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Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS ARTICLE NO.
26, 833– 835 (1998)
JE981535
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 368 pp., index, $26.00. This is a provocative book. The front flap on the book cover states that it is an outgrowth of a Foreign Affairs article that generated more response than any article published by the journal since George Kenan’s “X” article in the late 1940s. Huntington presents a vision of the post-Cold War world, sweeping in scope and controversial in its political implications. He presents what he believes will be a paradigm for a post-Cold War world where it no longer makes sense to think in terms of dividing the world among the West, the Communist Block, and the Third World. Huntington argues that “culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world (p. 20).” Furthermore, “modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies (p. 20).” Greater cooperation will occur between countries in the same civilization. Conflicts will occur between civilizations, often on the boundaries between civilizations as in Bosnia or between Azeris and Armenians. Huntington is a political scientist and the focus of the book is clearly directed toward explaining political change. But the thesis also has important implications for economic development and the role that the West may play in the world economy. Huntington admits that there is pressure to modernize economically. The question is whether this can be done within the context of existing cultural norms or whether westernization must be part of the bargain. Leaders in countries such as Turkey have decided that social changes are essential. The rise of the Asian “tigers” suggests an alternative model without Westernization. (The book was written before the Asian crisis when some Asian leaders claimed that the Asian model was superior to the Western model.) The rise of Muslim political parties in Turkey supports the contention that forcing cultural changes can be difficult. Of concern to Huntington is that “[t]he West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations (p. 20).” Huntington focuses on events such as the Gulf War to make his point, but as the Asian crisis illustrates, these issues also arise in the economic sphere. For example, the IMF might have pursued a less politically sensitive strategy in Korea where IMF 833
0147-5967/98 $25.00 Copyright © 1998 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
834
BOOK REVIEWS
reforms run counter to many existing norms, which have served Korea well until this juncture. Similar issues arise in the course of transition. Transition countries need more technical assistance from international organizations than Asian countries have received, but what should be the nature of that assistance? Should the advice be different when transition countries are in different civilizations? Huntington’s thesis has been attacked from many directions. For example, there are those who argue that nation states are the dominant political force; others find that his division of the world map is inappropriate or that focusing on civilizations ignores recent changes and improved world communication. There is additional concern that if such a world view is adopted, “clashes” are more likely (Ikenberry, Smith, Howell, and Nussbaum, 1997). Perceptions of global political divisions can have a profound effect on the study of comparative economics. These political divisions during the Cold War in part defined disciplines within economics. While most economists studied Western economies, comparative economists studied communist economies and development economists studied the Third World. With the end of the Cold War many economists are now asking whether there is a substantial difference between development economics and transition economics. At some point will it be important to separate Islamic economic scholars from Orthodox economic scholars? Many of the fundamental issues studied by comparative economists are related directly to the Huntington thesis. Comparative economists have been more concerned than many other economists about whether cultural differences matter. In the transition to market economies should there be an expectation that Western cultural values will also be adopted? Will the transition process be defined by cultural values? If so, will the transition process differ significantly across the countries going through transition? Can modernization occur without the eventual adoption of Western cultural values? Any analysis of these questions will depend on the civilizational divides. Huntington divides the world into nine civilizations. Outside of Western civilization most of the divisions are along religious lines. The 28 countries going through transition fall into four different civilizations. China and Vietnam are in the Sinic civilization along with Taiwan and the Koreas. He places Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in the Islamic civilization with Middle Eastern and north African countries. Also included in the Islamic civilization are Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Perhaps the most interesting division from the standpoint of the transition is his division between the Orthodox and Western civilizations. His map (p. 159) is based on the eastern boundary of Western civilization about 1500. The line cuts north–south and includes the Baltic countries, western Belarus, and the western part of the Ukraine in Western civilization. The boundary of Western civilization then extends part way into Romania and turns westward capturing northwestern
BOOK REVIEWS
835
Romania, northern Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. This division places most of the Balkans (including Greece) and the remaining republics and territories of the former Soviet Union in the Orthodox camp. Categories matter. In the present transition discussion, perhaps the most common division is between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, with the Baltics treated as a special case. This categorization is based on more recent history and more or less reflects the length of the communist central planning period and the beginning of the transition in each country. Which is more important: recent history or a division that existed in 1500? I would argue that, while not perfect, Huntington’s division between Western civilization and Orthodoxy provides a reasonably good prediction of relative success in the transition, comparable to the distinction between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. If we look at the other civilizational divisions, the Central Asian countries in Huntington’s Islamic civilization are performing poorly, but so are most of the other former Soviet republics. The economic success in China and Vietnam are in a category by themselves. In the post-Cold War era the U.S. needs to define a new vision for its foreign policy. This book is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate about that vision. Our perception of world political arrangements will continue to influence our views of economic events. Huntington’s book provides a valuable political perspective for comparative economists. REFERENCE Ikenberry, G. John, Smith, Tony, Howell, David, and Nussbaum, Bruce, “The West: Precious, Not Unique—Civilizations Make for a Poor Paradigm.” Foreign Affairs, March/ April, 162–166 1997. [Responses]
Jeffrey B. Miller Department of Economics University of Delaware Newark, Delaware 19716
26, 833– 835 (1998)
JE981535
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 368 pp., index, $26.00. This is a provocative book. The front flap on the book cover states that it is an outgrowth of a Foreign Affairs article that generated more response than any article published by the journal since George Kenan’s “X” article in the late 1940s. Huntington presents a vision of the post-Cold War world, sweeping in scope and controversial in its political implications. He presents what he believes will be a paradigm for a post-Cold War world where it no longer makes sense to think in terms of dividing the world among the West, the Communist Block, and the Third World. Huntington argues that “culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world (p. 20).” Furthermore, “modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies (p. 20).” Greater cooperation will occur between countries in the same civilization. Conflicts will occur between civilizations, often on the boundaries between civilizations as in Bosnia or between Azeris and Armenians. Huntington is a political scientist and the focus of the book is clearly directed toward explaining political change. But the thesis also has important implications for economic development and the role that the West may play in the world economy. Huntington admits that there is pressure to modernize economically. The question is whether this can be done within the context of existing cultural norms or whether westernization must be part of the bargain. Leaders in countries such as Turkey have decided that social changes are essential. The rise of the Asian “tigers” suggests an alternative model without Westernization. (The book was written before the Asian crisis when some Asian leaders claimed that the Asian model was superior to the Western model.) The rise of Muslim political parties in Turkey supports the contention that forcing cultural changes can be difficult. Of concern to Huntington is that “[t]he West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations (p. 20).” Huntington focuses on events such as the Gulf War to make his point, but as the Asian crisis illustrates, these issues also arise in the economic sphere. For example, the IMF might have pursued a less politically sensitive strategy in Korea where IMF 833
0147-5967/98 $25.00 Copyright © 1998 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
834
BOOK REVIEWS
reforms run counter to many existing norms, which have served Korea well until this juncture. Similar issues arise in the course of transition. Transition countries need more technical assistance from international organizations than Asian countries have received, but what should be the nature of that assistance? Should the advice be different when transition countries are in different civilizations? Huntington’s thesis has been attacked from many directions. For example, there are those who argue that nation states are the dominant political force; others find that his division of the world map is inappropriate or that focusing on civilizations ignores recent changes and improved world communication. There is additional concern that if such a world view is adopted, “clashes” are more likely (Ikenberry, Smith, Howell, and Nussbaum, 1997). Perceptions of global political divisions can have a profound effect on the study of comparative economics. These political divisions during the Cold War in part defined disciplines within economics. While most economists studied Western economies, comparative economists studied communist economies and development economists studied the Third World. With the end of the Cold War many economists are now asking whether there is a substantial difference between development economics and transition economics. At some point will it be important to separate Islamic economic scholars from Orthodox economic scholars? Many of the fundamental issues studied by comparative economists are related directly to the Huntington thesis. Comparative economists have been more concerned than many other economists about whether cultural differences matter. In the transition to market economies should there be an expectation that Western cultural values will also be adopted? Will the transition process be defined by cultural values? If so, will the transition process differ significantly across the countries going through transition? Can modernization occur without the eventual adoption of Western cultural values? Any analysis of these questions will depend on the civilizational divides. Huntington divides the world into nine civilizations. Outside of Western civilization most of the divisions are along religious lines. The 28 countries going through transition fall into four different civilizations. China and Vietnam are in the Sinic civilization along with Taiwan and the Koreas. He places Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in the Islamic civilization with Middle Eastern and north African countries. Also included in the Islamic civilization are Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Perhaps the most interesting division from the standpoint of the transition is his division between the Orthodox and Western civilizations. His map (p. 159) is based on the eastern boundary of Western civilization about 1500. The line cuts north–south and includes the Baltic countries, western Belarus, and the western part of the Ukraine in Western civilization. The boundary of Western civilization then extends part way into Romania and turns westward capturing northwestern
BOOK REVIEWS
835
Romania, northern Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. This division places most of the Balkans (including Greece) and the remaining republics and territories of the former Soviet Union in the Orthodox camp. Categories matter. In the present transition discussion, perhaps the most common division is between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, with the Baltics treated as a special case. This categorization is based on more recent history and more or less reflects the length of the communist central planning period and the beginning of the transition in each country. Which is more important: recent history or a division that existed in 1500? I would argue that, while not perfect, Huntington’s division between Western civilization and Orthodoxy provides a reasonably good prediction of relative success in the transition, comparable to the distinction between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. If we look at the other civilizational divisions, the Central Asian countries in Huntington’s Islamic civilization are performing poorly, but so are most of the other former Soviet republics. The economic success in China and Vietnam are in a category by themselves. In the post-Cold War era the U.S. needs to define a new vision for its foreign policy. This book is an interesting contribution to the ongoing debate about that vision. Our perception of world political arrangements will continue to influence our views of economic events. Huntington’s book provides a valuable political perspective for comparative economists. REFERENCE Ikenberry, G. John, Smith, Tony, Howell, David, and Nussbaum, Bruce, “The West: Precious, Not Unique—Civilizations Make for a Poor Paradigm.” Foreign Affairs, March/ April, 162–166 1997. [Responses]
Jeffrey B. Miller Department of Economics University of Delaware Newark, Delaware 19716