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Sabotaging the deal: The way relational concerns undermine negotiators
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47 (2011) 1167–1172
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Sabotaging the deal: The way relational concerns undermine negotiators Kathleen M. O'Connor a,⁎, Josh A. Arnold b a b
The Johnson School, Cornell University, USA California State University, Long Beach, USA
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 4 October 2010 Revised 12 April 2011 Available online 6 May 2011 Keywords: Negotiation Individual differences Belongingness Relational concerns Conflict Stress
a b s t r a c t We addressed the questions of how and to what end negotiators sacrifice their economic outcomes in exchange for hoped-for relationship gains with the other party. We predicted that negotiators' chronic belongingness needs–fundamental to human beings–would undercut the economic value of their deals. Moreover, we tested two mechanisms by which this occurs. Belongingness needs encouraged negotiators to reduce their economic ambitions ahead of time, and they interfered with negotiators' attention to the substantive issues on the table. Rather than finding that partners were able to exploit negotiators' belongingness needs for their own economic gains, we found that their partners were left worse off. If negotiators were making a calculation initially to trade economic gains for relationship gains, we did not find evidence that this paid off with a partner who especially wanted to work with the focal negotiator in the future. We conclude that belongingness needs lead negotiators to sabotage their economic outcomes without any clear benefits to the relationships these negotiators are keen to build. © 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Introduction Across a variety of situations, people routinely sacrifice their interests for the sake of their relationships. They spend date night watching an action movie when they would have preferred a romantic comedy; they lower their demands at budget time to preserve good will with their bosses. Common to these situations is the assumption that conceding some of one's own interests can help build or preserve a relationship with other people. Studies have documented that negotiators often trade their economic gains for their relationships (Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; White, Tynan, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004), and that negotiator traits systematically direct these decisions (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008). In an extension of this work, we investigate how a fundamental human need–the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995)–operates in negotiation. Beyond establishing that this need undercuts negotiators' economic outcomes, we also describe and test a set of potential cognitive mechanisms that theory suggests should explain the effects. We also test whether relational gains materialize for negotiators with elevated belongingness needs. Finally, we pinpoint the effects of one negotiator's belongingness needs on the outcomes of his/her partner. If belongingness needs operate the way we expect, we can draw conclusions about how naïve negotiators construe negotiations, and in particular how they understand the balance between economic ⁎ Corresponding author at: 317 Sage Hall, The Johnson School, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA. Fax: + 1 607 254 4590. E-mail address: [email protected] (K.M. O'Connor). 0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.04.004
gains and relationship gains. Specifically, this work will illuminate an implicit theory of negotiations held by some novices—that one can collect a relationship gain by trading away one's economic gains. Practically, this means that before they have learned anything about the other side, negotiators are already making decisions that will sabotage their own outcomes. Relational concerns Scholars have long been interested in the link between negotiators' relationships with one another and the quality of deals they reach. As part of this effort, studies have tested how parties' existing relationships affect their negotiations (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995). Researchers taking this approach have compared the quality of deals reached by pairs of friends to those hammered out by pairs of strangers (Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983). Presumably, because they share a past relationship, friends have reason to trust one another in the negotiation (Halpern, 1996). And, presumably because there is a shadow of the future, friends have incentives to be trustworthy (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). Trust between friends is likely to give way to the exchange of sensitive information, giving the advantage to friends over strangers. Empirical evidence for this, however, is mixed. As one would expect, friends do exchange more information during their negotiations compared to strangers (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; Mandel, 2006). In some studies, this enables pairs of friends to outperform pairs of strangers. However, Thompson and DeHarpport (1990) found that friends also conceded more to one another than strangers did, erasing any advantage that
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might have gone to friends. Similarly, compared to mixed-sex pairs of strangers, dating couples set lower aspirations for themselves and made fewer mutually-beneficial offers to one another (Fry et al., 1983), leading Valley and her colleagues to speculate that pairs with close ties might put a higher premium on their relationships than on their economic needs (Valley et al., 1995). Because both the past relationship and the shadow of the future are knotted together in these studies, it is unclear precisely what drives the effects of social ties. To get around this obstacle, we focus our analysis on a negotiator trait that speaks to the emphasis individuals place on their relationships. The need to belong refers to human beings' fundamental motive to gain acceptance and avoid rejection by other people (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). More than a yearning for mere affiliation, the need to belong is a desire to form and maintain positive and continuous relationships with other people. Although recent social experiences–for instance, social exclusion–can undermine people's feelings of belonging (Williams, 2007), so too are individuals chronically low or high in these needs (Leary, Kelly, & Schreindorfer, 2001b; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). Having chronically elevated belongingness needs is marked by a strong desire for both acceptance by others and physical proximity to others. Belongingness needs also contribute to acute negative affective reactions to exclusion, whether real or anticipated (Leary, Cottrell, & Philips, 2001a). Given how central belongingness needs are, it stands to reason that these needs shape people's perceptions and behavior (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). Higher belongingness needs are associated with heightened interpersonal sensitivity, for instance (Williams, 2007). People with greater chronic belongingness needs show an advantage in memory for explicitly social information, pay greater attention to vocal tone, and show an enhanced ability to sense and decode social cues (Pickett et al., 2004). In this same study, belongingness needs were positively and significantly correlated with performance on social tasks, including empathic accuracy tests. However, these needs were unrelated to performance on nonsocial tasks, including math and verbal performance tests.
With their focus on building relationships with others, those who are high in belongingness needs devote “considerable cognitive processing to interpersonal interactions and relationships” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 503). Indeed, empirical studies show that these needs direct the way people process information (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000), with those higher in belongingness needs showing better recall for interpersonal than for individual events for instance. Further, belongingness needs have been shown to be relatively more accurate in identifying others' emotional expressions, and in detecting their positive or negative vocal tone (Pickett et al., 2004). We hypothesize that attention to vocal tone and expressions, for instance, will leave fewer resources for understanding the partner's substantive interests. Belongingness needs, therefore, will be positively related to negotiators' misperceptions of their partners' economic preferences and priorities (H4). As has been shown in other studies (Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), this lack of insight is likely to come at a cost to negotiators' economic outcomes. We also propose that economic misperceptions will mediate the relation between relational concerns and economic outcomes (H5). Despite the negotiation literature's focus on economic outcomes, they are but one measure of negotiator success (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009). Other outcomes, including satisfaction with the experience also matter to negotiators (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). With respect to satisfaction with the negotiation experience, we hypothesize that the give and take that is part of the negotiation will be difficult for negotiators high in belongingness needs, and they will report being relatively less satisfied with their experience, regardless of how well they do economically (H6). Our hypotheses are rooted in the premise that relational concerns drive negotiators to focus on developing a relationship with their partner, and to do this, they are willing to sacrifice their economic gains. We also test whether this pays off. That is, does the cost in terms of economic outcomes deliver relational benefits, specifically a positive relationship with their partner? We hypothesize that the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the more partners will report wanting to work with negotiators again (H7).
Hypotheses
Method
Negotiation is a way for people to manage their differences through the process of information and offer exchange. Over the course of a negotiation, parties are likely to make and receive several offers, which necessarily involve having one's offers rejected some of the time. To the extent that negotiators are committed to the offers they make (DeDreu & van Knippenberg, 2005), having an offer rebuffed can very well translate into feelings of personal rejection. Because rejection avoidance is central for individuals who are high in belongingness needs, we expect that the prospect of a negotiation, and the potential for rejection that accompanies it, will be especially aversive to these individuals. Extending recent work that shows it is not uncommon for would-be negotiators to approach negotiations feeling stressed (O'Connor, Arnold, & Maurizio, 2010), we hypothesize that these pre-negotiation feelings will be pronounced among negotiators with greater belongingness needs (H1). Weighing their economic outcomes against the importance they place on relationships, we expect that would-be negotiators who are higher in belongingness needs would tip the scales in favor of the relationship, and away from their economic interests. Consequently, they will adjust their economic demands downward. Specifically, we propose that negotiators with greater belongingness needs will reduce their economic ambitions ahead of their negotiations (H2). As a consequence, they will reach deals of lower economic value (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002a). Moreover, we expect that economic ambitions will mediate the relation between belongingness needs and economic outcomes for negotiators (H3).
154 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory management course participated for course credit. This was their first negotiation. Seventy-eight (45%) were male. Many of these participants were part-time students with job experience and this is reflected in their demographics. Their average age was 23.4 years (SD = 5.2). The average number of years of part-time work experience was 4.2 (SD = 2.6) and full-time work experience was 1.7 (SD = 4.1). Each participant was randomly assigned to negotiate as an agent for a group of students in an advanced business course. One agent negotiated on behalf of a group of classmates with an academic focus on strategy, and the other negotiated for a group with a focus on entrepreneurship. Participants were randomly paired, and negotiated over five issues related to a class trip and project (see O'Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2005; O'Connor et al., 2010). Except for one (course project), all issues were variable sum. Course project (assignment) was a common value issue, meaning that both parties wanted the same outcome on this issue. The greatest number of individual points possible was 1160 (see Appendix A). We did not give negotiators any target or reservation price, thereby maximizing variance on negotiation outcomes. They had 30 min to negotiate. Prior to the negotiation, we gave the participants background material describing the situation and the issues to be negotiated. Participants also could receive a cash incentive for outstanding individual performance, creating some pressure on them to protect and advance their economic interests during the negotiation. Twenty prizes of $20 each went to negotiators who achieved the highest value
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deals for their sides. They completed two questionnaires, one before the task, and one following the negotiation. Pre-task measures Six weeks before the negotiation, participants completed a Need to Belong scale. All items on the 10-item battery (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2006) were on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) (see Appendix B). Previous work has found that the Need to Belong scale is moderately correlated with, but distinct from other variables, including the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1992; De Cremer & Blader, 2006), social self-esteem (Leary et al., 2001a), and self-doubt (De Cremer, 2004). Consistent with past research that has used the scale (De Cremer & Alberts, 2004; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; Pickett et al., 2004), its reliability was acceptable (α = .75). Recent investigations into how relational traits might matter for negotiators have focused on unmitigated communion (UC), an extreme concern for relationships (Amanatullah et al., 2008). Studies have shown that UC can lead to self-neglect as a result of neurotic concern those high in UC have about others (Fritz & Helgeson, 1998). In contrast, NTB is a desire to build and maintain positive relationships, making this a far less extreme construct than UC. In that way, our test of the impact of relational concern is more conservative than previous efforts. However, to make sure we were not studying the same construct with a different name, we conducted a second study to test the relation between NTB and UC. We drew a sample of 65 undergraduates from the same population who also were enrolled in an introductory management course. The correlation between the two sets of measures was positive, but only marginally significant (r = .23, p b .07, n = 65), indicating that the two constructs only minimally overlap. Thus, we are confident that the NTB Scale is measuring a construct that is distinct from UC. We measured momentary stress about the upcoming negotiation by asking participants, “To what extent do you feel stressed about the upcoming negotiation?” (0 = not at all, 8 = very much) (see Bono, Foldes, Vinson, & Muros, 2007). Because feelings of stress and fear tend to co-occur (O'Connor et al., 2010; Raffety, Smith, & Ptacek, 1997), we also asked, “To what extent do you feel fearful?” (0 = not at all, 8 = very much). We combined these two items to form a stress index (α = .66). Participants also noted the minimum number of points they were willing to accept in a deal. This is typically how researchers assess negotiators' reservation price (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). Because lower reservation prices mean that negotiators are setting their outcome sights rather low, we used this as a measure of their economic ambitions. Post-task measures We summed the points that each party received for each of the five issues to create an individual economic outcome score.
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To measure participants' misperceptions about their partners' interests and priorities, we had them report their estimates of the points associated with the various issues as they believed they appeared in their partners' materials (see DeDreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). As others have done, we calculated economic misperception by taking the absolute value of the difference between negotiators' estimates of the point values and the actual value of the issue. The greater the number of points, the greater the negotiators' economic misperceptions. In keeping with past research on negotiator satisfaction (e.g., Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec, 2002b; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004; White et al., 2004), we asked participants two questions about their satisfaction with their negotiation: “How satisfied were you with the process of your negotiation (i.e., the quality of your interaction)” and “How satisfied were you with the outcome of your negotiation?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Because they were highly correlated (r = .78, n = 145, p = .0001), we combined them to form an index of satisfaction (α = .88). To estimate relational gains, we asked participants: 1) “How much would you like to work with this person again in the future?”, and 2) “Given the choice, would you like to negotiate with your partner again?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). We combined the items to form an index (α = .88). Results Eight negotiators (5%) failed to reach an agreement in the negotiation. Results of a logistic regression indicated that the higher negotiators' need to belong, the more likely they were to reach an agreement in the negotiation, β = 1.62, SE= .772, p = .04 (0 = impasse, 1 = agree). Negotiators who failed to reach an agreement were not included in the subsequent analysis. Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the study variables. There were no significant effects for sex on any of the dependent variables, and therefore, they were not considered further in our analyses. Analytic strategy Our hypotheses center on how individual negotiators' traits affect their behaviors and negotiation outcomes. For measures collected before negotiations begin (e.g., stress and economic ambitions), would-be negotiators' responses are not yet influenced by their partners. Therefore, it is appropriate to treat the two members of the dyad as independent, and to conduct analyses of these variables at the individual level. However, once negotiations start, partners become interdependent with their choice of tactics and outcomes responsive, at least in part, to what the other has done. Thus, the cognitions and performance of one member of a dyad are likely to be correlated with those of his/her counterpart.
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Belongingness Own outcomes Stress Economic ambition Economic misperceptions Satisfaction Partners' belongingness
Note. n ≥ 120. † p b .10. ⁎ p ≤ .05. ⁎⁎ p b .01.
M
SD
3.29 748.00 2.87 569.00 1863.00 5.25 3.29
(0.56) (145.00) (1.57) (224.00) (671.00) (1.14) (0.56)
1 − .17⁎ .16⁎ − .16⁎
.16† − .25⁎⁎ .02
2
− .12 .25⁎⁎ − .26⁎⁎ .33⁎⁎ .05
3
4
5
6
− .13 .18⁎ − .17⁎ .22⁎
− .17† − .02 − .16†
− .12 .00
− .02
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These data interdependencies create several analytical challenges (Kenny, 1996; see also Turel, 2010). Ignoring these characteristics of the data can affect tests of significance (by producing biased standard errors) and lead to erroneous inferences (Kenny & Judd, 1986, 1996). Therefore, these correlations must be represented in the analysis for correct inferences to be drawn. Statistically speaking, dyads constitute a special case of hierarchically structured data, with individual negotiators nested within dyads. Multilevel models can be used to account for the interdependence between members of dyads. Such models are a set of regression estimation techniques applied to data organized into hierarchically structured clusters (here dyads) (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Multilevel analysis combines the effects of variables at different levels (individual and dyadic) into a single model, while accounting for the interdependence among observations within higher-level units. In this paper, we estimated a multilevel random intercept regression model (using STATA's xtreg command). For Hypotheses 3 and 5 we ran standard tests for mediation, following the method described by Baron and Kenny (1986). In addition to running separate tests of mediation, we used a multiple mediator model to simultaneously test the effects of our proposed mediators. Specifying and testing a single multiple mediation model in place of separate mediation models has some advantages (for a complete discussion, see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In particular, including both mediators in a single model enables us to directly pit competing accounts against one another. Hypothesis tests In H1, we proposed that the prospect of a negotiation would trigger greater stress among those with greater relational concerns. As negotiators' belongingness needs increased, so, too, did their reported levels of stress prior to the negotiation, (β = .44, t(144) = 1.91, p = .05, R 2 = .03). According to H2, as their relational concerns grew, negotiators would reduce their economic ambitions, demonstrating a willingness to accept less for themselves in the deal. Indeed, the greater negotiators' need to belong, the less ambitious they were for their own outcomes, setting lower economic minima (β = −64.6, t(139) = − 1.97, p = .05, R 2 = .03). Even before negotiations begin, then, bargainers with greater relational concerns show a willingness to sacrifice substantive economic gains. As we predicted, would-be negotiators' need to belong scores were significantly and negatively related to their economic outcomes (β = − 44.14, z(146) = −2.06, p b .05). We also tested whether low economic ambitions explain how relational concerns undermine economic outcomes (H3). Having established the links between belongingness and outcomes, and belongingness and ambitions, we tested and found a positive relation between ambitions and outcomes (β = .16, t(139) = 3.10, p = .002, R 2 = .07) . When both belongingness and economic ambitions were entered into the regression equation, economic ambitions remained significant (β = .15, t(138) = 2.86, p = .005, R 2 = .08), and belongingness effects were no longer significant (β = − 27.1, t(138) = − 1.29, ns). We found similar results with a bootstrapping approach (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Economic ambitions mediated the effect of belongingness need on economic outcomes (95% BCa of − 28.17, −.26). Relational concerns led negotiators to lower their economic sights ahead of the negotiation, which then directly undercut their economic gains. We hypothesized that relational concerns would have consequences for economic misperceptions (H4). The trend was in the predicted direction: the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the greater their misperceptions (β = 215, z(121) = 2.19, p b .05). To test whether economic misperceptions played a mediating role in explaining the link between relational concerns and economic outcomes, we conducted regression analyses. Results showed that misperceptions were negatively related to economic outcomes (β =
−.05, z(122) = −2.90, p b .01). When both belongingness and misperceptions were entered in the regression equation, the relationship between misperceptions and economic outcomes remained negative and significant (β = − .05, z(121) = −2.66, p b .01), whereas the link between belongingness and economic outcomes was no longer significant (β = −27.62, z(121) = − 1.25, ns), indicating mediation (H5). A bootstrapping approach yielded similar results. Economic insight mediated the effect of belongingness need on economic outcomes (95% BCa of −30.17, −.40). In addition to conducting separate mediation models to uncover the mechanisms that link belongingness needs to outcomes, we specified and tested a multiple mediation model that included both potential mediators (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This allows us to test one explanation against the other to establish more precisely what is driving the outcome effect we have identified. The total indirect effect of the need to belong on economic outcomes through the two mediators was significant, with a 95% BCa (bias-corrected and accelerated; see Efron, 1987) bootstrap confidence interval of −42.52 to −1.03. Thus, both economic ambitions and misperceptions fully mediated the association between relational concerns and economic gains. However, a closer look at the specific indirect effects of each proposed mediator indicated that only economic misperception was a significant mediator (95% BCa CI of −26.18, −2.08). When both mediators were included in the equation, the effect of negotiators' ambitions fell to non-significance (95% BCa CI of −29.13, .89). Turning our attention to subjective outcomes, we predicted that relational concerns would dampen negotiators' satisfaction with their negotiations, regardless of their economic outcomes (H6). As we expected, satisfaction was related to outcomes; the better a negotiator did in the deal, the more satisfied he/she was (r = .33, p b .0001). Therefore, we needed to account for this relation in our test of H6. To do this, we included negotiators' individual outcomes in our regression analysis as another independent variable. Including outcomes in the regression model, we find that the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the less satisfied they were with their negotiation experience (β = −.39, z(145) = −2.51, p b .05). Because we accounted for outcomes by including this variable in the regression, we can say that the post-negotiation dissatisfaction that is elevated for those with greater belongingness needs cannot be fully attributed to relatively poorer economic performance. Belongingness needs concern people's desire to form positive continuing relationships with other people. This led us to hypothesize that negotiators' efforts to build a relationship with their partner, while expensive in terms of economic outcomes, might pay dividends on the relationship side (H7). We hypothesized that the greater negotiators' relational concerns, the more their partners would report that they would want to work with them again in the future. However, this was not the case (β = .11, z(128) = .70, ns). There was no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between relational concerns and partner's interest in a relationship with the focal negotiator. Supplemental analysis To the extent that heightened relational concerns might encourage negotiators to look for ways to help their partners (Den Hartog, De Hoogh, & Keegan, 2007), a benefit may go to these partners. Specifically, we speculated that if a counterpart is paired with a negotiator who has relatively high relational concerns, that counterpart might have an economic advantage. Results of regression analyses, however, did not support this. In fact, we identified the opposite finding (B = −.16, t(144) = −2.05, pb.05.). Partners reached deals of lower economic value the greater their counterparts' belongingness needs. This suggests that the negotiators' desire to form a relationship is interfering with both their own and their partners' ability to do well in the negotiation. Misperceptions about partners' priorities and interests suggest a distracted or disengaged negotiator. These negotiators are not going to be able to help their partners craft high value deals. Thus, we
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postulated that the link between negotiators' misperceptions and their partners' deals would be negative. This was the case, (β = −.06, z(122) = −3.02, p b .01). Together, the results of the supplemental analyses indicate that not only are partners not able to capitalize on negotiators' belongingness needs, but to the extent that these needs distract negotiators, they also leave the partner worse off. Discussion We addressed the questions of how trait level belongingness needs affect negotiators' decisions for how they negotiate, as well as the consequences for them and their partners. As predicted, these needs undermined negotiators before they got to the table, elevating their feelings of stress at the mere prospect of the negotiation. More importantly, there was a significant negative relation between negotiators' belongingness needs and their pre-task economic ambitions, with negotiators higher in these needs setting lower economic minima. Before the negotiation kicks off, then, some negotiators systematically decide they will accept less in the deal. This has nothing to do with the skill or power or reputation of the other side, but rather, it is rooted in the focal negotiator's need to form positive lasting relationships with other people, and avoid being rejected by them. We found that negotiators' initial decisions to accept less in the deal played a role downstream when it came to negotiators' economic outcomes. Extending past research on the effects of belongingness needs on cognition (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000), we also tested and found that as these needs increased, negotiators' understanding of their counterparts' economic interests fell. Given the established link between perceptual accuracy and outcomes (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), we expected that accuracy would mediate the link between belongingness and economic outcomes, and it did. To determine which mediator– ambitions or accuracy–was the stronger explanation for the link between belongingness needs and outcomes, we conducted a multiple mediator analysis. When both mediators were included, the stronger effect came from misperceptions. That is, the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the less attentive they seemed to be to the substance of the issues, and this, more than anything else, undermined their ability to do well in the negotiation. Set before negotiations begin, economic ambitions are not as proximate to final outcomes as economic misperceptions are, and this may account for their weaker effect on deals. For negotiators with greater belongingness needs, the quality of their economic outcomes is likely to be secondary to their goal of building a relationship with the other side (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Testing whether lower economic ambitions paid relationship dividends for bargainers, we did not find any relation between belongingness needs and partners' interest in future interaction. Of course, it could be that the questions we asked the partners did not appropriately capture their attitudes about their relationship with their partner. Still, preliminary results are pessimistic. Given the tendency of belongingness needs to lead negotiators to sabotage their own outcomes, we speculated that partners might be the winners in these negotiations. If the person sitting across from the partner lowers his ambitions for the sake of the relationship, perhaps the partner can exploit this for his own gain. This was not the case; the other sides' belongingness needs were negatively associated with the partners' economic outcomes in this integrative negotiation. Taking a closer look at misperceptions, we found that the other sides' misperceptions also were negatively associated with partners' economic outcomes. Thus, it appears that the inattentiveness to substance that plagues those with high relational concerns does not do the partner any favors. In fact, it sabotages their outcomes, too. Implications and conclusions There is growing scholarly interest in the tendency of negotiators to focus on their relationship with the other side and totrade the substance
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of their negotiations for their relationships (e.g., Amanatullah et al., 2008). This study connects to that line of work, but extends it in three important ways. First, we focused on belongingness needs, thought to be fundamental to human beings, and whose impact has been documented across a range of contexts (Barnes, Carvallo, Brown, & Osterman, 2010; Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Gardner et al., 2000). Second, we pinpointed the mechanism that drives the effects of belongingness on negotiators' economic outcomes. Third, by using multi-level modeling approach rather than aggregating variables to the dyadic level, we were able to examine the effects of belongingness on both one's own outcomes, and on the partner's outcomes. We also could examine how one side's misperceptions undercut both side's economic performance. Testing our data in this way allowed us to draw a fuller picture of how any one individual's relational needs direct his/her own and others' outcomes in an interpersonal exchange. These data do not allow us to say definitively whether negotiators with high belongingness needs are deliberately or even consciously sabotaging their own outcomes for the sake of the relationship. To do this, subsequent studies need to measure would-be negotiators intentions at the outset. Even then, though, it's not clear how aware people are of the strength of their belongingness needs and how it shapes their interactions with other people. We did not assess negotiators' attention to the non-substantive aspects of the negotiation. This means that we are not able to say anything about the extent to which negotiators with greater belongingness needs may be particularly attuned to the emotional tone of their partner, for instance, and perhaps especially sensitive to it. More work should be done to address the way in which belongingness enhances this kind of sensitivity. Efforts to map the impact of negotiator traits on the process and outcomes of bargaining have been met with mixed success (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998; Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008), leading some to conclude that these studies are not helpful for building theory. Our results suggest that the choice of contextrelevant individual differences can make the difference. The centrality of rejection avoidance to belongingness needs makes them particularly ripe for investigation in negotiation, where offer rejection is commonplace. Acknowledgements We presented portions of this research in 2010 at the International Association for Conflict Management meeting in Boston, MA. Thanks to the Johnson School M&O brownbag participants for their input on this work, as well as to Beta Mannix and Chris Anderson for their comments.
Appendix A. Participants' payoff schedules
# of sites
Assignment
Budget
Strategy group representative issue chart (with profit points 5 (440) Journal (200) $50 (240) 7 (330) Group paper (150) $75 (180) 9 (220) Individual paper (100) $100 (120) 11 (110) Class presentation (50) $125 (60) 13 (0) In-depth analysis (0) $150 (0)
Mix
Timing (week)
in parentheses) E (120) 8 D (90) 9 C (60) 10 B (30) 11 A (0) 12
(160) (120) (80) (40) (0)
Entrepreneurship group representative issue chart (with profit points in parentheses) 13 (120) Journal (200) $150 (160) A (440) 12 (240) 11 (90) Group paper (150) $125 (120) B (330) 11 (180) 9 (60) Individual paper (100) $100 (80) C (220) 10 (120) 7 (30) Class presentation (50) $75 (40) D (110) 9 (60) 5 (0) In-depth analysis (0) $50 (0) E (0) 8 (0)
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Appendix B. Need to Belong Scale Instructions: For each of the statements below, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement by writing a number in the space beside the question using the scale below: 1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Neither agree nor disagree 4 = Moderately agree 5 = Strongly agree ____ 1. If other people don't seem to accept me, I don't let it bother me. ____ 2. I try hard not to do things that will make other people avoid or reject me. ____ 3. I seldom worry about whether other people care about me. ____ 4. I need to feel that there are people I can turn to in times of need. ____ 5. I want other people to accept me. ____ 6. I do not like being alone. ____ 7. Being apart from my friends for long periods of time does not bother me. ____ 8. I have a strong need to belong. ____ 9. It bothers me a great deal when I am not included in other people's plans. ____ 10. My feelings are easily hurt when I feel that others do not accept me.
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Elfenbein, H. A., Curhan, J. R., Eisenkraft, N., Shirako, A., & Baccaro, L. (2008). Are some negotiators better than others? Individual differences in bargaining outcomes. Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 1463–1475. Fritz, H. L., & Helgeson, V. S. (1998). Distinctions of unmitigated communion from communion: Self-neglect and overinvolvement with others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 121–140. Fry, W., Firestone, I., & Williams, D. (1983). Negoitiation process and outcome of stranger dyads and dating couples: Do lovers lose? Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 4, 1–16. Galinsky, A. D., Mussweiler, T., & Medvec, V. H. (2002). Disconnecting negotiated outcomes and evaluations: The role of negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 83(5), 1131–1140. Galinsky, A. D., Seiden, V., Kim, P. H., & Medvec, V. H. (2002). The dissatisfaction of having your first offer accepted: The role of counterfactual thinking in negotiations. 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Psychological Bulletin, 119, 138–148. Leary, M. R., Cottrell, C. A., & Philips, M. (2001). Interpersonal relations and group processes: Deconfounding the effects of dominance and social acceptance on selfesteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 898–909. Leary, M. R., Kelly, K. M., Cottrell, C. A., & Schreindorfer, L. S. (2006). Individual differences in the need to belong: Mapping the nomological network. Unpublished manuscript. Wake Forest University. Leary, M. R., Kelly, K. M., & Schreindorfer, L. S. (2001). Individual differences in the need to belong. Unpublished manuscript. Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC. Mandel, D. R. (2006). Economic transactions among friends: Asymmetric generosity but not agreement in buyers' and sellers' offers. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(4), 584–606. Novemsky, N., & Schweitzer, M. (2004). What makes negotiators happy? The differential effects of internal and external social comparisons on negotiator satisfaction. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 95, 186–197. O'Connor, K. M., Arnold, J. A., & Burris, E. R. (2005). Negotiators' bargaining histories and their effects on future negotiation performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(2), 350–362. O'Connor, K. M., Arnold, J. A., & Maurizio, A. M. (2010). The prospect of a negotiation: Stress, cognitive appraisal, and performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 729–735. Pickett, C. L., Gardner, W., & Knowles (2004). Getting a cue: The need to belong and enhanced sensitivity to social cues. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1095–1107. Pinkley, R. L., Neale, M. A., & Bennett, R. J. (1994). The impact of alternatives to settlements in dyadic negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 57(1), 97–116. Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavioral Research Methods, 40(3), 879–891. Raffety, B. D., Smith, R. E., & Ptacek, J. T. (1997). Facilitating and debilitating trait anxiety, situational anxiety, and coping with an anticipated stressor: A process analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 892–906. Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models (2nd Ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Smart Richman, L., & Leary, M. R. (2009). Reactions to discrimination, stigmatization, ostracism, and other forms of interpersonal rejection: A multimotive model. Psychological Review, 116, 365–383. Thompson, L. (1991). Information exchange in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27(2), 161–179. Thompson, L., & DeHarpport, T. (1990). Relationships, goal incompatibility, and communal orientation in negotiations. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20, 33–44. Thompson, L., & Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. 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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / j e s p
Reports
Sabotaging the deal: The way relational concerns undermine negotiators Kathleen M. O'Connor a,⁎, Josh A. Arnold b a b
The Johnson School, Cornell University, USA California State University, Long Beach, USA
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 4 October 2010 Revised 12 April 2011 Available online 6 May 2011 Keywords: Negotiation Individual differences Belongingness Relational concerns Conflict Stress
a b s t r a c t We addressed the questions of how and to what end negotiators sacrifice their economic outcomes in exchange for hoped-for relationship gains with the other party. We predicted that negotiators' chronic belongingness needs–fundamental to human beings–would undercut the economic value of their deals. Moreover, we tested two mechanisms by which this occurs. Belongingness needs encouraged negotiators to reduce their economic ambitions ahead of time, and they interfered with negotiators' attention to the substantive issues on the table. Rather than finding that partners were able to exploit negotiators' belongingness needs for their own economic gains, we found that their partners were left worse off. If negotiators were making a calculation initially to trade economic gains for relationship gains, we did not find evidence that this paid off with a partner who especially wanted to work with the focal negotiator in the future. We conclude that belongingness needs lead negotiators to sabotage their economic outcomes without any clear benefits to the relationships these negotiators are keen to build. © 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Introduction Across a variety of situations, people routinely sacrifice their interests for the sake of their relationships. They spend date night watching an action movie when they would have preferred a romantic comedy; they lower their demands at budget time to preserve good will with their bosses. Common to these situations is the assumption that conceding some of one's own interests can help build or preserve a relationship with other people. Studies have documented that negotiators often trade their economic gains for their relationships (Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; White, Tynan, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004), and that negotiator traits systematically direct these decisions (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008). In an extension of this work, we investigate how a fundamental human need–the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995)–operates in negotiation. Beyond establishing that this need undercuts negotiators' economic outcomes, we also describe and test a set of potential cognitive mechanisms that theory suggests should explain the effects. We also test whether relational gains materialize for negotiators with elevated belongingness needs. Finally, we pinpoint the effects of one negotiator's belongingness needs on the outcomes of his/her partner. If belongingness needs operate the way we expect, we can draw conclusions about how naïve negotiators construe negotiations, and in particular how they understand the balance between economic ⁎ Corresponding author at: 317 Sage Hall, The Johnson School, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA. Fax: + 1 607 254 4590. E-mail address: [email protected] (K.M. O'Connor). 0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.04.004
gains and relationship gains. Specifically, this work will illuminate an implicit theory of negotiations held by some novices—that one can collect a relationship gain by trading away one's economic gains. Practically, this means that before they have learned anything about the other side, negotiators are already making decisions that will sabotage their own outcomes. Relational concerns Scholars have long been interested in the link between negotiators' relationships with one another and the quality of deals they reach. As part of this effort, studies have tested how parties' existing relationships affect their negotiations (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995). Researchers taking this approach have compared the quality of deals reached by pairs of friends to those hammered out by pairs of strangers (Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983). Presumably, because they share a past relationship, friends have reason to trust one another in the negotiation (Halpern, 1996). And, presumably because there is a shadow of the future, friends have incentives to be trustworthy (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). Trust between friends is likely to give way to the exchange of sensitive information, giving the advantage to friends over strangers. Empirical evidence for this, however, is mixed. As one would expect, friends do exchange more information during their negotiations compared to strangers (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; Mandel, 2006). In some studies, this enables pairs of friends to outperform pairs of strangers. However, Thompson and DeHarpport (1990) found that friends also conceded more to one another than strangers did, erasing any advantage that
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might have gone to friends. Similarly, compared to mixed-sex pairs of strangers, dating couples set lower aspirations for themselves and made fewer mutually-beneficial offers to one another (Fry et al., 1983), leading Valley and her colleagues to speculate that pairs with close ties might put a higher premium on their relationships than on their economic needs (Valley et al., 1995). Because both the past relationship and the shadow of the future are knotted together in these studies, it is unclear precisely what drives the effects of social ties. To get around this obstacle, we focus our analysis on a negotiator trait that speaks to the emphasis individuals place on their relationships. The need to belong refers to human beings' fundamental motive to gain acceptance and avoid rejection by other people (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). More than a yearning for mere affiliation, the need to belong is a desire to form and maintain positive and continuous relationships with other people. Although recent social experiences–for instance, social exclusion–can undermine people's feelings of belonging (Williams, 2007), so too are individuals chronically low or high in these needs (Leary, Kelly, & Schreindorfer, 2001b; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). Having chronically elevated belongingness needs is marked by a strong desire for both acceptance by others and physical proximity to others. Belongingness needs also contribute to acute negative affective reactions to exclusion, whether real or anticipated (Leary, Cottrell, & Philips, 2001a). Given how central belongingness needs are, it stands to reason that these needs shape people's perceptions and behavior (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). Higher belongingness needs are associated with heightened interpersonal sensitivity, for instance (Williams, 2007). People with greater chronic belongingness needs show an advantage in memory for explicitly social information, pay greater attention to vocal tone, and show an enhanced ability to sense and decode social cues (Pickett et al., 2004). In this same study, belongingness needs were positively and significantly correlated with performance on social tasks, including empathic accuracy tests. However, these needs were unrelated to performance on nonsocial tasks, including math and verbal performance tests.
With their focus on building relationships with others, those who are high in belongingness needs devote “considerable cognitive processing to interpersonal interactions and relationships” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 503). Indeed, empirical studies show that these needs direct the way people process information (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000), with those higher in belongingness needs showing better recall for interpersonal than for individual events for instance. Further, belongingness needs have been shown to be relatively more accurate in identifying others' emotional expressions, and in detecting their positive or negative vocal tone (Pickett et al., 2004). We hypothesize that attention to vocal tone and expressions, for instance, will leave fewer resources for understanding the partner's substantive interests. Belongingness needs, therefore, will be positively related to negotiators' misperceptions of their partners' economic preferences and priorities (H4). As has been shown in other studies (Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), this lack of insight is likely to come at a cost to negotiators' economic outcomes. We also propose that economic misperceptions will mediate the relation between relational concerns and economic outcomes (H5). Despite the negotiation literature's focus on economic outcomes, they are but one measure of negotiator success (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009). Other outcomes, including satisfaction with the experience also matter to negotiators (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). With respect to satisfaction with the negotiation experience, we hypothesize that the give and take that is part of the negotiation will be difficult for negotiators high in belongingness needs, and they will report being relatively less satisfied with their experience, regardless of how well they do economically (H6). Our hypotheses are rooted in the premise that relational concerns drive negotiators to focus on developing a relationship with their partner, and to do this, they are willing to sacrifice their economic gains. We also test whether this pays off. That is, does the cost in terms of economic outcomes deliver relational benefits, specifically a positive relationship with their partner? We hypothesize that the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the more partners will report wanting to work with negotiators again (H7).
Hypotheses
Method
Negotiation is a way for people to manage their differences through the process of information and offer exchange. Over the course of a negotiation, parties are likely to make and receive several offers, which necessarily involve having one's offers rejected some of the time. To the extent that negotiators are committed to the offers they make (DeDreu & van Knippenberg, 2005), having an offer rebuffed can very well translate into feelings of personal rejection. Because rejection avoidance is central for individuals who are high in belongingness needs, we expect that the prospect of a negotiation, and the potential for rejection that accompanies it, will be especially aversive to these individuals. Extending recent work that shows it is not uncommon for would-be negotiators to approach negotiations feeling stressed (O'Connor, Arnold, & Maurizio, 2010), we hypothesize that these pre-negotiation feelings will be pronounced among negotiators with greater belongingness needs (H1). Weighing their economic outcomes against the importance they place on relationships, we expect that would-be negotiators who are higher in belongingness needs would tip the scales in favor of the relationship, and away from their economic interests. Consequently, they will adjust their economic demands downward. Specifically, we propose that negotiators with greater belongingness needs will reduce their economic ambitions ahead of their negotiations (H2). As a consequence, they will reach deals of lower economic value (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002a). Moreover, we expect that economic ambitions will mediate the relation between belongingness needs and economic outcomes for negotiators (H3).
154 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory management course participated for course credit. This was their first negotiation. Seventy-eight (45%) were male. Many of these participants were part-time students with job experience and this is reflected in their demographics. Their average age was 23.4 years (SD = 5.2). The average number of years of part-time work experience was 4.2 (SD = 2.6) and full-time work experience was 1.7 (SD = 4.1). Each participant was randomly assigned to negotiate as an agent for a group of students in an advanced business course. One agent negotiated on behalf of a group of classmates with an academic focus on strategy, and the other negotiated for a group with a focus on entrepreneurship. Participants were randomly paired, and negotiated over five issues related to a class trip and project (see O'Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2005; O'Connor et al., 2010). Except for one (course project), all issues were variable sum. Course project (assignment) was a common value issue, meaning that both parties wanted the same outcome on this issue. The greatest number of individual points possible was 1160 (see Appendix A). We did not give negotiators any target or reservation price, thereby maximizing variance on negotiation outcomes. They had 30 min to negotiate. Prior to the negotiation, we gave the participants background material describing the situation and the issues to be negotiated. Participants also could receive a cash incentive for outstanding individual performance, creating some pressure on them to protect and advance their economic interests during the negotiation. Twenty prizes of $20 each went to negotiators who achieved the highest value
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deals for their sides. They completed two questionnaires, one before the task, and one following the negotiation. Pre-task measures Six weeks before the negotiation, participants completed a Need to Belong scale. All items on the 10-item battery (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2006) were on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) (see Appendix B). Previous work has found that the Need to Belong scale is moderately correlated with, but distinct from other variables, including the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1992; De Cremer & Blader, 2006), social self-esteem (Leary et al., 2001a), and self-doubt (De Cremer, 2004). Consistent with past research that has used the scale (De Cremer & Alberts, 2004; De Cremer & Blader, 2006; Pickett et al., 2004), its reliability was acceptable (α = .75). Recent investigations into how relational traits might matter for negotiators have focused on unmitigated communion (UC), an extreme concern for relationships (Amanatullah et al., 2008). Studies have shown that UC can lead to self-neglect as a result of neurotic concern those high in UC have about others (Fritz & Helgeson, 1998). In contrast, NTB is a desire to build and maintain positive relationships, making this a far less extreme construct than UC. In that way, our test of the impact of relational concern is more conservative than previous efforts. However, to make sure we were not studying the same construct with a different name, we conducted a second study to test the relation between NTB and UC. We drew a sample of 65 undergraduates from the same population who also were enrolled in an introductory management course. The correlation between the two sets of measures was positive, but only marginally significant (r = .23, p b .07, n = 65), indicating that the two constructs only minimally overlap. Thus, we are confident that the NTB Scale is measuring a construct that is distinct from UC. We measured momentary stress about the upcoming negotiation by asking participants, “To what extent do you feel stressed about the upcoming negotiation?” (0 = not at all, 8 = very much) (see Bono, Foldes, Vinson, & Muros, 2007). Because feelings of stress and fear tend to co-occur (O'Connor et al., 2010; Raffety, Smith, & Ptacek, 1997), we also asked, “To what extent do you feel fearful?” (0 = not at all, 8 = very much). We combined these two items to form a stress index (α = .66). Participants also noted the minimum number of points they were willing to accept in a deal. This is typically how researchers assess negotiators' reservation price (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). Because lower reservation prices mean that negotiators are setting their outcome sights rather low, we used this as a measure of their economic ambitions. Post-task measures We summed the points that each party received for each of the five issues to create an individual economic outcome score.
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To measure participants' misperceptions about their partners' interests and priorities, we had them report their estimates of the points associated with the various issues as they believed they appeared in their partners' materials (see DeDreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). As others have done, we calculated economic misperception by taking the absolute value of the difference between negotiators' estimates of the point values and the actual value of the issue. The greater the number of points, the greater the negotiators' economic misperceptions. In keeping with past research on negotiator satisfaction (e.g., Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec, 2002b; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004; White et al., 2004), we asked participants two questions about their satisfaction with their negotiation: “How satisfied were you with the process of your negotiation (i.e., the quality of your interaction)” and “How satisfied were you with the outcome of your negotiation?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Because they were highly correlated (r = .78, n = 145, p = .0001), we combined them to form an index of satisfaction (α = .88). To estimate relational gains, we asked participants: 1) “How much would you like to work with this person again in the future?”, and 2) “Given the choice, would you like to negotiate with your partner again?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). We combined the items to form an index (α = .88). Results Eight negotiators (5%) failed to reach an agreement in the negotiation. Results of a logistic regression indicated that the higher negotiators' need to belong, the more likely they were to reach an agreement in the negotiation, β = 1.62, SE= .772, p = .04 (0 = impasse, 1 = agree). Negotiators who failed to reach an agreement were not included in the subsequent analysis. Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the study variables. There were no significant effects for sex on any of the dependent variables, and therefore, they were not considered further in our analyses. Analytic strategy Our hypotheses center on how individual negotiators' traits affect their behaviors and negotiation outcomes. For measures collected before negotiations begin (e.g., stress and economic ambitions), would-be negotiators' responses are not yet influenced by their partners. Therefore, it is appropriate to treat the two members of the dyad as independent, and to conduct analyses of these variables at the individual level. However, once negotiations start, partners become interdependent with their choice of tactics and outcomes responsive, at least in part, to what the other has done. Thus, the cognitions and performance of one member of a dyad are likely to be correlated with those of his/her counterpart.
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Belongingness Own outcomes Stress Economic ambition Economic misperceptions Satisfaction Partners' belongingness
Note. n ≥ 120. † p b .10. ⁎ p ≤ .05. ⁎⁎ p b .01.
M
SD
3.29 748.00 2.87 569.00 1863.00 5.25 3.29
(0.56) (145.00) (1.57) (224.00) (671.00) (1.14) (0.56)
1 − .17⁎ .16⁎ − .16⁎
.16† − .25⁎⁎ .02
2
− .12 .25⁎⁎ − .26⁎⁎ .33⁎⁎ .05
3
4
5
6
− .13 .18⁎ − .17⁎ .22⁎
− .17† − .02 − .16†
− .12 .00
− .02
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These data interdependencies create several analytical challenges (Kenny, 1996; see also Turel, 2010). Ignoring these characteristics of the data can affect tests of significance (by producing biased standard errors) and lead to erroneous inferences (Kenny & Judd, 1986, 1996). Therefore, these correlations must be represented in the analysis for correct inferences to be drawn. Statistically speaking, dyads constitute a special case of hierarchically structured data, with individual negotiators nested within dyads. Multilevel models can be used to account for the interdependence between members of dyads. Such models are a set of regression estimation techniques applied to data organized into hierarchically structured clusters (here dyads) (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Multilevel analysis combines the effects of variables at different levels (individual and dyadic) into a single model, while accounting for the interdependence among observations within higher-level units. In this paper, we estimated a multilevel random intercept regression model (using STATA's xtreg command). For Hypotheses 3 and 5 we ran standard tests for mediation, following the method described by Baron and Kenny (1986). In addition to running separate tests of mediation, we used a multiple mediator model to simultaneously test the effects of our proposed mediators. Specifying and testing a single multiple mediation model in place of separate mediation models has some advantages (for a complete discussion, see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In particular, including both mediators in a single model enables us to directly pit competing accounts against one another. Hypothesis tests In H1, we proposed that the prospect of a negotiation would trigger greater stress among those with greater relational concerns. As negotiators' belongingness needs increased, so, too, did their reported levels of stress prior to the negotiation, (β = .44, t(144) = 1.91, p = .05, R 2 = .03). According to H2, as their relational concerns grew, negotiators would reduce their economic ambitions, demonstrating a willingness to accept less for themselves in the deal. Indeed, the greater negotiators' need to belong, the less ambitious they were for their own outcomes, setting lower economic minima (β = −64.6, t(139) = − 1.97, p = .05, R 2 = .03). Even before negotiations begin, then, bargainers with greater relational concerns show a willingness to sacrifice substantive economic gains. As we predicted, would-be negotiators' need to belong scores were significantly and negatively related to their economic outcomes (β = − 44.14, z(146) = −2.06, p b .05). We also tested whether low economic ambitions explain how relational concerns undermine economic outcomes (H3). Having established the links between belongingness and outcomes, and belongingness and ambitions, we tested and found a positive relation between ambitions and outcomes (β = .16, t(139) = 3.10, p = .002, R 2 = .07) . When both belongingness and economic ambitions were entered into the regression equation, economic ambitions remained significant (β = .15, t(138) = 2.86, p = .005, R 2 = .08), and belongingness effects were no longer significant (β = − 27.1, t(138) = − 1.29, ns). We found similar results with a bootstrapping approach (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Economic ambitions mediated the effect of belongingness need on economic outcomes (95% BCa of − 28.17, −.26). Relational concerns led negotiators to lower their economic sights ahead of the negotiation, which then directly undercut their economic gains. We hypothesized that relational concerns would have consequences for economic misperceptions (H4). The trend was in the predicted direction: the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the greater their misperceptions (β = 215, z(121) = 2.19, p b .05). To test whether economic misperceptions played a mediating role in explaining the link between relational concerns and economic outcomes, we conducted regression analyses. Results showed that misperceptions were negatively related to economic outcomes (β =
−.05, z(122) = −2.90, p b .01). When both belongingness and misperceptions were entered in the regression equation, the relationship between misperceptions and economic outcomes remained negative and significant (β = − .05, z(121) = −2.66, p b .01), whereas the link between belongingness and economic outcomes was no longer significant (β = −27.62, z(121) = − 1.25, ns), indicating mediation (H5). A bootstrapping approach yielded similar results. Economic insight mediated the effect of belongingness need on economic outcomes (95% BCa of −30.17, −.40). In addition to conducting separate mediation models to uncover the mechanisms that link belongingness needs to outcomes, we specified and tested a multiple mediation model that included both potential mediators (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This allows us to test one explanation against the other to establish more precisely what is driving the outcome effect we have identified. The total indirect effect of the need to belong on economic outcomes through the two mediators was significant, with a 95% BCa (bias-corrected and accelerated; see Efron, 1987) bootstrap confidence interval of −42.52 to −1.03. Thus, both economic ambitions and misperceptions fully mediated the association between relational concerns and economic gains. However, a closer look at the specific indirect effects of each proposed mediator indicated that only economic misperception was a significant mediator (95% BCa CI of −26.18, −2.08). When both mediators were included in the equation, the effect of negotiators' ambitions fell to non-significance (95% BCa CI of −29.13, .89). Turning our attention to subjective outcomes, we predicted that relational concerns would dampen negotiators' satisfaction with their negotiations, regardless of their economic outcomes (H6). As we expected, satisfaction was related to outcomes; the better a negotiator did in the deal, the more satisfied he/she was (r = .33, p b .0001). Therefore, we needed to account for this relation in our test of H6. To do this, we included negotiators' individual outcomes in our regression analysis as another independent variable. Including outcomes in the regression model, we find that the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the less satisfied they were with their negotiation experience (β = −.39, z(145) = −2.51, p b .05). Because we accounted for outcomes by including this variable in the regression, we can say that the post-negotiation dissatisfaction that is elevated for those with greater belongingness needs cannot be fully attributed to relatively poorer economic performance. Belongingness needs concern people's desire to form positive continuing relationships with other people. This led us to hypothesize that negotiators' efforts to build a relationship with their partner, while expensive in terms of economic outcomes, might pay dividends on the relationship side (H7). We hypothesized that the greater negotiators' relational concerns, the more their partners would report that they would want to work with them again in the future. However, this was not the case (β = .11, z(128) = .70, ns). There was no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between relational concerns and partner's interest in a relationship with the focal negotiator. Supplemental analysis To the extent that heightened relational concerns might encourage negotiators to look for ways to help their partners (Den Hartog, De Hoogh, & Keegan, 2007), a benefit may go to these partners. Specifically, we speculated that if a counterpart is paired with a negotiator who has relatively high relational concerns, that counterpart might have an economic advantage. Results of regression analyses, however, did not support this. In fact, we identified the opposite finding (B = −.16, t(144) = −2.05, pb.05.). Partners reached deals of lower economic value the greater their counterparts' belongingness needs. This suggests that the negotiators' desire to form a relationship is interfering with both their own and their partners' ability to do well in the negotiation. Misperceptions about partners' priorities and interests suggest a distracted or disengaged negotiator. These negotiators are not going to be able to help their partners craft high value deals. Thus, we
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postulated that the link between negotiators' misperceptions and their partners' deals would be negative. This was the case, (β = −.06, z(122) = −3.02, p b .01). Together, the results of the supplemental analyses indicate that not only are partners not able to capitalize on negotiators' belongingness needs, but to the extent that these needs distract negotiators, they also leave the partner worse off. Discussion We addressed the questions of how trait level belongingness needs affect negotiators' decisions for how they negotiate, as well as the consequences for them and their partners. As predicted, these needs undermined negotiators before they got to the table, elevating their feelings of stress at the mere prospect of the negotiation. More importantly, there was a significant negative relation between negotiators' belongingness needs and their pre-task economic ambitions, with negotiators higher in these needs setting lower economic minima. Before the negotiation kicks off, then, some negotiators systematically decide they will accept less in the deal. This has nothing to do with the skill or power or reputation of the other side, but rather, it is rooted in the focal negotiator's need to form positive lasting relationships with other people, and avoid being rejected by them. We found that negotiators' initial decisions to accept less in the deal played a role downstream when it came to negotiators' economic outcomes. Extending past research on the effects of belongingness needs on cognition (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000), we also tested and found that as these needs increased, negotiators' understanding of their counterparts' economic interests fell. Given the established link between perceptual accuracy and outcomes (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), we expected that accuracy would mediate the link between belongingness and economic outcomes, and it did. To determine which mediator– ambitions or accuracy–was the stronger explanation for the link between belongingness needs and outcomes, we conducted a multiple mediator analysis. When both mediators were included, the stronger effect came from misperceptions. That is, the greater negotiators' belongingness needs, the less attentive they seemed to be to the substance of the issues, and this, more than anything else, undermined their ability to do well in the negotiation. Set before negotiations begin, economic ambitions are not as proximate to final outcomes as economic misperceptions are, and this may account for their weaker effect on deals. For negotiators with greater belongingness needs, the quality of their economic outcomes is likely to be secondary to their goal of building a relationship with the other side (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Testing whether lower economic ambitions paid relationship dividends for bargainers, we did not find any relation between belongingness needs and partners' interest in future interaction. Of course, it could be that the questions we asked the partners did not appropriately capture their attitudes about their relationship with their partner. Still, preliminary results are pessimistic. Given the tendency of belongingness needs to lead negotiators to sabotage their own outcomes, we speculated that partners might be the winners in these negotiations. If the person sitting across from the partner lowers his ambitions for the sake of the relationship, perhaps the partner can exploit this for his own gain. This was not the case; the other sides' belongingness needs were negatively associated with the partners' economic outcomes in this integrative negotiation. Taking a closer look at misperceptions, we found that the other sides' misperceptions also were negatively associated with partners' economic outcomes. Thus, it appears that the inattentiveness to substance that plagues those with high relational concerns does not do the partner any favors. In fact, it sabotages their outcomes, too. Implications and conclusions There is growing scholarly interest in the tendency of negotiators to focus on their relationship with the other side and totrade the substance
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of their negotiations for their relationships (e.g., Amanatullah et al., 2008). This study connects to that line of work, but extends it in three important ways. First, we focused on belongingness needs, thought to be fundamental to human beings, and whose impact has been documented across a range of contexts (Barnes, Carvallo, Brown, & Osterman, 2010; Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Gardner et al., 2000). Second, we pinpointed the mechanism that drives the effects of belongingness on negotiators' economic outcomes. Third, by using multi-level modeling approach rather than aggregating variables to the dyadic level, we were able to examine the effects of belongingness on both one's own outcomes, and on the partner's outcomes. We also could examine how one side's misperceptions undercut both side's economic performance. Testing our data in this way allowed us to draw a fuller picture of how any one individual's relational needs direct his/her own and others' outcomes in an interpersonal exchange. These data do not allow us to say definitively whether negotiators with high belongingness needs are deliberately or even consciously sabotaging their own outcomes for the sake of the relationship. To do this, subsequent studies need to measure would-be negotiators intentions at the outset. Even then, though, it's not clear how aware people are of the strength of their belongingness needs and how it shapes their interactions with other people. We did not assess negotiators' attention to the non-substantive aspects of the negotiation. This means that we are not able to say anything about the extent to which negotiators with greater belongingness needs may be particularly attuned to the emotional tone of their partner, for instance, and perhaps especially sensitive to it. More work should be done to address the way in which belongingness enhances this kind of sensitivity. Efforts to map the impact of negotiator traits on the process and outcomes of bargaining have been met with mixed success (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998; Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008), leading some to conclude that these studies are not helpful for building theory. Our results suggest that the choice of contextrelevant individual differences can make the difference. The centrality of rejection avoidance to belongingness needs makes them particularly ripe for investigation in negotiation, where offer rejection is commonplace. Acknowledgements We presented portions of this research in 2010 at the International Association for Conflict Management meeting in Boston, MA. Thanks to the Johnson School M&O brownbag participants for their input on this work, as well as to Beta Mannix and Chris Anderson for their comments.
Appendix A. Participants' payoff schedules
# of sites
Assignment
Budget
Strategy group representative issue chart (with profit points 5 (440) Journal (200) $50 (240) 7 (330) Group paper (150) $75 (180) 9 (220) Individual paper (100) $100 (120) 11 (110) Class presentation (50) $125 (60) 13 (0) In-depth analysis (0) $150 (0)
Mix
Timing (week)
in parentheses) E (120) 8 D (90) 9 C (60) 10 B (30) 11 A (0) 12
(160) (120) (80) (40) (0)
Entrepreneurship group representative issue chart (with profit points in parentheses) 13 (120) Journal (200) $150 (160) A (440) 12 (240) 11 (90) Group paper (150) $125 (120) B (330) 11 (180) 9 (60) Individual paper (100) $100 (80) C (220) 10 (120) 7 (30) Class presentation (50) $75 (40) D (110) 9 (60) 5 (0) In-depth analysis (0) $50 (0) E (0) 8 (0)
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Appendix B. Need to Belong Scale Instructions: For each of the statements below, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement by writing a number in the space beside the question using the scale below: 1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Neither agree nor disagree 4 = Moderately agree 5 = Strongly agree ____ 1. If other people don't seem to accept me, I don't let it bother me. ____ 2. I try hard not to do things that will make other people avoid or reject me. ____ 3. I seldom worry about whether other people care about me. ____ 4. I need to feel that there are people I can turn to in times of need. ____ 5. I want other people to accept me. ____ 6. I do not like being alone. ____ 7. Being apart from my friends for long periods of time does not bother me. ____ 8. I have a strong need to belong. ____ 9. It bothers me a great deal when I am not included in other people's plans. ____ 10. My feelings are easily hurt when I feel that others do not accept me.
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