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Santa Marta
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Cities, Vol. 14, No. 6, pp. 393-402. 1997
Pergamon
PII: S0264-2751(97)00036-X
© 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0264-2751/97 $17.00 + 0.00
City profile
Santa Marta Peter Kellett Centre for Architectural Research and Development Overseas, Department of Architecture, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne NEI 7RU, UK (e-mail [email protected])
Santa Marta is the regional capital of the Department of Magdalena in northern Colombia, with an urban population of over 210 000. Although it is the oldest city in the country with a long and auspicious history, it has been unable to compete effectively with the neighbouring coastal cities of Cartagena and Baranquilla and is now only the fifteenth largest city in the country. It is characterised by low levels of industrial and commercial activity and correspondingly high levels of informality, both within the economy and housing sectors. This profile will examine the historical development of the city over the preceding five centuries to identify the factors which have played a central role in defining its character and situation. In particular the factors which have led to the dominance of squatting as a housing option for the poor will be examined. This includes a detailed examination of the low-income housing market and the role of political patronage in settlement processes. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Keywords: Colombia, informal housing, urban history, housing markets
A Spanish colonial port For several centuries the indigenous Taironas developed a complex and technically sophisticated civilisation on the Caribbean coast of what today is the Republic of Colombia. They were organised in a loose federation of states with hundreds of small urban centres located at different ecological niches to effectively exploit the rich variety of natural resources available between the steep mountain slopes and coastal valleys (Mayr, 1984; Herrera, 1987). Their world was to change irrevocably with the arrival of the Spanish ships which explored the coastline in 1499, and noted the deep, protected, natural harbour and long sandy beaches in the shadow of the snow-capped mountains rising to over 19 000 feet behind. In 1524 the Sevillian explorer Don Rodrigo de Bastidas returned to this same bay to found the first permanent Spanish settlement in the territory which today is Colombia. In July 1525
the 'city' of Santa Marta was duly established as a collection of simple huts around a square, and shortly after became the seat of the first Bishopric of the Reino de Nueva Granada (White, 1971, p 1). Later it became famous as the place where the great liberator Simon Bolivar died in 1830, and as the region where the novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez was born. New urban settlements were founded by the Spanish throughout the New World on a scale with few historical parallels, largely because the colonial city was an essential component in the colonial project, acting as the centre of power and domination both during the colonisation process and later in the administration of the conquered lands and peoples (Hardoy, 1982). However the Caribbean coast did not become the focus for settlement as the invading Spaniards were drawn southwards towards the Andes mountains in search of the source of gold and other minerals, more healthy climates, more fer-
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tile lands and a compliant native workforce. At first the coastal ports of Santa Marta and Cartagena acted as points of departure for these various expeditions (Lucerna Salmoral, 1988), but later they became trading ports for the expanding colonial settlements in the mountains hundreds of miles inland. The coastal region itself became sparsely populated: the indigenous indian tribes were gradually pushed out of the best lands, and were replaced by a small number of very large haciendas (Aparicio, 1978; Colmenares, 1978; Posada, 1983; Wade, 1985). The very high concentration of land in a few hands is still typical of the region today: in 1970 in Magdatena, 20% of landowners controlled 85% of the agricultural land (Departamento del Magdalena, 1983, p 49). Cartagena de Indias, 200 km along the coast, was founded in 1533. It soon overtook Santa Marta and became the principal port for the whole of South America, dominating the trade in gold
City Profile and slaves, as well as becoming the seat of the Inquisition (Nichols, 1973, p 27). The two cities were growing slowly in size and competing fiercely for whatever trade was available. The Magdalena river running northwards was an obvious natural means of communication, but was treacherously difficult to navigate around its mouth. Competing attempts to find alternative by-pass routes avoiding the mouth were sponsored by Cartagena and Santa Marta with limited success. A third city, Barranquilla, grew rapidly especially during the 20th century when the problems of navigating the Magdalena river were largely resolved and steam navigation increased, facilitating communication with the interior. Barranquilla is now the fourth largest city in the country. The competition and growth of Cartagena and later Barranquilla have had a significant impact on the development of Santa Marta, which has lost out in terms of shipping and industry. The problem of linking Santa Marta with the interior was not satisfactorily solved until the 1950s when the national rail network eventually joined the 1 000 km between Santa Marta and BogotL and around the same time the road system was improved significantly.
The growth of population The population of the city did not grow consistently, indeed there were periods when the number of inhabitants declined dramatically despite relatively buoyant trade (Table 1). In addition, the nineteenth century was marked by considerable civil conflict and unrest culminating in the War of a Thousand Days between 1899 and 1904. The marked drop in population in the middle of the century can be accounted for by a series of natural disasters including earthquakes and tremors, floods and cholera epidemics (Nichols, 1973, pp 155 and 157).
Bananas and United Fruit In the 1880s the economic situation of the Santa Marta region changed as large scale foreign capital arrived to develop the plantation production of bananas for export (White, 1971, p 12).
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Table 1 The' Growth of Population of Santa Marta Year
Population
1823 1829 1834 1843 1851 1870 1905 1918 1928 1938 1951 1964 1973 1985 1993
approx 4500 7000 12082 11393 5774 5000 9568 18040 30942 33245 37005 89161 115238 177922 210915
Years 1823-1938: Nichols (1973, p 293) Years 1951-1973: FNPD (1977, anexo 1.1) Year 1985: DANE (1986, vol 1, p 18) Year 1993: DANE (1993) diskette
A railway was begun in 1882, intended to link Santa Marta with the Magdalena river, but it soon became much more important in facilitating the efficient transport of bananas to the port, which was itself improved (see Fig. 1). The United Fruit Company (UFC) (based in the USA) soon established a monopoly over land, irrigation systems, production and transport. This enclave economy based on monoculture for export was able to exploit the conditions which were previously disadvantageous, firstly the relative isolation and secondly the absence of local industry. This meant that labour was plentiful and cheap: indeed plantation wages were half those paid in Costa Rica (White, 1971, p 24; Nichols, 1973, p 254). After the civil war ended in 1904 there was a real banana boom, and by 1910 the UFC not only dominated the Santa Marta banana zone, but also 80% of the world market (White, 1971, p 19). The banana zone and the railway gradually extended southwards towards Sevilla, Aracataca and Fundacion. In 1928 a famous strike began of plantation workers seeking improved wages and working conditions. It soon spread and thousands of workers halted the export of bananas and hence the whole economy of the region. It ended tragically as the UFC and some local producers requested help from the army to break the strike. Reports vary, but
between 1 500 and 3 000 people were shot or killed in the 'reign of terror' which followed (White, 1971; Nichols, 1973; Aparicio, 1978; Los Comuneros, nd). It was a historic setback for worker's rights and union activities and had significant repercussions nationally. After the strike the UFC continued to buy land: between t926 and 1931 local producers lost up to 80% of their collective land holdings to the UFC (White, 1971, p 117). However after 1940 the company slowly began winding down operations and gradually sold land and withdrew completely in 1966 but no new industry of any size came to the area to replace the banana plantations: "...it was a region whose economy had partially collapsed with the exit of foreign capital" (White, 1971, p 132). This led to many workers migrating to the urban centres, particularly to Barranquilla which by this time had established itself not merely as the largest port in the country, but also as an important centre of industry and commerce (Casas and Uribe-Echevarria, 1985, p 99).
Buried treasure In the early 1970s a new coastal road was built linking Santa Marta with Rioacha and Venezuela. This made accessible the previously isolated northern slopes of the Sierra Nevada mountains, attracting colonists from different parts of Colombia intending to create agricultural subsistence small holdings, but who could quickly make sizeable profits through the illegal cultivation of marijuana. ~ At the same time, the opening up of the previously impenetrable forests soon led to the discovery of the ancient burial sites and settlements of the Tairona indians, who buried beautiful gold artefacts with their deceased elders. Dreams became reality: fortunes and lives were made and lost. The drug and gold 'bonanza' had a major impact on Santa Marta as the nearest urban centre: prices of all basic ~"By the 1970s there were an estimated 6000 producers in the Sierra Nevada, employing 13000 rural labourers. One study suggests that 30000 families depended totally or partially on Marjiuana" (Pearce, 1990, p 127).
City Profile
Figure 1
Aerial view of Santa Marta in 1987 (source: Instituto Agustin Codazzi).
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City Profile goods rose rapidly, to the detriment of the majority of urban dwellers whose incomes had not benefited, but there was no significant investment in industry, and there were few visible benefits to the city. When the 'bubble' inevitably burst in the early 1980s many businesses collapsed as they had extended credit too far (Departamento del Magdalena, 1983, p 168). Manufacturing activity fell: in 1974 there were 20 industrial companies (mostly light manufacturing) employing 1 379 people, but by 1980 this had dropped to 15 employing 1 270 (DANE/Camara de Comercio, 1982, p 25). The absence of formal sector employment opportunities was becoming more critical as the population rose. Between 1973 and 1983 the population increased by 44%, but no parallel sources of employment were being created, indeed there is evidence that business was contracting. The 'raison d'&re' for the foundation of the city was the natural harbour, but the port lacked the necessary modern investment and continued to be in a weak position to compete with Barranquilla. Despite this, it remains an important source of local employment and has recently managed to increase trade, partly with the export of coal from the large open-cast mine of E1 Cerrejon in the neighbouring Guajira.
Tourist potential The city and its surrounding region have considerable tourist potential. At present tourism is a major source of economic activity, particularly with the expansion of the beach resort of E1 Rodadero, immediately to the south of the main part of the city. Many new hotels and apartment buildings have been constructed there since the 1960s when a new access road was constructed. Despite this increase in tourist facilities, Santa Marta was again unable to compete with the historic city of Cartagena, which has benefited from the growth in the national tourist industry as well as attracting overseas tourists. Although there are a few very significant monuments, such as the Quinta de San Pedro Alejandrina where Simon Bolivar died, the remaining colonial and republican buildings are not of the quality of those found in Cartagena. However the beaches and outstanding
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natural landscapes close to the city, such as the Parque Tairona, mean that Santa Marta can offer the tourist a range of opportunities not available in Cartagena. Despite this, Cartagena continues to be dominant, and national investment has added to the imbalance: during the 1970s Magdalena received barely a quarter of the amount invested in the Department of Bolivar (Cartagena is the capital) by the National Tourist Corporation (Departamento del Magdalena, 1983, p 172). In 1983 there were 44 registered hotels in Santa Marta and El Rodadero, but as tourism is a seasonal activity, it is an erratic source of employment. Relatively few people find employment in industry or commerce, although the situation has been improving recently as several new industries have been attracted to the city, partly through incentives linked to the new 'Zona Franca'. The majority of urban dwellers are not formally employed but obtain income through a range of 'informal' activities. High levels of unemployment, well in excess of the national average, are a feature of Santa Marta. Robles Porto (1989, p 5) states that the unemployment rate in the city has exceeded 20% for over 15 years, reaching a peak of 24.1% in 1986, whereas the national figure has been between 9 and 13%. He also states that the commercial/service sector accounts for 91.6% of formal employment, and highlights the high dependency on the local state as an employer: 40% of all employment, compared to 34.6% in the informal sector and 25.5% in the private sector. The weak economy of the Magdalena region is shown in figures contrasting population with economic performance: the Department of Magdalena has 3.5% of the national population but contributes only 2% of GDP, and as a consequence incomes are lower in Magdalena than the national or regional averages (Departamento dei Magdalena, 1983, pp 43 and 46). A key limiting factor which is raised in connection with housing conditions, manufacturing industry and tourism, is the problem of water shortage, both in the city and the coastal region generally. The following section outlines the physical growth of the city and examines the impact of
these economic conditions and employment patterns on the housing market and living conditions of residents in the informal settlements which are the dominant form of housing supply.
The growth of Santa Marta Santa Marta is one of the earliest Spanish colonial settlements in the New World. It was founded before the detailed instructions which determined the standard planning of all new settlements were codified by royal decree in 1573 (Hardoy, 1982, p 24; Kostof, 1991, p 114), but almost certainly the central square would have been defined. Around the square the civic, ecclesiastic and military authorities would be located. This small ruling elite would have lived with their servants in large houses surrounding or close to the main square; humbler houses of artisans, small merchants and minor officials would be located around them (Hardoy, 1982, p 26) (see Fig. 2). The lower income workers, mestizos and indians, would have built their own dwellings farther away, almost certainly in perishable materials, echoing the present day practice of self-help informal construction. The square, cathedral and a few streets of houses from the colonial and republican periods remain, some in good condition, and the centre of the city is still where most commercial activity is focused. For over 400 years the city was very small and compact, and with few exceptions was confined within a small area defined by the sea to the west, a small river to the south, hills to the north and in the late 19th century by the railway to the east. Later the railway was re-routed well outside the built up area and the old line became a road. During the 1960s the population and the size of the city began to increase rapidly and by the 1980s the city had again expanded beyond the railway line. A high percentage of this new urban growth has taken place outside the formal planning procedures, mostly as a result of organised invasions of land followed by individual processes of progressive development of the dwellings. Successive planning administrations have had to redraw the urban boundary to accord with the reality on the ground.
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Figure 2
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Colonial Santa Marta: plan of the city in 1793 (source: CEHOPU, 1989, p 112)
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City Profile
North
T Caribbean
El Rodadero
Santa Maria R
builtup areas
I
squatter areas ( i.e began at invasions)
Figure 3 Map of Santa Marta indicating location of invasion settlements (source: based on data from the Municipal Planning Dept).
Invasion settlements Figure 3 identifies the location of such in~hsion settlements, and the areas w~ch have developed on the edge of both informal and formal settlements through individual processes of accretion. Although many such settlements are located in areas of potentially low commercial value a high proportion are found on flat land close to the centre of the city, on the edge of major roads, and are laid out following the standard orthogonal planning conventions of calles and carreras, forming blocks of standard size and leaving areas for public open space and facilities (see Figs 4 and 5). Invasion settlements have a long history in Santa Marta: two settlements were formed prior to 1920, and seven others before 1940. The number increased significantly from the 1960s onwards, and by 1991, over 106 invasion settlements had been recorded. It is clear that such informal housing
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processes house the majority of residents in the city, and that for the lowincome population it is the 'conventional' method of housing provision. In 1989 the Director of the Municipal Planning Department calculated that 74% of the population of the city were housed in settlements which began as invasions.2 Why are invasions the dominant form of new settlement formation in Santa Marta? In Colombia there is considerable variation in housing markets between different cities: in some, invasion settlements are virtually nonexistent. Gilbert (1981, p 662) identifies six factors which are believed to impact on the relative level of invasion activity: political patronage, land ownership patterns, the effectiveness of official action against squatters, the availability of alternative forms of land 2Information given in an interview with the author, April 1989.
acquisition, the presence of a rental sub-market and the strength of prevailing traditions. We will now discuss these in turn in the context of Santa Marta.
Political patronage One of the key factors determining the opportunities and constraints facing low-income populations is the strong patron-client inter linkages which operate at many levels of society in Colombia. Burgess (1986, p 37) defines patron--client relationships as being where "political and personal loyalty are exchanged by the client for access to the resources controlled by the patron in the state administration, political party or other organisation representing power and authority. A patron-client relationship is typically non-symmetrical... (and) the individuals involved are unequal in terms of access to the scarce goods and services
Ci~ Profile
Figure 4
View of Santa Marta looking towards the centre of the city. The port is on the extreme right of the picture.
Figure 5 Invasion settlement in the process of consolidation. Improvised dwellings and others built in permanent materials are visible. (Both photographs by the author) that are expected to be exchanged." Such relationships are crucial to explaining the various stages of formation and development of invasion settlements. In many cases, a political leader will encourage the formation of
a new settlement, and use his influence to prevent forceful removal by the authorities. He will commonly do this in exchange for electoral support, and then use his contacts and influence with the various municipal authorities and
service agencies to provide preferential access to infrastructure services (Burgess, 1986; Cuervo, 1988). For example the invasion settlement, Barrio Nacho Vives which "was founded in May 1960 by the politicians
399
City Profile Dr Ignacio Vives Echeverria and Dr Rafael Perez Davila. The land was the property of the Municipality before the invasion" (ICT, 1978, p 10). 3 Here the settlers adopted the name of one of their patrons when naming the settlement and under his powerful patronage the settlement has consolidated steadily despite its unfavourable position between the railway and the hills. Nacho Vives has held political office for many years in different capacities: for much of his political career he has been a Senator, and in 1990 was elected as Mayor for the city. There is a very close interrelationship between kin networks and political affiliation. Nacho Vives is part of the Vives political clan. When he was forced to resign as Mayor he was succeeded by a nephew Alvaro Ordofiez Vives. His two predecessors were also his cousins: Alfonso Vives Campo and Edgardo Vives Campo (also a Senator, former Governor and Director of the local paper E1 Informador, and Mayor again in the mid 1990s). Juan Carlos Vives Menotti is a member of the House of Representatives. Such political dynasties are a common feature of politics at all levels within Colombia, but it is the linkage between political power and administrative office which is especially revealing at local level. For example governors and mayors appoint key officials within the Department and Municipal authorities, and quite understandably such appointments go to those who belong to the same political line and who, frequently are also related. This can be illustrated by the Diazgranados family, another influential Santa Marta family with large landowning and commercial interests since colonial times. In addition to high profile political figures such as Jose Ignacio Diazgranados who has been Senator for many years and a Minister in the national government, several members of the family have been appointed to crucial offices within 3In Colombia the title 'Doctor' is frequently used by those who have a University education. In this case Nacho Vives Echeverria is a lawyer, so it is ironic that he is active in encouraging others to break the law. Indeed he broke it himself, and was forced to step down as Mayor because the Supreme Court confirmed that he was not eligible to hold public office.
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the local administration. These include the Secretaria de Planeacion Departamental, the Junta de Planeacion Municipal, the President of the local Chamber of Commerce and the Director General of Municipal Planning. Perhaps the most visible sign of such close patron-client interlinkages between low income communities and the politicians, is the frequent naming of settlements after the local politicians who have supported (and it is hoped will continue to support) the settlement. Examples of such settlements include: Goenaga, Perez Davila, Nacho Vives, Juan Carlos Vives, Edgardo Vives, Miguel Pineda and Cesar Mendoza. Such naming is no coincidence, and the names reflect and reinforce dominant political and economic interests. We may conclude that such relationships are a key factor in explaining the large scale and continuance of invasion settlements in the city.
Patterns of land ownership In situations where land prices are high and where ownership rights are clear, invasions are less likely to take place. This is true in Bogotfi where invasions are few, whereas in Santa Marta much of the undeveloped land surrounding the city is of low agricultural potential (requiring irrigation to be productive) and because there are many areas of disputed land rights. Absence of title or ambiguity of ownership has been exploited by invasion organisers. Invasions take place on both privately and publicly owned land. In the example given above of Barrio Nacho Vives, the invaded land was owned by the Municipality, who as a heavily politicised corporate institution is often in a weak position to press sufficiently firmly to evict squatters.
Official action against squatters Despite clarity in the law which upholds property rights, action by the police on behalf of owners is inconsistent throughout the country. Gilbert (1981, p 662) describes how in Bogotfi the police usually act promptly and effectively to remove squatters within the stipulated 30 days after notification.
However in Santa Marta, police action has been sporadic, frequently halfhearted and sometimes violent. A settler involved in one invasion commented that the police action continued "until the owners ran out of money to be able to keep paying the chief of police. ''4 This certainly underlines the perception amongst low-income settlers that the police are not independent of political or commercial interests. Although many invasions are repulsed initially and may require several attempts before succeeding, no reports were located of invasions which had been demolished or cleared following effective action through the courts. This is no doubt because in many cases powerful and influential backers are on hand. For example in the case of Barrio San Fernando: "the lands were the property of the Municipality and were invaded by workers from the Port, but on three occasions were dislodged by the army. The invaders named as their attorney Dr Fernando Fernandez Cuello, who defended them successfully, and to express their thanks they named the settlement after him" (ICT, 1978, p 12).
Housing options and alternative forms of land acquisition The official housing options for the poor in Santa Marta are severely constrained, both in terms of affordability and number of units available. Between 1951 and 1988 a total of over 7 500 dwellings were constructed by official agencies in the city. However on analysis it is clear that only a limited proportion were intended for those on low incomes. Using the official classification of socio-economic status, the majority of such dwellings were intended for occupation by the 'medium low' and 'medium' income groups, with none for those classified as 'very low' (Lopez and Alvarez, 1985; Distrito TCH de Santa Marta, 1991). This demonstrates that official housing programmes are not supplying housing to those on low incomes, quite 4This comes from an account by one of those involved in the invasion, collected during fieldwork in July 1986. For a more detailed account see Kellett (1987).
City Profile the reverse: those benefiting the most from such programmes are precisely those with household incomes well above subsistence level and hence with a larger potential surplus to devote to housing investment, and as a consequence have a relatively wide range of housing choice. Recent government initiatives have restructured the official housing agency !renamed the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda de lnteres Social y Reforma Urbana, INURBE) and introduced greater decentralisation, the involvement of the private sector and a range of housing subsidies for improvement and new building. However there is evidence to suggest that individual subsidies for the purchase of private sector dwellings are not benefitting those on the lowest incomes and in greatest housing need (Gilbert, 1997). Collective subsidies also appear to be having little effect: despite efforts at minimising the bureaucratic procedures, these subsidies are difficult for groups to operate unless they are particularly well organised, financially adept and professionally supported (Kellett and Garnham, 1995). Santa Marta does not have an active NGO tradition in housing and there has been little action with respect of the subsidies. Local construction companies have complained that virtually no housing activity is taking place and that the new housing subsidy is not being encouraged (El Informador, August 1991).
Rental markets in Santa Marta In common with the rest of Colombia the preference for all income groups is owner-occupation, although this is an unachievable goal for increasing numbers in the larger cities. In Bogotd 40% of dwellings are in the rental sector (DANE, 1986, vol. 6, p 388). In Santa Marta the figure is 26.3%, which is lower than the national figure of 31.1% for urban dwellings (DANE, 1986, vol. 6, pp 344 and 336). Renting is frequently a temporary stage, and often resorted to by households at the earlier stages of the family cycle prior to entering the owner-occupation market (by purchase or invasion). A particular characteristic of Santa Marta, and other cities of the coastal region, is that
dwellings are normally occupied by a single household consisting of related family members, and it is unusual for owner-occupiers to rent out a room or portion of the dwelling on a commercial basis (Kellett, 1992). The rented sector in informal settlements consists almost exclusively of independent dwellings at various stages of consolidation which are rented out in the absence of the owner, although in the older housing areas closer to the centre multi-occupancy dwellings can be found. The relatively small scale of the rental sub-market as a housing alternative may, therefore, contribute indirectly to the larger scale of invasion settlements.
Prevailing traditions and poverty The coastal region is one of the areas of the country where levels of poverty are highest, with Magdalena recording levels of around 75% (Pearce, 1990, p 71). The Municipality of Santa Marta is statistically better than the Department as a whole with 33.1% (28% for the urban area) of the population classified as having their basic needs unsatisfied (NBI), and 9.5% of the population living in "misery" (DANE, UNDP et al., 1989, p 51; SISMUN, 1991). There is a close correlation between the physical location of invasion settlements and zones of poverty. It is understandable why the formal commercial sector does not get involved in attempting to build conventional housing lbr those on the lowest incomes, and concentrates instead on middle and high income groups. High levels of poverty and low thresholds of affordability make such programmes uneconomic unless substantial subsidy is available and accessible. As we have seen, present government policy means that subsidy via the private sector is not readily available for those on the lowest incomes and so far has been slow in materialising. Given the limitations of both the formal public and private sectors, in many cities the key alternative housing option for the poor is found in illegal subdivisions, know in Colombia as 'pirate urbanisations'. Santa Marta certainly appears atypical in that there is relatiw,qy little diversity of housing sub-
markets, including no evidence of pirate urbanisations. 5 Although levels of poverty are high in Santa Marta, evidence of commercialisation of plots and dwellings within invasion settlements as well as evidence of dwelling consolidation suggest that poverty levels are not so low as to mean that the poorest would be unable to pay small amounts (in instalments) for pirate plots, if they were available. Perhaps a partial explanation may be found in the history of the city which since colonial times has demonstrated a lack of entrepreneurial drive. A consultants report in the late 1970s (FNPD, 1977) identified the weak entrepreneurial tradition at local level as one of three influential factors to explain the low level of industrial activity. Low levels of enterprise in industry could also be echoed in low levels of commercial activity related to informal housing activities. Without doubt the different traditions of particular cities influence the characteristics of the housing market (Gilbert, 1981, p 662). It is interesting that the invasion tradition in Santa Marta goes back to early this century, and may be linked to squatting processes in rural areas. When examining the response of unemployed landless workers in the Banana Zone during the 1930s and 1940s, White (1971, p 127) found that squatting on idle land was commonplace and points out how such processes were not necessarily discouraged as they could bring potential benefits to landowners. Under the political system operating in Colombia, the politicians need the support of low-income settlers and in the case of Santa Marta this is achieved through the official tolerance and political support for illegal housing activities. This again underlines the importance of examining in detail the political dimension of low-income housing processes. We can conclude that the invasion settlement process is an essential ingredient in the political system of the city.
5A further legal option available in certain parts of the country is through self-help housing organisations. No such projects were identified in Santa Marta (Kellen, 1995).
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City Profile
Conclusion In this profile we have followed the historical development of a particular set of political and economic conditions which are closely interlinked. We have examined the relatively isolated position of Santa Marta, the tradition of low investment and limited formal sector employment opportunities which have led to high reliance on the service sector and a strong informal tradition both in employment and housing. We have seen also how a small elite group of families have consolidated their position of power through domination of politics, the media, public office and, since the decline of foreign capital, the economy also. A key element in this process, particularly since the 1960s, has been their support of invasion settlement processes. Given the symbiotic nature of patron-client relationships, the settlement processes have provided political benefits for the powerful as well as an important option for the poor to acquire land at high social cost, but relatively low financial outlay. There is little evidence to suggest that the situation will change significantly in the foreseeable future.
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Colmenares, G (1978) Historia Economica y Social de Colombia, 1537-1719, Editorial La Carreta, Bogota. Cuervo, L M (1988) Gestion social y discriminacion espacial en la prestacion del servicio de agua y desagues en Colombia. Medio Ambiente y Urbanizacion 7, 49-57. DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica) (1986) XV Censo Nacional de Poblacion y IV de Vivienda, Vols 1,5 and 6, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica,
Bogotfi. DANE (1993) Censo Nacional de Poblacion y Vivienda, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (diskette), Bogotfi. DANE/Camara de Comercio de Santa Marta (1982) Monografia del Municipio de Santa Marta, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, Bogotfi. DANE, DNP, UNDP etaL (1989) La Pobreza en Colombia, Tomo I1, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, Bogotfi. Departamento del Magdalena (1983) Plan de Desarrollo 1983-1986: Diagnostico. Departamento del Magdalena, Secretaria de Planeacion, Santa Marta. Distrito TCH de Santa Marta (1991 ) Estratificacion de Barrios por Estratos SocioEconomicos, Santa Marta (unpublished document). FNPD (Fondo Nacional de Proyectos de Desarrollo) (1977) Santa Marta: Plan General de Desarrollo, FNPD/Compania de Estudios Urbanos Ltda (unpublished). Gilbert, A (1981) Pirates and invaders: land acquisition in urban Colombia and Venezuela. Worm Development 9, 657~i78. Gilbert, A (1997) On subsidies and homeownership: Colombian housing policy during the 1990s. Third Worm Planning Review 19, 51-70. Hardoy, J E (1982) The building of Latin American cities. In Urbanization in Contemporary Latin America; Critical Approaches to the Analysis of Urban Issues, ed A Gilbert, pp. 19-33. Wiley, London. Herrera, L F (1987) El manejo del medio ambiente natural por el hombre prehispanico en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. Boletin de Museo del Oro 19, 83-86. 1CT (Instituto de Creditio Territorial) (1978) lnvestigacion de la Zona Prioritaria de la Ciudad de Santa Marta, ICT Regional Magdalena, Santa Marta. Kellett, P (1987) Squatter settlements: a view from the inside. A case study from Santa Marta, Colombia. Proceedings of
the Fourth Symposium 'International Year of Shelter." A Case Study Approach', University College London, March, pp 22-33. Kellett, P (1992) Residential mobility and consolidation processes in spontaneous settlements: the case of Santa Marta, Colombia. Third World Planning Review 14, 355-369. Kellen, P (1995) Constructing home: production and consumption of popular housing in northern Colombia, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Kellett, P and Garnham, A. (1995) The role of culture and gender in mediating the impact of official interventions in informal settlements: a study from Colombia. Habitat International 19, 53~50. Kostof, S (1991 ) The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings through History, Thames and Hudson, London. Lopez, R M and Alvarez, M. (1985) Estudio Estratificacion Socio Economico de la Ciudad de Santa Marta, Electrificadora del Magdalena S.A., Santa Marta Los Comuneros (nd) 1928 La Masacre en Las Bananeras: Documentos Testimonios, Ediciones Los Comuneros, Bogotfi. Lucerna Salmoral, M (1988) Ximenez de Quesada: el Caballero de El Dorado, Ediciones Anaya, Madrid. Mayr, J (ed) (1984) La Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Mayr y Cabal Editores, Bogotfi. Nichols, T E (1973) Tres Puertos de Colombia; Estudio sobre el Desarrollo de Cartagena, Santa Marta y Barranquilla, Biblioteca Banco Popular, Bogotfi. Pearce, J (1990) Inside the Labyrinth, Latin American Bureau, London. Posada, E (1983) Introduction to a modern history of the Caribbean coast of Colombia (1904-1926), unpublished MPhil dissertation, Oxford University. Robles Porto, E (1989) El Desempleo en Santa Marta, El lnformador (Daily newspaper in Santa Marta), 30 March 1989, p. 5. SISMUN (1991) Listado de datos municipales, sistema de informacion municipal, BCH/FFDU, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, Bogotfi (computer printout). Wade, P (1985) Blacks in Colombia: identity and racial discrimination, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge. White, J (1971) The United Fruit Company in the Banana Zone of Santa Marta, Colombia: conflicts of the 1920s, unpublished BPhil dissertation, Oxford University.
Cities, Vol. 14, No. 6, pp. 393-402. 1997
Pergamon
PII: S0264-2751(97)00036-X
© 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0264-2751/97 $17.00 + 0.00
City profile
Santa Marta Peter Kellett Centre for Architectural Research and Development Overseas, Department of Architecture, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne NEI 7RU, UK (e-mail [email protected])
Santa Marta is the regional capital of the Department of Magdalena in northern Colombia, with an urban population of over 210 000. Although it is the oldest city in the country with a long and auspicious history, it has been unable to compete effectively with the neighbouring coastal cities of Cartagena and Baranquilla and is now only the fifteenth largest city in the country. It is characterised by low levels of industrial and commercial activity and correspondingly high levels of informality, both within the economy and housing sectors. This profile will examine the historical development of the city over the preceding five centuries to identify the factors which have played a central role in defining its character and situation. In particular the factors which have led to the dominance of squatting as a housing option for the poor will be examined. This includes a detailed examination of the low-income housing market and the role of political patronage in settlement processes. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Keywords: Colombia, informal housing, urban history, housing markets
A Spanish colonial port For several centuries the indigenous Taironas developed a complex and technically sophisticated civilisation on the Caribbean coast of what today is the Republic of Colombia. They were organised in a loose federation of states with hundreds of small urban centres located at different ecological niches to effectively exploit the rich variety of natural resources available between the steep mountain slopes and coastal valleys (Mayr, 1984; Herrera, 1987). Their world was to change irrevocably with the arrival of the Spanish ships which explored the coastline in 1499, and noted the deep, protected, natural harbour and long sandy beaches in the shadow of the snow-capped mountains rising to over 19 000 feet behind. In 1524 the Sevillian explorer Don Rodrigo de Bastidas returned to this same bay to found the first permanent Spanish settlement in the territory which today is Colombia. In July 1525
the 'city' of Santa Marta was duly established as a collection of simple huts around a square, and shortly after became the seat of the first Bishopric of the Reino de Nueva Granada (White, 1971, p 1). Later it became famous as the place where the great liberator Simon Bolivar died in 1830, and as the region where the novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez was born. New urban settlements were founded by the Spanish throughout the New World on a scale with few historical parallels, largely because the colonial city was an essential component in the colonial project, acting as the centre of power and domination both during the colonisation process and later in the administration of the conquered lands and peoples (Hardoy, 1982). However the Caribbean coast did not become the focus for settlement as the invading Spaniards were drawn southwards towards the Andes mountains in search of the source of gold and other minerals, more healthy climates, more fer-
393
tile lands and a compliant native workforce. At first the coastal ports of Santa Marta and Cartagena acted as points of departure for these various expeditions (Lucerna Salmoral, 1988), but later they became trading ports for the expanding colonial settlements in the mountains hundreds of miles inland. The coastal region itself became sparsely populated: the indigenous indian tribes were gradually pushed out of the best lands, and were replaced by a small number of very large haciendas (Aparicio, 1978; Colmenares, 1978; Posada, 1983; Wade, 1985). The very high concentration of land in a few hands is still typical of the region today: in 1970 in Magdatena, 20% of landowners controlled 85% of the agricultural land (Departamento del Magdalena, 1983, p 49). Cartagena de Indias, 200 km along the coast, was founded in 1533. It soon overtook Santa Marta and became the principal port for the whole of South America, dominating the trade in gold
City Profile and slaves, as well as becoming the seat of the Inquisition (Nichols, 1973, p 27). The two cities were growing slowly in size and competing fiercely for whatever trade was available. The Magdalena river running northwards was an obvious natural means of communication, but was treacherously difficult to navigate around its mouth. Competing attempts to find alternative by-pass routes avoiding the mouth were sponsored by Cartagena and Santa Marta with limited success. A third city, Barranquilla, grew rapidly especially during the 20th century when the problems of navigating the Magdalena river were largely resolved and steam navigation increased, facilitating communication with the interior. Barranquilla is now the fourth largest city in the country. The competition and growth of Cartagena and later Barranquilla have had a significant impact on the development of Santa Marta, which has lost out in terms of shipping and industry. The problem of linking Santa Marta with the interior was not satisfactorily solved until the 1950s when the national rail network eventually joined the 1 000 km between Santa Marta and BogotL and around the same time the road system was improved significantly.
The growth of population The population of the city did not grow consistently, indeed there were periods when the number of inhabitants declined dramatically despite relatively buoyant trade (Table 1). In addition, the nineteenth century was marked by considerable civil conflict and unrest culminating in the War of a Thousand Days between 1899 and 1904. The marked drop in population in the middle of the century can be accounted for by a series of natural disasters including earthquakes and tremors, floods and cholera epidemics (Nichols, 1973, pp 155 and 157).
Bananas and United Fruit In the 1880s the economic situation of the Santa Marta region changed as large scale foreign capital arrived to develop the plantation production of bananas for export (White, 1971, p 12).
394
Table 1 The' Growth of Population of Santa Marta Year
Population
1823 1829 1834 1843 1851 1870 1905 1918 1928 1938 1951 1964 1973 1985 1993
approx 4500 7000 12082 11393 5774 5000 9568 18040 30942 33245 37005 89161 115238 177922 210915
Years 1823-1938: Nichols (1973, p 293) Years 1951-1973: FNPD (1977, anexo 1.1) Year 1985: DANE (1986, vol 1, p 18) Year 1993: DANE (1993) diskette
A railway was begun in 1882, intended to link Santa Marta with the Magdalena river, but it soon became much more important in facilitating the efficient transport of bananas to the port, which was itself improved (see Fig. 1). The United Fruit Company (UFC) (based in the USA) soon established a monopoly over land, irrigation systems, production and transport. This enclave economy based on monoculture for export was able to exploit the conditions which were previously disadvantageous, firstly the relative isolation and secondly the absence of local industry. This meant that labour was plentiful and cheap: indeed plantation wages were half those paid in Costa Rica (White, 1971, p 24; Nichols, 1973, p 254). After the civil war ended in 1904 there was a real banana boom, and by 1910 the UFC not only dominated the Santa Marta banana zone, but also 80% of the world market (White, 1971, p 19). The banana zone and the railway gradually extended southwards towards Sevilla, Aracataca and Fundacion. In 1928 a famous strike began of plantation workers seeking improved wages and working conditions. It soon spread and thousands of workers halted the export of bananas and hence the whole economy of the region. It ended tragically as the UFC and some local producers requested help from the army to break the strike. Reports vary, but
between 1 500 and 3 000 people were shot or killed in the 'reign of terror' which followed (White, 1971; Nichols, 1973; Aparicio, 1978; Los Comuneros, nd). It was a historic setback for worker's rights and union activities and had significant repercussions nationally. After the strike the UFC continued to buy land: between t926 and 1931 local producers lost up to 80% of their collective land holdings to the UFC (White, 1971, p 117). However after 1940 the company slowly began winding down operations and gradually sold land and withdrew completely in 1966 but no new industry of any size came to the area to replace the banana plantations: "...it was a region whose economy had partially collapsed with the exit of foreign capital" (White, 1971, p 132). This led to many workers migrating to the urban centres, particularly to Barranquilla which by this time had established itself not merely as the largest port in the country, but also as an important centre of industry and commerce (Casas and Uribe-Echevarria, 1985, p 99).
Buried treasure In the early 1970s a new coastal road was built linking Santa Marta with Rioacha and Venezuela. This made accessible the previously isolated northern slopes of the Sierra Nevada mountains, attracting colonists from different parts of Colombia intending to create agricultural subsistence small holdings, but who could quickly make sizeable profits through the illegal cultivation of marijuana. ~ At the same time, the opening up of the previously impenetrable forests soon led to the discovery of the ancient burial sites and settlements of the Tairona indians, who buried beautiful gold artefacts with their deceased elders. Dreams became reality: fortunes and lives were made and lost. The drug and gold 'bonanza' had a major impact on Santa Marta as the nearest urban centre: prices of all basic ~"By the 1970s there were an estimated 6000 producers in the Sierra Nevada, employing 13000 rural labourers. One study suggests that 30000 families depended totally or partially on Marjiuana" (Pearce, 1990, p 127).
City Profile
Figure 1
Aerial view of Santa Marta in 1987 (source: Instituto Agustin Codazzi).
395
City Profile goods rose rapidly, to the detriment of the majority of urban dwellers whose incomes had not benefited, but there was no significant investment in industry, and there were few visible benefits to the city. When the 'bubble' inevitably burst in the early 1980s many businesses collapsed as they had extended credit too far (Departamento del Magdalena, 1983, p 168). Manufacturing activity fell: in 1974 there were 20 industrial companies (mostly light manufacturing) employing 1 379 people, but by 1980 this had dropped to 15 employing 1 270 (DANE/Camara de Comercio, 1982, p 25). The absence of formal sector employment opportunities was becoming more critical as the population rose. Between 1973 and 1983 the population increased by 44%, but no parallel sources of employment were being created, indeed there is evidence that business was contracting. The 'raison d'&re' for the foundation of the city was the natural harbour, but the port lacked the necessary modern investment and continued to be in a weak position to compete with Barranquilla. Despite this, it remains an important source of local employment and has recently managed to increase trade, partly with the export of coal from the large open-cast mine of E1 Cerrejon in the neighbouring Guajira.
Tourist potential The city and its surrounding region have considerable tourist potential. At present tourism is a major source of economic activity, particularly with the expansion of the beach resort of E1 Rodadero, immediately to the south of the main part of the city. Many new hotels and apartment buildings have been constructed there since the 1960s when a new access road was constructed. Despite this increase in tourist facilities, Santa Marta was again unable to compete with the historic city of Cartagena, which has benefited from the growth in the national tourist industry as well as attracting overseas tourists. Although there are a few very significant monuments, such as the Quinta de San Pedro Alejandrina where Simon Bolivar died, the remaining colonial and republican buildings are not of the quality of those found in Cartagena. However the beaches and outstanding
396
natural landscapes close to the city, such as the Parque Tairona, mean that Santa Marta can offer the tourist a range of opportunities not available in Cartagena. Despite this, Cartagena continues to be dominant, and national investment has added to the imbalance: during the 1970s Magdalena received barely a quarter of the amount invested in the Department of Bolivar (Cartagena is the capital) by the National Tourist Corporation (Departamento del Magdalena, 1983, p 172). In 1983 there were 44 registered hotels in Santa Marta and El Rodadero, but as tourism is a seasonal activity, it is an erratic source of employment. Relatively few people find employment in industry or commerce, although the situation has been improving recently as several new industries have been attracted to the city, partly through incentives linked to the new 'Zona Franca'. The majority of urban dwellers are not formally employed but obtain income through a range of 'informal' activities. High levels of unemployment, well in excess of the national average, are a feature of Santa Marta. Robles Porto (1989, p 5) states that the unemployment rate in the city has exceeded 20% for over 15 years, reaching a peak of 24.1% in 1986, whereas the national figure has been between 9 and 13%. He also states that the commercial/service sector accounts for 91.6% of formal employment, and highlights the high dependency on the local state as an employer: 40% of all employment, compared to 34.6% in the informal sector and 25.5% in the private sector. The weak economy of the Magdalena region is shown in figures contrasting population with economic performance: the Department of Magdalena has 3.5% of the national population but contributes only 2% of GDP, and as a consequence incomes are lower in Magdalena than the national or regional averages (Departamento dei Magdalena, 1983, pp 43 and 46). A key limiting factor which is raised in connection with housing conditions, manufacturing industry and tourism, is the problem of water shortage, both in the city and the coastal region generally. The following section outlines the physical growth of the city and examines the impact of
these economic conditions and employment patterns on the housing market and living conditions of residents in the informal settlements which are the dominant form of housing supply.
The growth of Santa Marta Santa Marta is one of the earliest Spanish colonial settlements in the New World. It was founded before the detailed instructions which determined the standard planning of all new settlements were codified by royal decree in 1573 (Hardoy, 1982, p 24; Kostof, 1991, p 114), but almost certainly the central square would have been defined. Around the square the civic, ecclesiastic and military authorities would be located. This small ruling elite would have lived with their servants in large houses surrounding or close to the main square; humbler houses of artisans, small merchants and minor officials would be located around them (Hardoy, 1982, p 26) (see Fig. 2). The lower income workers, mestizos and indians, would have built their own dwellings farther away, almost certainly in perishable materials, echoing the present day practice of self-help informal construction. The square, cathedral and a few streets of houses from the colonial and republican periods remain, some in good condition, and the centre of the city is still where most commercial activity is focused. For over 400 years the city was very small and compact, and with few exceptions was confined within a small area defined by the sea to the west, a small river to the south, hills to the north and in the late 19th century by the railway to the east. Later the railway was re-routed well outside the built up area and the old line became a road. During the 1960s the population and the size of the city began to increase rapidly and by the 1980s the city had again expanded beyond the railway line. A high percentage of this new urban growth has taken place outside the formal planning procedures, mostly as a result of organised invasions of land followed by individual processes of progressive development of the dwellings. Successive planning administrations have had to redraw the urban boundary to accord with the reality on the ground.
1
I
\ Wo
~
l
/
/
//
..... /
•
~
Figure 2
/2:
/
Colonial Santa Marta: plan of the city in 1793 (source: CEHOPU, 1989, p 112)
f
City Profile
North
T Caribbean
El Rodadero
Santa Maria R
builtup areas
I
squatter areas ( i.e began at invasions)
Figure 3 Map of Santa Marta indicating location of invasion settlements (source: based on data from the Municipal Planning Dept).
Invasion settlements Figure 3 identifies the location of such in~hsion settlements, and the areas w~ch have developed on the edge of both informal and formal settlements through individual processes of accretion. Although many such settlements are located in areas of potentially low commercial value a high proportion are found on flat land close to the centre of the city, on the edge of major roads, and are laid out following the standard orthogonal planning conventions of calles and carreras, forming blocks of standard size and leaving areas for public open space and facilities (see Figs 4 and 5). Invasion settlements have a long history in Santa Marta: two settlements were formed prior to 1920, and seven others before 1940. The number increased significantly from the 1960s onwards, and by 1991, over 106 invasion settlements had been recorded. It is clear that such informal housing
398
processes house the majority of residents in the city, and that for the lowincome population it is the 'conventional' method of housing provision. In 1989 the Director of the Municipal Planning Department calculated that 74% of the population of the city were housed in settlements which began as invasions.2 Why are invasions the dominant form of new settlement formation in Santa Marta? In Colombia there is considerable variation in housing markets between different cities: in some, invasion settlements are virtually nonexistent. Gilbert (1981, p 662) identifies six factors which are believed to impact on the relative level of invasion activity: political patronage, land ownership patterns, the effectiveness of official action against squatters, the availability of alternative forms of land 2Information given in an interview with the author, April 1989.
acquisition, the presence of a rental sub-market and the strength of prevailing traditions. We will now discuss these in turn in the context of Santa Marta.
Political patronage One of the key factors determining the opportunities and constraints facing low-income populations is the strong patron-client inter linkages which operate at many levels of society in Colombia. Burgess (1986, p 37) defines patron--client relationships as being where "political and personal loyalty are exchanged by the client for access to the resources controlled by the patron in the state administration, political party or other organisation representing power and authority. A patron-client relationship is typically non-symmetrical... (and) the individuals involved are unequal in terms of access to the scarce goods and services
Ci~ Profile
Figure 4
View of Santa Marta looking towards the centre of the city. The port is on the extreme right of the picture.
Figure 5 Invasion settlement in the process of consolidation. Improvised dwellings and others built in permanent materials are visible. (Both photographs by the author) that are expected to be exchanged." Such relationships are crucial to explaining the various stages of formation and development of invasion settlements. In many cases, a political leader will encourage the formation of
a new settlement, and use his influence to prevent forceful removal by the authorities. He will commonly do this in exchange for electoral support, and then use his contacts and influence with the various municipal authorities and
service agencies to provide preferential access to infrastructure services (Burgess, 1986; Cuervo, 1988). For example the invasion settlement, Barrio Nacho Vives which "was founded in May 1960 by the politicians
399
City Profile Dr Ignacio Vives Echeverria and Dr Rafael Perez Davila. The land was the property of the Municipality before the invasion" (ICT, 1978, p 10). 3 Here the settlers adopted the name of one of their patrons when naming the settlement and under his powerful patronage the settlement has consolidated steadily despite its unfavourable position between the railway and the hills. Nacho Vives has held political office for many years in different capacities: for much of his political career he has been a Senator, and in 1990 was elected as Mayor for the city. There is a very close interrelationship between kin networks and political affiliation. Nacho Vives is part of the Vives political clan. When he was forced to resign as Mayor he was succeeded by a nephew Alvaro Ordofiez Vives. His two predecessors were also his cousins: Alfonso Vives Campo and Edgardo Vives Campo (also a Senator, former Governor and Director of the local paper E1 Informador, and Mayor again in the mid 1990s). Juan Carlos Vives Menotti is a member of the House of Representatives. Such political dynasties are a common feature of politics at all levels within Colombia, but it is the linkage between political power and administrative office which is especially revealing at local level. For example governors and mayors appoint key officials within the Department and Municipal authorities, and quite understandably such appointments go to those who belong to the same political line and who, frequently are also related. This can be illustrated by the Diazgranados family, another influential Santa Marta family with large landowning and commercial interests since colonial times. In addition to high profile political figures such as Jose Ignacio Diazgranados who has been Senator for many years and a Minister in the national government, several members of the family have been appointed to crucial offices within 3In Colombia the title 'Doctor' is frequently used by those who have a University education. In this case Nacho Vives Echeverria is a lawyer, so it is ironic that he is active in encouraging others to break the law. Indeed he broke it himself, and was forced to step down as Mayor because the Supreme Court confirmed that he was not eligible to hold public office.
400
the local administration. These include the Secretaria de Planeacion Departamental, the Junta de Planeacion Municipal, the President of the local Chamber of Commerce and the Director General of Municipal Planning. Perhaps the most visible sign of such close patron-client interlinkages between low income communities and the politicians, is the frequent naming of settlements after the local politicians who have supported (and it is hoped will continue to support) the settlement. Examples of such settlements include: Goenaga, Perez Davila, Nacho Vives, Juan Carlos Vives, Edgardo Vives, Miguel Pineda and Cesar Mendoza. Such naming is no coincidence, and the names reflect and reinforce dominant political and economic interests. We may conclude that such relationships are a key factor in explaining the large scale and continuance of invasion settlements in the city.
Patterns of land ownership In situations where land prices are high and where ownership rights are clear, invasions are less likely to take place. This is true in Bogotfi where invasions are few, whereas in Santa Marta much of the undeveloped land surrounding the city is of low agricultural potential (requiring irrigation to be productive) and because there are many areas of disputed land rights. Absence of title or ambiguity of ownership has been exploited by invasion organisers. Invasions take place on both privately and publicly owned land. In the example given above of Barrio Nacho Vives, the invaded land was owned by the Municipality, who as a heavily politicised corporate institution is often in a weak position to press sufficiently firmly to evict squatters.
Official action against squatters Despite clarity in the law which upholds property rights, action by the police on behalf of owners is inconsistent throughout the country. Gilbert (1981, p 662) describes how in Bogotfi the police usually act promptly and effectively to remove squatters within the stipulated 30 days after notification.
However in Santa Marta, police action has been sporadic, frequently halfhearted and sometimes violent. A settler involved in one invasion commented that the police action continued "until the owners ran out of money to be able to keep paying the chief of police. ''4 This certainly underlines the perception amongst low-income settlers that the police are not independent of political or commercial interests. Although many invasions are repulsed initially and may require several attempts before succeeding, no reports were located of invasions which had been demolished or cleared following effective action through the courts. This is no doubt because in many cases powerful and influential backers are on hand. For example in the case of Barrio San Fernando: "the lands were the property of the Municipality and were invaded by workers from the Port, but on three occasions were dislodged by the army. The invaders named as their attorney Dr Fernando Fernandez Cuello, who defended them successfully, and to express their thanks they named the settlement after him" (ICT, 1978, p 12).
Housing options and alternative forms of land acquisition The official housing options for the poor in Santa Marta are severely constrained, both in terms of affordability and number of units available. Between 1951 and 1988 a total of over 7 500 dwellings were constructed by official agencies in the city. However on analysis it is clear that only a limited proportion were intended for those on low incomes. Using the official classification of socio-economic status, the majority of such dwellings were intended for occupation by the 'medium low' and 'medium' income groups, with none for those classified as 'very low' (Lopez and Alvarez, 1985; Distrito TCH de Santa Marta, 1991). This demonstrates that official housing programmes are not supplying housing to those on low incomes, quite 4This comes from an account by one of those involved in the invasion, collected during fieldwork in July 1986. For a more detailed account see Kellett (1987).
City Profile the reverse: those benefiting the most from such programmes are precisely those with household incomes well above subsistence level and hence with a larger potential surplus to devote to housing investment, and as a consequence have a relatively wide range of housing choice. Recent government initiatives have restructured the official housing agency !renamed the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda de lnteres Social y Reforma Urbana, INURBE) and introduced greater decentralisation, the involvement of the private sector and a range of housing subsidies for improvement and new building. However there is evidence to suggest that individual subsidies for the purchase of private sector dwellings are not benefitting those on the lowest incomes and in greatest housing need (Gilbert, 1997). Collective subsidies also appear to be having little effect: despite efforts at minimising the bureaucratic procedures, these subsidies are difficult for groups to operate unless they are particularly well organised, financially adept and professionally supported (Kellett and Garnham, 1995). Santa Marta does not have an active NGO tradition in housing and there has been little action with respect of the subsidies. Local construction companies have complained that virtually no housing activity is taking place and that the new housing subsidy is not being encouraged (El Informador, August 1991).
Rental markets in Santa Marta In common with the rest of Colombia the preference for all income groups is owner-occupation, although this is an unachievable goal for increasing numbers in the larger cities. In Bogotd 40% of dwellings are in the rental sector (DANE, 1986, vol. 6, p 388). In Santa Marta the figure is 26.3%, which is lower than the national figure of 31.1% for urban dwellings (DANE, 1986, vol. 6, pp 344 and 336). Renting is frequently a temporary stage, and often resorted to by households at the earlier stages of the family cycle prior to entering the owner-occupation market (by purchase or invasion). A particular characteristic of Santa Marta, and other cities of the coastal region, is that
dwellings are normally occupied by a single household consisting of related family members, and it is unusual for owner-occupiers to rent out a room or portion of the dwelling on a commercial basis (Kellett, 1992). The rented sector in informal settlements consists almost exclusively of independent dwellings at various stages of consolidation which are rented out in the absence of the owner, although in the older housing areas closer to the centre multi-occupancy dwellings can be found. The relatively small scale of the rental sub-market as a housing alternative may, therefore, contribute indirectly to the larger scale of invasion settlements.
Prevailing traditions and poverty The coastal region is one of the areas of the country where levels of poverty are highest, with Magdalena recording levels of around 75% (Pearce, 1990, p 71). The Municipality of Santa Marta is statistically better than the Department as a whole with 33.1% (28% for the urban area) of the population classified as having their basic needs unsatisfied (NBI), and 9.5% of the population living in "misery" (DANE, UNDP et al., 1989, p 51; SISMUN, 1991). There is a close correlation between the physical location of invasion settlements and zones of poverty. It is understandable why the formal commercial sector does not get involved in attempting to build conventional housing lbr those on the lowest incomes, and concentrates instead on middle and high income groups. High levels of poverty and low thresholds of affordability make such programmes uneconomic unless substantial subsidy is available and accessible. As we have seen, present government policy means that subsidy via the private sector is not readily available for those on the lowest incomes and so far has been slow in materialising. Given the limitations of both the formal public and private sectors, in many cities the key alternative housing option for the poor is found in illegal subdivisions, know in Colombia as 'pirate urbanisations'. Santa Marta certainly appears atypical in that there is relatiw,qy little diversity of housing sub-
markets, including no evidence of pirate urbanisations. 5 Although levels of poverty are high in Santa Marta, evidence of commercialisation of plots and dwellings within invasion settlements as well as evidence of dwelling consolidation suggest that poverty levels are not so low as to mean that the poorest would be unable to pay small amounts (in instalments) for pirate plots, if they were available. Perhaps a partial explanation may be found in the history of the city which since colonial times has demonstrated a lack of entrepreneurial drive. A consultants report in the late 1970s (FNPD, 1977) identified the weak entrepreneurial tradition at local level as one of three influential factors to explain the low level of industrial activity. Low levels of enterprise in industry could also be echoed in low levels of commercial activity related to informal housing activities. Without doubt the different traditions of particular cities influence the characteristics of the housing market (Gilbert, 1981, p 662). It is interesting that the invasion tradition in Santa Marta goes back to early this century, and may be linked to squatting processes in rural areas. When examining the response of unemployed landless workers in the Banana Zone during the 1930s and 1940s, White (1971, p 127) found that squatting on idle land was commonplace and points out how such processes were not necessarily discouraged as they could bring potential benefits to landowners. Under the political system operating in Colombia, the politicians need the support of low-income settlers and in the case of Santa Marta this is achieved through the official tolerance and political support for illegal housing activities. This again underlines the importance of examining in detail the political dimension of low-income housing processes. We can conclude that the invasion settlement process is an essential ingredient in the political system of the city.
5A further legal option available in certain parts of the country is through self-help housing organisations. No such projects were identified in Santa Marta (Kellen, 1995).
401
City Profile
Conclusion In this profile we have followed the historical development of a particular set of political and economic conditions which are closely interlinked. We have examined the relatively isolated position of Santa Marta, the tradition of low investment and limited formal sector employment opportunities which have led to high reliance on the service sector and a strong informal tradition both in employment and housing. We have seen also how a small elite group of families have consolidated their position of power through domination of politics, the media, public office and, since the decline of foreign capital, the economy also. A key element in this process, particularly since the 1960s, has been their support of invasion settlement processes. Given the symbiotic nature of patron-client relationships, the settlement processes have provided political benefits for the powerful as well as an important option for the poor to acquire land at high social cost, but relatively low financial outlay. There is little evidence to suggest that the situation will change significantly in the foreseeable future.
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