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Safeguarding critical transportation infrastructure: The US case
Transport Policy 28 (2013) 69–74
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Safeguarding critical transportation infrastructure: The US case Joseph S. Szyliowicz n Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Denver University, Denver, CO 80208, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
abstract
Available online 11 October 2012
This paper analyzes the state of critical transportation infrastructure in the US, its relationship to security, and how the lack of an updated national policy to resolve the serious weaknesses of the transportation infrastructure negatively impact security. The difficulties in safeguarding transportation networks are identified along with the degree to which changes enacted since 9/11 regarding intelligence and administration, notably the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, have led to increased security. However, these efforts, however successful, must be supplemented by a decision-making approach that goes beyond prevention and recognizes the importance of resiliency and such subsidiary concepts as robustness and redundancy. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Critical infrastructure Intelligence Department of homeland security Transportation security Cyber security Resiliency
1. Introduction Modern societies are dependent on a wide range of infrastructures for their effective functioning. People in all modern societies rely on sophisticated networks for such basic services as food, energy, health care, communications and transport. Though there is no precise agreement on which sectors are ‘‘critical’’ in terms of their role in national security, there is no doubt that transportation must be included. Indeed, terrorists view transportation facilities as attractive targets and have often launched attacks against them. All countries recognize this fact and have; therefore, taken important steps in recent years to safeguard their transportation systems, but doing so has proven to be no easy matter. That the threat is significant and continuing is vividly evidenced by the alert issued by the US State Department on October 3, 2010 to tourists planning to travel to Europe: ‘‘US citizens are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation systemsy. Terrorists have targeted and attacked subway and rail systems, as well as aviation and maritime services.’’ (News, October 2010). And, one should add, they have often used transportation vehicles such as trucks and planes as weapons. The most devastating use of vehicles as weapons occurred on 9/11 when the twin towers in New York City were demolished. This attack was a turning point for the United States, which has since spent billions of dollars and enacted numerous policies and programs to ensure the safety and security of its transportation system. These efforts have had a positive impact although many weaknesses remain, including the inability of the system to meet
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the needs of passengers and shippers in an effective and efficient manner. There is always a trade-off between security and mobility but the problem is aggravated by the US infrastructure, which is in poor condition and requires enhanced maintenance and upgrading. Obsolescence, Inadequacy and Security The decrease in international trade due to the worldwide recession (the number of containers imported into the US almost doubled between 2000 and 2008, rising from 8 million to 15 million but declined to an estimated 14.5 million in 2010 (Szyliowicz, 2010) has eased the strain on the infrastructure, especially that in Southern California. However, there is little doubt that the number of containers arriving at US ports will continue to increase in the future, or that the existing system is by no means adequate, imposing long delays and thus heavy costs on all the freight companies, an estimated $7.8 billion in 2005 (Eno Transportation Foundation, 2006). Congestion also imposes additional costs throughout the country, including environmental and health problems from increased diesel particulate emissions, as well as safety and security concerns. Nor can one ignore the costs of urban congestion imposed by heavy reliance on the automobile—in 2005, wasted time and fuel amounted to about $78 billion, accidents an additional $164.2 billion a year (American Automobile Association, Crashes vs. Congestion— What’s the Cost to Society? 3/5/2008). Despite the urgent needs, the existing political and economic situation in the US presents enormous barriers to any policy change, including budgetary constraints. Thus, although the existing law, SAFETEA-LU (the Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users) expired in 2009, Congress simply extended it nine times before finally passing a bill in 2012. Although it solved an immediate problem, it fails to address the long term funding issue. Not surprisingly, what passes for a national US
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transport policy can still be accurately characterized as ‘‘Absent, Outdated and Underperforming’’ (The Brookings Institution, 2008, Chapter V). The inability to handle existing large passenger and trade flows efficiently, let alone the anticipated growth, greatly complicates the task of safeguarding the transportation infrastructure. Security can best be achieved through the application of risk assessment methodologies that take into account not only the analytical, planning and preparedness dimensions, but also incorporate a response strategy. This is essential because all security incidents have a transportation impact. Should such an incident occur, transportation facilities will inevitably be affected, since emergency services have to reach the scene and inhabitants rescued and evacuated. Moreover, the incident zone may well have to be quarantined, thus raising the issue of alternative routes. Moreover, transportation issues are not limited to the specific zone since traffic impacts will inevitably spill over into other parts of the system, with consequences that extend well outside the immediate area that has been affected. Traffic backups will be commonplace, perhaps for many miles. And, the recovery phase may well be long lasting, creating more transportation issues. Clearly, the more efficient and effective the existing network, the better any community will be able to deal with a terrorist incident. Such a system will have to be resilient (able to absorb shocks with minimal service disruption). However, the US transportation system, because of its obsolescent state, possesses this characteristic to only a limited degree. The negative relationship between the age of a system’s infrastructure, its degree of congestion, and its resiliency is well established (Ortiz et al., 2009) and the limited available financial resources causes ‘‘aging to be one of the biggest challenges facing civil engineers in the coming years’’ (Righman-McConnell, 2011). In a later section we shall discuss in more detail the nature of such a key concepts as resiliency and the importance of incorporating its role in transportation planning. Modern Transportation Systems and Security Even if the transportation system were in better shape, ensuring its security is complicated by its basic characteristics. Contemporary transportation is global in scope, thus creating the need to safeguard borders that are often porous as evidenced by widespread smuggling of goods and people. Furthermore, it is necessary to gain the cooperation of many other states and to create and enforce international standards, a difficult task in an anarchic international system. Moreover, the contemporary infrastructure is not only global, it is increasingly intermodal as the individual modes become ever more interlinked. The development of the container was the key technological breakthrough, for it enabled goods to be shipped across continents more cheaply than ever and led to the integration of the different modes. Now, these are increasingly managed and governed as a system, creating new interdependencies so that it is essential not only to ensure that each individual mode be secure but that the nodes and linking points are also secured, especially since these represent new and attractive targets for terrorists. Not only are modes interlinked, but the entire system interacts closely with many other critical infrastructures. For example, in case of a terrorist attack on transportation, medical resources must be ready to help the injured. Conversely, in case of a pandemic, medical supplies and personnel have to be transported, and precautions taken to protect passengers. The most discussed interrelation, however, involves telecommunications. Modern transportation systems are highly dependent upon sophisticated communication systems. They are linked by computer and communication networks and rely on computer technologies for many important functions ranging from airline reservations and ticketing to ship navigation and cargo handling. They also
perform important control functions for such diverse activities as air traffic, train systems, and traffic lights. This dependency has not gone unnoticed by terrorists, who are known to have launched attacks on airline ticketing and reservation systems as well as many other transportation related websites. Because of these characteristics, a large number of foreign and domestic actors are involved, creating complex issues of coordination. Much of the nation’s transportation infrastructure is owned and controlled by the private sector, whose relationship with government agencies has often been characterized more by conflict than cooperation. Yet such cooperation is essential if security policies and standards are to be effectively implemented and relevant investments carried out. Nor is the private sector homogenous. Similar considerations apply to the government side. Not only are many national level agencies involved with transportation (including the military) but numerous state and local agencies are also active participants in transportation policy and administration. Their involvement runs from local mass transit to state highways, each of which poses important security issues. Hence, vertical and horizontal cooperation among many agencies is required, an ever continuing challenge. US Policy: Development and Challenges These challenges became increasingly obvious as the need to safeguard the country’s critical infrastructure became a national priority. In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Directive 63 which called for taking various protective steps. Subsequently, in 2003, President Bush published a revised version (Homeland Security Policy Directive 7) which called for the production of a National Infrastructure Assistance Plan, later renamed the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (Collins, 2009). The plan was designed to create an integrated and unified strategy. The latest version (2009) contains 9 specific sectoral plans, the one on transportation systems is the longest at 288 pages. President Obama also recognized the importance of critical infrastructure protection and, when he campaigned for the presidency, called for a meaningful plan and specifically cited the following needs: improved airline passenger screening, a comprehensive and accurate watch list, and improved intelligence sharing between national and local units. Nevertheless, the attempted Xmas day bombing attack on NW flight 253 in 2009 revealed that those needs had not been met adequately—the bomber had been allowed to board the plane even though there was considerable intelligence information that he should not have been allowed to do so. The importance of intelligence in preventing terrorist attacks and the need to ensure that it function effectively is a lesson that should have been driven home by the 9/11 attack. In its 2004 report, the 9/11 Commission which was established to investigate the attack, criticized the functioning of the intelligence community. It stated (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 12): The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge. Overcoming these shortcomings has obviously proven to be no easy matter despite the rapid enactment of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that sought to unify the intelligence community and to promote intelligence sharing among the numerous agencies involved in intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. It established the post of Director of National Intelligence to oversee all intelligence activities and
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created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which houses the government’s central data bank on terrorists—the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). This is the source for all the ‘‘watch lists’’ which alert Transportation Security Administration officials to persons who are considered potential threats to aviation. Another agency, the FBI, however, also plays an important role. Its Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) reviewed the accuracy of the information calling for persons to be included in TIDE and compiles the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB). This is the main terrorist watch list consisting of about 400,000 names and is used by numerous agencies to establish their own lists. In transportation, there are two watch lists—the Secondary Security Screening Selection (Selectee) List containing about 14,000 persons and the No Fly List. Both are maintained by the FBI’s TSC. Furthermore, the CIA continued to play its traditional role and the DHS also had it own intelligence function (office of Intelligence and Analysis.) This redundancy was deliberately established but obviously did not yield the hoped for results. The two critical transportation watch lists were known to possess weaknesses, due in part to the flood of information that came into the TSC. Misidentifications were a common problem as exemplified by the case of 8 year old Mikey Hicks who has been subjected to thorough screening at airports for years because someone with the same name is a suspected terrorist. Altogether over 80,000 persons have requested that their names be removed from the watch list. Circumventing the list is also a simple matter. Mario Labbe, a Canadian executive who was often subjected to lengthy questioning, simply changed his name to Francois Mario Labbe and solved his problem. Supposedly such problems have been resolved because the airlines are now required to collect birth dates and gender as well as their names, and this information is checked by the TSA (Alvarez, 2010). The basic issue plaguing the successful application of the watch list approach was clearly not the lack of data but analysis and coordination. There was more than sufficient information available concerning Mr. Abdulmutallab, the Xmas day bomber, to have placed him, if not on the ‘‘no fly’’ list, at least on the ‘‘selectee’’ list. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) which studied the incident enumerated fourteen different points at which the appropriate action that would have placed him on a list was not taken and concluded ‘‘y.there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community (IC).’’ It highlighted the fact that, though the NCTC’s mission was to be the lead agency for analyzing and integrating all relevant intelligence, it ‘‘was not organized adequately to fulfill its mission’’ and ‘‘no one agency saw itself as being responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats.’’ (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2010). No one should have been surprised that the system broke down, for its basic weakness could have been and was, in fact, foreseen. A General Accountability Office report that studied screening procedures noted, in October 2007, a lack of clear lines of responsibility and authority. As a result, agencies did not check against all records, only with those that were consonant with their particular missions and all information from all sources was not analyzed because the computer technology only allowed individuals to be checked against some records. It concluded (GAO-08-110, 2007): A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because, the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan – supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure – for enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent with
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presidential directive. Currently, numerous existing entities have roles in watch list-related activities, including the Terrorist Screening Center, screening agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community. Following this incident, President Obama acted quickly to fix these problems which had plagued the intelligence community prior to 9/11 and were supposed to have been dealt with through the subsequent reforms. He announced changes in airline watch lists and screening procedures, complete analysis of every threat, rapid and extensive distribution of all reports, and changes in analytical procedures. (The White House, 2010). The effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen, but there is little doubt that the intelligence community has grown to such an extent (1271 government units and 1931 companies are involved in intelligence and related activities) that coordinating and integrating this complex system and assessing its effectiveness remains a daunting challenge (Priest and Arkin, 2010). The difficulties of doing so even within a single organization is illustrated by the case of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the agency that is ultimately responsible for protecting critical transportation and other infrastructure. It was created in 2002 in order to integrate the many different organizations involved in protecting the domestic infrastructure of the US, including transportation, into one Cabinet level agency. Altogether over 20 separate units were involved, with about 200,000 employees. Infrastructure protection was recognized to be one of its key responsibilities, along with emergency response and border and transportation security. It represented the largest governmental reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense after World War II. Given the need to assimilate and integrate a large number of agencies and personnel, each with its own structure and culture, creating an integrated and well functioning department would inevitably require considerable time, effort, and experimentation. Part of the problem that the DHS has had to deal with since its inception is its broad mandate so that its activities in many other areas besides intelligence often duplicated efforts in other agencies. At the federal level, these involve such agencies as the Departments of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense. Thus, the DHS has an intelligence unit, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) which is expected ‘‘to ensure that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the full spectrum of homeland security customers in the Department, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private sector, and in the IC.’’ (DHS, 2011 website). However, it shares responsibility with the Department of Justice for obtaining intelligence and disseminating it. Such duplication inevitably leads to turf battles, although the new Undersecretary undertook a review, based on the I&A’s goals and resources, which has led to important changes, including restructuring (DHS, 2010). The situation regarding cyber security is similar. The DHS was assigned considerable responsibility for this sector but the National Security Agency remained in charge of the military dimension. Furthermore, as part of his attempts to strengthen cyber security, President Obama appointed a new chief who would coordinate the many programs, develop a national strategy and report to the National Security Council. And, it also had to coordinate with state and local officials and work with the private sector, a critical element in any transportation infrastructure security program since so many of the facilities were controlled by the private sector. According to the Defense Science Board Task Force, it failed to do so, being unable to protect and share private sector information adequately. Perhaps the most damning indictment of the DHS; however, was the Board’s charge that DHS
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demonstrated little creative thinking (Department of Defense, 2007). This sentiment is shared by many experts who have criticized the DHS’s efforts to achieve security in transportation on many grounds including poor integration, waste, and an over reliance on technology. To cite but one recent example, the $4 billion DHS program to deploy nuclear detecting machines at ports and border crossings was deemed a failure because the machines were too large and the software inadequate. This debacle was due to poor oversight and the failure of the two DHS programs (Nuclear Detection and Customs and Border Protection) to communicate with each other (GAO-10-1041T, 2010). Its Transportation Security Administration (TSA) division also favors technological solutions. In an attempt to enhance the efficacy of passenger screening procedures highlighted by the Xmas day bombing attempt, it is replacing metal detectors with whole body imaging machines in the airports. These will be installed in 200 airports by the end of 2010 even though serious questions have been raised concerning their efficacy and privacy concerns. A March 2010 GAO report pointed out that these machines were being deployed even though the ‘‘TSA had not yet conducted an assessment of the technology’s vulnerabilities’’ (GAO-10-484T, 2010). Questions have also been raised about the degree to which such areas as general aviation, air cargo, and ground to air missiles (MANPADS) have received the attention they deserve. Moreover, many have pointed out that the TSA’s emphasis on aviation has occurred at the expense of other important elements of the transportation infrastructure, such as mass transportation and ports and shipping. The DHS has undergone a number of structural reorganizations designed to improve its effectiveness, but these have sometimes yielded unexpected negative consequences and have seldom yielded the desired result – the development of a resilient critical infrastructure – because these structural changes have not been accompanied by the cultural changes that are essential to effective organizational functioning. Hence, as noted above, the DHS has long been faulted for its failure to overcome numerous weaknesses, such as the limited integration between units and a lack of creativity. As one critic recently noted, although numerous proposals have been presented to DHS offices to improve resilience, the response has been largely dismissive. In his words: ‘‘rhetoric must be matched by results y. Absent change in organizational behavior, today’s efforts to protect America’s infrastructures will – at best – result only in maintenance of a totally unacceptable cyber and physical infrastructure status quo’’ (Gaynor, 2012). The shortcomings that have characterized the DHS, however, cannot be attributed solely to its administrators. As noted above, the magnitude of the challenges they faced was enormous. Furthermore, the DHS has struggled to deal with new challenges and controversies, such as those involving intelligence capabilities and its inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina. Accordingly, the DHS has struggled over the years to revise its management practices and has succeeded to the extent that, while administrative issues remain, it is today a better functioning department in terms of such areas as acquisitions, information technology, human resources, and finances and it continues to implement recommendations made by the General Accountability Office (GAO-10-911T, 2010). Even the DHS’s own ratings of its performance indicate how much remains to be done to achieve an ‘‘effective’’ level of security. 61 separate programs were evaluated with the following results: 10 were judged ‘‘effective’’, 21 ‘‘moderately effective’’, 17 ‘‘adequate’’ and 13 ‘‘unknown’’. The ‘‘unknown’’ category included infrastructure protection as well as cyber security and air cargo. That ‘‘disaster response’’ and ‘‘disaster recovery’’ were
both judged ‘‘adequate’’ also does not inspire confidence in the DHS, given the Hurricane Katrina disaster that occurred after this evaluation. (DHS, 2011). Congress should play a prominent role in enhancing the effectiveness of these programs, given its supervisory responsibilities. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Indeed, the efforts by DHS administrators to create a functional and effective department and to deal with the many problems they have had to confront, have been complicated by Congress, rather than facilitated, because of its Byzantine oversight structure—about 80 committees and sub-committees, as well as every senator and at least 412 of the 435 house members are involved in ‘‘homeland security’’ (The Washington Post, 2004). To call such an arrangement ‘‘complex’’ is to minimize the harm that it inflicts upon the ability of the DHS to safeguard critical infrastructure. It not only forces its administrators to spend an inordinate amount of time preparing testimony and delivering it to various committees but, given the balkanization of Congress, no strategic perspective on homeland security is ever developed. As a recent report by prominent ex-legislators noted: ‘‘The result is a Department of Homeland Security that is hamstrung by a system of Congressional oversight that drains departmental energy and invites managerial circumvention (The Washington Post, 2004) Sporadic reform efforts have not changed the system’s dysfunctional character’’. Meeting the Challenges Although numerous problems and issues such as this continue to limit the effectiveness of efforts to secure the transportation infrastructure, there is no doubt that important steps have been taken during the past decade, especially the continuing development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. At the same time, one cannot minimize what remains to be done. The fact that the transportation system is in poor physical state and imposes heavy costs is a liability to passengers and freight, and as noted above possesses major negative security implications. However, the very fact that so much needs to be done presents an opportunity to rebuild, expand and manage the system using criteria that will enhance its security. Thus the first priority should be to develop a national plan based on sound design principles. Such a plan will obviously not be easy to produce. It will require collaboration across modes and organizations at many levels. Above all, a systems perspective is essential, one that considers all the dimensions involved—planning, design, implementation and operation. Security involves more than a sound infrastructure; it also requires effective management. This point is incorporated in the ‘‘guiding principles’’ of The American Society of Civil Engineers: (1) employ an integrated systems approach, (2) adapt to dynamic conditions and practice, (3) quantify, communicate, manage risk, and (4) exercise sound leadership, management and stewardship (ASCE, 2009). Another recent study was more specific, calling for a focus on high risk infrastructure, an emphasis on resiliency, an expansion of education, awareness, training and research, enhanced international cooperative efforts, and the importance of making every effort to develop a coherent Congressional oversight system (McNeill and Weitz, 2010). Again, it is clear that securing the transportation system requires more than a focus on simply rebuilding infrastructure. Obviously, an integrated approach to enhancing the security of the existing transportation infrastructure is required, but so is a new framework. The US has, as noted above, devoted enormous financial and human resources to intelligence, screening and related activities, in an effort to prevent a successful attack. Although measures designed to do so are obviously an essential element in any comprehensive strategy because prevention yields the most desirable outcome – the attack is foiled – this focus,
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because of the many complexities involved, including a constant evolution in the skills, ncapabilities, and target selection by the terrorists, can never be completely successful. nAccordingly, there has been a growing recognition of the importance of adding a new ndimension, that of resiliency, which enables the system to absorb the consequences of an attack with minimal damage and to recover quickly (Jackson, 2008). The importance of a resilient transportation system is highlighted during disasters where the need for restoring passenger and traffic flows becomes a priority. The 1989 San Francisco earthquake, for example, caused the collapse of a section of the bridge connecting the city to Oakland, leading to numerous traffic jams as drivers sought alternative routes,. Fortunately, the existence of a metro system (BART) which served the area, ameliorated the situation to some degree by providing an alternative mode. On the other hand, Hurricane Katrina (2005) which devastated much of New Orleans, demonstrated even more vividly the shortcomings of the existing transportation system and the importance of a resilient system for evacuation and recovery. In the words of the authors of a detailed case study of the impact of the hurricane: ‘‘This Post-Katrina New Orleans Case Study demonstrates the value of resiliency as an operative framework for decision making at all levels of government and across all modes of transportation.’’ (Amdal and Swigart, 2010). Most scholars agree that ‘‘resiliency’’ is an important dimension of an effective and efficient transportation system and some have even argued that resiliency is a characteristic of ‘‘a secure and highly functioning transportation network’’ (Chen and Miller-Hooks. 2012). However, it is no easy matter to define and operationalize this concept because it encompasses not only planning and design but the operation of the system. Thus, despite the efforts of many scholars to develop a precise conceptualization that would permit measurement, the challenge remains (Chilan et al., 2009; Cox, Andrew et al., 2011). Still, Murray-Tuite and Pamela (2006) has developed a useful taxonomy which contains ten dimensions: redundancy, diversity, efficiency, autonomous components: strength, collaboration, adaptability, mobility, safety, and rapid recovery. Bruneau and Reinhorn (2006) offer a different conceptualization with four: Robustness, Redundancy, Resourcefulness, Rapidity. Nevertheless, despite such disagreements about the dimensions of ‘‘resiliency’’, it is possible to identify two dimensions that are generally accepted as being of particular significance— ‘‘robustness’’ and ‘‘redundancy’’. Robustness has been defined as ‘‘the strength, or the ability of elements, systems, and other measures of analysis to withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering degradation or loss of function’’. This has two dimensions—the engineering component and the human resources (the operators, users, and regulators) who are involved with the infrastructure. The latter includes such dimensions as collaboration, adaptability, and resourcefulness. These are, of course,n integral parts of a resilient system—and often difficult to achieve. Even today the transportation network in New Orleans ‘‘still lacks adequate communication and coordination across modes. Coordination and communication remains especially problematic among the freight transportation community’’ (Amdal and Swigart,2010). Redundancy involves creating excess infrastructural capacity so that if one part of the system is destroyed, alternatives are available to enable mobility to be maintained. Experts agree that a certain amount of redundancy is essential to ensure the resiliency of a system. Indeed the National Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission in its final report, not only emphasized the importance of redundancy but went so far as to equate it with resiliency. It wrote: ‘‘Transportation system redundancy is the resiliency that enables
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the system to compensate for losses and allows the system to function even when infrastructure is damaged or destroyed.’’ (my emphasis). It continues: ‘‘For a transportation system at risk of disruption, availability of excess capacity provides redundancy which is needed not only for infrastructure and evacuation but also for the national transportation network. If there is no redundancy, there is greater risk to a transportation system. Redundancy is essential for daily system management and operations but is crucial during a disaster.’’ Clearly, costs are involved in implementing this concept (and these may be very large involving both direct and indirect financial and other expenses). Nevertheless, it is essential to expand the usual focus of the planning process beyond narrowly defined ‘‘efficiency’’ by conceptualizing ‘‘efficiency’’ in the context of a resilient transportation system. Applying this approach does not mean that costs should be ignored, though they may be less than anticipated for as one expert, Bob Bourne, has noted: ‘‘Redundancy is not favored by policy makers and can add to costs. However, a system with excess capacity will perform well in times of crisis and will provide additional service during normal times.’’(cited in Husdal, 2011). Making rigorous assessments of the costs and benefits in building such capacity is obviously required and experts have, in fact, suggested methodologies that permit us to do so, at least in a preliminary way (Jackson, Chapter 4, 2008).
2. Conclusion Many scholars and expert practitioners have analyzed the state of the nation’s critical infrastructure and its security requirements. There is essential agreement on what needs to be done; namely, that a coherent national plan be designed and implemented. Unfortunately, it is not at all evident that the existing American political system can function in such a manner. Thus the question arises—what can be done if the existing transportation system is allowed to continue in essentially its present state or even deteriorate further. In such a situation, the role of the DHS becomes more important than ever. If we are unable to develop a more resilient transportation system, then every effort has to be made to improve the operation of the existing system, so as to at least deal with the ‘‘human’’ side of resilience—work to improve communications and coordination, to enhance the ‘‘resourcefulness’’ of all the actors involved. In any effort to ensure that the existing infrastructure is secure, the DHS (2011) obviously has an important role nto play. Though it, too, requires attention for its weaknesses including its limited effectiveness in managing risk, there are important signs that it is becoming a more effective and efficient agency, a development that would be greatly facilitated by a more coherent Congressional oversight system. Whether the political leadership will demonstrate the will and ability to make such a change, to develop appropriate policies, and to allocate adequate resources for their implementation, remains to be seen. While it is impossible to guarantee security, there is no doubt that terrorists continue to plan attacks and that it is incumbent upon national leaders to develop strategies and plans that will foil such attempts. And, if one should tragically succeed, the infrastructure should be able to continue to function effectively and a well prepared response plan should minimize the human tragedy that will inevitably result.
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References Alvarez, L. Meet Mikey. 8: US Has Him on Watch List, NYT, January 13, 2010. ASCE, Guiding Principles for the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure. Reston, VA., 2009. Amdal, James R. Swigart, Stan L., Resilient Transportation Systems in a Post Disaster Environment. Gulf Coast Research Center for Evacuation and Transportation Resiliency, October 2010. American Automobile Association, Crashes vs. Congestion—What’s the Cost to Society? 3/5/2008, http://www.aaanewsroom.net/main/Default.asp?CategoryID= 7&ArticleID=596. B.B.C. News, US Issues Travel Alert for Americans in Europe, 3 October 2010, /http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11460335S. Bruneau, Amichel Reinhorn, Andrew, Overview of the Resilience Concept. Proceedings of the 8th US National Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 2006. Chen, L. Miller-Hooks, E., Resilience: An Indicator of Recovery Capability in Interrmodal Freight Transportation, Transportation Science, February 2012. Collins, Pamela Baggett, Ryan, Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2009. Cox, Andrew et al., Transportation Security and the Role of Resilience: A Foundation for Operational Metrics, Transport Policy, March 2011. Chilan,Ta et al., Structuring a Definition of Resilience for the Freight Transportation System. Transportation Research, vol. 2097, 2009. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, January 2007, /http://www.acq.osd.mil/ dsb/reports/ADA464666.pdfS. DHS FY 2008–2010 Annual Performance Report, Appendix C, 2011 /http://www. docstoc.com/docs/52016652/ DHS-Annual-Performance-Report-Fiscal-Years-2008—2010—Appendix-CS. DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis Examines Key Initiatives, May 13, 2010 /http://www.executivegov.com/2010/05/dhs-office-of-intelligence-analysi s-examines-key-initiatives/S. Eno Transportation Foundation. Efficient Goods Movement and the Environment, 2006. GAO-08-110, Terrorist Watch List Screening, October 2007. GAO-10-1041T, Combatting Nuclear Smuggling, September 15, 2010. GAO-10-484T, Aviation Security: TSA is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of the Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other Areas of Aviation Security Remain, March 17, 2010. GAO-10-911T, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation and Transformation of Management Functions, but More Work Remains, September 30, 2010.
Gaynor, Jeff. Critical Infrastructure Resilience. The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, February 27, 2012. Available from: /http://securitydebrief.com/2012/02/27/critical-infrastructure-resilience-effec tively-addressing-the-americas-achilles-heel/S. Husdal, J. The UK Transport Network Resilienceyand I ,/http://www.husdal.com/ 2011/03/19/the-uk-transport-network-resilience-and-i/S. Jackson, Brian A. Marrying Prevention and Resiliency, The Rand Corporation, 2008. McNeill, J.B. Weitz, Richard, 2010. How to Fix Critical Infrastructure Plans: A guide for Congress. Washington D.C. The Heritage Foundation, no. 2404, April 27, 2010. Murray-Tuite, Pamela M. A Comparison of Transportation Network Resilience Under Simulated System Optimum and User Equilibrium Conditions. Proceedings of the 38th Conference on Winter Simulation, 2006. National Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, Final Report, vol. III, Section 1, Part E /http://transportationfortomorrow.com/final_report/volu me_3_html/technical_issues_papers/paper94cb.htm?name=4e_02S. Ortiz, David S. et al., Freight Transportation Resilience. The Rand Corporation, June 2009. Priest, Dana Arkin, William. Top Secret America: A hidden world, growing beyond control, The Washington Post, 7/19-7/21/2010. Righman-McConnell, J., 2011. Investigation of Load-Path Redundancy in Aging Steel Bridges-Phase 2, /http://www.ce.udel.edu/UTC/Investigation of LoadPath Redundancy in Aging Steel Bridges2.htmlS. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, May 18, 2010. Available from: /http://intelligence.senate.gov/ 100518/report.pdfS. Szyliowicz, Joseph, 2010. Intermodalism in the US: Issues and Prospects In: Givoni, M., Banister, D. (Eds.), Integrated Transport. Routledge, Oxford, Eds. The Brookings Institution, A Bridge to Somewhere: Rethinking American Transportation for the 21st Century, Washington DC, 2008. The 9/11 Commission Report 2004. Available from: /http://www.9-11commis sion.gov/report/911Report.pdfS. The Washington Post, Homeland Security Oversight, December 28, 2004, pp. A18, /http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30342-2004Dec27. htmlS. The White House, Remarks by the President on Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation Security, January 7, 2010, /http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of fice/remarks-president-strengthening-intelligence-and-aviation-securityS.
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Transport Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tranpol
Safeguarding critical transportation infrastructure: The US case Joseph S. Szyliowicz n Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Denver University, Denver, CO 80208, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
abstract
Available online 11 October 2012
This paper analyzes the state of critical transportation infrastructure in the US, its relationship to security, and how the lack of an updated national policy to resolve the serious weaknesses of the transportation infrastructure negatively impact security. The difficulties in safeguarding transportation networks are identified along with the degree to which changes enacted since 9/11 regarding intelligence and administration, notably the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, have led to increased security. However, these efforts, however successful, must be supplemented by a decision-making approach that goes beyond prevention and recognizes the importance of resiliency and such subsidiary concepts as robustness and redundancy. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Critical infrastructure Intelligence Department of homeland security Transportation security Cyber security Resiliency
1. Introduction Modern societies are dependent on a wide range of infrastructures for their effective functioning. People in all modern societies rely on sophisticated networks for such basic services as food, energy, health care, communications and transport. Though there is no precise agreement on which sectors are ‘‘critical’’ in terms of their role in national security, there is no doubt that transportation must be included. Indeed, terrorists view transportation facilities as attractive targets and have often launched attacks against them. All countries recognize this fact and have; therefore, taken important steps in recent years to safeguard their transportation systems, but doing so has proven to be no easy matter. That the threat is significant and continuing is vividly evidenced by the alert issued by the US State Department on October 3, 2010 to tourists planning to travel to Europe: ‘‘US citizens are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation systemsy. Terrorists have targeted and attacked subway and rail systems, as well as aviation and maritime services.’’ (News, October 2010). And, one should add, they have often used transportation vehicles such as trucks and planes as weapons. The most devastating use of vehicles as weapons occurred on 9/11 when the twin towers in New York City were demolished. This attack was a turning point for the United States, which has since spent billions of dollars and enacted numerous policies and programs to ensure the safety and security of its transportation system. These efforts have had a positive impact although many weaknesses remain, including the inability of the system to meet
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the needs of passengers and shippers in an effective and efficient manner. There is always a trade-off between security and mobility but the problem is aggravated by the US infrastructure, which is in poor condition and requires enhanced maintenance and upgrading. Obsolescence, Inadequacy and Security The decrease in international trade due to the worldwide recession (the number of containers imported into the US almost doubled between 2000 and 2008, rising from 8 million to 15 million but declined to an estimated 14.5 million in 2010 (Szyliowicz, 2010) has eased the strain on the infrastructure, especially that in Southern California. However, there is little doubt that the number of containers arriving at US ports will continue to increase in the future, or that the existing system is by no means adequate, imposing long delays and thus heavy costs on all the freight companies, an estimated $7.8 billion in 2005 (Eno Transportation Foundation, 2006). Congestion also imposes additional costs throughout the country, including environmental and health problems from increased diesel particulate emissions, as well as safety and security concerns. Nor can one ignore the costs of urban congestion imposed by heavy reliance on the automobile—in 2005, wasted time and fuel amounted to about $78 billion, accidents an additional $164.2 billion a year (American Automobile Association, Crashes vs. Congestion— What’s the Cost to Society? 3/5/2008). Despite the urgent needs, the existing political and economic situation in the US presents enormous barriers to any policy change, including budgetary constraints. Thus, although the existing law, SAFETEA-LU (the Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users) expired in 2009, Congress simply extended it nine times before finally passing a bill in 2012. Although it solved an immediate problem, it fails to address the long term funding issue. Not surprisingly, what passes for a national US
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transport policy can still be accurately characterized as ‘‘Absent, Outdated and Underperforming’’ (The Brookings Institution, 2008, Chapter V). The inability to handle existing large passenger and trade flows efficiently, let alone the anticipated growth, greatly complicates the task of safeguarding the transportation infrastructure. Security can best be achieved through the application of risk assessment methodologies that take into account not only the analytical, planning and preparedness dimensions, but also incorporate a response strategy. This is essential because all security incidents have a transportation impact. Should such an incident occur, transportation facilities will inevitably be affected, since emergency services have to reach the scene and inhabitants rescued and evacuated. Moreover, the incident zone may well have to be quarantined, thus raising the issue of alternative routes. Moreover, transportation issues are not limited to the specific zone since traffic impacts will inevitably spill over into other parts of the system, with consequences that extend well outside the immediate area that has been affected. Traffic backups will be commonplace, perhaps for many miles. And, the recovery phase may well be long lasting, creating more transportation issues. Clearly, the more efficient and effective the existing network, the better any community will be able to deal with a terrorist incident. Such a system will have to be resilient (able to absorb shocks with minimal service disruption). However, the US transportation system, because of its obsolescent state, possesses this characteristic to only a limited degree. The negative relationship between the age of a system’s infrastructure, its degree of congestion, and its resiliency is well established (Ortiz et al., 2009) and the limited available financial resources causes ‘‘aging to be one of the biggest challenges facing civil engineers in the coming years’’ (Righman-McConnell, 2011). In a later section we shall discuss in more detail the nature of such a key concepts as resiliency and the importance of incorporating its role in transportation planning. Modern Transportation Systems and Security Even if the transportation system were in better shape, ensuring its security is complicated by its basic characteristics. Contemporary transportation is global in scope, thus creating the need to safeguard borders that are often porous as evidenced by widespread smuggling of goods and people. Furthermore, it is necessary to gain the cooperation of many other states and to create and enforce international standards, a difficult task in an anarchic international system. Moreover, the contemporary infrastructure is not only global, it is increasingly intermodal as the individual modes become ever more interlinked. The development of the container was the key technological breakthrough, for it enabled goods to be shipped across continents more cheaply than ever and led to the integration of the different modes. Now, these are increasingly managed and governed as a system, creating new interdependencies so that it is essential not only to ensure that each individual mode be secure but that the nodes and linking points are also secured, especially since these represent new and attractive targets for terrorists. Not only are modes interlinked, but the entire system interacts closely with many other critical infrastructures. For example, in case of a terrorist attack on transportation, medical resources must be ready to help the injured. Conversely, in case of a pandemic, medical supplies and personnel have to be transported, and precautions taken to protect passengers. The most discussed interrelation, however, involves telecommunications. Modern transportation systems are highly dependent upon sophisticated communication systems. They are linked by computer and communication networks and rely on computer technologies for many important functions ranging from airline reservations and ticketing to ship navigation and cargo handling. They also
perform important control functions for such diverse activities as air traffic, train systems, and traffic lights. This dependency has not gone unnoticed by terrorists, who are known to have launched attacks on airline ticketing and reservation systems as well as many other transportation related websites. Because of these characteristics, a large number of foreign and domestic actors are involved, creating complex issues of coordination. Much of the nation’s transportation infrastructure is owned and controlled by the private sector, whose relationship with government agencies has often been characterized more by conflict than cooperation. Yet such cooperation is essential if security policies and standards are to be effectively implemented and relevant investments carried out. Nor is the private sector homogenous. Similar considerations apply to the government side. Not only are many national level agencies involved with transportation (including the military) but numerous state and local agencies are also active participants in transportation policy and administration. Their involvement runs from local mass transit to state highways, each of which poses important security issues. Hence, vertical and horizontal cooperation among many agencies is required, an ever continuing challenge. US Policy: Development and Challenges These challenges became increasingly obvious as the need to safeguard the country’s critical infrastructure became a national priority. In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Directive 63 which called for taking various protective steps. Subsequently, in 2003, President Bush published a revised version (Homeland Security Policy Directive 7) which called for the production of a National Infrastructure Assistance Plan, later renamed the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (Collins, 2009). The plan was designed to create an integrated and unified strategy. The latest version (2009) contains 9 specific sectoral plans, the one on transportation systems is the longest at 288 pages. President Obama also recognized the importance of critical infrastructure protection and, when he campaigned for the presidency, called for a meaningful plan and specifically cited the following needs: improved airline passenger screening, a comprehensive and accurate watch list, and improved intelligence sharing between national and local units. Nevertheless, the attempted Xmas day bombing attack on NW flight 253 in 2009 revealed that those needs had not been met adequately—the bomber had been allowed to board the plane even though there was considerable intelligence information that he should not have been allowed to do so. The importance of intelligence in preventing terrorist attacks and the need to ensure that it function effectively is a lesson that should have been driven home by the 9/11 attack. In its 2004 report, the 9/11 Commission which was established to investigate the attack, criticized the functioning of the intelligence community. It stated (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 12): The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge. Overcoming these shortcomings has obviously proven to be no easy matter despite the rapid enactment of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that sought to unify the intelligence community and to promote intelligence sharing among the numerous agencies involved in intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. It established the post of Director of National Intelligence to oversee all intelligence activities and
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created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which houses the government’s central data bank on terrorists—the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). This is the source for all the ‘‘watch lists’’ which alert Transportation Security Administration officials to persons who are considered potential threats to aviation. Another agency, the FBI, however, also plays an important role. Its Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) reviewed the accuracy of the information calling for persons to be included in TIDE and compiles the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB). This is the main terrorist watch list consisting of about 400,000 names and is used by numerous agencies to establish their own lists. In transportation, there are two watch lists—the Secondary Security Screening Selection (Selectee) List containing about 14,000 persons and the No Fly List. Both are maintained by the FBI’s TSC. Furthermore, the CIA continued to play its traditional role and the DHS also had it own intelligence function (office of Intelligence and Analysis.) This redundancy was deliberately established but obviously did not yield the hoped for results. The two critical transportation watch lists were known to possess weaknesses, due in part to the flood of information that came into the TSC. Misidentifications were a common problem as exemplified by the case of 8 year old Mikey Hicks who has been subjected to thorough screening at airports for years because someone with the same name is a suspected terrorist. Altogether over 80,000 persons have requested that their names be removed from the watch list. Circumventing the list is also a simple matter. Mario Labbe, a Canadian executive who was often subjected to lengthy questioning, simply changed his name to Francois Mario Labbe and solved his problem. Supposedly such problems have been resolved because the airlines are now required to collect birth dates and gender as well as their names, and this information is checked by the TSA (Alvarez, 2010). The basic issue plaguing the successful application of the watch list approach was clearly not the lack of data but analysis and coordination. There was more than sufficient information available concerning Mr. Abdulmutallab, the Xmas day bomber, to have placed him, if not on the ‘‘no fly’’ list, at least on the ‘‘selectee’’ list. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) which studied the incident enumerated fourteen different points at which the appropriate action that would have placed him on a list was not taken and concluded ‘‘y.there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community (IC).’’ It highlighted the fact that, though the NCTC’s mission was to be the lead agency for analyzing and integrating all relevant intelligence, it ‘‘was not organized adequately to fulfill its mission’’ and ‘‘no one agency saw itself as being responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats.’’ (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2010). No one should have been surprised that the system broke down, for its basic weakness could have been and was, in fact, foreseen. A General Accountability Office report that studied screening procedures noted, in October 2007, a lack of clear lines of responsibility and authority. As a result, agencies did not check against all records, only with those that were consonant with their particular missions and all information from all sources was not analyzed because the computer technology only allowed individuals to be checked against some records. It concluded (GAO-08-110, 2007): A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because, the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan – supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure – for enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent with
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presidential directive. Currently, numerous existing entities have roles in watch list-related activities, including the Terrorist Screening Center, screening agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community. Following this incident, President Obama acted quickly to fix these problems which had plagued the intelligence community prior to 9/11 and were supposed to have been dealt with through the subsequent reforms. He announced changes in airline watch lists and screening procedures, complete analysis of every threat, rapid and extensive distribution of all reports, and changes in analytical procedures. (The White House, 2010). The effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen, but there is little doubt that the intelligence community has grown to such an extent (1271 government units and 1931 companies are involved in intelligence and related activities) that coordinating and integrating this complex system and assessing its effectiveness remains a daunting challenge (Priest and Arkin, 2010). The difficulties of doing so even within a single organization is illustrated by the case of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the agency that is ultimately responsible for protecting critical transportation and other infrastructure. It was created in 2002 in order to integrate the many different organizations involved in protecting the domestic infrastructure of the US, including transportation, into one Cabinet level agency. Altogether over 20 separate units were involved, with about 200,000 employees. Infrastructure protection was recognized to be one of its key responsibilities, along with emergency response and border and transportation security. It represented the largest governmental reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense after World War II. Given the need to assimilate and integrate a large number of agencies and personnel, each with its own structure and culture, creating an integrated and well functioning department would inevitably require considerable time, effort, and experimentation. Part of the problem that the DHS has had to deal with since its inception is its broad mandate so that its activities in many other areas besides intelligence often duplicated efforts in other agencies. At the federal level, these involve such agencies as the Departments of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense. Thus, the DHS has an intelligence unit, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) which is expected ‘‘to ensure that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the full spectrum of homeland security customers in the Department, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private sector, and in the IC.’’ (DHS, 2011 website). However, it shares responsibility with the Department of Justice for obtaining intelligence and disseminating it. Such duplication inevitably leads to turf battles, although the new Undersecretary undertook a review, based on the I&A’s goals and resources, which has led to important changes, including restructuring (DHS, 2010). The situation regarding cyber security is similar. The DHS was assigned considerable responsibility for this sector but the National Security Agency remained in charge of the military dimension. Furthermore, as part of his attempts to strengthen cyber security, President Obama appointed a new chief who would coordinate the many programs, develop a national strategy and report to the National Security Council. And, it also had to coordinate with state and local officials and work with the private sector, a critical element in any transportation infrastructure security program since so many of the facilities were controlled by the private sector. According to the Defense Science Board Task Force, it failed to do so, being unable to protect and share private sector information adequately. Perhaps the most damning indictment of the DHS; however, was the Board’s charge that DHS
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demonstrated little creative thinking (Department of Defense, 2007). This sentiment is shared by many experts who have criticized the DHS’s efforts to achieve security in transportation on many grounds including poor integration, waste, and an over reliance on technology. To cite but one recent example, the $4 billion DHS program to deploy nuclear detecting machines at ports and border crossings was deemed a failure because the machines were too large and the software inadequate. This debacle was due to poor oversight and the failure of the two DHS programs (Nuclear Detection and Customs and Border Protection) to communicate with each other (GAO-10-1041T, 2010). Its Transportation Security Administration (TSA) division also favors technological solutions. In an attempt to enhance the efficacy of passenger screening procedures highlighted by the Xmas day bombing attempt, it is replacing metal detectors with whole body imaging machines in the airports. These will be installed in 200 airports by the end of 2010 even though serious questions have been raised concerning their efficacy and privacy concerns. A March 2010 GAO report pointed out that these machines were being deployed even though the ‘‘TSA had not yet conducted an assessment of the technology’s vulnerabilities’’ (GAO-10-484T, 2010). Questions have also been raised about the degree to which such areas as general aviation, air cargo, and ground to air missiles (MANPADS) have received the attention they deserve. Moreover, many have pointed out that the TSA’s emphasis on aviation has occurred at the expense of other important elements of the transportation infrastructure, such as mass transportation and ports and shipping. The DHS has undergone a number of structural reorganizations designed to improve its effectiveness, but these have sometimes yielded unexpected negative consequences and have seldom yielded the desired result – the development of a resilient critical infrastructure – because these structural changes have not been accompanied by the cultural changes that are essential to effective organizational functioning. Hence, as noted above, the DHS has long been faulted for its failure to overcome numerous weaknesses, such as the limited integration between units and a lack of creativity. As one critic recently noted, although numerous proposals have been presented to DHS offices to improve resilience, the response has been largely dismissive. In his words: ‘‘rhetoric must be matched by results y. Absent change in organizational behavior, today’s efforts to protect America’s infrastructures will – at best – result only in maintenance of a totally unacceptable cyber and physical infrastructure status quo’’ (Gaynor, 2012). The shortcomings that have characterized the DHS, however, cannot be attributed solely to its administrators. As noted above, the magnitude of the challenges they faced was enormous. Furthermore, the DHS has struggled to deal with new challenges and controversies, such as those involving intelligence capabilities and its inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina. Accordingly, the DHS has struggled over the years to revise its management practices and has succeeded to the extent that, while administrative issues remain, it is today a better functioning department in terms of such areas as acquisitions, information technology, human resources, and finances and it continues to implement recommendations made by the General Accountability Office (GAO-10-911T, 2010). Even the DHS’s own ratings of its performance indicate how much remains to be done to achieve an ‘‘effective’’ level of security. 61 separate programs were evaluated with the following results: 10 were judged ‘‘effective’’, 21 ‘‘moderately effective’’, 17 ‘‘adequate’’ and 13 ‘‘unknown’’. The ‘‘unknown’’ category included infrastructure protection as well as cyber security and air cargo. That ‘‘disaster response’’ and ‘‘disaster recovery’’ were
both judged ‘‘adequate’’ also does not inspire confidence in the DHS, given the Hurricane Katrina disaster that occurred after this evaluation. (DHS, 2011). Congress should play a prominent role in enhancing the effectiveness of these programs, given its supervisory responsibilities. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Indeed, the efforts by DHS administrators to create a functional and effective department and to deal with the many problems they have had to confront, have been complicated by Congress, rather than facilitated, because of its Byzantine oversight structure—about 80 committees and sub-committees, as well as every senator and at least 412 of the 435 house members are involved in ‘‘homeland security’’ (The Washington Post, 2004). To call such an arrangement ‘‘complex’’ is to minimize the harm that it inflicts upon the ability of the DHS to safeguard critical infrastructure. It not only forces its administrators to spend an inordinate amount of time preparing testimony and delivering it to various committees but, given the balkanization of Congress, no strategic perspective on homeland security is ever developed. As a recent report by prominent ex-legislators noted: ‘‘The result is a Department of Homeland Security that is hamstrung by a system of Congressional oversight that drains departmental energy and invites managerial circumvention (The Washington Post, 2004) Sporadic reform efforts have not changed the system’s dysfunctional character’’. Meeting the Challenges Although numerous problems and issues such as this continue to limit the effectiveness of efforts to secure the transportation infrastructure, there is no doubt that important steps have been taken during the past decade, especially the continuing development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. At the same time, one cannot minimize what remains to be done. The fact that the transportation system is in poor physical state and imposes heavy costs is a liability to passengers and freight, and as noted above possesses major negative security implications. However, the very fact that so much needs to be done presents an opportunity to rebuild, expand and manage the system using criteria that will enhance its security. Thus the first priority should be to develop a national plan based on sound design principles. Such a plan will obviously not be easy to produce. It will require collaboration across modes and organizations at many levels. Above all, a systems perspective is essential, one that considers all the dimensions involved—planning, design, implementation and operation. Security involves more than a sound infrastructure; it also requires effective management. This point is incorporated in the ‘‘guiding principles’’ of The American Society of Civil Engineers: (1) employ an integrated systems approach, (2) adapt to dynamic conditions and practice, (3) quantify, communicate, manage risk, and (4) exercise sound leadership, management and stewardship (ASCE, 2009). Another recent study was more specific, calling for a focus on high risk infrastructure, an emphasis on resiliency, an expansion of education, awareness, training and research, enhanced international cooperative efforts, and the importance of making every effort to develop a coherent Congressional oversight system (McNeill and Weitz, 2010). Again, it is clear that securing the transportation system requires more than a focus on simply rebuilding infrastructure. Obviously, an integrated approach to enhancing the security of the existing transportation infrastructure is required, but so is a new framework. The US has, as noted above, devoted enormous financial and human resources to intelligence, screening and related activities, in an effort to prevent a successful attack. Although measures designed to do so are obviously an essential element in any comprehensive strategy because prevention yields the most desirable outcome – the attack is foiled – this focus,
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because of the many complexities involved, including a constant evolution in the skills, ncapabilities, and target selection by the terrorists, can never be completely successful. nAccordingly, there has been a growing recognition of the importance of adding a new ndimension, that of resiliency, which enables the system to absorb the consequences of an attack with minimal damage and to recover quickly (Jackson, 2008). The importance of a resilient transportation system is highlighted during disasters where the need for restoring passenger and traffic flows becomes a priority. The 1989 San Francisco earthquake, for example, caused the collapse of a section of the bridge connecting the city to Oakland, leading to numerous traffic jams as drivers sought alternative routes,. Fortunately, the existence of a metro system (BART) which served the area, ameliorated the situation to some degree by providing an alternative mode. On the other hand, Hurricane Katrina (2005) which devastated much of New Orleans, demonstrated even more vividly the shortcomings of the existing transportation system and the importance of a resilient system for evacuation and recovery. In the words of the authors of a detailed case study of the impact of the hurricane: ‘‘This Post-Katrina New Orleans Case Study demonstrates the value of resiliency as an operative framework for decision making at all levels of government and across all modes of transportation.’’ (Amdal and Swigart, 2010). Most scholars agree that ‘‘resiliency’’ is an important dimension of an effective and efficient transportation system and some have even argued that resiliency is a characteristic of ‘‘a secure and highly functioning transportation network’’ (Chen and Miller-Hooks. 2012). However, it is no easy matter to define and operationalize this concept because it encompasses not only planning and design but the operation of the system. Thus, despite the efforts of many scholars to develop a precise conceptualization that would permit measurement, the challenge remains (Chilan et al., 2009; Cox, Andrew et al., 2011). Still, Murray-Tuite and Pamela (2006) has developed a useful taxonomy which contains ten dimensions: redundancy, diversity, efficiency, autonomous components: strength, collaboration, adaptability, mobility, safety, and rapid recovery. Bruneau and Reinhorn (2006) offer a different conceptualization with four: Robustness, Redundancy, Resourcefulness, Rapidity. Nevertheless, despite such disagreements about the dimensions of ‘‘resiliency’’, it is possible to identify two dimensions that are generally accepted as being of particular significance— ‘‘robustness’’ and ‘‘redundancy’’. Robustness has been defined as ‘‘the strength, or the ability of elements, systems, and other measures of analysis to withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering degradation or loss of function’’. This has two dimensions—the engineering component and the human resources (the operators, users, and regulators) who are involved with the infrastructure. The latter includes such dimensions as collaboration, adaptability, and resourcefulness. These are, of course,n integral parts of a resilient system—and often difficult to achieve. Even today the transportation network in New Orleans ‘‘still lacks adequate communication and coordination across modes. Coordination and communication remains especially problematic among the freight transportation community’’ (Amdal and Swigart,2010). Redundancy involves creating excess infrastructural capacity so that if one part of the system is destroyed, alternatives are available to enable mobility to be maintained. Experts agree that a certain amount of redundancy is essential to ensure the resiliency of a system. Indeed the National Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission in its final report, not only emphasized the importance of redundancy but went so far as to equate it with resiliency. It wrote: ‘‘Transportation system redundancy is the resiliency that enables
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the system to compensate for losses and allows the system to function even when infrastructure is damaged or destroyed.’’ (my emphasis). It continues: ‘‘For a transportation system at risk of disruption, availability of excess capacity provides redundancy which is needed not only for infrastructure and evacuation but also for the national transportation network. If there is no redundancy, there is greater risk to a transportation system. Redundancy is essential for daily system management and operations but is crucial during a disaster.’’ Clearly, costs are involved in implementing this concept (and these may be very large involving both direct and indirect financial and other expenses). Nevertheless, it is essential to expand the usual focus of the planning process beyond narrowly defined ‘‘efficiency’’ by conceptualizing ‘‘efficiency’’ in the context of a resilient transportation system. Applying this approach does not mean that costs should be ignored, though they may be less than anticipated for as one expert, Bob Bourne, has noted: ‘‘Redundancy is not favored by policy makers and can add to costs. However, a system with excess capacity will perform well in times of crisis and will provide additional service during normal times.’’(cited in Husdal, 2011). Making rigorous assessments of the costs and benefits in building such capacity is obviously required and experts have, in fact, suggested methodologies that permit us to do so, at least in a preliminary way (Jackson, Chapter 4, 2008).
2. Conclusion Many scholars and expert practitioners have analyzed the state of the nation’s critical infrastructure and its security requirements. There is essential agreement on what needs to be done; namely, that a coherent national plan be designed and implemented. Unfortunately, it is not at all evident that the existing American political system can function in such a manner. Thus the question arises—what can be done if the existing transportation system is allowed to continue in essentially its present state or even deteriorate further. In such a situation, the role of the DHS becomes more important than ever. If we are unable to develop a more resilient transportation system, then every effort has to be made to improve the operation of the existing system, so as to at least deal with the ‘‘human’’ side of resilience—work to improve communications and coordination, to enhance the ‘‘resourcefulness’’ of all the actors involved. In any effort to ensure that the existing infrastructure is secure, the DHS (2011) obviously has an important role nto play. Though it, too, requires attention for its weaknesses including its limited effectiveness in managing risk, there are important signs that it is becoming a more effective and efficient agency, a development that would be greatly facilitated by a more coherent Congressional oversight system. Whether the political leadership will demonstrate the will and ability to make such a change, to develop appropriate policies, and to allocate adequate resources for their implementation, remains to be seen. While it is impossible to guarantee security, there is no doubt that terrorists continue to plan attacks and that it is incumbent upon national leaders to develop strategies and plans that will foil such attempts. And, if one should tragically succeed, the infrastructure should be able to continue to function effectively and a well prepared response plan should minimize the human tragedy that will inevitably result.
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