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Science and technology in global perspective
Techsologylu Society,Vol. 1, pp. 147-152 (1979) Printed in the USA. All rights r-~erved.
0160-791X/79/020147-06502.00/0 Copyright © 1979 PergamonPress Ltd
Science and Technology in Global Perspective Philippe de Seynes
The United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, to which this issue of Technology In Society is devoted, takes on additional importance because it precedes by a few months the launching, within the UN system, of a new Grand Design which is planned to guide the international community through the 1980s and possibly through the dawn of the next century. Unless the two events are seen in a single perspective, both will suffer, and an opportunity will be neglected to establish long-term objectives and policies within an improved analytical framework, enriched by new perceptions as well as the lessons of experience, and capable of accomodating alternative views of development. Particularly if the new international development strategy is to graduate from a scenario of "reproduction" (with minor corrections) to a scenario of "transformation," as seems implied in the concept of a New International Economic Order, there is hardly any aspect of it which would not be affected, positively or negatively, depending upon how it is related to science and technology. The serious examination of these interactions is all the more necessary since the treatment of technology in recent global cogitations, notably in the world models of the past five or six years, has been very inadequate. * As with other UN events, the Conference on Science and Technology for Development must focus primarily on the problems of Third World countries. Its organization cannot fail to reflect this imperative. But it will miss some important points unless it considers the wide range of questions which make up the "problematique" of science and technology. There is also a danger that, out of the participants' eagerness to reach a consensus on a program of action, the process of elucidation and consciousness-raising--so vital an element in the important conferences of the 1970s--might be shortchanged. Yet there are still important matters that are in urgent need of further elucidation. One would hope, for instance, that the conference would--if only as a by-product--generate a better understanding of the complexities and the pitfalls of policies designed to guide technological choices, that it would endeavor to assess the role of technology in appraising and overcoming the *SeeSam Cole, "GlobalModelsand the InternationalOrder," UNITAR,1977. Philippe de Seynes is Senior Special Fellow in the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and Director of the Institute's Special Programme on the Future. A former Undersecretary-General of the UN, he also served as head of its Department of Economic and Social Affairs for 20 years. He has taken part in numerous worldwide and regional conferences in his capacity as international civil servant. 147
148
Philippede Seynes
constraints of ecology on development, and that it would highlight the promise of "high technology" for the pursuit of a new international specialization.
The Complexities of Technological Choices It has been pointed out more than once that science and technology prospered for a very long time before the expression, "science and technology policies," found its way into the vocabularies of politicians and scientists alike. The need for a systematic "interface" between scientists and policymakers implied in this expression itself seems to have been recognized in the more advanced countries only when increasing costs of research and development made large-scale government support imperative. At that time, it also became clear that not all technological potentialities implicit in the existing fund of scientific knowledge could (even under the best of circumstances) be realized, and that the market signals alone would not always be a safe guide in the process of selection. It is not wise to wait for this stage which, incidentally, a number of Third World countries are approaching--in order to explore the difficult questions raised by technological choices in all phases of development. Yet it is important to recognize the shortcomings, in such a complex matter, of the purely pragmatic approach pursued in the UN for a quarter of a century under the popular headings of "technical cooperation" or "plans of action." One would not deny the success of sector programs undertaken through training programs and the building of institutions. One must even deplore that, for lack of an adequate flow of funds, not enough results were derived from this approach, all the more since useful ideas have been continuously produced by the UN Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology for Development. But it is rapidly becoming apparent that, because of the lack of an analytical framework adequately relating science and technology choices to the major factors of economic and social life such as employment, income distribution, spatial organization and others--a number of the actions undertaken may have been miscalculated or misdirected. This may even have created irreversible situations or, at least, severely constricted the freedom of choice for future actions. The present state of affairs may be somewhat surprising since, early in the game, science and technology came to be viewed--with good reason--as causes and symbols of domination and exploitation. Yet the treatment was consonant with the prevailing development philosophy, and its underlying assumption that the experience undergone by advanced countries would be universally reproduced. The view of technology as a commodity transferred through the provision of expertise, the establishment of laboratories, and the operation of international enterprises was the rational corollary of a generally accepted model within which technology choices would be made exclusively in terms of productivity. But this could not very well persist when the need for "appropriate technology" began to be understood. In fact, the revelations of the unanticipated social costs of the "Green Revolution" have already changed the perspective in regard to agricultural policies. But the process has hardly started in the field of industry, perhaps because--at least, in mixed economies--technological choices are made at the levels
Science and Technology in GlobalPerspective
149
of the enterprises rather than being induced by governmental policies of widespread application. But, whether in private enterprise or in government, planners must have at their disposal analytical tools to enable them to view the cumulative impact of the choices made. Technology, as a policy instrument, affects a host of factors in economic life and is also, in turn, affected by them. " A policy instrument so intertwined with the entire functioning of the economy should be suspect." * (If it is not suspect, it is, at least, elusive.) It is, for instance, often believed that freedom of choice exists in regard to processes (by contrast with the composition of the national product), for there always exist several techniques to produce a given good. Yet the process itself is usually largely predetermined by the initial endowment in capital goods, trained personnel, and research facilities. It is further influenced by sociological or institutional factors, such as the emergence of a "technocratic" class or the participation of the economy in a system of international production. It is, therefore, hard to escape the feeling that--in the search for optimal policies, in the exploration of trade-offs between contrasting solutions, in short, in the attempt to distinguish good policies from bad ones--more theoretical insights into the whole syndrome of science and technology are necessary. This becomes urgent in view of the likely emphasis on accelerated industrialization in the preparation of an (UN) International Strategy for the 1980s, and the current and intense investigation related to the desirable degree of participation of weak economies in the world industrial system. It has, for instance, already been seen in some cases that the momentum generated in developing countries by policies of export-led industrialization may quickly carry the process beyond any rational, let alone optimal, utilization of a country's human and material resources, and may have recognizable negative effects on the terms of trade and income distribution. One difficulty is that the building of technological capacity should be planned within a long-term perspective and by successive stages. There are circumstances when technology, as a policy instrument, is more servant than master, more affected than affect/ng, and the full impact of certain choices may be felt only after several decades, particularly since the learning process is so much a part of the whole evolution. The timing and combination of policies of imitation, adaptation, and innovation may lead to very different situations after a period of time. The problem is especially difficult when "dependencia" motives enter the picture. The policies could then very well differ drastically from those oriented toward immediate or proximate economic gains, and it is, hence, not always easy to anticipate the results. Mexico's nationalization of oil resources in 1938 is nowadays reaping rich dividends as the country is able to carry out--by its own human and institutional strength--the exploitation of one of the largest reserves of hydrocarbons discovered recently. On the other hand, it may be useful to analyze the contrasting experiences of France and Japan in the development of a computer industry. France, in the 1960s, responded to strong "dependencia" preoccupations and promoted policies designed to escape rapidly the US " i m p e r i u m " in this crucial field. Yet, • Graciela Chichilnisky and Sam Cole, from a working paper prepared for the UNITAR Project: "Technology, DomesticDistribution, and North-South Relations."
150
Philippe de Seynes
according to many observers, Japan, where a set of different attitudes prevailed, seems today better positioned to gain a substantial share in the world market. Ecological Constraints
The neo-Maltusian debate, which started with the publication of Limits to Growth, is directly relevant to any conference on science and technology. T h e extent to which ecology will constrain development, through resource scarcities or through environment overloading, has only recently entered the consciousness of politicians. But, up to now, it has hardly had any effect on the formulation of development policies and strategies in the UN. If the vision of "overshoot and collapse" of the early reports of the Club of Rome has now somewhat receded, it is nevertheless clear that the cost of development, its speed and its contents, for both advanced and developing nations, may be significantly altered by what can be learned about these constraints, or simply by the perception of them in the absence of incontrovertible evidence. Since this debate is often formulated in simplified terms as "technology fixes versus life styles" (meaning frugality), it should be viewed as an important element of the agenda of inquiry on which both the UNCSTD and the UN long-term strategy will focus attention. A serious effort of information and conceptualization is, therefore, all the more desirable as this area is one in which policies cannot be derived from past experience, and in which only the development of empirical knowledge seems likely to reduce the uncertainties. This knowledge will not come easily. At present, most statements or projections about supply constraints are unhelpful because of their vagueness; it is more than probable that grave misallocations or misdirections of financial and human resources are taking place, either through panic-induced investments or through the failure to initiate, in due time and on the proper scale, investigations that would help in scientifically appraising (and possibly overcoming) the dangers of scarcities. It would, therefore, seem reasonable to expect from the UNCSTD well-articulated guidelines for priority action in research and development in the major fields where scarcities are possible. This would mean regularly ascertaining the state of the knowledge in regard to potentialities, technologies, costs and side effects,* and also the identification of the institutional factors which may inhibit or retard the advancement of knowledge (such as the present confidentiality surrounding research and development results, or the frequent conservative attitudes of experts and institutions). It is true that ecological constraints are sometimes seen as opportunities, under the assumption that a world of recognized scarcities and other limitations would be more conducive to the desirable social changes than one where no restraint is envisaged in the frantic pursuit of growth. With this line of approach, it would not be prudent to rely on "technological fixes," particularly as physical limits are ultimately inescapable. Rather, the solution would lie in changes in prevailing value systems, life styles, and consumption patterns. There is an intimation here of the Utopian mind, which often produces critical and rigorous analyses of most elements interacting in a given situation, save that which would lend coherence to the * See, for example, the UNITAR-IIASA Conference on "The Future Supply of Nature-Made Oil and Gas," 1976.
Science and Technology in GlobalPerspective
151
preferred scenario and generally escapes the test of plausibility--in this case, how the desirable changes in values are likely to take place. It is unlikely that the international community, in devising guidelines for the future, would rally to that line of thinking. It is much more probable that the next development strategy to be adopted by the UN will involve normative scenarios of high growth, even if, for the time being, most projections concocted in the gloom and moroseness of the recent years seemed to suggest a different course. This would mean that the often maligned "technology fixes" would receive a high degree of legitimacy. The strategy certainly should recognize the importance of change in life styles and consumption patterns, and explore all their complex and often conflicting implications, notably on employment and distribution. This should be done regardless of whether the advent of a "steady state" is anticipated, and at what point it appears on the time horizon, for patterns of consumption have serious social implications. But it matters a lot whether the difficult road to the steady state begins under prevailing conditions of widespread and appalling poverty, or at a future time when it can reasonably be expected that significant social progress will have been made. Therefore, the role of technology in overcoming environmental constraints would appear to be an essential element in world development, more specifically in the appraisal of future trends, possibly involving discontinuities in price relationships and external imbalances.
High Technology and the International Division of Labor Many of the "fixes" designed to overcome environmental constraints may be categorized as high technology. Certainly many of the processes related to resources and energy development or to climate would at present be included under that rapidly evolving definition. There are other fields where innovation may be even more of a determinant in the transformation of societies, notably those heralding the microprocessor and the communications revolution. The temptation may be great to dismiss high technology from a central place in the Conference on Science and Technology for Development, under the argument that it might be pre-empting the debate for questions which are of principal, if not exclusive, interest to the industrial countries. The temptation should be resisted. This is partly because high technology may be a factor of progress in the solution of some of the crucial problems of poor countries, such as geology and climate, but, above all, because it is called upon to play a fundamental role in the construction of a new international division of labor. There have been confusing and conflicting statements about the morphology of the forthcoming post-industrial society. But innovation and high technology are likely to figure in most scenarios of world development, whether those of high growth or of low growth, those insisting on social change or those content with traditional approaches, as an essential element in facilitating the geographic redeployment of industrial activities in consonance with the objectives already formulated in the United Nations, not only in general terms but in a very explicit quantitative target. * • See UNIDO Conference, Lima, Peru, March 1975: The share of the Third World in the world's industrial activities should reach 25% by the year 2000.
152
Philippe de Seynes
This view of the role of high technology need not detract from a policy of reorientation of industry towards national markets through the enhancement of domestic demand and the improvement of the lot of low-income groups. Nor does it mean that the potentiality afforded by small-scale, low-technology activities should be neglected. The spirit of "small is beautiful" has not penetrated many of the areas where it can be usefully applied. But, even with an adequate effort towards these selfreliant policies, most developing countries would continue to be affected by the evolution of world markets, and the reshuffling of activities which must take place to produce the desirable international specialization cannot very well be visualized without a dynamic effort by the advanced countries to shift their resources towards science-based and high technology industries and services, thereby facilitating the rational deployment of industrial activities in Third World countries. High technology should be seen as a kind of balancing wheel necessary to keep the world system moving towards a New International Economic Order, living up to the new perception of "entitlements" the world over. A new UN Development Strategy must encourage these changes as well as highlight their inevitable social costs so that they may be met equitably and within a coherent framework. The Conference on Science and Technology for Development should explore the scientific and technological conditions of their achievement. Given the foreseeable requirements to avoid scarcities, and the opportunities for a better life afforded by the constant flow of discoveries, high technology cannot fail to remain a very dynamic factor in the shaping of the proximate and long-term future. It may also help in fulfilling at least some of the aspirations nurtured by new generations which have received an education that seems to cry for a new scientific and technological era. It is of the essence of a New International Economic Order that this dynamism be made to serve the higher objectives of the international community, above all, the more rapid progress of Third World countries. To that effect, the far-reaching transformations which can be expected must be kept within the purview of international institutions so that priorities in action conform more or less to the agreed objectives, and so that the main actors in the drama of science and technology may at all times be aware of their implications and remain in some way accountable for them.
0160-791X/79/020147-06502.00/0 Copyright © 1979 PergamonPress Ltd
Science and Technology in Global Perspective Philippe de Seynes
The United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, to which this issue of Technology In Society is devoted, takes on additional importance because it precedes by a few months the launching, within the UN system, of a new Grand Design which is planned to guide the international community through the 1980s and possibly through the dawn of the next century. Unless the two events are seen in a single perspective, both will suffer, and an opportunity will be neglected to establish long-term objectives and policies within an improved analytical framework, enriched by new perceptions as well as the lessons of experience, and capable of accomodating alternative views of development. Particularly if the new international development strategy is to graduate from a scenario of "reproduction" (with minor corrections) to a scenario of "transformation," as seems implied in the concept of a New International Economic Order, there is hardly any aspect of it which would not be affected, positively or negatively, depending upon how it is related to science and technology. The serious examination of these interactions is all the more necessary since the treatment of technology in recent global cogitations, notably in the world models of the past five or six years, has been very inadequate. * As with other UN events, the Conference on Science and Technology for Development must focus primarily on the problems of Third World countries. Its organization cannot fail to reflect this imperative. But it will miss some important points unless it considers the wide range of questions which make up the "problematique" of science and technology. There is also a danger that, out of the participants' eagerness to reach a consensus on a program of action, the process of elucidation and consciousness-raising--so vital an element in the important conferences of the 1970s--might be shortchanged. Yet there are still important matters that are in urgent need of further elucidation. One would hope, for instance, that the conference would--if only as a by-product--generate a better understanding of the complexities and the pitfalls of policies designed to guide technological choices, that it would endeavor to assess the role of technology in appraising and overcoming the *SeeSam Cole, "GlobalModelsand the InternationalOrder," UNITAR,1977. Philippe de Seynes is Senior Special Fellow in the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and Director of the Institute's Special Programme on the Future. A former Undersecretary-General of the UN, he also served as head of its Department of Economic and Social Affairs for 20 years. He has taken part in numerous worldwide and regional conferences in his capacity as international civil servant. 147
148
Philippede Seynes
constraints of ecology on development, and that it would highlight the promise of "high technology" for the pursuit of a new international specialization.
The Complexities of Technological Choices It has been pointed out more than once that science and technology prospered for a very long time before the expression, "science and technology policies," found its way into the vocabularies of politicians and scientists alike. The need for a systematic "interface" between scientists and policymakers implied in this expression itself seems to have been recognized in the more advanced countries only when increasing costs of research and development made large-scale government support imperative. At that time, it also became clear that not all technological potentialities implicit in the existing fund of scientific knowledge could (even under the best of circumstances) be realized, and that the market signals alone would not always be a safe guide in the process of selection. It is not wise to wait for this stage which, incidentally, a number of Third World countries are approaching--in order to explore the difficult questions raised by technological choices in all phases of development. Yet it is important to recognize the shortcomings, in such a complex matter, of the purely pragmatic approach pursued in the UN for a quarter of a century under the popular headings of "technical cooperation" or "plans of action." One would not deny the success of sector programs undertaken through training programs and the building of institutions. One must even deplore that, for lack of an adequate flow of funds, not enough results were derived from this approach, all the more since useful ideas have been continuously produced by the UN Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology for Development. But it is rapidly becoming apparent that, because of the lack of an analytical framework adequately relating science and technology choices to the major factors of economic and social life such as employment, income distribution, spatial organization and others--a number of the actions undertaken may have been miscalculated or misdirected. This may even have created irreversible situations or, at least, severely constricted the freedom of choice for future actions. The present state of affairs may be somewhat surprising since, early in the game, science and technology came to be viewed--with good reason--as causes and symbols of domination and exploitation. Yet the treatment was consonant with the prevailing development philosophy, and its underlying assumption that the experience undergone by advanced countries would be universally reproduced. The view of technology as a commodity transferred through the provision of expertise, the establishment of laboratories, and the operation of international enterprises was the rational corollary of a generally accepted model within which technology choices would be made exclusively in terms of productivity. But this could not very well persist when the need for "appropriate technology" began to be understood. In fact, the revelations of the unanticipated social costs of the "Green Revolution" have already changed the perspective in regard to agricultural policies. But the process has hardly started in the field of industry, perhaps because--at least, in mixed economies--technological choices are made at the levels
Science and Technology in GlobalPerspective
149
of the enterprises rather than being induced by governmental policies of widespread application. But, whether in private enterprise or in government, planners must have at their disposal analytical tools to enable them to view the cumulative impact of the choices made. Technology, as a policy instrument, affects a host of factors in economic life and is also, in turn, affected by them. " A policy instrument so intertwined with the entire functioning of the economy should be suspect." * (If it is not suspect, it is, at least, elusive.) It is, for instance, often believed that freedom of choice exists in regard to processes (by contrast with the composition of the national product), for there always exist several techniques to produce a given good. Yet the process itself is usually largely predetermined by the initial endowment in capital goods, trained personnel, and research facilities. It is further influenced by sociological or institutional factors, such as the emergence of a "technocratic" class or the participation of the economy in a system of international production. It is, therefore, hard to escape the feeling that--in the search for optimal policies, in the exploration of trade-offs between contrasting solutions, in short, in the attempt to distinguish good policies from bad ones--more theoretical insights into the whole syndrome of science and technology are necessary. This becomes urgent in view of the likely emphasis on accelerated industrialization in the preparation of an (UN) International Strategy for the 1980s, and the current and intense investigation related to the desirable degree of participation of weak economies in the world industrial system. It has, for instance, already been seen in some cases that the momentum generated in developing countries by policies of export-led industrialization may quickly carry the process beyond any rational, let alone optimal, utilization of a country's human and material resources, and may have recognizable negative effects on the terms of trade and income distribution. One difficulty is that the building of technological capacity should be planned within a long-term perspective and by successive stages. There are circumstances when technology, as a policy instrument, is more servant than master, more affected than affect/ng, and the full impact of certain choices may be felt only after several decades, particularly since the learning process is so much a part of the whole evolution. The timing and combination of policies of imitation, adaptation, and innovation may lead to very different situations after a period of time. The problem is especially difficult when "dependencia" motives enter the picture. The policies could then very well differ drastically from those oriented toward immediate or proximate economic gains, and it is, hence, not always easy to anticipate the results. Mexico's nationalization of oil resources in 1938 is nowadays reaping rich dividends as the country is able to carry out--by its own human and institutional strength--the exploitation of one of the largest reserves of hydrocarbons discovered recently. On the other hand, it may be useful to analyze the contrasting experiences of France and Japan in the development of a computer industry. France, in the 1960s, responded to strong "dependencia" preoccupations and promoted policies designed to escape rapidly the US " i m p e r i u m " in this crucial field. Yet, • Graciela Chichilnisky and Sam Cole, from a working paper prepared for the UNITAR Project: "Technology, DomesticDistribution, and North-South Relations."
150
Philippe de Seynes
according to many observers, Japan, where a set of different attitudes prevailed, seems today better positioned to gain a substantial share in the world market. Ecological Constraints
The neo-Maltusian debate, which started with the publication of Limits to Growth, is directly relevant to any conference on science and technology. T h e extent to which ecology will constrain development, through resource scarcities or through environment overloading, has only recently entered the consciousness of politicians. But, up to now, it has hardly had any effect on the formulation of development policies and strategies in the UN. If the vision of "overshoot and collapse" of the early reports of the Club of Rome has now somewhat receded, it is nevertheless clear that the cost of development, its speed and its contents, for both advanced and developing nations, may be significantly altered by what can be learned about these constraints, or simply by the perception of them in the absence of incontrovertible evidence. Since this debate is often formulated in simplified terms as "technology fixes versus life styles" (meaning frugality), it should be viewed as an important element of the agenda of inquiry on which both the UNCSTD and the UN long-term strategy will focus attention. A serious effort of information and conceptualization is, therefore, all the more desirable as this area is one in which policies cannot be derived from past experience, and in which only the development of empirical knowledge seems likely to reduce the uncertainties. This knowledge will not come easily. At present, most statements or projections about supply constraints are unhelpful because of their vagueness; it is more than probable that grave misallocations or misdirections of financial and human resources are taking place, either through panic-induced investments or through the failure to initiate, in due time and on the proper scale, investigations that would help in scientifically appraising (and possibly overcoming) the dangers of scarcities. It would, therefore, seem reasonable to expect from the UNCSTD well-articulated guidelines for priority action in research and development in the major fields where scarcities are possible. This would mean regularly ascertaining the state of the knowledge in regard to potentialities, technologies, costs and side effects,* and also the identification of the institutional factors which may inhibit or retard the advancement of knowledge (such as the present confidentiality surrounding research and development results, or the frequent conservative attitudes of experts and institutions). It is true that ecological constraints are sometimes seen as opportunities, under the assumption that a world of recognized scarcities and other limitations would be more conducive to the desirable social changes than one where no restraint is envisaged in the frantic pursuit of growth. With this line of approach, it would not be prudent to rely on "technological fixes," particularly as physical limits are ultimately inescapable. Rather, the solution would lie in changes in prevailing value systems, life styles, and consumption patterns. There is an intimation here of the Utopian mind, which often produces critical and rigorous analyses of most elements interacting in a given situation, save that which would lend coherence to the * See, for example, the UNITAR-IIASA Conference on "The Future Supply of Nature-Made Oil and Gas," 1976.
Science and Technology in GlobalPerspective
151
preferred scenario and generally escapes the test of plausibility--in this case, how the desirable changes in values are likely to take place. It is unlikely that the international community, in devising guidelines for the future, would rally to that line of thinking. It is much more probable that the next development strategy to be adopted by the UN will involve normative scenarios of high growth, even if, for the time being, most projections concocted in the gloom and moroseness of the recent years seemed to suggest a different course. This would mean that the often maligned "technology fixes" would receive a high degree of legitimacy. The strategy certainly should recognize the importance of change in life styles and consumption patterns, and explore all their complex and often conflicting implications, notably on employment and distribution. This should be done regardless of whether the advent of a "steady state" is anticipated, and at what point it appears on the time horizon, for patterns of consumption have serious social implications. But it matters a lot whether the difficult road to the steady state begins under prevailing conditions of widespread and appalling poverty, or at a future time when it can reasonably be expected that significant social progress will have been made. Therefore, the role of technology in overcoming environmental constraints would appear to be an essential element in world development, more specifically in the appraisal of future trends, possibly involving discontinuities in price relationships and external imbalances.
High Technology and the International Division of Labor Many of the "fixes" designed to overcome environmental constraints may be categorized as high technology. Certainly many of the processes related to resources and energy development or to climate would at present be included under that rapidly evolving definition. There are other fields where innovation may be even more of a determinant in the transformation of societies, notably those heralding the microprocessor and the communications revolution. The temptation may be great to dismiss high technology from a central place in the Conference on Science and Technology for Development, under the argument that it might be pre-empting the debate for questions which are of principal, if not exclusive, interest to the industrial countries. The temptation should be resisted. This is partly because high technology may be a factor of progress in the solution of some of the crucial problems of poor countries, such as geology and climate, but, above all, because it is called upon to play a fundamental role in the construction of a new international division of labor. There have been confusing and conflicting statements about the morphology of the forthcoming post-industrial society. But innovation and high technology are likely to figure in most scenarios of world development, whether those of high growth or of low growth, those insisting on social change or those content with traditional approaches, as an essential element in facilitating the geographic redeployment of industrial activities in consonance with the objectives already formulated in the United Nations, not only in general terms but in a very explicit quantitative target. * • See UNIDO Conference, Lima, Peru, March 1975: The share of the Third World in the world's industrial activities should reach 25% by the year 2000.
152
Philippe de Seynes
This view of the role of high technology need not detract from a policy of reorientation of industry towards national markets through the enhancement of domestic demand and the improvement of the lot of low-income groups. Nor does it mean that the potentiality afforded by small-scale, low-technology activities should be neglected. The spirit of "small is beautiful" has not penetrated many of the areas where it can be usefully applied. But, even with an adequate effort towards these selfreliant policies, most developing countries would continue to be affected by the evolution of world markets, and the reshuffling of activities which must take place to produce the desirable international specialization cannot very well be visualized without a dynamic effort by the advanced countries to shift their resources towards science-based and high technology industries and services, thereby facilitating the rational deployment of industrial activities in Third World countries. High technology should be seen as a kind of balancing wheel necessary to keep the world system moving towards a New International Economic Order, living up to the new perception of "entitlements" the world over. A new UN Development Strategy must encourage these changes as well as highlight their inevitable social costs so that they may be met equitably and within a coherent framework. The Conference on Science and Technology for Development should explore the scientific and technological conditions of their achievement. Given the foreseeable requirements to avoid scarcities, and the opportunities for a better life afforded by the constant flow of discoveries, high technology cannot fail to remain a very dynamic factor in the shaping of the proximate and long-term future. It may also help in fulfilling at least some of the aspirations nurtured by new generations which have received an education that seems to cry for a new scientific and technological era. It is of the essence of a New International Economic Order that this dynamism be made to serve the higher objectives of the international community, above all, the more rapid progress of Third World countries. To that effect, the far-reaching transformations which can be expected must be kept within the purview of international institutions so that priorities in action conform more or less to the agreed objectives, and so that the main actors in the drama of science and technology may at all times be aware of their implications and remain in some way accountable for them.