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Science policy making in the United States and the Batavia accelerator
676
Book reviews
Plaudits are extended for the emphasis on "back-up systems," testing of filter integrity by aerosol generation, use of metal covers for unused glove ports, the several precautions given in the health surveillance chapter, and the emphasis on fire prevention. Of particular interest for plutonium handling, are the tables showing the burning characteristics of plutonium and the relative effectiveness of various methods of controlling or extinguishing plutonium fires. It is the danger of fire in handling plutonium that controls the design of facilities, especially the materials which can be used, as much as routine personnel and environmental protection. In contrast to the above, the information given for bioassay and interpretation of internal body burden therefrom is so rudimentary as to be almost useless by itself, except for being almost unique in mentioning of the important fact that the daily creatinine excretion in the urine may vary considerably from country to country--a fact easily overlooked when applying an international recommendation to a given operation. The reader cannot help but realize that the "small" laboratory for handling plutonium is small only by comparison with "high level" installations. The investment in facilities, equipment and organization is still major. Yet it is difficult to see significant ways in which the required levels of safety to personnel and environment could be reached by designs appreciably simpler or less expensive than those described. Perhaps some of the functions recommended for the "organization" could be accomplished as well or better in some countries by the use of competent outise part-time consultants and fee-for-service laboratories. The job descriptions of the radiological health and safety officer and of the health physiscist make the latter much less the professional than he is in many countries, including the U.S.A. These functions might easily be combined in many instances. But this is a matter of detail since monitors would still be needed to perform many of the functions listed as the duties of the "health physiscist." The specific examples of equipment design lean heavily on Euratom, Karlsruhe, and one or two other sources. It is assumed that these are to be regarded as examples only. But it would have been useful to have had a more comprehensive listing and more assistance in what to look for in terms of performance unless the examples are to be regarded as doing this without so stating. Also, the book might be more useful in future years if it could have an addendum extending some of the quantitative considerations for different isotopic compositions beyond those given in the first chapter on physical and chemical characteristics to relative hazard analysis. The book was assembled by a panel chaired by D. S. Myers, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory with one member each from Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, India, Japan and the United Kingdom, plus "observers" from Monaco, and the U K and a Euratom representative. Unlike many more complex volumes resulting from such international efforts, this one is quite cohesive and espouses principles applicable anywhere. Differences in philosophy among the member nations in details of handling plutonium are not apparent in this volume, probably because these apply largely to the "high activity" operations. When combined with some of the more general guides in the Safety Series and other compendia, this book
should be of considerable value not only to the audience addressed but as a concise primer of the basic design for laboratories handling hazardous materials in small to moderate quantities. J. N. STANNARD
University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry Rochester, New York 14642, U.S.A. * Although not so stated, it is assumed the authors mean plutonium-239. t This paper is based on work performed under contract with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission at the University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project and has been assigned Report No. UR-3490-702. Science Policy Making in the United States and the Batavia Accelerator ANTON G. JACHIM The now-defunct U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was born with a split personality. Its mission to turn the power of the nucleus into beneficial channels for humanity was emphasized in media releases, in official pronouncements and in the minds of many young scientists who, like myself, considered this a worthy lifework. At the same time, the military uses of nuclear energy were a primary purpose of the Commission, and made the procurement of funds for all nuclear activities a remarkably easy task. Finally, a totally different mission, not dedicated to any specific practical end, was also accepted; this mission was to support the performance fundamental scientific research. The rationale for accepting this last mission was that the Manhattan Project of World War II, whose facilities the AEC had inherited, had in fact built up laboratories of unparalleled capability in the course of the A-bomb project. These laboratories were now available for scientific research, no longer being fully occupied with imperative tasks of the weapons program. Moreover, they had collected staffs of very high scientific statures, who had, in the Project, shown their capability of doing great work. Finally, at that time it was established conventional wisdom that scientific research was the inevitable forerunner of far-reaching, practical technological advances (wartime successes of radar and the A-bomb being the widely quoted examples); thus it seemed likely that support of the fundamental research tasks which had been both stimulated and backlogged by war activities would serve the highest national interest. For several years in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the multiple aims of the AEC were prosecuted with remarkable vigor and considerable success. An inevitable flow of personnel from the wartime laboratories back to their university homes was compensated by recruitment of a new generation of creative scientists who accommodated readily to the Laboratories' milieus. Contributing to the success of this era was the hazy differentiation of the three missions: reactor physics and bomb physics were considered to be physics, for example, and were undertaken as needed (or as research opportunities were seen) by the same physicists who were engaged in fundamental studies. The same cathloicity was observable among chemists, biologists and metallurgists. The result was a flow of creativity leading,
Book reviews among other results, to swift progress in computing, reactor design, weaponry, materials technology and heat engineering, as well as to impressive results in more basic studies of nuclear structure, radiochemical phenomena and life processes. Nevertheless, all was not sweetness and light as a result of these successes. The major federal laboratories, whether supported by the AEC or by other branches of the government, (DOD, NASA, etc.) were not the only valid claimants for federal research support; the major universities had claims of a different, but equally valid sort. They, too, had been performing excellent research, and they had been training new scientists besides. As the equipment at the federal laboratories became obsolete and new areas of work rose to prominence, the question "Who gets what?" began to be heard. In addition, regional disputes over the location of major research facilities had also become more severe. The Northeast, Southeast and Pacific Coast had all received several "prizes" from the government in the form of location of major new research or development facilities; and all had experienced a flowering of new scientific-industrial activity. The Midwest (known to residents of the Pacific Coast as the "Big 8 and Big 10 Country"), although a leading producer of scientific and engineering manpower, had lagged in this latter development. It is probably significant in this connection that the major universities of the Mid-west were quite alienated from existing major federal laboratories in their region (Argonne, near Chicago, of the AEC, and Lewis, near Cleveland, of NASA). By the mid 1960's, the Midwest had acquired a mood of desperation about the need for a new, stimulating laboratory in their region. There was a feeling that, unless such a project was landed, the region would become a "new Appalachia." The regional ambition came to a head over the newest and most glamorous piece of research equipment to be built by the AEC" a very high-energy particle accelerator. The Midwest determined to get this machine, and it did. In so doing, it violated some of the unwritten rules of scientific grantsmanship, and publicized the political processes, within and outside the scientific community, which affected research awards. In this sense, the National Accelerator Laboratory near Batavia, Illinois, is the forerunner of the politicization of scientific decisionmaking which is very apparent today.
677
The story of this in-fighting is the main theme of Jachim's book. As a political scientist, he is clearly most at home in setting out the steps of the political process by which the Midwest successfully acquired the NAL. At the same time, he shows some perception of the sociology of science, which it is quite necessary to understand in order to understand why anything but politics should influence locational decisions on research facilities. The result is a useful resource volume for those who wish to study a case history of science-politics interaction, and one which specifically illustrates the transition between eras of scientific and political dominance in this interaction. Still, the book is unsatisfactory to me. The alienation between the regional National Laboratory (Argonne) and the community of hinterland universities (MURA) is described, but not explained. When I was an applied scientist at Argonne, I was both perplexed and dismayed by it, and my perplexity continues to this day. I have a strong hunch that a deeper understanding of this feud would shed light both on the reasons for the Midwest not developing science-based industries (when, in the same period, it was becoming a national center of creativity in the performing arts) and on the reasons why it became necessary for the Midwest to politicize its research aspirations. Thus, I came to the end of the book with a strong conviction that one key piece of the story was left out. This sense of incompleteness is reinforced by one error madebyJachim: his uncritical adoptionoftheassumption that Brookhaven was an acceptable focus for the Eastern universities, while Argonne was unacceptable to the Midwestern ones, because Brookhaven was qualitatively "purer." The fact is that the distribution between basic and applied activities at the two laboratories was similar, and that while Brookhaven had a somewhat larger fraction of basic research than Argonne, both laboratories had more than half their staffs employed in basic research (or research-related) activities. Something else made the difference. The book is clearly written and academic jargon is, to the author's credit, segregated into an appendix. It could, however, have used one more editing, to remove examples of bad grammar and awkward rhetoric which can be found too frequently in it. B. L SPINRAO Oregon State University
Book reviews
Plaudits are extended for the emphasis on "back-up systems," testing of filter integrity by aerosol generation, use of metal covers for unused glove ports, the several precautions given in the health surveillance chapter, and the emphasis on fire prevention. Of particular interest for plutonium handling, are the tables showing the burning characteristics of plutonium and the relative effectiveness of various methods of controlling or extinguishing plutonium fires. It is the danger of fire in handling plutonium that controls the design of facilities, especially the materials which can be used, as much as routine personnel and environmental protection. In contrast to the above, the information given for bioassay and interpretation of internal body burden therefrom is so rudimentary as to be almost useless by itself, except for being almost unique in mentioning of the important fact that the daily creatinine excretion in the urine may vary considerably from country to country--a fact easily overlooked when applying an international recommendation to a given operation. The reader cannot help but realize that the "small" laboratory for handling plutonium is small only by comparison with "high level" installations. The investment in facilities, equipment and organization is still major. Yet it is difficult to see significant ways in which the required levels of safety to personnel and environment could be reached by designs appreciably simpler or less expensive than those described. Perhaps some of the functions recommended for the "organization" could be accomplished as well or better in some countries by the use of competent outise part-time consultants and fee-for-service laboratories. The job descriptions of the radiological health and safety officer and of the health physiscist make the latter much less the professional than he is in many countries, including the U.S.A. These functions might easily be combined in many instances. But this is a matter of detail since monitors would still be needed to perform many of the functions listed as the duties of the "health physiscist." The specific examples of equipment design lean heavily on Euratom, Karlsruhe, and one or two other sources. It is assumed that these are to be regarded as examples only. But it would have been useful to have had a more comprehensive listing and more assistance in what to look for in terms of performance unless the examples are to be regarded as doing this without so stating. Also, the book might be more useful in future years if it could have an addendum extending some of the quantitative considerations for different isotopic compositions beyond those given in the first chapter on physical and chemical characteristics to relative hazard analysis. The book was assembled by a panel chaired by D. S. Myers, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory with one member each from Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, India, Japan and the United Kingdom, plus "observers" from Monaco, and the U K and a Euratom representative. Unlike many more complex volumes resulting from such international efforts, this one is quite cohesive and espouses principles applicable anywhere. Differences in philosophy among the member nations in details of handling plutonium are not apparent in this volume, probably because these apply largely to the "high activity" operations. When combined with some of the more general guides in the Safety Series and other compendia, this book
should be of considerable value not only to the audience addressed but as a concise primer of the basic design for laboratories handling hazardous materials in small to moderate quantities. J. N. STANNARD
University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry Rochester, New York 14642, U.S.A. * Although not so stated, it is assumed the authors mean plutonium-239. t This paper is based on work performed under contract with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission at the University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project and has been assigned Report No. UR-3490-702. Science Policy Making in the United States and the Batavia Accelerator ANTON G. JACHIM The now-defunct U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was born with a split personality. Its mission to turn the power of the nucleus into beneficial channels for humanity was emphasized in media releases, in official pronouncements and in the minds of many young scientists who, like myself, considered this a worthy lifework. At the same time, the military uses of nuclear energy were a primary purpose of the Commission, and made the procurement of funds for all nuclear activities a remarkably easy task. Finally, a totally different mission, not dedicated to any specific practical end, was also accepted; this mission was to support the performance fundamental scientific research. The rationale for accepting this last mission was that the Manhattan Project of World War II, whose facilities the AEC had inherited, had in fact built up laboratories of unparalleled capability in the course of the A-bomb project. These laboratories were now available for scientific research, no longer being fully occupied with imperative tasks of the weapons program. Moreover, they had collected staffs of very high scientific statures, who had, in the Project, shown their capability of doing great work. Finally, at that time it was established conventional wisdom that scientific research was the inevitable forerunner of far-reaching, practical technological advances (wartime successes of radar and the A-bomb being the widely quoted examples); thus it seemed likely that support of the fundamental research tasks which had been both stimulated and backlogged by war activities would serve the highest national interest. For several years in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the multiple aims of the AEC were prosecuted with remarkable vigor and considerable success. An inevitable flow of personnel from the wartime laboratories back to their university homes was compensated by recruitment of a new generation of creative scientists who accommodated readily to the Laboratories' milieus. Contributing to the success of this era was the hazy differentiation of the three missions: reactor physics and bomb physics were considered to be physics, for example, and were undertaken as needed (or as research opportunities were seen) by the same physicists who were engaged in fundamental studies. The same cathloicity was observable among chemists, biologists and metallurgists. The result was a flow of creativity leading,
Book reviews among other results, to swift progress in computing, reactor design, weaponry, materials technology and heat engineering, as well as to impressive results in more basic studies of nuclear structure, radiochemical phenomena and life processes. Nevertheless, all was not sweetness and light as a result of these successes. The major federal laboratories, whether supported by the AEC or by other branches of the government, (DOD, NASA, etc.) were not the only valid claimants for federal research support; the major universities had claims of a different, but equally valid sort. They, too, had been performing excellent research, and they had been training new scientists besides. As the equipment at the federal laboratories became obsolete and new areas of work rose to prominence, the question "Who gets what?" began to be heard. In addition, regional disputes over the location of major research facilities had also become more severe. The Northeast, Southeast and Pacific Coast had all received several "prizes" from the government in the form of location of major new research or development facilities; and all had experienced a flowering of new scientific-industrial activity. The Midwest (known to residents of the Pacific Coast as the "Big 8 and Big 10 Country"), although a leading producer of scientific and engineering manpower, had lagged in this latter development. It is probably significant in this connection that the major universities of the Mid-west were quite alienated from existing major federal laboratories in their region (Argonne, near Chicago, of the AEC, and Lewis, near Cleveland, of NASA). By the mid 1960's, the Midwest had acquired a mood of desperation about the need for a new, stimulating laboratory in their region. There was a feeling that, unless such a project was landed, the region would become a "new Appalachia." The regional ambition came to a head over the newest and most glamorous piece of research equipment to be built by the AEC" a very high-energy particle accelerator. The Midwest determined to get this machine, and it did. In so doing, it violated some of the unwritten rules of scientific grantsmanship, and publicized the political processes, within and outside the scientific community, which affected research awards. In this sense, the National Accelerator Laboratory near Batavia, Illinois, is the forerunner of the politicization of scientific decisionmaking which is very apparent today.
677
The story of this in-fighting is the main theme of Jachim's book. As a political scientist, he is clearly most at home in setting out the steps of the political process by which the Midwest successfully acquired the NAL. At the same time, he shows some perception of the sociology of science, which it is quite necessary to understand in order to understand why anything but politics should influence locational decisions on research facilities. The result is a useful resource volume for those who wish to study a case history of science-politics interaction, and one which specifically illustrates the transition between eras of scientific and political dominance in this interaction. Still, the book is unsatisfactory to me. The alienation between the regional National Laboratory (Argonne) and the community of hinterland universities (MURA) is described, but not explained. When I was an applied scientist at Argonne, I was both perplexed and dismayed by it, and my perplexity continues to this day. I have a strong hunch that a deeper understanding of this feud would shed light both on the reasons for the Midwest not developing science-based industries (when, in the same period, it was becoming a national center of creativity in the performing arts) and on the reasons why it became necessary for the Midwest to politicize its research aspirations. Thus, I came to the end of the book with a strong conviction that one key piece of the story was left out. This sense of incompleteness is reinforced by one error madebyJachim: his uncritical adoptionoftheassumption that Brookhaven was an acceptable focus for the Eastern universities, while Argonne was unacceptable to the Midwestern ones, because Brookhaven was qualitatively "purer." The fact is that the distribution between basic and applied activities at the two laboratories was similar, and that while Brookhaven had a somewhat larger fraction of basic research than Argonne, both laboratories had more than half their staffs employed in basic research (or research-related) activities. Something else made the difference. The book is clearly written and academic jargon is, to the author's credit, segregated into an appendix. It could, however, have used one more editing, to remove examples of bad grammar and awkward rhetoric which can be found too frequently in it. B. L SPINRAO Oregon State University