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Science and technology under constitutional separation of powers
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!&!dm&y in society, vol. 14, pp. a-73.1992 PrintdintheUSA.Allright6rmerved.
Science and Technology under Constitutional Separation of Powers James W. Curlin
ABSTRACT Under the US Constitution, three bodies share equal authority fir the Congress, and the Judiciary. Unlike governance - the Executive, parliamentary governments or authoritarian regimes, the President and the presidential advisors are but one element in tk equation that determines US policy. More often than not in the last 23 years, the President’s party has been the minority party in Congress. Focussing attention solely on the Office of the President, as has been the tendency, ignores the reality that the Congress continues to be a nu-@orforce for framing US policy for science and techno&y. Congress has a workable analytical and advwory system fir science and technology policy that meets its institutional needs. The executive bmnch, on the other hand, is still grappling with how factual, responsible, neutral analysis and advice can be efictively used in the politically charged atmosphere of the White House, where issues of science and technology often tahe a bachseat to economic, political, and ideak@cal constderations.
Introduction
Governance, power, and technology have been inseparable throughout history. Whether the source of economic advantage, the creation of tools of destruction and military dominance, or the benevolent gifts of medicine and agriculture, nations and their leaders use the comparative advantages they hold in science and technology to further national interDr. Curlin is Manager of Communication and Information Txhnologies Program, Office of Bzhnolqgy Assessment, US Congress. He was formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary fir Policy, Department of Commerce, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land and Water Resources, Department of the Interior. Curlin is a scientist and Icuuyr, admitted to pm&ice befire the US Supreme Court, the Federal Courts, and the courts of l’ennessee and the District of Columbia. He served with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and was a research scientist with Oah Ridge National Laboratory and the lknnessee Valley Authority. 63
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eats. The question we face - and the issue to be addressed by this forum - is how can the substance of science and technology be brought rationally, systematically, and beneficially into the political process? My experience is entirely American. We have grappled with the problems of science advice to the United States government since the early 1950s. The intellectual community began its musings long before that. With appropriate humility, may I observe that few nations have debated longer and harder, and acted more forcefully to establish communication between their science and engineering communities and their government as has the United States. But I am also astounded by foreign colleagues who perceive the American science advisory apparatus as a model worthy of emulation. Although I am personally proud of our achievements, you will see by my later comments that I believe we still have a long way to go. Bringing scientific knowledge and technical information into government decision making in the United States is complicated by our system of government. The United States Constitution established three equal branches of government, each of which is granted distinct and different powers. Another level of complexity was added when our founders chose to share sovereignty between the federal government and the individual states of the union by creating a federal republic. A pluralistic society has grown around this governmental system, based on the principles of participatory government. The individualism of Americans adds yet another complexity to the formulation of public policy But as I hope to show, this confusing, obtuse, and sometimes seemingly senseless system of governance has a robustness and durability that tends to favor good decisions over bad. I have chosen in this paper to concentrate on the organization of science and engineering advice under the separate powers of the President and the Congress. This is not to ignore the importance of the Judiciary in resolving controversial issues involving science and technology, but its role is unique and narrowly circumscribed and has been discussed eloquently elsewhere. Neither will I reiterate the importance of considering science and engineering information in government decisions; others have made the case persuasively The political tension between the President and Congress in setting national goals and policy is an important aspect to understand if one is to appreciate the nuances of the US science advisory system. I will set forth several propositions that define boundary conditions that tend to limit the ability of the US political system to respond to technical and scientific information. Mine will be neither an academic nor a philosophical discussion; it will be based on my experience as a practitioner in science and technology policy in the executive branch and the congress, and will have a certain inelegance that I hope my fellow participants in the forum will find informative if not literary.
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65
Who Is in Charge? must be perplexing for non-Americans to comprehend the workings of our government. The President, leader by title and international spokesman for the United States, is elected at large by the people in a national election held every four years, but no president may serve more than eight years. The members of congress - senators and members of the House of Representatives - are elected by the citizens of each state. Two Senators are elected at-large for six-year staggered terms, and members are elected for two-year terms, by the citizens residing in political subdivisions (congressional districts) of nearly equal population. In effect, Americans elect two different governments every four years. This has recently become more obvious. In 1990 we will have operated for 24 of the last 40 years (18 of the last 22 years) with presidents and congresses of different political parties. Parliamentary governments occasionally may have to contend with rule by a coalition of political factions, but generally, by definition, the legislature and the ministry are led by the same party. In the United States, the electorate recently seems to End comfort in a coalition government of Republican presidents and Democratic congresses. This results in the diffusion of power and responsibility between the two branches of government. It is precisely this kind of political balancing between President and Congress that the framers of the US Constitution considered necessary to prevent the central government from becoming too powerful and ideologically one-dimensional. In the 97th Congress (1981-831, the Senate was controlled by Republicans, the House of Representatives by Democrats, and President Reagan, a Republican, occupied the White House. Outsiders must wonder how, under any imaginable circumstances, such a political system could work. PaAsanship plays an important role in thrashing out policies that will be supported by the majority in a pluralistic society. However, it is a mistake to place too much emphasis on the differences between the political parties and ignore the fundamental differences between the institutions. In practice, it is only marginally easier for a president to get favored legislation passed by a congress controlled by the president’s party than for one facing the opposition. The Separation of Powers doctrine has created two institutions with common objectives, but with very different philosophies, procedures, and protocols for achieving them. The President and Congress exist as equals. This may be dif&ult for outsiders to understand when international television continually beams the image of the President in the ceremonial role as our nation’s leader. But it is with hat in hand that the President must go to the Congress with budget requests and proposals for laws to authorize new government programs, or with treaties to ratify; and it is the Congress that can override the President’s veto of a bill and make it become law despite the President’s wishes. It
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The presidency, with its cabinet and executive agencies, is structured vertically and is authoritarian, with the power residing at the top. The congress, with its committees and subcommittees, disperses its power horizontally among 535 elected representatives and relies on debate, negotiation, and compromise to achieve a workable consensus. Executive policies are hammered out in confidentiality and secrecy; congressional policies evolve in a fishbowl of public debate. These differences in behavior, procedure, and culture are important in considering how matters of science and technology enter into policy decisions of either branch.
Science and Technology Information for the President The title of this section may strike you as unusual, but I prefer to discuss the role of science and technology in presidential decisions in terms of information synthesis and delivery, rather than “advising” on science and technology issues, as have many of my colleagues.1 This brings me closer to the views of Harvard professor Ashton B. Carter, who stresses the need for open public debate on science issues, rather than with other distinguished observers who favor a few sages whispering in the ear of the President.2 A rich literature, contributed by a number of prominent scientists, has grown around the topic of science advice to the White House. I believe, however, that many of these discussions put too much emphasis on “what should be” while tending to overlook “what is.” The President is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the federal government. At the President’s beck and call are thousands of scientists and engineers in the executive agencies. The National Research Council (NRC), National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and National Academy of Engineering (NAE) stand at the ready with a government charter to marshal the assistance of non-government scientists and engineers. Why, then, does a CEO having these science and engineering resources suffer so for lack of information? I will discuss several propositions that I believe help explain the dysfunctions observed in the current presidential science and technology apparatus: 1. The Value of Science and lbchnology Advice in Presidential Making Is Only What the President Decides to Make of It
Decision
Thirty-eight years ago this month, William T Golden, then a special consultant to the White House, recommended to President Harry S. Truman that he appoint a Scientific Adviser to counsel him on science matters. The President took Golden’s advice and appointed Oliver Buckley. Other presidents followed suit, appointing outstanding scientists with wisdom and experience: George B. Ristiakowsy, Jerome B. Weisner, James R.
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Killian, Jr., Edward E. David, and Lee A. DuBridge, to name a few. President Dwight D. Eisenhower created a President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) whose members were distinguished scientists and engineers, and formally established an Of&e of Science and ‘Ibchnology (OST) in the White House. The period between the Eisenhower presidency and that of Lyndon B. Johnson were the heydays of presidential science advice. President Richard M. Nixon abolished the Office of Science and Technology in 1973 and transferred science advisory functions to the National Science Foundation (NSF), the federal agency that provides funds for basic academic research. President Nixon’s reasons for abolishing OST and PSAC were ostensibly related to his dissatisfaction with positions taken publicly by PSAC members in opposition to defense projects like anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and the civilian Super Sonic Transport (SST), and PSAC’s heavy emphasis on basic research rather than technology for meeting the energy problems at that time. For 22 years, up to the time Nixon dismantled the White House science apparatus, science advisers had served at the invitation and pleasure of the President. Their advice was sought and received at the behest of the President; and although things did not always go smoothly between the White House and the science adviser, and advice was not always accepted or acted upon, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson found value in the advice. In 1976, Congress created the current science advisory structure.~ The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is in the executive office of the President, not in the White House as was its predecessor, and the director is a presidential appointee who must be confirmed by the senate (science advisers prior to 1976 were not subject to senate confirmation). The Director of OSTP is not designated by law as the President’s science adviser, but the President can make such a designation. The President may also make the science adviser a cabinet officer, because the cabinet is a creature of the presidency and is not specified in the Constitution. OSTP has not achieved the prominence, visibility;and recognition that the earlier science advisers and the Office of Science and Technology enjoyed. Under Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald R. Reagan (two Republicans and a Democrat), OSTP has been understaffed, under-funded, and considered by many observers to be outside the circles where major decisions are made. Presidents seldom like having congress tell them what advice they need and who should give it to them, as it did in the 1976 Act. Other presidential advisers and assistants hold positions of personal trust and confidentiality. They may not be called by the Congress to testify on matters that would violate the President’s trust under the protection of the Separation of Powers doctrine. The Director of OSTP, whose authority is granted by the Congress, can be called to testify at congressional pro-
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ceedings, and must do so under penalty of law. Under these circumstances, can the Director of OSTP effectively fulfill his or her statutory responsibilities and still serve as science adviser or assistant to the President for science, as some have proposed? Perhaps the need would be better served if we lefi the decision of how the President organizes to obtain advice on science and engineering matters up to the President. This assumes that presidents are interested and understand the importance of reliable science and engineering information in decision making. There are four living former presidents. In the literature I have read on science advice to the President, I have seen no reference to a retrospective assessment of their personal experiences or opinions on the fin&ion, value, and pitfalls of science advisers and science advice. 2. Vested Interests in the Federal Agencies Consider Presidential Advisers to Be Threats, Not Allies
Science
The federal agencies have their own agendas, their oivn constituencies, and develop their own cultures. Presidents may come and go, but the bureaucracy continues on its course like so many armies driven by a holy mission. Often one or more agencies share responsibility for similar areas of research and development as part of their mission function. This frequently leads to overlap, competition, and in-fighting among the agencies. The OSTP Director is assigned the responsibility to referee interagency disagreements and to coordinate their activities. This is done through the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET), which can consume a considerable amount of time and energy of the OSTP stafY. It is nearly impossible for an executive agency to produce politically neutral analyses and reports on major science and technology issues. Agencies nurture parochial interests, and few - should they desire have the ability to look broadly enough across the breadth of concerns that must be taken into account at the presidential level. Even balanced analyses by competent scientists may find conclusions in the executive summary skewed by political appointees to agree with the notions or ideological bent of an administration. If the findings of a study are in major conflict with administration policy, it will likely be suppressed. !tb be effective, science advisers must have apolitical, competent, comprehensive analyses and unbiased information on the issues. The most important responsibility a science adviser has is to ensure that the President, the cabinet, and the White House staff have the clearest and fairest analyses of the issues on which to base decisions. PSAC once partially filled the need for policy information, but neither the Office of Science and Technology, nor its successor, the Office of Science and l&hnology Policy, had staffs large enough or intellectually equipped to
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gather information, analyze its meaning, and summarixe the results for policy use. The Department of Defense (DOD) is particularly chary of presidential science advisers because of their potential for upsetting decisions on major weapons systems. PSAC’s demise in 1973 is partially blamed on certain members’ outspoken opposition to the Safeguard ABM system favored by President Nixon. But without the intervention of a bold and effective science adviser, there is no other means to critique a DOD proposal or present a balanced view in the executive branch (it is nearly equally difficult to do so in the legislative branch). 3.1Mqjbr Decisions Seldom l’brn Solely on Scientific Fact Decisions about basic science, engineering, industrial competitiveness, space, and the environment often turn on factors unrelated to scientific or technical information. More and more, such decisions in the United States are made on affordability and budget considerations rather than scientific merit. Severe budget deficits and a negative balance in foreign trade has strained the expendable income of the federal government. Budgets tend to reflect priorities, so decisions on science expenditures are often weighed against other societal needs in addition to scientific merit. Environmental problems, though well documented by scientific evidence, may go unattended because of their economic impact on an industrial sector, national defense, or the cost of remedial action. The ideological bents of the President and the political parties also shade decisions that are sometimes made contrary to the weight of logic. Finally, public opinion, perceptions, and pragmatic politics guide government actions as much as evidence supporting the need for action.
Science and ?lxhnology Information in the Legislative Process In contrast to the vertical, authoritarian structure of the executive branch with the President at the apex of power, the power of the Congress is dispersed among 38 standing committees, 10 select committees, and four joint committees, each operating as nearly autonomous units. Within these committees there are about 150 subcommittees that attend to the legislative details of a subset of programs and issues within the parent committee’s jurisdiction. The Senate and the House of Representatives are organixed in a parallel fashion, each committee generally having a counterpart in the other body. The Senate and the House of Representatives are equal in power with only two exceptions: Bills appropriating money must originate in the House, and the Senate has the sole legislative power for advising and consenting to treaties and presidential appointments. The Speaker of the
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House and the Majority Leader of the Senate - with their minority party counterparts - preside over their respective legislative bodies more by suasion than by vested power. Nonetheless, their influence over the agenda and political strategies of their colleagues is substantial. Committee jurisdictions over issues that involve science and technology are fragmented and tend to ramify through nearly the entire institution. Decisions tend to produce legislated compromises more often than thoughtful strategic policies. The committees of the Congress have been likened to “fiefdoms,” “baronies,” or “tribes.” This is shorthand for acknowledging that considerable power and independence are exercised by the committee chairs. Some chairs code this power to subcommittees; others retain a major portion as their own. Providing science and technology information to Congress with its diffused power structure is a different matter from giving science advice to the President. First, the bipartisan nature of Congress demands a neutral stance on science and technology issues, devoid of ideological or political bias. Second, science and technology information must be available to a large number of decision makers with different levels of understanding. Third, although the staff members of the committees and those in the congressional offices are generally knowledgeable about many issues, they often cannot provide the in-depth evaluation and understanding needed for complex science and engineering decisions. There are about 38,000 employees in the legislative branch (19,724 are congressional stafYJ.This seems like a large number, but it is minuscule compared to the over three million employed by the executive departments and independent agencies that Congress oversees. Four support agencies provide science and technology information to Congress: Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Congressional Research Service KXS) of the Library of Congress, General Accounting Ofice (GAO), and the Congressional Budget Of&e (CBO). GAO is the largest, with broad responsibility for investigations, audits, and fiscal accounting, as well as policy analysis. CBO focuses on budget issues, some of which relate to science and technology. The bulk of science and technology information is handled by CRS and OTA. The functions of CRS and OTA are parallel, but dissimilar in many ways. CRS is the larger, having about 864 employees with nearly 100 (including clerical) assigned to the Science Policy and Environment and Natural Resources Policy Divisions which share major responsibility for S&T matters. OTA has about 200 persons (132 are analysts) working in nine scientific and technical subject programs. Any senator, member of the House of Representatives, or staff member on behalf of their member can request information, analyses, speeches, or position papers from the CRS. OTA’s process is more formal: Requests for assessments are received from chairs - or ranking minority members - of standing com-
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mittees,, although all members of Congress have access to the information produced. OTAs technology assessments are generally more comprehensive than those of CRS, and the issues addressed must have a high technical content. CFWs responsibilities are much broader than just science and technology, and its studies and analyses are generally more narrowly focused than those of OTA. OTA makes liberal use of outside experts and advisory panels to assist in its studies; CRS relies primarily on in-house analysts. Answers to CRS requests are considered to be confidential and the property of the requester (although CRS produces public information as well), whereas OTA’s reports are written with considerable public input and review, and once released, its reports are available to the general public through the Government Printing Office (GPO). The President and Congress share the common problems of fitting science and technology into political decisions involving tremendous uncertainty Legislators, like most of us, opt for clear statements of fact or recommendations when facing difficult decisions. Seldom is this possible, and in any event it is likely that there is more than one approach to solving any problem. OTA instead offers “options” to Congress and evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each. The members are thus given the benefit of analysis and reasoning for each plausible solution without being told the “best” solution. They are then ike to adjust their decisions to their own political preferences, such as a stronger federal, state, or private sector role in the issue. The option approach has been criticized as being too wishy-washy (nondeterminative), but it has thus far withstood the test of time as the best way (if not the optimal way) to provide information to a political body as diverse as the US Congress.
Observations
for Those Who Would Advise on Matters of Science and !llxhnology
Organizers of this forum urged us to provide recommendations based on our experience as science advisers to our governments. I am left in the embarrassing position of having just previously argued the virtues of providing options rather than recommendations. ‘lb ikltill my charge to the forum, while still maintaining my principles, I will instead make several “observations:” 1. Advisory Functions Must Match the Style, Procedure, and Personalities of the Institution First, what is the government’s basic form: authoritarian, a democratic republic, a federal republic, a parliamentary monarchy? Second, where is the major locus of decision making: political parties, president, legisla-
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ture, parliament? Third, what is the nature of the decision-making process: shared, centralized? Fourth, does the leadership encourage, welcome, and seek science and technology advice? Experience in the United States suggests that a president who wants to get and use science advice will get and use science advice. The corollary is also true. The form and functions of the US Government under the Constitution establishes equals between President and Congress in the decision-making process; therefore we must have parallel science and technology advisory functions for the President and Congress. Under a parliamentary system, or where the legislature is weak relative to the power of the executive, a different science advisory apparatus might serve better. 2. Information Must be Free From Bias, Based.on Fact, and Politically Neutral to Be Most Effective Scientific and technical facts must be clearly separated from opinions and ideological bias. Neither can a science adviser be perceived as a protagonist of science for science’s sake at the expense of balance and judgment. The best information is produced through competent neutrality by anal.ysts who are intellectually equipped to assess the subject, while leaving the politics to others. This is not always easily achieved, particularly in the political atmosphere surrounding the President. It is more easily attained in a diversified, decentralized, bipartisan political environment like Congress. 3. An Open Process for Analyzing Than a Closed Approach
Science and lkchnology Issues Is Better
No matter how large or competent the staff, valuable insights may be gained by involving the public in the analytical process. The pluralism of the US culture ensures that there are many sides to issues of science and technology and many ways to view them. Scientists, engineers, lawyers, economists, and lay persons all have perspectives, positions, and information that are important to the decision-making process. They are located at universities, science and engineering academies, professional associations, state governments, in corporations and businesses, at special interest groups, and within the public at large. If the analytical process is internalized and closed to outside participation and review, there is a high risk that options may be overlooked or facts missed, and inaccuracies or misstatements can result. The burden of analyzing and compiling reports in a public “fishbowl” is less on those of us serving the Congress than the burdens on our counterparts in the executive branch who serve the President. Openness is antithetical to presidential decision making. How would it look for a president to make a decision against the public advice of the president’s science adviser?
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Public participation in “analysis” can be accommodated while still maintaining confidentiality in the “advice.” Fact finding - if facts are at issue A can best be discovered by full and open debate. Weighing the evidence and making judgments on the evidence can be private and con& dential. Issues of national security and defense are of course exceptions. 4. Globalization Is Placing New Demands on the Science and ~chnology Advisory Apparatus. Global environmental issues, transboundary telecommunications, transnational corporations, interlocked securities markets, and economic interdependency are current indicators of a world growing figuratively smaller and nations becoming more similar as a result of technology. The breadth of enquiry and analysis of science and technology issues must widen, as our national futures now depend as much on the actions of others as it does on our own determination. Intelligence about discoveries, developments, and economic and technical strategies in other countries assume more importance than they once did. The test of our collective value as science and technology advisers to our governments may ultimately be judged on how well we perform our responsibilities in addressing the pressing global problems connected with technologic and economic development for all of humankind.
!&!dm&y in society, vol. 14, pp. a-73.1992 PrintdintheUSA.Allright6rmerved.
Science and Technology under Constitutional Separation of Powers James W. Curlin
ABSTRACT Under the US Constitution, three bodies share equal authority fir the Congress, and the Judiciary. Unlike governance - the Executive, parliamentary governments or authoritarian regimes, the President and the presidential advisors are but one element in tk equation that determines US policy. More often than not in the last 23 years, the President’s party has been the minority party in Congress. Focussing attention solely on the Office of the President, as has been the tendency, ignores the reality that the Congress continues to be a nu-@orforce for framing US policy for science and techno&y. Congress has a workable analytical and advwory system fir science and technology policy that meets its institutional needs. The executive bmnch, on the other hand, is still grappling with how factual, responsible, neutral analysis and advice can be efictively used in the politically charged atmosphere of the White House, where issues of science and technology often tahe a bachseat to economic, political, and ideak@cal constderations.
Introduction
Governance, power, and technology have been inseparable throughout history. Whether the source of economic advantage, the creation of tools of destruction and military dominance, or the benevolent gifts of medicine and agriculture, nations and their leaders use the comparative advantages they hold in science and technology to further national interDr. Curlin is Manager of Communication and Information Txhnologies Program, Office of Bzhnolqgy Assessment, US Congress. He was formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary fir Policy, Department of Commerce, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land and Water Resources, Department of the Interior. Curlin is a scientist and Icuuyr, admitted to pm&ice befire the US Supreme Court, the Federal Courts, and the courts of l’ennessee and the District of Columbia. He served with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and was a research scientist with Oah Ridge National Laboratory and the lknnessee Valley Authority. 63
64
J. W. Curlin
eats. The question we face - and the issue to be addressed by this forum - is how can the substance of science and technology be brought rationally, systematically, and beneficially into the political process? My experience is entirely American. We have grappled with the problems of science advice to the United States government since the early 1950s. The intellectual community began its musings long before that. With appropriate humility, may I observe that few nations have debated longer and harder, and acted more forcefully to establish communication between their science and engineering communities and their government as has the United States. But I am also astounded by foreign colleagues who perceive the American science advisory apparatus as a model worthy of emulation. Although I am personally proud of our achievements, you will see by my later comments that I believe we still have a long way to go. Bringing scientific knowledge and technical information into government decision making in the United States is complicated by our system of government. The United States Constitution established three equal branches of government, each of which is granted distinct and different powers. Another level of complexity was added when our founders chose to share sovereignty between the federal government and the individual states of the union by creating a federal republic. A pluralistic society has grown around this governmental system, based on the principles of participatory government. The individualism of Americans adds yet another complexity to the formulation of public policy But as I hope to show, this confusing, obtuse, and sometimes seemingly senseless system of governance has a robustness and durability that tends to favor good decisions over bad. I have chosen in this paper to concentrate on the organization of science and engineering advice under the separate powers of the President and the Congress. This is not to ignore the importance of the Judiciary in resolving controversial issues involving science and technology, but its role is unique and narrowly circumscribed and has been discussed eloquently elsewhere. Neither will I reiterate the importance of considering science and engineering information in government decisions; others have made the case persuasively The political tension between the President and Congress in setting national goals and policy is an important aspect to understand if one is to appreciate the nuances of the US science advisory system. I will set forth several propositions that define boundary conditions that tend to limit the ability of the US political system to respond to technical and scientific information. Mine will be neither an academic nor a philosophical discussion; it will be based on my experience as a practitioner in science and technology policy in the executive branch and the congress, and will have a certain inelegance that I hope my fellow participants in the forum will find informative if not literary.
Science and !&cbnology under Sepamtion of Powers
65
Who Is in Charge? must be perplexing for non-Americans to comprehend the workings of our government. The President, leader by title and international spokesman for the United States, is elected at large by the people in a national election held every four years, but no president may serve more than eight years. The members of congress - senators and members of the House of Representatives - are elected by the citizens of each state. Two Senators are elected at-large for six-year staggered terms, and members are elected for two-year terms, by the citizens residing in political subdivisions (congressional districts) of nearly equal population. In effect, Americans elect two different governments every four years. This has recently become more obvious. In 1990 we will have operated for 24 of the last 40 years (18 of the last 22 years) with presidents and congresses of different political parties. Parliamentary governments occasionally may have to contend with rule by a coalition of political factions, but generally, by definition, the legislature and the ministry are led by the same party. In the United States, the electorate recently seems to End comfort in a coalition government of Republican presidents and Democratic congresses. This results in the diffusion of power and responsibility between the two branches of government. It is precisely this kind of political balancing between President and Congress that the framers of the US Constitution considered necessary to prevent the central government from becoming too powerful and ideologically one-dimensional. In the 97th Congress (1981-831, the Senate was controlled by Republicans, the House of Representatives by Democrats, and President Reagan, a Republican, occupied the White House. Outsiders must wonder how, under any imaginable circumstances, such a political system could work. PaAsanship plays an important role in thrashing out policies that will be supported by the majority in a pluralistic society. However, it is a mistake to place too much emphasis on the differences between the political parties and ignore the fundamental differences between the institutions. In practice, it is only marginally easier for a president to get favored legislation passed by a congress controlled by the president’s party than for one facing the opposition. The Separation of Powers doctrine has created two institutions with common objectives, but with very different philosophies, procedures, and protocols for achieving them. The President and Congress exist as equals. This may be dif&ult for outsiders to understand when international television continually beams the image of the President in the ceremonial role as our nation’s leader. But it is with hat in hand that the President must go to the Congress with budget requests and proposals for laws to authorize new government programs, or with treaties to ratify; and it is the Congress that can override the President’s veto of a bill and make it become law despite the President’s wishes. It
66
J. W. Curlin
The presidency, with its cabinet and executive agencies, is structured vertically and is authoritarian, with the power residing at the top. The congress, with its committees and subcommittees, disperses its power horizontally among 535 elected representatives and relies on debate, negotiation, and compromise to achieve a workable consensus. Executive policies are hammered out in confidentiality and secrecy; congressional policies evolve in a fishbowl of public debate. These differences in behavior, procedure, and culture are important in considering how matters of science and technology enter into policy decisions of either branch.
Science and Technology Information for the President The title of this section may strike you as unusual, but I prefer to discuss the role of science and technology in presidential decisions in terms of information synthesis and delivery, rather than “advising” on science and technology issues, as have many of my colleagues.1 This brings me closer to the views of Harvard professor Ashton B. Carter, who stresses the need for open public debate on science issues, rather than with other distinguished observers who favor a few sages whispering in the ear of the President.2 A rich literature, contributed by a number of prominent scientists, has grown around the topic of science advice to the White House. I believe, however, that many of these discussions put too much emphasis on “what should be” while tending to overlook “what is.” The President is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the federal government. At the President’s beck and call are thousands of scientists and engineers in the executive agencies. The National Research Council (NRC), National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and National Academy of Engineering (NAE) stand at the ready with a government charter to marshal the assistance of non-government scientists and engineers. Why, then, does a CEO having these science and engineering resources suffer so for lack of information? I will discuss several propositions that I believe help explain the dysfunctions observed in the current presidential science and technology apparatus: 1. The Value of Science and lbchnology Advice in Presidential Making Is Only What the President Decides to Make of It
Decision
Thirty-eight years ago this month, William T Golden, then a special consultant to the White House, recommended to President Harry S. Truman that he appoint a Scientific Adviser to counsel him on science matters. The President took Golden’s advice and appointed Oliver Buckley. Other presidents followed suit, appointing outstanding scientists with wisdom and experience: George B. Ristiakowsy, Jerome B. Weisner, James R.
Scienceand lbchno@y
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Killian, Jr., Edward E. David, and Lee A. DuBridge, to name a few. President Dwight D. Eisenhower created a President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) whose members were distinguished scientists and engineers, and formally established an Of&e of Science and ‘Ibchnology (OST) in the White House. The period between the Eisenhower presidency and that of Lyndon B. Johnson were the heydays of presidential science advice. President Richard M. Nixon abolished the Office of Science and Technology in 1973 and transferred science advisory functions to the National Science Foundation (NSF), the federal agency that provides funds for basic academic research. President Nixon’s reasons for abolishing OST and PSAC were ostensibly related to his dissatisfaction with positions taken publicly by PSAC members in opposition to defense projects like anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and the civilian Super Sonic Transport (SST), and PSAC’s heavy emphasis on basic research rather than technology for meeting the energy problems at that time. For 22 years, up to the time Nixon dismantled the White House science apparatus, science advisers had served at the invitation and pleasure of the President. Their advice was sought and received at the behest of the President; and although things did not always go smoothly between the White House and the science adviser, and advice was not always accepted or acted upon, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson found value in the advice. In 1976, Congress created the current science advisory structure.~ The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is in the executive office of the President, not in the White House as was its predecessor, and the director is a presidential appointee who must be confirmed by the senate (science advisers prior to 1976 were not subject to senate confirmation). The Director of OSTP is not designated by law as the President’s science adviser, but the President can make such a designation. The President may also make the science adviser a cabinet officer, because the cabinet is a creature of the presidency and is not specified in the Constitution. OSTP has not achieved the prominence, visibility;and recognition that the earlier science advisers and the Office of Science and Technology enjoyed. Under Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald R. Reagan (two Republicans and a Democrat), OSTP has been understaffed, under-funded, and considered by many observers to be outside the circles where major decisions are made. Presidents seldom like having congress tell them what advice they need and who should give it to them, as it did in the 1976 Act. Other presidential advisers and assistants hold positions of personal trust and confidentiality. They may not be called by the Congress to testify on matters that would violate the President’s trust under the protection of the Separation of Powers doctrine. The Director of OSTP, whose authority is granted by the Congress, can be called to testify at congressional pro-
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ceedings, and must do so under penalty of law. Under these circumstances, can the Director of OSTP effectively fulfill his or her statutory responsibilities and still serve as science adviser or assistant to the President for science, as some have proposed? Perhaps the need would be better served if we lefi the decision of how the President organizes to obtain advice on science and engineering matters up to the President. This assumes that presidents are interested and understand the importance of reliable science and engineering information in decision making. There are four living former presidents. In the literature I have read on science advice to the President, I have seen no reference to a retrospective assessment of their personal experiences or opinions on the fin&ion, value, and pitfalls of science advisers and science advice. 2. Vested Interests in the Federal Agencies Consider Presidential Advisers to Be Threats, Not Allies
Science
The federal agencies have their own agendas, their oivn constituencies, and develop their own cultures. Presidents may come and go, but the bureaucracy continues on its course like so many armies driven by a holy mission. Often one or more agencies share responsibility for similar areas of research and development as part of their mission function. This frequently leads to overlap, competition, and in-fighting among the agencies. The OSTP Director is assigned the responsibility to referee interagency disagreements and to coordinate their activities. This is done through the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET), which can consume a considerable amount of time and energy of the OSTP stafY. It is nearly impossible for an executive agency to produce politically neutral analyses and reports on major science and technology issues. Agencies nurture parochial interests, and few - should they desire have the ability to look broadly enough across the breadth of concerns that must be taken into account at the presidential level. Even balanced analyses by competent scientists may find conclusions in the executive summary skewed by political appointees to agree with the notions or ideological bent of an administration. If the findings of a study are in major conflict with administration policy, it will likely be suppressed. !tb be effective, science advisers must have apolitical, competent, comprehensive analyses and unbiased information on the issues. The most important responsibility a science adviser has is to ensure that the President, the cabinet, and the White House staff have the clearest and fairest analyses of the issues on which to base decisions. PSAC once partially filled the need for policy information, but neither the Office of Science and Technology, nor its successor, the Office of Science and l&hnology Policy, had staffs large enough or intellectually equipped to
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gather information, analyze its meaning, and summarixe the results for policy use. The Department of Defense (DOD) is particularly chary of presidential science advisers because of their potential for upsetting decisions on major weapons systems. PSAC’s demise in 1973 is partially blamed on certain members’ outspoken opposition to the Safeguard ABM system favored by President Nixon. But without the intervention of a bold and effective science adviser, there is no other means to critique a DOD proposal or present a balanced view in the executive branch (it is nearly equally difficult to do so in the legislative branch). 3.1Mqjbr Decisions Seldom l’brn Solely on Scientific Fact Decisions about basic science, engineering, industrial competitiveness, space, and the environment often turn on factors unrelated to scientific or technical information. More and more, such decisions in the United States are made on affordability and budget considerations rather than scientific merit. Severe budget deficits and a negative balance in foreign trade has strained the expendable income of the federal government. Budgets tend to reflect priorities, so decisions on science expenditures are often weighed against other societal needs in addition to scientific merit. Environmental problems, though well documented by scientific evidence, may go unattended because of their economic impact on an industrial sector, national defense, or the cost of remedial action. The ideological bents of the President and the political parties also shade decisions that are sometimes made contrary to the weight of logic. Finally, public opinion, perceptions, and pragmatic politics guide government actions as much as evidence supporting the need for action.
Science and ?lxhnology Information in the Legislative Process In contrast to the vertical, authoritarian structure of the executive branch with the President at the apex of power, the power of the Congress is dispersed among 38 standing committees, 10 select committees, and four joint committees, each operating as nearly autonomous units. Within these committees there are about 150 subcommittees that attend to the legislative details of a subset of programs and issues within the parent committee’s jurisdiction. The Senate and the House of Representatives are organixed in a parallel fashion, each committee generally having a counterpart in the other body. The Senate and the House of Representatives are equal in power with only two exceptions: Bills appropriating money must originate in the House, and the Senate has the sole legislative power for advising and consenting to treaties and presidential appointments. The Speaker of the
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House and the Majority Leader of the Senate - with their minority party counterparts - preside over their respective legislative bodies more by suasion than by vested power. Nonetheless, their influence over the agenda and political strategies of their colleagues is substantial. Committee jurisdictions over issues that involve science and technology are fragmented and tend to ramify through nearly the entire institution. Decisions tend to produce legislated compromises more often than thoughtful strategic policies. The committees of the Congress have been likened to “fiefdoms,” “baronies,” or “tribes.” This is shorthand for acknowledging that considerable power and independence are exercised by the committee chairs. Some chairs code this power to subcommittees; others retain a major portion as their own. Providing science and technology information to Congress with its diffused power structure is a different matter from giving science advice to the President. First, the bipartisan nature of Congress demands a neutral stance on science and technology issues, devoid of ideological or political bias. Second, science and technology information must be available to a large number of decision makers with different levels of understanding. Third, although the staff members of the committees and those in the congressional offices are generally knowledgeable about many issues, they often cannot provide the in-depth evaluation and understanding needed for complex science and engineering decisions. There are about 38,000 employees in the legislative branch (19,724 are congressional stafYJ.This seems like a large number, but it is minuscule compared to the over three million employed by the executive departments and independent agencies that Congress oversees. Four support agencies provide science and technology information to Congress: Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Congressional Research Service KXS) of the Library of Congress, General Accounting Ofice (GAO), and the Congressional Budget Of&e (CBO). GAO is the largest, with broad responsibility for investigations, audits, and fiscal accounting, as well as policy analysis. CBO focuses on budget issues, some of which relate to science and technology. The bulk of science and technology information is handled by CRS and OTA. The functions of CRS and OTA are parallel, but dissimilar in many ways. CRS is the larger, having about 864 employees with nearly 100 (including clerical) assigned to the Science Policy and Environment and Natural Resources Policy Divisions which share major responsibility for S&T matters. OTA has about 200 persons (132 are analysts) working in nine scientific and technical subject programs. Any senator, member of the House of Representatives, or staff member on behalf of their member can request information, analyses, speeches, or position papers from the CRS. OTA’s process is more formal: Requests for assessments are received from chairs - or ranking minority members - of standing com-
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mittees,, although all members of Congress have access to the information produced. OTAs technology assessments are generally more comprehensive than those of CRS, and the issues addressed must have a high technical content. CFWs responsibilities are much broader than just science and technology, and its studies and analyses are generally more narrowly focused than those of OTA. OTA makes liberal use of outside experts and advisory panels to assist in its studies; CRS relies primarily on in-house analysts. Answers to CRS requests are considered to be confidential and the property of the requester (although CRS produces public information as well), whereas OTA’s reports are written with considerable public input and review, and once released, its reports are available to the general public through the Government Printing Office (GPO). The President and Congress share the common problems of fitting science and technology into political decisions involving tremendous uncertainty Legislators, like most of us, opt for clear statements of fact or recommendations when facing difficult decisions. Seldom is this possible, and in any event it is likely that there is more than one approach to solving any problem. OTA instead offers “options” to Congress and evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each. The members are thus given the benefit of analysis and reasoning for each plausible solution without being told the “best” solution. They are then ike to adjust their decisions to their own political preferences, such as a stronger federal, state, or private sector role in the issue. The option approach has been criticized as being too wishy-washy (nondeterminative), but it has thus far withstood the test of time as the best way (if not the optimal way) to provide information to a political body as diverse as the US Congress.
Observations
for Those Who Would Advise on Matters of Science and !llxhnology
Organizers of this forum urged us to provide recommendations based on our experience as science advisers to our governments. I am left in the embarrassing position of having just previously argued the virtues of providing options rather than recommendations. ‘lb ikltill my charge to the forum, while still maintaining my principles, I will instead make several “observations:” 1. Advisory Functions Must Match the Style, Procedure, and Personalities of the Institution First, what is the government’s basic form: authoritarian, a democratic republic, a federal republic, a parliamentary monarchy? Second, where is the major locus of decision making: political parties, president, legisla-
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ture, parliament? Third, what is the nature of the decision-making process: shared, centralized? Fourth, does the leadership encourage, welcome, and seek science and technology advice? Experience in the United States suggests that a president who wants to get and use science advice will get and use science advice. The corollary is also true. The form and functions of the US Government under the Constitution establishes equals between President and Congress in the decision-making process; therefore we must have parallel science and technology advisory functions for the President and Congress. Under a parliamentary system, or where the legislature is weak relative to the power of the executive, a different science advisory apparatus might serve better. 2. Information Must be Free From Bias, Based.on Fact, and Politically Neutral to Be Most Effective Scientific and technical facts must be clearly separated from opinions and ideological bias. Neither can a science adviser be perceived as a protagonist of science for science’s sake at the expense of balance and judgment. The best information is produced through competent neutrality by anal.ysts who are intellectually equipped to assess the subject, while leaving the politics to others. This is not always easily achieved, particularly in the political atmosphere surrounding the President. It is more easily attained in a diversified, decentralized, bipartisan political environment like Congress. 3. An Open Process for Analyzing Than a Closed Approach
Science and lkchnology Issues Is Better
No matter how large or competent the staff, valuable insights may be gained by involving the public in the analytical process. The pluralism of the US culture ensures that there are many sides to issues of science and technology and many ways to view them. Scientists, engineers, lawyers, economists, and lay persons all have perspectives, positions, and information that are important to the decision-making process. They are located at universities, science and engineering academies, professional associations, state governments, in corporations and businesses, at special interest groups, and within the public at large. If the analytical process is internalized and closed to outside participation and review, there is a high risk that options may be overlooked or facts missed, and inaccuracies or misstatements can result. The burden of analyzing and compiling reports in a public “fishbowl” is less on those of us serving the Congress than the burdens on our counterparts in the executive branch who serve the President. Openness is antithetical to presidential decision making. How would it look for a president to make a decision against the public advice of the president’s science adviser?
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Public participation in “analysis” can be accommodated while still maintaining confidentiality in the “advice.” Fact finding - if facts are at issue A can best be discovered by full and open debate. Weighing the evidence and making judgments on the evidence can be private and con& dential. Issues of national security and defense are of course exceptions. 4. Globalization Is Placing New Demands on the Science and ~chnology Advisory Apparatus. Global environmental issues, transboundary telecommunications, transnational corporations, interlocked securities markets, and economic interdependency are current indicators of a world growing figuratively smaller and nations becoming more similar as a result of technology. The breadth of enquiry and analysis of science and technology issues must widen, as our national futures now depend as much on the actions of others as it does on our own determination. Intelligence about discoveries, developments, and economic and technical strategies in other countries assume more importance than they once did. The test of our collective value as science and technology advisers to our governments may ultimately be judged on how well we perform our responsibilities in addressing the pressing global problems connected with technologic and economic development for all of humankind.