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Russian women in Kyrgyzstan
Pergamon
Women's Studies International Forum, Vol. 19, Nos. 1/2, pp. 125-132, 1996 Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in the USA. All fights reserved 0277-5395/96 $15.00 + .00
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RUSSIAN WOMEN
IN KYRGYZSTAN Coping with New R e a l i t i e s
NATALYA KOSMARSKAYA Moscow Centre for Gender Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, ul. Krasikova 27, Moscow 117218, Russia
Synopsis - - This article, based on intensive fieldwork carried out in two villages in northern Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan between 1992 and 1994, examines interethnic relations in this republic of the former Soviet Union. It looks, in particular, at the position of the local Russian-speaking diaspora as it copes with the challenges of the new realities it faces. Some historical background, as well as Kyrgyz views on the status of women, religion, mixed marriages, and language, contribute to understanding Russian adaptive strategies and attitudes. The articles portrays the situation as it is perceived by women, who are usually more "visible" than men and are more active and influential agents of interethnic communication.
The position of the huge Russian-speaking diaspora in the national republics of the former Soviet Union has already proved to be one of the most painful and politically sensitive problems of Russia's development today. According to the last All-Union Population Census (1989), there are about 25 million ethnic Russians living in the so-called "near abroad." Outside Russia, there are another 11 million people whose nationality is not officially Russian, but who consider Russian to be their native language. Outbursts of interethnic confrontation in the new independent states, and the resulting gradual rise in the migrational expectations of these Russian-speakers, threaten serious socio-economic and political destabilisation in Russia itself. This is even more likely, given that the newly-born, extreme-right nationalist parties who did so well in the December 1993 parliamentary elections openly used this trump-card in their struggle for power.
The importance o f developing balanced policies based on in-depth social research cannot be overstated here. Unfortunately, the positions presented by the mass media and the academic community in Russia are often too general, too simplistic. They paint a picture of discrimination of all kinds against Russians and of the rapid rise o f local nationalisms, together with Islamic fundamentalism, in the case of Central Asia. In my view, such a generalised analysis should be replaced by microlevel studies, as the situation varies substantially from one country to another and even within one country. For example, there are striking distinctions between the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. Using a microlevel approach, one can see that the nationalism of the "titular" ethnic group is undergoing dramatic change in both values and economic realities, as is the case everywhere in the former USSR. How does this "return to ethnicity" manifest itself in present-day independent Kyrgyzstan, on the level of both official policy and everyday interethnic contact? What is the socio-psychological atmosphere in which Russians find themselves? How do they perceive the situation and cope with it? What options are open to them? The following is an attempt to address these questions. It is based on intensive field research
Sincere acknowledgements are due to my friends and colleagues from the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, who shared with me the joys and sorrows of fieldwork, and commented generously on the manuscript. I would also like to thank the British Council for its support of my research at the School of Social Sciences, University of Greenwich, London and my colleagues from the School, Dr. Nira YuvaI-Davis in particular. Their contribution to my better knowledge of gender and ethnicity in the European context inspired me greatly while writing this article. 125
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conducted in two villages on the northern shores of the I s s y k - K u l lake in May 1993, with a preparatory pilot survey carded out in October 1992 and a third follow-up visit in September 1994. The villages are located 25 and 40 kilometres, respectively, from Cholpon-Ata, the district centre, and about 300 kilometres from Bishkek, the county capital. Their population, ethnically mixed, varies from 2,500 to 4,000 people. The programme in which I was involved was called "Ethnicity: the Women's Dimension," part of a larger project entitled "Ethnic Conflict and the Rise of Ethnic Consciousness in the former USSR" begun in 1992 under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The interethnic situation will be shown as it is perceived by women. Men's views will provide a comparative background. As well as using questionnaires, I collected life stories and conducted in-depth interviews with Russian women adapting to their new role as members of an ethnic minority, and K y r g y z w o m e n experiencing a rise in their national aspirations. Why women? In countries enjoying relative political stability such as Kyrgyzstan, people's socio-psychological equilibrium depends less on political events in the capital than on local circumstances in which women play a large role. It is mainly women who find themselves in the very demanding role of "contact person" or "ambassador," irrespective of whether they belong to the ethnic m a j o r i t y or minority grouping. The fact that a very high rate of economic activity was typical for Soviet women (over 80% were in paid employment in 1989) is only part of the explanation. Traditional roles still prevail in both Kyrgyz and Russian ex-Soviet families and so childcare and housework are still seen as women's duties. Women, extensively involved as they are in contact routines outside the home - - dealing with neighbours, shop assistants, schoolteachers, doctors, kindergarten nurses (all of whom are usually women as well) - - are, in practice, more "visible" than men, more active and influential agents of interethnic relations. This is particularly true in the villages, with life usually in the public eye, and with usually only one shop, m a r k e t p l a c e , hospital, and kindergarten, if any. Women's success or failure at finding the right tone in everyday interethnic communication may contribute substantially to the socio-psychological climate within both family and community.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT Kyrgyzstan, formerly a republic of the USSR, and independent since 1991, is situated in Central Asia, mainly within the western and central parts of the Tien Shan mountain range. Its neighbouring countries are Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China. The territory where the Kyrgyz are the indigenous population became part of the Russian empire in the 1860s and 1870s and Russians have settled there ever since. This process was further stimulated under the Soviet regime, when people were moved in large numbers to the periphery of that enormous country, in order to transmit new cultures and ideologies and to build up industry. As a result, Kyrgyzstan became a multinational republic: The Russian-speaking population, including Ukrainians and Germans as well as "true" Russians, is still, despite the gradual increase of emigration in recent years, the largest non-Kyrgyz group in Kyrgyzstan (21.9% of the population in 1993), followed by Uzbeks (13.5%) (Svobodnye Gory, 1993, p. 1). Local nomadic tribes had long been patronized and deeply influenced by the Russian empire. Kyrgyz from the Issyk-Kul region initiated contacts with their powerful neighbouring state and became the first to apply for and receive official Russian citizenship in 1855. It was precisely here, in the north, that the newcomers f r o m Russia settled and where the Russian-speaking population is most densely concentrated. Many of them were peasants, attracted by the favourable climate and fertile soils of northern Kyrgyzstan, and these peasant settlers have made Kyrgyzstan very different from the other Central Asian republics, which do not have such a high number of Russians p e a k e r s as rural dwellers (about 30% in Kyrgyzstan, according to the last All-Union Population Census, as opposed to 3 - 6 % in Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan) (Panarin, 1993, p. 315). An additional reason for choosing the IssylKul north shore as a research area is that, after World War II, it developed its potential as a health and holiday resort area, together with the creation of modern transport and communication systems. L o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d links with Russia are stamped on the memories of several generations of Issyk-Kul Kyrgyz, and their extensive contacts with Russians, both local residents and
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holidaymakers, contributed greatly to their ethnic tolerance, openness and good knowledge of the Russian language. This is the first factor worth noting as favourable for Russian assimilation and their current adaptation to the changing socio-ethnic environment. The next two factors concern women's status and religion.
extra-marital love affairs, and illegitimate births were among these matters. Interestingly, although there are some differences between the positions and attitudes o f Russian and Kyrgyz women, they do not seem to be of a fundamental nature: Women provide a promising basis for interethnic dialogue.
W O M E N ' S STATUS
RELIGION Compared with the other peoples of Central Asia, the Kyrgyz have always been famous for being the "worst" believers and the most tolerant of women's freedom in the family and society. These related phenomena are deeply-rooted in the age-old nomadic way of life in the mountains, an existence hardly compatible with women's seclusion and the scrupulous implementation of Muslim rituals. This contrasts with southern Kyrgyzstan, where there are very few Russians and other Europeans, and which has, for centuries, been a frontier contact zone between the nomadic and the settied agricultural civilizations strictly adherent to Islam, whose influence on the local Kyrgyz is growing slowly but steadily. A noticeable return to religious values and even the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in some parts of Central and Western Asia has not brought any tangible changes to northern Kyrgyzstan. Along with ancient Kyrgyz beliefs, Islam is part of a ritual culture returning to life, and part of ideal patterns of everyday behaviour, seen as providing eternal human values. There is no question of Islam turning into a modus vivendi of the native population or, even more, into a guide to political militancy. In the words of the village mullah, "We should not divide the people into Muslims and Christians, there is only one God for all." What is striking about my village research data, is that the respondents are much less wellinformed about the fundamentals of their religion than one might expect, with Islamic and pre-Islamic rituals being mixed in their minds. Of 43 men and 30 women interviewed in depth, only 7.1% and 10% respectively said that they read the Koran on a regular basis. The majority (53.4% and 63.3%) have never read it, but have only heard fragments read aloud. Both men and women were strongly opposed to the idea of an Islamic state in Kyrgyzstan. The women usually reacted very emotionally, saying that they did not want to wear veils or be subordinate to men. Only two men in the sample (the village
As early as the second half of the 19th century, Russian explorers and travellers visiting northern Kyrgyzstan noted the relatively high status of women. Observers of that period re,oorded that: Kyrgyz wives work from dawn till night in their yurts and nomad tents, but they are far from being slaves and are treated with great r e s p e c t . . , women run the house independently and, when outdoors, they do not wear veils, enjoying the same freedom as their husbands. (Russian explorers and travellers, 1973, pp. 185, 196) As President Askare Akayev recently put it: The mentality of the Kyrgyz people is not just very different from that of our neighbours, but is an amalgamation of European and Asian consciousness; we are very openhearted, tolerant and, perhaps, the only oriental nation whose women enjoy rights very similar to those of Europeans. (Sem'ya, 1993, p. 5) My village observations confirm this point. When asked to define quickly and in only one word the main feature of Kyrgyz women's character, only six o f the 30 women interviewed spoke of "obedience" and "dependency." Moreover, it would appear that five of this small group mentally contrasted Kyrgyz and Russian women, defining Russian women as "independent," "emancipated," and "resolute." Eighteen respondents gave very different answers: "hospitality," "flexibility in communication," "patience," "diligence," and the remaining respondents did not answer. Village women of different ages and educational status did not seem to be shy or embarrassed when discussing with me matters so delicate that they could not even be touched upon in a conversation between a stereotyped "oriental" woman and a stranger. Abortion, divorce,
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mullah's nephew and an elderly teacher) were able to name easily the five "pillars of Muslim faith" (the profession of faith, the prayer ceremony, giving alms to the poor, keeping the annual fast of the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca to be undertaken at least once in a lifetime). Nine men named two or three of these items, seven could name one while the other male respondents were hesitant about answering. Women's notions of the core of Muslim faith were even more vague: only four of them mentioned one or two of the principles. The others improvised freely, most often naming general moral principles of human behaviour similar to the biblical commandments, as well as the necessity of keeping the body clean and showing respect to the elderly. Bearing this in mind, we should be cautious in our interpretation of the fact that 74.4% of the men and 73.3% of the women replied positively to the question: "Do you consider yourself to be a Muslim?" Being Kyrgyz appears to be more crucial for the respondents than being Muslim as the following survey data illustrated. About half of the respondents said that they would prefer the President of Kyrgyzstan to be a Muslim; 28.9% of the men and 41.5% of the women considered that their immediate superior should also be a Muslim. But of the same respondents, 81.4% of men and 80% of women thought that the President of Kyrgyzstan should be Kyrgyz by nationality, while 40% of men and 62.1% of women would want their immediate superior to be Kyrgyz, bearing out our contention that women attach greater importance than men to national rather than religious characteristics. In short, religion cannot be considered as an indispensable element of national identity in present-day Kyrgyzstan. The "titular" ethnic group seems to be more sensitive to the existing distinctions along ethnic lines (Kyrgyz-nonKyrgyz) than to the religious affiliations of their ethnic partners. "Anatomizing" this sensitivity was one of my priority tasks, the more so since Kyrgyz "nationalism" appeared to be at the core of the Russians' pessimism and anxiety about their future. R E T U R N T O E T H N I C VALUES The rapid rise of Kyrgyz ethnic consciousness is a reality. During my second visit, I was often asked - - with suspicion or curiosity - - "What
are you studying us for? It is a foreign country here now, isn't it?" A small boy, pacing back and forth on the Issyk-Kul express bus and repeating proudly '~VIama Kyrgyz! Papa Kyrgyzl" seemed to symbolize this attitude. On the one hand a positive and natural process, it is also a painful one in reaction to decades of oppression and forced "russification." So-called "everyday life" nationalism is g r o w i n g . T h e w o m e n , b o t h R u s s i a n and Kyrgyz, told me about the bickering and scandals between people of different ethnic groups standing in bread queues, getting into overcrowded buses, or wrangling over prices at the bazaar. This a p p a r e n t interethnic tension reported by respondents could, however, probably be explained in terms of economic competition under the pressure of market reforms, or psychological stresses which are very understandable in the present turmoil and struggle for survival. It is usually difficult to expose the rise of national aspirations by asking "frontal" or overly abstract questions in interviews. When asked, for example, about their attitudes toward other ethnic groups, people - - consciously or not - - try to conceal any particular antipathies they may have, and to demonstrate an "internationalist" approach. The results are much more revealing when a concrete, personalized situation is discussed. For example, when asked, "What would your reaction be to your son/daughter's possible marriage to a non-Kyrgyz (Russian, Uzbek, Tatar)?," the respondents reacted negatively often enough to take them as being rather "nationalistically-minded." Kyrgyz women's t h i n k i n g a b o u t their d a u g h t e r s ' m a r r i a g e seemed to be the most uncompromising. Only 14.3% of women rated their son's potential marriage to a non-Kyrgyz girl positively and 40% negatively, yet for 45.7%, the ethnicity of the future d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w did not matter much. When it was a question of a daughter's marriage to a non-Kyrgyz boy, the mothers' opinions were much more polarized: 6.3% positive, 75% negative, and 18.7% indifferent. When Kyrgyz men were asked about their daughters' marriage choices, their attitudes were somewhat less biased: 4.5% positive, 62.8% negative, and 36.6% indifferent to the ethnicity of the future son-in-law. Again, we must be circumspect in our interpretation of this quantitative data. We must
Russian Womenin Kyrgyzstan
bear in mind that the Kyrgyz lead the central Asian nations in terms of numbers of mixed marriages (in 1988-1989, the percentage was 14.3% of all Kyrgyz marriages, compared with 4.2% and 3.6% for Kazakh men and women respectively; 4.2% and 3.4% for Uzbeks; and 5.5% and 2.3% for Turkmens. [Information Bulletin, 1992, pp. 135-38]). Second, that "ingroup ethnic favouritism" is more relevant to Kyrgyz attitudes than "out-group negativism," in that the fact of being Kyrgyz was important while all n o n - K y r g y z ethnic groups were lumped together even though they differ substantially on ethnic and religious lines. In the few cases where distinctions were made (for example, in one case, marriage to a Tatar was considered positive while marriage to a Russian or an Uzbek was seen as negative), it could be explained on the individual grounds of a particular personal experience. Third, motivations which have little connection to national prejudices or preferences must be taken into account. Prevailing negative reactions towards a daughter's mixed marriage may result from a kind of psychological self-defence, as parents contemplate the undesirable effects that this marriage could have, most notably, the daughter's departure, possibly spending her whole life apart from her parents, relatives, friends, and native village. This problem lies in the Kyrgyz tradition that after the wedding, a woman must remove to her h u s b a n d ' s home. Few w o m e n could avoid the natural adaptive stress and discomfort which follow, especially after marriage to an outsider and not to a local resident. This may give a clue to the women's more frequent negative reaction, as compared with men: The men just commented very briefly, "I would not like our daughter to leave us," but the women, always more talkative during the interview than the men, seemed to add their own difficult personal experiences of postmarriage adaptation to their normal parental anxieties. THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM The rise of ethnic consciousness amongst the "titular" ethnic group is a multiform process. As well as the attitudes o b s e r v e d towards mixed marriages, the Kyrgyz are showing a growing interest in their language, culture, and history, together with a renaissance of traditional arts, handicrafts, and rituals. As early as 1989, Kyrgyz was proclaimed as the official
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language of Kyrgyzstan. Later, because of the technical and psychological difficulties of a full transition to Kyrgyz in education, health, services, publishing, and clerical work, implementation of this decision was postponed from 1997 to 2000. The p r o b l e m gained a new and pressing d i m e n s i o n on 5 M a y 1993, when the new C o n s t i t u t i o n o f K y r g y z s t a n was adopted. Despite the hopes of the local Russian diaspora, the Russian language was not granted the status of a means of interethnic communication (a very clumsy formula, created by post-Soviet realities and quite unknown in international law). The local Russian-speaking population was very disturbed by this, and perceived it as an infringement of their civil rights. I arrived in the Issyk-Kul region on 5 May 1993, and could see for myself how painful the perception of the language situation is for the Russians. It really was on everybody's lips. Together with "everyday" nationalism, they saw it as crucial for their future in Kyrgyzstan, for reasons which are as clear as day. Although a majority of the Russians of the Issyk-Kul area are descendants of the first settlers, with their fathers and grandfathers buried in this land, most of them do not speak Kyrgyz even at the minimal level of everyday exchange. They are not the exception. According to the 1989 Population Census, only a tiny proportion (1.2%) of all Russians living in Kyrgyzstan were fluent in the Kyrgyz language (Arutyunyan, 1992, p. 295). Although openness in communication with the native people, willingness to assimilate to Kyrgyz language, culture, and traditions m a y be of vital importance for those Russians in the area - - and they are still a majority - - who do not want to emigrate, the Russians seem to be psychologically poorly equipped to cope. If Kyrgyzstan followed Western experience, such as that of Finland, the language of the second largest ethnic minority would be the second official language. But with Kyrgyz nationalist feeling having been oppressed for so long, and with a powerful nationalist lobby in parliament, a solution of this kind appears quite utopian. T H E RUSSIAN V I E W OF T H E SITUATION: S E L F - I S O L A T I O N SYNDROME According to my observations, the c.ore of Russian women's survival strategies is self-isolation from
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the local Kyrgyz community. This worrying tendency can be observed both in their attitudes toward Kyrgyz language, culture, and traditions and in their prevailing mode of behaviour, which is expressed in a narrowing of everyday and professional contacts. Three variants of this syndrome revealed during my research are illustrated by individual stories. Natalya is a 20-year-old housewife. I call her and others like her "a mouse in a hole," exhibiting passive isolationism as a principal line of conduct. After her marriage, she found herself in a village with very few Russians. While she was on maternity leave, she lived within her four walls. Only other Russians are considered as potential friends or colleagues. As for the Kyrgyz language, she thinks that "it is too late [at her young age!] to learn it." When asked: "How do you overcome the language barrier?," Natalya answered, "I try my best to avoid any contact with them." Svetlana is a 38-year-old teacher of Russian in a Kyrgyz school, in which all subjects are taught in Kyrgyz. She has adopted a "warlike isolationism" in her attitudes toward Kyrgyz people. When attacked by "them," she is ready to resist actively: " I f we have to leave this place, we shall bum everything to ashes. They will get nothing!" She is energetic and communicative, but these skills are nonetheless not being used to find a common language with the native community: "It is a pity that the older generation of Russian-speaking Kyrgyz teachers are leaving school. It is difficult to set up contact with the younger ones. But, hopefully, I will manage without learning their language." It seems absurd for Russian women to teach Russian language and literature in Kyrgyz schools with only a few words of Kyrgyz in their vocabulary. They were uneasy in professional meetings and had difficulty in teaching small children who did not know any Russian. The Director has already dropped hints about possible dismissal from school if they do not learn some Kyrgyz within the next 2 years. Nevertheless, my respondents did not see any serious reason for changing things, having only one solution in mind: giving up work and becoming a housewife. Zoya is the 40-year-old wife of a successful businessman. The pattern of her behaviour can be described as "forced isolationism." This seemed typical for those Russians whose business activities were not linked directly with the
local economy and local people (as in the sale of fruit to Siberia and Kazakhstan). I met Zoya and her family in 1992 and was greatly impressed by her benevolence and optimism: "How I love these mountains! Leave here? I would never do that, not even with a pistol at my head!" Much had changed by the following year. Zoya's family had become wealthier in contrast to the growing poverty of many Kyrgyz, which led to a narrowing of contacts with the neighbours and other members of the Kyrgyz community. As the children put it: "We are rich and that's why people feel envious of us." Zoya's "superiority complex" could be expressed in the following way: "What a marvellous life we had here when Kyrgyzstan was a colony!" or "I~arn Kyrgyz? No, that's the best way to break my tongue[" This makes it even more difficult for her and her family to come to an understanding with the new Kyrgyz context. RUSSIAN V I E W S ON KYRGYZ WOMEN: STEREOTYPING Asked to define the main features of Kyrgyz women's character in one word, my Russian respondents were unanimous in their views, which were usually far from positive. Their self-identification, on the other hand, was usually positive and they set themselves in opposition to Kyrgyz women. The most frequently named pairs of opposites were: "Their women are lazy-our women are diligent"; "irresponsible-responsible"; "obedient-independent"; "deceitful-honest." Only one Russian woman of 23 respondents provided an exception, naming "hospitable-self-confident." K y r g y z w o m e n s e e m e d m o r e indulgent toward Russian women's weaknesses. Sixteen of the 19 who answered spoke about Russian w o m e n ' s "independence," "emancipation," "honesty, .... beauty, .... self-determination," and "diligence." The three negative features mentioned were: "perfectly indifferent to other people's views," "do not respect their elders," "some of them are very clever and some are very greedy." One might feel that these attitudes should be interpreted with caution, because the Russian researcher is not quite "neutral" for the Kyrgyz respondents. To minimize possible bias, therefore, half the Kyrgyz w o m e n ' s sample was interviewed by Kyrgyz women students. Good personal contact between the researcher and
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women respondents as well as my warm and friendly relations with a great number of other Kyrgyz women also contribute to the reliability of this data. The views expressed by Kyrgyz and Russian women might also be affected by the "interaction" between the women's cultures of the two communities. "Interaction" is not quite the right word here, as, according to my observations, it is primarily Kyrgyz women who seek guidance and advice from their Russian counterparts on many everyday matters, from salad recipes to treating children's proneness to disease, which is so widespread in the area. Kyrgyz women may, therefore, be more willing to recognise Russian women's skills and virtues. In contrast, Russian w o m e n seemed not only quite indifferent to local women's culture, but also demonstrated a poor understanding of the nature and origins of many local customs. The Kyrgyz mutton-eating tradition, a crucial element of national culture, is a case in point. All traditional Kyrgyz rituals, deeply-rooted in their nomadic past, include slaughtering sheep followed by a mutton-eating ceremony, with women playing important roles in cooking and serving meals. During the past few years, the living standards of rural Kyrgyz families have fallen, and only a few of them can afford such a ceremony as often as it is prescribed by tradition. When organized, it becomes a very special occasion in both a material and spiritual sense. The Russian women I spoke with made comments such as "Why on earth do they have to tell us about this meat! We eat meat every day, there is nothing special about it!" They reacted according to their stereotype and did not understand the importance of the muttoneating ceremony for the Kyrgyz. The overwhelming majority of Russians interviewed, both men and women, considered Kyrgyzstan as their Motherland, implying not only their place of birth, but primarily an emotional link. Yet in response to my question "What do you like about K y r g y z s t a n ? " they mentioned only natural and never human factors - - warm climate; good weather; fertile soil; fruit; and beautiful skies, lakes, and mountains. It should not be forgotten, however, that the main task faced by the Russian d i a s p o r a in K y r g y z s t a n , as well as in the "near abroad," is to find its proper place, not within the natural surroundings but in the human community.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH It is hoped that these observations on the situation in northern Kyrgyzstan, albeit of a tentative nature, could provide food for thought for scholars, policymakers, and public opinion. A set of acute problems, to be explored in further research, have also been revealed. The findings concerning the Russians' lack of rootedness and their self-isolation tendencies support the idea that the m i g r a t i o n a l potential of the Russian-speaking population is relatively high even in those parts of the former USSR previously known for their ethno-political stability. The importance of the gender variable in analysing migrational expectations should be stressed here. According to my field observations in Kyrgyzstan and in one of the regions of central Russia receiving migrants from the "near abroad," women are generally the first to think about the family migrating. To what extent does Russian women's deep involvement in everyday ethnic contacts and their frequent failure to find the right tone here contribute to their discontent with the existing ethno-social environment and, finally, to their decision to migrate? In other words, what is the structure of specifically women's discontent and is it greater than that of their husbands? If so, could we predict a distinct social phenomenon, namely, women migrating without men? Another intriguing area for research is the Russians' lack of rootedness and the self-isolation outlined in this article. Russian academics mention most often the ambitions of superiority, and the Russians' "eldest brother complex" (with all the different ethnic groups of central Asia supposedly "junior" under the Soviet regime). One could add to this the sense that the Russians in the "near abroad" might be lacking a strong sense of belonging to an ethnic collectivity. As my respondents said, "We do not know who we are, but we are not true Russians"; "We are different from Russians in Russia"; "We are mankurts" (heroes of the famous novel by the Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov, The Day Longer than a Century, who are deprived of ethnic memories). Russian speakers outside Russia seem to shape their identities not along ethnic lines, but rather along ideological lines, seeing themselves as the "Soviet people" and relying heavily on Moscow as an imperial centre in charge
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of their problems. The impact of conceptuallybased state policies on the diaspora cannot be overestimated here, particularly because Russia has an interest in preventing the occurrence of an avalanche of migration to the "Motherland." Nonetheless, where interethnic relations are concerned, much also depends on people's individual perceptions, decisions, and actions. In-depth analysis of the Russians' national identities in the making, paying attention to gender-specific differences, is crucial not only in order to evaluate adaptive strategies versus the migrational potential of the diaspora. The tensions periodically erupting between the resident population and migrants in different parts of Russia itself lend still greater socio-political relevance to the problem. The fact that the newcomers are sometimes labelled "nierusy" in the host communities of central Russia (a
colloquial, disapproving word deriving from the ancient name of the country and implying "non-Russianness"), adds a new layer of ethnic complexity to these tensions, instead of simply explaining them, as is usually the case, in terms of competition for scarce resources. REFERENCES Arutyunyan, Yuriy (Ed.). (1992). The Russians: Ethnosociological essays. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House. Information Bulletin. (1992). Moscow: CIS Statistical Committee. Panarin, Sergei (Ed.). (1993). Russian and the Orient. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Russian explorers and travellers tell about the Kyrgyz people. (1973). Frunze: Academisdat. Sem'ya (Family). (1993) No. 2. Moscow. S vobodnye Gory (FreeMountains). (1993). No. 344. Bishkek.
Women's Studies International Forum, Vol. 19, Nos. 1/2, pp. 125-132, 1996 Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in the USA. All fights reserved 0277-5395/96 $15.00 + .00
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RUSSIAN WOMEN
IN KYRGYZSTAN Coping with New R e a l i t i e s
NATALYA KOSMARSKAYA Moscow Centre for Gender Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, ul. Krasikova 27, Moscow 117218, Russia
Synopsis - - This article, based on intensive fieldwork carried out in two villages in northern Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan between 1992 and 1994, examines interethnic relations in this republic of the former Soviet Union. It looks, in particular, at the position of the local Russian-speaking diaspora as it copes with the challenges of the new realities it faces. Some historical background, as well as Kyrgyz views on the status of women, religion, mixed marriages, and language, contribute to understanding Russian adaptive strategies and attitudes. The articles portrays the situation as it is perceived by women, who are usually more "visible" than men and are more active and influential agents of interethnic communication.
The position of the huge Russian-speaking diaspora in the national republics of the former Soviet Union has already proved to be one of the most painful and politically sensitive problems of Russia's development today. According to the last All-Union Population Census (1989), there are about 25 million ethnic Russians living in the so-called "near abroad." Outside Russia, there are another 11 million people whose nationality is not officially Russian, but who consider Russian to be their native language. Outbursts of interethnic confrontation in the new independent states, and the resulting gradual rise in the migrational expectations of these Russian-speakers, threaten serious socio-economic and political destabilisation in Russia itself. This is even more likely, given that the newly-born, extreme-right nationalist parties who did so well in the December 1993 parliamentary elections openly used this trump-card in their struggle for power.
The importance o f developing balanced policies based on in-depth social research cannot be overstated here. Unfortunately, the positions presented by the mass media and the academic community in Russia are often too general, too simplistic. They paint a picture of discrimination of all kinds against Russians and of the rapid rise o f local nationalisms, together with Islamic fundamentalism, in the case of Central Asia. In my view, such a generalised analysis should be replaced by microlevel studies, as the situation varies substantially from one country to another and even within one country. For example, there are striking distinctions between the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. Using a microlevel approach, one can see that the nationalism of the "titular" ethnic group is undergoing dramatic change in both values and economic realities, as is the case everywhere in the former USSR. How does this "return to ethnicity" manifest itself in present-day independent Kyrgyzstan, on the level of both official policy and everyday interethnic contact? What is the socio-psychological atmosphere in which Russians find themselves? How do they perceive the situation and cope with it? What options are open to them? The following is an attempt to address these questions. It is based on intensive field research
Sincere acknowledgements are due to my friends and colleagues from the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, who shared with me the joys and sorrows of fieldwork, and commented generously on the manuscript. I would also like to thank the British Council for its support of my research at the School of Social Sciences, University of Greenwich, London and my colleagues from the School, Dr. Nira YuvaI-Davis in particular. Their contribution to my better knowledge of gender and ethnicity in the European context inspired me greatly while writing this article. 125
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conducted in two villages on the northern shores of the I s s y k - K u l lake in May 1993, with a preparatory pilot survey carded out in October 1992 and a third follow-up visit in September 1994. The villages are located 25 and 40 kilometres, respectively, from Cholpon-Ata, the district centre, and about 300 kilometres from Bishkek, the county capital. Their population, ethnically mixed, varies from 2,500 to 4,000 people. The programme in which I was involved was called "Ethnicity: the Women's Dimension," part of a larger project entitled "Ethnic Conflict and the Rise of Ethnic Consciousness in the former USSR" begun in 1992 under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The interethnic situation will be shown as it is perceived by women. Men's views will provide a comparative background. As well as using questionnaires, I collected life stories and conducted in-depth interviews with Russian women adapting to their new role as members of an ethnic minority, and K y r g y z w o m e n experiencing a rise in their national aspirations. Why women? In countries enjoying relative political stability such as Kyrgyzstan, people's socio-psychological equilibrium depends less on political events in the capital than on local circumstances in which women play a large role. It is mainly women who find themselves in the very demanding role of "contact person" or "ambassador," irrespective of whether they belong to the ethnic m a j o r i t y or minority grouping. The fact that a very high rate of economic activity was typical for Soviet women (over 80% were in paid employment in 1989) is only part of the explanation. Traditional roles still prevail in both Kyrgyz and Russian ex-Soviet families and so childcare and housework are still seen as women's duties. Women, extensively involved as they are in contact routines outside the home - - dealing with neighbours, shop assistants, schoolteachers, doctors, kindergarten nurses (all of whom are usually women as well) - - are, in practice, more "visible" than men, more active and influential agents of interethnic relations. This is particularly true in the villages, with life usually in the public eye, and with usually only one shop, m a r k e t p l a c e , hospital, and kindergarten, if any. Women's success or failure at finding the right tone in everyday interethnic communication may contribute substantially to the socio-psychological climate within both family and community.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT Kyrgyzstan, formerly a republic of the USSR, and independent since 1991, is situated in Central Asia, mainly within the western and central parts of the Tien Shan mountain range. Its neighbouring countries are Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China. The territory where the Kyrgyz are the indigenous population became part of the Russian empire in the 1860s and 1870s and Russians have settled there ever since. This process was further stimulated under the Soviet regime, when people were moved in large numbers to the periphery of that enormous country, in order to transmit new cultures and ideologies and to build up industry. As a result, Kyrgyzstan became a multinational republic: The Russian-speaking population, including Ukrainians and Germans as well as "true" Russians, is still, despite the gradual increase of emigration in recent years, the largest non-Kyrgyz group in Kyrgyzstan (21.9% of the population in 1993), followed by Uzbeks (13.5%) (Svobodnye Gory, 1993, p. 1). Local nomadic tribes had long been patronized and deeply influenced by the Russian empire. Kyrgyz from the Issyk-Kul region initiated contacts with their powerful neighbouring state and became the first to apply for and receive official Russian citizenship in 1855. It was precisely here, in the north, that the newcomers f r o m Russia settled and where the Russian-speaking population is most densely concentrated. Many of them were peasants, attracted by the favourable climate and fertile soils of northern Kyrgyzstan, and these peasant settlers have made Kyrgyzstan very different from the other Central Asian republics, which do not have such a high number of Russians p e a k e r s as rural dwellers (about 30% in Kyrgyzstan, according to the last All-Union Population Census, as opposed to 3 - 6 % in Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan) (Panarin, 1993, p. 315). An additional reason for choosing the IssylKul north shore as a research area is that, after World War II, it developed its potential as a health and holiday resort area, together with the creation of modern transport and communication systems. L o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d links with Russia are stamped on the memories of several generations of Issyk-Kul Kyrgyz, and their extensive contacts with Russians, both local residents and
Russian Womenin Kyrgyzstan
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holidaymakers, contributed greatly to their ethnic tolerance, openness and good knowledge of the Russian language. This is the first factor worth noting as favourable for Russian assimilation and their current adaptation to the changing socio-ethnic environment. The next two factors concern women's status and religion.
extra-marital love affairs, and illegitimate births were among these matters. Interestingly, although there are some differences between the positions and attitudes o f Russian and Kyrgyz women, they do not seem to be of a fundamental nature: Women provide a promising basis for interethnic dialogue.
W O M E N ' S STATUS
RELIGION Compared with the other peoples of Central Asia, the Kyrgyz have always been famous for being the "worst" believers and the most tolerant of women's freedom in the family and society. These related phenomena are deeply-rooted in the age-old nomadic way of life in the mountains, an existence hardly compatible with women's seclusion and the scrupulous implementation of Muslim rituals. This contrasts with southern Kyrgyzstan, where there are very few Russians and other Europeans, and which has, for centuries, been a frontier contact zone between the nomadic and the settied agricultural civilizations strictly adherent to Islam, whose influence on the local Kyrgyz is growing slowly but steadily. A noticeable return to religious values and even the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in some parts of Central and Western Asia has not brought any tangible changes to northern Kyrgyzstan. Along with ancient Kyrgyz beliefs, Islam is part of a ritual culture returning to life, and part of ideal patterns of everyday behaviour, seen as providing eternal human values. There is no question of Islam turning into a modus vivendi of the native population or, even more, into a guide to political militancy. In the words of the village mullah, "We should not divide the people into Muslims and Christians, there is only one God for all." What is striking about my village research data, is that the respondents are much less wellinformed about the fundamentals of their religion than one might expect, with Islamic and pre-Islamic rituals being mixed in their minds. Of 43 men and 30 women interviewed in depth, only 7.1% and 10% respectively said that they read the Koran on a regular basis. The majority (53.4% and 63.3%) have never read it, but have only heard fragments read aloud. Both men and women were strongly opposed to the idea of an Islamic state in Kyrgyzstan. The women usually reacted very emotionally, saying that they did not want to wear veils or be subordinate to men. Only two men in the sample (the village
As early as the second half of the 19th century, Russian explorers and travellers visiting northern Kyrgyzstan noted the relatively high status of women. Observers of that period re,oorded that: Kyrgyz wives work from dawn till night in their yurts and nomad tents, but they are far from being slaves and are treated with great r e s p e c t . . , women run the house independently and, when outdoors, they do not wear veils, enjoying the same freedom as their husbands. (Russian explorers and travellers, 1973, pp. 185, 196) As President Askare Akayev recently put it: The mentality of the Kyrgyz people is not just very different from that of our neighbours, but is an amalgamation of European and Asian consciousness; we are very openhearted, tolerant and, perhaps, the only oriental nation whose women enjoy rights very similar to those of Europeans. (Sem'ya, 1993, p. 5) My village observations confirm this point. When asked to define quickly and in only one word the main feature of Kyrgyz women's character, only six o f the 30 women interviewed spoke of "obedience" and "dependency." Moreover, it would appear that five of this small group mentally contrasted Kyrgyz and Russian women, defining Russian women as "independent," "emancipated," and "resolute." Eighteen respondents gave very different answers: "hospitality," "flexibility in communication," "patience," "diligence," and the remaining respondents did not answer. Village women of different ages and educational status did not seem to be shy or embarrassed when discussing with me matters so delicate that they could not even be touched upon in a conversation between a stereotyped "oriental" woman and a stranger. Abortion, divorce,
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mullah's nephew and an elderly teacher) were able to name easily the five "pillars of Muslim faith" (the profession of faith, the prayer ceremony, giving alms to the poor, keeping the annual fast of the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca to be undertaken at least once in a lifetime). Nine men named two or three of these items, seven could name one while the other male respondents were hesitant about answering. Women's notions of the core of Muslim faith were even more vague: only four of them mentioned one or two of the principles. The others improvised freely, most often naming general moral principles of human behaviour similar to the biblical commandments, as well as the necessity of keeping the body clean and showing respect to the elderly. Bearing this in mind, we should be cautious in our interpretation of the fact that 74.4% of the men and 73.3% of the women replied positively to the question: "Do you consider yourself to be a Muslim?" Being Kyrgyz appears to be more crucial for the respondents than being Muslim as the following survey data illustrated. About half of the respondents said that they would prefer the President of Kyrgyzstan to be a Muslim; 28.9% of the men and 41.5% of the women considered that their immediate superior should also be a Muslim. But of the same respondents, 81.4% of men and 80% of women thought that the President of Kyrgyzstan should be Kyrgyz by nationality, while 40% of men and 62.1% of women would want their immediate superior to be Kyrgyz, bearing out our contention that women attach greater importance than men to national rather than religious characteristics. In short, religion cannot be considered as an indispensable element of national identity in present-day Kyrgyzstan. The "titular" ethnic group seems to be more sensitive to the existing distinctions along ethnic lines (Kyrgyz-nonKyrgyz) than to the religious affiliations of their ethnic partners. "Anatomizing" this sensitivity was one of my priority tasks, the more so since Kyrgyz "nationalism" appeared to be at the core of the Russians' pessimism and anxiety about their future. R E T U R N T O E T H N I C VALUES The rapid rise of Kyrgyz ethnic consciousness is a reality. During my second visit, I was often asked - - with suspicion or curiosity - - "What
are you studying us for? It is a foreign country here now, isn't it?" A small boy, pacing back and forth on the Issyk-Kul express bus and repeating proudly '~VIama Kyrgyz! Papa Kyrgyzl" seemed to symbolize this attitude. On the one hand a positive and natural process, it is also a painful one in reaction to decades of oppression and forced "russification." So-called "everyday life" nationalism is g r o w i n g . T h e w o m e n , b o t h R u s s i a n and Kyrgyz, told me about the bickering and scandals between people of different ethnic groups standing in bread queues, getting into overcrowded buses, or wrangling over prices at the bazaar. This a p p a r e n t interethnic tension reported by respondents could, however, probably be explained in terms of economic competition under the pressure of market reforms, or psychological stresses which are very understandable in the present turmoil and struggle for survival. It is usually difficult to expose the rise of national aspirations by asking "frontal" or overly abstract questions in interviews. When asked, for example, about their attitudes toward other ethnic groups, people - - consciously or not - - try to conceal any particular antipathies they may have, and to demonstrate an "internationalist" approach. The results are much more revealing when a concrete, personalized situation is discussed. For example, when asked, "What would your reaction be to your son/daughter's possible marriage to a non-Kyrgyz (Russian, Uzbek, Tatar)?," the respondents reacted negatively often enough to take them as being rather "nationalistically-minded." Kyrgyz women's t h i n k i n g a b o u t their d a u g h t e r s ' m a r r i a g e seemed to be the most uncompromising. Only 14.3% of women rated their son's potential marriage to a non-Kyrgyz girl positively and 40% negatively, yet for 45.7%, the ethnicity of the future d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w did not matter much. When it was a question of a daughter's marriage to a non-Kyrgyz boy, the mothers' opinions were much more polarized: 6.3% positive, 75% negative, and 18.7% indifferent. When Kyrgyz men were asked about their daughters' marriage choices, their attitudes were somewhat less biased: 4.5% positive, 62.8% negative, and 36.6% indifferent to the ethnicity of the future son-in-law. Again, we must be circumspect in our interpretation of this quantitative data. We must
Russian Womenin Kyrgyzstan
bear in mind that the Kyrgyz lead the central Asian nations in terms of numbers of mixed marriages (in 1988-1989, the percentage was 14.3% of all Kyrgyz marriages, compared with 4.2% and 3.6% for Kazakh men and women respectively; 4.2% and 3.4% for Uzbeks; and 5.5% and 2.3% for Turkmens. [Information Bulletin, 1992, pp. 135-38]). Second, that "ingroup ethnic favouritism" is more relevant to Kyrgyz attitudes than "out-group negativism," in that the fact of being Kyrgyz was important while all n o n - K y r g y z ethnic groups were lumped together even though they differ substantially on ethnic and religious lines. In the few cases where distinctions were made (for example, in one case, marriage to a Tatar was considered positive while marriage to a Russian or an Uzbek was seen as negative), it could be explained on the individual grounds of a particular personal experience. Third, motivations which have little connection to national prejudices or preferences must be taken into account. Prevailing negative reactions towards a daughter's mixed marriage may result from a kind of psychological self-defence, as parents contemplate the undesirable effects that this marriage could have, most notably, the daughter's departure, possibly spending her whole life apart from her parents, relatives, friends, and native village. This problem lies in the Kyrgyz tradition that after the wedding, a woman must remove to her h u s b a n d ' s home. Few w o m e n could avoid the natural adaptive stress and discomfort which follow, especially after marriage to an outsider and not to a local resident. This may give a clue to the women's more frequent negative reaction, as compared with men: The men just commented very briefly, "I would not like our daughter to leave us," but the women, always more talkative during the interview than the men, seemed to add their own difficult personal experiences of postmarriage adaptation to their normal parental anxieties. THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM The rise of ethnic consciousness amongst the "titular" ethnic group is a multiform process. As well as the attitudes o b s e r v e d towards mixed marriages, the Kyrgyz are showing a growing interest in their language, culture, and history, together with a renaissance of traditional arts, handicrafts, and rituals. As early as 1989, Kyrgyz was proclaimed as the official
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language of Kyrgyzstan. Later, because of the technical and psychological difficulties of a full transition to Kyrgyz in education, health, services, publishing, and clerical work, implementation of this decision was postponed from 1997 to 2000. The p r o b l e m gained a new and pressing d i m e n s i o n on 5 M a y 1993, when the new C o n s t i t u t i o n o f K y r g y z s t a n was adopted. Despite the hopes of the local Russian diaspora, the Russian language was not granted the status of a means of interethnic communication (a very clumsy formula, created by post-Soviet realities and quite unknown in international law). The local Russian-speaking population was very disturbed by this, and perceived it as an infringement of their civil rights. I arrived in the Issyk-Kul region on 5 May 1993, and could see for myself how painful the perception of the language situation is for the Russians. It really was on everybody's lips. Together with "everyday" nationalism, they saw it as crucial for their future in Kyrgyzstan, for reasons which are as clear as day. Although a majority of the Russians of the Issyk-Kul area are descendants of the first settlers, with their fathers and grandfathers buried in this land, most of them do not speak Kyrgyz even at the minimal level of everyday exchange. They are not the exception. According to the 1989 Population Census, only a tiny proportion (1.2%) of all Russians living in Kyrgyzstan were fluent in the Kyrgyz language (Arutyunyan, 1992, p. 295). Although openness in communication with the native people, willingness to assimilate to Kyrgyz language, culture, and traditions m a y be of vital importance for those Russians in the area - - and they are still a majority - - who do not want to emigrate, the Russians seem to be psychologically poorly equipped to cope. If Kyrgyzstan followed Western experience, such as that of Finland, the language of the second largest ethnic minority would be the second official language. But with Kyrgyz nationalist feeling having been oppressed for so long, and with a powerful nationalist lobby in parliament, a solution of this kind appears quite utopian. T H E RUSSIAN V I E W OF T H E SITUATION: S E L F - I S O L A T I O N SYNDROME According to my observations, the c.ore of Russian women's survival strategies is self-isolation from
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the local Kyrgyz community. This worrying tendency can be observed both in their attitudes toward Kyrgyz language, culture, and traditions and in their prevailing mode of behaviour, which is expressed in a narrowing of everyday and professional contacts. Three variants of this syndrome revealed during my research are illustrated by individual stories. Natalya is a 20-year-old housewife. I call her and others like her "a mouse in a hole," exhibiting passive isolationism as a principal line of conduct. After her marriage, she found herself in a village with very few Russians. While she was on maternity leave, she lived within her four walls. Only other Russians are considered as potential friends or colleagues. As for the Kyrgyz language, she thinks that "it is too late [at her young age!] to learn it." When asked: "How do you overcome the language barrier?," Natalya answered, "I try my best to avoid any contact with them." Svetlana is a 38-year-old teacher of Russian in a Kyrgyz school, in which all subjects are taught in Kyrgyz. She has adopted a "warlike isolationism" in her attitudes toward Kyrgyz people. When attacked by "them," she is ready to resist actively: " I f we have to leave this place, we shall bum everything to ashes. They will get nothing!" She is energetic and communicative, but these skills are nonetheless not being used to find a common language with the native community: "It is a pity that the older generation of Russian-speaking Kyrgyz teachers are leaving school. It is difficult to set up contact with the younger ones. But, hopefully, I will manage without learning their language." It seems absurd for Russian women to teach Russian language and literature in Kyrgyz schools with only a few words of Kyrgyz in their vocabulary. They were uneasy in professional meetings and had difficulty in teaching small children who did not know any Russian. The Director has already dropped hints about possible dismissal from school if they do not learn some Kyrgyz within the next 2 years. Nevertheless, my respondents did not see any serious reason for changing things, having only one solution in mind: giving up work and becoming a housewife. Zoya is the 40-year-old wife of a successful businessman. The pattern of her behaviour can be described as "forced isolationism." This seemed typical for those Russians whose business activities were not linked directly with the
local economy and local people (as in the sale of fruit to Siberia and Kazakhstan). I met Zoya and her family in 1992 and was greatly impressed by her benevolence and optimism: "How I love these mountains! Leave here? I would never do that, not even with a pistol at my head!" Much had changed by the following year. Zoya's family had become wealthier in contrast to the growing poverty of many Kyrgyz, which led to a narrowing of contacts with the neighbours and other members of the Kyrgyz community. As the children put it: "We are rich and that's why people feel envious of us." Zoya's "superiority complex" could be expressed in the following way: "What a marvellous life we had here when Kyrgyzstan was a colony!" or "I~arn Kyrgyz? No, that's the best way to break my tongue[" This makes it even more difficult for her and her family to come to an understanding with the new Kyrgyz context. RUSSIAN V I E W S ON KYRGYZ WOMEN: STEREOTYPING Asked to define the main features of Kyrgyz women's character in one word, my Russian respondents were unanimous in their views, which were usually far from positive. Their self-identification, on the other hand, was usually positive and they set themselves in opposition to Kyrgyz women. The most frequently named pairs of opposites were: "Their women are lazy-our women are diligent"; "irresponsible-responsible"; "obedient-independent"; "deceitful-honest." Only one Russian woman of 23 respondents provided an exception, naming "hospitable-self-confident." K y r g y z w o m e n s e e m e d m o r e indulgent toward Russian women's weaknesses. Sixteen of the 19 who answered spoke about Russian w o m e n ' s "independence," "emancipation," "honesty, .... beauty, .... self-determination," and "diligence." The three negative features mentioned were: "perfectly indifferent to other people's views," "do not respect their elders," "some of them are very clever and some are very greedy." One might feel that these attitudes should be interpreted with caution, because the Russian researcher is not quite "neutral" for the Kyrgyz respondents. To minimize possible bias, therefore, half the Kyrgyz w o m e n ' s sample was interviewed by Kyrgyz women students. Good personal contact between the researcher and
Russian Women in Kyrgyzstan
women respondents as well as my warm and friendly relations with a great number of other Kyrgyz women also contribute to the reliability of this data. The views expressed by Kyrgyz and Russian women might also be affected by the "interaction" between the women's cultures of the two communities. "Interaction" is not quite the right word here, as, according to my observations, it is primarily Kyrgyz women who seek guidance and advice from their Russian counterparts on many everyday matters, from salad recipes to treating children's proneness to disease, which is so widespread in the area. Kyrgyz women may, therefore, be more willing to recognise Russian women's skills and virtues. In contrast, Russian w o m e n seemed not only quite indifferent to local women's culture, but also demonstrated a poor understanding of the nature and origins of many local customs. The Kyrgyz mutton-eating tradition, a crucial element of national culture, is a case in point. All traditional Kyrgyz rituals, deeply-rooted in their nomadic past, include slaughtering sheep followed by a mutton-eating ceremony, with women playing important roles in cooking and serving meals. During the past few years, the living standards of rural Kyrgyz families have fallen, and only a few of them can afford such a ceremony as often as it is prescribed by tradition. When organized, it becomes a very special occasion in both a material and spiritual sense. The Russian women I spoke with made comments such as "Why on earth do they have to tell us about this meat! We eat meat every day, there is nothing special about it!" They reacted according to their stereotype and did not understand the importance of the muttoneating ceremony for the Kyrgyz. The overwhelming majority of Russians interviewed, both men and women, considered Kyrgyzstan as their Motherland, implying not only their place of birth, but primarily an emotional link. Yet in response to my question "What do you like about K y r g y z s t a n ? " they mentioned only natural and never human factors - - warm climate; good weather; fertile soil; fruit; and beautiful skies, lakes, and mountains. It should not be forgotten, however, that the main task faced by the Russian d i a s p o r a in K y r g y z s t a n , as well as in the "near abroad," is to find its proper place, not within the natural surroundings but in the human community.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH It is hoped that these observations on the situation in northern Kyrgyzstan, albeit of a tentative nature, could provide food for thought for scholars, policymakers, and public opinion. A set of acute problems, to be explored in further research, have also been revealed. The findings concerning the Russians' lack of rootedness and their self-isolation tendencies support the idea that the m i g r a t i o n a l potential of the Russian-speaking population is relatively high even in those parts of the former USSR previously known for their ethno-political stability. The importance of the gender variable in analysing migrational expectations should be stressed here. According to my field observations in Kyrgyzstan and in one of the regions of central Russia receiving migrants from the "near abroad," women are generally the first to think about the family migrating. To what extent does Russian women's deep involvement in everyday ethnic contacts and their frequent failure to find the right tone here contribute to their discontent with the existing ethno-social environment and, finally, to their decision to migrate? In other words, what is the structure of specifically women's discontent and is it greater than that of their husbands? If so, could we predict a distinct social phenomenon, namely, women migrating without men? Another intriguing area for research is the Russians' lack of rootedness and the self-isolation outlined in this article. Russian academics mention most often the ambitions of superiority, and the Russians' "eldest brother complex" (with all the different ethnic groups of central Asia supposedly "junior" under the Soviet regime). One could add to this the sense that the Russians in the "near abroad" might be lacking a strong sense of belonging to an ethnic collectivity. As my respondents said, "We do not know who we are, but we are not true Russians"; "We are different from Russians in Russia"; "We are mankurts" (heroes of the famous novel by the Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov, The Day Longer than a Century, who are deprived of ethnic memories). Russian speakers outside Russia seem to shape their identities not along ethnic lines, but rather along ideological lines, seeing themselves as the "Soviet people" and relying heavily on Moscow as an imperial centre in charge
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of their problems. The impact of conceptuallybased state policies on the diaspora cannot be overestimated here, particularly because Russia has an interest in preventing the occurrence of an avalanche of migration to the "Motherland." Nonetheless, where interethnic relations are concerned, much also depends on people's individual perceptions, decisions, and actions. In-depth analysis of the Russians' national identities in the making, paying attention to gender-specific differences, is crucial not only in order to evaluate adaptive strategies versus the migrational potential of the diaspora. The tensions periodically erupting between the resident population and migrants in different parts of Russia itself lend still greater socio-political relevance to the problem. The fact that the newcomers are sometimes labelled "nierusy" in the host communities of central Russia (a
colloquial, disapproving word deriving from the ancient name of the country and implying "non-Russianness"), adds a new layer of ethnic complexity to these tensions, instead of simply explaining them, as is usually the case, in terms of competition for scarce resources. REFERENCES Arutyunyan, Yuriy (Ed.). (1992). The Russians: Ethnosociological essays. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House. Information Bulletin. (1992). Moscow: CIS Statistical Committee. Panarin, Sergei (Ed.). (1993). Russian and the Orient. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Russian explorers and travellers tell about the Kyrgyz people. (1973). Frunze: Academisdat. Sem'ya (Family). (1993) No. 2. Moscow. S vobodnye Gory (FreeMountains). (1993). No. 344. Bishkek.