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Russia's resurgence: Prospects for space policy and international cooperation
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24 www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol
Russia’s resurgence: Prospects for space policy and international cooperation Bertrand de Montluc1 SciencesPo Paris, Associate Expert, Centre d’e´tudes des relations internationales, France Available online 12 January 2010
Abstract Based on a joint study initiated in 2007e2008 by the Policy planning staff (CAP) of the French Foreign Ministry and the space agency CNES, which brought together experts, researchers and industry insiders, this article considers the factors behind Russia’s recent resurgence and the possible revival of its space programme. It examines how far the latter will require international cooperation in order to progress further and discusses likely areas of profitable collaboration with Europe in general and France in particular, given that country’s long history of space cooperation with Russia and the need in the mid-term future to share the burden of developing ambitious new space programs. While there is in principle much potential, especially in the area of space transportation, there are also numerous challenges and uncertainties. How these are resolved will affect the level and success of any cooperative efforts of both sides. Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Fortified by past technological investments and by improvements in its economy,2 Russia has begun reconstituting its capabilities in the aerospace and defence fields, although it is not yet clear which sectors or programmes will be favoured.3 As the role given to space programmes in the power politics being conducted by Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev becomes clearer, how will the space
E-mail address: [email protected] In this article Dr de Montluc expresses only personal views. The paper has been re-written in 2009 by Frances Brown, Editor, to whom the author delivers his very warm thanks. The original research for this paper was carried out in France with inputs from several experts from ministry of Foreign Affairs (X. Rey), University (J. Sapir), French space agency CNES (P. Frisch, C. Ivanov), think tanks (I. Facon, FRS, I. Sourbe`s-Verger, CNRS, L. Nardon et T. Jean, IFRI) and industry (J. Chenet, B. Planas, M. Doubovick). 2 The last year recession should be followed by a period of economic growth of 5% for national production (PIB/GIP) according to OECD data (publication n 86). 3 The Russian state industry is presently under review by political leaders (website RiaNovosti, http://fr.rian.ru/economic_news/). 1
0265-9646/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.12.002
lobby compare with other client groups and what are its actual modes of action not only in budgetary terms but where mobilisable human resources are concerned? Do proposals for new projects (‘useful’ applications, space exploration, launchers, etc) and a real ability to mobilise political support for them exist? We already know for sure that the restructuring of the aerospace sector has been accompanied by a new division between civil and military, and aeronautics and space. Industrial reorganisations have taken place, particularly in the space sector: Roskosmos is now only concerned with civil space. One of its goals has been developing international cooperation e among others, with France (Soyuz launched from Kourou) e in areas like space transportation and scientific research, in partnership with institutions related to the influential Russian Academy of Sciences. Space budgets have been rising for several years (see below). At the same time Russian industrial firms have been concluding joint ventures with European companies. For their part, various European firms (Alcatel, Snecma-Safran, Astrium) have been developing a turnover, albeit modest, with Russia. There are thus several positive indicators that an in-depth exploration of the possibilities for European and particularly
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French civil space cooperation with Russia is worth undertaking, as confirmed by a variety of parliamentary groups (WEU assembly,4 European Parliamentary Group for Space, Groupe Parlementaire pour l’Espace (GPE) of the French Parliament, etc). Nevertheless, there remain uncertainties about the global development of Russian policy, with several specific question marks over: the budgets available for civil space, while laboratories funded by the Academy of Sciences still seem starved of basic resources or of a new supply of young researchers to mitigate the effects of the brain drain of the 1990s; political support for the space agency to implement an ambitious policy, at a time when its long-term plans are not clear;5 the apparent vagueness of the reorganisation of the aerospace and defence industries,6 and the lack of clarity over the reorganisation of Rosoboronexport; Russian reluctance to engage in true, lasting and balanced industrial partnerships, the often only short-term profitorientated aims of cooperation,7 and the difficulty of moving from a logic of supply through technology transfer to one of acquisition; the strengthening of the regulations governing the spread of sensitive technical information. Franco-Russian space cooperation, which has been ongoing for over 40 years, has been an original axis of France’s space policy. Assuming a deepening of this trend in the new Russian context, how much room for manoeuvre does a country like France, together with other European member states, have, given current developments? This paper will attempt to analyse the current conditions of interdependence within the Russian militaryeindustrial complex and the elements which are shaping it, with a view to sketching out some low-risk options. The first part analyses the economic and political context in Russia and the specific situation of the aerospace and defence industries. The second part discusses the present state of cooperation between Europe and Russia. Finally, some future paths for possible new directions in French and European space cooperation with Russia will tentatively be outlined.
2. Specifics of the Russian context 2.1. Geopolitical context The loss of their country’s status as an imperial power has been the major trauma for Russians since the dissolution of the USSR and they clearly find it difficult to give such status up.8 For the first time since the 15th century the territory in which the historical Russian consciousness developed, and triumphs such as the conquest of space took place, has indeed dramatically shrunk. Today Russians have a new need to be respected by the world, to speak as an equal with the ‘European bloc’ and to give free rein to their sovereignty and indeed to their imperium. Over the past few years Russia has entered a phase of power affirmation. This new assurance rests on a substantial improvement in its economic situation (see below) and on the ideological corpus promoted by President, now Prime Minister, Putin and his entourage: internally, restoration of the state and of the unity of the Russian federation; externally, restoration of the country’s power and independence of action. But the successful tackling of this task has vastly exceeded its initial objectives, reducing democratic freedoms and calling into question the nature and longevity of the regime itself. The Western model of liberal democracy no longer serves as an example for Russia’s internal development; at the same time the West has discovered the absence of any real tools for influencing Russia’s choices. The rhetoric of sovereignty and ‘the Russian way’ that is developing is obsessed with stability, justifies the concentration of power and the calling into question of democratic attainments, and is promoting patriotism, if not outright nationalism.9 The hardening of Russia’s foreign policy is noticeable. Russia has become a more demanding and difficult partner on major international issues (Iran, Kosovo, 2008 war in Georgia, crises at the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, NagornoKarabakh and Transnistria). Where relations between the EU and Russia are concerned, progress has been very modest (questions over the integrity of Russia as a critical energy supplier, bilateral disagreements with the new member states). The Kremlin thinks of its near environment in terms that hark back to spheres of influence, within a logic of zero-sum games with the EU, which hobbles any possibility of cooperation within the ‘common neighbourhood’. Its principal fear is of the expansion of NATO into the territory of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan) and of the contagious effect of the ‘pink’ and ‘orange revolutions’.
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Document C/2008, May 6, 2008, A. Rigni. I. Facon, I. Sourbe`s-Verger, ‘Le spatiale russe, implications nationales et internationales d’une apparente remonte´e en puissance’ [Space in Russia, national and international consequences of a possible resurgence], Recherches et Documents, FRS, June 2007, at http://www.frstrategie.org. 6 Les Echos, 19 September 2006; L. Nardon, ‘Les re´organisations de l’industrie spatiale russe’, Paris, IFRI, December 2006 (in French); and A Yakovlev, ‘The evolution of businessestate interaction in Russia: from state capture to business capture’, Europe-Asia Studies, 58 (7), 2006. 7 A. Ionin, ‘Does Russia need the European cosmodrome?, Moscow Defence Brief, 2, 2005. 5
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CERI/SciencesPo-CNRS-MGIMO (State Institute of International Relations of Moscow) colloquium, ‘Fifteen years after the creation of the CIS: developments in post-Soviet space activities and energy questions’, Paris, 7 June 2007(www.ceri-sciences-po.org). 9 See research works by Th. Gomart (IFRI), X. Rey (CAP Policy planning staff of the French ministry of Foreign and European affairs) and M. Mendras, professor at Paris SciencesPo and the London School of Economics (recent paper for France’s Higher College for Defense Studies (IHEDN), Paris April, 18, 2009 (http://russiactuprime.com).
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Relations with the USA have been strained since 2004 as the Bush administration became less careful to deal tactfully with Russia, hardening its tone over domestic political developments and announcing the build-up of missile defence facilities in Eastern Europe10 and its support for those states of the CIS whose relationship with Moscow is tricky. For its part the Kremlin has profited from the USA’s diplomatic weakness (Iraq) to assert itself, as demonstrated by Putin’s denunciation of US ‘unilateralism’ in a famous speech in Munich in February 2007;11 by obstinate and pretty aggressive reaction to US plans e now shelved e to site missile defence hardware in Poland and the Czech Republic; and by its continued apparent opposition to any weaponisation of space.12 The fact that, on the one hand, in his 17 September 2009 White House speech President Obama announced that the USA would scrap the Bush plans for a European missile shield and, on the other hand, that Washington was planning a major shake-up of the Pentagon’s weapons priorities e with Defense Secretary Robert Gates writing in Foreign Affairs that the USA ‘cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets’- should provide smoother relationships.13 Moreover the USA has declared that Washington and Moscow are to start talking about strategic disarmament in the future.14 On the other side, Russia has stated that a new Russian military doctrine is going to be adopted before 2010.15 It might be that in some respects the Obama administration feels the need to turn a page rather than simply tinker at the edge.16 In home affairs, the succession from President Putin to President Medvedev demonstrated a broad continuation of earlier policy and a shuffling of the cards at the heart of the same elite. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the obstacles created by the system (lack of any credible link between the state and its citizens, corruption), the modernisation of the country, the spread of a middle class anxious about judicial protections, and generational change within the establishment, all argue for structural political changes. Other doubts over the direction the country is taking are of a structural nature: there are dangers from an unbalanced development weighted too heavily in favour of hydrocarbons;
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V. Dvorkin, ‘The Threats Posed by the U.S. Missile Shield’, Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 5 n 2, AprileJune 2007 (pp. 23e32). Major General (Ret) Dvorkin commanded the Russian Space Forces; he described the American plans as obvious threat (Jane’s JDW, 31 January 2007, p. 7). 11 This speech for the 43rd Wehrkunde Munich conference (9e11/2/2007) was published in French in Revue de De´fense nationale, June 2007. 12 Col. Gen. V. Popovkin, responsible for ‘Russian space forces’, ‘We don’t want to wage a war in space, we don’t want to gain dominance in space, but we won’t allow any other nation to dominate space’, IHT, 28 September 2007. 13 Star Wars Retreat ?, M. O’Halon, September 23, 2009, Foreign Affairs notes on website (www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65420/michel-ohanlon/starwars-retreats). The Robert Gates’s article ‘A Balanced Strategy’ is from Jaunary/February 2009. 14 IHT, 18/9/2009, 21/9/2009, and 18/12/2009 for the new perspectives of disarmamant (nuclear arms limitation talks). 15 Statement by General N. Makarov (JCS), ‘RussiaNovosty’ (website quoted infra), November, 11, 2009. 16 ‘The Russia File’, R. Levgold, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009 (pp. 78e94).
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there is underinvestment in ageing infrastructure, and an unprecedented demographic crisis (half a million inhabitants fewer each year). The political direction for the mid-term future is in such conditions rather opened. 2.2. Economic context Russia’s economic growth at around 7% since 2003 e halted by the worldwide financial and economic collapse of 2008 with the Moscow financial market falling in the fourth trimester of 2008 by 73% e has not wiped out the earlier worse depression (1990e98). One should not forget that Russia only reached its 1990 GDP level in the first quarter of 2007! The cumulative impoverishment during the 1990s explains the breadth of the frustration felt and the sometimes clumsy vigour of the country’s efforts to return to the global stage. Between mid-2008 and mid2009 Russian GDP again fell by more than 10%. However after the negative economic growth in 2009 (8.7), things are expected to get better in 2010 and 2011 (þ4%e5% increase) with low inflation, no deficit of public finances, foreign exchange reserves stabilized at about US$430 billion and the budget deficit itself limited at 6% or less of industrial production.17 2.3. Industrial policy The restoration of a Russian high-tech industry capable of measuring up to those of the major industrial powers thanks to a more significant role taken by state-controlled companies in the energy sector and restructuring in sectors like aeronautics, nanotechnologies, nuclear power and naval construction, has ceased to be a purely economic goal and is becoming a strategic objective.18 It may be seen as a response to a US challenge to regional domination signalled by the Iraq war, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or events in Georgia, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Achieving this restoration was initially aided by a strong international financial situation created by the rise in the price of hydrocarbons (growth, in monthly balance, reaching $10 billion in 2005, followed by a collapse at the moment of the 2008 financial crisis, the price of a barrel of oil at the end of 2009 growing significantly again) and by the fall in imports, which allowed the restoration of a positive commercial balance. Today Russia exports about $400 billion worth of goods and imports $263 billion worth (with between $340 to $380 billion expected in 2010 and 2011, according to the OECD).19 The lack of a true modern financial system capable of operating as an intermediary between the reserves produced in the traditional domestic small business sector and the sectors needing 17 OECD, World Bank, Coe-Rexecode, 2009 data (ECO/CPE(2009)20/EO86/4). See also October 2009 analysis by the services of BNP-Paribas bank, ‘Bresil, Russia: why so different evolutions in regard to the international crisis’ A. Dorbec, V. Perracino, 15/10/2009 (pp.23e33), accessible through the website http:// bourses.bnpparibas.net. 18 I. Facon, I Sourbe`s-Verger, ‘Le spatial russe, presence internationale et souverainete´ nationale’ (in French), Courrier des Pays de l’Est, n 1061, 2007. 19 Above quoted references and data of ‘Diagnostic(s)’ published by CoeRexecode (www.coe-rexecode.fr) and ‘RIAnovosti’ news agency cited website.
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capital nevertheless continues to create difficulties for the Russian economy. This situation has made necessary the use of the major public enterprises in the role of industrial investor. The aim e a priority from the point of view of the national interest e of rebuilding an industry centred on advanced technologies and fit to represent Russian competitiveness at the international scale in the important strategic sectors (aerospace, nuclear power, telecommunications, weapons production) implies the mobilisation of considerable amounts of capital. This suggests that the revenues from the exploitation of raw materials (a monthly total exceeding $15 billion for the commercial balance) should be controlled in order to be reinvested in industry. The winter of 2005 saw the emergence of a clear industrial strategy connecting up Russian industry into three major sectors: a priority sector for economic development, controlled by the state (energy and raw materials); a strategic industry sector aimed at diversifying production, whose strategic direction is laid down by the state (engineering, automotive industry, aerospace); a ‘third market’ sector where the state does not intend to interfere.20 This structure has a double aspect: the vertical ascent of the state in the economy and the concentration of activity, as is apparent in the arms, aeronautical and, to a lesser degree, space sectors.21 2.4. Characteristics and evolution of the defence industry The defence industry is in a rather poor condition, being no longer capable of producing a whole range of conventional weapons systems, and is even ready to buy armament equipment, drones or ships from abroad. The failure of the Bulava ballistic missile is an example among others of the difficulties met by the armament sector.22 Through an increased budgetary effort and the determination to place the restructuring process in a strong framework with the same basic principle e the formation of industrial poles concentrating production capacity, design and scientists, with a more or less significant role for the state in the capital of the companies e the Russian state now wants to make the most of what the industries did of their own accord to survive during the lean 20
The entry of foreign shareholders in this sector can be envisaged if these identify themselves with the strategic directions. See J. Sapir, in french, ‘Les conditions d’une pe´rennisation de la croissance en Russie’, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales EHESS-CEMI, July 2008 (http://cemi.ehess.fr/) and Quelle e´conomie pour le XXIe`me sie`cle ?, O. Jacob, 2005. 21 For the space industry and the movement of consolidation through ‘holdings’, see L. Nardon, ‘Les reorganisations de l’industrie spatiale russe’, December 2006, at the IFRI website. On the new organisation of the Khrunichev launcher company, see Air & Cosmos, 20 083, 22 June 2007. The workloads of the satellite company Lavochkin and of Ukrainian firms are presented in Air & Cosmos, 2085, 6 July 2007. 22 ‘‘Russia Reborn’’, D. Trenin, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009 (pp. 64e79).
years and utilise this experience so that the country can ensure its own defence and remain in world markets. These two goals obviously require a raising of the technological level of national production. Presently it seems that in the overall strategic and space defence militaryeindustrial field the budget would be about V40 billion, with which 30 ballistic missiles and 11 ‘ground space facilities’ have to be built. A similar effort has been undertaken to help firms find new markets at a time when, for Russia, the traditional market (in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia) is slowing down. Thus the majority of countries with which Russia is developing space cooperation are, also, important (China, India, Iran) or potential (Venezuela, Malaysia, South Korea) customers of the arms industry. Another point in common between the two sectors is their opening to more international collaboration opportunities, space e though of less macroeconomic weight e being a precursor from this point of view (engines, launchers). Nowadays the Russians do not shy away from integrating foreign components or sub-systems into their spacecraft. The government is encouraging or accompanying partnerships targeting the acquisition of skills. In the defence industry even more than in the space industry, action consists in seeking the margins of technological advance. Hence the interest in buying production licences, the search for complementary partners and the interest, albeit still limited, in sharing the technical and financial risks through industrial partnerships. Yet for each sector, the action goes hand in hand with strong criticism of unequal partnerships (or partnerships that are experienced as unequal) as a result of exploitation of Russian resources to the benefit of international partners without any skills transfer, a concern that recalls the ‘pillaging’ of the militaryeindustrial complex in the 1990s. Incidentally, Russia no longer seems necessarily to be relying on partnerships with Western firms. It is seeking openings with rising technological powers. The underlying reason for the return of the state in these sectors can be found in the PutineMedvedev strategy of promoting the national interest. The legitimation of public involvement in particular in the arms or aerospace field is explained by a policy of national re-engagement in strategic economic sectors in order to give them an impetus that would allow diversification of the economy, i.e. ensuring Russia’s independence as an industrial and technological power e not just as an energy-rich power. Another point that the defence industry and space sectors have in common may be found in the government’s project to rationalise the use of state credits. The policy would consist in taking greater control over the uses of such credits; the government believes these are not so much insufficient as poorly utilised by businesses and research departments. In particular, the excessive number of R&D projects causes credits to be uselessly spread too thinly and even the misappropriation of funds (which are easily misappropriated since there is nothing concrete to be produced). An example of this in the space field is Glonass, the project of navigation satellites: the tardiness of progress with the Russian satellite
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constellation, whose refurbishment was announced over a decade ago, illustrates the inefficiency, indeed the corruption of whole sections of the space sector, which has been accused of using R&D funding for other ends or of citing insufficient budgets to justify the absence of results. By extension the ‘prototype policy’ is labelled dilatory (emphasising R&D funding when the means to guarantee mass production do not exist). Today the Kremlin is insisting on ‘true’ R&D, starting from the fact that the potential for innovation and the technology base did not progress very far during the 1990s. In all cases the response is the same: stricter centralisation via the militaryeindustrial complex and Rosoboronexport for the arms industry e without trying to find out whether such a step might not also lead to the creation of sources of corruption and opaqueness in other hands. The return of the state is more marked in the defence than in the space industry, thanks to the former’s greater role in national security. Any direct or major role for space in national security is, outside of the rhetoric, badly understood, except by certain high rank general officers of the Army, or considered marginal at this stage by the politicians, even though a real consolidation effort based around launcher and satellite prime contractors, having complete mastery of their entire chain of production (avionics, propulsion, integration), certainly seems to have been successfully undertaken. Feeling itself responsible for the whole of the space industry, the government may have decided that, when the time comes, a high-level return to the world stage will be easier and quicker to arrange. But, this calculation could prove risky, if it later appeared that this sector had developed a real tendency to resist change e and ultimately showed itself to be deprived of resurgence capability! 2.5. The specific case of the space industry When discussing the Russian space industry, three notable facts are worth underlining. 1. Since 2001 there has been greater political interest in the space sector, essentially in words. But this has, also, been expressed in some actions: selective budget support, steering documents, intention to restore Glonass to its status as national programme, security council meeting on military space, reorganisation of the Roskosmos agency, new policy for the ‘cosmodromes’ launch sites . Everything is happening as if the government wanted to retake ownership of the achievements of the Soviet era, while wishing to exploit the knowledge gained differently and at a political level, increasing the credibility of the role of the state. Space would thus become one of the means for integrating ‘postmodern’ (post-industrial) society. In this regard, the presence of one of Putin’s advisors at the Moscow celebrations of 40 years of Franco-Russian cooperation in October 2006 can be interpreted as a mark of the new political interest in this sector. On the other hand, Roskosmos has seen its role restricted to that of executive agency, at a lower level than in the past in comparison with the era of Koptev and the oligarchs.
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2. At the budgetary level the space budget, as far as one can know, remains weak: $1.3 billion per year,23 or $2.4 billion according to other sources (Glonass budget for 2007 being $260 million).24 Over the 2006e2015 period the Roskosmos budget is expected to be around V7 billion (305 billion roubles).25 At that funding, budgets for defence and security ‘space forces’, for the already mentioned Glonass, and for development of ground space launch infrastructures should be added. Of course it is obvious that the civil budget is topped up by comparable military budgets for strategic programmes. In the short term we should not expect much more substantial support, until the sector has been reviewed for greater economic efficiency. So, without a larger budget, can the Russian space sector flourish without being dependent on the West? Can it allow the development of ambitious cooperative ventures? Can the logic which forms the basis of this policy, coherent with that which accompanies the industrial restructurings around holding companies, lead to licensing arrangements in the industry? If measures are not taken to attract young people, if necessary in the form of short-term-type contracts, the problem of skills maintenance will inevitably arise. Cooperation between European and Russian firms as equals, in such conditions, would not be automatic. 3. Taking the example of the prospects for cooperation over future launchers, it must be admitted that concrete progress in the ‘Soyuz at Kourou’ deal, and in other future launchers, has been somehow rather haphazard and slow. To speak quite bluntly, Russians have a tendency to think about the short term, the modernisation of their own systems, cooperation starting from current assets, rather than about the long term and work on truly new concepts. To cross this barrier, it will be necessary to pass to a higher, political level (of the order of the tradeoff made at the time in favour of the ‘Soyuz at Kourou’ cooperation). Or again, we would need to imagine a different thematic domain for cooperation. The question of realistic prospects for Euro-Russian cooperation on the Clipper vehicle, by the time the major international space exploration programmes are due to set off (2012), needs to be posed: what might be the Russian motives for it and what the European objectives? What type of mission (servicing the ISS, exploration missions?) for such a vehicle would be the sort to create a political and industrial consensus in its favour? On the whole, we can confirm that the return of the state in the arms industry is more marked than it is in the space industry. The strategic and economic stakes, notably but not solely where exports are concerned, are of more immediate importance for the defence industries. As for space, we cannot yet clearly make out the government’s objectives, nor the 23
Euroconsult ‘Government space markets’, World Prospects to 2017 (2008). B. Harvey, The rebirth of Russian space program, Springer, 2007. 25 French Embassy in Moscow, interview with Space attache´, C. Ivanov (December 2009). 24
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industrial strategy in action. Certainly Russia will wish to demonstrate both at home and on the international stage that in this field it is both the heir to a ‘long history’ (50th anniversary of the launch of Sputnik in 2007) and has every intention of maintaining its rank, making the most of its technological knowledge and being well on the way to modernisation (launchers, Glonass system). Beyond this, the goals of the budgetary mobilisation and of the industrial restructuring currently underway remain somewhat blurred. One possible interpretation of the relatively static situation could be that the ‘space lobby’ is resisting change and continues to benefit from a form of guaranteed income. It is probably best not to approach the space question in too global a manner. In reality, the situation and the stakes in the industry are different according to whether we are talking about satellites, launchers or human spaceflight technologies. For example, in the field of telecommunications satellites, Russia has been modernising its fleet for the past 10 years, not hesitating to cooperate with France (Alcatel payloads). Russian equipment is being modernised and the well organised industry actively responds to international calls for tenders. For launchers the situation is evolving from the strategy of the past decade, which aimed to get more value from the Proton and Zenith launchers via joint-ventures with the Americans. This policy had the merit of bringing a market to the Soviet-era launch industry. Per contra, the transfer payments fixed and made by the US manufacturers were excessively low. Today Russia is demonstrating an intention to take back more autonomy over its means of access to space and is refusing to yield up its assets and services at too low a price. It has been able to modernise its production. Finally, where future space vehicle programmes are concerned (Clipper programme), the situation remains confused (planetary exploration or ISS service?). At any rate Russia does not envisage offering cooperative partnership opportunities to all comers, at any price. For its part, Europe has been slow to demonstrate a clear political will and adequate budget planning. 3. The current state of French and European space cooperation with Russia Although Russia is currently reaffirming its power, reforming its industrial structures and winning back expertise and technology from abroad, this process has only just begun in the space sector, one of the crowning successes of the former Soviet state. The Russian Federation’s above mentioned ‘Space Plan for 2006 to 2015’ envisages about V7 billion, to which should be added classified defence funds and non-budgetary (in-kind) sources. This ‘dual’ budget, which could be seen for the best years as of the same order of size as that allocated each year to NASA for civil programmes only (with salary costs some three to five times lower!), clearly demonstrates a policy of relaunch of the space sector in Russia and an intention to make up the deficit that occurred following the collapse of
the Soviet system by modernising the Soyuz and Proton launchers and reconfiguring Glonass with regular satellite launches. Change has swept through the sector, with the creation of the federal space agency Roskosmos in 2004 (separation of space and aeronautical activities) and the consolidation of the sector’s institutes and businesses (establishment of prime contractors able to undertake the entire industrial process). 3.1. The federal space programme and the axes of cooperation The 2006e2011 Russian space programme covers all sectors of the space field: construction of a manned spacecraft for visiting the ISS and exploration (Clipper), development of new launchers (Soyuz 2, Proton M and Angara), launch of a probe to the Martian moon Phobos (Phobos-Grunt), and a doubling of the number of scientific, telecommunications, navigation and Earth observation satellites. The Russian space agency has entered into cooperative relationships with the major space agencies in diverse areas and to varying degrees, mainly in the scientific field and to service the ISS. In addition, after the fall of the Berlin Wall industrial partnerships in the form of commercial businesses were undertaken on US initiatives in order to take advantage of Russian and Ukrainian rockets (ILS for Proton, Sea Launch for Zenith). 3.2. Launcher cooperation The leader in this field, Russia has started, alone or in cooperation, a series of measures to ensure, in the short term, the maintenance of its autonomy and the competitiveness of its industry on the international market for launch services. They include extending the lease on the Baikonur launch centre; development of the infrastructure at Plesetsk; installation of the Soyuz rocket at the ESA equatorial site in French Guiana; development of more powerful versions of Soyuz; development of the modular launcher Angara, which will be launched from Baikonur and Plesetsk; modernisation of Proton, which has been completely refurbished in order to augment its performance by 15%; and installation at Baikonur of the Zenith-3SL as part of the ‘Land launch’ project. In the longer term Russia’s strategy is less explicit. There is not really any development of a heavy-lift launcher beyond Angara nor of any vehicle to launch manned craft to orbital stations. Reusable launchers will not be on the cards for another 30 years.26 As a historic Russian partner, with whom it has cooperated for 40 years in successive circles (space science, then manned flights, then launch services and finally launchers), France, via its space agency CNES, has maybe a special role to play as an 26 The Russians are interested in the idea of a reusable booster that would diminish pollution over the plains of Kazakhstan.
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interface between Europe and Russia, particularly in its specialist area, that of launchers. 3.3. Installation of Soyuz at the Guyana Space Centre This European project (V344 million invested, of which V233 is the European share under ESA responsibility, with 63% of that borne by France) is not a bilateral arrangement with France, even though it is the extension of the creation of the Franco-Russian company Starsem in 1996. France has nevertheless carried the project from the start and agreed to support the whole of the loan guarantee of V121 granted by the European Investment Bank (EIB). It has a security agreement with Russia (the result of tough negotiations) through the persons of CNES and Roskosmos, whose actual operation has yet to be tested. The first launch of a Soyuz from the Guyana Space Centre is slated for mid-2010. This type of cooperation, which creates major infrastructure, constitutes a long-term bond (20 years) and thus poses the question of the stability of the agreements which saw its birth and of Russian intentions towards exploitation of the Soyuz family. Vigilance must be maintained over the latter because: Arianespace, which is the operator, does not have a monopoly on the commercial use of Soyuz and nothing has been said at this stage about future developments of it (use for commercial launches from Baikonur; development of a cryogenic upper stage). Potential future competition in the market for the European Ariane 5 launcher might thus remain a concern, even if the prices of the Russian launching services are progressively increased. If Russia’s economic take-off is confirmed, this would mean that the differential in salary costs between Russia and Europe is likely to diminish, eroding the current competitive advantage of Russian manufacture. It remains to be seen how this evolution in costs will be reclaimed on the relative margins between Russian and European companies in the future. In order to compensate for this likely change in production costs, the Russian space industry should put in place productivity efforts that will allow it to remain attractive on the international market as soon as possible, avoiding the need to request a renegotiation of the 2003 agreement on Soyuz at Kourou.
3.4. The Oural future launchers programme The agreement of November 2003, ratified by an interagency protocol of 15 March 2005, covers among things the development of future launch vehicles (with no exchange of funds). It is concerned with the development and concerted validation of the technologies necessary for a new generation of launchers, to be developed around 2015. There remain difficulties over the transfer of data from the Russian party, which requires an intergovernmental agreement dedicated to
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exchanges on future launcher technologies. Discussions on this agreement got underway within an inter-agency working group. The pursuit of joint technical activities awaits a solution to the problem of exchanging technological data. Tests on the KVD1-Lox/methane engine are being carried out on the Russian side; however, it is not possible for the Russians to obtain the results of French studies. The ultimate goals of the Oural programme are not clearly fixed yet. This is considered a serious obstacle to the mobilisation of funds by the Russian side. If, in the case of ‘reusable launchers’ there is consensus on bringing forward the objective, the question of ‘reusability’ itself as a good way of advancing technology, especially engine technology, remains. Russia is interested in reusable motors/thrusters (of the Baikal or Bargouzine type using LOX/methane with strong thrust) which would improve the ecology around Baikonur and would justify studies on a Volga engine (400 t). The bilateral ‘Oural’ management group is currently working on the redefinition of common, concrete and driving goals, via demonstrators for example. In reality the future of the framework of exchanges represented by Oural remains highly dependent on Russian will to lead new and realistically shared activities. The difficulties encountered over the transfer of data are not a good omen. With cooperation over future launchers being part of the ‘Soyuz at Kourou’ agreement, the Russian party certainly can’t totally disregard it. Nevertheless said cooperation appears to be dormant. 3.5. Future propulsion systems The Safran/Snecma industrial corporation has been cooperating with Russia for 15 years and has signed over 250 contracts with it, of which around a dozen are in progress. The Volga programme, in partnership with the propulsion systems manufacturers KBKhA, NPO Energomash27 and the Keldysh Institute, and EADS Volvo, is aiming to develop a LOX/ methane engine of 200e400 tons for future launch vehicles. It seems still to be on ‘stand-by’ and requires a relaunch, pending the development of an innovative LOX/methane propulsion sector. 3.6. Manned flight and exploration 3.6.1. Experiments on board the ISS ESA is the usual interface for the Russians on the general management of the International Space Station and for experiments in the Russian sector of the ISS, with some exceptions for certain bilateral Franco-Russian experiments. France has specialised in microgravity experiments and in space medicine. These are activities that are destined to 27
The propulsion system manufacturer Energomash will have obtained an increase in its capital (250 million roubles) for the construction of new facilities, following a visit to the site in early December 2009 by V. Putin.
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endure, CNES remaining a driving force in these fields. Future experiments proposed by CNES in the Russian sector are the microgravity experiments VIP-KRIT, which are to be developed within an ESA framework, and Cardiomed, which is the object of a direct bilateral agreement between CNES and Roskosmos. 3.6.2. Space exploration and Clipper Beyond the ISS, the creation of new manned vehicles for the post-Shuttle era (2012?) is a necessity, both for the Americans, who want to support their exploration programme to the Moon and beyond, and for the Russians, who are anxious to make large-scale Russian access to the orbital station permanent and to take part in the new lunar programmes. Roskosmos is to make the choice of manned vehicle launcher, but the manned craft has not been definitely defined and the proposals from Energia on the ‘Clipper’ concept appear to be moribund. While, doubtless thanks to a lack of funding, the system was open to cooperative participation (Roskosmos has insisted for years on its desire to see Europe participating in the development of a high-performing transportation vehicle) ESA has had doubts about the project. Since the context of space exploration is evolving quite rapidly, possible cooperation with Russia on this subject would necessarily have to be envisaged with a much larger framework, situating the European or Euro-Russian contribution in the context of the new planning proposed by NASA, but also by China and India, and maybe Japan. 3.6.3. Space science After a dark period for Russian space science activities, a brighter spell is emerging. It remains to be seen whether this will arrive in time, given the ageing profile of the teams of researchers. The highest priority project is the launch of NPO Lavotchkin’s Phobos-Grunt probe, which is to bring samples of the Martian moon Phobos’s soil back to Earth. This mission, in partnership with China, was due to launch in 2009 but has been postponed until 2011. France is to have instruments on board. In order to mitigate the deficiency in public funding for scientific missions, Russian firms have also strengthened the work they do developing scientific instruments for foreign interplanetary missions. Thus Russian entities are taking part in the following projects: Mars Express, Venus Express, BepiColombo, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and the Mars Science Laboratory; within these projects Euro-Russian cooperation, led by ESA, involves the European Exo Mars rover programme, which may carry Russian radio-isotope heater units (RHUs), BepiColombo, which will have a Russian instrument on board, and the Russian Spectrum Gamma mission, which will use European instruments. 3.6.4. Applications satellites The Russian satellite sector has suffered from a serious lack of performance culture in the past, linked notably to the existence of very powerful launchers whose costs are accounted for nearly nothing, which favours the development
of heavy satellites with a short lifespan. This state of affairs has thwarted the development of an industrial export market for satellites, following the dismemberment of the Soviet bloc, in contrast to the situation for launchers. This sector has therefore fallen significantly behind its international rivals, a situation from which Russia is now attempting to catch up. Satellite earth observation is a field in which Russia is rebuilding its potential thanks to a marked rise in the federal space programme budgets. The latest satellite, Ressours-DK, is now operational; others are in preparation. This is a ‘dual use’ civil/military sector in which Russia wishes to cooperate in order to initiate the exchange of data and could thus possibly constitute a new axis of cooperation. In the telecommunications sector Russia offers significant potential for growth from a commercial viewpoint. Here the partnerships are of manufacturers and the policy is the forming of joint-ventures with European actors, allowing, beyond the sales, ‘russification’ of some of the products while respecting the legal procedures on sensitive technologies.28 In the field of satellite navigation, cooperation with France takes place through the European Union and is aimed at making the Glonass and Galileo systems interoperable. Lastly, plasma propulsion for spacecraft is an area for R&T cooperation, since Safran, allied to the US company Loral, has been commercialising the SPT-100 satellite motor, with the Russian OKB Fakel, since 1993 and has developed the improved PPS-1350 version which sent Europe’s SMART 1 probe to the Moon. 4. Conclusion In a once more buoyant context for strategic industries, or for those linked to political power, space in Russia should in theory be benefiting from some powerful leverage. In reality, this has not yet been clearly demonstrated (resistance to change, secondary priority?), even though the country has both obvious needs (for satellites) and technical instruments that are dated but modernisable. Analysis of the factors favourable to a deepening of cooperation in space with Russia must be accompanied by a firm grasp of the reality of the daily constraints on the exchange of high-level technological information (launchers and associated infrastructures) encountered in real life and, at a more general level, of the existence of a strong Russian desire to systematically reassert the country’s sovereignty. Other unfavourable factors must be cited, ranging from uncertainty about the political future, despite economic and financial progress, to the lack of clarity in the reorganisation of the aerospace and arms sectors. Last but not least, the positive evolution of the diplomatic and strategic dialogue between Washington and Moscow at the 28
Astrium and RNIIKP have created Synertech, in order to transfer a degree of competence in design and production of payloads for civil telecommunications; Alcatel has formed a joint-venture with NPO-PM to commercialise satellites manufactured on the territory of the Russian Federation based on certain technologies supplied by Alcatel.
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end of 2009 may result in a true change of their bilateral relationships, or a limited step forward. In order to serve its interests, Russia should strengthen its ties with Europe and the world’s most influential actors rather than remaining obsessed with a focus on power balance.29 In as much as, in France and Europe, clear needs and a programmatic strategy could be well established, the path to a more substantial space partnership with Russia is not too difficult to imagine. But the path is narrow. Everything depends on the way the uncertainty factors develop and on the endurance of the positive factors, on the cooperative field, on the empirical conditions and finally on the timetable we would want to envisage for large-scale joint undertakings. Faced with this methodological difficulty, it seems reasonable to prepare a cautious approach comprising a choice of options or scenarios. These are briefly presented below. Before doing this, however, we should remember that the Russian authorities do not expect trustworthiness and transparency from us Europeans. They still have a bitter memory of the pressure exerted on the weakened Russia of the 1990s and consider that they have often been forced into concessions which they deem shameful.30 The new Russia is linked to Europe by trade, but it is not pro-European. In addition, this analysis of future prospects must take account of the specific international context for the space industries and services, particularly of the fact that, in contrast to the base years (1970e80), the major actors in the launcher or satellite fields, alongside Russia, are no longer just the USA and France but half-a-dozen other states (India, China, Japan, etc). Some of these may lay claim to a future position as rivals to the ageing Russian systems, others may become candidates for cooperation with Russia, thus competing with their traditional partners (like France). We should also note that, for its part, Europe has been concentrating on its goal of autonomy over the years. It no longer seems to be in a position, as it was in the 1980s with the Hermes project, to commit itself with the means appropriate for international space cooperation on a grand scale. Among the various options that might be envisaged for the future, three principal scenarios are presented below:
about what to do next. It means to keep the advances made in several areas of propulsion for itself. Its needs for Western technologies are limited to applications for satellites (telecommunications and remote sensing). Who knows, Russia may even be wanting to ‘leave the West’ e according to one of the best research fellows in Europe on these issues, I. Facon.31 For its part, Europe, finally, still has time to think about Ariane 6 or planetary exploration projects. 2. In contrast, a proactive scenario e rather unlikely at this stage e would be based on Russia’s intention to invest in Europe for the long term, showing itself ready to play fully by the rules of confidentiality, of security, and of balanced sharing of technical information. This scenario would be combined with a hypothesis of major desired evolution in the European policy for the launch industry: confirmation of the political will to engage in a new programme of post-Ariane 5 heavy launchers, favouring a diminution of the development costs and the sharing of risks with a major international partner, the whole being acceptable to the European industry. The future of European launchers would be Euro-Russian. 3. An even more ambitious option would assume a storming return of Russia to the international space stage and a parallel confirmation of its intention to open up cooperation with Europe as well as of its respect for international law. For its part Europe would take full cognisance of the strategic nature of space competence and would demonstrate a renewal of ambition for programmes on the scale of the 1980s, in order to keep pace, for example, with the acceleration of the US programmes of space exploration, or with the Chinese, Indian or Japanese lunar programmes.In such a scenario, it would be conceivable to imagine a structured Franco-Euro-Russian cooperation aiming to contribute to the international community, as a complement to US, Chinese or Indian efforts, an essential element of the global infrastructures for the conquest of space in the 21st century. Such could be the case of a proposal, in industrial partnership supported by the agencies, of a grand robotic mission to Mars or manned flights to the Moon, if Russia does not wish to be left behind in the lunar missions race.
1. A ‘wait-and-see’ option would involve honouring the undertakings made with Russia relating to the implementation of an ESA launch pad reserved for the Soyuz launcher in French Guiana, while renouncing the possibility of real joint work on European launchers beyond Ariane 5, despite the anticipated advantages. Such an option would involve a sort of waiting game on both sides, leaving no place for any large-scale inter-state cooperation. After all, Russia is well equipped with modernised launch industries covering its needs for the next 30 years; it has time to think
We should emphasise that these different options all start from the same assumption that Russia is not going to become impossible to deal with, that it is not going to follow a path of narrow nationalism, of jealous neo-imperialism, and shut itself off from Europe or provide evidence of duplicity. In a catastrophe scenario of negative development in space cooperation, one could imagine Russia raising the price of Soyuz, multiplying its launches from Baikonur or elsewhere, pocketing the profits, should the occasion arise asking to review the terms for the use of Soyuz at Kourou in order to obtain extra financial compensation and, finally, not being a bona fide party to the application of the security and safety rules for the site.Forced to take on an
29 ‘Russia Reborn’, D. Tremin, Foreign Affairs, Vol.88 N 6, November/ December 2009 (p.78). 30 See the remarks about V. Putin sayings, reported in N. Sokov, ‘The origins and prospects for Russian nuclear doctrine’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, n 2, July 2007: ‘‘In the fall of 2004, President Vladimir Putin spoke openly about the desire of unnamed countries to ‘tear juicy morsels’ from Russia’’.
31 The West and post-Putin Russia:does Russia ‘leave the West’?, I. Facon, FRS Note, April 22, 2008, for Berstelsmann Stiftung.
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investment of several hundred million euros, we would discover that we had no useful lever with which to lean on our negotiating partners and we would find ourselves facing an iniquitous dilemma: whether to close the Russian site at Kourou or put it to bed in the hope of better times to come. But this is an abhorrent scenario.
Whatever hypothesis we take, the position of our European partners, especially the Germans, will condition the possible inflections in favour of strengthened cooperation in space with Russia on a path that is promising but extremely narrow. Analysis of their own priorities will be required in order to determine the direction desired by European member states.
Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24 www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol
Russia’s resurgence: Prospects for space policy and international cooperation Bertrand de Montluc1 SciencesPo Paris, Associate Expert, Centre d’e´tudes des relations internationales, France Available online 12 January 2010
Abstract Based on a joint study initiated in 2007e2008 by the Policy planning staff (CAP) of the French Foreign Ministry and the space agency CNES, which brought together experts, researchers and industry insiders, this article considers the factors behind Russia’s recent resurgence and the possible revival of its space programme. It examines how far the latter will require international cooperation in order to progress further and discusses likely areas of profitable collaboration with Europe in general and France in particular, given that country’s long history of space cooperation with Russia and the need in the mid-term future to share the burden of developing ambitious new space programs. While there is in principle much potential, especially in the area of space transportation, there are also numerous challenges and uncertainties. How these are resolved will affect the level and success of any cooperative efforts of both sides. Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Fortified by past technological investments and by improvements in its economy,2 Russia has begun reconstituting its capabilities in the aerospace and defence fields, although it is not yet clear which sectors or programmes will be favoured.3 As the role given to space programmes in the power politics being conducted by Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev becomes clearer, how will the space
E-mail address: [email protected] In this article Dr de Montluc expresses only personal views. The paper has been re-written in 2009 by Frances Brown, Editor, to whom the author delivers his very warm thanks. The original research for this paper was carried out in France with inputs from several experts from ministry of Foreign Affairs (X. Rey), University (J. Sapir), French space agency CNES (P. Frisch, C. Ivanov), think tanks (I. Facon, FRS, I. Sourbe`s-Verger, CNRS, L. Nardon et T. Jean, IFRI) and industry (J. Chenet, B. Planas, M. Doubovick). 2 The last year recession should be followed by a period of economic growth of 5% for national production (PIB/GIP) according to OECD data (publication n 86). 3 The Russian state industry is presently under review by political leaders (website RiaNovosti, http://fr.rian.ru/economic_news/). 1
0265-9646/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.12.002
lobby compare with other client groups and what are its actual modes of action not only in budgetary terms but where mobilisable human resources are concerned? Do proposals for new projects (‘useful’ applications, space exploration, launchers, etc) and a real ability to mobilise political support for them exist? We already know for sure that the restructuring of the aerospace sector has been accompanied by a new division between civil and military, and aeronautics and space. Industrial reorganisations have taken place, particularly in the space sector: Roskosmos is now only concerned with civil space. One of its goals has been developing international cooperation e among others, with France (Soyuz launched from Kourou) e in areas like space transportation and scientific research, in partnership with institutions related to the influential Russian Academy of Sciences. Space budgets have been rising for several years (see below). At the same time Russian industrial firms have been concluding joint ventures with European companies. For their part, various European firms (Alcatel, Snecma-Safran, Astrium) have been developing a turnover, albeit modest, with Russia. There are thus several positive indicators that an in-depth exploration of the possibilities for European and particularly
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French civil space cooperation with Russia is worth undertaking, as confirmed by a variety of parliamentary groups (WEU assembly,4 European Parliamentary Group for Space, Groupe Parlementaire pour l’Espace (GPE) of the French Parliament, etc). Nevertheless, there remain uncertainties about the global development of Russian policy, with several specific question marks over: the budgets available for civil space, while laboratories funded by the Academy of Sciences still seem starved of basic resources or of a new supply of young researchers to mitigate the effects of the brain drain of the 1990s; political support for the space agency to implement an ambitious policy, at a time when its long-term plans are not clear;5 the apparent vagueness of the reorganisation of the aerospace and defence industries,6 and the lack of clarity over the reorganisation of Rosoboronexport; Russian reluctance to engage in true, lasting and balanced industrial partnerships, the often only short-term profitorientated aims of cooperation,7 and the difficulty of moving from a logic of supply through technology transfer to one of acquisition; the strengthening of the regulations governing the spread of sensitive technical information. Franco-Russian space cooperation, which has been ongoing for over 40 years, has been an original axis of France’s space policy. Assuming a deepening of this trend in the new Russian context, how much room for manoeuvre does a country like France, together with other European member states, have, given current developments? This paper will attempt to analyse the current conditions of interdependence within the Russian militaryeindustrial complex and the elements which are shaping it, with a view to sketching out some low-risk options. The first part analyses the economic and political context in Russia and the specific situation of the aerospace and defence industries. The second part discusses the present state of cooperation between Europe and Russia. Finally, some future paths for possible new directions in French and European space cooperation with Russia will tentatively be outlined.
2. Specifics of the Russian context 2.1. Geopolitical context The loss of their country’s status as an imperial power has been the major trauma for Russians since the dissolution of the USSR and they clearly find it difficult to give such status up.8 For the first time since the 15th century the territory in which the historical Russian consciousness developed, and triumphs such as the conquest of space took place, has indeed dramatically shrunk. Today Russians have a new need to be respected by the world, to speak as an equal with the ‘European bloc’ and to give free rein to their sovereignty and indeed to their imperium. Over the past few years Russia has entered a phase of power affirmation. This new assurance rests on a substantial improvement in its economic situation (see below) and on the ideological corpus promoted by President, now Prime Minister, Putin and his entourage: internally, restoration of the state and of the unity of the Russian federation; externally, restoration of the country’s power and independence of action. But the successful tackling of this task has vastly exceeded its initial objectives, reducing democratic freedoms and calling into question the nature and longevity of the regime itself. The Western model of liberal democracy no longer serves as an example for Russia’s internal development; at the same time the West has discovered the absence of any real tools for influencing Russia’s choices. The rhetoric of sovereignty and ‘the Russian way’ that is developing is obsessed with stability, justifies the concentration of power and the calling into question of democratic attainments, and is promoting patriotism, if not outright nationalism.9 The hardening of Russia’s foreign policy is noticeable. Russia has become a more demanding and difficult partner on major international issues (Iran, Kosovo, 2008 war in Georgia, crises at the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, NagornoKarabakh and Transnistria). Where relations between the EU and Russia are concerned, progress has been very modest (questions over the integrity of Russia as a critical energy supplier, bilateral disagreements with the new member states). The Kremlin thinks of its near environment in terms that hark back to spheres of influence, within a logic of zero-sum games with the EU, which hobbles any possibility of cooperation within the ‘common neighbourhood’. Its principal fear is of the expansion of NATO into the territory of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan) and of the contagious effect of the ‘pink’ and ‘orange revolutions’.
4
Document C/2008, May 6, 2008, A. Rigni. I. Facon, I. Sourbe`s-Verger, ‘Le spatiale russe, implications nationales et internationales d’une apparente remonte´e en puissance’ [Space in Russia, national and international consequences of a possible resurgence], Recherches et Documents, FRS, June 2007, at http://www.frstrategie.org. 6 Les Echos, 19 September 2006; L. Nardon, ‘Les re´organisations de l’industrie spatiale russe’, Paris, IFRI, December 2006 (in French); and A Yakovlev, ‘The evolution of businessestate interaction in Russia: from state capture to business capture’, Europe-Asia Studies, 58 (7), 2006. 7 A. Ionin, ‘Does Russia need the European cosmodrome?, Moscow Defence Brief, 2, 2005. 5
8
CERI/SciencesPo-CNRS-MGIMO (State Institute of International Relations of Moscow) colloquium, ‘Fifteen years after the creation of the CIS: developments in post-Soviet space activities and energy questions’, Paris, 7 June 2007(www.ceri-sciences-po.org). 9 See research works by Th. Gomart (IFRI), X. Rey (CAP Policy planning staff of the French ministry of Foreign and European affairs) and M. Mendras, professor at Paris SciencesPo and the London School of Economics (recent paper for France’s Higher College for Defense Studies (IHEDN), Paris April, 18, 2009 (http://russiactuprime.com).
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Relations with the USA have been strained since 2004 as the Bush administration became less careful to deal tactfully with Russia, hardening its tone over domestic political developments and announcing the build-up of missile defence facilities in Eastern Europe10 and its support for those states of the CIS whose relationship with Moscow is tricky. For its part the Kremlin has profited from the USA’s diplomatic weakness (Iraq) to assert itself, as demonstrated by Putin’s denunciation of US ‘unilateralism’ in a famous speech in Munich in February 2007;11 by obstinate and pretty aggressive reaction to US plans e now shelved e to site missile defence hardware in Poland and the Czech Republic; and by its continued apparent opposition to any weaponisation of space.12 The fact that, on the one hand, in his 17 September 2009 White House speech President Obama announced that the USA would scrap the Bush plans for a European missile shield and, on the other hand, that Washington was planning a major shake-up of the Pentagon’s weapons priorities e with Defense Secretary Robert Gates writing in Foreign Affairs that the USA ‘cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets’- should provide smoother relationships.13 Moreover the USA has declared that Washington and Moscow are to start talking about strategic disarmament in the future.14 On the other side, Russia has stated that a new Russian military doctrine is going to be adopted before 2010.15 It might be that in some respects the Obama administration feels the need to turn a page rather than simply tinker at the edge.16 In home affairs, the succession from President Putin to President Medvedev demonstrated a broad continuation of earlier policy and a shuffling of the cards at the heart of the same elite. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the obstacles created by the system (lack of any credible link between the state and its citizens, corruption), the modernisation of the country, the spread of a middle class anxious about judicial protections, and generational change within the establishment, all argue for structural political changes. Other doubts over the direction the country is taking are of a structural nature: there are dangers from an unbalanced development weighted too heavily in favour of hydrocarbons;
10
V. Dvorkin, ‘The Threats Posed by the U.S. Missile Shield’, Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 5 n 2, AprileJune 2007 (pp. 23e32). Major General (Ret) Dvorkin commanded the Russian Space Forces; he described the American plans as obvious threat (Jane’s JDW, 31 January 2007, p. 7). 11 This speech for the 43rd Wehrkunde Munich conference (9e11/2/2007) was published in French in Revue de De´fense nationale, June 2007. 12 Col. Gen. V. Popovkin, responsible for ‘Russian space forces’, ‘We don’t want to wage a war in space, we don’t want to gain dominance in space, but we won’t allow any other nation to dominate space’, IHT, 28 September 2007. 13 Star Wars Retreat ?, M. O’Halon, September 23, 2009, Foreign Affairs notes on website (www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65420/michel-ohanlon/starwars-retreats). The Robert Gates’s article ‘A Balanced Strategy’ is from Jaunary/February 2009. 14 IHT, 18/9/2009, 21/9/2009, and 18/12/2009 for the new perspectives of disarmamant (nuclear arms limitation talks). 15 Statement by General N. Makarov (JCS), ‘RussiaNovosty’ (website quoted infra), November, 11, 2009. 16 ‘The Russia File’, R. Levgold, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009 (pp. 78e94).
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there is underinvestment in ageing infrastructure, and an unprecedented demographic crisis (half a million inhabitants fewer each year). The political direction for the mid-term future is in such conditions rather opened. 2.2. Economic context Russia’s economic growth at around 7% since 2003 e halted by the worldwide financial and economic collapse of 2008 with the Moscow financial market falling in the fourth trimester of 2008 by 73% e has not wiped out the earlier worse depression (1990e98). One should not forget that Russia only reached its 1990 GDP level in the first quarter of 2007! The cumulative impoverishment during the 1990s explains the breadth of the frustration felt and the sometimes clumsy vigour of the country’s efforts to return to the global stage. Between mid-2008 and mid2009 Russian GDP again fell by more than 10%. However after the negative economic growth in 2009 (8.7), things are expected to get better in 2010 and 2011 (þ4%e5% increase) with low inflation, no deficit of public finances, foreign exchange reserves stabilized at about US$430 billion and the budget deficit itself limited at 6% or less of industrial production.17 2.3. Industrial policy The restoration of a Russian high-tech industry capable of measuring up to those of the major industrial powers thanks to a more significant role taken by state-controlled companies in the energy sector and restructuring in sectors like aeronautics, nanotechnologies, nuclear power and naval construction, has ceased to be a purely economic goal and is becoming a strategic objective.18 It may be seen as a response to a US challenge to regional domination signalled by the Iraq war, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or events in Georgia, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Achieving this restoration was initially aided by a strong international financial situation created by the rise in the price of hydrocarbons (growth, in monthly balance, reaching $10 billion in 2005, followed by a collapse at the moment of the 2008 financial crisis, the price of a barrel of oil at the end of 2009 growing significantly again) and by the fall in imports, which allowed the restoration of a positive commercial balance. Today Russia exports about $400 billion worth of goods and imports $263 billion worth (with between $340 to $380 billion expected in 2010 and 2011, according to the OECD).19 The lack of a true modern financial system capable of operating as an intermediary between the reserves produced in the traditional domestic small business sector and the sectors needing 17 OECD, World Bank, Coe-Rexecode, 2009 data (ECO/CPE(2009)20/EO86/4). See also October 2009 analysis by the services of BNP-Paribas bank, ‘Bresil, Russia: why so different evolutions in regard to the international crisis’ A. Dorbec, V. Perracino, 15/10/2009 (pp.23e33), accessible through the website http:// bourses.bnpparibas.net. 18 I. Facon, I Sourbe`s-Verger, ‘Le spatial russe, presence internationale et souverainete´ nationale’ (in French), Courrier des Pays de l’Est, n 1061, 2007. 19 Above quoted references and data of ‘Diagnostic(s)’ published by CoeRexecode (www.coe-rexecode.fr) and ‘RIAnovosti’ news agency cited website.
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capital nevertheless continues to create difficulties for the Russian economy. This situation has made necessary the use of the major public enterprises in the role of industrial investor. The aim e a priority from the point of view of the national interest e of rebuilding an industry centred on advanced technologies and fit to represent Russian competitiveness at the international scale in the important strategic sectors (aerospace, nuclear power, telecommunications, weapons production) implies the mobilisation of considerable amounts of capital. This suggests that the revenues from the exploitation of raw materials (a monthly total exceeding $15 billion for the commercial balance) should be controlled in order to be reinvested in industry. The winter of 2005 saw the emergence of a clear industrial strategy connecting up Russian industry into three major sectors: a priority sector for economic development, controlled by the state (energy and raw materials); a strategic industry sector aimed at diversifying production, whose strategic direction is laid down by the state (engineering, automotive industry, aerospace); a ‘third market’ sector where the state does not intend to interfere.20 This structure has a double aspect: the vertical ascent of the state in the economy and the concentration of activity, as is apparent in the arms, aeronautical and, to a lesser degree, space sectors.21 2.4. Characteristics and evolution of the defence industry The defence industry is in a rather poor condition, being no longer capable of producing a whole range of conventional weapons systems, and is even ready to buy armament equipment, drones or ships from abroad. The failure of the Bulava ballistic missile is an example among others of the difficulties met by the armament sector.22 Through an increased budgetary effort and the determination to place the restructuring process in a strong framework with the same basic principle e the formation of industrial poles concentrating production capacity, design and scientists, with a more or less significant role for the state in the capital of the companies e the Russian state now wants to make the most of what the industries did of their own accord to survive during the lean 20
The entry of foreign shareholders in this sector can be envisaged if these identify themselves with the strategic directions. See J. Sapir, in french, ‘Les conditions d’une pe´rennisation de la croissance en Russie’, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales EHESS-CEMI, July 2008 (http://cemi.ehess.fr/) and Quelle e´conomie pour le XXIe`me sie`cle ?, O. Jacob, 2005. 21 For the space industry and the movement of consolidation through ‘holdings’, see L. Nardon, ‘Les reorganisations de l’industrie spatiale russe’, December 2006, at the IFRI website. On the new organisation of the Khrunichev launcher company, see Air & Cosmos, 20 083, 22 June 2007. The workloads of the satellite company Lavochkin and of Ukrainian firms are presented in Air & Cosmos, 2085, 6 July 2007. 22 ‘‘Russia Reborn’’, D. Trenin, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009 (pp. 64e79).
years and utilise this experience so that the country can ensure its own defence and remain in world markets. These two goals obviously require a raising of the technological level of national production. Presently it seems that in the overall strategic and space defence militaryeindustrial field the budget would be about V40 billion, with which 30 ballistic missiles and 11 ‘ground space facilities’ have to be built. A similar effort has been undertaken to help firms find new markets at a time when, for Russia, the traditional market (in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia) is slowing down. Thus the majority of countries with which Russia is developing space cooperation are, also, important (China, India, Iran) or potential (Venezuela, Malaysia, South Korea) customers of the arms industry. Another point in common between the two sectors is their opening to more international collaboration opportunities, space e though of less macroeconomic weight e being a precursor from this point of view (engines, launchers). Nowadays the Russians do not shy away from integrating foreign components or sub-systems into their spacecraft. The government is encouraging or accompanying partnerships targeting the acquisition of skills. In the defence industry even more than in the space industry, action consists in seeking the margins of technological advance. Hence the interest in buying production licences, the search for complementary partners and the interest, albeit still limited, in sharing the technical and financial risks through industrial partnerships. Yet for each sector, the action goes hand in hand with strong criticism of unequal partnerships (or partnerships that are experienced as unequal) as a result of exploitation of Russian resources to the benefit of international partners without any skills transfer, a concern that recalls the ‘pillaging’ of the militaryeindustrial complex in the 1990s. Incidentally, Russia no longer seems necessarily to be relying on partnerships with Western firms. It is seeking openings with rising technological powers. The underlying reason for the return of the state in these sectors can be found in the PutineMedvedev strategy of promoting the national interest. The legitimation of public involvement in particular in the arms or aerospace field is explained by a policy of national re-engagement in strategic economic sectors in order to give them an impetus that would allow diversification of the economy, i.e. ensuring Russia’s independence as an industrial and technological power e not just as an energy-rich power. Another point that the defence industry and space sectors have in common may be found in the government’s project to rationalise the use of state credits. The policy would consist in taking greater control over the uses of such credits; the government believes these are not so much insufficient as poorly utilised by businesses and research departments. In particular, the excessive number of R&D projects causes credits to be uselessly spread too thinly and even the misappropriation of funds (which are easily misappropriated since there is nothing concrete to be produced). An example of this in the space field is Glonass, the project of navigation satellites: the tardiness of progress with the Russian satellite
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constellation, whose refurbishment was announced over a decade ago, illustrates the inefficiency, indeed the corruption of whole sections of the space sector, which has been accused of using R&D funding for other ends or of citing insufficient budgets to justify the absence of results. By extension the ‘prototype policy’ is labelled dilatory (emphasising R&D funding when the means to guarantee mass production do not exist). Today the Kremlin is insisting on ‘true’ R&D, starting from the fact that the potential for innovation and the technology base did not progress very far during the 1990s. In all cases the response is the same: stricter centralisation via the militaryeindustrial complex and Rosoboronexport for the arms industry e without trying to find out whether such a step might not also lead to the creation of sources of corruption and opaqueness in other hands. The return of the state is more marked in the defence than in the space industry, thanks to the former’s greater role in national security. Any direct or major role for space in national security is, outside of the rhetoric, badly understood, except by certain high rank general officers of the Army, or considered marginal at this stage by the politicians, even though a real consolidation effort based around launcher and satellite prime contractors, having complete mastery of their entire chain of production (avionics, propulsion, integration), certainly seems to have been successfully undertaken. Feeling itself responsible for the whole of the space industry, the government may have decided that, when the time comes, a high-level return to the world stage will be easier and quicker to arrange. But, this calculation could prove risky, if it later appeared that this sector had developed a real tendency to resist change e and ultimately showed itself to be deprived of resurgence capability! 2.5. The specific case of the space industry When discussing the Russian space industry, three notable facts are worth underlining. 1. Since 2001 there has been greater political interest in the space sector, essentially in words. But this has, also, been expressed in some actions: selective budget support, steering documents, intention to restore Glonass to its status as national programme, security council meeting on military space, reorganisation of the Roskosmos agency, new policy for the ‘cosmodromes’ launch sites . Everything is happening as if the government wanted to retake ownership of the achievements of the Soviet era, while wishing to exploit the knowledge gained differently and at a political level, increasing the credibility of the role of the state. Space would thus become one of the means for integrating ‘postmodern’ (post-industrial) society. In this regard, the presence of one of Putin’s advisors at the Moscow celebrations of 40 years of Franco-Russian cooperation in October 2006 can be interpreted as a mark of the new political interest in this sector. On the other hand, Roskosmos has seen its role restricted to that of executive agency, at a lower level than in the past in comparison with the era of Koptev and the oligarchs.
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2. At the budgetary level the space budget, as far as one can know, remains weak: $1.3 billion per year,23 or $2.4 billion according to other sources (Glonass budget for 2007 being $260 million).24 Over the 2006e2015 period the Roskosmos budget is expected to be around V7 billion (305 billion roubles).25 At that funding, budgets for defence and security ‘space forces’, for the already mentioned Glonass, and for development of ground space launch infrastructures should be added. Of course it is obvious that the civil budget is topped up by comparable military budgets for strategic programmes. In the short term we should not expect much more substantial support, until the sector has been reviewed for greater economic efficiency. So, without a larger budget, can the Russian space sector flourish without being dependent on the West? Can it allow the development of ambitious cooperative ventures? Can the logic which forms the basis of this policy, coherent with that which accompanies the industrial restructurings around holding companies, lead to licensing arrangements in the industry? If measures are not taken to attract young people, if necessary in the form of short-term-type contracts, the problem of skills maintenance will inevitably arise. Cooperation between European and Russian firms as equals, in such conditions, would not be automatic. 3. Taking the example of the prospects for cooperation over future launchers, it must be admitted that concrete progress in the ‘Soyuz at Kourou’ deal, and in other future launchers, has been somehow rather haphazard and slow. To speak quite bluntly, Russians have a tendency to think about the short term, the modernisation of their own systems, cooperation starting from current assets, rather than about the long term and work on truly new concepts. To cross this barrier, it will be necessary to pass to a higher, political level (of the order of the tradeoff made at the time in favour of the ‘Soyuz at Kourou’ cooperation). Or again, we would need to imagine a different thematic domain for cooperation. The question of realistic prospects for Euro-Russian cooperation on the Clipper vehicle, by the time the major international space exploration programmes are due to set off (2012), needs to be posed: what might be the Russian motives for it and what the European objectives? What type of mission (servicing the ISS, exploration missions?) for such a vehicle would be the sort to create a political and industrial consensus in its favour? On the whole, we can confirm that the return of the state in the arms industry is more marked than it is in the space industry. The strategic and economic stakes, notably but not solely where exports are concerned, are of more immediate importance for the defence industries. As for space, we cannot yet clearly make out the government’s objectives, nor the 23
Euroconsult ‘Government space markets’, World Prospects to 2017 (2008). B. Harvey, The rebirth of Russian space program, Springer, 2007. 25 French Embassy in Moscow, interview with Space attache´, C. Ivanov (December 2009). 24
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industrial strategy in action. Certainly Russia will wish to demonstrate both at home and on the international stage that in this field it is both the heir to a ‘long history’ (50th anniversary of the launch of Sputnik in 2007) and has every intention of maintaining its rank, making the most of its technological knowledge and being well on the way to modernisation (launchers, Glonass system). Beyond this, the goals of the budgetary mobilisation and of the industrial restructuring currently underway remain somewhat blurred. One possible interpretation of the relatively static situation could be that the ‘space lobby’ is resisting change and continues to benefit from a form of guaranteed income. It is probably best not to approach the space question in too global a manner. In reality, the situation and the stakes in the industry are different according to whether we are talking about satellites, launchers or human spaceflight technologies. For example, in the field of telecommunications satellites, Russia has been modernising its fleet for the past 10 years, not hesitating to cooperate with France (Alcatel payloads). Russian equipment is being modernised and the well organised industry actively responds to international calls for tenders. For launchers the situation is evolving from the strategy of the past decade, which aimed to get more value from the Proton and Zenith launchers via joint-ventures with the Americans. This policy had the merit of bringing a market to the Soviet-era launch industry. Per contra, the transfer payments fixed and made by the US manufacturers were excessively low. Today Russia is demonstrating an intention to take back more autonomy over its means of access to space and is refusing to yield up its assets and services at too low a price. It has been able to modernise its production. Finally, where future space vehicle programmes are concerned (Clipper programme), the situation remains confused (planetary exploration or ISS service?). At any rate Russia does not envisage offering cooperative partnership opportunities to all comers, at any price. For its part, Europe has been slow to demonstrate a clear political will and adequate budget planning. 3. The current state of French and European space cooperation with Russia Although Russia is currently reaffirming its power, reforming its industrial structures and winning back expertise and technology from abroad, this process has only just begun in the space sector, one of the crowning successes of the former Soviet state. The Russian Federation’s above mentioned ‘Space Plan for 2006 to 2015’ envisages about V7 billion, to which should be added classified defence funds and non-budgetary (in-kind) sources. This ‘dual’ budget, which could be seen for the best years as of the same order of size as that allocated each year to NASA for civil programmes only (with salary costs some three to five times lower!), clearly demonstrates a policy of relaunch of the space sector in Russia and an intention to make up the deficit that occurred following the collapse of
the Soviet system by modernising the Soyuz and Proton launchers and reconfiguring Glonass with regular satellite launches. Change has swept through the sector, with the creation of the federal space agency Roskosmos in 2004 (separation of space and aeronautical activities) and the consolidation of the sector’s institutes and businesses (establishment of prime contractors able to undertake the entire industrial process). 3.1. The federal space programme and the axes of cooperation The 2006e2011 Russian space programme covers all sectors of the space field: construction of a manned spacecraft for visiting the ISS and exploration (Clipper), development of new launchers (Soyuz 2, Proton M and Angara), launch of a probe to the Martian moon Phobos (Phobos-Grunt), and a doubling of the number of scientific, telecommunications, navigation and Earth observation satellites. The Russian space agency has entered into cooperative relationships with the major space agencies in diverse areas and to varying degrees, mainly in the scientific field and to service the ISS. In addition, after the fall of the Berlin Wall industrial partnerships in the form of commercial businesses were undertaken on US initiatives in order to take advantage of Russian and Ukrainian rockets (ILS for Proton, Sea Launch for Zenith). 3.2. Launcher cooperation The leader in this field, Russia has started, alone or in cooperation, a series of measures to ensure, in the short term, the maintenance of its autonomy and the competitiveness of its industry on the international market for launch services. They include extending the lease on the Baikonur launch centre; development of the infrastructure at Plesetsk; installation of the Soyuz rocket at the ESA equatorial site in French Guiana; development of more powerful versions of Soyuz; development of the modular launcher Angara, which will be launched from Baikonur and Plesetsk; modernisation of Proton, which has been completely refurbished in order to augment its performance by 15%; and installation at Baikonur of the Zenith-3SL as part of the ‘Land launch’ project. In the longer term Russia’s strategy is less explicit. There is not really any development of a heavy-lift launcher beyond Angara nor of any vehicle to launch manned craft to orbital stations. Reusable launchers will not be on the cards for another 30 years.26 As a historic Russian partner, with whom it has cooperated for 40 years in successive circles (space science, then manned flights, then launch services and finally launchers), France, via its space agency CNES, has maybe a special role to play as an 26 The Russians are interested in the idea of a reusable booster that would diminish pollution over the plains of Kazakhstan.
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interface between Europe and Russia, particularly in its specialist area, that of launchers. 3.3. Installation of Soyuz at the Guyana Space Centre This European project (V344 million invested, of which V233 is the European share under ESA responsibility, with 63% of that borne by France) is not a bilateral arrangement with France, even though it is the extension of the creation of the Franco-Russian company Starsem in 1996. France has nevertheless carried the project from the start and agreed to support the whole of the loan guarantee of V121 granted by the European Investment Bank (EIB). It has a security agreement with Russia (the result of tough negotiations) through the persons of CNES and Roskosmos, whose actual operation has yet to be tested. The first launch of a Soyuz from the Guyana Space Centre is slated for mid-2010. This type of cooperation, which creates major infrastructure, constitutes a long-term bond (20 years) and thus poses the question of the stability of the agreements which saw its birth and of Russian intentions towards exploitation of the Soyuz family. Vigilance must be maintained over the latter because: Arianespace, which is the operator, does not have a monopoly on the commercial use of Soyuz and nothing has been said at this stage about future developments of it (use for commercial launches from Baikonur; development of a cryogenic upper stage). Potential future competition in the market for the European Ariane 5 launcher might thus remain a concern, even if the prices of the Russian launching services are progressively increased. If Russia’s economic take-off is confirmed, this would mean that the differential in salary costs between Russia and Europe is likely to diminish, eroding the current competitive advantage of Russian manufacture. It remains to be seen how this evolution in costs will be reclaimed on the relative margins between Russian and European companies in the future. In order to compensate for this likely change in production costs, the Russian space industry should put in place productivity efforts that will allow it to remain attractive on the international market as soon as possible, avoiding the need to request a renegotiation of the 2003 agreement on Soyuz at Kourou.
3.4. The Oural future launchers programme The agreement of November 2003, ratified by an interagency protocol of 15 March 2005, covers among things the development of future launch vehicles (with no exchange of funds). It is concerned with the development and concerted validation of the technologies necessary for a new generation of launchers, to be developed around 2015. There remain difficulties over the transfer of data from the Russian party, which requires an intergovernmental agreement dedicated to
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exchanges on future launcher technologies. Discussions on this agreement got underway within an inter-agency working group. The pursuit of joint technical activities awaits a solution to the problem of exchanging technological data. Tests on the KVD1-Lox/methane engine are being carried out on the Russian side; however, it is not possible for the Russians to obtain the results of French studies. The ultimate goals of the Oural programme are not clearly fixed yet. This is considered a serious obstacle to the mobilisation of funds by the Russian side. If, in the case of ‘reusable launchers’ there is consensus on bringing forward the objective, the question of ‘reusability’ itself as a good way of advancing technology, especially engine technology, remains. Russia is interested in reusable motors/thrusters (of the Baikal or Bargouzine type using LOX/methane with strong thrust) which would improve the ecology around Baikonur and would justify studies on a Volga engine (400 t). The bilateral ‘Oural’ management group is currently working on the redefinition of common, concrete and driving goals, via demonstrators for example. In reality the future of the framework of exchanges represented by Oural remains highly dependent on Russian will to lead new and realistically shared activities. The difficulties encountered over the transfer of data are not a good omen. With cooperation over future launchers being part of the ‘Soyuz at Kourou’ agreement, the Russian party certainly can’t totally disregard it. Nevertheless said cooperation appears to be dormant. 3.5. Future propulsion systems The Safran/Snecma industrial corporation has been cooperating with Russia for 15 years and has signed over 250 contracts with it, of which around a dozen are in progress. The Volga programme, in partnership with the propulsion systems manufacturers KBKhA, NPO Energomash27 and the Keldysh Institute, and EADS Volvo, is aiming to develop a LOX/ methane engine of 200e400 tons for future launch vehicles. It seems still to be on ‘stand-by’ and requires a relaunch, pending the development of an innovative LOX/methane propulsion sector. 3.6. Manned flight and exploration 3.6.1. Experiments on board the ISS ESA is the usual interface for the Russians on the general management of the International Space Station and for experiments in the Russian sector of the ISS, with some exceptions for certain bilateral Franco-Russian experiments. France has specialised in microgravity experiments and in space medicine. These are activities that are destined to 27
The propulsion system manufacturer Energomash will have obtained an increase in its capital (250 million roubles) for the construction of new facilities, following a visit to the site in early December 2009 by V. Putin.
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endure, CNES remaining a driving force in these fields. Future experiments proposed by CNES in the Russian sector are the microgravity experiments VIP-KRIT, which are to be developed within an ESA framework, and Cardiomed, which is the object of a direct bilateral agreement between CNES and Roskosmos. 3.6.2. Space exploration and Clipper Beyond the ISS, the creation of new manned vehicles for the post-Shuttle era (2012?) is a necessity, both for the Americans, who want to support their exploration programme to the Moon and beyond, and for the Russians, who are anxious to make large-scale Russian access to the orbital station permanent and to take part in the new lunar programmes. Roskosmos is to make the choice of manned vehicle launcher, but the manned craft has not been definitely defined and the proposals from Energia on the ‘Clipper’ concept appear to be moribund. While, doubtless thanks to a lack of funding, the system was open to cooperative participation (Roskosmos has insisted for years on its desire to see Europe participating in the development of a high-performing transportation vehicle) ESA has had doubts about the project. Since the context of space exploration is evolving quite rapidly, possible cooperation with Russia on this subject would necessarily have to be envisaged with a much larger framework, situating the European or Euro-Russian contribution in the context of the new planning proposed by NASA, but also by China and India, and maybe Japan. 3.6.3. Space science After a dark period for Russian space science activities, a brighter spell is emerging. It remains to be seen whether this will arrive in time, given the ageing profile of the teams of researchers. The highest priority project is the launch of NPO Lavotchkin’s Phobos-Grunt probe, which is to bring samples of the Martian moon Phobos’s soil back to Earth. This mission, in partnership with China, was due to launch in 2009 but has been postponed until 2011. France is to have instruments on board. In order to mitigate the deficiency in public funding for scientific missions, Russian firms have also strengthened the work they do developing scientific instruments for foreign interplanetary missions. Thus Russian entities are taking part in the following projects: Mars Express, Venus Express, BepiColombo, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and the Mars Science Laboratory; within these projects Euro-Russian cooperation, led by ESA, involves the European Exo Mars rover programme, which may carry Russian radio-isotope heater units (RHUs), BepiColombo, which will have a Russian instrument on board, and the Russian Spectrum Gamma mission, which will use European instruments. 3.6.4. Applications satellites The Russian satellite sector has suffered from a serious lack of performance culture in the past, linked notably to the existence of very powerful launchers whose costs are accounted for nearly nothing, which favours the development
of heavy satellites with a short lifespan. This state of affairs has thwarted the development of an industrial export market for satellites, following the dismemberment of the Soviet bloc, in contrast to the situation for launchers. This sector has therefore fallen significantly behind its international rivals, a situation from which Russia is now attempting to catch up. Satellite earth observation is a field in which Russia is rebuilding its potential thanks to a marked rise in the federal space programme budgets. The latest satellite, Ressours-DK, is now operational; others are in preparation. This is a ‘dual use’ civil/military sector in which Russia wishes to cooperate in order to initiate the exchange of data and could thus possibly constitute a new axis of cooperation. In the telecommunications sector Russia offers significant potential for growth from a commercial viewpoint. Here the partnerships are of manufacturers and the policy is the forming of joint-ventures with European actors, allowing, beyond the sales, ‘russification’ of some of the products while respecting the legal procedures on sensitive technologies.28 In the field of satellite navigation, cooperation with France takes place through the European Union and is aimed at making the Glonass and Galileo systems interoperable. Lastly, plasma propulsion for spacecraft is an area for R&T cooperation, since Safran, allied to the US company Loral, has been commercialising the SPT-100 satellite motor, with the Russian OKB Fakel, since 1993 and has developed the improved PPS-1350 version which sent Europe’s SMART 1 probe to the Moon. 4. Conclusion In a once more buoyant context for strategic industries, or for those linked to political power, space in Russia should in theory be benefiting from some powerful leverage. In reality, this has not yet been clearly demonstrated (resistance to change, secondary priority?), even though the country has both obvious needs (for satellites) and technical instruments that are dated but modernisable. Analysis of the factors favourable to a deepening of cooperation in space with Russia must be accompanied by a firm grasp of the reality of the daily constraints on the exchange of high-level technological information (launchers and associated infrastructures) encountered in real life and, at a more general level, of the existence of a strong Russian desire to systematically reassert the country’s sovereignty. Other unfavourable factors must be cited, ranging from uncertainty about the political future, despite economic and financial progress, to the lack of clarity in the reorganisation of the aerospace and arms sectors. Last but not least, the positive evolution of the diplomatic and strategic dialogue between Washington and Moscow at the 28
Astrium and RNIIKP have created Synertech, in order to transfer a degree of competence in design and production of payloads for civil telecommunications; Alcatel has formed a joint-venture with NPO-PM to commercialise satellites manufactured on the territory of the Russian Federation based on certain technologies supplied by Alcatel.
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end of 2009 may result in a true change of their bilateral relationships, or a limited step forward. In order to serve its interests, Russia should strengthen its ties with Europe and the world’s most influential actors rather than remaining obsessed with a focus on power balance.29 In as much as, in France and Europe, clear needs and a programmatic strategy could be well established, the path to a more substantial space partnership with Russia is not too difficult to imagine. But the path is narrow. Everything depends on the way the uncertainty factors develop and on the endurance of the positive factors, on the cooperative field, on the empirical conditions and finally on the timetable we would want to envisage for large-scale joint undertakings. Faced with this methodological difficulty, it seems reasonable to prepare a cautious approach comprising a choice of options or scenarios. These are briefly presented below. Before doing this, however, we should remember that the Russian authorities do not expect trustworthiness and transparency from us Europeans. They still have a bitter memory of the pressure exerted on the weakened Russia of the 1990s and consider that they have often been forced into concessions which they deem shameful.30 The new Russia is linked to Europe by trade, but it is not pro-European. In addition, this analysis of future prospects must take account of the specific international context for the space industries and services, particularly of the fact that, in contrast to the base years (1970e80), the major actors in the launcher or satellite fields, alongside Russia, are no longer just the USA and France but half-a-dozen other states (India, China, Japan, etc). Some of these may lay claim to a future position as rivals to the ageing Russian systems, others may become candidates for cooperation with Russia, thus competing with their traditional partners (like France). We should also note that, for its part, Europe has been concentrating on its goal of autonomy over the years. It no longer seems to be in a position, as it was in the 1980s with the Hermes project, to commit itself with the means appropriate for international space cooperation on a grand scale. Among the various options that might be envisaged for the future, three principal scenarios are presented below:
about what to do next. It means to keep the advances made in several areas of propulsion for itself. Its needs for Western technologies are limited to applications for satellites (telecommunications and remote sensing). Who knows, Russia may even be wanting to ‘leave the West’ e according to one of the best research fellows in Europe on these issues, I. Facon.31 For its part, Europe, finally, still has time to think about Ariane 6 or planetary exploration projects. 2. In contrast, a proactive scenario e rather unlikely at this stage e would be based on Russia’s intention to invest in Europe for the long term, showing itself ready to play fully by the rules of confidentiality, of security, and of balanced sharing of technical information. This scenario would be combined with a hypothesis of major desired evolution in the European policy for the launch industry: confirmation of the political will to engage in a new programme of post-Ariane 5 heavy launchers, favouring a diminution of the development costs and the sharing of risks with a major international partner, the whole being acceptable to the European industry. The future of European launchers would be Euro-Russian. 3. An even more ambitious option would assume a storming return of Russia to the international space stage and a parallel confirmation of its intention to open up cooperation with Europe as well as of its respect for international law. For its part Europe would take full cognisance of the strategic nature of space competence and would demonstrate a renewal of ambition for programmes on the scale of the 1980s, in order to keep pace, for example, with the acceleration of the US programmes of space exploration, or with the Chinese, Indian or Japanese lunar programmes.In such a scenario, it would be conceivable to imagine a structured Franco-Euro-Russian cooperation aiming to contribute to the international community, as a complement to US, Chinese or Indian efforts, an essential element of the global infrastructures for the conquest of space in the 21st century. Such could be the case of a proposal, in industrial partnership supported by the agencies, of a grand robotic mission to Mars or manned flights to the Moon, if Russia does not wish to be left behind in the lunar missions race.
1. A ‘wait-and-see’ option would involve honouring the undertakings made with Russia relating to the implementation of an ESA launch pad reserved for the Soyuz launcher in French Guiana, while renouncing the possibility of real joint work on European launchers beyond Ariane 5, despite the anticipated advantages. Such an option would involve a sort of waiting game on both sides, leaving no place for any large-scale inter-state cooperation. After all, Russia is well equipped with modernised launch industries covering its needs for the next 30 years; it has time to think
We should emphasise that these different options all start from the same assumption that Russia is not going to become impossible to deal with, that it is not going to follow a path of narrow nationalism, of jealous neo-imperialism, and shut itself off from Europe or provide evidence of duplicity. In a catastrophe scenario of negative development in space cooperation, one could imagine Russia raising the price of Soyuz, multiplying its launches from Baikonur or elsewhere, pocketing the profits, should the occasion arise asking to review the terms for the use of Soyuz at Kourou in order to obtain extra financial compensation and, finally, not being a bona fide party to the application of the security and safety rules for the site.Forced to take on an
29 ‘Russia Reborn’, D. Tremin, Foreign Affairs, Vol.88 N 6, November/ December 2009 (p.78). 30 See the remarks about V. Putin sayings, reported in N. Sokov, ‘The origins and prospects for Russian nuclear doctrine’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, n 2, July 2007: ‘‘In the fall of 2004, President Vladimir Putin spoke openly about the desire of unnamed countries to ‘tear juicy morsels’ from Russia’’.
31 The West and post-Putin Russia:does Russia ‘leave the West’?, I. Facon, FRS Note, April 22, 2008, for Berstelsmann Stiftung.
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investment of several hundred million euros, we would discover that we had no useful lever with which to lean on our negotiating partners and we would find ourselves facing an iniquitous dilemma: whether to close the Russian site at Kourou or put it to bed in the hope of better times to come. But this is an abhorrent scenario.
Whatever hypothesis we take, the position of our European partners, especially the Germans, will condition the possible inflections in favour of strengthened cooperation in space with Russia on a path that is promising but extremely narrow. Analysis of their own priorities will be required in order to determine the direction desired by European member states.