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Sea-dumped chemical weapons: Aspects, problems and solutions
the Science of the Total Ermironment hol-luulrr-nMlbEh~~PI-‘1tlMv ELSEVIER
The Science of the Total Environment 208 (1997) 145-147
Book review Sea-Dumped Chemical Weapons: Aspects, Problems and Solutions Editor, AV Kaffka; Kluwer, Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1996; 170 pp. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has enabled many of the pieces of the Cold-war jigsaw to fall into place. This volume on sea-dumped chemical weapons edited by A.V. Kafka is an outcome of the NATO advanced Research Workshop held in Kaliningrad in early 1995 and represents an invaluable guide to Soviet and post-Soviet views on chemical weapons, particularly with respect to their possible use in World War II and their subsequent disposal. Nine of the 16 chapters of this volume are by Russian authors. Of particular importance is the extent to which German preparations for the use of chemical weapons on the Eastern front during World War II is revealed. According to A.V. Fokin and K.K. Babievsky, Germany had the capacity to produce 180000 tonnes of chemical agents per year in 1943. Individual plants produced 12000 tonnes of tabun and 500 tonnes of sarin per year. These nerve gases were much more toxic than the chemical agents used in World War I. In June 1942, the Wehrmacht received confidential instructions for the use of chemical weapons against the Soviet Union. These emphasized the need for sudden large-scale applications of chemical weapons on a wide front, the classic Blitzkrieg formula. The Russian view is that only the high preparedness of the Soviet forces and the threat
of massive retaliation prevented their use on the Eastern front. Substantial amounts of chemical weapons were, however, subsequently stockpiled by German forces in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union. British opinion (as summarized in the l&cyclopaedinBritannica) is that chemical weapons were not used in World War II because they were no more effective than conventional weapons, that their use risked retaliation, that there was an aversion to their use by military and political leaders based on the proscriptions of the Geneva Convention and that their use would lead to indecisive tactical advantage. The Russian view, on the contrary, is that large-scale use of chemical weapons on the Eastern front was under serious consideration by the German high command and only prevented by the high levels of Soviet preparedness and capacity for retaliation. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union produced 120000 m tonnes of chemical agents. Whether the vast increase in the toxicity of chemical agents and their methods of delivery (including aerial bombardment) since World War I would have led to a strategic breakthrough on the Eastern front is a moot point but the evidence presented here suggests that Europe was sitting on a chemical weapons tinderbox in 1942. In my earlier paper (Glasby, 19971, I mentioned that 32000 tonnes of chemical munitions were found by the Soviet occupation forces at Wolgast in Peene Delta in the former German Democratic Republic. In fact, German long-range bal-
0048-9697/97/$17.00 0 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PZZ SOO48-9697(97)00283-O
146
Book review
listic missiles, ultimately to include the V-l and V-2, the Vergeltungswaffen (revenge weapons), were developed at Peenemiinde which is about 20 km from Wolgast in a deserted area of the Baltic coast. Over 3000 V-2s were deployed against London, Antwerp, Liege and other targets between September 1944 and March 1945. I have been puzzled by the use of these weapons. In Britain, these are what are considered to be Hilter’s ‘secret weapon’. I am rather sceptical. The V-2 weighed about 13000 kg, was fuelled by a mixture of alcohol and liquid oxygen, had a range of 350 km and a peak altitude of about 100 km and a payload of 900 kg. This is a rather inefficient delivery system for conventional explosives. By 1945, for example, a single Lancaster bomber could deliver 6000 kg of bombs at a distance of 800 km. The impact of these weapons would have been immeasurably enhanced by loading them with nerve agents. Whether the proximity of the Wolgast and Peenemiinde sites is a mere coincidence or reflects an early intention to develop ballistic missiles for the delivery of chemical agents, I do not know. Certainly, if that had been the intention, they would have presented a much more formidable weapon to prolong the war. In my opinion then, Europe was much closer to major hostilities involving the strategic use of chemical weapons during World War II than is commonly thought, especially on the Eastern front and possibly in Britain and elsewhere involving the deployment of long-range ballistic missiles. After World War II, disposal of these weapons became a major problem involving not only captured German weapons but also those manufactured in the Soviet Union and Britain. Tens of thousands of tonnes of these weapons were dumped in the shallow seas around Europe, including the Baltic, North, Irish, White, Barents and Black Seas as well the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. According to L.P. Malyshev, the natural purifactory abilities of the worlds oceans and land were mercilessly exploited during the 46 years of the Cold War. At present, no quantitative assessment of the environmental dangers posed by the dumping of these chemical weapons is available. More could
be done to make a proper scientific assessment of the situation including the monitoring of selected sites to establish the present status of these canisters on the sea floor (including their degree of corrosion and depth of burial), the risk of leakage of chemical agents into seawater and the possibility of their bioaccumulation in marine organisms and the possible need for remedial steps. Monitoring strategies to establish the distribution and state of these canisters on the sea floor, including the use of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), are described in the chapter by R. Haber and J. Hedtmann. In contrast to Western opinion which seems to be relatively optimistic, Russian opinion on the environmental prospects is less favourable. According to L.P. Malysehv, Russian studies predict three main periods of leakage of chemical agents from their canisters with a peak release lasting 60 years in the middle of the 21st Century. During this peak period, some 65000 tonnes of mustard gas could be released. This situation calls for the development of some kind of in situ early warning system for toxic chemical release. S.S. Yufit and his colleagues and also G.V. Lisichkin warn of possible catastrophes arising from the sudden release of chemical agents from canisters as a result of accidents such as anchors hitting the sea floor. In 1990, 4-20 million starfish died and were washed ashore along the coast of the White Sea over a period of 1 month during which there were a number of strong storms. One of the possibilities invoked to explain this was the release of mustard gas from chemical weapons dumped during the period 1947-1955 which could yield concentrations of 10 ppm in the overlying seawater. Unfortunately, it is not possible to solve the environmental problems posed by these dumped weapons by lifting them from the from seabed and incinerating the chemical agents. G.V. Lisichkin has shown that it would take 15 years and cost $US 100 billion to raise the 35000 chemical weapons disposed of around Bornholm island in the Baltic Sea. This volume is an authoritative and invaluable reference work on the problems posed by the post-war dumping of chemical weapons in the
Book review
shallow seas around Europe which suggests that our present attitudes to this problem may be somewhat complacent. It illustrates our limited knowledge of the environmental consequences of this dumping and the need for systematic studies to give a better understanding of the possible adverse environmental effects that may or may not occur in the future. Certainly, this is a cautionary tale of environmental abuse on a large scale in which the disposal of chemical weapons was, for the most part, carried out in an ecologically hazardous manner. It is a lesson which should not by lightly ignored in the future. I strongly recom-
mend this volume field.
147
to all those involved in this
G.P. Glasby Department of Earth Sciences, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S3 7HF, UK References Glasby GP. Disposal of chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea. Sci Total Environ 1997.
The Science of the Total Environment 208 (1997) 145-147
Book review Sea-Dumped Chemical Weapons: Aspects, Problems and Solutions Editor, AV Kaffka; Kluwer, Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1996; 170 pp. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has enabled many of the pieces of the Cold-war jigsaw to fall into place. This volume on sea-dumped chemical weapons edited by A.V. Kafka is an outcome of the NATO advanced Research Workshop held in Kaliningrad in early 1995 and represents an invaluable guide to Soviet and post-Soviet views on chemical weapons, particularly with respect to their possible use in World War II and their subsequent disposal. Nine of the 16 chapters of this volume are by Russian authors. Of particular importance is the extent to which German preparations for the use of chemical weapons on the Eastern front during World War II is revealed. According to A.V. Fokin and K.K. Babievsky, Germany had the capacity to produce 180000 tonnes of chemical agents per year in 1943. Individual plants produced 12000 tonnes of tabun and 500 tonnes of sarin per year. These nerve gases were much more toxic than the chemical agents used in World War I. In June 1942, the Wehrmacht received confidential instructions for the use of chemical weapons against the Soviet Union. These emphasized the need for sudden large-scale applications of chemical weapons on a wide front, the classic Blitzkrieg formula. The Russian view is that only the high preparedness of the Soviet forces and the threat
of massive retaliation prevented their use on the Eastern front. Substantial amounts of chemical weapons were, however, subsequently stockpiled by German forces in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union. British opinion (as summarized in the l&cyclopaedinBritannica) is that chemical weapons were not used in World War II because they were no more effective than conventional weapons, that their use risked retaliation, that there was an aversion to their use by military and political leaders based on the proscriptions of the Geneva Convention and that their use would lead to indecisive tactical advantage. The Russian view, on the contrary, is that large-scale use of chemical weapons on the Eastern front was under serious consideration by the German high command and only prevented by the high levels of Soviet preparedness and capacity for retaliation. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union produced 120000 m tonnes of chemical agents. Whether the vast increase in the toxicity of chemical agents and their methods of delivery (including aerial bombardment) since World War I would have led to a strategic breakthrough on the Eastern front is a moot point but the evidence presented here suggests that Europe was sitting on a chemical weapons tinderbox in 1942. In my earlier paper (Glasby, 19971, I mentioned that 32000 tonnes of chemical munitions were found by the Soviet occupation forces at Wolgast in Peene Delta in the former German Democratic Republic. In fact, German long-range bal-
0048-9697/97/$17.00 0 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PZZ SOO48-9697(97)00283-O
146
Book review
listic missiles, ultimately to include the V-l and V-2, the Vergeltungswaffen (revenge weapons), were developed at Peenemiinde which is about 20 km from Wolgast in a deserted area of the Baltic coast. Over 3000 V-2s were deployed against London, Antwerp, Liege and other targets between September 1944 and March 1945. I have been puzzled by the use of these weapons. In Britain, these are what are considered to be Hilter’s ‘secret weapon’. I am rather sceptical. The V-2 weighed about 13000 kg, was fuelled by a mixture of alcohol and liquid oxygen, had a range of 350 km and a peak altitude of about 100 km and a payload of 900 kg. This is a rather inefficient delivery system for conventional explosives. By 1945, for example, a single Lancaster bomber could deliver 6000 kg of bombs at a distance of 800 km. The impact of these weapons would have been immeasurably enhanced by loading them with nerve agents. Whether the proximity of the Wolgast and Peenemiinde sites is a mere coincidence or reflects an early intention to develop ballistic missiles for the delivery of chemical agents, I do not know. Certainly, if that had been the intention, they would have presented a much more formidable weapon to prolong the war. In my opinion then, Europe was much closer to major hostilities involving the strategic use of chemical weapons during World War II than is commonly thought, especially on the Eastern front and possibly in Britain and elsewhere involving the deployment of long-range ballistic missiles. After World War II, disposal of these weapons became a major problem involving not only captured German weapons but also those manufactured in the Soviet Union and Britain. Tens of thousands of tonnes of these weapons were dumped in the shallow seas around Europe, including the Baltic, North, Irish, White, Barents and Black Seas as well the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. According to L.P. Malyshev, the natural purifactory abilities of the worlds oceans and land were mercilessly exploited during the 46 years of the Cold War. At present, no quantitative assessment of the environmental dangers posed by the dumping of these chemical weapons is available. More could
be done to make a proper scientific assessment of the situation including the monitoring of selected sites to establish the present status of these canisters on the sea floor (including their degree of corrosion and depth of burial), the risk of leakage of chemical agents into seawater and the possibility of their bioaccumulation in marine organisms and the possible need for remedial steps. Monitoring strategies to establish the distribution and state of these canisters on the sea floor, including the use of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), are described in the chapter by R. Haber and J. Hedtmann. In contrast to Western opinion which seems to be relatively optimistic, Russian opinion on the environmental prospects is less favourable. According to L.P. Malysehv, Russian studies predict three main periods of leakage of chemical agents from their canisters with a peak release lasting 60 years in the middle of the 21st Century. During this peak period, some 65000 tonnes of mustard gas could be released. This situation calls for the development of some kind of in situ early warning system for toxic chemical release. S.S. Yufit and his colleagues and also G.V. Lisichkin warn of possible catastrophes arising from the sudden release of chemical agents from canisters as a result of accidents such as anchors hitting the sea floor. In 1990, 4-20 million starfish died and were washed ashore along the coast of the White Sea over a period of 1 month during which there were a number of strong storms. One of the possibilities invoked to explain this was the release of mustard gas from chemical weapons dumped during the period 1947-1955 which could yield concentrations of 10 ppm in the overlying seawater. Unfortunately, it is not possible to solve the environmental problems posed by these dumped weapons by lifting them from the from seabed and incinerating the chemical agents. G.V. Lisichkin has shown that it would take 15 years and cost $US 100 billion to raise the 35000 chemical weapons disposed of around Bornholm island in the Baltic Sea. This volume is an authoritative and invaluable reference work on the problems posed by the post-war dumping of chemical weapons in the
Book review
shallow seas around Europe which suggests that our present attitudes to this problem may be somewhat complacent. It illustrates our limited knowledge of the environmental consequences of this dumping and the need for systematic studies to give a better understanding of the possible adverse environmental effects that may or may not occur in the future. Certainly, this is a cautionary tale of environmental abuse on a large scale in which the disposal of chemical weapons was, for the most part, carried out in an ecologically hazardous manner. It is a lesson which should not by lightly ignored in the future. I strongly recom-
mend this volume field.
147
to all those involved in this
G.P. Glasby Department of Earth Sciences, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S3 7HF, UK References Glasby GP. Disposal of chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea. Sci Total Environ 1997.