates is increasing for price categories above €5, with domestic drivers rarely being willing to pay higher prices.

2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Percentage of respondents Fig. 3. Percentage of respondents selecting WTP and MAP price category in relation to the day of motorway use.

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> 10 € Foreign MAP

5-10 €

DomesƟc

2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay > 10 €

WTP

5-10 € 2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay Fig. 4. Percentage of respondents selecting WTP and MAP price category in relation to the vehicle origin.

> 10 €

Other Business trip Shoping and recreaƟon Going to work/school

M AP

5-10 € 2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay > 10 € 5-10 € WTP

Price category

Fig. 5 depicts the distribution of responses for WTP and MAP price categories in relation to the trip purpose. For both questions, one can observe a small variability in the percentage of respondents stating they are not willing to pay for all trip purposes. For the WTP question, the highest percentage of respondents would pay up to €2, with shopping and recreation being 61.3%, going to school/work 59%, business trip 56.3% and other 55.8%. On the contrary, the highest percentage of respondents for the MAP question selected the price category between €2 and €5, with going to school/work being 45.6%, business trip 45.1%, other 44.7%, and shopping and recreation 44%. Fig. 6 shows the percentage of respondents selecting WTP and MAP price category based on the frequency of roadway use. From this figure, one can conclude that roadway users with different roadway use frequencies are mainly selecting the price category up to €2 for WTP question. The distribution of MAP differs, as there is also a large percentage of respondents selecting the category €2 to €5. However, for both WTP and MAP, the relative differences between more and less frequent roadway users shows a shift after the €2 threshold. The higher percentages of respondents accepting higher price categories are those that are travelling less frequently. Fig. 7 shows the percentages of respondents selecting specific price categories for WTP and MAP question, classified according to their income. One can observe that there are higher percentages of the lowest income respondents selecting the lowest price category for WTP question. For the MAP question, this same user group is mainly present in the two lowest price categories, up to €5. Moreover, the lowest income users are most often stating they are not accepting to pay road pricing, with 21.7% for WTP, and 3.4% for MAP question. On the contrary, the distribution of responses from the higher income respondents is skewed towards the higher price categories. In addition, responses to the open-ended question from those respondents answering “Would not pay” included very strong statements, such as “I would surely not pay”, “I would pay nothing”, “I would never pay”, and “I will not use this road”. Cross comparison of results indicate that approximately 75% of respondents answering “would not pay” for MAP question have also stated “would not pay” for WTP question. This clearly identifies a stable percentage of potential users that are absolutely not accepting to pay road toll.

2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay 0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Percentage of respondents Fig. 5. Percentage of respondents selecting WTP or MAP price category in relation to trip purpose.

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> 10 €

First/second Ɵme Monthly Daily

5-10 € M AP

Price category

D. Glavic et al.

Yearly Weekly

2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay > 10 €

WTP

5-10 € 2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay 0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Percentage of respondents

MAP

Price category

Fig. 6. Percentage of respondents selecting WTP or MAP price category in relation to frequency of roadway use.

> 10 €

>1850€

1251-1850€

5-10 €

401-600€

<400€

601-1250€

2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay > 10 €

WTP

5-10 € 2-5 € 0-2 € Would not pay 0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Percentage of respondents Fig. 7. Percentage of respondents selecting WTP or MAP price category in relation to income class.

Fig. 8 depicts a relationship between the WTP and MAP as income percentage compared to the respondent’s monthly income group. This figure infers that respondents with higher monthly income are willing to pay a smaller amount percentagewise for using the motorway compared to respondents with low monthly income. However, one should note that absolute WTP in euros had a general increasing trend with the increase in the income. Table 2 below shows the results from Student’s T-test for the travel day in the week, as well as the origin of vehicle’s registration plate. This table indicates that there are significant statistical differences for WTP (t = 18.745; p = 0.000) and MAP (t = 19.380;

Percentage of income (%)

100% 90%

WTP

80%

MAP

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

300

500

925 Income (€)

1550

2275

Fig. 8. Relationship between the respondent’s monthly income, WTP, and MAP.

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Table 2 Students’ T-test for day in the week and the origin of vehicle’s registration plate.

Day

Country of origin

How much would you pay for 30 min travel time savings, expressed in €? At what price will you recede use of the motorway, expressed in €/100 km? (…use of THIS motorway?) How much would you pay for 30 min travel time savings, expressed in €? At what price will you recede use of the motorway, expressed in €/100 km? (…use of THIS motorway?)

working day weekend working day weekend domestic foreign domestic foreign

Mean

Std. Deviation

F

t

Sig. (2-tailed)

2.142 1.827 2.773 2.402 2.058 2.452 2.663 3.198

0.807 0.629 0.858 0.876 0.765 0.929 0.837 1.027

80.907

18.745

0

0.06

19.38

0

299.604

−19.451

0

69.567

−22.85

0

p = 0.000) based on the day in the week of motorway use, and that consequently H1 should be accepted. The reason for this might be a high percentage of trip purpose including business and work/school trips. In addition, this table shows that there are statistically significant differences for WTP (t = −19.451; p = 0.000) and MAP (t = −22.850; p = 0.000) taking into consideration the origin of the vehicle’s registration plate. Thus, base H2 is accepted, pointing to the difference related to vehicle’s country of registration. The explanation for this might be similar to the previous information from Fig. 4, which indicates higher willingness of foreign drivers to pay higher toll price. Table 3 shows ANOVA test results for WTP and MAP. This table points out several important information:

• There is a significant statistical difference for trip purpose when compared to WTP (F = 3.793; p = 0.004) and MAP (F = 7.581; p = 0.000). Thus, H3 is accepted. • There is a significant statistical difference for trip frequency when compared to WTP (F = 90.855; p = 0.000) and MAP (F = 117.546; p = 0.000). Consequently, H4 is accepted. • There is a significant statistical difference for monthly income group, related to WTP (F = 87.646; p = 0.000) and MAP (F = 94.347; p = 0.000), resulting in accepting H5. • There is a significant statistical difference when comparing MAP to WTP (F = 764.373; p = 0.000). As a result, H6 is accepted. Table 4 shows the results from Dunnett’s T3 Post Hoc test for detailed comparison of WTP and MAP. This test indicates significant statistical differences for almost all the values, except when the MAP is €5 to €10, and WTP is greater than €10, and vice versa. Similarly to the results from Table 3, this indicates that users differentiate between WTP and MAP. In essence, respondents are more willing to pay certain maximum toll value, rather than dedicate additional money to savings in travel time. Table 5 below shows odds ratios from the logistic regression for both WTP and MAP questions, with confidence intervals of 98%. The day of the week, vehicle country of origin, trip purpose, and frequency of motorway use are predicting variables. The final model for WTP has the following parameters χ 2 = 1110.983, df = 6, p < 0.000, pseudo RN2 = 0.126, and correct classification in 83.2% of cases. The final model for MAP has the following parameters χ 2 = 922.63, df = 6, p < 0.000, pseudo RN2 = 0.216, and correctly classifies in 95.6% of cases. Considering that odds ratio are greater than one, one can conclude that the exposure is associated with higher odds of outcome. However, in both models, the least important factor is trip purpose. In addition, there is a strong interdependence between WTP and MAP. Fig. 9 shows a relationship between average WTP value and monthly income. Linear regression indicates the following relationship:

y = 0.0014x + 1.4043

(1)

where x is the monthly income as an independent variable, while y is average WTP value as a dependent variable. This equation, with Table 3 ANOVA test for WTP and MAP. Factor question

Dependent question

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

How much would you pay for 30 min travel time savings, expressed in €?

Trip purpose H3 How often do you use this road? H4 What is your monthly income group? H5 At what price will you recede use of the motorway, expressed in €/100 km? (MAP) H6 Trip purpose How often do you use this road? H3 What is your monthly income group? H5 How much would you pay for 30 min travel time savings, expressed in €? (WTP) H6

94.842 369.072 298.319 1.401.993

4 4 4 4

23.710 92.268 74.580 350.498

3.793 90.855 87.646 764.373

0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000

201.037 492.215 331.632 1.401.993

4 4 4 4

50.259 123.054 82.908 350.498

7.581 117.546 94.347 764.373

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

At what price will you recede use of the motorway, expressed in €/100 km? (…use of THIS motorway?)

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Table 4 Dunnett’s T3 Post Hoc test for WTP and MAP. Dependent Variable

Toll rate

would not pay

How much would you pay for 30 min travel time savings, expressed in €?

0.1–2 euros

2–5 euros

5–10 euros

> 10 euros

At what price will you recede use of the motorway, expressed in €/100 km? (… use of THIS motorway?)

Mean Difference (I-J)

0.1–2 euros 2–5 euros 5–10 euros > 10 euros would not pay 2–5 euros 5–10 euros > 10 euros would not pay 0.1–2 euros 5–10 euros > 10 euros would not pay 0.1–2 euros 2–5 euros > 10 euros would not pay 0.1–2 euros 2–5 euros 5–10 euros

−0.41731 −0.77782 −1.25390 −1.32272 0.41731 −0.36051 −0.83659 −0.90541 0.77782 0.36051 −0.47608 −0.54490 1.25390 0.83659 0.47608 −0.069 1.32272 0.90541 0.54490 0.069

Std. Error

0.030 0.030 0.038 0.053 0.030 0.011 0.026 0.045 0.030 0.011 0.026 0.045 0.038 0.026 0.026 0.051 0.053 0.045 0.045 0.051

Sig.

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.852 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.852

95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound

Upper Bound

−0.501 −0.862 −1.360 −1.471 0.334 −0.391 −0.908 −1.032 0.694 0.330 −0.549 −0.672 1.148 0.765 0.404 −0.211 1.174 0.779 0.418 −0.073

−0.334 −0.694 −1.148 −1.174 0.501 −0.330 −0.765 −0.779 0.862 0.391 −0.404 −0.418 1.360 0.908 0.549 0.073 1.471 1.032 0.672 0.211

Table 5 Logistic regression odds ratios for WTP and MAP.

WTP (€)

Day of the week Country of origin Trip purpose Road use frequency Income MAP WTP

WTP

MAP

1.980 (0.452–0.565) 1.378 (1.135–1.673) 1.045 (0.985–1.108) 1.090 (1.039–1.143) 1.154 (1.093–1.218) 13.890 (11.491–16.790) /

1.050 (0.771–1.178) 1.010 (0.678–1.457) Not significant 1.157 (1.156–1.268) 1.120 (1.009–1.243) / 13.825 (11.440–16.707)

5 5 4 4

y = 0.0014x + 1.4043 R² = 0.9718

3 3 2 2 1 1 0

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500 Income (€)

Fig. 9. Linear relationship between monthly income and average WTP.

an error smaller than 3%, indicates how much respondents are willing to pay for travel time savings of 30 min over 100 km in relation to their monthly income. Using linear regression as in the case of the previous figure, Fig. 10 shows a relationship between monthly income and average MAP. Linear regression indicates a following relationship:

y = 0.0025x + 2.5966

(2)

where x is monthly income as an independent variable, while y is average MAP as a dependent variable. This equation, with an error smaller than 2%, indicates the maximum toll price per 100 km would influence respondents not to use the motorway in relation to their monthly income. 88

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MAP (€)

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9 8 7

y = 0.0025x + 2.5966 R² = 0.9873

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

0

1000

500

1500

2000

2500

Income (€) Fig. 10. Linear relationship between monthly income and average MAP.

Fig. 11 depicts a percentage of motorway usage in relation to a suggested price, analogous to economic demand supply curves. The curves in light blue and light red are analogous to the demand curves, and depict the distribution of users that accept certain toll price per 100 km. From this figure, one can observe the intersecting points between the distribution line and suggested price lines, and determine a percentage of users that accept a certain toll price. In fact, the area between the two curves represents the search space for an acceptable toll price. For example, establishing a price between €2 and €3 might be acceptable for 80–95% of users, as a range of values between WTP and MAP values. On the contrary, establishing toll price at €5 might reduce the acceptance rate to a range from 23% to 58%. Figs. 12 and 13 show a percentage of motorway use for different monthly income, taking into account fixed toll price, for WTP and MAP questions, respectively. Five monthly income categories are presented, as variable demand curves. Assuming a fixed supply curve that represents toll price, one can determine the demand, i.e., the percentage of users with different income that decide to use tolled motorway. Logically, the results from these figures show that the higher the income, the higher the percentage of using the motorway with higher road toll value.

6. Conclusions and recommendations 6.1. Discussion of findings The survey results highlight several important findings. The most important finding is that users have a range of hypothetical borderline prices. However, the majority of respondents accepts road tolls prices up to €5, with less than 4% of respondents that are willing to pay more than this value. The estimated average value for road toll is around €2. Furthermore, the results inform us that acceptability and toll price vary based on several indicators, as all six alternative hypothesis are accepted (Tables 2–5). First, a higher percentage of respondents is not willing to pay road toll during weekends, as opposed to weekdays (Fig. 3). In depth analysis for WTP and MAP in relation to day in the week informs us that trip purpose could have an effect. For example, weekend trips are dominated by shopping and recreation trip purpose, with 67.0%, 63.6%, 56.0%, and 66.5%, for WTP pay, WTP not pay, MAP pay, and MAP not pay, respectively. On the contrary, working day trips with going to work/school and business trip purpose amount to around one third each. Moreover, from the results in Table 5, one can conclude that traveling during work day implies almost double WTP (1.98), to those trips in the weekend. Second, domestic drivers are willing to dedicate smaller amounts for travel time savings and use of the motorway when compared to foreign drivers (Fig. 4). This is also confirmed with the logistic regression, as foreign drivers are willing to dedicate 1.38 times higher value to WTP compared to domestic drivers. Third, the trip purpose itself has a rather small effect on

Percentage of roadway users

100 90

WTP

80

MAP

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0

2

5

10

>10

Toll rate (€) Fig. 11. Percentage of motorway usage with suggested prices.

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Percentage of users of the highway

100% 90%

<400€

80%

401-600€

70%

601-1250€

60% 50%

1251-1850€

40%

>1850€

30% 20% 10% 0% 0

2

10

5

>10

Toll rate [€]

Percentage of users of the highway

Fig. 12. Percentage of motorway use for different monthly income and fixed toll rate (WTP). 100% 90%

<400€

80%

401-600€

70% 60%

601-1250€

50%

1251-1850€

40%

>1850€

30% 20% 10% 0% 0

2

5

10

>10

Toll rate [€] Fig. 13. Percentage of motorway use for different monthly income and fixed toll rate (MAP).

WTP and MAP estimates, to the point that it can be neglected. Fourth, those users who travel more frequently are less willing to pay higher toll rate (Fig. 6). Besides the information on factors and values for WTP and MAP, it is important to underline that 19.3% of respondents are explicitly not willing to pay for travel time savings (WTP). In addition, 4.5% of respondents are explicitly not willing to pay in relation to losing access to motorway (MAP). Cross comparison informs us about a stable percentage of users who absolutely do not accept road toll, as 75% of those not willing to pay for MAP are also not willing to pay for WTP. Moreover, there are more of those respondents who are not willing to pay for traveling during weekend as opposed to weekday. In addition, it is important to highlight the relationship between the income category and stated unwillingness to pay for road pricing. Results inform us that 21.7% of respondents from the lowest income category were explicitly not willing to pay for road pricing, in relation to the WTP question. Similarly, the percentage of those unwilling to pay in relation to WTP questions for other income categories ranges from 13.3% to 16.9%. This group of potential users who are explicitly not willing to pay for motorway should be accounted for having in mind an issue of “rat running”. Considering a high percentage of users explicitly stating that they are not willing to pay for road tolls, “rat running” is one of the potential externalised effects. An obvious issue arising from “rat running” could be a severe degradation of traffic safety due to the low development of the secondary roadway network. Thus, this is an important aspect that transport planners in BiH should account in the road toll scheme and further analysis. The role that income has in explaining the low average road toll estimate and high percentage of those not accepting road toll is of particular interest in the context of transition countries. Figure such as Fig. 7 clearly show the relationship between income and selected WTP/MAP price categories. In addition to Fig. 7, other Figs. 8, 9, and 10, inform us that respondents with higher monthly income more often select higher price categories. Furthermore, the income effect can be inferred from the differences between domestic and foreign users. The absolute borderline for road toll for over 95% of domestic drivers is five euros, while a larger share of foreign respondents accepts a higher road toll. This strong relationship between stated road toll price and income is not the usual case in previous research on road pricing. However, an obvious explanation for the probable influencing factors is the value of monthly income itself, which is relatively low. As the survey results show, 56.1% of respondents have reported that their monthly income is lower than €400. To put this value in perspective, one should compare it to the average monthly income in the EU and US, which ranges from €3000 to €4000. Thus, it is evident that very low income that the majority of respondents, and BiH citizens in general have, relates to the low valuation of travel time itself. Besides the potential low valuation of the travel time itself, one additional factor that should be accounted for in explaining the low estimate for road toll is the citizens’ understanding of costs and benefits. As previous research informs us, WTP values are often difficult to estimate, as users often underestimate their WTP for actual time savings, or misunderstand costs and benefits involved (Small, 2012). These misunderstandings have also been identified to originate from considering time-related congestion costs as internal and not external (Grieco and Jones, 1994), and from difficulty in understanding the issues of systems efficiency (Viegas,

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2001). On the contrary, one should note that survey questions did not include specific references to other elements besides travel time, such as accident risks or fuel costs. Omitting these questions might have affected the acceptance of road pricing and estimation of toll rate. Moreover, one possible explanation for road price values might be the status quo bias, since using the road network was previously free in BiH. Besides the status quo bias, lack of viable alternative transport modes, such as the long distance rail network, could also be one of the factors affecting users’ perception on road pricing. As this survey used stated preference approach, a range of these and other limitations (e.g., in depth psychological factors) should be addressed in the future studies. Besides the effect of income, citizens’ understanding, and other psychological factors, an important set of factors shaping the perception towards road pricing might stem from the current socio-political situation in BiH. As highlighted in the third section, BiH has an undeveloped citizen sector, accompanied with the lack of trust in country’s public institutions. Observing the question of road pricing from the socio-political standpoint, it is important to highlight that trust is an essential element to introduction of road pricing policy (Ison, 1998). Thus, failing to prevent corruption in relation to revenue use will greatly undermine acceptability of road pricing schemes. A prime example of this lack of trust relates to the potential corruption related to toll revenue use, which can be exacerbated by similar negative examples from other SEE countries, where there were instances of organized toll revenue abuse. On the contrary, the interpretation of findings should account for the fact that explanation between the influence of road toll decision and the decision to build the motorway was not provided to the respondents. From the planning and policy-making perspective, findings provide an interesting conclusion of the difference between acceptable WTP and MAP values. This difference between WTP and MAP values is the strongest for the most acceptable price categories, i.e., up to €5. As mentioned in the methodology section, this difference is similar to the differences between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept. Moreover, respondents have consistently indicated a tendency for smaller toll price values for WTP as opposed to MAP question. One interpretation for this information is that respondents are more willing to pay certain maximum toll value, rather than dedicate additional money to savings in travel time. Nevertheless, rather than an average value, the concept of acceptable road price should be observed as a range of values, with WTP as the lower boundary values, and MAP as the upper boundary values. Figs. 11–13 are especially relevant for highlighting the importance of the range of values. For example, if we assume that toll price is 2.0€/100 km, for WTP, around 78% of users with monthly income of up to €400 would decide to use the motorway. However, this percentage of users is higher for users with monthly income greater than €1850, with around 88% (Fig. 12). On the contrary, if we assume that toll price is 2.0€/100 km for MAP, around 94% of users with monthly income of €400 would decide to use the motorway. However, this percentage of users rises for users with monthly income greater than €1850 to around 98% (Fig. 13). On the contrary, establishing toll price at €5 might reduce the acceptance rate to a range from 23% (WTP) to 58% (MAP) of the users. In addition to the fact that road price value should account for users’ acceptability, planners and policy-makers cannot neglect an important question of financial sustainability. As mentioned in the background section, road pricing is an important source for infrastructural funding (Deakin, 1989). This importance of road pricing as the funding source is even more highlighted in the context of country in transition. Similarly to other SEE countries in transition with motorway network, such as Serbia and Macedonia, BiH is facing a public funding deficit, which affects not just the construction but also the maintenance of the motorway network. Thus, planners can use the range between acceptable WTP and MAP values, and Figs. 11–13, to calculate the road price that satisfies both users’ and investment requirements. As an example, the results from the survey can be compared to current road prices in neighbouring country in transition, Serbia. Considering that an average income in Serbia is €360.35 (Anon., 2015a), an estimated road price for 100 km based on the relationship of monthly income to WTP would be €2.63. Comparing this value to the actual road price for motorway from Belgrade to Markovac (approximately 100 km) which is €2.54, the difference amounts to only 3.5%. Small difference thus indicates potential transferability of the results to other SEE countries in transition. 6.2. Discussion of further policy learning efforts Considering that this is an initial research in BiH and SEE region, extensive further efforts are needed to help establish a comprehensive policy package on road user charging. However, since survey findings point to a unique case of high number of citizens that are potentially both time- and money-poor, as well as taking into account the context of reform towards a deliberative democracy in BiH, three overall themes for planning and policy-making are highlighted. 6.2.1. The analysis of road tolling principles and technologies Survey findings have informed us that individual’s income capacity has a significant role in perceptions of acceptable road price values. Thus, in addition to a focus solely on the one acceptable road toll price, previous international experiences should be taken into consideration, including defining toll value based on the level of congestion, time in day or week, number of charged passes, toll location, or vehicle and propulsion type (Langmyhr, 1997; Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002; King et al., 2007; Rouhani et al., 2015). Further analysis of the applicability of these tolling schemes in BiH should take into account that the current state of road pricing technology provides capabilities to introduce sophisticated charging mechanisms (Hensher and Puckett, 2005). 6.2.2. The analysis of toll revenue allocation Previous research identifies several recommendation related to allocation of toll revenue, including (Jones, 1991; Small, 1992a, 1992b; Deakin et al., 1996; Langmyhr, 1997; Ison, 1998, 2000; Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002; Santos and Rojey, 2004; King et al., 2007; Welch and Mishra, 2014):

• Investment in the entire transport system; 91

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• Investment specifically in the public transport, pedestrian or bicycling facilities; • Distribution back to travellers; • Distribution to cities where motorways are located; • Reduction in general taxes used to fund transport infrastructure, such as gas tax; • Avoiding compensating losers or reduction in general taxes. Taking into account the survey findings and previous experiences informing us that equitable revenue allocation can be important for overcoming political resistance (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002), there is a need for further analysis of revenue allocation options in BiH. First, further policy analysis should focus on options for revenue allocation to both infrastructural investment and maintenance, and for providing alternatives for long-distance travel, such as railway network. In addition, the analysis of revenue allocation, both from the financial and political standpoint, should compare at least two alternative options. One option is the revenue allocation to the municipalities through which motorway passes, in line with recommendations by King et al. (2007). Taking into account the significant political fragmentation and weak role of the state in BiH, a second comparison option is revenue allocation to the state government, as an opportunity to focus political consensus on the federal interest. In each of these potential alternatives, the analysis will have to include legal limitations for toll revenue redistribution.

6.2.3. The development of planning and policy-making processes In the case of BiH, a positive attitude towards road pricing among planners and politicians might originate from the potential revenue source for the road network development, perceived as a support for country’s transition to the EU membership. However, a significant source of risk is the limited expertise of public administration, both with regard to the evidence base as well as planning and policy-making processes. In order to further the process of reform and successfully introduce road pricing in clear transition stages, there is a need for a close collaboration between politicians and transport planners. As two key stakeholders influencing road pricing planning and implementation, politicians and planners will need to enhance their institutional capacity through a discussion on a range of dimensions affecting road pricing implementation. As previously stated, the findings provided by this research are only a starting point for the decision-making evidence base. Thus, there is an essential need for further analysis of inter-personal and intra-personal variation of road pricing acceptability, including cultural and psychological effects. This would particularly help in understanding the factors affecting road pricing acceptability, such as mobility-related norms. Moreover, using further survey of stated and revealed preferences with a range of travel scenarios (e.g., different trip distances or destinations), should also enable modelling the behavioural change and distributional effects from the introduced road pricing. This analysis should help planners and politicians understand the potential opposition from the losers (Small, 1992a, 1992b). Moreover, further analysis should inform the public discourse on road pricing, shifting it away from the focus on investments towards the increased visibility of other benefits, such as safety and environmental improvements. In relation to the need to further professionalise and increase accountability of public institutions, there is a need for advancing the mechanisms for pluralistic public discourse on normative questions. Thus, besides the cooperation between planners and politicians, all the political and interest groups, and the general public in particular should be included in the planning processes (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002). Including participatory mechanisms in planning is important as losers mobilize more easily than winners (Ison, 1998). Thus, enabling deliberation among all the concerned stakeholders ensures a balanced consideration of a range of societal goals (Pahaut and Sikow, 2006; Ungemah, 2007; Levinson, 2010). However, due to the current lack of participatory mechanisms in BiH, the momentum from losers might present a risk for disobedience of road pricing schemes. Consequently, the current practice of non-transparent and non-accessible discussions will gradually need to change. In order to achieve process equity during deliberation, it is important for decision-makers to pay special attention to the transparency of decision processes (Levinson, 2010). Moreover, it is important to discuss acceptability of road pricing simultaneously with evaluating its effectiveness, including both time, money, safety, and environmental effects (Ungemah, 2007). This way, transport planners will consider both outcome and process equity, while public will reduce uncertainty related to the effects of road pricing (Hensher and Li, 2013). In developing deliberation-based planning mechanisms, and following the liberal line of thought, transport planners should particularly listen to voiceless and powerless citizens, as well as evaluate impacts on these groups. Ultimately, the process of road pricing planning strongly relates to a healthy civil society in the context of democratic development in BiH. In addition to the opportunity to develop country’s infrastructure, or support economic development, this large infrastructural scheme can be an important exercise of participatory democracy. However, what politicians should not expect is that citizens’ deliberation should always lead to a general agreement of views. In Rawls’ words, “Citizens learn and profit from debate and argument, and when their arguments follow public reason, they instruct society's political culture and deepen their understanding of one another even when agreement cannot be reached.” (Rawls, 2005) Consequently, both decision-makers and citizens will have to engage in potentially lengthy deliberation processes. This is perhaps a difficult, but rather, a necessary learning exercise for simultaneously implementing effective infrastructure, and aiding the development of BiH civil society in general.

Acknowledgement The authors acknowledge the constructive comments of two anonymous reviewers, which have helped in significantly improving this paper. 92

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