Science policy in Sweden: sectorization and adjustment to crisis

SUiWMARY Sweden is a small industrial country that is having to reformulate its tectmoiogy and science rr.lolicy in a rapidly charsgr’ngin terna tionaf environmer, t. Outing the early 196O*ls, in Sweden as in other countries, GNP was taken as an indicator (.Bfsrzientificgrowth. Today the science policy discussion I~ more centered around the questic 1 of the polr’tical direction of science in accordance with social goals defined along sectoral lines. This change of science policy doctrine reflects modifications in

important

conditions for tile production

of scientific knouvledw. This paper traces some of the1changes in the dominant science policy doctrine, and an attGImpt is m.& to &row into relief the backg,round to present day efforts at reorienting L*chnologh and science policy.

Ir9

this con-

text the paper touches upon the role of futu*.resstudies, the divergence of views between establiShed interests and radical critics, as wt~llas the emlzrgenceof trade union interest in science pol;cy i&sues.Finally then? is a brief review of some of tht, measures introduced !n 75479to meet the challenge of trie next decade.

science policyin swefien: sectorisation andaid~ustmen cr .

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by Aant E LZINGA University

of Gothenburg,

Sdidra vci;gen 67, S.4 72 54 Gii teborg, Swden

WTRODUCT ION The inr ernatic nal crisis has had repercusions on Sweden’s science and technology policies. A3 a ~-all industrial country, Sweden is now striving to develop a selective Gelicy aimed at strengthening R&D potential in specific areas of strategic interest to export-oriented in&tries a# their particular ‘niches’ in the internationz! market. The discussion during the last couple cf vears has . the higher educational system, and the need to make bas: c research more t effective. The rapid expansion of thz vocational tasks oC the university system, combined with a strong sector - and hence applied - orientation; of research resources during the late 1960’s and early 19570’s, has meant a relative lapse in basic reseirrch. This is being admitted, eveh by some members of the former Social Dttmocratic government which wa$, in office at the time. The present government in contrast is trying to gairz the reputation of being a strong supporter of basic research. The Ministry “of Education in its part of the budget proposition for 1979180 proposes an i&ease of about 100 million Swedish Crowns (SCr) for research. Apart from ‘this the government counts on an additional increase of nearly 200 million SCr earmarked for developmgent in the fields of energy, space technology .jnd technology generally. Altogether this is still only a small injection wh& compared to the total proposed state budget of 5 billion SCr for R&D. (R&D took 3.2% cf the state budget last year). It should also be noted that the allocation to space research is in fact a gift to on.: of Sweden .s maloT industries, ccmpens;lting for the termination of plans ito develop a new military aircralt after Viggen. Ketertheless, the proposed increases arc enoq$ to mark a reorientation in science and technology policy thinking. This is ffurther corrcborated by the Ministry of Industry’s proposition for 1979/80, which 41s for various

measures to stimulate industry’s own R&D and the possibility of fore gn technology imports. In February 1978 the government charged the Ro:Jal Academy of Engineering Sciences (JVA) and the National Board of Technological Developmc*nt (ST(J) with the task of reviewing the country’s technical-industrial competence with a long-term perspective. Their studies and plans of acthon are ~to be completed during 1979. Already WA together with the Royal Academy of Sciences, have sent out a warning regilrding’the decreasing numbers of graduate and post-graduate students from the naturat sciences 2nd engineering faculties. If th.e recent trend continues it is expected that there will be a serious shortage 0-Tcompetent scientific manpower in the 1980’s.“’ To help turn :he tide the recent proposition from the Ministry of Education calls for the introduction of a state supported popular science jou,nal for primary schools and the publicat ,on of a series of inexpensive pocket book literature on science. Disseminatit)n of scientific information to the public generally is also emphasized. At the ideological level this is meant tt:, help curb current jlopulist and anti-intellectual tendencies that have ariseq in the wakaeof the dfzbateon nuclear power reactors and hybrid-DNA research. A further feature in the government’s proposition to Parliament is the introduction of fi\le year plans for science and science policy. Parliament would vote on these in the same way as is presently donz in the case of perspectivepians in the ttefence sector. This system, if accepted, is scheduled to start operating in tl-c period!after the next elections (elections are in the Fall 1979). In this way it is hoped to obtain a better overview and continuity in zientzfic growth. The implications of the last decade of university reforms are also being d,scussed. One of the features of the “new university’ is tll, inclusion of instiitutions of higher vocational training that were previously outside the universtty Lystem. This new situation raises the issue of providing research facilities for these ‘new’ vocational lines ?r(ritltinthe higher educational system, Trade union OrgarizatiQns, and in part the Social Democratic Party, Eeethis reform as a springboard for ldemcl;r3tiratrot~ of the control over R&D resources. In this context science policy is erlvisaged as a component part df a stratel;y not only for economic grow II, but also for economic democracy. In the following a review is made of certain aspects gf the Swedish ‘sciencediscussion’ Gnce the mid&ties. It is held that the present reorientation must be see11 against thz background of the transition process that has takl:n

:I See [23].

place in xiencc policy thinking, from that of the first OECD-doctrirx to that of the second OECD##doctrine. Generally the development can be cl taracterixd as one from science policy to technology policy. Present attempts to define a more selective policy occur within the conceptual framqwork of tradition and criticism at :he level of science policy doctrine. THE SWEDISH RES1IARCl-I SYSTEM The Swedish R&D system, consisting of lthose who carry on research and developmental activities as well as groups, organisations etc. influencing the orientation and vol ltne of Swedish: science, is schematically represented in fig. 1 which i? t Iken from a recent official report. This system has three levels1 _- the actual bearers of R&D activities at the bott am, the natixral policy-, making and advisor) bod:es xt the top, and at an intermediate level the steering and allocating agencies. e.g., granting bodies that translate general policy considerationi into mc;e concrete measures to steer R&D activities1 in various ways. For the purpose; of analysis one may distinguish four separate more or less coherent subsystems: the R&D subsystem serving business enterprise., the one- serving the general governmental sector, the subsystcn. associated with higher education., and finally the R.&D subsystem of private non-profit organisations. In a(:tual practice there are msny interconnections between these four suLsystems. The first three are the most significant in terms L)fresources. The

number of people in Sweden actively involved in R&D in the early 1970 was reckoned to be close to ‘35,000. In 1975 there qwereabout 40,000. Nearly 15,000 of these were located in the university sector. This latter figure mlay be further broken down into 2150 actual research ptisitions (professors, docents and research assistants); which increased by about 200% during the five years 1970- 1975. Acc:ording to an official statistical survey in 1973 there were about 25,030 people engaged in R&D in the business enterprise sector that year, producing a work capacity of 19,253 man years. Of these ol’lly 21% had more than two years academic training. The number with graduate training was 520. For 1975 the corresponding manpower capacity associated with R&D in (business enterprises is reckoned to be about 20,600. Of this work 23% W,JScarried out by people with academic traiuing. One fourth cf industry’s R&D potential in manpower terms lay in processing and production associated with transport and means of transport) another fourth in the electrotechnical industry, and 15cn in engineering and manufacturing industries. A stud!! carried out by the Acatlemy of Engineering Sciences reveals that in 1972 between 600043000 people in industry were

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Science policy in Sweden

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connected to R&D activities for military ends.* On the financial side the picture for 1974 was roughly as follows: about one half of the 4 billiion SCr annual investment in R&D was provided by the state, while more thdn half of R&D was carried out within industry [28, p. 161. Today about half of the R&D activity is financed through the state budget. In 1974/75 2.3 Mlion SCr went to R&D over the state budget. Jn 1~75/76 the figure was 3.2 billion, in 1976177 it was 3.6 billion and in the budget year 1977/78 it is reported to be 4.45 billion SCr for R&.Dactivity financed over tjne state budget, being 3.6% of the whole state budget [28a] , R&D in state run astivity financed in other ways - e.g. over the defence budget, or the R&D of state owned enterprises - is not included in these figures. It is generally reckoned that the business enterprise sector (private, state owned, IIILqicipal companies all together) invests an aqount for R&D that is about qua1 tJ the amount the state puts in via its ‘annual budget_ Resources are concentr&.J in the business enterprise sector. In 1975 the firms with over 1000 emk?oyees had 85% of the R&D cake, measured in monetary terms. Generallv Industry divides its R&D into’90% ‘D’ and 10% ‘R’. W course pharmaceutical and other branches with intense R&D infras;ructures have a higher than average proportion. The state budget finances both basic research and applied sci’;:ncetied to socially determined goals. This latter is called sector-oriented re,search activity* and it has come to dominate during the last five years. Prithin sectorsteered science, investment for military ends dominates. T’lbeuni;versity sector, which is the relatively “free sector”, gets about one tlhirc!lof the state R&D budget. (Fig. 2, 3 and table 1 show something of the .t:inancialside and its breakdown in different ways.)

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Fig. 3. Relationship between R&D per sector. 1973 in millions SCr.

Table 1 R&D allocated over governmental budget 1976177 per social sector Sector Labour market measues Housing Energy Communications Agriculture & forestry etc. Industrial development Social welfare etc. Environmental protection General research Education Defence International cooperation _

Sorcrce: Budget proposal 1977.

Millions SCr -13 21 234 69 347 155 172 107 1458 52 852 125

Science policy in Sweden

123

THE SECTOR.IZATIONPRINCIPLE A considerable amount of the state-financing of R&D has to be seen in the light of the needs of the business enterprises, particularly the larger corporations. Some years ago a study commissioned by the Ministry of Industry, in a sub-report concerning ind nstrial R&D, referred to the fundamental diMon of labour between state and private enterprise as follows: The state support to R&D concerns two aspects, one being R&D as part of the developmental program of the stat.e sector, an the other part being R&D to stimulate development in regions where the state does no; have direct responsibility. The motives for R&D investments in the latter case vary. They are founded partly on a role-division between state and private enterprise, llhhich hjs gradually developed in Swedish society, and partly on ways in which the i rdu,trial policy is meant to transform society. Here support is dependen on political goals . . . [28] . In Sweden the state has a key rcle as research financer and intervener in the long-term planning of new R&D projects, as well as in exploitation b3f known resuits. A principle for the centrally-steered coordination of statefinanced R&D in accordance with needs of both state and private enterprises is the ‘sector princi@e’. According this principle the organ responsible fi>r planning and development in a certain sector of society must also formulate and finance that sector’s R&D program, after careful weighing of altern&iv:s. ‘Today tlhe sector principle is the factor which more than any other ies behind the institutional changes that occur’, [28, p. 151. The sector principle has direct consequences for the organization and economics of research, the structure of the system. Indirectly it :r.lsoa:ffects the ‘inner’ conditions for knowledge production, for example th.rough program budgeting, which puts specific demands even on long-term motivated research. That which was once called “basic research’ takes up #about l&20% of the monetary resources going to R&D. But this does not mean that it is thereby ‘free’ from the influence of sectoriz.ation. Tl;;e main trend in the Swedish science discussion 1965 19’75 has been, on the one hand a reappraisal of the fisst OECD docirine and its developmental optimism, and a general ratnon;ilisation of the transition to sector-orientation; and on the other hand a reaction to this transition. The main trend in policy has been to extend the questions of ::ience policy to become sci,ence and techrlology policy. In practice the strong trend of sectorization !.leans that today the perspective is more one of technology policy than sciewe policy. ‘Thus one

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A. Ekitlga

can see the general development as one porn science policy to technology policy.

FROM SCIENCE POLICY TO TECHNOLOGYPOLICY One can make a schematic periodization of the history of the officially accepted science policy doctrine. I distinguish tEbee periods: I. The ‘heroic’ period which bore the stamp Jf GNP-thinking and reached its culmination in the mid-60’s. II. The period of reassessment which began in the late-60’s and was definitely completed by 1975. III. The ‘technocratic’ period characterized by full steam for the sector principle. This is the period we are in now. The implementation of the sector principle has been stepwise during the years 1970-1975; more th?n ten new sectoral R&D steering organs were created, and several authorities got their own R&D budgets to hand out. According to an official study, in the latter year between 1 and 1.6 billion SCr from the state R&D budget were earmarked for sector-oriented research activities. Another 300 million were earmarked for energy research and development alone. Lars Ingelstam, head of the Secretariat fcr Futures Studies gave a good description of the situation when he wrote in 1973: At present there are a number of clear signs indicating despondency and defeatism in the scientific community. The tangible source of it is the recent slow development ot‘ research grants, perhaps also the universities’ acute problems of adaptation (of many sorts). Negativism is, as I see it, not reasonably justified. The inquiries and new efforts that have been mentioned show that exceptional possibilities will exist for cooperation between researchers and other social workers, provided there is a certain reorientation on both sides of the fence. If the scientific community, on the contrary - resignedly or hysterically leans to a concept of freedom that is both historically and practically unreasonable, defeatism may very well show itself to be motivated [ 1Sj . In the last resort the despondency depends on scientists” uncertainty and lack of knowledge concerning the field of forces steering the direction of scientific efforts. Despondency is a reaction to the shift of emphasis from basic to applied science in the course of a strong sectorization which threatens autonomy in science. In the early 40’s discussion revolved around whether or not science should be

Science policy in Sweden

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steered. The Swedish government’s Science Policy Advisory Board (Forskningsberednmgen) was established during this period. l’n its reports and in disclrsyions in government circles at the time one assumed the basic OECD inspired categories and defined science policy as a policy for allocating resources to research for different purposes. A general presupposition was that ali investment in science somehow facilitates the growth of the country’s Gross National Product - even if investment in basic science might be conceived to function ts a long term investment or insurance premium. The idea of an insurance premium to garantee basic technological knowledge was introduced by Weinbt:rg, and it was a major topic in the so-called Minerva debate in the early 1960’s (see [ 1,2] and also [ 12,131). Today a leading cztcqory in the conceptual apparatus used in government and associated circles is tl-e one of ‘sector-oriented research’. The distinction between basic and applied rc:e::rch 1s blurred, if not erased. The emphasis is on social utility with respect tc Jii’f~rent ‘missions’, and the formerly exaggerated idea of R&D as an economic factor of growth alongside labour and capital has receded into the background (if taken up at all). The discussion no longer concerns steering or not steering science, but rather izorv to steer. The question is not posed abstractly, but quite concretely with respect to different technologies. Here I use the term ‘technology’ in a broad sense - in the sense that one ma;! speak of energy technology, war technology, environmental technology, etc. Because the emphasis is thus on technologies for use and the boundary between basic and applied science is blurred, it seems to me more fitting to speak of technology ~tolicy, and no longer of science policy. The theoretical legitimation of officially accepted doctrine again comes from the OECD; the second OECD doctrine, introduces the question of societal relevance. It postulates autonomy for b;asic science and departmental or sector-orientation of applied science. Between the criteria ‘internal scientific merit’ and ‘social relevance’, the former is to be given priority in the case of autolromous (basic) science and the latter in the case of heteronomously determined research activities. The creation of the Swedish government’s Science Advisory Board in 1962 is itself partly the outcome of the first OECD doctrine, and partly the result of scientists’ demanding contact with the government. This is evident from a statemerit made by the Minister of Education at the time, Ragnar Edenstam at a symposium in 1963: Government after government finds it ‘rlecessary, in one form or another., to introduce different kinds of planning organs which for one take up the question of ‘science policy’ and for another the different aspects ot

126

A. Elzinga

long-term planning *Jf education. In the OECD for example these two questions of 4anning, apati from those of eco4:lomicplanning, have been giten the highest priority. At the same time he explains how the establish.ment of the Science Advisory Board must be seen as a response to demands voiced at the Harpsund Conference on higher education and research in 1962 between representatives of the government, fntiustry and scientists. The academics at that time put forth three demands:

(1) better contact between government and researchers; (9 1 a long term economic plan for higher educatiori and research; (3) greater job security for the scientists and those under training. 42

The creation of the government’s Science Advisory Board may be seen as a response to the first problem. The other two problems were answered by pointing to the work of committees inquiring into these two aspects. Ever since the early 1960’s there have been a vast number of official reports and white papers on R&D, but the question of job security still remains. Nor can it ever be settled as long as research is so sensitive to the ups and downs of the economic life of the 20untry. In times of economic crisis, such as the present. it is not strange to find calls for readjustment and cut-backs. And research ti;at cannot defend its ‘usefulness’ in economic terms is the first to suffer. The Science Advisory Board was an attempt to supplant spontal-iety with coordination based on overview. However the Board iaever became anyting clsc than an advisory body. It never became an ‘overorgan’ for science policy, and it was kept out of more controversial projects. like the orre for constructing an independent Swedish V&en-37 fighter aircraft, or the atomic energy policy. These projects of far-reaching social consequence were discussed at top level directly with people from industry, but out of sight of the scientists. The question of foundirlg a special Ministry for Science was also discussed off and on during the 1960’s. Such a ministry was never introduced. The Social Democratic government preferred to follow a pluralistic model of organisation and pqhcy application irk science. This is perhaps another reason why the Advl:sory Board never :4!tained a stronger position. It was assumed that each mhistry is best equ’pped to deal twith the R&D falling within its scope, and thle Science Advisory Board h(as direct access to the Prime Minis$terbut no splecial connections to ,any one governmental department. T!je end of the 1960's witnessed relative economic stagnation, the student protLst move-

Science policy in Sweden

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ment, t’nvironmental activity in embryonic form and on the part of .industsy a distrust in the slogan that science provides economic growth. The idea of ‘growth without science’ came from the U.S.A., based on the fln’dings of Project Hindsight which was commissioned by the Pentagon and large corporations. Project Hindsight consisted of an inventory of outstanding innovations, tracing them back in time to see if there was originally some idea from basic research blehirqd them. The study covered 835 important inncavations which had come in the development of 20 different weapons systems,, It was found that in only 5% c f these could research resuhs be identified as having played an initial role. 0‘1 the civilian side a similar investigation MS carried out on S67 comn~er14ally successful enterprises in five different branches of industry. Each innovation had its source in an inventive idea. Only in 37clof cases was this idea identified :I; intirir ted by basic research [I 1‘J . These investigatiorrs made a strong impression on industrialists. OECD’s optimistic view of science as productive factor was questioned. The economic situation at the time, demanding strict priorities with links to application, together with rising social criticism of certain technologies, helped create a favourable opinion for the idea of sector orientation. In the U.S.A. the transitional period of reassessment stimulated some scientists to a counter-offensive, to question Project Hindsight. The National Science Foundation initiated a project TRACES, which showed th’at basic research does play an important role in the process of inno,vation, if one looks not only at the initial stage of the chain but at all its lirrks from start to finish (Batelle report - Scieme, Techrology ad hzrrovatior~)., Hindsight had only focussed on the initial stage of the innovatiolr chain. The study of the academics corrected this bias. Since the National Science Foundatron project there have been similar investigations in other countries. In England for example, the Mence Policy Research Unit (SPRU) alt Sussex Universiey has a related project under the name SAPPHO. It also affirms that research plays an important role in technological development. These projects are in themselves part of the science policy debate. In Sweden no such project has been taken up, which must be considered a weakness in a country so rich in the tradition of technical innovation. It also implies that the Swedish deblate in these questions has belen far from independent. It swings after the pendulum in the U.S.A. and OECD, and. has absorbed many of the value judgements prevailing ther(e. Now it is possible that not everyone is agreed about the gene::al significance of the “Hindsight” studies. Some readers may feel that their role is o’verplayed in my presentation. I would disagree, and maintain that thetr propa-

128

A. Elzingi~

gandistic signil3cancefor the Swedish debate was quite important. Reassessment and the demand for societal relevance also left its mark on the Science Advisory Board. Its membership was reduced, and at the same time the proportion of social scientists in it increased. This was in 1969.The Boards standing committee was abolished. Later. as sectorization increased during the 1970’s, the Advisory Board was drawn more closely to the Ministry of Education, and consequently it was made an organ in that department in 1976. The first introduction to Sweden of the sector principle cane via the Defence Research Board, in connection with a 1969 report dealing with military oriented R&D. Some analysts have shown the inspiration came from the Pentagon and the U.S.A. [ 14) .* The theoretical legitimation came fro tn the Rotschild report of 197 1 in England and the OECD Brooks report .Bfthe same year. The distinction between the autcriomy of basic science ar:d the sectorized steering of applied science with reference to criteria of societal relevance has been introduced into the directives of the governmerit appointed committee to study the structure and development of the Swedish research system. This committee has elaborated on the doctrine in its preliminary discussion introducing its first report which came in 1975 [28a, ** Within the Secretariat for Futures Studies one has gon:: ever PP* 22-281. . further, introducing a distinction between two types of autonomous re:i,earch - studies which are independent and those that are not independent. The reasoning concerns futures studies, but may also be extended to other iforms of basic research, especially in the social sciences. One can distinguish two chief categories of autonomous futures stuJi2s critical wholly free futures studies which arc carrried out indepemllently of what questions government, parliament, organizations, etc. experience as urgent, and alternative investigations that are initiated for example, by state sponsored inquiries. The Secretariat means to follow the interrtions of its repxt, to try and look at the possibilities for specially suppljrting autonomous ciritcal studies [6]. Critical free autonomous studies would be free in the classical sensi’, while basic studies to run parallel (or perhaps counter) to commissioned mquiries are themseives steered from without.

* For an overview of the development of sectors-oriented policy in Sweden see [ I la,]. ** An important coyiributor to the Swedish discussitin on policy science doc:riws is Sverker Gustavsson, see [ 121.

Science poticy irlSrvcderr

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THE SECRETAR1A.T FOR FUTURES STUDIES It is no coincidence that the Secretariat for Futures Studies or at least some of its members have called for independent critical studies. The Secretariat is itself the outcome of a political process involving conflicting interests. The Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA) serving industrial interests, and the Defence Research Board (FdA) serving the military were the first institutions to get futuristic studies off the ground. In :2.969 IVA presented a plan for establishing >ome kind of institute to be run on a joint 50-50 basis by the state together with industrial interests [ 181. This prqject was bitterly attacked by both pa’itical and theoretical arguments from various quarters. Critics noted that the plan implied too strong an attachment to private enteprise and LCc~omination of engineers and natural scientists in the composition of sugr:csted staff. The plan was in fact a reflection f IVA’s own inquiry group which co,%ted of experts from technical research and administration, several repres:i:tatives from big business, one from the state apparatus, but none from the trade union organizations or political parties. The white collar workers union TCO’s research delegation criticized the: plan as being the work of a technocratic mentality and suggested an alternative, a model with a wholly state-run institute attached to the office of the Prime Minister and thus to serve government with advice on matters concerning planning of R&D in long term perspective. The government appointed a group to draw up recommendations for Swedish futures studies. This was in 1969. In 1972 the group presented its report, ‘Choosing the Future’ (Att vtilja fram!id). In it the TCO suggestion is partly taken up and elaborated. A secretariat was founded in February 1973, attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. It was given a staff of six. persons. Its area of studies includes the following questions, broken down into four projects: I. II. III. IV.

Working life in the future. Sweden’s international situation. Resources and raw materials. Energy and society.

More recently a project was introduced t,o study ‘Sweden ~1 the New Economic World Order’. iti This reflects the need of a small industrial count *y like Sweden to redefine its ro!t: in the international setting. The project has two main parts. One consists of an analysis of the international debate. It reviews *

See [343.

130

A. Ekirrga

the demands and suggestions of the underdeveloped countries, as well as ideas contained in other international futures studies. The second part is devoted to the task of formulating the implications of NEW0 for a country like Sweden, and the demands that may be posed on Swedish politics. The aim is to sketch alternative lines of development and their possible cc~;equences for Sweden vis ci vis the international environment. Adaptation and change may involve all sectors of Swedish life, including science and technology. While members of the secretariat have condoned the sec:or-steering of science and technology, they and their associates have also si9nplied warnings against carrying this principle too far. One of the members of the original inquiry group has been particularly vocal in opposing program budgeting of rescar,i=h work. Four major arguments were put forward, which in principle may dk0 be used against far-reaching sectorization: (1) (2) (3) (4)

it leads to the impoverishment of basic research; it. leads to a bureaucratization of science; it leads to a politicization in a bad anti-democraLic anti-popular directian; the ‘freedom of science’ is lost [22] .

At a conference sponsored by the Secretariat for Futures Studies togeth.er with the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Giitebclrg in 1974, some critical voices extended the argumentation to include criticism of sectorization: Sectoral research policy is closely connected with program budgeting, the new system of planning. Goals, means and results are in principle to bear their own costs. What the consequences are for basic research and for such goal-determined research that does not fit ill with e.g. the present technical development and therefore has difficulty obtaining financers/contractors, is illuminated in a quo’-&ion from Odin [22]: ‘It has been ascertained in the U.S.A. that program budgeting of research leads to a successive impoverishment of basic research, since contractors/financers concentrate their interest Ion the applied science which has current relevance. This tendency is n:inforlzed owing to the circumstance thal basic science cannot be formulated in terms of output, which is a neccessity if it is to adapt to the system of program budgeting’. A more general introduction of program budgeting in our country could lead to serious difficulties for basic research [33] . These criltics add that basic science in Sweden today only accounts for abo.lt 10% of the total costs of science, and already this also includes a considerable amount of ‘directed basic research’.

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Sector-orientation of research implies a shift of interest onto researc.1~that provides data and material for formulating goals in a given social sector, and that identifies and analyses alternative ivays of reaching these gcxals, and develups methods and instruments to achieve the goals. As the pressure of sectorization increases so dops polarization of the scientific commuriity into those who are receptive and t!rose who resist this development. In the science policv. discussion this manifests itself in the debate between those who accept the technocratic p?ase as a necessary modernization, and those who opff;ose i:. Among ,those opposing we find two categories. Qne is the group arguing from the i&a of a free or autonomous science, based on liberal values, andl the other is the group often with a radical leftist social in&nation, who) oppose sectorizatiol in its corncrete form because the overall gcjals are determined by rnonopJij capitalis class interests. Between these two groups of opponents there sametimes exisis alI uneasy alliance.. ESTABLISHED INTERESTS AND RADICAL CRITICISM Apart from the idea of ‘growth without science“ during the period of reassessment, leading industrialists also expressed a traditional scepticism regarding university research. On the other hand scien’ ists within the universities as well as students voiced opposition to the state’s ambition to break down the old pattern of organization of science znd higher education, in order to make these more maleable irl line with the prastical needs of the various social sectors. This was the situation during the late 60’s *hen Marcus Wallenberg, head of Sweden’s leading finance family observed: It is important to try and narrow the gap between academic research and industry. There exists, as I understand it, a certain reluctance against the call for contact with industry. This reluctance is less in the U.S.A.; Maybe that is because the significance of business in an interplay between technology and economy is better understood there than in Sweden [35]. Wallenberg’s philosophy is that the factor of business leadershiip is more important than the quantity of research and techno/logy. ‘I’herefore it is of first rate importance that the organizational side of the country‘s R&D system is such that it facilitates the most efficient exploitation of resources. In practical terms this means there should be a good degree of mobility between the university and industry. It should be noted that those industrial concerns that stand the best ckmce 0,’ utilising university research or it; results are those that maintain a cerkrj

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scientific-technical infrastructure with scientific personnel of their own, In practice this is the category of large corporations with considerable export market. The institution that has served as catalyser for contacts between industry, miversity and tht: governmental sector of R&D is the Academy of iEngineering Sciences (WA). IVA has a network of foreign correspondents through which scientific, technical and relevant policy developments in other parts of the world are closely followed. We have already noted how WA, took an initiative to get fut-lristic studies going. Earlier, in 1964/65 WA ran a series of seminars on problems of science policy. It was when this was a new field. This helped raise awareness in Sweden as to sciencp IMcy discussions going on in other countries. Failing in its plan to gpt d joint state-private enterprise run institute for futures studies, IVA has gone further to initiate the creation of an AssocAtion for Futt res Studies(in 1371), and an agency for distribution of information and studies in the Geld of futuristic studies. This is organized in the form of 3 corporation financed through subscriptir)ns. Some year? ago there were about 70 subscribers receiving news materials, book reviews, reports etc. Most of the subscribers wer: private enterprise firms. The Defence Research Board, which has already teen mentioned as another promoter of futuristic studies, has played a certain role in meeting the arguments against capitalist value-based futures studies. Eskil Block who is employed at the Defence Research Board has noted how scientists have divided themselves into two camps, those who support and those who oppose the futures studies inspired by the U.S.A. On the one hand ‘through IVA’s distribution agency but also through scientists associated with the Associa:ion for Futures Studies and the Defence Research Board’, who rather uncritically receive the ideas and make use of them, and on the other hand critical scientists. The latter have tended to emphasize the question of power over research in general and over futures studies in particular (3,161. The former have, to defend themselves, emphasized questions of method, in attempl to give futures studies an epistemological legitimation [27] . The two lines correspond roughly to ‘wo views and attitudes towards the science policy question of sectorization, where there are also ‘critics’ and apologists for ‘technocralny’ (4) . Critical studies of Sweden’s science policy are the rewl? of private initiative of younger researchers and produced outside the framework of established science.* An earlier study Forsknitag och rrtvccklhg in 1970 was the work of * This may also be said for the work of Ambjijrnsson, Andcrsson, Elzinga [ 3a] which came durir?g the days of the student revolt and was the fist critical surrrey af its kind in Sweden.

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the research delegation d,t’ the white collar workers union TCO. In this the emphasis is on power. Who has the power over R&D by virtue of ownership or control ovel’ the means of production? This is a central lquesti1.>ndealt with in critical studies.* The TCO-report poineed to two important factors: Firstly, in the scientific community there is a small elite of about 25-80 persons ~210 are active in different Research Councils, the Science Advisory Board, the Board for Technical Development (STU), various official study groups etc. Around this there is a circle of 50-75 less active in science policy, and th?:eaf.er comes the grey mass of ten thousand or more research workers who are nostly silent. This was in 19’70. Since then the environmental rloverncnt for exa,nple has brought about a raldicalization of researcher ;, thu:; bringjng some oi the silent mass into action. One has also to consider the fact that :,re *ndergraduatcs active ia the student movement of the late six& have in same cases continued in their activism as young scientists. Secondly, the TCO-report pointed out that thle scientific elite mentioneci above was closely linked to the country’s economic elite, particularly through the Wallenberg corporation, Incentive AB, whose executive board has attached to it a scientific brainstrust of ten or more of Sweden’s top scientists covering important branches of natural science and technical research. The TCO-report noted : ‘Incentive’s scientific advisory group is undoubtedly the organ which has the best tc?tal o\/erview over natural scientific and technical research in Sweden’. Since the time this statement was written in 1970 the Social Democratic government, until the time of its defeat in the I976 elections, has led the restructuring of the Swedish R&D system and the ?>olicy scanning machinery. In the course of this, state agencies dealing with science and technology have grown up like mushrooms after rain. But it is not certain that this enhanced efforts to obtain a unified view on the side of public interest. Radical critics are noting that a main problem today is the dominance of sectoral research and that so much of basic research is being done in institutions outside the university system. Thus, political direction bas 4 on established interests increases, as do utilitarian pressures for short-sighted appli:ation. These institutions are not subject to the same openess and public scrutiny as the universities. The universities are in any case those institutions where what little ‘free science’ that exists, can gr(ow. The academic environment, despite its weakness. is capable of providing some degree of inlepen*

See furt!rer [ 263 .

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dence from the direct pressures of capitalism and the profit motive. An exception is reseat& in the medical field, which is strongly linked to the pharmaceutical business, among other things, through a system of adjunct professors who come from industrial laboratories. Another problem is that of the concentration of economic power in a few hands. This, together with bureaucratizatior I affects the situation in which science and technology develop. It has already been noted how only the largest corporatiors have the potential to carry out genuine research. The tendency to have a concentration of technical resources around large-scale enterprises also involves a fusion of private enterprise and municipa; or state bureaucracies. This phenomenon has led some critics to speak of a growing technocratic authoritarianism manifdsted in ‘technocomplexes’. The militaryindustrial complex, being a fusion of private monopolist and state bureaucratic interests, is well known from the discussion of the 60’s. Parallel to this, it is suggested, we now observe an extension of this phenomenon iq the form of the energv-industrial complex, the traffic-industrial complex, the . computer-industrial complex, the electrotechnical-industrial, and the medicalmunicipal-industrial complexes [ 161. Several hundreds of thousands of people work in these technocomplexes, making contributions to technology, as irldustreal uorkers, white collar workers. engineers, technicians and scien . tists. Yet they la& the power of ctintrol over these structures in which their creative activities p ay a strategic role. The goals and orientation are set by economic and technocratic elites. in this situation the question arises of mobilizing tech-nicians, scientists and engineers together with the industrial wor’kers against the tcctrnrdcorrrplcxes(tk term ‘technofacism’ has also been usecl) _

These f$ures indicate a rapid expansion of the highly qualified man pl)wcr

potential. In general, the number of propertyless intellectuals has v;i$tly increased. The process of industrial expansion has brought about a change of job structure such that a higher degree of academic training has become a necessity in many inetances. The number of service personnel, administrative and office people with advanced schcloling has increased enormously. not least because of 7he expansion of GK state apparatus. Part of the charqe of

job structure ar,d the expansion of the state apparatus can be related to the development of science and technolo gy in various sectors of society. The state has a much more active role than before in the planning an? running of lrarious sectors of activity. The demand for a steering of the higher educational system and R&D resources is reflected in the lnrhole discussion of science policy and technolqy policy. The university reform carried out and stul going on is another manifestation of the structural rationalization. At the same time there has been a trend of concentration and centralization of capital resotirces accompanying this rapid developme?lt of productive forces and related job structure changes, and expansion of state apparatus. The state’s role as fin: ricer grows. At present the situation of economic crisis and the nerjd for accumulation of capital for Mher economic :md technological development has introduced a further element that cannot be ignored in tl-le science discussion either (see p. 140). Critics are looking toward t;ic creation of research potential in various vocational fields as a means of going against the monopoliz&ion process,. The idea is that by basing research on the problems seen by nurses, social workers and other practical people. the orientation of scientific activity may be changed in a democratic direction. Here is a point of coincidence between the interests of radical critics on the one hand and certain proposals ‘being made by the trade unions on the other. After the 1976 elections, the Social Democratic Party in its position of opposition has launched a campaign for proceeding from ‘political democracy to economic democracy’. Democratic control over science is cited as ain important plank in this platform. By virtue of its ideological hegemony in the Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) which organizes almost 90%) of the manu31 labourerm, the Social Democratic Paity is able to put consideraL& force behind its words. Whether the actions behind the words serve the public interest or the interest of a new class of state bureaucrat capitalists in their tug of war with the traditional private monopolists is another m:ltter. TRADE UNION INTEREST IN SCBENCE PCILICY At the last congress of the Confederation of Trade Unions, 12-19 June 1976. there were several motions to the effect that the trade union s,hould develop and formulate its view on science policy. The chief motivation was to try and find ways and means to increase clnpZq,ee itrflrrclrceover the d&ection and organization of Swedish R&D. The emphasis in the first place has been on questions of job environment. I: is pointed out t’hat scit‘ntists htve

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long ago known the dangers to health of various chemical substances involved in industrial processes. However, it was not until the 1970’s that scientists considerzc this to be a suitable and acceptable area for research. In a nutshell this shows where power over research does not lie. Scientists’ partisanship manifests itself furthermore in the fact that in many cases they are reluctant to speak out clearly about the cotlnection between certain ailments and work conditions. The Union of Engmeering and Manufacturing workers at their 1977 congress paid considerable attention to the question of formulating a science policy fro111 the point of view of the working people. Among the points brought up ‘vere: firstly the fact that scientists with values representing working class interests are often refused access to places of work to study health hazards and other related environmental problems, secondly that the results of research are inaccessible to many people because of the technical language and restricted channels of distribution, thirdly that the trade unions have not dealt with science policy questions before, that they lack perspective and have a great problem in formulating what they want done in this area. A group of scientists working on a project called ‘Democratic Steering and Planning in Working Life’ serving the trade union interests came out with a pamphlet on the trade unions and power over research [8]. Here the foIlowing points arc argued: (a) the need for new bridges between scientists and the trad? unions; (b) the need for resources for research carried out from an employee-oriented value baser (c) the right of access to places of work and research information are democratic demands related to the foregoing value base; (d) the need for .job security for scientists is a precondition for an atmosphere conducive to good research; (e) the need for democratic working conditions in research organizations: (f) the demand for quality of research work does not conflict with but rather coincides with democratic demands; (g) the need for 1esearch concerning questions of the democrtitization of the working life. Several of these themes have been taken up in a couple ol‘ recent reports by the two unions previously mentioned, LO and TCO. In 2977 LO appointed a committee for science policy questions (it is called LOFO). One of its tasks is to take care of and develop contacts with research organizstions and individual scientists, and to stimulate debate on science policy amongst trade union members and leaders at various levels. In June

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!I978 there was a conference around the theme ‘Research -- development -labour’. One of the practical results was the endorsement of a publication ;;repared by the science policy group: ‘Science a question for the labour movement ’ [ 171. This is a popular and well illust ;ated idiscussion pa.mphlet meant for study circles m the unions. An important ar._;ument by way af i,lotivation concerns the basic perspective, whic!l calls for an alliance between working life an;i science, between worker and researcher. Mutual interests, it is maintaincc,, rest on two basic pivots: knowledge and democracy, Regarding the knowledge-process: The trade unio; organizations possess a lot of knowledge of problems concerning working life, and a considerable consciousness of society. Researchers 1lave a lot of kncwledge, a professional and expert knowledge, in part rpLarding research 2s such, and in part regarding special areas of research. :t lies in every3r.3‘ s interests to bring together these !wo types of kno;vledge, from practice and theory, to work together for the development of knowledge which wil! lead to a better and more Secure society. Regarding democracy and working conditions: The trade union movement has no use for research that is carried out for opportunist reasons or with run-of-the mJ1 methods. Creating job security for researchers is somethin? of a precondition for good research. The researchers’ demand fox security in their employment is no di.fferent from that of groups in other vocations. A researcher with.out basic security, TArhohastes from project to project, risks becoming insecure and therewith adaptable, a real danger for the f.,eedom of science. A principled stand and viewpoint with regard to the connection between knowledge and democracy is expressed in this docu.ment. It can be traced back to both an episte:mological and a political standpoint, viz. that knowledge emerges out of practice, and that knowledge is power. These are fundamental tenets in the ideology of the labour movement. The other organization, TCO, has also continued its concern with developing a science policy. During the past two years two important statements have appeared, in the form of publications. One is a discussion paper regarding the creation of research potential at institutions of higher vocational trainins. in which case the democratic aspect is emphasized [30] . The other is ‘1 science policy program to be presented at the TCQ Congress in June IQ79. This latter report, en? itled ‘Research and the white collar worker’, has keen produced by a special advisory group working directly under the cer.tral execuri-de. It contains a review of the present situation in Swedish R&D, bolth

in quantitative and qualitative terms, as well as a review of the debate around certain questions of science policy and the proposals presented by government Commissions. Emphasis is placed on activating local sections of the u!lio,1 in cor,tributing to the initation of research projects. The trade union demands have already had some consequences for Swedish science and science policy. On January 1st 1977 an institute for research on conditions of working life was established in Stockholm (Centrum fiir Arbetslivsfr%gor). It is financed via the st-:te budget. A recent official inquiry on Science Policy in its recommendations calls for direct support to trade union organizations to help them identify research problems, formulate R&D programs and projects and generally strengthen their capacity for making use of research and acting in ques.lons of science policy. The support would be channelled through the Center for Research on Questions 01.Working Life, so that the center would build up resources for maintaining an overview over science policy questions. The same official inquiry also contains general reccllnmendations aimed at democratizing control over science. Two main aspects here relate to popularization of research results and information about research 9 including that of industrial firms. These questions are presently being discussed in Sweden. Many of these recommendations were recently provided for in a couple of propositions the government ha’s presented to the parliament for decision, in the Spring of 1979. In the budget-proposition for 1979/80, [24], and in a special proposition dealing with research organization and graduate training [23], the Ministry of Education suggests that employee organizations be given funds (5 million SCr through the Occupational Safety and Health Fund) to initiate their own rese arch, and to increase the range of their possibilities to influence decisions reg: rding science and science policy. An example is t&e introduction of trade unicn representatives in two important advisory groups on the National Board for Tllechnical Development. Another is a series of reforms to give working pcoF4e outside the universities an opportunity to enter research. Proposals corxerning popularization of scientific in,rormation have already been mentioned in the introduction (above, p. 118). As regards the democrntization of research in formation, the forementioned Commission recommended that the government incr3ase financial rk sources for popularization, information projects, training of science journahsts and support to popular scientific journals and authors, etc. Special measures for assisting members of parliament to acquaint themselves with and digest R&D information are also suggested, but no concrete proposals have been made as yet.

The delicate question of registering research projects has been avoided. It is a controversial matter, and the government has chosen to leave it for further review in a specially appointed CommiGon. Another important comm~issi~,n was appointed in 1978, for the purpose of studying means to incre;tse reguiar contacts between science and society, universities and industry. Its name is COSAM (short for ‘For& ring - s?mhalle’, mf:aning Science - Society). The trade unions have introduced another aspect. This is the question of nationalizatio?l of certain branches of industry as a means of obtaining public control over production and also R&D involved in this production. An important question in this connection is the one d,:aling with the so-called Meidner fund, a form of public accr nnulation of capital suggested by a irtide union economist Meidner, in order tc: help the trade l;.;lnon gain influence oljer the econom>. After its defe:rt in the elections the Social Democratic Pscty tnaJe a tac’L1 retreat on thi,; question. The conservative and liberal parties succeeded in creating a sea:-e c y branling the idea as a form of ‘socializatic~~n’. Since the withdrawal of Meidner’s Troposal, a number of alternative suggestions for ‘public’ funds havt popped tip in the debate, none of then as radical as thle original. Still, the basic: strategy remains the same: there are two main instruments for bridling the economic power of private monopoly. They are (a) a form of ‘collective’ accumulation of capital, and (b j an YmpLoyee-steered’ science and technology policy. The reasoning behind th:ils is founded on a one-sided view which puts the development of the force’; of productioil in the center and ignores the question of genuine popular ow:lership and control over the means of production. In my estimation the essence of the strategy is to enhance the power of state-bureaucratic capitalism, a new bourgeoisie formed by the fusion of various social elern:nts in the technocomplexes - top level state functionaries, technocrats, managerial elites in ctrtain large corporations, as well as elites amongst politicians and trnde union officials .* This development if allowed to proceed to its ultimate organic results means the creation of a state capitalist order in some ways similar to that found in Eastern Europe (minus the Marxist rhetoric perhaps). The scope of the present parer does not permit an elaboration of this thX:sis. It is suftjcient to make one more observation: the tension existing betweet the different factions, the ‘traditional’ private moncpolists and the ‘modl:rn’ state-bureaucratic capitahsts, will :jlmost certainly ,ncrease in the tours: ;lf time, particularly as in the future Sweden will be forcefd to develop mart selective policies to meet international competition. *

A similar point is made in a recent paper by Jan Valdclin [ 321 in which V~hi~lir, translrites A. I). Chandler h‘s tlwis about administr;ltivc capitalisrrl to S\~t$ich conditions.

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A. Ekinga

REORIENTATION AND RESPcLbNSET0 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS Industry’s investment in R&D :ras declined dramatically during the period follolving the oil crisis. The l,c!ative decrease in outlay for R&D may be read in the following figures [ 1li r : 1369-1973, 6.5% Average increase R&D/year: 1973,-1975, 3.5% 19754977, 2.0% This situation has prompted the government to seek means of stimulating industrial innovation. Another problem to be tackled is the drop-off of graduates and postgraduates in the engineering and natural sciences faculties, which affects the future manpower sltual:ion. This is the background to the projects carried out by the Acnrdemyof Cngir eering Sciences (IVA) and the National Board of Technical Devc!lopment (SW). The IVA project is called ‘Sweden’stechnical capability and industrial competence’. As mentioned in the introduction, it was star&d in 1978 and is to be completed during 1979. WEi‘s charting activities are organized in four subcommittees, all with strong Indutrial and managerial connections. A staff of some fifteen people working part-time has been built up around the pr(Dject.Also, there is a certain overlap between this project and two bothers,one at the National Board for Technical Develogment (STU) and anot’iler :It the Industrial Research Institute (WI), the latter a privately financed insti, ution in the service of (mostly) big business. S’W”s task is to pinpoint a n qr*ber of ‘priority areas’ and develop these through support on the basis of 3-5 yc!ar plans. In 1.978 STU recognized about eight or nine such areas, and it is expected that in the long run the total number of such technology-regions may reach fifty. This activity is to be tied to STU’s budgetary routines, an innovation that has become possible thanks to a reorganization during 1978 giving STU greater flexibility. Instead of being organized around a number of permanent zornmittees for different technical sectors, the new organization works on an ‘ad hoc’ basis, with engineers from industry and technical universities coming to STU for shorter periods IOdevelop research in their own specialities [ 31, STU gives financial support direct11 to projects in industrial laboratories and state institutes. By dovetailing 3-5 year plans in the budgetary procedure it is hoped that parliament will Beeable to play a greater role in deciding, on the basis of social and political criteria, which sectors are to be strengthened with R&D support. WA’S project is to provide guidelines in a long term perspective - ten to twenty years. According to the project description:

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The complete study is expected to lead to ;I large number 01’propo:;als, for example regarding changes in thl:: basic conditions which deteminc the country’s level of technical and industriai competence9 as well as f(!r ckmges and reinforcement in particular regions which are considered ..r,\tal. These proposals may relate to general action by society in education and research, to the creatior of incentives and the removal of obstacles to technological creativity, to new forms of cooperation between state and industry in technical development [ 19] . Among the operational measures explored are tax incentives, increased government2 supper’s of industry’s R&l>, support to technology-based firms and innovators, educational measures, cooperation between universities, colleges and intlesendent research institutes, and so-called collective research centers in- or ! utside the universities. ‘The educational measured considered include the int.-odu:tion of rese;;ach potential in vocational institutions which are part of the ‘new university’. At the same time IVA is mobiiizing its system OF technical-sa:ientific attachees, financial responsibility for which has now been transferred to the hational Board for ‘Ie.zhnical Development. Offices ;rre located in Washington, Los Angeles, Ottawa, Tokyo., Peking, Moscow, Bonn, Paris and London. The whoie network comprises 44 persons. At a conference ‘Swedish industqi and its environment -. threat or possibilities’, n March 1979 organized by IVA, the focus was put on the economrc crists ar:d how it has hit Swedish industry. One third of industry is unprof:tuble, ;rrimng, steel and timber are stagnating branches. Modernization is seen as a factor of strategic importance. Yet a small country cannot maintain independent technical capability across the whole spectrum. Information on techni~,:al and scientific innovation in tl te leading industrial counrries is of vital importance for a small country when drafting its own technology and science policy. IVA’s task then is to maintain a continual watchdog and early warning system. This gives essential bar:kground information for decisions concerning the I.:ontent of selective support to indig?nous R&D, as well as selective import of foreign technoloj:y. Active state intervention in both cases is geared to the overall goal 01 ilexibility am’ growth for Swedish industry. Preliminary results from IVA’s and SIU’s projects have already had a bearing on governmental proposals. This may be seen in the prqosition to parliament presented by the Ministry of Industry in March 1979. Traditionally Sweden has been able to maintain an advanced position thanks in part to import, adaptation and further development of new technologies

142 from abroad. In future this will not be enou& Another strategy may have to be considered. This is the conclusion of one of the cub-committees in a publication put out jointly by IVA and IUI [7]. After a review of 100 years of Swedish ecorlomic and industrial history and a comparison of the economic crisis cf t4e 19’70’s with earlier crises, the authors discuss the role of the ‘technology factor’ for economic growth. It is noted how this factor has steadily increased in importance, particularly since the Second World War. During the 13st decade technical development has slowed down. It ‘wasmore rapid in the period 1955~1965. During the 60’s the gap vis d vis the U.S.A. w3s closed, and at the end of the decade Sweden had reached the int-. national technology front in many areas. But several other European COUIItries and Japan were closing in. Since then competition from these countries has become sharper. Competition from Eastern Europe is also being feit, 3s well as problems in some branches due to the 3
security systems are also mentioned as important for the industrial :i>t:I,!re. The state, it is suggested, has a responsibility for the creation and maintehance of an innovative climate generally, and should moreover s+imulal:e s&cte:l areas of technology. This may be done by establishing a St;& of ‘n3tionn2 development PI ejects’, complementing teclnnology imporls. At; for the universities, their future r-ole is to serv:: as bases for ‘intelligence industries’. Measures should be intrc;iuced so th;.rt postgraduates can be funneled off from research training at an earlier stagi:, i.e. before the Ph.D. Formally this proposal means the introduction of som,: form of M.Sc. degree. Finally, it is interesting to note hole structu-ed rationalization in the Swedish R&D system tcjgether witi adjustment to the economic crisis generally affects the position of basic reseti -ch. UNWERSITIES

IN TRIPLE CRISIS

The universities are in serious crisis. 7 his is !:he verdict of many researchers. In the debate thus far three dimensions of crisis are revealed: a general ideological one, a quality crisis folLtJb,ng the intellectually depletmg effect of sectorization, and finally the pressure cf the steadily increasing political direction on knowledge production, which ;.rggravates existing tensions and introduces new ones. Let us briefly look at e:tch of these dimensions, taking them in reverse order, starting with the pl-essure from the dictane ui the state. The strategic significance of basic research has; been recognized. E!ut its future will not be one of spontaneous self-governed activity. The political direction of the production of knowledge in the ‘free sector’ is to increase. This is evident from a recent proposition to par!iament.* The implication if its guidelines are adopted, will sllake the univ.:rsities. The number of students in certain fields of st,sdy are to be reduced; this refers particularly to fields not in demand on the labour market. Decentralization and local initiatives regarding subordinate questions at the universities and colleges will cointinue to be combined with the system of centralization of decisions on basic issues regarding the orientation and use of zhe nation’s R&D resources. As professor:;hips become vacant the content and orientatiolh of the specialty in qJestior may be subj(lfiAto rcdefinirion on the basis of extra-scientific consideratiorls. Research support by e.g. the National Eoard of Universities ar d Colleges will continue to be influenced 1%~ mechanisms with reference groups, meetings and conferences invo%ing academics and participants from outside the scientific community. Last but ~ot least scientists are called upon to plan their research within thle faculties at the local level so as to meet tl e demands1 of stricter priorities, effii:inilcy *

See [24),

pp.

377-387.

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A. Ekinga

arId budger:ary prxedures aimed to provide more effective control dver and fl&bility .in available R&D resources. An attempt will be made to induce consciousness reylrding extra-scientific criteria, by inducing science policy discussions at the local Zevel.The aim is to arrive at a self-regulated reorientation IDflocal priorities and the formulation. of a l:onscious research profile in each faculty. The government proposition takes note of the difficulties involved, as academics in the main are loathe to take up such research policy discussions on their own and morleover, one might add, they easily bog down in bickering and rivalry. The governmert proposition hints that if the academics do not take the necessary steps the National Universities and Colleges Board will be obliged to intervene’ and introduce ready-made savings programs to evoke response. As the politicization of research increases, the outcome. despondency, consensus, protest, etc. will to a considerable degree depend on scientists’ ability to see their own position in society and formulate conscious alternati:es that can win popular support. However here lies a danger too, that of opportunism, of accomodating various fashions and populist streams of the times. inadvertek-.tly this may contribute to erosion of standards of internal criticism and quality control. More serious though is the lowering of standards and the pragmatism resultir‘g from nearly 3 decade of sectorization. It has already been noted how this contributes to bureaucratization of the research system. A current joke has it thltt the number of granting and steering organs of a sectoral type will soon exceed the number of qualified researchers not engaged full time in readirlg applications, for grants or sitting in meetings in these organs. Actually it’s n(Jt that much of a joke, because it comes so close to depicting the reality of a dilemma, And there are no signs of a reversal irl official policy. Unles; drastic measures are taken the sectors principle will continue to dominate. even if the Minister of Education in the recent proposition to parliament trieb to modify the doctrine by adding a stipulation concerning basic research. It is maintained that the sectors principle must be upheld; at the same time as efforts should be made to place further (even sectoral) R&D as far as possible in the university environment. It is difficult to see this as a signal for rectification. On the contrary, the essence of the proposal is to raise the s#ectorsprinciple to the level of legislation. Critics are dissappointed by the fact that the Minister of Education has failed to analyze the problem of seciorization and the deep crisis it has created for the universities, which after ali are meant to function as the society’s institutions for basic research. With the sectors principle in full force they cannot ftlnction as such. It is not enough to recognize or talk about the strategic im ortance of basic research.

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It is also necessary to provide an organizalional structure which takes cognizance c f the inner dynamics of the research process. This the sectors principle does rrot 610- as we have seen, it is a reductionist principle based Ijn a totalization of extra-scientific criteria. Finally there is the idecjlogical crisis at f he universities, particul jrly in the :&ulties of social science and the humanities. Their earlier ideological function of fosterin; spokesmen and servants allied to the traditioml ruling classes is no longer IL tune with the times. Also, with the contention in the ruling elites between prjvate monopolists and state bureaucratic interests, ideological confurion Irises. Various other groups, in society are filrthermore putting demands, a,ld amongst researchers themselves there are al GOcalls for attaching to allother value base. This is reflected in methodological discussions and in various critiques of the positivist ideal of science.* In some qlrarters Fe) erabend’s m+otiological anarchism - anything goes -- is now in vogue. Neopopuiist trends dre working hand in hand with the erosike effect of sectorization. In view of the serious crisis and the degenerate intellectual climafs, one can foresee heated debate and dramatic change in the universities in the time to come.

REFERENCES PI

G. Andersson,

Forskning oc;z samhh’lle. En vetenskupsteoreti:;k debattana&s,

Report No. 21, from Department of Theory of Science, University of Giiteborg (1971). G. Andersson,

Vetenskapens #bet och nytta, Report No. 75, from Deprirtment of Theory of Science, University of Gijteborg (1975) 13’ J. Annerstedt :!nd A. Jamison, Science Policy in Scandinavia (Denm:uk, Norway. Sweden), in: 1). S. Green) ‘70, (ed.), Science and Government Report, (International Almanac Washington, I 979). G. Andersxq Ambjiirnsson and Elzinga, Forskning och Politik i Sverige, Sovjet I34 och U.S.A. (Stockholm, 1969). WI E. Block, Om dynamiska verklighetsbilder i samhh’lls@rskning, Report No. 16 in series 12, Department of Theory of Science, University of Glite’llorg (1976). (51 Brooks, Science, Growth and Society (QECD, Paris). 161 G. Btickstrand, Blunering av forskning infer en oviss framtid, Lerum-Ggteborg, Centrum ftir tvtietenskap, University of Giiteborg (1574) p. 114. 171 B. Carlsson et al., Teknik och ir!dustristruktur - 70-talets ekowmiska kris i historisk belysning, Industriens ut redntilgsinstitut, Igenjiirsvett:nskq)sakademien, Stockho’hn (1979).

PI

* In the humanities the criticism of old traditions has been taken up in a recent debate (361.

‘146 [ 81

A. Elzinga

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