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Russification of Soviet nationalities: The importance of territorial autonomy
0191.6599/92 ~J.W+O.oO '*1992PergamonPress Lrd
RUSSIFICATION OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY PETRF.
DOSTAL*
and HANSKNIPPENBERG*
THE PROBLEM When in 1917 the Bolsheviks took power over the former Russian Empire, they were confronted with a very complex ‘nationality problem’: how to match the enormous ethnic diversity in this very large country of more than one hundred peoples, varying from Germans to Uzbeks, and from Jews to Mongol tribes? According to the Marxist view nationalism could hamper the growth of the class consciousness in the world and it was therefore necessary to fight against national cleavages within the working class. ’ However, the disaffection of the major non-Russian nationalities to the former Russian Empire, that ‘prison of nations’, was one of the principal factors contributing to the revolution of 1917.2 Two options were available to shape nationalistic aspirations in a new political unit dominated by the Bolsheviks: a territorial and an extra-territorial one. The prominent Austrian social-democrats Otto Bauer and Karl Renner elaborated an extra-territorial solution for ‘die Nationalit~tenfrage’ in the multinational Habsburg Empire that could have been used.3 They supported cuItural-national autonomy for ethnic communities regardless of territorial divisions and place of birth of its members. Lenin criticised this idea of extra-territorial arrangements for ideological and tactical reasons. He accused the two Austrian thinkers and their Menshevik followers of divorcing the cultural phenomena from their material-economic base. Tactically, he had to accept a territorial base for national movements: the centrifugal forces of national aspirations disintegrating the multi national capitalist and feudal states must be exploited for the mobilisation of the working class. Confronted with the need to develop their own structure, the Bolshevik leaders proposed a territorial solution for the nationality problem: a Union of Socialists Soviet Republics with the right to secede. In their opinion the ah-union communist party without ethnic cleavages, the union-wide command economy and the union-wide planning system were strong enough to guarantee the unity of the Soviet system: a de jure federal, but de facto unitary state. Consequently, the notion of territory became an integral part of the hierarchical structure of ethnonational autonomy in the Soviet Union. Not only was ethnonational autonomy ensured by concrete cultural rights for the main nationalities (e.g. education, radio, television, newspapers, etc. in the native language), territorial rights also were granted and they facilitated nationalistic identification. For national territories are an essential element in national ideologies4 In this paper we want to analyse the effects that the Soviet administrative *University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 631
632
Petr F. Dostcil a.4 Hans Knippenberg
structure of territorial autonomy has had on past assimilation processes. To what extent has this structure been a barrier to the integration of the many different Soviet nationalities? According to Aspaturian, three interrelated, yet distinct, processes of national integration have occurred.5 First was the process of sovietisation: ‘the process of modernization and industrialization within the Marixst-Leninist norms of social, economic, and political behaviour’. This often had a coercive character. Second was the widening of contacts with Russian culture, in particular language. Russian became the lingua franca of the U.S.S.R. Aspaturian called this the process of russianisation. Third was the process of russification in the sense of a true assimilation. Russification was defined as the process ‘whereby nonRussians are transformed objectively and psychologically into Russians, and is more an individual process than a collective one’. Obviously, there is an evolutionary relationship between russianisation and russification: without russianisation, no russification. This paper focuses on the russification process in the 1959-1979 period using data from the 1959 and 1979 Soviet Census. Since language is a core symbol of russified when the Russian language is ethnicity,6 we regard a non-Russian listed as his/her native language.’
THE FEDERAL
STRUCTURE
The federal structure of the Soviet Union consists of 15 Union republics (S.S.R.), 20 autonomous republics (A.S.S.R.) (always part of a Union republic), and on a lower level 8 autonomous provinces (Autonomous Oblast) and 10 autonomous districts (Autonomous Okrug) (Fig. 1). The higher a unit in this hierarchy, the greater its constitutional rights.8 Basically, the Union republics and to a lesser extent also the autonomous republics enjoy both cultural and (a few) social-economics rights within their respective territories. The autonomous provinces and districts enjoy only cultural rights. The formation of the hierarchical territorial system has been a long-term and very complex process9 According to the ideological tenets of Lenin and Stalin, the degree of ‘national consolidation’ of a group was an important basis for allowing a measure of territorial autonomy. Population size and geographical concentration supplied additive criteria. The territories of all large nationalities were given the status of Union republic or at least A.S.S.R. The ethnic heterogeneity of many regions complicated the process of allowing territorial autonomy. This territorial structure underwent many changes, mostly upgrading the autonomous status of the homeland. For example, in 1936 the autonomous provinces of Komi and Mari became autonomous republics and the autonomous republics of Kazakhs and Kirgiz became Union republics.iO During the ‘Great Patriotic War’ the inverse took place: Germans, Krimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Karachaevs, Chechens and Ingushes lost their autonomous territories. Accused of collaboration with the Germans they were deported to Central Asia, Siberia but Germans and and the Arctic north. ‘I In 1957, most were rehabilitated, Crimean Tatars remained in exile. The return of these peoples to their lands of
633
634
Perr F. Dostcil and Hans Knippenberg
origin and the re-instalment of their autonomous territories is currently, under discussion. World War II added four new Union republics: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldavia, and enlarged the territories of Belorussia and the Ukrainian republic in the westerly direction. Since 1945 the Soviet territorial structure has remained basically unchanged, being confirmed in the 1977 constitution.‘2
RUSSIFICATION Between 1959 and 1979 the russification level of all non-Russians together increased from 10.8% in 1959 to 13.1% in 1979. However, the differences between the non-Russian nationalities are very great: the russification level in 1979 varies from 83% (Jews) to 0.5% (Karakalpaks and Kirgiz); the rate of russification between 1959 and 1979 varies from a decrease of9% (Gypsies) to an increase of 31% (Nanai). The central question is, is there any correlation between this differentiated pattern and the federal structure ascribed above? To answer this we distinguish three aspects: (i) the possession of an autonomous territory; (ii) its administrative status; and (iii) the effect of living inside or outside this territory. (i) Tables 1 and 2 show the difference in 1979 russification level and russification rate between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. All 68 nationalities numbering more than 10,000 in 1979 are analysed with exception of the Jews. There is a correlation between the possession of an autonomous territory and the level and rate of russification, though not a perfect one. The most russified nationalities are those which possess a homeland outside the Soviet Union, such as Germans, Poles, Greeks, Finns, Koreans, etc. The evidence suggests that Jews also fit this group, although they have an autonomous territory inside the Soviet IJnion. This artificial ‘homeland’, Birobidzhan in the Far East began in 1928 when Stalin created a Jewish National District (Okrug), which became an autonomous province (Oblast) in 1934.13 In 1979 only 10,000 out of 1.8 million Soviet Jews lived in this province, where they formed asmall minority of 5.4% of the population. Based on language Jews have the highest level of
Table 1: Soviet Nationalities by Level of Russifi~ation Autonomous Territory in 1979. Russification level in %
No homeland in U.S.S.R. homeland outside U.S.S.R. no yes
< 15% > 15% Total Mean level in % Data source:
Census
3 7 10 31.2
8 5 13 16.3
1979 (data excluding
and the Possession
Homeland in U.S.S.R.
Total
32 12 44 10.2
43 24 67 14.5
the Jews).
of an
Russification of Soviet Nationalities Table 2: Soviet Nationalities Possession of an Autonomous
Russification rate in %
by Rate Territory.
of Russitication
No homeland in U.S.S.R. homeland outside U.S.S.R. no yes
< 8% > 8% Total Mean rate % Data source:
635
3 7 10 9.3 Census
9 4 13 6.2
1979 (data excluding
(1959-1979)
and
Homeland in U.S.S.R.
Total
33 11 44 4.0
44 23 67 5.2
the
the Jews).
russification: 83% in 1979, but language is probably not a valid indicator for the ethnic identification of this nationality.14 There are only three ‘foreign’ nationalities with a low level of russification: the Rumanians, the Persians and the Hungarians. The Rumanians are highly assimilated with the Moldavian culture (54% in 1979), which differs very little from their own culture. The Persians, a very small group, are highly assimilated with the Uzbek culture (60% in 1979). The Hungarians are hardly assimilated with any other culture at all. They live in the former Austrian-Hungarian western part of the Ukrainian republic. Most of the indigenous nationalities with an autonomous territory have a low level and low rate of russitication. The most striking exceptions are the Karelians with a russification level of 44% and a rate of russification of 16% and the Khanti/Mansi with a level of 37% and a rate of 10%. Both nationalities are minorities in their own autonomous territories. In 1979 only 11% of the population of the Karelian ASSR was Karelian, 71% was Russian. From the population of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug only 2% was Khanty and 1% was Mansi; the great majority was Russian (74%) and even the Ukrainians (8%) and Tatars (6%) outnumbered the titular population. Among the groups that do not have autonomous territories there is a great deal of variation. Some exhibit a very low level of russification, (Beludzh (0.7%), Dungans (2.4%) and Abazins (3.4%)). Generally these nationalities belong to the Table 3: Soviet Nationalities Status of their Autonomous
by 1979 Level of Russification Territories.
and the Political
S.S.R.
A.S.S.R.
A Oblast/Okrug
Total
< 15% > 15% Total Mean level in %
12 2 14 5.5
15 5 20 12.9
5 5 10 16.0
32 12 44 11.4
Data source:
1979 (data excluding
Russification
Census
the Jews).
Petr F. Dosta’l and Hans K~ippe~ber~
636
Table 4: Soviet Nationalities by Rate of Russification Political Status of their Autonomous Territories. S.S.R.
A.S.S.R.
< 15% > 15% Total Mean rate in %
13 1 14 1.5
14 6 20 4.5
Data
1979 (data
Russification
source:
Census
excluding
(1959-1979)
A Oblast/Okrug 5 5 10 6.5
and the
Total 32 12 44 4.0
the Jews).
most traditional, rural and geographically concentrated peoples with a minimum of contact with the Russian culture. (ii) Tables 3 and 4 analyse the effect of the administrative status of the autonomous territory. There is a clear correlation. The lowest levels and rates of russification occur for those nationalities with their own Union republics (S.S.R.). Those nationalities with an autonomous province (Oblast) or district (Okrug) are the most russified. In between, are the nationalities with their own A.S.S.R. In other words, having a Union republic is an effective barrier to russification. There is one exception: the Belorussians have a very close relationship with the Russians (and have had for a long time). (iii) In Table 5 the population ofall nationalities with an autonomous territory has been split into those who live outside and those who live inside their own territory. The results are straightforward. In almost all cases those members ofa nationality residing outside their homeland are many times more russified than those living inside. Even the Belorussians are far more russified outside their republic than they are inside. The only exception are Jews and Khanty-Mansi. Analysing the rate of russification between 1959 and 1979 there are some more exceptions: Jews, Latvians, Komi and Karelians. Still, in general, the rate of russification is higher outside the homeland than inside the homeland. Over the 1959-1979 period the differences between level of assimilation of nationalities inside and outside the homelands increased.
CONCLUSIONS The Bolsheviks chose a territorial solution for the nationality problem in the Soviet Union. It is an open question if they had any other practical option. The territorial choice allowed for an identification with a homeland which is expressed in formal citizenship. A Soviet citizen is not only a formal citizen of the Union, but also of a Union republic or an A.S.S.R.15 Despite a defacto centralist political system and a russification policy of the central government and the communist party, the dejurefederal structure turned out to be a barrier for integration and assimilation. Retrospectively, the conclusion seems justified that the territorial solution chosen by the Bolsheviks to solve or at least contain the problem of the many nationalities within their own
Russification of Soviet Nationalities
637
Table 5: Level and Rate of Russitication of Soviet Nationalities Inside and Outside their Autonomous Territories in 1979 and in 1959-1979 (percentages). Level of russification Inside Outside Ukrainians Uzbeks Belorussians Kazakhs Tatars Azerbaidzhans Armenians Georgians Moldavians Tadzhiks Lithuanians Turkmen Kirgiz Jews Chuvashes Dagestans Latvians Bashkirs Mordovians Estonians Chechens Udmurts Mari Ossetians Komi Buryats Yakuts Kabardins Karakalpaks Ingushes Komi-Permyak Tuva Kalmyks Karelians Krachaevs Adygei Abkhaz Khakas Balkars Altai Cherkess Nenets Evenki Khanty/Mansi Chukchi Data source: Census
10.9 0.4 16.5 1.4 2.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 3.3 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.4 86.5 10.2 0.8 2.2 2.7 5.7 1.0 0.3 17.6 6.3 1.5 20.0 5.9 3.6 0.8 0.2 0.6 13.0 0.9 2.9 38.1 0.6 1.3 2.1 13.4 1.3 8.7 0.9 9.1 13.5 39.6 19.4 1979.
55.7 1.8 60.8 4.7 17.0 6.4 23.5 7.5 21.4 1.6 29.8 4.0 1.5 83.3 26.3 7.4 42.5 16.6 36.0 51.2 5.4 35.1 19.6 17.0 46.5 27.1 27.7 21.4 5.9 7.8 45.7 13.1 21.3 52.7 9.3 15.8 25.3 42.8 15.6 37.6 20.2 43.0 21.8 32.1 28.9
Rate of russification Inside Outside 4.4 0.0 8.8 0.6 1.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 25.8 7.7 0.2 0.7 1.7 3.0 0.3 0.0 10.8 4.1 -0.1 13.8 3.1 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.4 0.2 1.1 19.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 3.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 5.7 9.9 9.4 14.0
10.9 0.6 5.0 1.9 6.9 3.6 5.6 1.6 4.7 0.8 14.8 1.7 0.7 6.8 10.1 2.2 -2.0 9.2 6.8 9.4 3.3 12.1 12.1 5.1 11.2 12.3 10.9 2.5 4.2 4.7 2.4 6.4 5.5 14.1 2.6 2.1 7.1 4.0 7.8 11.4 -9.6 17.3 12.2 11.9 21.4
638
Petr F. Dost~I and Hans ~~ipp~n~erg
state bore the seed of the disintegration of the Soviet confederation or even in a set of independent states.16 Petr F. Do61
Union
in a loose
and Hans Knippenberg
University of Amsterdam
NOTES The authors wish to thank Professor an earlier version.
Dr Herman
van der Wusten for his comments
on
1. Connor (1984), 30 ff. 2. Aspaturian (1968). 3. Pipes (1968), pp. 24-27; Bezemer 1990. Bauer published his ‘Die Nationaiittitenfrage und die Sozial-demokratie’ in 1907. 4. Anderson (1988), p. 18. 5. Aspaturian (1968), pp. 159-160. 6. See e.g. Silver (1974). 7. See for a discussion of russification as a measurement problem Dostal and Knippenberg (1979) pp. 203-205. 8. Shtromas (1978). 9. Bromley (1979); Bromley and Kozlov (1989); Kozlov (1977); Zhdanko (1977). 10. Kozlov (1988). pp. 32-35. Il. Gilbert (1985), p. 131. 12. Kozlov (1988), p. 35. 13. Baron (1964), pp. 227-236. 14. Karklins (1987). 15. Tratnik (1989), p. X7-88. One should not confuse this federal state citizenship with the ethnic nationality (‘nationalnost’) mentioned in the internal passport compulsory for every Soviet citizen in the age of 16 years and older. 16. See also Dostal (1989 and 1990).
RUSSIFICATION OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY PETRF.
DOSTAL*
and HANSKNIPPENBERG*
THE PROBLEM When in 1917 the Bolsheviks took power over the former Russian Empire, they were confronted with a very complex ‘nationality problem’: how to match the enormous ethnic diversity in this very large country of more than one hundred peoples, varying from Germans to Uzbeks, and from Jews to Mongol tribes? According to the Marxist view nationalism could hamper the growth of the class consciousness in the world and it was therefore necessary to fight against national cleavages within the working class. ’ However, the disaffection of the major non-Russian nationalities to the former Russian Empire, that ‘prison of nations’, was one of the principal factors contributing to the revolution of 1917.2 Two options were available to shape nationalistic aspirations in a new political unit dominated by the Bolsheviks: a territorial and an extra-territorial one. The prominent Austrian social-democrats Otto Bauer and Karl Renner elaborated an extra-territorial solution for ‘die Nationalit~tenfrage’ in the multinational Habsburg Empire that could have been used.3 They supported cuItural-national autonomy for ethnic communities regardless of territorial divisions and place of birth of its members. Lenin criticised this idea of extra-territorial arrangements for ideological and tactical reasons. He accused the two Austrian thinkers and their Menshevik followers of divorcing the cultural phenomena from their material-economic base. Tactically, he had to accept a territorial base for national movements: the centrifugal forces of national aspirations disintegrating the multi national capitalist and feudal states must be exploited for the mobilisation of the working class. Confronted with the need to develop their own structure, the Bolshevik leaders proposed a territorial solution for the nationality problem: a Union of Socialists Soviet Republics with the right to secede. In their opinion the ah-union communist party without ethnic cleavages, the union-wide command economy and the union-wide planning system were strong enough to guarantee the unity of the Soviet system: a de jure federal, but de facto unitary state. Consequently, the notion of territory became an integral part of the hierarchical structure of ethnonational autonomy in the Soviet Union. Not only was ethnonational autonomy ensured by concrete cultural rights for the main nationalities (e.g. education, radio, television, newspapers, etc. in the native language), territorial rights also were granted and they facilitated nationalistic identification. For national territories are an essential element in national ideologies4 In this paper we want to analyse the effects that the Soviet administrative *University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 631
632
Petr F. Dostcil a.4 Hans Knippenberg
structure of territorial autonomy has had on past assimilation processes. To what extent has this structure been a barrier to the integration of the many different Soviet nationalities? According to Aspaturian, three interrelated, yet distinct, processes of national integration have occurred.5 First was the process of sovietisation: ‘the process of modernization and industrialization within the Marixst-Leninist norms of social, economic, and political behaviour’. This often had a coercive character. Second was the widening of contacts with Russian culture, in particular language. Russian became the lingua franca of the U.S.S.R. Aspaturian called this the process of russianisation. Third was the process of russification in the sense of a true assimilation. Russification was defined as the process ‘whereby nonRussians are transformed objectively and psychologically into Russians, and is more an individual process than a collective one’. Obviously, there is an evolutionary relationship between russianisation and russification: without russianisation, no russification. This paper focuses on the russification process in the 1959-1979 period using data from the 1959 and 1979 Soviet Census. Since language is a core symbol of russified when the Russian language is ethnicity,6 we regard a non-Russian listed as his/her native language.’
THE FEDERAL
STRUCTURE
The federal structure of the Soviet Union consists of 15 Union republics (S.S.R.), 20 autonomous republics (A.S.S.R.) (always part of a Union republic), and on a lower level 8 autonomous provinces (Autonomous Oblast) and 10 autonomous districts (Autonomous Okrug) (Fig. 1). The higher a unit in this hierarchy, the greater its constitutional rights.8 Basically, the Union republics and to a lesser extent also the autonomous republics enjoy both cultural and (a few) social-economics rights within their respective territories. The autonomous provinces and districts enjoy only cultural rights. The formation of the hierarchical territorial system has been a long-term and very complex process9 According to the ideological tenets of Lenin and Stalin, the degree of ‘national consolidation’ of a group was an important basis for allowing a measure of territorial autonomy. Population size and geographical concentration supplied additive criteria. The territories of all large nationalities were given the status of Union republic or at least A.S.S.R. The ethnic heterogeneity of many regions complicated the process of allowing territorial autonomy. This territorial structure underwent many changes, mostly upgrading the autonomous status of the homeland. For example, in 1936 the autonomous provinces of Komi and Mari became autonomous republics and the autonomous republics of Kazakhs and Kirgiz became Union republics.iO During the ‘Great Patriotic War’ the inverse took place: Germans, Krimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Karachaevs, Chechens and Ingushes lost their autonomous territories. Accused of collaboration with the Germans they were deported to Central Asia, Siberia but Germans and and the Arctic north. ‘I In 1957, most were rehabilitated, Crimean Tatars remained in exile. The return of these peoples to their lands of
633
634
Perr F. Dostcil and Hans Knippenberg
origin and the re-instalment of their autonomous territories is currently, under discussion. World War II added four new Union republics: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldavia, and enlarged the territories of Belorussia and the Ukrainian republic in the westerly direction. Since 1945 the Soviet territorial structure has remained basically unchanged, being confirmed in the 1977 constitution.‘2
RUSSIFICATION Between 1959 and 1979 the russification level of all non-Russians together increased from 10.8% in 1959 to 13.1% in 1979. However, the differences between the non-Russian nationalities are very great: the russification level in 1979 varies from 83% (Jews) to 0.5% (Karakalpaks and Kirgiz); the rate of russification between 1959 and 1979 varies from a decrease of9% (Gypsies) to an increase of 31% (Nanai). The central question is, is there any correlation between this differentiated pattern and the federal structure ascribed above? To answer this we distinguish three aspects: (i) the possession of an autonomous territory; (ii) its administrative status; and (iii) the effect of living inside or outside this territory. (i) Tables 1 and 2 show the difference in 1979 russification level and russification rate between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. All 68 nationalities numbering more than 10,000 in 1979 are analysed with exception of the Jews. There is a correlation between the possession of an autonomous territory and the level and rate of russification, though not a perfect one. The most russified nationalities are those which possess a homeland outside the Soviet Union, such as Germans, Poles, Greeks, Finns, Koreans, etc. The evidence suggests that Jews also fit this group, although they have an autonomous territory inside the Soviet IJnion. This artificial ‘homeland’, Birobidzhan in the Far East began in 1928 when Stalin created a Jewish National District (Okrug), which became an autonomous province (Oblast) in 1934.13 In 1979 only 10,000 out of 1.8 million Soviet Jews lived in this province, where they formed asmall minority of 5.4% of the population. Based on language Jews have the highest level of
Table 1: Soviet Nationalities by Level of Russifi~ation Autonomous Territory in 1979. Russification level in %
No homeland in U.S.S.R. homeland outside U.S.S.R. no yes
< 15% > 15% Total Mean level in % Data source:
Census
3 7 10 31.2
8 5 13 16.3
1979 (data excluding
and the Possession
Homeland in U.S.S.R.
Total
32 12 44 10.2
43 24 67 14.5
the Jews).
of an
Russification of Soviet Nationalities Table 2: Soviet Nationalities Possession of an Autonomous
Russification rate in %
by Rate Territory.
of Russitication
No homeland in U.S.S.R. homeland outside U.S.S.R. no yes
< 8% > 8% Total Mean rate % Data source:
635
3 7 10 9.3 Census
9 4 13 6.2
1979 (data excluding
(1959-1979)
and
Homeland in U.S.S.R.
Total
33 11 44 4.0
44 23 67 5.2
the
the Jews).
russification: 83% in 1979, but language is probably not a valid indicator for the ethnic identification of this nationality.14 There are only three ‘foreign’ nationalities with a low level of russification: the Rumanians, the Persians and the Hungarians. The Rumanians are highly assimilated with the Moldavian culture (54% in 1979), which differs very little from their own culture. The Persians, a very small group, are highly assimilated with the Uzbek culture (60% in 1979). The Hungarians are hardly assimilated with any other culture at all. They live in the former Austrian-Hungarian western part of the Ukrainian republic. Most of the indigenous nationalities with an autonomous territory have a low level and low rate of russitication. The most striking exceptions are the Karelians with a russification level of 44% and a rate of russification of 16% and the Khanti/Mansi with a level of 37% and a rate of 10%. Both nationalities are minorities in their own autonomous territories. In 1979 only 11% of the population of the Karelian ASSR was Karelian, 71% was Russian. From the population of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug only 2% was Khanty and 1% was Mansi; the great majority was Russian (74%) and even the Ukrainians (8%) and Tatars (6%) outnumbered the titular population. Among the groups that do not have autonomous territories there is a great deal of variation. Some exhibit a very low level of russification, (Beludzh (0.7%), Dungans (2.4%) and Abazins (3.4%)). Generally these nationalities belong to the Table 3: Soviet Nationalities Status of their Autonomous
by 1979 Level of Russification Territories.
and the Political
S.S.R.
A.S.S.R.
A Oblast/Okrug
Total
< 15% > 15% Total Mean level in %
12 2 14 5.5
15 5 20 12.9
5 5 10 16.0
32 12 44 11.4
Data source:
1979 (data excluding
Russification
Census
the Jews).
Petr F. Dosta’l and Hans K~ippe~ber~
636
Table 4: Soviet Nationalities by Rate of Russification Political Status of their Autonomous Territories. S.S.R.
A.S.S.R.
< 15% > 15% Total Mean rate in %
13 1 14 1.5
14 6 20 4.5
Data
1979 (data
Russification
source:
Census
excluding
(1959-1979)
A Oblast/Okrug 5 5 10 6.5
and the
Total 32 12 44 4.0
the Jews).
most traditional, rural and geographically concentrated peoples with a minimum of contact with the Russian culture. (ii) Tables 3 and 4 analyse the effect of the administrative status of the autonomous territory. There is a clear correlation. The lowest levels and rates of russification occur for those nationalities with their own Union republics (S.S.R.). Those nationalities with an autonomous province (Oblast) or district (Okrug) are the most russified. In between, are the nationalities with their own A.S.S.R. In other words, having a Union republic is an effective barrier to russification. There is one exception: the Belorussians have a very close relationship with the Russians (and have had for a long time). (iii) In Table 5 the population ofall nationalities with an autonomous territory has been split into those who live outside and those who live inside their own territory. The results are straightforward. In almost all cases those members ofa nationality residing outside their homeland are many times more russified than those living inside. Even the Belorussians are far more russified outside their republic than they are inside. The only exception are Jews and Khanty-Mansi. Analysing the rate of russification between 1959 and 1979 there are some more exceptions: Jews, Latvians, Komi and Karelians. Still, in general, the rate of russification is higher outside the homeland than inside the homeland. Over the 1959-1979 period the differences between level of assimilation of nationalities inside and outside the homelands increased.
CONCLUSIONS The Bolsheviks chose a territorial solution for the nationality problem in the Soviet Union. It is an open question if they had any other practical option. The territorial choice allowed for an identification with a homeland which is expressed in formal citizenship. A Soviet citizen is not only a formal citizen of the Union, but also of a Union republic or an A.S.S.R.15 Despite a defacto centralist political system and a russification policy of the central government and the communist party, the dejurefederal structure turned out to be a barrier for integration and assimilation. Retrospectively, the conclusion seems justified that the territorial solution chosen by the Bolsheviks to solve or at least contain the problem of the many nationalities within their own
Russification of Soviet Nationalities
637
Table 5: Level and Rate of Russitication of Soviet Nationalities Inside and Outside their Autonomous Territories in 1979 and in 1959-1979 (percentages). Level of russification Inside Outside Ukrainians Uzbeks Belorussians Kazakhs Tatars Azerbaidzhans Armenians Georgians Moldavians Tadzhiks Lithuanians Turkmen Kirgiz Jews Chuvashes Dagestans Latvians Bashkirs Mordovians Estonians Chechens Udmurts Mari Ossetians Komi Buryats Yakuts Kabardins Karakalpaks Ingushes Komi-Permyak Tuva Kalmyks Karelians Krachaevs Adygei Abkhaz Khakas Balkars Altai Cherkess Nenets Evenki Khanty/Mansi Chukchi Data source: Census
10.9 0.4 16.5 1.4 2.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 3.3 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.4 86.5 10.2 0.8 2.2 2.7 5.7 1.0 0.3 17.6 6.3 1.5 20.0 5.9 3.6 0.8 0.2 0.6 13.0 0.9 2.9 38.1 0.6 1.3 2.1 13.4 1.3 8.7 0.9 9.1 13.5 39.6 19.4 1979.
55.7 1.8 60.8 4.7 17.0 6.4 23.5 7.5 21.4 1.6 29.8 4.0 1.5 83.3 26.3 7.4 42.5 16.6 36.0 51.2 5.4 35.1 19.6 17.0 46.5 27.1 27.7 21.4 5.9 7.8 45.7 13.1 21.3 52.7 9.3 15.8 25.3 42.8 15.6 37.6 20.2 43.0 21.8 32.1 28.9
Rate of russification Inside Outside 4.4 0.0 8.8 0.6 1.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 25.8 7.7 0.2 0.7 1.7 3.0 0.3 0.0 10.8 4.1 -0.1 13.8 3.1 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.4 0.2 1.1 19.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 3.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 5.7 9.9 9.4 14.0
10.9 0.6 5.0 1.9 6.9 3.6 5.6 1.6 4.7 0.8 14.8 1.7 0.7 6.8 10.1 2.2 -2.0 9.2 6.8 9.4 3.3 12.1 12.1 5.1 11.2 12.3 10.9 2.5 4.2 4.7 2.4 6.4 5.5 14.1 2.6 2.1 7.1 4.0 7.8 11.4 -9.6 17.3 12.2 11.9 21.4
638
Petr F. Dost~I and Hans ~~ipp~n~erg
state bore the seed of the disintegration of the Soviet confederation or even in a set of independent states.16 Petr F. Do61
Union
in a loose
and Hans Knippenberg
University of Amsterdam
NOTES The authors wish to thank Professor an earlier version.
Dr Herman
van der Wusten for his comments
on
1. Connor (1984), 30 ff. 2. Aspaturian (1968). 3. Pipes (1968), pp. 24-27; Bezemer 1990. Bauer published his ‘Die Nationaiittitenfrage und die Sozial-demokratie’ in 1907. 4. Anderson (1988), p. 18. 5. Aspaturian (1968), pp. 159-160. 6. See e.g. Silver (1974). 7. See for a discussion of russification as a measurement problem Dostal and Knippenberg (1979) pp. 203-205. 8. Shtromas (1978). 9. Bromley (1979); Bromley and Kozlov (1989); Kozlov (1977); Zhdanko (1977). 10. Kozlov (1988). pp. 32-35. Il. Gilbert (1985), p. 131. 12. Kozlov (1988), p. 35. 13. Baron (1964), pp. 227-236. 14. Karklins (1987). 15. Tratnik (1989), p. X7-88. One should not confuse this federal state citizenship with the ethnic nationality (‘nationalnost’) mentioned in the internal passport compulsory for every Soviet citizen in the age of 16 years and older. 16. See also Dostal (1989 and 1990).