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Scientists and arms control in outer space
vtew/m/nt Scientists and arms control in outer space Allan M. Din
Scientists have a special responsibility in helping to further the goal of arms control in outer space. Allan Din argues that it is incumbent upon them to study the development of weapons and the arms race, influence policy making at the national and international levels, and publicize the necessity of arms control The author believes that a treaty controlling use of anti-satellite weapons is urgently required, while a long-term goal must be the formation of an international satellite monitoring agency to regulate use of intelligence-gathering indirect weapons. Dr A. Din is at the Institut de Physique Th~orique, Facult~ des Sciences, Universit~ de Lausanne, B&timent des sciences physiques, CH-1015 Lausanne, Dorigny, Switzerland (Tel: 021-462385).
S P A C E P O L I C Y M a y 1985
The arms race in outer space started early but its development was characterized for many years by restraint. In the late 1970s, however, pressure built up for unconstrained militarization, the spectre of which came to public attention through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech of President Reagan in March 1983. That speech contained a direct appeal to scientists 'to develop the defensive technologies necessary for rendering nuclear weapons obsolete and impotent'. In respect of its solicitation of the scientific community, only the Manhattan project of the second world war, which gave rise to the nuclear bomb, comes to mind. In fact, it has been said that a realization of the technologies alluded to would imply a successful completion of 4 to 5 projects of a magnitude similar to the Manhattan project. A generation of physicists has been engaged in furthering arms control during the past 40 years but, unfortunately, their success has been modest, as is becoming increasingly evident. We are now confronted with a novel situation where scientists investigating the substance and the possible implications of modern militarily-related science and technology are, once again, much in demand. A new generation of scientists must be ready to take up this challenge and find ways of acting more effectively than in the past. There are three activities that scientists can engage in to help foster the goal of arms control:
• •
•
Study the technical facts behind the arms race at academic institutions; Establish contacts with policymaking national and international organizations; and, P u b l i s h in i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y periodicals and attract the attention of the news media.
First, there is a need to know more about the scientific and technological background of specific arms race developments. This can be done by physicists, chemists and mathematicians working on relevant topics at universities and research centres. In general, scientists do not have access to classified material, but experience shows that it is possible to arrive at a surprisingly complete picture by piecing together publicly available material. A wider spectrum of scientists than the few presently engaged must be mobilized through discussions and seminars. Eventually one would hope that this would lead to a wider recognition of the importance of including the relationship between technology and security problems in the academic curriculum. The second point is concerned with the necessity of influencing the decision-making process of security and arms control policy. This can be done by developing formal as well as personal contacts at the national level, eg within government circles, and at the international level, eg within appropriate bodies of international organizations. To be effective in these activities, it is necessary to find a
151
Viewpoint
Table 1. Classification of weapons in space. Indirect weapons
Intelligence gathering Reconnaissance Early-warning Nuclear detection Electronic ferret
Warfighting Navigation Communication
Direct weapons Conventional Unconventional Killer-satellites Laser beams Missiles Particle beams Advanced guns
152
c o m m o n language between scientists and politicians and diplomats. In this endeavour, scientists have a certain advantage in that it is probably easier for them to understand the subtleties of concepts like nuclear deterrence and counterforce strategies than for politicians to appreciate the technicalities of the arms race. Third, but n o t the least important, the understanding of the issues gained after careful study must be made public. For this purpose there exists a number of interdisciplinary periodicals that are likely to welcome substantial contributions of this kind. The contents of interdisciplinary publications often find an immediate echo in the more widely diffused news media, which of course may also be contacted directly. Let me now turn to a brief description of the issues. Care must be taken when drawing comparisons between the d e v e l o p m e n t of space weapons and the Manhattan project. The transition from chemical to nuclear explosives represented a quantum j u m p of six orders of magnitude in destructive power. One could, therefore, ask whether a comparable technological q u a n t u m j u m p is e m e r g i n g . T h e answer is undoubtedly no. At present there appear to be no new forces of nature or technology whose military potential could upset the nuclear weapon predicament. It is true that there has been spectacular progress in computers and sensors which makes it imaginable, at least in principle, to develop laser and particle beam weapons. H o w e v e r , for the foreseeable future these developments do not seem likely to meet the military requirements of efficiency and survivability. Nevertheless, this d e v e l o p m e n t would represent a dangerous escalation in the arms race. To analyse their impact one must have a clear picture of the military e n v i r o n m e n t in which they are supposed to be integrated. Present and future outer space weapons can be classified as shown in Table 1.
Space weapons can be classified first as either direct or indirect. When discussing the militarization of space. one is most often concerned with thc direct weapons, those carrying the 'kill-mechanisln'. Unconventional direct weapons, as well as some of tile conventional ones. have a ballistk: missile defence potential aml are therefore of the greatest concern with respect to current nuclear weapon strategies. In the near term, dirccl weapons such as killer satel[ites ~ill bc of greatest concern as there ale no treaties controlling their use. While the urgency ol an antisatellite weapon treaty is evident, it i~ important to realize the insufficiency of doing away with direct weapons alone. This would be like curing the symptoms of an illness without eliminating its cause. The weapon classification m Table 1 shows the existence ot7 several types of indirect weapons. Those with warfighting capabilities, like navigation and communication satellites, arc instrumental in conducting war, and the general trend is towards an increasing significance of and dependency on such systems. It would be contrary to military logic to create a sanctuary for i m p o r t a n t warfighting outer space assets by banning only direct weapons; an anti-satellite weapon treaty doing just that is not likely to be durable. A viable and durable treaty must limit the military uses of navigation and communication satellites. There are many technical questions which need to be addressed, but it is possible to define m trealy form specific limitations, with only minor negative civilian user effects, which would be absolutely verifiable, From a mininlum level, arms control could proceed step by step toward regulation of intelligence-gathering indirect w e a p o n s . Realistically, the formation of an international satellite monitoring agency ( I S M A ) must be a long term goal, but to reach that scientists will have to acquire a more prominent role in arms control,
SPACE
POLICY
May
1985
Scientists have a special responsibility in helping to further the goal of arms control in outer space. Allan Din argues that it is incumbent upon them to study the development of weapons and the arms race, influence policy making at the national and international levels, and publicize the necessity of arms control The author believes that a treaty controlling use of anti-satellite weapons is urgently required, while a long-term goal must be the formation of an international satellite monitoring agency to regulate use of intelligence-gathering indirect weapons. Dr A. Din is at the Institut de Physique Th~orique, Facult~ des Sciences, Universit~ de Lausanne, B&timent des sciences physiques, CH-1015 Lausanne, Dorigny, Switzerland (Tel: 021-462385).
S P A C E P O L I C Y M a y 1985
The arms race in outer space started early but its development was characterized for many years by restraint. In the late 1970s, however, pressure built up for unconstrained militarization, the spectre of which came to public attention through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech of President Reagan in March 1983. That speech contained a direct appeal to scientists 'to develop the defensive technologies necessary for rendering nuclear weapons obsolete and impotent'. In respect of its solicitation of the scientific community, only the Manhattan project of the second world war, which gave rise to the nuclear bomb, comes to mind. In fact, it has been said that a realization of the technologies alluded to would imply a successful completion of 4 to 5 projects of a magnitude similar to the Manhattan project. A generation of physicists has been engaged in furthering arms control during the past 40 years but, unfortunately, their success has been modest, as is becoming increasingly evident. We are now confronted with a novel situation where scientists investigating the substance and the possible implications of modern militarily-related science and technology are, once again, much in demand. A new generation of scientists must be ready to take up this challenge and find ways of acting more effectively than in the past. There are three activities that scientists can engage in to help foster the goal of arms control:
• •
•
Study the technical facts behind the arms race at academic institutions; Establish contacts with policymaking national and international organizations; and, P u b l i s h in i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y periodicals and attract the attention of the news media.
First, there is a need to know more about the scientific and technological background of specific arms race developments. This can be done by physicists, chemists and mathematicians working on relevant topics at universities and research centres. In general, scientists do not have access to classified material, but experience shows that it is possible to arrive at a surprisingly complete picture by piecing together publicly available material. A wider spectrum of scientists than the few presently engaged must be mobilized through discussions and seminars. Eventually one would hope that this would lead to a wider recognition of the importance of including the relationship between technology and security problems in the academic curriculum. The second point is concerned with the necessity of influencing the decision-making process of security and arms control policy. This can be done by developing formal as well as personal contacts at the national level, eg within government circles, and at the international level, eg within appropriate bodies of international organizations. To be effective in these activities, it is necessary to find a
151
Viewpoint
Table 1. Classification of weapons in space. Indirect weapons
Intelligence gathering Reconnaissance Early-warning Nuclear detection Electronic ferret
Warfighting Navigation Communication
Direct weapons Conventional Unconventional Killer-satellites Laser beams Missiles Particle beams Advanced guns
152
c o m m o n language between scientists and politicians and diplomats. In this endeavour, scientists have a certain advantage in that it is probably easier for them to understand the subtleties of concepts like nuclear deterrence and counterforce strategies than for politicians to appreciate the technicalities of the arms race. Third, but n o t the least important, the understanding of the issues gained after careful study must be made public. For this purpose there exists a number of interdisciplinary periodicals that are likely to welcome substantial contributions of this kind. The contents of interdisciplinary publications often find an immediate echo in the more widely diffused news media, which of course may also be contacted directly. Let me now turn to a brief description of the issues. Care must be taken when drawing comparisons between the d e v e l o p m e n t of space weapons and the Manhattan project. The transition from chemical to nuclear explosives represented a quantum j u m p of six orders of magnitude in destructive power. One could, therefore, ask whether a comparable technological q u a n t u m j u m p is e m e r g i n g . T h e answer is undoubtedly no. At present there appear to be no new forces of nature or technology whose military potential could upset the nuclear weapon predicament. It is true that there has been spectacular progress in computers and sensors which makes it imaginable, at least in principle, to develop laser and particle beam weapons. H o w e v e r , for the foreseeable future these developments do not seem likely to meet the military requirements of efficiency and survivability. Nevertheless, this d e v e l o p m e n t would represent a dangerous escalation in the arms race. To analyse their impact one must have a clear picture of the military e n v i r o n m e n t in which they are supposed to be integrated. Present and future outer space weapons can be classified as shown in Table 1.
Space weapons can be classified first as either direct or indirect. When discussing the militarization of space. one is most often concerned with thc direct weapons, those carrying the 'kill-mechanisln'. Unconventional direct weapons, as well as some of tile conventional ones. have a ballistk: missile defence potential aml are therefore of the greatest concern with respect to current nuclear weapon strategies. In the near term, dirccl weapons such as killer satel[ites ~ill bc of greatest concern as there ale no treaties controlling their use. While the urgency ol an antisatellite weapon treaty is evident, it i~ important to realize the insufficiency of doing away with direct weapons alone. This would be like curing the symptoms of an illness without eliminating its cause. The weapon classification m Table 1 shows the existence ot7 several types of indirect weapons. Those with warfighting capabilities, like navigation and communication satellites, arc instrumental in conducting war, and the general trend is towards an increasing significance of and dependency on such systems. It would be contrary to military logic to create a sanctuary for i m p o r t a n t warfighting outer space assets by banning only direct weapons; an anti-satellite weapon treaty doing just that is not likely to be durable. A viable and durable treaty must limit the military uses of navigation and communication satellites. There are many technical questions which need to be addressed, but it is possible to define m trealy form specific limitations, with only minor negative civilian user effects, which would be absolutely verifiable, From a mininlum level, arms control could proceed step by step toward regulation of intelligence-gathering indirect w e a p o n s . Realistically, the formation of an international satellite monitoring agency ( I S M A ) must be a long term goal, but to reach that scientists will have to acquire a more prominent role in arms control,
SPACE
POLICY
May
1985